/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/211205.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, December 5, 2021, Vol. 25, No. 338

                            Headlines

ACREC 2021-FL1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
AIMCO CLO 16: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
AMUR EQUIPMENT: DBRS Takes Rating Actions on 4 Finance Transactions
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 16: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-R Notes
ANGEL OAK 2020-SBC1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class B2 Certs

ANGEL OAK 2021-7: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on Cl. B-2 Debt
ANTARES CLO 2020-1: S&P Stays BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
AOA 2021-1177 MORTGAGE: DBRS Gives (P) BB(high) Rating on HRR Certs
ARBOR REALTY 2019-FL2: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
BANK 2020-BNK29: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class K Certs

BARINGS CLO 2021-III: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
BARINGS MIDDLE 2017-I: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on D-R Notes
BBCMS MORTGAGE 2021-C12: Fitch Gives Final 'B-' on H-RR Certs
BDS 2020-FL5: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
BENCHMARK 2018-B6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class J-RR Certs

BENCHMARK 2019-B15: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on G-RR Certs
BHMS 2018-ATLS: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
BRAVO RESIDENTIAL 2021-NQM3: DBRS Gives (P) B Rating on B-2 Notes
BREAN ASSET 2021-RM2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class M5 Notes
BX 2021-21M: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on Class G Certs

BX COMMERCIAL 2021-CIP: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to Cl. F Certs
BX TRUST 2021-ARIA: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class G Certs
BX TRUST 2021-BXMF: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
BX TRUST 2021-LGCY: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
CAMB 2021-CX2: DBRS Gives (P) BB(high) Rating on Class HRR Certs

CARLYLE US 2020-2: S&P Affirms B- (sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
CFMT 2021-FRR1: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on 6 Classes
CFMT 2021-HB7: DBRS Gives Provisional B Rating on Class M5 Notes
CFMT TRUST 2021-AL1: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating to $23.32MM C-2 Notes
CIFC FUNDING 2021-VII: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class E Notes

CIG AUTO 2021-1: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating on Class E Notes
CIM TRUST 2020-J1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-5 Bonds to Ba3
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC31: DBRS Confirms B(low) on G Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC33: DBRS Confirms B Rating on F Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-C7: DBRS Confirms B(low) on JRR Certs

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2020-420K: DBRS Confirms BB(high) on HRR Certs
COLD STORAGE 2020-ICE5: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class HRR Certs
COMM 2013-CCRE7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
COMM 2014-CCRE14: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class E Certs
COMM 2014-UBS6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-D Certs

CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2021-R01: DBRS Gives (P) BB Rating on 4 Classes
CPS AUTO 2021-D: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating on Class E Notes
CSAIL 2015-C4: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-G Certs
CSWF TRUST 2018-TOP: DBRS Hikes Class H Certs Rating to BB(low)
DBGS 2018-C1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-RR Certs

DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2021-4: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on B-2 Notes
EAGLE RE 2021-2: DBRS Gives Provisional B Rating on 2 Classes
ELMWOOD CLO XII: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
ELP COMMERCIAL 2021-ELP: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on G Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-13INV: Moody's Gives B2 Rating to B-5 Certs

FORTRESS CREDIT XIV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
GCAT 2021-NQM6: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
GPMT 2021-FL4: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on G Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: DBRS Confirms C Rating on Class F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2018-GS10: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G-RR Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2021-ARDN: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on G Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2021-GR3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2021-PJ11: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to B-5 Certs
HOME PARTNERS 2021-2: DBRS Gives (P) B Rating on Class G Certs
ICG US 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E-R Notes

IMPERIAL FUND 2021-NQM3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B2 Certs
INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE 2013-3: DBRS Cuts Class G Certs Rating to D
JP MORGAN 2013-C16: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
JP MORGAN 2018-6: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-4 Bonds From Ba1
JP MORGAN 2021-13: DBRS Gives (P) B(high) Rating on B5 Certs

JP MORGAN 2021-14: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Certs
JP MORGAN 2021-NYAH: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) on H Certs
LENDMARK FUNDING 2021-2: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on D Notes
LOANCORE 2021-CRE6: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on G Notes
LUXE TRUST 2021-MLBH: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on G Certs

LUXE TRUST 2021-TRIP: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on 2 Classes
MCA FUND III: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Notes
MED TRUST 2021-MDLN: DBRS Gives (P) BB Rating on Class E Certs
MELLO MORTGAGE 2021-INV4: Moody's Gives B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Certs
MFA 2021-AEINV1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C27: DBRS Confirms B Rating on 2 Classes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2021-INV2: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B5 Certs
OAKTOWN RE VII 2021-2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on 2 Classes
OPORTUN ISSUANCE 2021-C: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on D Notes
PAWNEE EQUIPMENT 2021-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on E Notes

PFP 2019-6: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
PRESTIGE AUTO: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating on Class E Notes
PRKCM 2021-AFC2: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on B-2 Notes
PROGRESS RESIDENTIAL 2021-SFR9: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on F Certs
PRPM 2021-RPL2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class M-2 Notes

REAL ESTATE 2021-1: DBRS Gives Provisional B Rating on G Certs
RMF BUYOUT 2020-HB1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on M4 Notes
SCULPTOR CLO XXVIII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2021-9: Fitch Gives BB-(EXP) Rating to B4 Certs
SREIT TRUST 2021-IND: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on F Certs

SYCAMORE TREE 2021-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
TABERNA PREFERRED V: Moody's Upgrades 2 Tranches to Ba1
TICP CLO XIV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
TOWD POINT 2021-SJ1: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on 7 Tranches
TRICON RESIDENTIAL 2021-SFR1: DBRS Gives (P) BB Rating on F Certs

TRINITAS CLO VII: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F-R Notes
VELOCITY COMMERCIAL 2021-3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on 3 Classes
VERUS SECURITIZATION 2021-6: DBRS Gives (P) B Rating on B-2 Notes
WELLS FARGO 2016-C36: DBRS Cuts Rating on 3 Tranches to B
[*] DBRS Reviews 228 Classes From 30 US RMBS Transactions

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 22 Classes from 15 U.S. Deals

                            *********

ACREC 2021-FL1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by ACREC 2021-FL1, Ltd:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Coronavirus Overview

With regard to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
magnitude and extent of performance stress posed to global
structured finance transactions remain highly uncertain. This
considers the fiscal and monetary policy measures and statutory law
changes that have already been implemented or will be implemented
to soften the impact of the crisis on global economies. Some
regions, jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling
more immediate effects. Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply
additional short-term stresses to its rating analysis. For example,
DBRS Morningstar may front-load default expectations and/or assess
the liquidity position of a structured finance transaction with
more stressful operational risk and/or cash flow timing
considerations.

The initial collateral consists of 23 floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 23 transitional multifamily properties. The pool totals
$875.6 million (98.0% of the fully funded balance), excluding $18.4
million of remaining future funding commitments. Each collateral
interest is secured by a mortgage on a multifamily property or a
portfolio of multifamily properties. The transaction is a managed
vehicle, which includes an 18-month reinvestment period. During the
reinvestment period, so long as the note protection tests are
satisfied and no event of default (EOD) has occurred or is
continuing, the collateral manager may direct the reinvestment of
principal proceeds to acquire reinvestment collateral interests,
including funded companion participations, that meet the
eligibility criteria. The eligibility criteria, among other things,
have minimum debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), loan-to-value
ratio (LTV), and loan size limitations. In addition, mortgages
exclusively secured by multifamily properties are allowed as
collateral interests during the reinvestment period. Lastly, the
eligibility criteria stipulate a rating agency confirmation (RAC)
on reinvestment loans, and pari passu participation acquisitions
above $500,000 if a portion of the underlying loan is already
included in the pool, thereby allowing DBRS Morningstar the ability
to review the new collateral interest and any potential impacts on
the overall ratings. Of the 23 loans, there are three unclosed,
delayed-close loans as of September 21, 2021 (Crawford at Grand
Morton (Prospectus ID#6), Yardz at West Cheyenne (Prospectus
ID#15), and Serene at Woodlake (Prospectus ID#22) (together, the
Delayed Close Mortgage Assets), representing a total initial pool
balance of 11.3%. The Issuer has 45 days after closing to acquire
the Delayed Close Mortgage Assets. If the Delayed Close Mortgage
Assets are not acquired within 45 days of the closing date, up to
$5.0 million will be deposited into the Reinvestment Account and
any amount in excess of $5.0 million will be applied as principal
proceeds in accordance with the priority of payments.

The loans are mostly secured by cash flowing assets, many of which
are in a period of transition with plans to stabilize and improve
the asset value. In total, nine loans, representing 39.6% of the
pool, have remaining future funding participations totaling $18.4
million, which the Issuer may acquire in the future.

All loans in the pool are secured by multifamily properties across
13 states. Multifamily properties have historically seen lower
probability of default (PODs) and typically see lower Expected
Losses within the DBRS Morningstar model. Multifamily properties
benefit from staggered lease rollover and generally low expense
ratios compared with other property types. While revenue is quick
to decline in a downturn because of the short-term nature of the
leases, it is also quick to respond when the market improves.
Additionally, most loans in the pool are secured by traditional
multifamily properties, such as garden-style communities or
mid-rise/high-rise buildings, with no independent
living/assisted-living/memory care facilities or student housing
properties included in this pool. Furthermore, during the
transaction's reinvestment period, only multifamily properties
(excluding senior housing and student housing properties) are
eligible to be brought into the trust.

The loan collateral was generally in very good physical condition
as evidenced by two loans, representing 14.0% of the initial pool
balance, are secured by properties that DBRS Morningstar deemed to
be Above Average in quality. An additional 10 loans, representing
53.1% of the initial pool balance, are secured by properties with
Average + quality. Furthermore, no loans in the pool are backed by
a property that DBRS Morningstar considered to be of Average – or
Below Average quality.

The DBRS Morningstar Business Plan Score (BPS) for the loans DBRS
Morningstar analyzed was between 1.3 and 3.3, with an average of
2.02. On a scale of 1 to 5, a higher DBRS Morningstar BPS indicates
more risk in the sponsor's business plan. DBRS Morningstar
considers the anticipated lift at the property from current
performance, planned property improvements, sponsor experience,
projected time horizon, and overall complexity. Compared with
similar transactions, this pool has a lower average DBRS
Morningstar BPS, which is indicative of lower risk.

The weighted-average (WA) DBRS Morningstar Stabilized LTV is lower
than commercial real estate (CRE) collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transactions recently rated by DBRS Morningstar. Nine loans,
representing 41.4% of the total trust balance, have a DBRS
Morningstar Stabilized LTV less than 70.0%, which decreases
refinance risk at maturity. Four of these loans are in the top 10
largest loans in the pool, including City Club Apartments – CBD
Cincinnati (Prospectus ID#2), Millenium Hometown (Prospectus ID#3),
Tessa at Katy (Prospectus ID#4), and Crawford at Grand Morton
(Prospectus ID#6). Additionally, there are no loans in the pool
with a DBRS Morningstar Stabilized LTV of 80.0% or greater.

Twenty loans, representing 76.4% of the pool, were originated in
2021, with the earliest loan in the pool having a note date of
August 2020. The loan files are recent, including third-party
reports that consider impacts from the coronavirus pandemic.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to the CRE sector and, while DBRS Morningstar expects
multifamily (100.0% of the pool) to fare better than most other
property types, its long-term effects on the general economy and
consumer sentiment are still unclear. All loans in the pool were
originated after March 2020, i.e., at the beginning of the pandemic
in the U.S. Loans originated after the pandemic include timely
property performance reports and recently completed third-party
reports, including appraisals.

The Sponsor for the transaction, ACREC REIT, is a new CRE CLO
issuer and collateral manager, and the subject transaction is its
first securitization. ACREC REIT will purchase and retain the most
subordinate portion of the capital structure totaling 17.625%,
including Notes F and G; in addition to the Preferred Shares. This
provides protection to the Offered Notes, as the Issuer will incur
first losses up to 17.625%. DBRS Morningstar met with the Sponsor
and evaluated its investment strategy, organization structure, and
origination practices. Based on this meeting, DBRS Morningstar
found that ACREC REIT met its issuer standards. Furthermore, as of
August 4, 2021, Asia Capital Real Estate (ACRE) had $2.9 billion of
assets under management with strong institutional support.

The transaction is managed and includes three delayed-close loans
and a reinvestment period, which could result in negative credit
migration and/or an increased concentration profile over the life
of the transaction. Eligibility criteria for reinvestment assets
partially offsets the risk of negative credit migration. The
criteria outlines DSCR, LTV, 14 HERF minimum, and property type
limitations. However, a No Downgrade Confirmation RAC is required
from DBRS Morningstar for reinvestment loans and companion
participations above $500,000. Before loans are acquired and
brought into the pool, DBRS Morningstar will analyze them for any
potential ratings impact.

The eligibility criteria allow for a maximum Stabilized LTV of
80.0% and a minimum DSCR of 1.15x. This is considerably more
aggressive than the current pool's Issuer Stabilized WA LTV of
70.6% and DSCR of 1.83x. Furthermore, the stabilized maximum LTV
and minimum DSCR allowed for in the eligibility criteria are
generally more aggressive than recent CRE CLO transactions. Before
the collateral manager can acquire new loans, the loans will be
subject to a No Downgrade Confirmation by DBRS Morningstar.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the as-is cash flow. It is
possible that the sponsors will not successfully execute their
business plans and that the higher stabilized cash flow will not
materialize during the loan term, particularly with the ongoing
coronavirus pandemic and its impact on the overall economy. A
sponsor's failure to execute the business plan could result in a
term default or the inability to refinance the fully funded loan
balance. DBRS Morningstar made relatively conservative
stabilization assumptions and, in each instance, considered the
business plan rational and the loan structure sufficient to execute
such plans. In addition, DBRS Morningstar analyzed LGD based on the
as-is credit metrics, assuming the loan was fully funded with no
NCF or value upside.

The pool has seven related borrower groups, which represent 69.1%
of the initial pool balance across 14 loans. The largest sponsor
concentration is 17.4% and consists of City Club Apartments – CBD
Detroit (Prospectus ID#1) and City Club Apartments – CBD
Cincinnati (Prospectus ID#2), followed by the second largest
concentration of 16.6% (Prospectus ID#4 Tessa at Katy, Prospectus
ID#6 Crawford at Grand Morton, and Prospectus ID#9 Verso). The
sponsors for these loans are repeat ACRE borrowers that are
experienced in multifamily investment in their respective markets
and both own more than 2,500 multifamily units worth more than
$500.0 million each.

Because of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, DBRS Morningstar was
able to perform site inspections on only two loans in the pool: The
Duncan (Prospectus ID#5) and The Otis (Prospectus ID#18). As a
result, DBRS Morningstar relied more heavily on third-party
reports, online data sources, and information from the Issuer to
determine the overall DBRS Morningstar property quality score for
each loan. DBRS Morningstar made relatively conservative property
quality adjustments with 11 loans, comprising 32.9% of the pool,
having Average property quality.

All loans have floating interest rates and are IO during the
initial term, which ranges from 24 months to 49 months, creating
interest rate risk. The borrowers of all 23 loans have purchased
Libor rate caps, ranging between 0.50% and 3.50%, to protect
against rising interest rates over the term of the loan.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



AIMCO CLO 16: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to AIMCO CLO 16
Ltd.'s floating-rate debt.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 1,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated debt through portfolio
identification and ongoing management.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  AIMCO CLO 16 Ltd./AIMCO CLO 16 LLC

  Class A-L loan(i), $222.25 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A(i), $95.25 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $62.50 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $30.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $30.00 million: BBB (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $18.75 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $47.70 million: Not rated

(i)The class A notes may be increased by up to $317.50 million upon
a conversion of the class A-L loans.



AMUR EQUIPMENT: DBRS Takes Rating Actions on 4 Finance Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded 10 ratings, discontinued one rating, and
confirmed the remaining ratings on the following classes of
securities included in four Amur Equipment Finance transactions:

Amur Equipment Finance Receivables VI LLC:

-- Series 2018-2, Class A-2 Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)

-- Series 2018-2, Class B Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA
(high) (sf)

-- Series 2018-2, Class C Notes, upgraded to AA (high) (sf) from A
(high) (sf)

-- Series 2018-2, Class D Notes, upgraded to AA (low) (sf) from
BBB (sf)

-- Series 2018-2, Class E Notes, upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from
BB (low) (sf)

-- Series 2018-2, Class F Notes, upgraded to B (high) (sf) from
CCC (high) (sf)

Amur Equipment Finance Receivables VII LLC:

-- Series 2019-1, Class A-2 Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)

-- Series 2019-1, Class B Notes, upgraded to AA (high) (sf) from
AA (sf)

-- Series 2019-1, Class C Notes, upgraded to A (high) (sf) from A
(low) (sf)

-- Series 2019-1, Class D Notes, upgraded to BBB (sf) from BBB
(low) (sf)

-- Series 2019-1, Class E Notes, upgraded to BB (low) (sf) from B
(high) (sf)

-- Series 2019-1, Class F Notes, upgraded to B (low) (sf) from CCC
(high) (sf)

Amur Equipment Finance Receivables VIII LLC:

-- Series 2020-1, Class A-2 Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2020-1, Class B Notes, confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Series 2020-1, Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series 2020-1, Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2020-1, Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)
-- Series 2020-1, Class F Notes, confirmed at B (sf)

Amur Equipment Finance Receivables IX LLC:

-- Series 2021-1, Class A-1 Notes, discontinued
-- Series 2021-1, Class A-2 Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2021-1, Class B Notes, confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Series 2021-1, Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series 2021-1, Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2021-1, Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)
-- Series 2021-1, Class F Notes, confirmed at B (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary titled "Baseline Macroeconomic
Scenarios For Rated Sovereigns," published on September 8, 2021.
These baseline macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's
moderate and adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic
scenarios, which were first published in April 2020. The baseline
macroeconomic scenarios reflect the view that, although the
pandemic remains a risk to the outlook, uncertainty around the
macroeconomic effects of the pandemic has gradually receded.
Current median forecasts considered in the baseline macroeconomic
scenarios incorporate some risks associated with further outbreaks
but remain fairly positive on recovery prospects given expectations
of continued fiscal and monetary policy support. The policy
response to the coronavirus may nonetheless bring other risks to
the forefront in the coming months and years.

-- The removal of additional stress applied to account for the
impact from the coronavirus pandemic as a result of the healthy
condition of the equipment leasing sector and relatively stable
overall economic conditions.

-- The improving collateral performance of the transactions, with
performance metrics within the expectations range.

-- The accelerated pace of principal repayment (caused by low
delinquencies and healthy collections), even in seasoned
transactions, resulting in the faster build-up in credit
enhancement, as the pool factor declines.

-- Improved recoveries on off-lease equipment inventory and the
significant reduction in the amount of such inventory.

-- The relative benefit from obligor and geographic
diversification of collateral pools.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originating, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 26, 2021), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.



ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 16: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to two classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by Anchorage Capital CLO 16, Ltd. (the
"Issuer").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$270,000,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$21,375,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks particularly those associated with the
CLO's portfolio and structure.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans. At least
92.5% of the portfolio must consist of first lien senior secured
loans and eligible investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may
consist of second lien loans, unsecured loans, and permitted
non-loan assets.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (the "Manager") will continue to
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's extended five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, the issuer
also issued four other classes of secured notes. A variety of other
changes to transaction features will occur in connection with the
refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment period;
extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period; changes to
certain collateral quality tests; changes to the
overcollateralization test levels; and changes to the base matrix
and modifiers.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $449,148,869

Defaulted par: $1,702,261

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3400

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.45%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


ANGEL OAK 2020-SBC1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class B2 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2020-SBC1 issued by Angel Oak
SB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2020-SBC1:

-- Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- Class A3 at A (sf)
-- Class M1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- Class B2 at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The subject transaction closed in
November 2020 and comprised 236 loans secured by 236 commercial,
multifamily, and single-family rental home (SFR) properties with a
trust balance of $181.0 million. Nearly all loans have variable
interest rates with interest rate floors ranging from 5.125% to
10.125%. At issuance, loan terms ranged from 10 to 30 years and all
loans but one amortized on a 360-month basis. Of the 236 loans,
DBRS Morningstar identified five loans, representing 1.2% of the
trust balance, that are secured by SFR properties. Because the DBRS
Morningstar CMBS methodology does not currently contemplate ratings
on SFR properties, DBRS Morningstar drastically increased the
expected losses on these loans relative to the non-SFR loan
expected losses.

Per the September 2021 remittance report, 203 of the original 236
loans remained in the transaction with a trust balance of $154.3
million, representing a 14.8% collateral reduction since issuance.
The remaining pool is relatively diverse by property type as the
three largest property concentrations are industrial (25.9% of the
trust balance), retail (22.3% of the trust balance), and
multifamily (17.3% of the trust balance). Overall, there are five
distressed loans in the pool, which include two loans (1.7% of the
trust balance) that are 60+ days delinquent, two loans (1.0% of the
trust balance) with borrowers that have filed for bankruptcy, and
one loan (0.8% of the pool) that is in the foreclosure process. As
part of this review, DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of
default for all distressed loans.

The pool is relatively granular with an average loan size of
$764,000 as of the September 2021 remittance report. The higher
pool diversity insulates the senior classes from event risk.
Additionally, the loans are secured by traditional property types
with no exposure to higher-volatility property types, such as
hotels. The pool generally represents lower leverage financing as a
weighted-average loan-to-value ratio of 61.7% based on the issuance
balances and appraised values. All but 20 loans, representing 10.8%
of the trust balance, fully amortize over their respective loan
terms.

There are 101 loans that were considered below-average quality,
representing 46.7% of the trust balance. The probability of default
was increased for loans with these property qualities. Limited
property-level information was available for DBRS Morningstar at
issuance and for the subject review. Property condition reports and
Phase I environmental reports were not provided and the loans do
not require terrorism insurance or earthquake insurance.
Consequently, DBRS Morningstar applied a penalty to the loss
severity to mitigate any potential future environmental risk.
Although each mortgage loan provides full recourse to the borrower,
sponsors of small balance loans are generally less sophisticated
operators of commercial real estate with limited real estate
portfolios and experience. Therefore, DBRS Morningstar modeled
loans with Weak borrower strength, which increases the stress on
the default rate.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



ANGEL OAK 2021-7: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on Cl. B-2 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage
Trust 2021-7 (AOMT 2021-7).

DEBT             RATING                PRIOR
----             ------                -----

AOMT 2021-7

A-1       LT AAAsf     New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-2       LT AAsf      New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
A-3       LT Asf       New Rating    A(EXP)sf
M-1       LT BBB-sf    New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
B-1       LT BBsf      New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
B-2       LT Bsf       New Rating    B(EXP)sf
B-3       LT NRsf      New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
A-IO-S    LT NRsf      New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XS        LT NRsf      New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
R         LT NRsf      New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch rates the residential mortgage-backed certificates to be
issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust 2021-7, Mortgage-Backed
Certificates, Series 2021-7 (AOMT 2021-7), as indicated. The
certificates are supported by 944 loans with a balance of $386.88
million as of the cut-off date. This will be the 19th Fitch-rated
AOMT transaction, and the seventh Fitch-rated AOMT transaction in
2021.

The certificates are secured by mortgage loans originated by Angel
Oak Home Loans LLC (AOHL), Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (AOMS)
and Angel Oak Prime Bridge LLC (AOPB; together, the Angel Oak
originators), as well as various third-party originators, with each
contributing less than 10% to the pool. Of the loans, 65.1% are
designated as non-qualified mortgage (non-QM) and 34.8% are
investment properties not subject to the Ability to Repay (ATR)
Rule. One loan (0.03%) is designated as rebuttable presumption QM
in the pool.

There is Libor exposure in this transaction. Of the pool, 64 loans
represent adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) loans that reference
one-year Libor. The offered certificates are fixed-rate and capped
at the net weighted average coupon (WAC).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Given Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, home price values for this pool
are viewed as 10.2% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
11.7% on a national level). Underlying fundamentals are not keeping
pace with the growth in prices, which is a result of a
supply/demand imbalance driven by low inventory, low mortgage rates
and new buyers entering the market. These trends have led to
significant home price increases over the past year, with home
prices rising 18.6% yoy nationally as of June 2021.

Non-QM Credit Quality (Mixed): The collateral consists of 944
loans, totaling $386.88 million and seasoned approximately 11
months in aggregate, according to Fitch (nine months per the
transaction documents). The borrowers have a strong credit profile
(740 FICO and 36% debt to income ratio [DTI], as determined by
Fitch) and relatively moderate leverage with an original combined
loan to value ratio (CLTV) of 72.2% that translates to a
Fitch-calculated sustainable LTV (sLTV) of 76.4%. Of the pool,
61.5% comprises loans where the borrower maintains a primary
residence, while 38.5% comprises an investor property or second
home based on Fitch's analysis; 18.4% of the loans were originated
through a retail channel.

Additionally, 65.1% are designated as non-QM, while the remaining
34.8% are exempt from QM status since they are investor loans, and
0.03% of the pool are designated as rebuttable presumption QM.

The pool contains 58 loans over $1 million, with the largest
amounting to $3.5 million.

Loans on investor properties (22.6% underwritten to the borrowers'
credit profile and 12.1% comprising investor cash flow loans)
represent 34.8% of the pool. There is one second lien loan, and
4.2% of borrowers are seen as having a prior credit event in the
past seven years. Of the borrowers, 0.0% have subordinate financing
in Fitch's analysis, and there are no deferred balances.

Five loans in the pool are to foreign nationals/non-permanent
residents. Fitch treated these borrowers as investor occupied,
coded as ASF1 (no documentation) for employment and income
documentation; if a credit score was not available, Fitch used a
credit score of 650 for these borrowers and removed the liquid
reserves.

17.6% of the loans in the pool are agency eligible loans that were
underwritten to DU/LP and received an "Approved/Eligible" status.
All but one of these loans are investor loans.

The largest concentration of loans is in California (28.8%),
followed by Florida and Georgia. The largest MSA is Los Angeles
(13.4%), followed by Miami (12.4%) and Atlanta (6.5%). The top
three MSAs account for 32.3% of the pool.

Although the borrowers' credit quality is higher than that of the
prior AOMT transactions securitized in 2020 and 2019, the pool
characteristics resemble non-prime collateral; therefore, the pool
was analyzed using Fitch's non-prime model.

Loan Documentation (Negative): Fitch determined that 70% of the
loans in the pool were underwritten to borrowers with less than
full documentation. Of this amount, 57% were underwritten to a 12-
or 24-month bank statement program for verifying income, which is
not consistent with Appendix Q standards and Fitch's view of a full
documentation program. To reflect the additional risk, Fitch
increases the probability of default (PD) by 1.5x on the bank
statement loans. Besides loans underwritten to a bank statement
program, 0.8% are an asset depletion product and 12.1% comprise a
debt service coverage ratio product. The pool does not have loans
underwritten to a CPA or PnL product, which Fitch views as
positive.

Five loans to foreign nationals/non-permanent residents were
underwritten to a full documentation program; however, in Fitch's
analysis, these loans were treated as no documentation loans for
income and employment.

Limited Advancing (Mixed): The deal is structured to six months of
servicer advances for delinquent principal and interest (P&I). The
limited advancing reduces loss severities as a lower amount is
repaid to the servicer when a loan liquidates and liquidation
proceeds are prioritized to cover principal repayment over accrued,
but unpaid interest. The downside is the additional stress on the
structure as liquidity is limited in the event of large and
extended delinquencies.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Neutral): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while excluding the subordinate bonds from principal until all
three classes are reduced to zero. To the extent that either a
cumulative loss trigger event or delinquency trigger event occurs
in a given period, principal will be distributed sequentially to
class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds until they are reduced to zero.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how
    the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
    (MVDs) than assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was
    conducted at the state and national levels to assess the
    effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower
    MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

-- This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in
    addition to the model-projected 41.6% at 'AAA'. The analysis
    indicates that there is some potential rating migration with
    higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
    projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
    prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how
    the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
    (MVDs) than assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was
    conducted at the state and national levels to assess the
    effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower
    MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to positive home price growth of
    10% with no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class,
    which is already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there
    is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
    classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result
    in a full category upgrade for the rated class excluding those
    being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Consolidated Analytics, Digital Risk, Clayton,
Infinity, Covius, AMC, New Diligence Advisors, and EdgeMAC. The
third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on three
areas: compliance review, credit review, and valuation review.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result,
Fitch did not make any adjustment(s) to its analysis due to the due
diligence findings. Based on the results of the 100% due diligence
performed on the pool, the overall expected loss was reduced by
0.43%.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the loans. The third-party due diligence was
consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." The sponsor
engaged Consolidated Analytics, Inc., Infinity IPS, Covius Real
Estate Services, LLC, and AMC Diligence, LLC, to perform the
review. Loans reviewed under these engagements were given
compliance, credit and valuation grades and assigned initial grades
for each subcategory.

An exception and waiver report was provided to Fitch, indicating
the pool of reviewed loans has a number of exceptions and waivers.
Fitch determined that the exceptions and waivers do not materially
affect the overall credit risk of the loans due to the presence of
compensating factors such as having liquid reserves or FICO above
guideline requirements or LTV or DTI lower than guideline
requirement. Therefore, no adjustments were needed to compensate
for these occurrences.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. The loan-level
information Fitch received was provided in the American
Securitization Forum's (ASF) data layout format.

The ASF data tape layout was established with input from various
industry participants, including rating agencies, issuers,
originators, investors and others, to produce an industry standard
for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization
market. The data contained in the data tape layout were populated
by the due diligence company and no material discrepancies were
noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

AOMT 2021-7 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' [+] for Transaction
Parties & Operational Risk due to strong transaction due diligence
and a 'RPS1-' Fitch-rated servicer, which has a positive impact on
the credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction
with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


ANTARES CLO 2020-1: S&P Stays BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Antares CLO 2020-1 Ltd.
The delayed draw class E note, which S&P rated on the original
closing date, has never been drawn but will remain outstanding
following the refinancing closing date and will close with a zero
balance. Antares CLO 2020-1 Ltd. is a CLO previously issued in Oct.
2020 and is managed by Antares Capital Advisers LLC.

On the Nov. 30, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes were used to redeem the original notes. S&P also
withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1, A-2, C, D and E
notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture,
which outlines the terms of the replacement notes. According to the
proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes
were issued at a lower spread over three-month LIBOR, replacing the
current class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes.

-- The stated maturity, reinvestment period, and non-call period
were extended by about two years.

--- The class E delayed draw tranche was included in the new
capital structure, which is consistent with the original deal
terms.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."
  
  Ratings Assigned

  Antares CLO 2020-1 Ltd./Antares CLO 2020-1 LLC

  Class A-1-R, $413.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-R, $14.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R, $59.50 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $52.50 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $35.00 million: BBB- (sf)

  Ratings Withdrawn

  Antares CLO 2020-1 Ltd./Antares CLO 2020-1 LLC

  Class A-1: to NR from 'AAA (sf)'
  Class A-2: to NR from 'AAA (sf)'
  Class B: to NR from 'AA (sf)'
  Class C: to NR from 'A (sf)'
  Class D: to NR from 'BBB- (sf)'
  Class E: to NR from 'BB- (sf)'

  Other Outstanding Ratings

  Antares CLO 2020-1 Ltd./Antares CLO 2020-1 LLC

  Class E (deferrable)(i), $42.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes(ii), $80.99 million: Not rated

(i)Class E is a delayed draw tranche. It will be unfunded at
closing but can be drawn up to a maximum notional amount $42.00
million.

(ii)The notional amount of the subordinated notes will be $122.99
million at closing. The $80.99 million notional amount reflects the
balance if the class E note were to be fully drawn and the proceeds
used to pay down an equal portion of the subordinated notes.

NR--Not rated.


AOA 2021-1177 MORTGAGE: DBRS Gives (P) BB(high) Rating on HRR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates to be issued by AOA
2021-1177 Mortgage Trust (AOA 2021-1177):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at A (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The AOA 2021-1177 transaction is secured by the fee simple interest
in 1177 Avenue of the Americas, a 47-story, 1,036,549-square-foot
(sf) office tower. The building is located between 45th Street and
46th Street on 6th Avenue (Avenue of the Americas) in the Grand
Central submarket of Manhattan. Built in 1992, the building was
acquired in 2007 by the California State Teachers' Retirement
System (CalSTRS), Silverstein Properties (Silverstein), and UBS. In
June 2021, CalSTRS acquired UBS's equity position in the property
at a valuation of $865.0 million. The property was also previously
securitized in the AOA 2015-1177 transaction and this financing
retires the previous securitization. The property has undergone a
recent lobby renovation including new turnstiles, limestone walls,
lighting, artwork, and upgraded elevator mechanical systems. As of
September 30, 2021, the property was 87.0% leased to 23 tenants
with a weighted-average remaining lease term of approximately 9.1
years.

The loan's appraised loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is 52.0% based on a
$865 million valuation. The DBRS Morningstar LTV is 81.9% at an
assumed cap rate of 6.50%. Another key credit metric of the loan is
the high appraised land value of $430 million, or $651.93 sf on a
floor area ratio basis. With its location along Sixth Avenue, land
value carries a significant premium, which reduces the downside
risk in the event of distress.

The property consists of 968,772 sf of office space and 4,992 sf of
ground-floor retail space. Other space includes storage, management
offices, and amenity spaces. There are two retail tenants (Charles
Tyrwhitt, which is an apparel retailer, and a newsstand) inside the
lobby. Charles Tyrwhitt was granted a partial rent abatement during
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic-related shutdowns and
is required to pay back its rent in arrears.

The property is a high-quality asset in one of Manhattan's
high-rise office corridors with good access to transit. The rent
roll counts law firms, banks, and other financial services firms
among its 23 tenants. The largest tenant, Kramer Levin Naftalis &
Frankel (Kramer Levin), occupies 27.0% of the net rentable area
(NRA) under a lease that expires in 2035. The firm is based in New
York and maintains its headquarters at the property. In 2017,
Kramer Levin, which has been in occupancy since 2005, signed a
lease extension for 265,000 sf that took effect in 2020.

Signature Bank (Signature), a private client bank, is the
second-largest tenant with 8.4% of the NRA. The bank, which
operates its Signature Securities Group arm out of the property,
signed a lease in 2017 that expires in 2033. One concern is that
the bank subsequently signed a lease at 1400 Broadway in 2018 and,
according to media reports, intended to relocate staff from the
subject to 1400 Broadway. Because Signature Bank has a 2028
termination option in its lease, DBRS Morningstar believes there is
some risk that this tenant may vacate. According to the sponsor,
however, Signature amended its lease in April 2020, adding 24,637
sf and extended the term on its fourth-floor space in 2021. This
demonstrates a commitment to the property that DBRS Morningstar
considered in its analysis of the tenant. Furthermore, none of
Signature's space has been subleased or is listed as available
sublease. Given these facts, DBRS Morningstar did not assign any
negative credit adjustments to this tenant.

As a result of the ongoing pandemic, two tenants were granted some
type of deferral or abatement. One, Regus, an operator of shared
office space, extended its lease term and posted a letter of credit
in consideration of the abatement, while the retail tenant, Charles
Tyrwhitt, agreed to repay any deferred rent. The occupancy rate in
2019 was 90.5% and with September occupancy of 87.0%, the decline
to date has been relatively minimal. Historically, the property's
seven-year average occupancy is 91.7% and leases on only 25.6% of
the space will expire during the full extended loan term.

However, there are concerns regarding the future of return to
office across the Manhattan office market. Sublease space in
Midtown Manhattan is currently at an all-time high with over 11
million sf of supply and Cushman and Wakefield anticipates this
could put pressure on rents in the short term.

Some tenants have deferred decisions on renewals by signing short
term extensions and others have sought out properties offering
significant discounts to lock in lower rental rates for the long
term. While the Manhattan office market remains in a transitional
phase, DBRS Morningstar believes that the ultimate beneficiaries
will be higher quality assets with well-capitalized sponsors who
can weather short-term disruptions. In the case of the subject,
there is a historically stable asset with good tenancy and strong
sponsorship with expertise in the market and good relationships
with tenants in the market.

1177 Avenue of the Americas is on Sixth Avenue between 45th and
46th Streets in Midtown Manhattan. It is a short distance from
Times Square, Bryant Park, and Grand Central Terminal. It is near
several subway stations, which provide access throughout the area.
With the location in a highly desirable corridor in Midtown
Manhattan, the property has an indicated land value of $430
million, or $652 per foot on a floor-area-ratio basis. The land
value accounts for approximately 50% of the property value.

From 2014 to 2019, the property maintained average occupancy of
greater than 90%. While occupancy dipped during the pandemic to
89%, the long-term leases have helped cushion it from further
weakness. Going forward, lease rollover will total less than 45% of
the total gross rent through 2030.

Kramer Levin is the largest tenant with more than 300 attorneys and
maintains its headquarters at the property. It has been a tenant
since 2005 and signed a lease extension in 2017 that extends
through 2035. Beyond Kramer Levin, no other tenants account for
more than 10% of the property's total based rent.

The loan sponsors are Silverstein and CalSTRS. Silverstein has more
than 60 years of experience in real estate, primarily in New York
City, and has owned or managed more than 40 million sf of space
since it was founded. CalSTRS is one of the largest public pension
funds in the United States with more than $310 billion in assets
under management and owns a significant portfolio of commercial
real estate directly through investment funds.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to virtually all major commercial real estate property types,
creating an element of uncertainty around future demand for office
space, even in gateway markets that have historically been highly
liquid. The property negotiated coronavirus-related lease
amendments with two tenants, Regus and Charles Tyrwhitt. Regus,
which occupies 33,628 sf, has a 50% reduction in rent that was
effective from January 2021 to September 2021, for which it
extended its lease from March 2026 to February 2031. Charles
Tyrwhitt had deferred rent from April 2020 through June 2020 and
agreed to pay arrears of the amounts from April 2020 to February
2021.

The loan does not have a nonrecourse carve-out guarantor,
effectively limiting the recourse back to the sponsor for bad act
carveouts. "Bad boy" guarantees and consequent access to the
guarantor help mitigate the risk and increased loss severity of
bankruptcy, additional encumbrances, unapproved transfers, fraud,
misappropriation of rents, physical waste, and other potential bad
acts of the sponsor. In this case, the loan sponsors are
experienced and well capitalized, including the California State
Teachers' Retirement System. The sponsors have owned the property
through joint ventures since 2007 and maintained strong
performance. A loan backed by the property was securitized in AOA
2015-1177 and paid as agreed.

The borrower did not obtain environmental insurance on the property
and there is no environmental indemnitor, save for the borrower.
Typically borrowers obtain environmental insurance to protect the
trust against losses caused by environmental spoilage and
nonrecourse carveout guarantors are required to backstop the risk
of environmental damage.

The loan is structured with recycled special-purpose entities
(SPEs). The borrowers have given backward-looking representation,
from the date of the SPE's formation, that it does not carry any
prior liabilities. Additionally, if the borrower's SPE
representations are breached, a guarantee from the sponsor is
triggered.

There are no performance triggers, financial covenants, or fees
required for the borrower to exercise any of the three one-year
extension options. The options are exercisable by the borrower
subject only to compliance with the following conditions: (1) at
least 30 days prior written notice to lender, (2) no event of
default existing as of the commencement of the applicable extension
term, (3) borrower's purchase of a cap agreement for each extension
term providing for a cap on Libor, and (4) reimbursement of lender
and servicer's reasonable third party out-of-pocket costs and
expenses actually incurred in connection with processing and
documenting the extension option.

The underlying mortgage loan for the transaction will pay floating
rate, which presents potential benchmark transition risk as the
deadline approaches for the elimination of Libor. The transaction
documents provide for the transition to an alternative benchmark
rate, which is primarily contemplated to be either the Term Secured
Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) plus the Benchmark Replacement
Adjustment, or Compounded SOFR plus the applicable Benchmark
Replacement Adjustment.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



ARBOR REALTY 2019-FL2: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on all classes of secured floating
rate notes issued by Arbor Realty Commercial Real Estate Notes
2019-FL2, Ltd. as follows:

-- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Secured Floating Rate Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Secured Floating Rate Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Floating Rate Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G Floating Rate Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations. In conjunction with this press release, DBRS
Morningstar has published a Surveillance Performance Update rating
report with in-depth analysis and credit metrics for the
transaction and business plan updates on select loans.

The transaction is a managed collateralized loan obligation pool
with a maximum funded balance of $635.0 million. At issuance, the
pool initially consisted of 27 loans totaling $510.9 million, which
subsequently ramped up to the maximum balance. The transaction has
a 36-month reinvestment period that will expire with the November
2022 Payment Date. All loans contributed during the reinvestment
period are subject to Eligibility Criteria that include a rating
agency condition by DBRS Morningstar. The pool has exhibited a high
rate of loan turnover during the reinvestment period, with 19
loans, totaling $214.0 million (33.7% of the maximum trust
balance), being contributed to the trust since December 2020. As of
the October 2021 remittance report, the trust comprised 38 loans
totaling $580.6 million with $54.4 million of available cash to
fund additional collateral acquisitions.

The trust benefits from the high concentration of loans secured by
multifamily properties, which have generally been less affected by
the coronavirus pandemic. As of October 2021, 33 loans, totaling
92.0% of the funded pool balance, are secured by multifamily
properties. The pool also benefits from properties located in urban
areas with 10 loans, representing 38.3% of the current pool
balance, with DBRS Market Ranks of 5 or greater. The pool has a
weighted average (WA) stabilized loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
70.0%, indicating favorable credit metrics for take-out financing
and value creation; however, the pool also has an elevated WA As-Is
LTV ratio of 83.9%, indicating limited sponsor equity should the
individual borrower business plans fail. In addition, the WA As-Is
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) based on the DBRS Morningstar
net cash flow (NCF) totals 0.90 times (x). The WA as-stabilized
DSCR based on the DBRS Morningstar NCF totals 1.35x, which
adequately covers debt service payments. The achievement of the
as-stabilized DSCR is ultimately based on the borrowers' execution
of their business plans.

DBRS Morningstar is monitoring two related loans, The Park at
Carlyle (Prospectus ID#3; 5.4% of the trust balance) and The Park
at Callington (Prospectus ID#6; 4.6% of the trust balance), as the
respective business plans appear to be delayed. Both loans are
secured by large, garden-style multifamily properties in
Birmingham, Alabama, and share sponsorship. In addition, both loans
exhibited debt service payment delays after March 2020; however,
the borrowers have since brought both loans current. The Park at
Carlyle loan is secured by a 629-unit multifamily property
purchased in April 2019. The business plan is to complete an
extensive $9.0 million renovation that includes new roofs, windows,
painting and siding, deck staircases, and interior unit upgrades
($4,965 per unit). According to a Q2 2021 portfolio update,
approximately $6.4 million (70%) of the renovation reserve has been
disbursed since origination and the borrower has only completed 124
unit renovations (18% of all units). The loan has a final maturity
date in April 2022 and it is unlikely the borrower will complete
all planned renovations within the original timeframe. As a
mitigant, the property was 87.0% occupied with an average rental
rate of $954 per unit as of June 2021, above DBRS Morningstar's
average post-renovated projected rental rate of $829 per unit at
issuance. It should be noted the Central Birmingham submarket's
average vacancy rate significantly increased during the coronavirus
pandemic. According to Q2 2021 Reis data, the average vacancy rate
was 9.3%, compared with the YE2019 (pre-pandemic) average vacancy
rate of 5.6%. Reis projects the average vacancy rate to decrease to
8.2% by YE2022 and does not forecast the vacancy rate to return to
pre-pandemic levels in the near term.

The Park at Callington loan is secured by a 604-unit multifamily
property also purchased in April 2019. The business plan is to
complete an extensive $8.6 million renovation identical to The Park
at Carlyle with $4,888 per unit of interior upgrades. According to
a Q2 2021 portfolio update, approximately $6.5 million (76%) of the
renovation reserve has been disbursed since origination and the
borrower has completed 107 unit renovations (17% of all units). The
loan has a final maturity date in April 2022 and, as such, the
borrower is also unlikely to complete all planned renovations
within the original timeframe. The property was 87.0% occupied with
an average rental rate of $890 per unit as of June 2021, above DBRS
Morningstar's average post-renovated projected rental rate of $767
per unit at issuance. The property is also located in the Central
Birmingham submarket. DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of
default for both loans as the capital expenditure plans are
unlikely to be completed by loan maturity in addition to the
weakened demand in the submarket, which may present refinance
risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK 2020-BNK29: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class K Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-BNK29 issued by BANK
2020-BNK29 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high)
-- Class X-D at A (sf)
-- Class X-F at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-H at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-J at BB (sf)
-- Class X-K at B (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class J at BB(low)(sf)
-- Class K at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the transaction's overall stable
performance since issuance, when the transaction consisted of 41
fixed-rate loans secured by 89 commercial and multifamily
properties across eight states, with a trust balance of $871.2
million. According to the September 2021 remittance report, all
loans remain in the pool and there has been negligible amortization
to date.

The transaction is concentrated by property type with eight loans
secured by office collateral, representing 52.0% of the pool and 13
loans secured by retail collateral, representing 21.1% of the pool.
The remaining concentrations are relatively small, with five loans
secured by mixed-use collateral, representing 8.6% of the pool, and
five loans secured by self-storage collateral, representing 5.2% of
the pool. The remaining loans are secured by industrial, co-op
housing, lodging, and mobile home park collateral.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar shadow-rated three loans, The Grace
Building (Prospectus ID#4, 8.6% of the pool), Turner Towers
(Prospectus ID#13, 2.8% of the pool), and McDonald's Global HQ
(Prospectus ID#6, 5.5% of the pool) as investment grade. With this
review, DBRS Morningstar confirms the performance for all three
loans remains in line with the investment grade shadow ratings.

According to the September 2021 remittance report, two loans,
representing 2.1% of the pool, were on the servicer's watchlist,
including the Courtyard Marriot Solana Beach (Prospectus ID#22,
1.29% of the pool) and 169-171 University Avenue (Prospectus ID#25,
0.85% of the pool). There are no loans in special servicing. The
Courtyard Marriot Solana Beach was added to the watchlist in July
2021 because of a drop in the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
from 2.11 times (x) at issuance to 0.48x as of the trailing
12-month (T-12) ended June 2021 reporting period. A reduction in
occupancy to 59.1% as of the T-12 ended June 2021 reporting period,
from 83.9% at year-end 2020 was the primary driver for the cash
flow decline. The 169-171 University Avenue loan is being monitored
for deferred maintenance observed at the most recent servicer's
site inspection.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BARINGS CLO 2021-III: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Barings CLO Ltd. 2021-III (the
"Issuer" or "Barings 2021-III").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2035,
Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$50,750,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$5,250,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2035,
Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$21,600,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$24,800,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$17,600,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Barings 2021-III is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured loans and
bonds. Moody's expect the portfolio to be approximately 80% ramped
as of the closing date.

Barings LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter,
subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2852

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


BARINGS MIDDLE 2017-I: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class X-R, A-1-R,
A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Barings Middle
Market CLO 2017-I LLC, a CLO originally issued in November 2017
that is managed by Barings LLC and was not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Ratings Assigned

  Barings Middle Market CLO 2017-I LLC

  Class X-R(i), $4.0 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1-R, $280.0 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-R, $57.5 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-R (deferrable), $45.0 million: A- (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $22.5 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $33.5 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $64.6 million: Not rated

(i)The class X-R notes are expected to be paid down using interest
proceeds in equal installments of $285,714.29, beginning April 2022
and ending July 2025.



BBCMS MORTGAGE 2021-C12: Fitch Gives Final 'B-' on H-RR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings and Rating Outlooks to
BBCMS Mortgage Trust 2021-C12, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2021-C12.

The assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks are as follows:

-- $13,880,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $112,570,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $10,510,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $37,406,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $132,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $418,700,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $725,066,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $179,972,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $86,749,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $47,906,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $45,317,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $54,380,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $12,947,000ab class X-F 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $10,358,000ab class X-G 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $29,779,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $24,601,000b class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $12,947,000b class F 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $10,358,000b class G 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $10,358,000bc class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $42,728,099bc class J-RR;

-- $30,897,028bd class RR;

-- $7,784,640bd class RR Certificates.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.

(b) Privately-place and pursuant to Rule 144a.

(c) Represents the "eligible horizontal interest" estimated to be
1.40% of all amounts collected on the mortgage loans (net of all
expenses of the issuing entity) that are available for distribution
to the certificates and the RR interest on each distribution date.

(d) The class RR certificates and the RR interest collectively
comprise the "VRR interest." The VRR interest represents the right
to receive approximately 3.60% of all amounts collected on the
mortgage loans (net of all expenses of the issuing entity) that are
available for distribution to the certificates and the RR interest
on each distribution date.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Nov. 30, 2021.

Since Fitch issued its presale on Nov. 8, 2021, the balances for
classes A-4 and A-5 were finalized. At the time the expected
ratings were published, the initial certificate balances of classes
A-4 and A-5 were expected to be $550,700,000 in the aggregate,
subject to a variance of plus or minus 5%. The final class balances
for classes A-4 and A-5 are $132,000,000 and $418,700,000,
respectively. The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal
structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 67 loans secured by 151
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,074,490,768 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by KeyBank National Association, Barclays Capital Real
Estate Inc., Bank of Montreal, Societe Generale Financial
Corporation and Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC. The Master Servicer
is expected to be KeyBank National Association and the Special
Servicer is expected to be LNR Partners, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 31.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analyses of 79.7% of the pool, and asset
summary reviews on 100% of the pool.

Coronavirus Impact: The ongoing containment effort related to the
coronavirus pandemic may have an adverse impact on near-term
revenue (i.e. bad debt expense, rent relief) and operating expenses
(i.e. sanitation costs) for some properties in the pool.
Delinquencies may occur in the coming months as forbearance
programs are put in place, although the ultimate impact on credit
losses will depend heavily on the severity and duration of the
negative economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, and to what
degree fiscal interventions by the U.S. federal government can
mitigate the impact on consumers.

Per the offering documents, all of the loans are current and are
not subject to any forbearance requests; however, the sponsors for
the Hamilton Commons loan (2.0% of pool) and the Hampton Inn
Altoona Des Moines loan (0.8% of the pool), have negotiated loan
amendments/modifications. See the "Additional Coronavirus
Forbearance Provisions" section of the presale report for
additional information.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average In-line with Recent Transactions: The pool has average
leverage compared with recent multiborrower transactions rated by
Fitch. The pool's Fitch loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 106.2% is
higher than the YTD 2021 and 2020 averages of 102.9% and 99.6%,
respectively. Additionally, the pool's Fitch debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.32x is lower than the YTD 2021 of 1.39x but
inline with the 2020 average of1.32x, respectively.

High Multifamily Exposure and Low Hotel Exposure: Loans secured by
traditional multifamily properties represent 20.5% of the pool by
balance, including four of the top 20 loans. The total multifamily
concentration is higher than both the YTD 2021 and 2020 averages of
16.9% and 16.3%, respectively. Loans secured by multifamily
properties have a lower probability of default in Fitch's
multiborrower model, all else equal. There are only four hotel
loans, representing 4.5% of the pool, which is lower than the YTD
2021 and 2020 averages of 4.7% and 9.2%, respectively.

Fitch considers the hotel asset type to have the greatest downside
risk among all commercial asset types, and loans secured by hotel
properties are assigned an above-average probability of default in
Fitch's multiborrower model. Additionally, Fitch considers hotel
property types to have the greatest downside risk among all
commercial asset types as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.

Diverse Pool: The pool's 10 largest loans represent 44.9% of the
pool's cutoff balance, which is considerably lower than the YTD
2021 and 2020 averages of 50.7% and 56.8%, respectively. The loan
concentration index (LCI) and sponsor concentration index (SCI) of
307 and 341, respectively, are considerably lower than the YTD 2021
respective averages of 384 and 412, indicative of a diverse pool
with little sponsor concentration.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: Only one loan representing
3.94% of the pool received an investment-grade credit opinion. HQ @
First received a standalone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf'. This is
slightly below the YTD 2021 average of 13.3% and considerably below
the 2020 average of 24.5%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

This section provides insight into the sensitivity of ratings when
one assumption is modified, while holding others equal. For U.S.
CMBS, the sensitivity reflects the impact of changes to property
net cash flow (NCF) in up- and down-environments. The results below
should only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It should
not be used as an indicator of possible future performance.

Declining cash flow decreases property value and capacity to meet
its debt service obligations. The table below indicates the model
implied rating sensitivity to changes in one variable, Fitch NCF:

-- Original Rating: 'AAAsf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-
    sf' / 'BB+sf' / 'BB-sf' / 'B-sf';

-- 10% NCF Decline: 'A+sf' / 'BBB+sf' / 'BBB-sf' / 'BB+sf' /
    'B+sf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf' / CCCsf';

-- 20% NCF Decline: 'BBB+sf' / 'BBB-sf' / 'BBsf' / 'CCCsf' /
    'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf';

-- 30% NCF Decline: 'BBB-sf' / 'BB-sf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf' /
    'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Improvement in cash flow increases property value and capacity
    to meet its debt service obligations. The table below
    indicates the model implied rating sensitivity to changes to
    the same one variable, Fitch NCF:

-- Original Rating: 'AAAsf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-
    sf' / 'BB+sf' / 'BB-sf' / 'B-sf';

-- 20% NCF Increase: 'AAAsf' / 'AAAsf' / 'AA+sf' / 'A+sf' / 'A
    sf' / 'BBB+sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-sf'.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BDS 2020-FL5: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on all classes of notes issued
by BDS 2020-FL5 Ltd. as follows:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes as AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations. In conjunction with this press release, DBRS
Morningstar has published a Surveillance Performance Update rating
report with in-depth analysis and credit metrics for the
transaction and business plan updates on select loans. For access
to this report, please click on the link under Related Documents
below or contact us at info@dbrsmorningstar.com.

At issuance, the trust consisted of 24 loans secured by
transitional real estate properties with a cut-off pool balance of
$492.2 million. The $57.8 million ramp-up period ended in August
2020, increasing the pool balance to $550.0 million. The trust
features a two-year reinvestment period that is scheduled to expire
with the February 2022 Payment Date. Loans contributed during the
reinvestment period are subject to an Eligibility Criteria, which
includes a rating agency condition by DBRS Morningstar for funded
companion participations that are being acquired for more than $1.5
million and for any other mortgaged assets.

As of the October 2021 remittance report, there were 22 loans in
the pool totaling $521.5 million. Since issuance, 10 loans were
repaid and eight loans have been added to the pool. The pool is
heavily concentrated with loans secured by multifamily properties,
which represent 67.0% of the currently funded pool balance.
Multifamily properties have generally been more resilient during
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic relative to other
property types. Most of the multifamily properties in the pool are
in a transitional phase that commenced prior to the pandemic;
however, the pandemic has delayed some of the original business
plan timelines, which could affect the collaterals' stabilization
process prior to the respective initial loan maturities. There is
only one loan secured by a hotel property, which represents 5.7% of
the currently funded loan balance.

According to an update from the collateral manager, a cumulative
amount of $20.6 million of loan future funding has been advanced to
13 individual borrowers to aid in property stabilization efforts
through September 2021. An additional $43.6 million of loan future
funding allocated to 19 individual borrowers has yet to be
advanced.

As of the October 2021 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and two loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing
8.7% of the fully funded pool balance. Both loans are secured by
multifamily properties and are being monitored for a low debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) as a result of the pandemic, which
has delayed the borrowers' capital improvement and lease-up plans
to stabilize the properties. Despite these challenges, the loans
remain current on debt service obligations.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BENCHMARK 2018-B6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class J-RR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-B6 issued by Benchmark
2018-B6 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at BB (sf)
-- Class J-RR at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which remains in line with expectations at
issuance. The transaction closed with 55 fixed-rate loans secured
by 211 commercial and multifamily properties with a trust balance
of $1.1 billion. Per the October 2021 remittance report, 54 loans
remain in the pool with the pool balance minimally reduced to
approximately $1.0 billion. Six loans, totaling 34.1% of the trust
balance, were shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS Morningstar at
issuance. With this review, DBRS Morningstar confirmed that all six
continue to exhibit investment-grade characteristics. The
transaction has had relatively limited exposure to the property
types most immediately affected by the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic as only eight loans, representing approximately
10.0% of the deal balance, are secured by hospitality properties.
The transaction also benefits from relatively low leverage with a
weighted-average (WA) loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 56.0% for the
underlying loans, based on the appraised values at issuance.

Per the October 2021 remittance report, four loans, representing
5.7% of the trust balance, are in special servicing, all of which
are secured by hotel properties. The special servicer is pursuing
loan modifications for all four loans with no plans to foreclose.
The largest of these loans is the Aloft Portland Airport loan
(Prospectus ID#13; 2.2% of the trust balance), which is secured by
the leasehold interest in a five-story 136-key limited-service
hotel near the Portland International Airport. The loan transferred
to the special servicer in September 2020 for payment default and
loan payments were last remitted in July 2020. Per the special
servicer, a loan modification is being documented, which will
require all ground lease payments to be brought current. The
property was re-appraised in March 2021 for $30.3 million, down
24.1% from the $39.9 million appraised value at issuance. The total
loan exposure with the outstanding principal balance and servicer
advances equates to an 85.6% LTV ratio based on the most recent
appraised value. A June 2021 STR report noted the collateral's
occupancy rate, average daily rate (ADR) and revenue per available
room (RevPAR) of 84.2%, $117, and $98, respectively, for the
trailing three months ended June 30, 2021, were considerably
greater than the competitive set's occupancy rate, ADR, and RevPAR
figures of 59.9%, $116 and $67, respectively, but continued to lag
historical performance metrics.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, JAGR Hotel Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#18; 1.8% of the trust balance), is secured by a
portfolio of three full-service hotels totaling 721 keys in
Annapolis, Maryland; Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Jackson,
Mississippi. The loan transferred to the special servicer in August
2020 because of imminent monetary default caused by the coronavirus
pandemic. Loan payments were last remitted in October 2020 and the
special servicer expects a loan modification to be finalized by
December 2021. The properties were re-appraised in Q3 2021 for a
combined value of $52.3 million, down from the $73.5 million
appraised value at issuance. The total loan exposure with the
outstanding principal balance and servicer advances equate to an
LTV ratio of 98.5%, based on the most recent appraised value.

As of October 2021, four loans, representing 9.4% of the trust
balance, are on the servicer's watchlist for a low debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR). The largest watchlisted loan, Willow Creek
Corporate Center (Prospectus ID#4; 6.7% of the trust balance), will
be removed from the servicer's watchlist in the near term as the
DSCR calculated for 2020 was artificially low because of an error
in the servicer's other income adjustments. The most recent
developments for this loan are positive, including a new lease for
Facebook Technologies, LLC (Facebook). Facebook, an
investment-grade entity, executed a 10-year lease for 40.0% of the
building's rentable space that commenced in October 2020. The new
tenant replaced GE Grid Solutions, which vacated before its May
2022 lease expiration. A March 2021 rent roll showed the property
is 100% occupied and Facebook's rental rate is above the rate paid
by the previous tenant.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BENCHMARK 2019-B15: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on G-RR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-B15 issued by Benchmark
2019-B15 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the transaction consisted of
32 fixed-rate loans secured by 87 commercial and multifamily
properties. The initial trust balance of $846.6 million has been
reduced by only a nominal amount as of the October 2021 remittance,
as all loans from issuance remain in the pool and there has been
negligible amortization to date. The transaction is concentrated by
property type as eight loans, representing approximately 37.0% of
the current trust balance, are secured by office collateral;
mixed-use properties back the second-largest concentration of
loans, with eight loans representing approximately 30.0% of the
current trust balance. As of the October 2021 remittance, four
loans, representing 12.1% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist, and there is one loan, representing 2.3% of the pool, in
special servicing.

The largest loan in special servicing is Hilton Cincinnati
Netherland Plaza (Prospectus ID#18, 2.3% of pool), which
transferred to special servicing in February 2021 because of
imminent monetary default as a result of disruptions from the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The $72.4 million whole
loan, $19.5 million of which is held in the subject transaction, is
secured by a 561-key full-service hotel in Cincinnati. The loan was
previously reported up to 60 days to 89 days delinquent throughout
2021; however, the loan was made current as of its August 2021
payment and has been current since. The special servicer and the
borrower continue to negotiate the terms of the loan workout.

At issuance, the collateral was valued at $105.0 million, and the
servicer obtained an updated value dated April 2021, which showed a
relatively moderate decline to $86.0 million. As of a July 2021
STR, Inc. (STR) report, the property reported occupancy rate,
average daily rate, and revenue per available room figures of
49.0%, $140.19, and $68.74, respectively, for the trailing three
months (T-3) ended July 31, 2021. The property's website showed
room rates near $200 per night for near-term bookings as of an
October 2021 search conducted by DBRS Morningstar, suggesting that
demand has improved since the July 2021 STR report. For the T-7
period ended July 31, 2021, the servicer reported a debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.06 times (x), an improvement from the
YE2020 DSCR of -0.70x, but cash flows remain well below the
issuance figures. These trends are generally in line with reported
figures for similarly positioned hotels in the DBRS
Morningstar-rated universe, and DBRS Morningstar notes mitigating
factors in the borrower's equity contribution to bring the loan
current and the April 2021 value that suggests the as-is value
remained north of the senior debt balance on the property.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is Kildeer Village
Square (Prospectus ID#6, 5.7% of pool), which was flagged for
delinquent debt service payments for some periods between April
2020 and March 2021, when it was marked as current, and it has
remained current since. The $47.9 million 10-year interest-only
loan with $9.0 million in mezzanine debt at issuance is secured by
a 199,245-square-foot shopping center in Kildeer, Illinois,
approximately 40 miles northwest of Chicago. Following the March
2020 departure of the former largest tenant, Art Van Furniture
(20.4% of the net rentable area (NRA)), cash flows declined and the
DSCR fell, first to 1.47x at YE2020 and again to 1.11x for the T-6
period ended June 30, 2021. The Art Van Furniture closure prompted
a cash flow sweep, and, as of the October 2021 reserve report, the
lockbox reported a reserve balance of $104,300.

As of the June 2021 rent roll, the subject was 78.4% occupied, with
the largest tenants being Nordstrom Rack (16.6% of the NRA, lease
expiration in April 2027), Sierra (10.8% of the NRA, lease
expiration in May 2027), and Nike (8.6% of the NRA, lease
expiration in January 2028). The servicer has noted ongoing
negotiations with a fitness tenant to backfill the former Art Van
Furniture space as well as several other letters of intent from
prospective tenants. The property is relatively new and modern and
is an attractive development that should fare better than other
spaces in the area trying to backfill vacant boxes, with a superior
location along a heavily travelled thoroughfare within a middle- to
upper-middle-class area within Chicago's northwest suburbs.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BHMS 2018-ATLS: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-ATLS issued by BHMS
2018-ATLS as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (low) (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed all classes from Under
Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on March
27, 2020; DBRS Morningstar maintained the Under Review with
Negative Implications status on all classes on October 21, 2020, as
a result of the ongoing effects of the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. The trends on Classes E and HRR are Negative,
which reflects remaining risks with the underlying loan as the
property begins to recover from the challenges posed by the
pandemic. The trends on Classes A, X-NCP, B, C, and D are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect DBRS Morningstar's view that,
despite a significant interruption of operations and cash flow in
2020 related to the pandemic, the property is well-positioned to
rebound given the sponsor's long-term commitment to the underlying
hotel displayed by the raising of additional capital to fund cash
shortfalls throughout the pandemic and reinvest in the property.

The transaction's sole loan is secured by the Atlantis Resort, a
2,917-key luxury beachfront resort on Paradise Island in the
Bahamas. Also included in the collateral is the fee interest in
amenities including, but not limited to, 40 restaurants and bars; a
60,000-square-foot (sf) casino; the 141-acre Aquaventure water
park; 73,391 sf of retail space and spa facilities; and 500,000 sf
of meeting and group space. The resort includes a luxury tower with
an additional 495 rooms owned by third parties as condo-hotel units
and 392 timeshare rooms at the Harborside Resort, neither of which
are part of the collateral.

Loan proceeds of $1.2 billion along with $650.0 million in
mezzanine debt spread across three loans were used to refinance
existing debt of $1.7 billion (previously secured in the BHMS
2014-ATLS transaction), return $148.9 million of sponsor equity,
and cover closing costs, leaving $635.0 million of cash equity
remaining behind the transaction. The loan has a two-year original
term with five one-year extension options and is interest only (IO)
for its entire loan term.

The loan is sponsored by BREF ONE, LLC, a subsidiary of Brookfield
Asset Management Inc. (rated A (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar). The hotel is managed by Brookfield Hospitality
Management, an affiliate of the sponsor, under a 20-year management
agreement that expires in 2034. There is also a franchise agreement
in place through 2034 with Marriott International Inc. (Marriott),
with the property marketed under the Marriott brand's Autograph
Collection.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar noted the opening of the 2,019-key
Baha Mar, a competing resort that began its first phase of
development in June 2018, located approximately seven miles from
the collateral property. Baha Mar is a $3.5 billion luxury resort
that features three towers of different hotel brands, including the
Grand Hyatt, SLS, and Rosewood as well as a 100,000-sf casino. Baha
Mar caters to a more affluent adult clientele, rather than
families. At issuance, Baha Mar did not offer water and marine
attractions, which are key demand and revenue drivers at the
subject. In July 2021, however, Baha Mar opened its own $300.0
million water park, increasing the competition for the subject
property. Baha Mar offers the largest casino in the Caribbean,
which at issuance was expected to drive down casino revenue at the
subject's casino. In addition, the Baha Mar resort is newer and has
higher-end finishes. However, DBRS Morningstar maintains that, in
terms of overall appeal for the vast majority of visitors to the
island, the subject is generally superior to Baha Mar because of
the longer list of amenities that appeal to families, recent
capital improvements, and more budget-friendly price point.

Between 2012 and 2017, the sponsor completed approximately $213.0
million ($73,020/key) in capital improvements, including a $25.4
million ($40,448/key) renovation in 2018 to The Coral (629 keys)
that targeted newly designed rooms and a pool area as well as a
brand new lobby, in order to compete with Baha Mar. According to
the property's website, the borrower recently completed a
renovation of The Royal in late 2020, estimated at $8.0 million
($32,000/key).

The subject's reliance on international tourism is particularly
important given the global travel disruptions resulting from the
coronavirus pandemic. The Bahamas' Ministry of Tourism responded to
the pandemic by effectively shutting down the island's tourism
industry in March 2020; however, restrictions were eased over time
and the properties reopened in December 2020. The Bahamian
government further updated restrictions in May 2021 to allow fully
vaccinated individuals and unvaccinated individuals with proof of a
negative coronavirus test to enter the country, and visitors must
also have a Bahamas Travel Health Visa. Based on a report from July
2021, the Bahamas has welcomed 525,224 stopover visitors year to
date, compared with the 2019 figure (pre-pandemic) of 1,269,991;
however, the Q2 2021 figure of 272,446 reflected a sizable increase
over the Q1 2021 figure of 109,269, and July 2021 reflected the
highest monthly figure to date at 143,509 stopover visitors.

Based on the trailing-12-month (T-12) financials ended March 31,
2021, the loan reported a net cash flow of -$92.6 million, compared
with the YE2019 figure of $151.4 million, thus demonstrating the
size of the disruption brought on by the pandemic. The borrower's
year-to-date operating statement ending in June 2021 reflects an
annualized departmental revenue of $305.9 million, a significant
improvement over the March 2021 T-12 figure of $65.9 million.

Based on the Smith Travel Research report for the T-3 period ended
April 30, 2021, reviewed by DBRS Morningstar, The Royal Tower
(1,201 keys) reported occupancy rate, average daily rate, and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) figures of 63.40%, $292, and
$185, respectively, compared with the competitive set's figures of
29.9%, $226, and $68, respectively. While these figures are below
historical levels, the subject property is showing signs of
improvement as tourism rises, with the month of April 2021
reflecting comparable figures of 72.9%, $290, and $211,
respectively, and a RevPAR penetration rate of 258.4%.

DBRS Morningstar updated its internal assessment on The
Commonwealth of the Bahamas in Q3 2021, in line with its 2020
assessment. This assessment could result in a ceiling to this
transaction's rating; these concerns were originally mitigated and
may continue to be mitigated by the political risk insurance of
$560.0 million, the transaction's securitized bonds by cash flows
that are largely (95%) denominated in U.S. dollars, and DBRS
Morningstar's capitalization rate assumption when assigning ratings
as a way to account for a potential decrease in value in an
elevated probability of default situation.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BRAVO RESIDENTIAL 2021-NQM3: DBRS Gives (P) B Rating on B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2021-NQM3 to be issued by BRAVO
Residential Funding Trust 2021-NQM3:

-- $256.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $21.1 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $20.1 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $15.4 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $8.1 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 25.95% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinate certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 19.85%,
14.05%, 9.60%, 7.25%, and 5.20% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime and nonprime first-lien residential mortgages
funded by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 934
loans with a total principal balance of approximately $345,957,053
as of the Cut-Off Date (September 30, 2021).

The top originator for the mortgage pool is Summit Mortgage Bankers
(11.3%). The remaining originators each comprise less than 7.0% of
the mortgage loans. The Servicers of the loans are Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc. (70.2%), Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (25.4%),
Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC (3.8%), and AmWest Funding
Corp. (0.6%).

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as a Master Servicer. Citibank,
N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar), an
affiliate of Citigroup Inc., will act as Indenture Trustee, Paying
Agent, Note Registrar, and Owner Trustee. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as
Custodian.

The proposed pool is about 35 months seasoned on a weighted average
(WA) basis, although seasoning may span from 19 to 91 months.
Except for 41 loans (4.3% of the pool) that were 30 to 59 days
delinquent as of the Cut-Off Date, the loans have been performing
since origination.

In accordance with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 63.5% of the loans by balance are
designated as non-QM. Twenty-nine loans (4.0% of the pool) are
designated as Safe Harbor. Approximately 32.5% of the loans in the
pool made to investors for business purposes are exempt from the
CFPB Ability-to-Repay (ATR) and QM rules. Additionally, Commerce
and Quontic Bank originated approximately (2.8%) of the loans and
are each designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury as a
Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI). Such loans were
originated under no income verification programs that consider
property value and borrower's credit, among other factors, to
qualify a borrower for a mortgage loan. While CDFI loans are not
required to comply with the ATR rules, the CDFI loans included in
this pool were made to mostly creditworthy borrowers with a WA
credit score of 724 and an original combined loan-to-value ratio of
54.5%.

There will be no advancing of delinquent principal or interest on
any mortgage loan by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance; the cost of preservation,
restoration, and protection of mortgaged properties; and any
enforcement or judicial proceedings, including foreclosures and
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

The Sponsor or a majority-owned affiliate of the Sponsor will
acquire and intends to retain an eligible horizontal residual
interest in the Issuer in the amount of not less than 5.0% of the
aggregate fair value of the Notes (other than the Class SA, Class
FB, and Class R Notes) to satisfy the credit risk-retention
requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

The holder of the Trust Certificates may, at its option, on or
after the earlier of (1) the payment date in October 2024 or (2)
the date on which the total loans' and real estate owned (REO)
properties' balance falls to or below 30% of the loan balance as of
the Cut-Off Date (Optional Termination Date), purchase all of the
loans and REO properties at the optional termination price
described in the transaction documents.

The Depositor, at its option, may purchase any mortgage loan that
is 90 days or more delinquent under the Mortgage Banker Association
(MBA) method (or in the case of any loan that has been subject to a
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic-related forbearance plan,
on any date from and after the date on which such loan becomes 90
days MBA delinquent following the end of the forbearance period) at
the repurchase price (Optional Purchase) described in the
transaction documents. The total balance of such loans purchased by
the Depositor will not exceed 10% of the Cut-Off Date balance.

The transaction's cash flow structure is similar to that of other
non-QM securitizations. The transaction employs a sequential-pay
cash flow structure with a pro rata principal distribution among
the senior tranches subject to certain performance triggers related
to cumulative losses or delinquencies exceeding a specified
threshold (Credit Event). Principal proceeds can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes (IIPP)
before being applied sequentially to amortize the balances of the
senior and subordinated notes. For the Class A-3 Notes (only after
a Credit Event) and for the mezzanine and subordinate classes of
notes (both before and after a Credit Event), principal proceeds
will be available to cover interest shortfalls only after the more
senior notes have been paid off in full. Also, the excess spread
can be used to cover realized losses first before being allocated
to unpaid Cap Carryover Amounts due to Class A-1 down to Class
B-2.

Coronavirus Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an immediate economic contraction, leading to sharp
increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for many
consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in delinquencies for many
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes,
shortly after the onset of coronavirus.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of forbearance,
which are generally short-term payment reliefs that may perform
very differently from traditional delinquencies. At the onset of
coronavirus, because the option to forebear mortgage payments was
so widely available, it drove forbearance to a very high level.
When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid, low
loan-to-value ratios, and good underwriting in the mortgage market
in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes, delinquencies
have been gradually trending down in recent months as forbearance
periods come to an end for many borrowers.

As of the Cut-Off Date, nine borrowers within the pool (1.0% of the
pool by balance) are currently subject to a coronavirus-related
payment relief plan with the Servicer. In the event a borrower
requests or enters into a coronavirus-related forbearance plan
after the Cut-Off Date but prior to the Closing Date, the Sponsor
will remove such loan from the mortgage pool and remit the related
Closing Date substitution amount. Loans that enter a
coronavirus-related forbearance or payment relief plan on or after
the Closing Date will remain in the pool.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BREAN ASSET 2021-RM2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class M5 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2021-2, issued by Brean Asset-Backed
Securities Trust 2021-RM2 (BABS 2021-RM2):

-- $202.2 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $5.5 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $2.3 million Class M4 at BB (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class M5 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating reflects 110.8% of cumulative advance rate. The
AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect
114.9%, 118.3%, 121.3%, 122.5%, and 123.7% of cumulative advance
rates, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar did not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

Lenders typically offer reverse mortgage loans to people who are at
least 62 years old. Through reverse mortgage loans, borrowers have
access to home equity through a lump sum amount or a stream of
payments without periodically repaying principal or interest,
allowing the loan balance to accumulate over a period of time until
a maturity event occurs. Loan repayment is required (1) if the
borrower dies, (2) if the borrower sells the related residence, (3)
if the borrower no longer occupies the related residence for a
period (usually a year), (4) if it is no longer the borrower's
primary residence, (5) if a tax or insurance default occurs, or (6)
if the borrower fails to properly maintain the related residence.
In addition, borrowers must be current on any homeowner's
association dues if applicable. Reverse mortgages are typically
nonrecourse; borrowers don't have to provide additional assets in
cases where the outstanding loan amount exceeds the property's
value (the crossover point). As a result, liquidation proceeds will
fall below the loan amount in cases where the outstanding balance
reaches the crossover point, contributing to higher loss severities
for these loans.

As of the September 1, 2021, cut-off date, the collateral had
approximately $182.5 million in current unpaid principal balance
from 167 performing, nonrecourse, fixed-rate jumbo reverse mortgage
loans secured by first liens on single-family residential
properties, condominiums, townhomes, and multifamily (two- to
four-family) properties. The loans were originated in 2021.

The transaction uses a structure in which cash distributions are
made sequentially to each rated note until the rated amounts with
respect to such notes are paid off. No subordinate note shall
receive any payments until the balance of senior notes has been
reduced to zero. Interest is capitalized to the note and the senior
notes will accrue cap carryover for any interest shortfalls.

The note rate for Class A Notes will reduce to 0.25% if the Home
Price Percentage (as measured using the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller
National Index) declines by 30% or more compared with the value on
the cut-off date.

If the notes are not be paid in full or redeemed by the issuer on
September 2026, the Expected Repayment Date, the issuer will be
required to conduct an auction within 180 calendar days of the
Expected Repayment Date to offer all the mortgage assets and use
the proceeds, net of fees and expenses due to auction, to be
applied to payments to all amounts owed. If the proceeds of the
auction are not sufficient to cover all the amounts owed, the
issuer will be required to conduct an auction within six months of
the previous auction.

If, during any six-month period, the average one month conditional
prepayment rate is equal to or greater than 20%, then on such date,
50% of available funds remaining after payment of fees and expenses
and interest to the Class A Notes will be deposited into the
Refunding Account, which may be used to purchase additional
mortgage loans.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BX 2021-21M: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-21M to
be issued by BX 2021-21M Mortgage Trust (BX 2021-21M):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at AA (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Class H and Class JRR are not rated by DBRS
Morningstar.

The collateral for BX 2021-21M includes the borrower's fee-simple
interest in 21 Class A and B multifamily properties totaling 6,671
units across seven states and 10 distinct markets throughout the
U.S. The portfolio is primarily concentrated in Texas (10
properties, 3,468 units, 35.4% of NCF), Florida (three properties,
989 units, 19.6% of NCF), and Washington (two properties, 432
units, 15.3% of NCF). Within Texas, nine assets are located
throughout Dallas Fort Worth and one asset is in San Antonio.
Within Florida, the three properties are in Jacksonville and
Sarasota. Additional markets include Atlanta; Seattle; Denver;
Savannah, Georgia; Kansas City, Kansas; and Charleston, South
Carolina. The sponsor, an affiliate of Blackstone, acquired the
portfolio through multiple off-market, all cash acquisitions from
April through September 2021. Portfolio composition is split
between 13 Class A urban and suburban mid-rise properties built
since 2001 and eight 1980s vintage garden-style apartments. The
portfolio includes 14 stabilized properties (57.6% of net cash flow
(NCF)) and seven newly stabilized assets brought to market within
the past two years, which have experienced strong leasing momentum
during Q3 2021.

The properties comprising the portfolio generally exhibit favorable
finish qualities and comprehensive amenity offerings with a
weighted-average (WA) year built of 2002, and 10 properties,
representing 61.2% of the portfolio's NCF, were delivered after
2010. In addition to the generally favorable asset quality of the
underlying collateral, DBRS Morningstar generally views the markets
to which the portfolio is exposed as highly desirable for
multifamily development, with strong growth potential and favorable
population statistics. The generally favorable market conditions
are further evidenced by relatively tight submarket vacancy rates,
which averaged 4.9% across the portfolio per the appraiser and are
generally projected to decline through the fully extended loan
maturity. While 18 of the 21 properties (representing 71.2% of the
portfolio by allocated loan amount (ALA) are in areas characterized
as having a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of between 2 and 4 (ranks
generally associated with more suburban locations), the
cross-collateralized and geographically diversified nature of the
portfolio generally mitigates some of the market risk. As of
September 2021, the portfolio was 94.9% occupied with favorably
increasing portfolio occupancy and rent trends demonstrated from
year-end (YE) 2020 through the trailing one-month period (T-1)
ended August 2021. Additionally, despite the noise surrounding
lease defaults and nonpayment of rent in the U.S. through the
recent and ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
sponsor was successful in ramping up toward full stabilization with
economic occupancy increasing from 82.1% as of the T-6 ended August
2021 to 95.9% based on the September 2021 rent roll. Portfolio NCF
has increased from $47.0 million to approximately $64.5 million
from the T-6 ended August 2021 to the T-1 ended August 2021, a
37.1% increase.

As part of its investment thesis, the sponsor plans to increase
performance by continuing to lease up recently delivered assets
approaching stabilization (40% of units were delivered in 2018 or
later) and by renovating and marking to market rents at older,
occupancy stabilized assets. The portfolio is currently achieving
WA monthly rents of $1,378 per unit, which is approximately 5.4%
below the WA submarket rent of $1,455 per unit. Given the sponsor's
extensive multifamily portfolio in each of these markets, the
sponsor should be able to leverage its existing network to maximize
operational efficiency. While DBRS Morningstar did not give any
credit to potential upside in cash flow from the sponsor's business
plan, the portfolio's generally favorable asset quality and
location in high-growth markets make it well positioned to maintain
stable operating performance through the loan term. Additionally,
DBRS Morningstar expects there would be no issues funding any
planned renovations, given the sponsor's strong access to capital
and significant financial wherewithal.

The sponsor is the real estate fund commonly known as Blackstone
Real Estate Partners (BREP) IX. BREP IX is the firm's $20.5 billion
flagship global real estate opportunity fund that closed in August
2019. The Blackstone Real Estate group was established in 1991 and
is the largest private equity real estate investment manager in the
world today with more than $457 billion of assets under management
(AUM) in the private equity, real estate, hedge fund solutions, and
credit sectors. Today, its more than $120 billion real estate AUM
includes premier properties in many top locations in the U.S.,
Europe, Asia, and Latin America, with a diverse mix of hospitality,
office, retail, industrial, and residential investments.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BX COMMERCIAL 2021-CIP: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by BX Commercial Mortgage Trust
2021-CIP, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-CIP:

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by the borrower's fee and
leasehold interests in 101 primarily industrial properties located
across 15 states. Moody's ratings are based on the credit quality
of the loans and the strength of the securitization structure.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of Moody's Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology. The rating approach for securities backed by a
single loan compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying
collateral with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also consider a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The portfolio contains approximately 15,218,397 SF of aggregate net
rentable area ("NRA") across the following three property subtypes
- warehouse/distribution (93 properties; 97.2% of NRA), R&D/flex (7
properties; 2.7% of NRA), and general industrial (one property;
0.2% of NRA). The portfolio is geographically diverse as the
properties are located across 15 states and 23 markets. The top
five market concentrations by NRA are Chicago (12 properties; 16.7%
of NRA), Columbus (6 properties; 11.0% of NRA), Indianapolis (5
properties; 10.7% of NRA), Atlanta (4 properties; 7.8% of NRA) and
Baltimore (7 properties; 7.0% of NRA). The portfolio properties are
primarily located in global gateway markets and generally situated
within close proximity to major transportation arteries.

Construction dates for properties in the portfolio range between
1969 and 2022, with a weighted average year built of 2007. Property
sizes for assets range between 19,317 SF and 673,920 SF, with an
average size of approximately 150,677 SF. Clear heights for
properties range between 16 feet and 40 feet, with a weighted
average maximum clear height for the portfolio of approximately
29.8 feet. As of December 1, 2021, the portfolio was approximately
96.7% leased to over 180 tenants.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjust the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan balance that reflects each
loan's amortization profile.

The Moody's first mortgage DSCR is 1.71x and Moody's first mortgage
stressed DSCR at a 9.25% constant is 0.45x. Moody's DSCR is based
on Moody's stabilized net cash flow.

Moody's LTV ratio for the first mortgage balance is 184.7% based on
Moody's Value. Adjusted Moody's LTV ratio for the first mortgage
balance is 160.5% based on Moody's Value using a cap rate adjusted
for the current interest rate environment.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's weighted
average property quality grade is 0.75.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: the proximity to
global gateway markets, infill locations, geographic diversity,
tenant granularity, low percentage of flex industrial and
experienced sponsorship.

Notable concerns of the transaction include: the high Moody's LTV
ratio, tenant rollover, floating-rate/interest-only mortgage loan
profile and certain credit negative legal features.

Moody's rating approach considers sequential pay in connection with
a collateral release as a credit neutral benchmark. Although the
loans' release premium mitigates the risk of a ratings downgrade
due to adverse selection, the pro rata payment structure limits
ratings upgrade potential as mezzanine classes are prevented from
building enhancement. The benefit received from pooling through
cross-collateralization is also reduced.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securitizations Methodology" published in November 2021.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


BX TRUST 2021-ARIA: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-ARIA issued by BX Trust 2021-ARIA:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class D at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

BX Trust 2021-ARIA is a single-asset/single-borrower transaction
collateralized by the borrower's leased-fee interest in the Aria
Resort & Casino and Vdara Hotel & Spa hotel and casino properties
located on Las Vegas Boulevard in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Despite the disruptions and ongoing uncertainty in the lodging and
gaming sectors attributable to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic, DBRS Morningstar takes a generally positive view on
Blackstone Real Estate Partners IX L.P.'s (BREP) acquisition of the
Aria and Vdara properties. The transaction represents their third
major resort casino sale-leaseback transaction in the past two
years in Las Vegas; previous transactions using the same structure
were collateralized by the Bellagio and the MGM Grand/Mandalay Bay
properties. The sale-leaseback strategy allows experienced gaming
operators like MGM Resorts International (MGM) to optimize capital
allocation away from the ownership of real estate while maintaining
operational control over their portfolios.

The Aria and Vdara properties are well located along the central
portion of the Las Vegas Strip, which results in a critical mass of
foot traffic attributable to numerous nearby attractions and
properties, including the Bellagio and Cosmopolitan. Furthermore,
the properties are the centerpiece of the 16.7 million-square-foot
mixed-use development known as City Center, which includes the
high-end Shops at Crystals retail complex, among other attractions.
Finally, the Aria Express (formerly known as the City Center Tram)
monorail system connects the properties via the Shops at Crystals
with Bellagio to the north and Park MGM to the south.

Predictably, performance at the Aria and Vdara properties has
suffered over the last 18 months as the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic besieged the economy, crippled domestic and international
travel, and resulted in mandated closures and other operating
restrictions. However, the properties experienced a robust rebound
in performance as vaccinations rolled out and as Americans emerged
from months of quarantine. In 2021, combined monthly EBITDAR during
the months of May, June, July, and August exceeded the same periods
in 2019. Additionally, the combined financials for both properties
for the trailing-12-month (T-12) period ended August 31, 2021,
which include several heavily depressed months of performance
during the second wave of the pandemic, have rebounded to
approximately 70% of their stabilized 2019 levels, compared with
only 52% in the T-12 period ended June 30, 2021 (further
illustrating the strong rebound over the summer).

MGM Resorts has invested a significant amount of capital, nearly
$700 million, into both properties since 2012 in order to maintain
and improve their performance. MGM is planning to invest several
hundred million dollars across both properties over the next four
years, including a major room renovation at Aria. Furthermore,
under the terms of the master lease, MGM is required to invest a
minimum of 4.0% of actual net revenues per year into the properties
throughout the five-year loan term and between 2.5% and 3.0% per
year thereafter.

The transaction benefits from a guaranty provided by MGM, which
covers payment and performance of all monetary obligations and
certain other obligations of the MGM Tenant under the master lease
agreement. However, unlike prior transactions, MGM has not provided
a shortfall guaranty for the mortgage loan. While MGM is not an
investment grade-rated entity, the firm is well capitalized and had
revenues of approximately $12.9 billion and EBITDA of approximately
$3 billion in 2019.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to virtually all major commercial real estate property types,
creating a substantial element of uncertainty around the recovery
of demand in the hospitality sectors, even in stronger markets that
have historically been highly liquid. Both properties were closed
from April 2020 through June 2020 because of government
restrictions as a result of the pandemic and experienced combined
occupancy and revenue per available room declines to 50.2% and
$125.14 as of YE2020 from 90.6% and $231.89 as of YE2019. As
previously discussed, the properties have rebounded sharply in
2021, but the recovery could be hampered by unforeseen changes in
public health circumstances or the emergence of new variants.

DBRS Morningstar's net cash flow and value reflects normalized
occupancy assumptions of 90.2% for Aria and 90.8% for Vdara, which
are above the 55.5% and 56.0% occupancy rates for the properties,
respectively, as of the T-12 period ended August 31, 2021. DBRS
Morningstar elected to stabilize the properties and assumed
occupancy in line with pre-pandemic performance given the robust
recovery trajectory, MGM's extensive experience operating casino
and hospitality properties, strong operating history, and superior
location in the center of the Las Vegas Strip. DBRS Morningstar
accounted for this stabilization risk by applying a penalty to its
qualitative adjustments.

A substantial component of revenue across the properties is derived
from non-room revenue, including gaming revenue (27.3% of DBRS
Morningstar Revenue) and revenue from food and beverage outlets
(29.5%). These revenue sources are generally more volatile than
room revenue; however, the proportion of gaming revenue across both
properties is consistent with most other properties on the Las
Vegas Strip, which generally derive around 30% of revenue from
casino operations. Gaming revenue is also disproportionately
dependent on the trends and habits of high-end international
gamblers, who have been slower to return to Las Vegas than domestic
gamblers because of international travel restrictions.

The borrowers have entered into a master lease agreement with MGM
Lessee III, LLC (the Master Tenant or the MGM Tenant). While the
borrowers and the Master Tenant are not under common control and a
true lease opinion was provided, master lease arrangements may
still pose a risk of recharacterization of the master lease as a
financing from the borrowers to the Master Tenant. Furthermore, the
master lease allows the Master Tenant to obtain leasehold mortgage
and/or mezzanine financing. The master lease and loan documents
also contain certain restrictions that may affect the lender's
rights and remedies. For example, the master lease restricts
certain transfers of the property to designated competitors of the
Master Tenant, which could significantly reduce the pool of
qualified buyers and therefore reduce liquidity.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BX TRUST 2021-BXMF: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-BXMF
(the Certificates) to be issued by BX Trust 2021-BXMF (BX
2021-BXMF), as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at BBB (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The collateral for BX 2021-BXMF includes the borrower's fee-simple
interest in 13 Class A multifamily properties totaling 5,449 units
across seven states. BREIT Operating Partnership L.P. (the Loan
Sponsor) is using mortgage loan proceeds of $1.075 billion
($197,284 per unit) in addition to a borrower equity contribution
of nearly $347.7 million ($63,809 per unit) to recapitalize the
Sponsor's interest in the Project Solar Portfolio. The properties
comprising the portfolio generally exhibit favorable finish
qualities and comprehensive amenity offerings with a
weighted-average (WA) year built of 2010, with only two of the
assets constructed prior to 2002.

In addition to the generally favorable asset quality of the
underlying collateral, DBRS Morningstar generally views the markets
to which the portfolio is exposed as highly desirable for
multifamily development with strong growth potential. Five
properties within the portfolio are located in submarkets that have
observed a higher inventory growth rate relative to each property's
respective market. According to Reis, the current WA vacancy for
the submarket is only 6.2% in Q2 2021, and it is projected to
decrease to 5.4% over the next five years. While nine of the 13
properties (representing 76.5% of the portfolio by allocated loan
amount) are located in areas characterized as having a DBRS
Morningstar market rank between 2 and 4 (ranks generally associated
with more suburban locations that exhibit higher historical
probabilities of default within conduit securitizations), the
cross-collateralized and geographically diversified nature of the
portfolio generally mitigates some of the market risk.

The portfolio is currently 95.8% occupied per the September 2021
rent roll, with favorably increasing portfolio occupancy and rent
trends demonstrated from YE2018 through September 2021.
Additionally, despite the noise surrounding lease defaults and
nonpayment of rent in the U.S. through the recent and ongoing
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the sponsor was successful
in ramping up toward full stabilization, with the WA portfolio
occupancy increasing steadily to 95.8% as of the September 2021
rent roll from 89.1% in December 2018. The portfolio's net
operating income increased 28.6% between 2018 and the trailing
12-month period ended August 31, 2021.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BX TRUST 2021-LGCY: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-LGCY (the Certificates) issued by BX Trust 2021-LGCY (BX
2021-LGCY), as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The collateral for BX Trust 2021-LGCY (BX 2021-LGCY or the Trust)
includes the borrower's fee-simple interest in 11 Class A
multifamily properties totaling 2,882 units across six states.
After the Origination Date, it is expected that the Mortgage Loan
will be secured by the fee simple interest in one additional
multifamily property (Bell Quarry Hill or the Earn-Out Property)
that is not currently collateral for the Mortgage Loan. It is
expected that Bell Quarry Hill will become collateral for the
mortgage loan upon repayment of the existing debt on the property.
At origination, the Borrowers funded an earn-out reserve in the
amount of $24,600,000. If and when the Earn-Out Property becomes
collateral for the Mortgage Loan, such reserve will be distributed
to the Borrowers. However, if the Borrowers are unable to repay the
existing debt encumbering the Earn-Out Property and satisfy the
other applicable earn-out conditions on or before March 22, 2022,
after using commercially reasonable efforts, then the Borrowers
will be permitted to instruct the Lender to apply such reserve to
prepay the Mortgage Loan, without payment of a spread maintenance
premium, and such Earn-Out Property will not become collateral for
the Mortgage Loan. Such prepayment amount, if made, will be applied
to the prepayment of the Mortgage Loan on a pro rata basis.
Allocated Mortgage Loan Amounts are based on the Original Mortgaged
Properties and the Earn-Out Property, collectively, and the
Allocated Mortgage Loan Amount for the Earn-Out Property has been
reserved for at origination. For the purposes of net cash flow NCF,
valuation, and sizing analyses, DBRS Morningstar assumed that the
loan sponsor completed the outstanding debt repayment for Bell
Quarry Hill. All metrics within this report are generally based on
the portfolio inclusive of Bell Quarry Hill, unless otherwise
noted. The addition of Bell Quarry Hill would increase the
collateral for the Trust to 12 Class A/B multifamily properties
totaling 3,030 units across six states. BREIT Operating Partnership
L.P. (the Loan Sponsor) is using mortgage loan proceeds of $575.0
million ($189,769 per unit) in addition to a borrower equity
contribution of nearly $247.3 million ($81,614 per unit) to finance
the $807.4 million acquisition of the collateral and cover closing
costs associated with the transaction.

The properties comprising the portfolio generally exhibit favorable
finish qualities and comprehensive amenity offerings with a WA
weighted-average year built of 2007 and four properties,
representing 36.0% of the portfolio's net operating income (NOI)
for the trailing 12 months (T-12) ended June 30, 2021 T-12 NOI,
were delivered after 2011. In addition to the generally favorable
asset quality of the underlying collateral, DBRS Morningstar
generally views the markets to which the portfolio is exposed as
highly desirable for multifamily development, with strong growth
potential and favorable population statistics. Eight properties,
representing 69.2% of the portfolio's NOI for the T-12 ended June
30, 2021 T-12 NOI, are located in areas with appraisal-projected
population growth rates that more than quadruple the U.S. 2020
national average of 0.351%, and all properties are located in areas
with projected population growth rates in excess of the U.S. 2020
national average. The generally favorable market conditions are
further evidenced by relatively tight submarket vacancy rates,
which averaged 6.3% across the portfolio per the Q2 2021 Reis
reports and are generally projected to decline through the
fully-extended loan maturity. While 10 of the 12 properties
(representing 77.6%% of the portfolio by allocated loan amount) are
located in areas characterized as having a DBRS Morningstar market
rank of between 2 and 4 (ranks generally associated with more
suburban locations that exhibit higher historical probabilities of
default PODs within conduit securitizations), the
cross-collateralized and geographically diversified nature of the
portfolio generally mitigates some of the market risk.

As of July 2021, the portfolio was 96.9% occupied with favorably
increasing portfolio occupancy and rent trends demonstrated from
YE2018 through the T-12 ended June 30, 2021. Additionally, despite
the noise surrounding lease defaults and nonpayment of rent in the
U.S. through the recent and ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the
portfolio demonstrated relatively stable collections (averaging
97.7% monthly) between July 2020 and July 2021. These collection
figures are generally above the national averages provided by the
National Multifamily Housing Council, which reported collection
rates ranging from 93.2% to 95.9% between January 2021 and May
2021. As part of its acquisition thesis, the Loan Sponsor has
shared capital investment plans that contemplate renovating
approximately 80.0% of portfolio units, potentially further
elevating the cash flowing potential and stability of the
portfolio. While the Loan Sponsor's renovation plans are neither
required by nor reserved for as part of this transaction, the
portfolio's generally favorable asset quality, strong amenity
packages, and locations in high-growth markets make it
well-positioned to maintain stable operating performance through
the loan term. Additionally, DBRS Morningstar expects there to be
no issues funding any planned renovations, given the Loan Sponsor's
strong access to capital and generally significant financial
wherewithal.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CAMB 2021-CX2: DBRS Gives (P) BB(high) Rating on Class HRR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the classes of CAMB
2021-CX2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, as
follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The CAMB 2021-CX2 Mortgage Trust single-asset/single-borrower
transaction is collateralized by the borrower's fee-simple interest
in 350 and 450 Water Street, two newly constructed, Class A LEED®
Gold (targeted), life-sciences office buildings totaling 915,233 sf
in the Kendall Square submarket of Cambridge, Massachusetts. 350
Water comprises 511,157 sf of lab/R&D space and 450 Water Street
comprises 404,076 sf of office space. DBRS Morningstar takes a
positive view of the credit characteristics of the collateral which
will be the newest component to be delivered of the larger,
master-planned Cambridge Crossing Development (CX), which is
currently being executed by the sponsor, DivcoWest. When fully
built out, CX will consist of 17 buildings consisting of over 2.1
million sq. ft. of science and technology space, approximately 2.4
million sq. ft. of residential space and approximately 100,000 sq.
ft. of retail space. The development of Cambridge Crossing is well
underway with approximately 2.5 million sq. ft. completed or under
construction and recent leases to Philips, Sanofi, and Bristol
Myers Squibb.

In a post-coronavirus environment, DBRS Morningstar expects
increased growth in healthcare spending, which is a key driver of
the life sciences field. With this rise in spending, much of which
is already devoted to disease prevention, cancer treatments, and
chronic conditions, companies focused in these fields will continue
to thrive. Given the specialized nature of these industries,
coupled with advancements in medical and other technology, a
skilled and educated workforce is necessary to sustain
profitability of life sciences enterprises. DBRS Morningstar
believes the most important factor for the long-term sustainability
of cash flow is proximity to talent, which means access to research
and educational institutions as well as other technology and
medical centers, typically located in urban centers.

The building benefits from long-term, institutional-grade tenancy
with an expected WA remaining lease term of 15 years, which DBRS
Morningstar believes should largely shield the property from any
short- or medium-term dislocations in the Cambridge office and life
sciences market resulting from the ongoing Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. The property is 100% leased to Aventis Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of the French healthcare conglomerate
Sanofi. The property will serve as its North American research
headquarters pursuant to a two 15-year NNN leases. Sanofi is
expected to consolidate approximately 3,000 employees from a number
of local offices into the property and it is anticipated that
multiple business groups will operate at the property. Further,
Sanofi intends to bring together around 400 employees across its
sites at CX and in Lyon, France, to form a Center of Excellence
dedicated to mRNA vaccine research at the property. Aventis's
laboratory space is at 350 Water (Parcel G), which can accommodate
a mix of 60% laboratory and 40% office space, typical of other
laboratory buildings in the market. The tenant's office space is
located at 450 Water (Parcel H).

Executed in late 2018, Aventis's leases have a blended starting
base rent of $71.50 psf, which is 22.4% below market office rents
of $85.00 psf and 31% below market laboratory rents of $110.00 psf,
as referenced by the appraisal. Additionally, Aventis's WA rent
represents a 24.7% discount to the sponsor's average asking NNN
base rent of $95.00 psf for similar product type in the greater CX.
The limited lease rollover provides minimal opportunity to capture
the upside during the 10-year initial loan term, but the property
will likely benefit in the long run from increased rental revenue
as leases expire and roll to market.

The properties are currently in the process of finishing
construction and substantial completion is expected for the 350
Water Street building in the second quarter of 2022 and the fourth
quarter of 2021 for the 450 Street building. Aventis Inc. is still
undergoing the build out of its space at both properties. The 350
Water Street lease commenced on July 1, 2021 and for the 450 Water
Street lease, the commencement is tied to substantial completion,
with it occurring the later of (i) November 10, 2021 and (ii) the
date that is 46 days prior to the substantial completion date for
the base building work. Aventis Inc. does not have any termination
rights in connection with the buildout of the space. Aventis Inc.
does not have any termination rights in connection with the
buildout of the space. The borrower will fund an obligations
reserve at loan closing to cover outstanding TI obligations,
project costs, and gap rent. While DBRS Morningstar believes that
it is unlikely that an investment-grade tenant, such as Aventis,
would sign a lease and then fail to take occupancy, there is still
the potential for unforeseen circumstances to arise where the
borrower would need to find a new tenant for this space.

The construction contract to build out Aventis's tenant spaces and
base building changes total $304.3 million ($595 psf) for Parcel G
and $90.9 million ($225 psf) for Parcel H. Aventis is entitled to
receive an approximately $139.8 million ($273 psf) tenant
improvement allowance for Parcel G and an approximately $73.7
million ($82 psf) tenant improvement allowance for Parcel H. In
total, the $395.2 million ($432 psf) tenant fit out contract and
base building changes do not include any tenant investment for soft
costs. Aventis is expected to invest approximately $181.7 million
($198 psf) into the property, not including tenant-specific FF&E.

The transaction benefits from strong, experienced institutional
sponsorship in the form of a joint venture (JV) partnership between
DivcoWest, the California State Teachers Retirement System
(CalSTRS), and Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS). DivcoWest,
which manages $13.7 billion in assets (as of June 30, 2021), is an
experienced developer, owner, and operator of real estate
throughout the U.S., with significant expertise in Boston, having
invested in and managed more than 22 commercial properties in the
area, including offices in the Seaport, Financial District, and
East Cambridge submarkets. CalSTRS is the country's second-largest
public pension fund with assets totaling approximately $312.2
billion as of September 30, 2021. Its investment portfolio is
broadly diversified into nine asset categories, approximately 12.7%
(approximately $39.8 billion) which is allocated towards real
estate investments. Established in 1937, TRS provides retirement
and related benefits for those employed by the public schools,
colleges, and universities supported by the State of Texas. As of
August 31, 2020, the agency is serving nearly 1.7 million
participants and had assets under management of nearly $187
billion. TRS is the largest public retirement system in Texas in
both membership and assets and is one of the largest public pension
funds in the world.

DBR Investments Co. Limited (DBRI), Bank of America, N.A., JPMorgan
Chase Bank, National Association, and 3650 Cal Bridge Lending, LLC
originated the 10-year ARD loan that pays fixed-rate interest of
2.792000 % on an IO basis through the entire term of the loan. The
whole loan features a 10-year term with a five-year ARD period
following. The anticipated repayment date of the whole loan is
expected to be the payment date in November 2031 and the scheduled
maturity date of the whole loan is expected to be the payment date
in November 2036 coterminous with Aventis's final lease maturity.
In addition to penalty interest due on the mortgage after this
date, all property cash flow after current debt service will be
diverted away from the sponsor and toward amortizing the mortgage
loan. This feature strongly incentivizes the sponsor to arrange
takeout financing before the ARD date, and therefore reduces
maturity risk for the certificate holders.

The $1.225 billion whole loan is composed of 24 promissory notes:
16 senior A notes totaling $814 million and four junior B notes of
$411 million. The CAMB 2021-CX2 mortgage trust will total $696
million and consist of four senior A notes with an aggregate
principal balance of $285 million and the four junior B notes with
an aggregate principal balance of $411 million. The remaining $529
million of senior A notes will be held by the originators and may
be included in future securitizations. The senior notes are pari
passu in right of payment with respect to each other. The senior
notes are generally senior in right of payment to the junior note.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CARLYLE US 2020-2: S&P Affirms B- (sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes and new class X and E-R notes
from Carlyle US CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Carlyle US CLO 2020-2 LLC, a CLO
originally issued in November 2020 that is managed by Carlyle US
CLO 2020-2 LLC. At the same time, S&P withdrew its ratings on the
original class A-1a, A-1b, A-2, B, C, and D notes following payment
in full on the Nov. 23, 2021, refinancing date.

The replacement notes were issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which outlines the terms of the replacement notes.
According to the proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes
were issued at a lower spread over three-month LIBOR than the
original notes.

-- The original class A-1a and A-1b notes were combined into the
class A-1-R (floating-rate) notes and issued at a lower spread.

-- New class X and E-R notes were issued in connection with this
refinancing. The class X notes will be paid down using interest
proceeds over 11 payment periods, starting in April 2022.

-- The stated maturity date and the reinvestment period were both
extended four years, while the non-call period extended two years.

-- Of the identified underlying collateral obligations, 99.58%
have credit ratings (which may include confidential ratings,
private ratings, and credit estimates)assigned by S&P Global
Ratings.

-- Of the identified underlying collateral obligations, 92.32%
have recovery ratings (which may include confidential ratings,
private ratings, and credit estimates)assigned by S&P Global
Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Ratings Assigned

  Carlyle US CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Carlyle US CLO 2020-2 LLC

  Class X, $5.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1-R, $310.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-R, $70.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-R (deferrable), $30.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $30.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $17.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $7.80 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $40.45 million: NR

  Ratings Withdrawn

  Carlyle US CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Carlyle US CLO 2020-2 LLC

  Class A-1a to NR from 'AAA (sf)'
  Class A-1b to NR from 'AAA (sf)'
  Class A-2 to NR from 'AA (sf)'
  Class B to NR from 'A (sf)'
  Class C to NR from 'BBB- (sf)'
  Class D to NR from 'BB- (sf)'

  NR--Not rated.


CFMT 2021-FRR1: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on 6 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Multifamily Mortgage Certificate-Backed Certificates, Series
2021-FRR1 to be issued by CFMT 2021-FRR1:

-- Class A-K45 at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B-K45 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-K45 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class D-K45 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class A-K54 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-K54 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-K54 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class A-K58 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-K58 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-K58 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class A-KW01 at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B-KW01 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-KW01 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class D-KW01 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class A-K98 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-K98 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-K98 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class A-K99 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-K99 at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

This transaction is a re-securitization collateralized by the
beneficial interests in six commercial mortgage-backed pass-through
certificates from six underlying transactions: FREMF 2015-K45
Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2015-K45; FREMF 2016-K54 Mortgage Trust, Multifamily
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-K54; FREMF 2016-K58
Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2016-K58; FREMF 2019-K98 Mortgage Trust, Multifamily
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-K98; FREMF 2019-K99
Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2019-K99; and FREMF 2016-KW01 Mortgage Trust, Multifamily
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-KW01. The ratings
are dependent on the performance of the underlying transactions.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CFMT 2021-HB7: DBRS Gives Provisional B Rating on Class M5 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2021-3 to be issued by CFMT 2021-HB7,
LLC:

-- $545.8 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $63.6 million Class M1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $46.4 million Class M2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $43.1 million Class M3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $41.7 million Class M4 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $30.1 million Class M5 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating reflects 72.6% of the cumulative advance rate.
The AA (low) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (low) (sf), and
B (sf) ratings reflect 81.0%, 87.2%, 92.9%, 98.4%, and 102.5% of
the cumulative advance rates, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar did not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

Lenders typically offer reverse mortgage loans to people who are at
least 62 years old. Through reverse mortgage loans, borrowers have
access to home equity through a lump sum amount or a stream of
payments without periodically repaying principal or interest,
allowing the loan balance to accumulate over a period of time until
a maturity event occurs. Loan repayment is required (1) if the
borrower dies, (2) if the borrower sells the related residence, (3)
if the borrower no longer occupies the related residence for a
period (usually a year), (4) if it is no longer the borrower's
primary residence, (5) if a tax or insurance default occurs, or (6)
if the borrower fails to properly maintain the related residence.
In addition, borrowers must be current on any homeowner's
association dues if applicable. Reverse mortgages are typically
nonrecourse; borrowers don't have to provide additional assets in
cases where the outstanding loan amount exceeds the property's
value (the crossover point). As a result, liquidation proceeds will
fall below the loan amount in cases where the outstanding balance
reaches the crossover point, contributing to higher loss severities
for these loans.

As of the Cut-Off Date (September 30, 2021), the collateral has
approximately $752.2 million in unpaid principal balance (UPB) from
2,671 nonperforming home equity conversion mortgage (HECM) reverse
mortgage loans and real estate-owned (REO) properties secured by
first liens typically on single-family residential properties,
condominiums, townhomes, multifamily (two- to four-family)
properties, manufactured homes, and planned unit developments. The
mortgage assets were originally originated between 2004 and 2016.

The transaction uses a sequential structure. No subordinate note
shall receive any principal payments until the senior notes (Class
A notes) have been reduced to zero. This structure provides credit
enhancement in the form of subordinate classes and reduces the
effect of realized losses. These features increase the likelihood
that holders of the most senior class of notes will receive regular
distributions of interest and/or principal. All note classes have
available fund caps.

The Class M notes have principal lockout terms insofar as they are
not entitled to principal payments until after the expected final
payment of the upstream notes. Available cash will be trapped until
these dates at which stage the notes will start to receive
payments. Note that the DBRS Morningstar cash flow, as it pertains
to each note, models the first payment being received after these
dates for each of the respective notes; hence at the time of
issuance, these rules are not likely to affect the natural cash
flow waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CFMT TRUST 2021-AL1: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating to $23.32MM C-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by CFMT 2021-AL1 Trust. This is the inaugural auto
loan transaction sponsored by Cascade Funding, LP - Series 9
(Cascade, unrated). The sole general partner of Cascade is Cascade
Funding GP, LLC, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Waterfall Asset Management, LLC (Waterfall, unrated). The notes are
backed by a pool of retail automobile loan contracts originated by
KeyBank National Association, who is also the servicer for the
transaction

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CFMT 2021-AL1 Trust

$322,436,000, 1.39%, Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
(sf)

$27,362,000, 1.88%, Class C-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

$23,320,000, 3.02%, Class C-2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of KeyBank National
Association as the servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2021-AL1
pool is 1.00%. Moody's based its cumulative net loss expectation on
an analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the
historical performance of similar collateral, including
securitization performance and managed portfolio performance; the
ability of KeyBank National Association to perform the servicing
functions; and current expectations for the macroeconomic
environment during the life of the transaction.

At closing, the Class B, Class C-1 and Class C-2 notes are expected
to benefit from 2.66%, 1.75% and 1.00% of hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the Class B notes
consists of a combination of overcollateralization (OC), a reserve
account, and subordination. For Class C-1 notes, it is a
combination of OC and subordination. For Class C-2 notes, it is OC
only. The notes may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
September 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. Prepayments and interest collections directed
toward note principal payments will accelerate this build of
enhancement. Moody's expectation of pool losses could decline as a
result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the
value of the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment.
Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the US job market, the
market for used vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud.


CIFC FUNDING 2021-VII: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CIFC Funding 2021-VII
Ltd./CIFC Funding 2021-VII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by CIFC Asset Management LLC.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  CIFC Funding 2021-VII Ltd./CIFC Funding 2021-VII LLC

  Class X, $6.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1L, $100.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A1, $266.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $90.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $33.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $38.40 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $22.80 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $54.15 million: Not rated



CIG AUTO 2021-1: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes (the Notes) to be issued by CIG Auto Receivables Trust 2021-1
(CIGAR 2021-1):

-- $105,810,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $16,280,000 Class B Notes rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $8,140,000 Class C Notes rated AA (low) (sf)
-- $23,990,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $11,140,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is provided in the form of subordination,
OC, a fully funded reserve fund, and excess spread. Credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS Morningstar
expected loss assumptions under various stress scenarios for the
assigned ratings.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the rating addresses the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The CIG senior management team has considerable experience and
a successful track record within the auto finance industry, having
managed the company through multiple economic cycles.

-- The capabilities of CIG Financial, LLC (CIG) with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool
data for CIG originations and performance of the CIG auto loan
portfolio.

-- DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. While
considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the intensity and
duration of the shock, DBRS Morningstar-projected CNL includes an
assessment of the expected impact on consumer behavior. The DBRS
Morningstar CNL assumption is 11.55% based on the expected cut-off
date pool composition.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns," published on September 8, 2021. These baseline
macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's moderate and
adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic scenarios, which
were first published in April 2020. The baseline macroeconomic
scenarios reflect the view that, although COVID-19 remains a risk
to the outlook, uncertainty around the macroeconomic effects of the
pandemic has gradually receded. Current median forecasts considered
in the baseline macroeconomic scenarios incorporate some risks
associated with further outbreaks, but remain fairly positive on
recovery prospects given expectations of continued fiscal and
monetary policy support. The policy response to COVID-19 may
nonetheless bring other risks to the forefront in the coming months
and years.

-- The legal structure and expected presence of legal opinions
that will address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special purpose vehicle with CIG, that the
trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the assets,
and the consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria for
U.S. Structured Finance."

The CIGAR 2021-1 transaction represents the fourth public term
securitization of subprime auto loans and will offer both senior
and subordinate rated securities.

The rating on the Class A Note reflects the 39.25% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(34.75%), the Reserve Account (1.00%), and overcollateralization
(3.50%). The ratings on the Class B, C, D, and E Notes reflect
29.75%, 25.00%, 11.00%, and 4.50% of initial hard credit
enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CIM TRUST 2020-J1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-5 Bonds to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 29 classes
from four RMBS transactions issued by CIM Trust between 2018 to
2020. CIM 2018 Trust-INV1 is a securitization of fixed-rate
investment property mortgage loans secured by first liens on
agency-eligible non-owner occupied residential properties. The
other three transactions are securitizations of fixed rate, prime
jumbo and agency-eligible mortgage loans. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is
the master servicer.

A List of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3I5avMI.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIM Trust 2018-INV1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CIM Trust 2018-J1

Cl. A-19, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CIM Trust 2019-J2

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2019 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: CIM Trust 2020-J1

Cl. A-IO8*, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-IO2*, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2020
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades reflect the increased levels of credit
enhancement available to the bonds, the recent performance, and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. In these
transactions, high prepayment rates averaging 26%-70% over the last
six months, driven by the low interest rate environment, have
benefited the bonds by increasing the paydown and building credit
enhancement.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk posed by
borrowers enrolled in payment relief programs. Moody's increased
its MILAN model-derived median expected losses by 15% and Moody's
Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the performance deterioration resulting
from a slowdown in US economic activity due to the COVID-19
outbreak.

For transactions where more than 4% of the loans in pool have been
enrolled in payment relief programs for more than 3 months, Moody's
further increased the expected loss to account for the rising risk
of potential deferral losses to the subordinate bonds. Moody's also
considered higher adjustments for transactions where more than 10%
of the pool is either currently enrolled or was previously enrolled
in a payment relief program. Specifically, Moody's account for the
marginally increased probability of default for borrowers that have
either been enrolled in a payment relief program for more than 3
months or have already received a loan modification, including a
deferral, since the start of the pandemic.

Moody's will reduce the adjustment to pool losses in instances
where the collateral has demonstrated strong performance since the
start of the pandemic. For transactions where (1) the current
proportion of loans enrolled in payment relief programs is lower
than 2.5%, and (2) the proportion of loans that are cash flowing
today but were previously enrolled in a payment relief program
since the start of the pandemic is lower than 5%, Moody's increase
the median expected loss by 10% and Moody's Aaa loss by 2.5%. The
reduced adjustment reflects the assumption that pools with a higher
proportion of borrowers that continued to make payments throughout
the pandemic are likely to have lower default rates as COVID-19
continues to decline.

Moody's estimated the proportion of loans granted payment relief in
a pool based on a review of loan level cashflows. In Moody's
analysis, Moody's considered a loan to be enrolled in a payment
relief program if (1) the loan was not liquidated but took a loss
in the reporting period (to account for loans with monthly
deferrals that were reported as current), or (2) the actual balance
of the loan increased in the reporting period, or (3) the actual
balance of the loan remained unchanged in the last and current
reporting period, excluding interest-only loans and pay ahead
loans. Based on Moody's analysis, the proportion of borrowers that
are enrolled in payment relief plans in the underlying pools ranged
between 0%-4.6% over the last six months.

Given the pervasive financial strains tied to the pandemic,
servicers have been making advances on increased amount of
non-cash-flowing loans, sometimes resulting in interest shortfalls
due to insufficient funds in subsequent periods when such advances
are recouped. Moody's expect such interest shortfalls to be
reimbursed over the next several months.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicer.

The action reflects the coronavirus pandemic's residual impact on
the ongoing performance of residential mortgage loans as the US
economy continues on the path toward normalization. Economic
activity will continue to strengthen in 2021 because of several
factors, including the rollout of vaccines, growing household
consumption and an accommodative central bank policy. However,
specific sectors and individual businesses will remain weakened by
extended pandemic related restrictions.

Moody's regard the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC31: DBRS Confirms B(low) on G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC31 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-GC31 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes F and G to
Negative from Stable. All other trends remain Stable.

According to the September 2021 remittance, 48 of the original 50
loans remain in the trust, with loan repayments and scheduled
amortization resulting in a collateral reduction of 6.6% since
issuance. There are 10 defeased loans, representing 12.1% of the
current pool balance. Loans secured by office and mixed-use
property types represent the largest concentrations in the pool at
38.0% and 19.9% of the pool balance, respectively. As of the
September 2021 remittance, two loans, representing 2.4% of the
current pool balance, were in special servicing, and nine loans,
representing 33.4% of the current pool balance, were on the
servicer's watchlist. The watchlisted loans are being monitored for
low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) and/or occupancy issues,
some of which are related to disruptions caused by the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

The rating confirmations reflect DBRS Morningstar's generally
stable view of the credit risk for the larger pool, which benefits
from a relatively low percentage of loans secured by retail
properties (19.9% of the pool balance), and the overall stable
performance for the largest 15 loans in the pool, which
collectively represent 73.1% of the pool balance.

DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes F and G to Negative
from Stable largely as a reflection of the increased risk of loss
to the trust with the largest loan in special servicing, Crowne
Plaza Bloomington (Prospectus ID#16, 1.6% of the pool balance), and
the increased risks associated with the largest loan in the pool,
which is backed by an office tower in Chicago, as further discussed
below. The Crowne Plaza Bloomington loan is a pari passu loan that
is secured by a 430-key full-service hotel in the Minneapolis
suburb of Bloomington, Minnesota. The loan went 60 days delinquent
in October 2020 and was transferred to special servicing in
November 2020. A modification was approved that allowed for a
forbearance of payments due between August 2020 and August 2021,
but more recently, the special servicer's commentary states that a
discounted payoff (DPO) has been approved and is expected to close
in the near term. The terms of the DPO have not been provided to
DBRS Morningstar, but the low in-place cash flow that resulted in a
DSCR of -2.05 times (x) as of the trailing six months (T-6) ended
June 30, 2021, suggests the as-is value has fallen significantly
from issuance. In addition, hotel revenues were consistently
slightly below issuance expectations, with the YE2019 figure
approximately 3.4% below the issuer's estimate. Given the lack of
an updated appraisal and any concrete details surrounding the DPO,
DBRS Morningstar assumed a conservative liquidation scenario for
this loan as part of this review that suggested a loss severity of
approximately 40.0%.

The largest loan in the pool, 135 South LaSalle (Prospectus ID#1,
14.8% of the pool), was placed on the servicer's watchlist because
of the July 2021 lease expiration of the largest tenant, Bank of
America (BofA; 62.3% of the net rentable area (NRA)). The servicer
has confirmed that the tenant will vacate at lease expiration. The
loan is full term interest only (IO) through the 2025 anticipated
repayment date, with a final maturity date in 2030. The loan is
secured by a 1.3 million-square-foot Class A office property in
Chicago's Central Loop submarket. The loan was structured with a
cash flow sweep that was to begin 12 months prior to the BofA lease
expiration date; however, the loan documents also allowed for the
cash flow sweep requirement to be waived if the debt yield exceeded
10.0%, suggesting that a sweep will not be initiated until a debt
yield calculation is made based on the property cash flows without
the BofA rent. The servicer reports approximately $1.0 million in
tenant reserves on the loan. The loan is conservatively structured,
with the issuer's DSCR at 5.42x, and the most recent figures
reported by the servicer show an in-place DSCR of 4.94x for the T-6
period ended June 30, 2021. Based on the reported figures for 2021,
DBRS Morningstar expects the in-place coverage to fall well below
breakeven with the loss of BofA's rent.

Outside of BofA, the remaining tenancy is quite granular, with the
second-largest tenant representing just 1.4% of the NRA on a lease
through August 2024. DBRS Morningstar expects that the sponsor will
encounter significant difficulty securing a single tenant or a few
larger tenants to backfill the space to be vacated by BofA given
the soft submarket conditions and the general drop in demand that
has been seen amid the coronavirus pandemic. According to Reis, the
subject's Central Loop submarket reported a vacancy rate of 15.9%
as of Q2 2021, up from the Q4 2019 figure of 15.5%. Although the
vacancy increase amid the pandemic has been relatively muted, it is
noteworthy that vacancy had been on the rise in the few years prior
to 2020, with the vacancy rate increasing significantly in the two
years after it was reported at 13.4% for Q4 2017 as several larger
tenants vacated buildings in the Central Loop and moved to newer
projects in the West Loop. Reis forecasts that vacancy will
increase to 17.4% by 2023 before notching down over 2024 and 2025,
when the vacancy rate is forecast at 15.4%. Given these factors and
the significant cash flow drop that will be realized with the loss
of BofA, DBRS Morningstar applied a probability of default penalty
for this loan to increase the expected loss in the analysis for
this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC33: DBRS Confirms B Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC33 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-GC33 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed all 10
investment-grade-rated bonds from Under Review with Negative
Implications, where they were placed on August 6, 2021. In
addition, DBRS Morningstar has removed the Interest in Arrears
designation on all of the classes. Classes D, X-D, E, F, and G
carry Negative trends to reflect the continuing performance
challenges for the underlying collateral, many of which have been
driven by the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic. All other trends are Stable.

DBRS Morningstar initially placed the aforementioned classes Under
Review with Negative Implications and assigned the Interest in
Arrears designation as a result of interest shortfalls stemming
from the Hammons Hotel Portfolio (Prospectus ID#2, 10.4% of the
current pool balance) loan modification as reported in the July
2021 remittance. However, the servicer subsequently restated the
July 2021 remittance, which corrected the interest allocations for
the period and removed all of the interest shortfalls aside from
those affecting the nonrated Class H. Per the October 2021
remittance, interest shortfalls remain contained to Class H and
total approximately $1.1 million.

The Hammons Hotel Portfolio loan is secured by a pari passu
interest in a $250.8 million whole loan collateralized by a
portfolio of seven hotels, including five full-service, one
limited-service, and one extended-stay property. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in July 2020 after the borrower
requested mortgage relief as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.
In June 2021, the loan was brought current in conjunction with a
loan modification, which included two one-year maturity extension
options through September 2027, a $22.0 million equity infusion
from the borrower (with help from an institutional investor), and
the conversion to interest-only (IO) payments for the remainder of
the term. The conversion to IO was applied retroactively to April
2020, and the payments from April 2020 through December 2020 were
deferred with repayment of deferred amounts occurring in
one-eighteenth intervals beginning in October 2021.

Based on the trailing six-month financial reporting period ended
June 30, 2021, the loan reported an annualized net cash flow (NCF)
of $6.1 million, compared with $2.7 million at YE2020 and $29.1
million at YE2019. Historically, most of the hotels' demand has
been driven by meeting and group, and commercial demand; four of
the hotels are attached to convention centers and include a
leasehold interest in the underlying improvements. Despite
operational shortfalls, the individual hotels continue to perform
at the top of their respective competitive sets, reporting a
weighted-average revenue per available room penetration rate of
112.6% based on the most recent trailing three-month figures
available. The portfolio also benefits from a new sponsor after the
loan's former sponsor, John Q Hammons Company, filed for bankruptcy
protection in 2018, and the portfolio was later sold out of
bankruptcy to the prior owner's largest creditor, JDHQ Holding LP.

As of the October 2021 remittance, 62 of the original 64 loans
remain in the transaction, with an aggregate trust balance of
$896.7 million, representing a collateral reduction of 6.4% since
issuance. There have been no losses to date, and five loans,
representing 7.0% of the pool, are secured by collateral that has
been defeased. There is currently only one loan, the Houston Hotel
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#15, 1.4% of the pool), in special
servicing, which became real estate owned in August 2021. Based on
the September 2020 appraisal, the portfolio was valued at $9.9
million, reflecting a 45.6% decline compared with the issuance
value of $21.7 million and a loan-to-value ratio of 138.7% based on
the total loan exposure as of October 2021. DBRS Morningstar
anticipates a loss with the resolution of this loan in excess of
45.0%.

There are currently 22 loans, representing 39.4% of the current
pool balance, on the servicer's watchlist. Nine of these loans
(5.7% of the current pool) were added to the watchlist because of
non-performance-related items (deferred maintenance, delinquent
taxes, etc.), while the remaining 13 loans (33.7% of the current
pool balance) are being monitored for performance-related issues,
including low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs), increased
vacancy, near-term tenant rollover, and/or pandemic-related
hardships.

The largest loan in the pool, Illinois Center (Prospectus ID#1,
10.9% of the current pool balance), is secured by two adjoining
Class A office towers totaling 2.1 million square feet in the East
Loop submarket of downtown Chicago. This loan was added to the
watchlist in September 2021 following a decline in occupancy to
63.1%. Reis data shows that as of Q3 2021, the Eastern Loop
submarket had a vacancy rate of 14.7% with an average rental rate
of $25.41 per square foot (psf), while the greater market had
comparable figures of 19.7% and $24.33 psf, respectively. The
subject's average rental rate was $22.68 psf based on the June 2021
rent roll. Historically, occupancy at the property has been
volatile, but has generally hovered above 70.0%, peaking at 77.0%
in early 2018. The most notable tenants to vacate during the past
couple of years include Young & Rubicam (3.3% of the net rentable
area (NRA)) and Silker, Inc (1.6% of the NRA); otherwise, tenant
rollover has been fairly granular. Both the General Services
Administration (GSA; 8.4% of the NRA, expiring in November 2024)
and the Combined Insurance Company Of America (3.2% of the NRA,
expiring July 2024) recently extended their leases by three years
but downsized by 8,205 sf and 33,068 sf, respectively. In addition,
according to various news sources, the GSA has indicated that it
will be relocating at the end of their extended expiration.

The loan converted from IO payments in September 2020, placing
additional stress on the on the DSCR. As of Q2 2021, the loan
reported an NCF of $17.6 million (a DSCR of 1.12 times (x)),
compared with $19.0 million (a DSCR of 1.20x) at YE2020 and $23.8
million (a DSCR of 1.50x) at YE2019. Besides the decline in
occupancy, a number of tenants also received abatements during the
first half of 2020. Although cash flow and occupancy have recently
shown signs of stress, the borrower has access to $18.4 million in
reserves, including $8.8 million for tenant improvements and
leasing costs and $7.5 million in tenant reserves. DBRS Morningstar
analyzed the loan with an elevated probability of default given the
ongoing leasing struggles; however, the loan remains current. The
loan is sponsored by Michael Karfunkel, a principal of AmTrust
Realty Corp, which injected $139.9 million equity at issuance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-C7: DBRS Confirms B(low) on JRR Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-C7 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-C7 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-H at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class J-RR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Additionally, DBRS Morningstar assigned the
Interest in Arrears designation to Class J-RR for the interest
shortfalls incurred per the September 2021 remittance.

As of September 2021, one loan, Courtyard by Marriott New
Haven/Milford (Prospectus ID#41; 0.8% of the pool), was in special
servicing. Courtyard by Marriott New Haven/Milford is secured by a
121-key limited-service hotel in Orange, Connecticut. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in July 2020 because of monetary
default as a result of cash flow disruptions resulting from the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. At the time, the borrower
was in the midst of a $1 million performance improvement plan. The
property was appraised for $11.0 million in August 2020, a 29.0%
decrease from the issuance value of $15.5 million, implying a
current loan-to-value ratio of 87.1%. According to remittance
reports, the loan was in the midst of a modification for several
months before recently being finalized. Classes F through J-RR
experienced a cumulative interest shortfall of $287,000 stemming
from interest-clawback provisions agreed between the lender and the
borrower to bring the loan in line with the current amortization
schedule. As of the October 2021 remittance, the interest
shortfalls for classes F through H have been repaid and the loan
has been returned to the master servicer.

The current composition of the pool shows a moderate concentration
of hospitality and retail properties of around 9.0% and 18.1%,
respectively. These property types have been disproportionately
negatively affected by the coronavirus pandemic and pose slightly
elevated risks for the pool. The transaction is concentrated by
property type as 18 loans, representing 29.8% of the current pool
balance, are secured by multifamily assets.

As of the October 2021 remittance, all 55 original loans remain in
the pool. No loans have been defeased. There are 13 loans,
representing 31.7% of the current pool balance, on the servicer's
watchlist for a variety of reasons including low occupancy and low
debt service coverage ratio.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar assigned an investment-grade shadow
rating on 650 Madison Avenue (Prospectus ID#2, 4.4% of the pool)
and 805 3rd Avenue (Prospectus ID#3, 4.4% of the pool). With this
review, DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the performance of these
loans remain consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2020-420K: DBRS Confirms BB(high) on HRR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-420K issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2020-420K as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which remains in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations at issuance. The single-asset/single-borrower
transaction is collateralized by the borrower's fee-simple interest
in two Class A residential towers on the waterfront in the
Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. The $388.0 million
total debt package consists of a mortgage loan of $298.0 million
and a mezzanine loan of $90.0 million. The mortgage loan comprises
$216.9 million in senior notes and $81.1 million in junior notes.
The trust is made up of the $156.9 million senior A-1 note and the
$81.1 million junior B-1 note for an aggregate principal amount of
$238.0 million in the trust. The $60.0 million A-2 note is pari
passu with the senior note, but is held outside the trust
(contributed to the non-DBRS Morningstar-rated BMARK 2020-B21
conduit transaction). The mezzanine loan is not an asset of the
trust. The notes evidence a 10-year fixed rate interest-only loan,
maturing in November 2030, with no extension options. The total
proceeds of $388.0 million were used to refinance $381.5 of
existing debt, pay closing costs, fund upfront reserves, and return
equity to the sponsor.

The collateral consists of two 22-story luxury residential towers,
416 Kent and 420 Kent, located directly along the waterfront just
south of the Williamsburg Bridge. Both towers are built on one
base, which also has a combined 18,827 sf of commercial space. The
property has 857 units, with 468 units, or 54.6%, being studio
apartments. The remaining units include 202 one-bedroom units and
187 two-bedroom units. The property has extensive amenities with
two parking garages containing a total of 429 parking spaces,
rooftop pools, resident lounges, fitness center, yoga studios,
landscaped roof decks with outdoor lounges, wellness spa, lobby
coffee bar, billiard and gaming lounge, co-working lounges, common
dining areas with professional grade kitchens, library/quiet room,
concierge services, shuttle bus services, and bicycle storage.

Both the 416 Kent and 420 Kent portions of the development benefit
from significant 421-a tax exemptions during the loan term and, in
return, the developer has designated between 20% and 25% of the
units at each address as affordable (65 units at 416 Kent and 121
units at 420 Kent). The market rate units at 416 Kent generally are
not subject to any restrictions on rental rates, while the market
rate component at 420 Kent is subject to limits on rental rate
increases set by the NYC Rent Guidelines Board during the exemption
period. The tax abatements exempt each of the properties from 100%
of the taxes on the improvements and continue well past loan
maturity.

The properties were completed and began leasing up between January
2019 and September 2019, and were not fully stabilized at the time
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic broke out. At the time
of issuance in November 2020, the properties were 83.7% occupied.
The issuer noted that the borrower had been able to maintain
positive leasing momentum despite the pandemic and, as of the June
2021 rent roll, the property was 92.6% occupied, with an average
monthly rate of $3,483.83. This compares with the King's County
submarket vacancy rate of 3.2% and average asking rent of $1,847.62
as of Q2 2021, according to Reis data. During its initial analysis,
DBRS Morningstar concluded an in-place vacancy rate of 20.0%,
representing significant potential upside as the sponsor continues
to lease units. Additionally, although the borrower plans to assess
an additional amenity fee, in order to incentivize leasing during
the pandemic, the property has temporarily waived that fee. No
credit was given for the potential revenue from those amenity fees
but, as the sponsor begins to collect, those fees could represent
further upside.

DBRS Morningstar's net cash flow of $21.8 million and cap rate of
6.25% from issuance resulted in a DBRS Morningstar value of $348.6
million, a variance of 48.0% from the appraised value of $669.8
million at issuance. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies a loan to
value ratio (LTV) of 85.5% (111.3% for the combined whole loan and
mezzanine loan) compared with the LTV of 44.5% on the appraised
value at issuance.

The sponsor and guarantor for the mortgage loan is Eliot Spitzer,
the former governor of New York and the head of Spitzer
Enterprises, a real estate firm started by his father, Bernard
Spitzer. Spitzer Enterprises has a 60+ year history of developing,
owning, and managing real estate in New York City and Washington,
D.C. Spitzer Enterprises has completed nearly $1 billion in
financings over the past few years.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



COLD STORAGE 2020-ICE5: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class HRR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-ICE5 issued by Cold
Storage Trust 2020-ICE5:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (sf)
-- Class A-Y at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-Z at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-IO at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes A-Y, A-Z, and A-IO are CAST certificates that can be
exchanged for other classes of CAST certificates and vice versa.

The transaction is collateralized by the borrowers' fee-simple
interest in a portfolio of 46 industrial cold storage facilities in
the United States. The portfolio benefits from strong diversity
with a Herfindahl score of 30.4 by allocated loan amount. The
collateral spans across 19 states in multiple regions and favorable
markets near major population centers. The portfolio also
exemplifies diversity in terms of income and customer granularity
perspectives. At issuance, the top 10 customer accounts represented
29.9% of total revenue, with the largest account representing just
5.5%.

The borrowers amassed the portfolio in phases across seven
acquisitions dating from October 2019 to April 2020 and used
whole-loan proceeds to recapitalize the borrowers' interest in the
portfolio, which was unencumbered by secured debt.

The borrowers lease the properties (except for the Chicago Cold -
Bartlett property) to an operating company, Lineage Logistics, LLC
(Lineage), pursuant to six master leases. The rent from the master
leases is the sole source of cash flow to pay debt service for the
trust loan. The six master leases (collectively, the Master Leases)
are between the borrowers and affiliates of the borrowers. The
Master Leases allow the related master tenant (or subtenants of
such master tenant) or operators engaged by the master tenant or
subtenants to operate such properties.

The transaction also benefits from property quality and
functionality. The portfolio's properties generally exhibit
favorable ceiling heights, loading capacity, and temperature
configurations. The portfolio has a weighted-average clear height
of more than 30 feet, and it benefits from a very high proportion
of freezer space (80.4%, based on the appraisal). Freezer space
generally commands higher rents and valuations and is more flexible
through down-conversion to refrigeration temperatures when
necessary to accommodate customer demand.

Cold storage properties require specialized knowledge and expertise
to operate effectively. Therefore, the pool of potential buyers may
be more limited than traditional warehouse facilities. Furthermore,
a substantial component of the portfolio's value depends on
Lineage's client roster and extensive industry expertise.

The mortgage loan is interest only through the five-year fully
extended term and does not benefit from deleveraging through
amortization.

The loan is currently on the servicer's watchlist for a
force-placed insurance advance. The loan is otherwise performing in
line with issuance expectations. The servicer reported a T-12 ended
June 2021 net cash flow (NCF) of $132.1 million, which exceeds DBRS
Morningstar's assumed NCF at issuance of $122.5 million. As of the
T-12 ended June 2021, the loan had a debt service coverage ratio of
5.30 times.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



COMM 2013-CCRE7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE7 issued by COMM
2013-CCRE7 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes E and F to Negative
from Stable. Class G's trend is Negative and has been since
December 10, 2020. All other trends are Stable. The Negative trends
reflect DBRS Morningstar's concerns with several loans on the
servicer's watchlist and in special servicing, most notably the
Lakeland Square Mall (Prospectus ID #2, 12.9% of the pool), which
were analyzed with elevated expected losses. Additionally,
refinance risk could pose a problem with all remaining loans
scheduled to mature in 2023.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the pool consisted of 59 loans
with an initial balance of $936.2 million. As of the October 2021
remittance, there has been collateral reduction of 51.7% as a
result of loan repayment, liquidations, and scheduled amortization.
Fifteen loans have been repaid in full since issuance and one loan,
Sunset Plaza (Prospectus ID #28), was liquidated in July 2021 with
a $2.4 million loss, representing a loss severity of approximately
34.5%. The transaction benefits from a high concentration of
defeasance, with 12 loans defeased, representing 25.5% of the
remaining pool balance. As of the October 2021 remittance, there
are two loans, representing 3.6% of the pool, in special servicing,
and 13 loans, representing 49.0% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist.

The largest and most pivotal loan on the servicer's watchlist is
the largest remaining loan in the pool, Lakeland Square Mall. The
loan is secured by 535,937 square feet (sf) of in-line and anchor
space in an 883,290-sf regional mall in Lakeland, Florida, 35 miles
east of Tampa. The loan is sponsored by Brookfield Properties. This
loan was initially added to the servicer's watchlist in June 2020
after the borrower made a Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)-relief
request. As of July 2021, the loan is being monitored for low debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR), which was reported at 1.10 times (x)
in the T-6 period ended June 30, 2021, and 1.45x as of YE2020.
While the current DSCR is partially a result of the pandemic as a
number of tenants were granted rent deferrals, the loan's
performance had fallen short of issuance expectations pre-pandemic,
consistently reporting net cash flow (NCF) below the issuer's
underwritten NCF of $7.1 million, with 2019's NCF reported at $6.3
million. Collateral occupancy was most recently reported at 94% in
March 2021 and 95% as of YE2020.

Since 2017, two of the mall's noncollateral anchor stores, Sears
and Macy's, have closed and no replacement tenants have been
signed. Remaining anchors include Dillard's (noncollateral),
JCPenney (19.4% of the net rentable area (NRA), lease through
November 2025), Burlington Coat Factory (15.3% of the NRA, lease
through January 2023), and Cinemark (8.8% of the NRA, lease through
February 2024). As noted above, several tenants received rent
deferrals as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, including
Cinemark and Urban Air Adventure Park (7.8% of the NRA, lease
through September 2028). Cinemark received rent deferral from April
2020 through September 2020 and recommenced full rent payments in
October 2020. It is scheduled to repay the deferred rent in 18
payments commencing in June 2021. Similarly, Urban Air Adventure
Park received various rent abatements and deferrals totaling
approximately $367,000. This amount shall be repaid in 18 payments
commencing January 2022. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with
an elevated probability of default.

The two loans in special servicing include NCH Portfolio
(Prospectus ID #25, 2.1% of the pool) and Tifton Plaza (Prospectus
ID #33, 1.6% of the pool). The larger loan, NCH Portfolio, is
secured by a portfolio of three limited service hotels with a
combined 222 rooms located in rural and tertiary markets in
Illinois, North Dakota, and Minnesota. The loan transferred to
special servicing in April 2020 for imminent default following the
borrower's coronavirus relief request. This loan has been
underperforming for several years, with DSCRs just above 1.00x.
Performance declines since issuances have been driven by falling
demand near the Bakken oil formation in North Dakota and the loss
of various corporate accounts. The loan has been reported as
current throughout the pandemic and a loan modification was
approved to allow for furniture, fixtures, and equipment funds to
be used to cover operating shortfalls. The special servicer
commentary notes that a return to the master servicer is pending.
DSCR was reported at 0.63x as of June 2021, unchanged from YE2020.
DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with an elevated probability of
default.

The Tifton Plaza loan is secured by a 220,165-sf anchored retail
center in Tifton, Georgia, 92 miles northeast of Tallahassee,
Florida. This loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020
due to payment default and remains delinquent as of the October
2021 remittance. A loan modification was approved to allow the
sponsor to use leasing reserves to fund operating shortfalls and,
as of October 2021, the loan reports total reserves of $104,000.
According to the special servicer, the current workout strategy
entails the borrower repaying delinquent amounts throughout 2021
with a contingent waiver of late charges and default interest. The
subject property is anchored by Belk (21.6% of the NRA, lease
through February 2024), Ollie's Bargain Outlet (15.5% of the NRA,
lease through March 2026), and TJMaxx (10.9% of the NRA, lease
through October 2022). Other large tenants include Bealls Outlet,
AMC Theatres, and JoAnn Fabrics. The property was reappraised in
December 2020 for $4.3 million, representing a 63.4% decline from
the issuance value of $11.6 million. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this
loan assuming a liquidation scenario, resulting in an implied loss
severity exceeding 60.0%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



COMM 2014-CCRE14: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-CCRE14 issued by COMM
2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at B (low) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Class F, which does not
carry a trend.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect the overall
stable performance of the transaction. Per the September 2021
remittance, 43 of the original 60 loans remain in the transaction,
with a trust balance of $986.3 million, representing a collateral
reduction of 28.4% since issuance as a result of loan repayments,
scheduled amortization, and proceeds from liquidated loans. In
August 2021, the McKinley Mall (2.0% of the issuance trust)
incurred a realized loss of $19.7 million (loss severity of 81.4%),
slightly less than DBRS Morningstar's projection of $20.8 million
(loss severity of 85.9%). In total, five loans have been liquidated
from the trust, resulting in a $31.1 million writedown to the
nonrated Class G.

The transaction has a high concentration of office collateral, as
11 loans, representing 47.4% of the pool, are secured by office
properties, which have shown greater resiliency to cash flow
declines during the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic,
although the full impact on the office segment remains to be seen
as companies begin to have their employees return to offices. This
office concentration includes the pool's three-largest loans,
comprising a telecommunications data center in lower Manhattan in
New York (60 Hudson Street; Prospectus ID#2, 15.7% of the pool),
Google and Amazon Office Portfolio (Prospectus ID#1, 14.9% of the
pool balance), and the fee interest in the land underneath 625
Madison Avenue (Prospectus ID#3, 11.1% of the pool balance).
Additionally, nine loans, representing 13.0% of the pool, are
defeased.

According to the September 2021 remittance, 11 loans, representing
30.4% of the pool, are currently on the servicer's watchlist. These
loans are being monitored for various reasons, including low debt
service coverage ratios (DSCR) or occupancy, tenant rollover risk,
and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests. Five of these loans,
representing 7.2% of the pool, are secured by hotel assets that
have all received pandemic-related forbearances.

Two loans, representing 1.8% of the pool, are in special servicing.
These two loans, Hampton Inn Cranberry Township Pittsburgh
(Prospectus ID#35, 0.9% of the pool) and Hampton Inn Pittsburgh
Greentree (Prospectus ID#36, 0.9% of the pool), are both secured by
limited-service hotels in Pittsburgh. The loans, which share
related borrower entities, transferred to special servicing in the
last 12 months for imminent monetary default related to pandemic,
with workout discussions listed as ongoing. Both loans had seen
significant drops in net cash flow prior to the pandemic, primarily
from a glut of new supply in the market. DBRS Morningstar increased
the probability of default (PoD) for these loans.

The third-largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, 175 West
Jackson (Prospectus ID#8, 3.8% of the pool), is secured by a
22-storey, 1.54 million-square-foot (sf) office tower in the
Chicago central business district. The loan has severely
underperformed since issuance and transferred to the special
servicer in 2018 because of a below-breakeven DSCR. The loan
transferred back to the master servicer in September 2018 after
Brookfield Asset Management (Brookfield) acquired the property for
$305 million ($218/sf) in 2018, or 26% lower than the at-issuance
appraised value. Occupancy minimally improved to 63% as of March
2021 from 61% as of YE2018. According to the servicer, the sponsor
had a lot of leasing activity planned in 2020, but given the
fallout from the pandemic, there has been very little leasing in
the Central Loop submarket, which reported a vacancy rate of 15.4%
as of Q3 2021. As of Q1 2021, the loan reported an annualized
coverage of 0.34 times (x) compared with 0.52x at YE2020 given the
increased vacancy and 12 months of rental abatements given to
Sedgwick (9.1% of net rentable area, expiring May 2033) upon its
lease renewal. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan with an elevated
PoD given the ongoing leasing struggles; however, the loan remains
current.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



COMM 2014-UBS6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-D Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-UBS6 issued by COMM
2014-UBS6 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at C (sf)

The trends on Classes X-C, D, E, X-D, and F are Negative. The
rating on Class G does not carry a trend. All other trends are
Stable. At last review, in December 2020, DBRS Morningstar
downgraded Classes X-C, D, E, X-D, and F and they all carried
Negative trends. The Negative trends continue to reflect concerns
largely surrounding the loans in special servicing and otherwise
showing performance declines that, in some cases, were driven by
the effects of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 89 fixed rate loans,
secured by 267 commercial and multifamily properties, with an
original principal balance of $1.28 billion. As of the October 2021
remittance, 76 loans remain, with a current pool balance of $1.06
billion, representing a collateral reduction of 17.3%. To date, two
loans, Cray Plaza (Prospectus ID #27) and Black Gold Suites Hotel
Portfolio (Prospectus ID #42), have been liquidated with total
realized losses to the trust of $18.1 million, which has been
contained to Class H, which DBRS Morningstar does not rate. The
pool benefits from 13 loans (representing 9.7% of the current
pool), which are fully defeased. Loans secured by retail properties
account for the largest concentration by property type,
representing over 30.0% of the current pool balance, with loans
backed by lodging properties showing the second-highest
concentration, at approximately 18.0% of the current pool balance.
The concentration of retail and lodging properties exposes the pool
to greater risk as those property types have generally been more
affected by pandemic-related performance issues than other property
types.

As of the October 2021 reporting, there were seven loans in special
servicing (representing 10.0% of the current pool) and 19 loans
being monitored on the servicer's watchlist (representing 26.8% of
the current pool). The specially serviced loans include four loans
backed by lodging properties and one loan secured by a retail
property. Each of the loans in special servicing was in special
servicing at the time of DBRS Morningstar's review in December
2020, as well, and each is at least 90 days delinquent. Three of
the specially serviced loans are past their respective scheduled
maturity dates.

The largest loan in special servicing, University Village
(Prospectus ID #5; 3.6% of the current pool balance), is secured by
the borrower's fee-simple interest in a 456-unit (1,164-bed)
student housing complex located less than two miles from the
University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa. The loan transferred to
special servicing in July 2019 for imminent default, with the
sponsor noting preleasing was negatively affected by numerous
shootings and criminal activity at the property, with the preleased
rate only reaching 44.8% for the coming 2019–2020 academic year
at the time of the loan's transfer, one month before the fall 2019
semester was set to begin. A receiver was installed in 2019 and
workout negotiations have been ongoing since the loan's transfer.
The receiver has been working to improve property performance and
rebranded the complex with a new name as the property is now known
as The Path @ Tuscaloosa. Updated financial information has been
limited, but the special servicer's most recent commentary noted
that the property was only 46.3% occupied as of July 2021, down
from 96.3% at issuance. Further, as of July 2021, the property was
only 33.3% preleased for the 2021–2022 school year. An updated
appraisal was received in March 2020, which valued the property at
$24.3 million, down 59.8% from the issuance appraised value, and
well below the total exposure of $46.3 million as of the October
2021 remittance. The resulting loan-to-value ratio based on the
March 2020 appraised value is 164.0%. It is unclear why the special
servicer has not provided an updated appraisal given the March 2020
figure is now well over a year old, but it is unlikely there has
been an improvement given the recent occupancy metrics reported by
the servicer, as previously noted. In its analysis, DBRS
Morningstar assumed a haircut to the March 2020 appraised value and
liquidated the loan from the trust, resulting in a modeled loss
severity approaching 80.0%.

The other nine specially serviced loans in the pool were either
analyzed with a loss scenario based on the most recent appraised
value and DBRS Morningstar's expected loss severity at resolution
or, in cases where a workout was expected that would return the
loan to the master servicer, a probability of default (PD) penalty
was applied to reflect the performance and/or value declines for
the underlying collateral since issuance. In total, DBRS
Morningstar assumed liquidation losses of approximately $35.0
million with this review.

The largest loan being monitored on the servicer's watchlist,
University Edge (Prospectus ID #7; 3.3% of the current pool
balance), is secured by the borrower's fee-simple interest in a
newly constructed 148-unit (578 bed) luxury student housing
project, directly across the street from the University of Akron,
in Akron, Ohio. The property, which was built between 2013 and
2014, also includes 18,380 square feet of street level retail, with
largest tenant (Chipotle Mexican Grill) occupying 13.3% of the
retail portion's net rentable area. The loan was added to the
servicer's watchlist in August 2020 and as of the October 2021
reporting, it was being monitored for a low debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and resulting activation of cash management. Property
performance has been declining since it peaked in 2016 and dipped
below the issuance figures starting with the YE2019 reporting,
trends that were exacerbated by the expiration of an initial
interest-only (IO) period in 2019. The YE2019 and YE2020 net cash
flow figures were down 6.2% and 40.3% from the issuance figure,
respectively, and the servicer most recently reported a DSCR of
0.66 times for the annualized June 2021 reporting period. The June
2021 rent roll showed an occupancy rate of 87.5% for the apartments
and an occupancy rate of 80.8% for the retail component. The
performance trends have generally been attributed to declining
enrollment at the University of Akron, which was down by 28.8% for
the fall 2020 semester as compared with the fall 2014 semester. The
loan remains current and to date, no relief request has been
reported by the servicer. Given the sustained performance declines,
DBRS Morningstar applied a PD penalty in the analysis for this
review, significantly increasing the expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2021-R01: DBRS Gives (P) BB Rating on 4 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS), Series 2021-R01 Notes to be
issued by Connecticut Avenue Securities Trust 2021-R01 (CAS
2021-R01):

-- $274.7 million Class 1M-1 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1M-2A at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1M-2B at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1M-2C at BBB (sf)
-- $240.4 million Class 1M-2 at BBB (sf)
-- $188.9 million Class 1B-1A at BB (high) (sf)
-- $188.9 million Class 1B-1B at BB (sf)
-- $377.8 million Class 1B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-A1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1A-I1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-A2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1A-I2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-A3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1A-I3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-A4 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1A-I4 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-B1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1B-I1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-B2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1B-I2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-B3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1B-I3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-B4 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1B-I4 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-C1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1C-I1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-C2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1C-I2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-C3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1C-I3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1E-C4 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1C-I4 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-D1 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-D2 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-D3 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-D4 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-D5 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-F1 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-F2 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-F3 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-F4 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1E-F5 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-X1 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-X2 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-X3 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-X4 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-Y1 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-Y2 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-Y3 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-Y4 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1-J1 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1-J2 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1-J3 at BBB (sf)
-- $80.1 million Class 1-J4 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-K1 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-K2 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-K3 at BBB (sf)
-- $160.3 million Class 1-K4 at BBB (sf)
-- $240.4 million Class 1M-2Y at BBB (sf)
-- $240.4 million Class 1M-2X at BBB (sf)
-- $377.8 million Class 1B-1Y at BB (sf)
-- $377.8 million Class 1B-1X at BB (sf)

Classes 1M-2, 1A-I1, 1A-I2, 1A-I3, 1A-I4, 1E-A1, 1E-A2, 1E-A3,
1E-A4, 1B-I1, 1B-I2, 1B-I3, 1B-I4, 1E-B1, 1E-B2, 1E-B3, 1E-B4,
1C-I1, 1C-I2, 1C-I3, 1C-I4, 1E-C1, 1E-C2, 1E-C3, 1E-C4, 1E-D1,
1E-D2, 1E-D3, 1E-D4, 1E-D5, 1E-F1, 1E-F2, 1E-F3, 1E-F4, 1E-F5,
1-J1, 1-J2, 1-J3, 1-J4, 1-K1, 1-K2, 1-K3, 1-K4, 1-X1, 1-X2, 1-X3,
1-X4, 1-Y1, 1-Y2, 1-Y3, 1-Y4, 1M-2Y, 1M-2X, 1B-1, 1B-1Y, and 1B-1X
are Related Combinable and Recombinable Notes (RCR Notes). Classes
1A-I1, 1A-I2, 1A-I3, 1A-I4, 1B-I1, 1B-I2, 1B-I3, 1B-I4, 1C-I1,
1C-I2, 1C-I3, 1C-I4, 1-X1, 1-X2, 1-X3, 1-X4, 1-Y1, 1-Y2, 1-Y3,
1-Y4, 1M-2X, and 1B-1X are interest-only RCR Notes.

The BBB (high) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (high) (sf), and BB (sf) ratings
reflect 1.600%, 1.250%, 0.975%, and 0.700% of credit enhancement,
respectively. Other than the specified classes above, DBRS
Morningstar does not rate any other classes in this transaction.

CAS 2021-R01 is the 40th benchmark transaction in the CAS series.
The Notes are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a
certain reference pool (the Reference Pool) of residential mortgage
loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed mortgage-backed
securities.

As of the Cut-Off Date, the Reference Pool consists of 246,836
greater-than-20-year fully amortizing first-lien fixed-rate
mortgage loans underwritten to a full documentation standard, with
original loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 60% and less than
or equal to 80%. The mortgage loans were estimated to be originated
on or after February 2020 and were securitized by Fannie Mae
between October 1, 2020, and January 31, 2021.

On the Closing Date, the trust will enter into a Collateral
Administration Agreement (CAA) with Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae, as the
credit protection buyer, will be required to make transfer amount
payments. The trust is expected to use the aggregate proceeds
realized from the sale of the Notes to purchase certain eligible
investments to be held in a securities account. The eligible
investments are restricted to highly rated, short-term investments.
Cash flow from the Reference Pool will not be used to make any
payments; instead, a portion of the eligible investments held in
the securities account will be liquidated to make principal
payments to the Noteholders and return amount, if any, to Fannie
Mae upon the occurrence of certain specified credit events and
modification events.

The coupon rates for the Notes are based on the Secured Overnight
Financing Rate (SOFR). There are replacement provisions in place in
the event that SOFR is no longer available. DBRS Morningstar did
not run interest rate stresses for this transaction, as the
interest is not linked to the performance of the reference
obligations. Instead, the trust will use the net investment
earnings on the eligible investments together with Fannie Mae's
transfer amount payments to pay interest to the Noteholders.

In this transaction, approximately 43.56% of the loans were
originated using property values determined by using Fannie Mae's
Appraisal Waiver (AW) rather than a traditional full appraisal.
Loans where the AW is offered generally have better credit
attributes.

Notable Changes

This transaction incorporates the following notable changes:

(1) Unlike prior CAS transactions, the minimum credit enhancement
test—one of the two performance tests—is not set to fail at the
Closing Date. This will allow rated nonsenior classes to receive
principal payments from the first Payment Date.

(2) Nonsenior rated tranches will now be locked out from receiving
principal payments if any of the performance tests fail. In prior
CAS transactions, nonsenior rated tranches were allocated scheduled
principal even when the performance tests were not satisfied.

(3) CAS 2021-R01 is the first CAS transaction where the coupon
rates for the various notes are based on the SOFR, whereas the
coupon rates for prior transactions were based on Libor.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
actual principal collected on the Reference Pool. Starting with
this transaction, there has been a revision to principal
allocation. The scheduled principal in prior transactions was
allocated pro rata between the senior and nonsenior (mezzanine and
subordinate) tranches, regardless of deal performance, while the
unscheduled principal was allocated pro rata subject to certain
performance tests being met. Starting with CAS 2021-R01
transaction, the scheduled and unscheduled principal will be
combined and only be allocated pro rata between the senior and
nonsenior tranches if the performance tests are satisfied.

Additionally, the nonsenior tranches will also be entitled to
supplemental subordinate reduction amount if the offered reference
tranche percentage increases above 5.50%.

The interest payments for these transactions are not linked to the
performance of the reference obligations except to the extent that
modification losses have occurred.

The Notes will be scheduled to mature on the payment date in
October 2041 but will be subject to mandatory redemption prior to
the scheduled maturity date upon the termination of the CAA.

The administrator and trustor of the transaction will be Fannie
Mae. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Negative trend and R-1
(high) with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the
Indenture Trustee, Exchange Administrator, Custodian and Investment
Agent. U.S. Bank National Association (rated AA (high) with a
Stable trend and R-1 (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as the Delaware Trustee.

The Reference Pool consists of approximately 1.1% of loans
originated under the Home Ready program. HomeReady is Fannie Mae's
affordable mortgage product designed to expand the availability of
mortgage financing to creditworthy low- to moderate-income
borrowers.

If a reference obligation is refinanced under the High LTV
Refinance Program, then the resulting refinanced reference
obligation may be included in the Reference Pool as a replacement
of the original reference obligation. The High LTV Refinance
Program provides refinance opportunities to borrowers with existing
Fannie Mae mortgages who are current in their mortgage payments but
whose LTV ratios exceed the maximum permitted for standard
refinance products. The refinancing and replacement of a reference
obligation under this program will not constitute a credit event.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies
for many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset
classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of forbearance,
which are generally short-term periods of payment relief, that may
perform differently from traditional delinquencies. At the onset of
coronavirus, the option to forebear mortgage payments was widely
available, driving forbearances to an elevated level. When the dust
settled, loans with coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid and
acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in general. Across
nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months, delinquencies have
been gradually trending downward, as forbearance periods come to an
end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CPS AUTO 2021-D: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2021-D:

-- $189,000,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $44,460,000 Class B Notes at AA (high) (sf)
-- $37,801,000 Class C Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- $39,240,000 Class D Notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $38,701,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization
(OC), subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund, and excess
spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption
under various stress scenarios.

-- The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 14.80%, based on the
expected cut-off date pool composition.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns," published on September 8, 2021. These baseline
macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's moderate and
adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic scenarios, which
were first published in April 2020. The baseline macroeconomic
scenarios reflect the view that, although COVID-19 remains a risk
to the outlook, uncertainty around the macroeconomic effects of the
pandemic has gradually receded. Current median forecasts considered
in the baseline macroeconomic scenarios incorporate some risks
associated with further outbreaks, but remain fairly positive on
recovery prospects given expectations of continued fiscal and
monetary policy support. The policy response to COVID-19 may
nonetheless bring other risks to the forefront in the coming months
and years..

(2) The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

(3) The consistent operational history of Consumer Portfolio
Services, Inc. (CPS or the Company) and the strength of the overall
Company and its management team.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and
a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

(4) The capabilities of CPS with regard to originations,
underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar performed an operational review of CPS and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
servicer.

(5) DBRS Morningstar exclusively used the static pool approach
because CPS has enough data to generate a sufficient amount of
static pool projected losses.

-- DBRS Morningstar was conservative in the loss forecast analysis
it performed on the static pool data.

(6) The Company indicated that there is no material pending or
threatened litigation.

(7) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the nonconsolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that the trust has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets, and the consistency
with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured
Finance."

CPS is an independent full-service automotive financing and
servicing company that provides (1) financing to borrowers who do
not typically have access to prime credit-lending terms for the
purchase of late-model vehicles and (2) refinancing of existing
automotive financing.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 48.50% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool
(44.50%), the reserve account (1.00%), and OC (3.00%). The ratings
on the Class B, C, D, and E Notes reflect 36.15%, 25.65%, 14.75%,
and 4.00% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CSAIL 2015-C4: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C4 issued by CSAIL 2015-C4
Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect the overall
stable performance of the transaction. Per the September 2021
remittance, 85 of the original 87 loans remain in the transaction,
with a trust balance of $857.9 million, representing a collateral
reduction of 8.7% since issuance as a result of loan repayments,
scheduled amortization, and the liquidation of one loan. In
addition, 13 loans, representing 8.8% of the current pool balance,
are defeased.

The pool is relatively diverse, as no loan represents more than
5.0% of the current pool balance, with the exception of the largest
loan, Fairmont Orchid (Prospectus ID#1, 13.1% of the current pool
balance). The pool has a high concentration of retail and
hospitality properties, representing 32.3% and 22.4% of the current
pool balance, respectively, which is noteworthy as these property
types have been most acutely affected by the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. Based on YE2020 reporting, retail and
hospitality loans (excluding defeasance and the Fairmont Orchid
loan) reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.61 times (x) and 0.81x, respectively.

According to the September 2021 remittance, there are two loans in
special servicing: 120 NE 39th Street Miami (Prospectus ID#14, 2.0%
of the current pool balance) and Dorsey Business Center III
(Prospectus ID#48, 0.7% of the current pool balance). Another loan,
Richmond Highlands Center (Prospectus ID#56, 0.6% of the current
pool balance) is listed as 30+ days delinquent. The 120 NE 39th
Street Miami loan, secured by a freestanding two-storey
4,079-square-foot (sf) retail building in the Design District of
Miami, transferred to special servicing in April 2020 after the
sole tenant, retailer Stefano Ricci, closed as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic and subsequently stopped making rent payments.
The sponsor, Thor Equities, filed an eviction notice, which the
tenant contested. The tenant subsequently pledged to pay all back
due rent once the courts rule on an amount. While foreclosure was
being pursued, the borrower resumed making debt service payments in
April 2021 and a loan modification was agreed upon in August 2021.
The loan is still listed as delinquent; however, the modification
agreement states that the borrower will cure all delinquent
payments, and cover any accrued interest and any fees associated
with the workout. DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of
default for this loan given its current status.

According to the September 2021 remittance, there are 18 loans,
representing 24.6% of the current pool balance, on the servicer's
watchlist. Four of these loans (4.0% of the current pool balance)
were added to the servicer's watchlist because of deferred
maintenance, while the remaining 14 loans (20.6% of the current
pool balance) are being monitored for performance-related issues,
including low DSCRs, increased vacancy, near-term tenant rollover,
and/or pandemic-related hardships. Excluding the Fairmont Orchid
loan, these 13 loans had a WA DSCR of 1.44x based on the most
recent reportingly (primarily Q1 and Q2 2021 annualized figures),
an improvement from 0.86x at YE2020.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Fairmont Orchid, is
secured by a full-service beach resort hotel totaling 540 keys on
Big Island in Hawaii. Hotel operations ceased in March 2020 in
response to the coronavirus pandemic, but the borrower has been
keeping loan payments current despite reporting negative cash flow
in 2020. While coverage has moderately improved to 0.82x as of Q2
2021, the property's trailing three-month revenue per available
room penetration rate ended in July 2021 was only 72.2%, compared
with the YE2019 (pre-pandemic) figure of 96.4%, indicating that
performance has not fully recovered; however, the travel season is
generally busiest from December through April, which will help to
increase occupancy levels and performance over the next couple of
months with travel restrictions becoming more relaxed. DBRS
Morningstar believes the sponsor is deeply committed to the
collateral given the $122.5 million of equity injected at
issuance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CSWF TRUST 2018-TOP: DBRS Hikes Class H Certs Rating to BB(low)
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded its ratings on four classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-TOP issued by CSWF
Trust 2018-TOP as follows:

-- Class E to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class F to A (high) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class G to BBB (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class H to BB (low) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS Morningstar also discontinued the
rating on Class D due to full repayment with the September 2021
remittance.

The ratings upgrades are reflective of the continued release of
collateralized properties and the resultant prepayments to the
trust. In total, nine properties have been released since issuance,
reducing the deal's balance by 71.8%. One of those properties was
released since DBRS Morningstar's most recent review in July 2021,
resulting in $25.6 million passing through the trust's waterfall,
repaying Class D in full, and considerably paying down Class E.

The loan and deal structures include a number of features that were
designed to adjust as the loan pays down. At the deal level,
prepayment proceeds on the first 20.0% of the pool balance were to
be distributed pro rata, with proceeds above that threshold to be
distributed sequentially. With the repayments as of April 2021, the
20.0% threshold was met and the sequential payment structure is now
being followed. In addition, there was a tiered property release
premium that was increased from the initial requirement of 105.0%
of the allocated principal balance to 115.0% of the allocated
principal balance with the property releases as of April 2021.

The transaction sponsor, TPG Real Estate's TPG Real Estate Partners
Fund II, used the collateral loan to acquire and recapitalize the
fee-simple and leasehold interests in a portfolio of 15 mostly
single-tenant Class A office properties totaling 3.1 million square
feet (sf) in 11 states. The loan facilitated the sponsor's (1)
buyout of Gramercy Property Trust's (GPT) interest in Strategic
Office Partners, a joint venture between the sponsor and GPT, and
(2) its acquisition of four of the original assets included in the
portfolio. The six properties remaining in the trust total 1.4
million sf and are primarily located in secondary markets across
the U.S. including Charlotte, North Carolina; San Bernardino,
California; Tampa, Florida; Tempe, Arizona; San Antonio, Texas; and
Lawrenceville, Georgia. Major tenants in the remaining properties
include Bank of America; Wells Fargo; Bristol Myers Squibb Company;
and Amazon.com, Inc. According to the servicer, the borrower
exercised its second one-year extension to extend the maturity to
August 2022.

For the purposes of this analysis, DBRS Morningstar considered both
a base-case stress and an upgrade stress on the property values for
the remaining collateral. The base-case stress was based on the
values derived by DBRS Morningstar as part of the rating actions
taken in April 2020, when DBRS Morningstar assigned the ratings.
The resulting value is $223.2 million, a -13.6% variance from the
aggregate appraised value of the remaining properties at issuance.
The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) for the remaining
properties is $18.4 million, a -4.6% variance from the Issuer's
NCF, and implies an 8.2% weighted-average cap rate on the pool. The
upgrade stress assumed a 20.0% haircut to the base-case values
given the increased concentration risk for the remaining collateral
and the continued unknowns posed by the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic.

DBRS Morningstar made negative qualitative adjustments to the final
loan-to-value sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis,
totaling -4.0% to account for cash flow volatility, property
quality, and market fundamentals.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



DBGS 2018-C1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-RR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-C1 issued by DBGS 2018-C1
Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trend on Class G-RR to Negative from
Stable. All other trends are Stable. The Negative trend reflects
DBRS Morningstar's concerns with the specially serviced loans,
which make up 7.0% of the current pool, up from 1.9% in November
2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the transaction's overall stable
performance since issuance, when the transaction consisted of 37
fixed-rate loans secured by 102 commercial and multifamily
properties, with a trust balance of $1.1 billion. According to the
October 2021 remittance report, all loans remain in the pool and
there has been an immaterial reduction in the trust balance since
issuance given the limited amortization to date.

The transaction has a high concentration of office collateral, as
13 loans, representing 37.8% of the pool, are secured by office
properties. The office sector has thus far shown greater resiliency
to cash flow declines during the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic, although the full impact on the office segment remains to
be seen as companies begin to have their employees return to
offices. The remaining concentrations include 14 loans secured by
retail collateral, representing 30.1% of the pool, and three loans
secured by mixed-use collateral, representing 13.1% of the pool.
Additionally, nine loans, representing 36.3% of the pool, were
shadow-rated as investment grade at issuance. With this review,
DBRS Morningstar confirms that the loans continue to perform in
line with those shadow ratings.

According to the October 2021 remittance, seven loans, representing
19.1% of the pool, are currently on the servicer's watchlist. These
loans are being monitored for various reasons, including low debt
service coverage ratios (DSCRs) or occupancy, delinquent taxes,
tenant rollover risk, and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests.
The largest loan on the watchlist is the TripAdvisor HQ loan
(Prospectus ID#3, 7.1% of the pool), which is being monitored for
delinquent taxes. In addition to the delinquent taxes, DBRS
Morningstar remains concerned with the long-term health of the
company, which has been severely affected by travel restrictions
amid the coronavirus pandemic. TripAdvisor laid off 25% of its
workforce and closed its offices in Boston and San Francisco as it
attempted to cut costs throughout the pandemic. According to a news
article from the Boston Herald in September 2020, TripAdvisor was
attempting to sublease 100,000 square feet (sf) of its space at the
collateral. It currently occupies all 280,000 sf at the subject on
a lease through December 2030 with no termination options. DBRS
Morningstar analyzed this loan with an elevated probability of
default.

There are three loans, representing 7.0% of the pool, in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan, Outlet Shoppes at
El Paso (Prospectus ID#9, 3.5% of the pool balance), is an anchored
retail outlet shopping center in Canutillo, Texas. The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2020 after the
borrower's parent company, CBL Properties, filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. The property was 90.2% occupied according to the July
2021 rent roll, and YE2020 financials reported a DSCR of 1.47 times
(x) compared with the YE2019 DSCR of 1.69x. The loan has remained
current throughout the pandemic and, because of its proximity to
the border, should benefit from increased traffic once the
U.S./Mexico border is opened in November 2021. DBRS Morningstar
analyzed this loan with an elevated probability of default.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2021-4: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on B-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Deephaven Residential
Mortgage Trust 2021-4's mortgage pass-through notes series 2021-4.

The note issuance is an RMBS transaction backed first-lien, fixed-
and adjustable-rate mortgage loans secured by single-family
residences, planned-unit developments, condominiums, two- to
four-family homes, and five– to 10-unit properties. The pool
consists of 751 loans backed by 868 properties that are primarily
non-qualified mortgage loans and ability-to-repay exempt loans; of
the 751 loans, 24 are cross collateralized, which were broken down
to their constituents at the property level (making up 141
properties).

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;

-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;

-- The mortgage aggregator, Deephaven Mortgage LLC;

-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework;

-- The geographic concentration;

-- The 100% due diligence results consistent with represented loan
characteristics; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Ratings Assigned

  Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2021-4

  Class A-1, $252,319,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $24,332,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $41,191,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $23,756,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $16,860,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $16,093,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-3, $8,622,229: NR
  Class XS, Notional(i): NR
  Class A-IO-S, Notional(i): NR
  Class R: NR

(i)Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal
balance.
NR--Not rated.



EAGLE RE 2021-2: DBRS Gives Provisional B Rating on 2 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series 2021-2 to be issued by
Eagle Re 2021-2 Ltd. (EMIR 2021-2):

-- $118.3 million Class M-1A at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $102.2 million Class M-1B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $145.2 million Class M-1C at BB (sf)
-- $48.4 million Class M-1C-1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $48.4 million Class M-1C-2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $48.4 million Class M-1C-3 at BB (sf)
-- $91.4 million Class M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $26.9 million Class B-1 at B (sf)
-- $26.9 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The BBB (high) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (high) (sf), BB (sf), B
(high) (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 5.65%, 4.70%, 3.80%, 3.35%,
2.50%, and 2.00% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

EMIR 2021-2 is Radian Guaranty Inc.'s (Radian Guaranty or the
Ceding Insurer) sixth rated mortgage insurance (MI)-linked note
transaction. The Notes are backed by reinsurance premiums, eligible
investments, and related account investment earnings, in each case
relating to a pool of MI policies linked to residential loans. The
Notes are exposed to the risk arising from losses the Ceding
Insurer pays to settle claims on the underlying MI policies. As of
the cut-off date, the pool of insured mortgage loans consists of
153,373 fully amortizing first-lien fixed- and variable-rate
mortgages. They all have been underwritten to a full documentation
standard, have original loan-to-value ratios less than or equal to
97%, have never been reported to the Ceding Insurer as 60 or more
days delinquent, and have never been reported to be in a payment
forbearance plan as of the cut-off date. The mortgage loans have MI
policies effective on or after August 2020 and on or before July
2021.

On March 1, 2020, a new master policy was introduced to conform to
government-sponsored enterprises' revised rescission relief
principles under the Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility
Requirements guidelines. Approximately 99.97% of the mortgage loans
were originated under the new master policy.

On the Closing Date, the Issuer will enter into the Reinsurance
Agreement with the Ceding Insurer. As per the agreement, the Ceding
Insurer will get protection for the funded portion of the MI
losses. In exchange for this protection, the Ceding Insurer will
make premium payments related to the underlying insured mortgage
loans to the Issuer.

The Issuer is expected to use the proceeds from the sale of the
Notes to purchase certain eligible investments that will be held in
the reinsurance trust account. The eligible investments are
restricted to AAA or equivalent rated U.S. Treasury money market
funds and securities. Unlike other residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) transactions, cash flow from the underlying loans
will not be used to make any payments; rather, in MI-linked note
transactions, a portion of the eligible investments held in the
reinsurance trust account will be liquidated to make principal
payments to the noteholders and to make loss payments to the Ceding
Insurer when claims are settled with respect to the MI policy.

The Issuer will use the investment earnings on the eligible
investments, together with the Ceding Insurer's premium payments,
to pay interest to the noteholders.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
the reduction in aggregate exposed principal balance on the
underlying MI policy that is allocated to the Notes. The
subordinate Notes will receive their pro rata share of available
principal funds if the minimum credit enhancement test and the
delinquency test are satisfied. The minimum credit enhancement test
has been set to fail at the closing date, thus locking out the
rated classes from initially receiving any principal payments until
the subordinate percentage grows to 7.75% from 6.75%. The
delinquency test will be satisfied if the three-month average of
60+ days delinquency percentage is below 75% of the subordinate
percentage.

The coupon rates for the Notes issued by EMIR 2021-2 are based on
the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). There are replacement
provisions in place in the event that SOFR is no longer available,
please see the Offering Circular for more details. DBRS Morningstar
did not run interest rate stresses for this transaction, as the
interest is not linked to the performance of the underlying loans.
Instead, interest payments are funded via (1) premium payments that
the Ceding Insurer must make under the reinsurance agreement and
(2) earnings on eligible investments.

On the Closing Date, the Ceding Insurer will establish a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account. In case of the
Ceding Insurer's default in paying coverage premium payments to the
Issuer, the amount available in this account will be used to make
interest payments to the noteholders. The premium deposit account
will not be funded at closing.

This is the second EMIR transaction issued with a 12.5-year term.
The Notes are scheduled to mature on April 25, 2034, but will be
subject to early redemption at the option of the Ceding Insurer (1)
for a 10% clean-up call or (2) on or following the payment date in
October 2028, among others. The Notes are also subject to mandatory
redemption before the scheduled maturity date upon the termination
of the Reinsurance Agreement. Additionally, this is the first
transaction where there is a provision for the Ceding Insurer to
issue a tender offer to reduce all or a portion of the outstanding
Notes.

Radian Guaranty will be the Ceding Insurer. The Bank of New York
Mellon (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar)
will act as the Indenture Trustee, Paying Agent, Note Registrar,
and Reinsurance Trustee.

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Impact

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies
for many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset
classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of forbearance,
which are generally short-term periods of payment relief, that may
perform differently from traditional delinquencies. At the onset of
coronavirus, the option to forebear mortgage payments was widely
available, droving forbearances to an elevated level. When the dust
settled, loans with coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid and
acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in general. Across
nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months, delinquencies have
been gradually trending downward, as forbearance periods come to an
end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



ELMWOOD CLO XII: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned ratings to Elmwood CLO XII Ltd./Elmwood
CLO XII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Elmwood Asset Management LLC.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and
lower) senior secured term loans.

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Elmwood CLO XII Ltd./Elmwood CLO XII LLC

  Class A-L Loans, $279.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A, $93.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $84.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $36.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $36.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $24.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Class F (deferrable), $9.00 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $47.00 million: Not rated



ELP COMMERCIAL 2021-ELP: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-ELP to
be issued by ELP Commercial Mortgage Trust 2021-ELP:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Class J and Class K-RR are not rated by DBRS
Morningstar.

The ELP Commercial Mortgage Trust 2021-ELP
single-asset/single-borrower transaction is collateralized by the
borrower's fee-simple and leasehold interests in a portfolio of 142
industrial properties totaling approximately 28.0 million square
feet (sf) across 18 markets and 17 states. DBRS Morningstar
continues to take a favorable view on the long-term growth
stability of the warehouse and logistics sector, despite the
uncertainties and risks that the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has created across all commercial real estate asset
classes. Increased consumer reliance on e-commerce and home
delivery during the pandemic has only accelerated pre-pandemic
consumer trends, and DBRS Morningstar believes that retail's loss
continues to be industrial's gain. The subject portfolio benefits
from both favorable geographic diversification and favorable tenant
granularity, both of which contribute to potential cash flow
stability over time. In addition, DBRS Morningstar has a positive
view of the net cash flow (NCF) and believes the NCF is sustainable
in the near term, given DBRS Morningstar's weighted average (WA)
in-place base rent of $4.57 per square foot (psf) triple net (NNN),
which is approximately 17% below the submarket's WA average rent of
$5.51 psf NNN per the market data provided by the Issuer, therefore
providing rent upside potential for the portfolio as a whole. When
looking at the leases expiring between loan origination and
December 2022, and considering the contractual rent steps through
November 2022 and the straight-line average rent steps for the
investment-grade (IG) tenants, the Issuer's WA underwritten base
rent is about 9.3% below market.

The transaction benefits from additional cash flow stability
attributable to multiple property pooling. The portfolio has a
property Herfindahl score of 68.3 by allocated loan amount (ALA),
which is one of the highest compared with the average score of
recent DBRS Morningstar-rated industrial portfolios of 28.5 and
provides a favorable diversification of cash flow when compared
with a single asset. No single property accounts for more than 3.8%
of the portfolio's net rentable area (NRA) or 3.3% of the Issuer UW
portfolio net operating income (NOI). As a result, a temporary cash
flow decline at one property would likely not result in a debt
service shortfall.

The properties in the subject portfolio span 18 markets in 17
states, providing favorable geographic diversity evidenced by
market and state Herfindahl scores of 9.7 and 11, respectively. No
single market accounts for more than 19.6% of the Issuer UW
portfolio NOI, and no single state accounts for more than 18.2% of
the Issuer UW portfolio NOI.

The loan sponsors, EQT Exeter PF1 US Member, LCC (EQT Exeter) and
EG Industrial Properties, LLC (G Investor), entered into a contract
to recapitalize a larger platform of more than 300 industrial
properties for approximately $6.9 billion in Q4 2020. G Investor is
contributing approximately $2.7 billion in connection with the
broader recapitalization, of which approximately $591.5 million is
allocated to the portfolio. The loan proceeds, along with sponsor
equity, were used to finance the acquisition by G Investor and its
affiliates of an approximate 99.2% interest in the portfolio and to
cover closing costs. DBRS Morningstar generally views acquisition
financings involving significant amounts of cash equity
contributions from the transaction sponsors favorably, given the
stronger alignment of economic incentives when compared with
cash-out financings.

The sponsors for this transactions are EQT Exeter and G Investor.
EQT Exeter is one of the largest real estate investment managers in
the world and operates from 38 regional offices worldwide. G
Investor is an entity 100% owned by GIC Realty Private Limited
(GIC). GIC is a global investment firm established in 1981 to
manage Singapore's foreign reserves. GIC boasts a team of
investment professionals in 10 offices in key financial cities
worldwide with headquarters in Singapore. GIC has investments
across a wide range of asset classes, including equities, fixed
income, private equity, infrastructure, and real estate, in more
than 40 countries.

The portfolio generally benefits from its geographical position in
strong industrial markets with more than half of the portfolio NOI
derived from assets in the Midwest's e-commerce corridor, including
Memphis, Tennessee (19.6% of NOI); Indianapolis (16.0% of NOI);
Louisville, Kentucky (11.1% of NOI); and St. Louis (9.6% of NOI).

The entire portfolio is classified as warehouse/distribution
product, which was generally confirmed by DBRS Morningstar's site
tours of a sampling of the portfolio. DBRS Morningstar considered
about 3.7% of the portfolio's square footage to be office/flex
space, based on the percentage of office usage and rents on the
properties, which is on the lower end of the range for recently
analyzed industrial portfolios.

Approximately 15.8% of the DBRS Morningstar in-place base rent is
attributable to IG tenants, which provide strong cash flow
stability. IG tenants include Amazon.com Inc., Geodis, and Cummins
Inc. (Cummins).

The DBRS Morningstar's WA in-place base rent of $4.57 psf NNN is
approximately 17% below the submarket's WA average rent of $5.51
psf NNN, per the market data provided by the Issuer, providing rent
upside potential for the portfolio as a whole. The DBRS Morningstar
LTV on the trust loan is significant at 109.4%. The high leverage
point, combined with the lack of amortization, reflects elevated
refinance risk and could potentially result in elevated loss
severities in the occurrence of an event of default.

Leases representing approximately 72.2% of the portfolio NRA and
74% of the DBRS Morningstar gross rent are scheduled to roll
through the fully extended loan term in 2026. Lease rollover is
especially concentrated in 2022 (18.3% of the portfolio NRA and
18.5% of the DBRS Morningstar gross rent) and 2023 (19.9% of the
portfolio NRA and 38.3% of the DBRS Morningstar gross rent). As
such, there is elevated refinance risk at the initial and final
fully extended loan maturity dates in 2023 and 2026, respectively.

Forty-nine of the portfolio's 142 properties are leased to
single-tenant users, reducing the portfolio's tenant diversity and
granularity. The properties leased to single tenants collectively
comprise 37.5% of the portfolio's in-place base rent and 38.1% of
the portfolio NRA.

The loan has a partial pro rata/sequential-pay structure that
allows for pro rata paydown of the first 25% of the unpaid
principal balance. DBRS Morningstar generally considers this
structure to be credit negative, particularly at the top of the
capital structure. Under a partial pro rata paydown structure,
deleveraging of the senior notes through the release of individual
properties occurs at a slower pace than a sequential-pay structure.
DBRS Morningstar applied a penalty to the transaction's capital
structure to account for the pro rata nature of certain
prepayments.

The borrower can also release individual properties subject to
customary requirements. However, the prepayment premium for the
release of individual assets is generally 105.0% of the ALA for the
first 25.0% of the original principal balance of the mortgage loan
and 110.0% thereafter. DBRS Morningstar considers the release
premium to be weaker than a generally credit-neutral standard of
115.0% and, as a result, applied a penalty to the transaction's
capital structure to account for the weak deleveraging premium.

The liability of the carveout guarantor is capped at 15% of the
then-outstanding loan amount for bankruptcy events and full
recourse is triggered only by such bankruptcy events or if certain
transfer provisions are violated. In addition, the guarantor under
the mortgage loan is required to maintain a minimum net worth of at
least $300 million; however, there is no liquidity requirement.
DBRS Morningstar views these factors as credit negative and
relatively weak in the context of the size of the mortgage.

The guarantor on this loan is Industrial JV REIT LLC, a Delaware
LLC. This effectively limits the recourse to the sponsor for bad
act carveouts. Bad boy guarantees and consequent access to the
guarantor help mitigate the risk and increased loss severity of
bankruptcy, additional encumbrances, unapproved transfers, fraud,
misappropriation of rents, and other potential bad acts of the
borrower or its sponsor.

Ategrity Specialty Insurance Company, rated "A-VIII" by AM Best, is
a pre-approved insurer for a portion of the property on the
deductible buy-down policy. This insurer is only replaced if
downgraded and not upon policy renewal as has been the practice in
other single-asset/single-borrower transactions rated by DBRS
Morningstar.

The debt yield trigger for the cash flow sweep event is low at less
than a 5.25% debt yield on the initial term. The low thresholds
increase the term and balloon default risks.

The underlying mortgage loan for the transaction will pay a
floating rate, which presents potential benchmark transition risk
as the deadline approaches for the elimination of Libor. The
transaction documents provide for the transition to an alternative
benchmark rate, which is primarily contemplated to be either Term
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) plus the applicable
Alternative Rate Spread Adjustment or Compounded SOFR plus the
Alternative Rate Spread Adjustment.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-13INV: Moody's Gives B2 Rating to B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
forty-four classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
issued by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-13INV ("FSMT 2021-13INV").
The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-13INV (FSMT 2021-13INV) is the
thirteenth issue from Flagstar Mortgage Trust in 2021 and the
eighth issue with investor-property loans in 2021. Flagstar Bank,
FSB [Flagstar; Baa2 (Long Term Counterparty Risk Rating), Not on
Watch] is the sponsor of the transaction. FSMT 2021-13INV is a
securitization of GSE eligible first-lien investment property
mortgage loans. 100.0% of the pool by loan balance was originated
by Flagstar.

All the loans are underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae guidelines, which take into consideration, among other
factors, the income, assets, employment and credit score of the
borrower as well as loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the loan. The
loans were run through one of the government-sponsored enterprises'
(GSE) automated underwriting systems (AUS) and received an
"Approve" or "Accept" recommendation.

All of the personal-use loans are "qualified mortgages" under
Regulation Z as result of the temporary provision allowing
qualified mortgage status for loans eligible for purchase,
guaranty, or insurance by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and certain
other federal agencies). If the Sponsor or the Reviewer determines
a Personal Use Loan is no longer a "qualified mortgage" under the
ATR Rules, the Sponsor may be required to repurchase such Personal
Use Loan. With the exception of personal-use loans, all other
mortgage loans in the pool are not subject to TILA because each
such mortgage loan is an extension of credit primarily for a
business purpose and is not a "covered transaction" as defined in
Section 1026.43(b)(1) of Regulation Z.

Moody's analyzed the underlying mortgage loans using Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. Moody's also compared the
collateral pool to other prime jumbo securitizations backed by
investment property loans. Overall, this pool has average credit
risk profile as compared to that of similar recent prime jumbo
transactions. The securitization has a shifting interest structure
with a five-year lockout period that benefits from a senior floor
and a subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-13INV

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-6*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-8*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-10*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-13*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-15*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-16*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-17*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-18*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-20*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-21*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. RR-A Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

*Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 1.18%
at the mean, 0.91% at the median and reaches 6.56% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

FSMT 2021-13INV is a securitization of GSE eligible first-lien
investment property mortgage loans. 100.0% of the pool by loan
balance was originated by Flagstar Bank, FSB. All the loans were
underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae
guidelines, which take into consideration, among other factors, the
income, assets, employment and credit score of the borrower as well
as loan-to-value (LTV). As of the cut-off date of November 1, 2021,
the approximately $454,144,664 pool consisted of 1,630 mortgage
loans secured by first liens on residential investment properties.
The average stated principal balance is $278,616 and the weighted
average (WA) current mortgage rate is 3.5%. The majority of the
loans have a 30-year term, with nine loans with a 25-year term. All
of the loans have a fixed rate. The WA original credit score is 770
for the primary borrower only and the WA combined original LTV
(CLTV) is 67.2%. The WA original debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is
36.5%. Approximately, 12.4% by loan balance of the borrowers have
more than one mortgage loan in the mortgage pool.

All of the mortgage loans originated by Flagstar were either
directly or indirectly originated through correspondents and
brokers.

A significant percentage of the mortgage loans by loan balance
(36.7%) are backed by properties located in California. The second
and third largest geographic concentration of properties are Texas
and Florida which represent 12.6% and 6.9% by loan balance,
respectively. All other states each represent less than 5% by loan
balance. Approximately 19.9% (by loan balance) of the pool is
backed by properties that are 2-4 unit residential properties
whereas loans backed by single family residential properties
represent 43.7% (by loan balance) of the pool.

Origination Quality

Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar) originated 100% of the loans in the
pool. The loans in the pool are underwritten in conformity with GSE
guidelines. Moody's consider Flagstar conforming and non-conforming
mortgage origination quality to be adequate. As a result, Moody's
did not make any adjustments to its base case and Aaa stress loss
assumptions based on Moody's review of the underwriting, QC, audit
and loan performance.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate. Flagstar will service the mortgage loans.

Servicing compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee
structure. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will be the master
servicer. Flagstar will be responsible for principal and interest
advances as well as servicing advances. The master servicer will be
required to make principal and interest advances if Flagstar is
unable to do so.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base fee of $20.50 for all
performing loans and increases according to certain delinquent and
incentive fee schedules. By establishing a base servicing fee for
performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans, the
fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The fee-for-service
compensation is reasonable and adequate for this transaction. It
also better aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance
and structure. The Class B-6-C (NR) is first in line to absorb any
increase in servicing costs above the base servicing costs.
Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted from the Class
B-6-C interest payment amount first and could result in interest
shortfall to the certificates depending on the magnitude of the
delinquency and incentive fees.

Trustee and master servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB.
The custodian functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells
Fargo, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight,
and termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. The master servicer will be required to make principal
and interest advances if Flagstar is unable to do so.

Third-party review

Moody's did not apply an adjustment to its Aaa and expected losses
due to the adequate sample size. The credit, compliance, property
valuation, and data integrity portion of the third-party review
(TPR) was conducted on a total of approximately 21.1% of the pool
(by loan count). Canopy Financial Technology Partners (Canopy)
conducted due diligence for a total random sample of 344 mortgage
loans in the final collateral pool. The TPR results indicated
compliance with the originators' underwriting guidelines for most
of the loans without any material compliance issues or appraisal
defects. 100% of the loans reviewed received a grade B or higher
with 80.2% of loans receiving an A grade.

The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for most of the loans, no material
compliance issues and no material appraisal defects. In addition,
the total sample size of 344 loans reviewed met Moody's credit
neutral criteria. Moody's therefore made no adjustment to loss
levels.

Representations and Warranties Framework

Flagstar Bank, FSB the originator as well as an investment-grade
rated entity, makes the loan-level representation and warranties
(R&Ws) for the mortgage loans. The loan-level R&Ws are strong and,
in general, either meet or exceed the baseline set of credit
neutral R&Ws Moody's have identified for US RMBS. Further, R&W
breaches are evaluated by an independent third party using a set of
objective criteria to determine whether any R&Ws were breached when
(1) the loan becomes 120 days delinquent, (2) the servicer stops
advancing, (3) the loan is liquidated at a loss or (4) the loan
becomes between 30 days and 119 days delinquent and is modified by
the servicer. Similar to other private-label transactions, the
transaction contains a "prescriptive" R&W framework. These reviews
are prescriptive in that the transaction documents set forth
detailed tests for each R&W that the independent reviewer will
perform.

Moody's assessed the R&W framework for this transaction as
adequate. Moody's analyzed the strength of the R&W provider, the
R&Ws themselves and the enforcement mechanisms. The R&W provider is
rated investment grade, the breach reviewer is independent, and the
breach review process is thorough, transparent and objective.
Moody's did not make any additional adjustment to its base case and
Aaa loss expectations for R&Ws.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments on pro rata basis up to the
senior bonds principal distribution amount, and then interest and
principal payments on sequential basis up to each subordinate bond
principal distribution amount. As in all transactions with shifting
interest structures, the senior bonds benefit from a cash flow
waterfall that allocates all prepayments to the senior bond for a
specified period of time, and increasing amounts of prepayments to
the subordinate bonds thereafter, but only if loan performance
satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

All certificates (except Class B-6-C) in this transaction are
subject to a net WAC cap. Class B-6-C will accrue interest at the
net WAC minus the aggregate delinquent servicing and aggregate
incentive servicing fee. For any distribution date, the net WAC
will be the greater of (1) zero and (2) the weighted average net
mortgage rates minus the capped trust expense rate.

Realized losses are allocated reverse sequentially among the
subordinate, starting with most junior, and senior support
certificates and on a pro-rata basis among the super senior
certificates.

Tail Risk and subordination floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 0.80% of the cut-off date pool
balance, and as subordination lock-out amount of 0.80% of the
cut-off date pool balance. The floors are consistent with the
credit neutral floors for the assigned ratings according to Moody's
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


FORTRESS CREDIT XIV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Fortress Credit BSL XIV
Ltd./Fortress Credit BSL XIV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by FC BSL XIV Management LLC, a
subsidiary of Fortress Investment Group.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Fortress Credit BSL XIV Ltd./Fortress Credit BSL XIV LLC

  Class A, $270.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $35.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $30.20 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $29.30 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $27.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $18.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $43.97 million: Not rated



GCAT 2021-NQM6: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to GCAT 2021-NQM6 Trust's
mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS transaction backed first-lien,
fixed- and adjustable-rate, fully amortizing, and interest-only
residential mortgage loans primarily secured by single-family
residential properties, planned-unit developments, condominiums,
two- to four-family residential properties, townhouses, and
cooperatives to both prime and nonprime borrowers. The pool has 798
loans, which are either nonqualified or ATR-exempt mortgage loans.

S&P said, "Since we assigned preliminary ratings and published our
presale report on Nov. 22, 2021, the issuer removed 25 loans from
the pool and S&P Global Ratings provided updated loss coverage
feedback. As a result, we analyzed an updated structure on the
pool, and credit support remained sufficient on all classes for us
to assign final ratings that are unchanged from preliminary
ratings." The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The asset pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, geographic concentration, and representation and
warranty framework;

-- The mortgage aggregator, Blue River Mortgage III LLC; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and the liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Ratings Assigned(i)

  GCAT 2021-NQM6 Trust

  Class A-1, $295,228,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1IO, $295,228,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-1B, $295,228,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1X, $295,228,000(iii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $15,200,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $17,703,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $11,444,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $8,405,000; BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $5,364,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $4,292,572: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, Notional(iv): Not rated
  Class X, Notional(iv): Not rated
  Class R, N/A: Not rated

(i)The ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.

(ii) Class A-1IO will have a notional balance amount equal to the
balance of class A-1

(iii)Class A-1X will have a notional amount equal to the lesser of
(a) the balance of class A-1 immediately prior to such distribution
date and (b) the notional amount set forth on a schedule for the
related accrual period. After the 39th distribution date, the
notional amount of the A-1X certificates will be zero.

(iv)The notional amount equals the aggregate principal balance of
the loans.

N/A--Not applicable.



GPMT 2021-FL4: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on G Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by GPMT 2021-FL4, Ltd:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

With regard to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
magnitude and extent of performance stress posed to global
structured finance transactions remain highly uncertain. This
considers the fiscal and monetary policy measures and statutory law
changes that have already been implemented or will be implemented
to soften the impact of the crisis on global economies. Some
regions, jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling
more immediate effects. Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply
additional short-term stresses to its rating analysis. For example,
DBRS Morningstar may front-load default expectations and/or assess
the liquidity position of a structured finance transaction with
more stressful operational risk and/or cash flow timing
considerations.

DBRS Morningstar analyzed the pool to determine the provisional
ratings, reflecting the long-term risk that the Issuer will default
and fail to satisfy its financial obligations in accordance with
the terms of the transaction. The initial collateral consists of 23
floating-rate mortgage loans secured by 31 mostly transitional real
estate properties, with a cut-off pool balance totaling
approximately $621.4 million, excluding approximately $86.3 million
of future funding commitments. The initial pool is composed of two
whole loans and 21 participations. There are no B-notes or
mezzanine loans included in the initial pool. Most loans are in a
period of transition with plans to stabilize and improve the asset
value. The transaction is a managed vehicle with a 24-month
reinvestment period. During the reinvestment period, so long as the
note protection tests are satisfied and no event of default (EOD)
has occurred and is continuing, the Issuer (as directed by the
Collateral Manager) may acquire future funding commitments and
additional eligible loans subject to the eligibility criteria,
which, among other things, has a minimum debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and loan-to-value ratio (LTV) for each respective
property type, a 14.0 Herfindahl score, and loan size limitations.
The eligibility criteria stipulates a No Downgrade Confirmation
from DBRS Morningstar on reinvestment loans (except in the case of
the acquisition of companion participations if a portion of the
underlying loan is already included in the pool and less than
$500,000). The No Downgrade Confirmation allows DBRS Morningstar
the ability to review the new collateral interest and any potential
impacts to the overall ratings. The transaction does not include a
ramp-up period with unidentified loans; however, there are three
delayed close assets, representing 10.5% of the cut-off balance
($65.5 million), which are expected to close prior to or within 90
days of the transaction closing date. The transaction will have a
sequential-pay structure. For so long as any class of notes with a
higher priority is outstanding, any interest due on the Class C, D,
E, F, and G Notes can be deferred and interest deferral will not
result in an EOD.

All of the loans in the pool have floating interest rates initially
indexed to Libor and are interest only (IO) through their initial
and extended terms. As such, to determine a stressed interest rate
over the loan term, DBRS Morningstar used the one-month Libor rate,
which was the lower of DBRS Morningstar's stressed rates that
corresponded to the remaining fully extended term of the loans and
the strike price of the interest rate cap with the respective
contractual loan spread added. The pool exhibited a relatively high
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Morningstar Issuance LTV of 80.2%,
though it is estimated to improve to 69.1% through stabilization.
When the cut-off date balances were measured against the DBRS
Morningstar As-Is Net Cash Flow (NCF), 11 loans, representing 46%
of the cut-off date pool balance, had a DBRS Morningstar As-Is DSCR
below 1.00 times (x), a threshold indicative of high default risk.
However, five loans, representing 22.2% of initial pool balance
have DBRS Morningstar Stabilized DSCR of less than 1.25x, a
threshold indicative of elevated refinance risk. The properties are
often transitioned with potential upside in cash flow. However,
DBRS Morningstar does not give full credit to the stabilization if
there are no holdbacks of if other loan structural features are
insufficient to support such treatment. Furthermore, even with the
structure provided, DBRS Morningstar generally does not assume the
assets will stabilize above market levels.

The Sponsor for the transaction, Granite Point Mortgage Trust Inc.
(GPMT), is an experienced commercial real estate collateralized
loan obligation (CRE CLO) issuer and collateral manager. As of
October 19, 2021, GPMT had a market capitalization of approximately
$733.1 million. As of June 30, 2021, GPMT managed a commercial
mortgage debt portfolio of approximately $4.1 billion. GPMT has
completed three CRE CLO securitizations: GPMT 2018-FL1, GPMT
2019-FL2, and GPMT 2021-FL3. Additionally, GPMT CLO Holdings LLC, a
wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of GPMT, will purchase and retain
100.0% of the Class F Notes, the Class G Notes, and the Preferred
Shares, which total 19.125% of the transaction total.

Fifteen loans, or 20 properties, representing 68.7% of the initial
pool, are backed by multifamily properties. The multifamily
property type has historically shown lower defaults and losses.
Multifamily properties benefit from staggered lease rollover and
generally low expense ratios compared with other property types.
While revenue is quick to decline in a downturn because of the
short-term nature of the leases, it is also quick to respond when
the market improves. Most of the multifamily properties in the
initial pool are either garden style or midrise multifamily
complexes. There are also two student housing loans, The Hive and
10 North & The Crest, representing 5.8% of the initial pool. While
student housing properties often exhibit higher cash flow
volatility than traditional multifamily properties, both portfolios
are located in tight student housing markets with a vacancy rate of
3% and 6% for The Hive and 10 North & The Crest, respectively. Both
properties demonstrated strong historical occupancy rates and
preleasing rates, and are currently 100% occupied. In addition, the
eligibility criteria for reinvestment stipulates a minimum 40% of
multifamily property type with no maximum limitation during the
reinvestment period, which DBRS Morningstar considered credit
positive given the lower default risk and losses associated with
this property type.

The DBRS Morningstar Business Plan Scores (BPS) for sampled loans
ranged from 1.4 to 2.93, with an average of 1.99. On a scale of 1
to 5, a higher DBRS Morningstar BPS is indicative of more risk in
the sponsor's business plan. Consideration is given to the
anticipated lift at the property from current performance, planned
property improvements, sponsor experience, projected time horizon,
and overall complexity. Compared with similar transactions, the
subject has a relatively low average DBRS Morningstar BPS, which is
indicative of lower risk. In addition, the WA remaining fully
extended term for the pool is 56 months, which allows the sponsors
time to execute their business plans without risk of imminent
maturity.

Seventeen loans, comprising 77.1% of the initial trust balance,
represent acquisition financing wherein sponsors contributed cash
equity as a source of funding in conjunction with the mortgage
loan. The cash equity in the deal will incentivize the sponsors to
perform on the loan and protect their equity.

The borrowers of all loans have purchased Libor rate caps with
strike prices that range from 0.5% to 4.0% to protect against
rising interest rates through the duration of the loan term. In
addition to the fulfillment of certain minimum performance
requirements, exercise of any extension options would also require
the repurchase of interest rate cap protection through the duration
of the respectively exercised option.

Twenty loans, representing 89.5% of the pool, were originated in
2021. Three loans, representing 10.5% of the pool, were originated
in 2019. The loan files for all the loans including the financial
statements, rent rolls, and appraisal reports, are all current and
reflective of the impacts from the coronavirus pandemic.

The pool exhibits a DBRS Morningstar WA market rank of 3.5, which
is considerably lower than the GPMT 2021-FL3 transaction (WA market
rank of 5.9) and similar recent CRE CLO transactions rated by DBRS
Morningstar. Approximately 66.1% of the properties in the pool are
located in DBRS Morningstar Market Rank 3 and 4. The DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank range is 1 to 8, with 8 representing the
highest-density markets with the greatest amount of liquidity and
most origination activity. DBRS Morningstar recognizes market
liquidity by giving credit to loans secured by properties in dense
urban locations and penalizing loans in less populated areas and
areas with lower economic activity. Also, the historical commercial
mortgage-backed security (CMBS) conduit loan data shows that the
probability of default (POD) increases in middle markets (Market
Rank 3 or 4); moderates in tertiary and rural markets (Market Rank
1 or 2); and greatly improves in primary urban markets (Market Rank
6, 7, or 8). Historical loan data further supports the idea that
loss given default (LGD) increases in tertiary and rural markets,
and the lowest LGDs were noted in Market Rank 8. The initial pool
consists of 9.5% of the cut-off date loan balance in Market Rank 5
or 6, 5.7% in Market Rank 7, and 0% in Market Rank 8. In addition,
this transaction only has 19.2% of the pool located in metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) Group 3 compared with 44.1% in GPMT
2021-FL3. MSA Group 3 represents the best-performing group in terms
of historical CMBS default rates among the top 25 MSAs. MSA Group 3
has a historical default rate of 17.2%, which is nearly 40.0% lower
than the overall CMBS historical default rate of 28.0%. The initial
pool consists of 29.1% of the cut-off date loan balance in MSA
Group 1, which have historically shown higher PODs resulting in
greater loan-level expected losses. The loans that are located in
Market Rank 3 and 4 in the initial pool have a WA Stabilized LTV
and DSCR of 66.2% and 1.30x respectively. The DBRS Morningstar
model increases the likelihood of defaults and losses for
properties located in the weaker markets as designated by the DBRS
Morningstar Market and MSA Group.

Five loans, representing 21.5% of the initial pool, are backed by
office properties, and one loan, representing 2.4% of the pool is
backed by multifamily/retail mixed-used property. These property
types have experienced considerable disruption as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic with mandatory closures, working from home
strategies, and consumer shifts to online purchasing. The office
properties in this pool exhibit favorable WA DBRS Morningstar
Stabilized DSCR and LTV of 1.42x and 67.9%, respectively. The
multifamily/retail mixed-used property is located in DBRS Market
Rank 7, which is generally characterized as highly dense urbanized
areas that benefit from increased liquidity driven by consistently
strong investor demand, even during times of economic stress.

Based on the initial pool balances, the overall WA DBRS Morningstar
As-Is LTV and DSCR is 80.2% and 1.00x, respectively, generally
reflecting high-leverage financing. Most of the assets are
generally well-positioned to stabilize, and any realized cash flow
growth would help to offset a rise in interest rates and improve
the overall debt yield of the loans. DBRS Morningstar associates
its LGD based on the assets' as-is LTV, which does not assume that
the stabilization plan and cash flow growth will ever materialize.
The DBRS Morningstar As-Is DSCR for each loan at issuance does not
consider the sponsor's business plan, as the DBRS Morningstar As-Is
NCF was generally based on the most recent annualized period. The
sponsor's business plan could have an immediate impact on the
underlying asset performance that the DBRS Morningstar As-Is NCF is
not accounting for. When measured against the DBRS Morningstar
Stabilized NCF, the WA DBRS Morningstar DSCR is estimated to
improve to 1.36x, suggesting that the properties are likely to have
improved NCFs once the sponsors' business plans have been
implemented. Six loans representing 22.0% of the initial pool
balance are structured with a debt service reserve account, carry
shortfall reserve or excess cash flow sweep.

The transaction is managed and includes a reinvestment period,
which could result in negative credit migration and/or an increased
concentration profile over the life of the transaction. The risk of
negative migration is partially offset by eligibility criteria
(detailed in the transaction documents) that outline DSCR, LTV,
Herfindahl score minimum, property type, and loan size limitations
for reinvestment assets. New Reinvestment loans and companion
participations of $500,000 or greater require a No Downgrade
Confirmation from DBRS Morningstar. DBRS Morningstar will analyze
these loans for potential impacts on ratings. Deal reporting also
includes standard monthly CREFC reporting and quarterly updates.
DBRS Morningstar will monitor this transaction on a regular basis.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the in-place cash flow. It is
possible that the sponsors will not successfully execute their
business plans and that the higher stabilized cash flow will not
materialize during the loan term, particularly with the ongoing
coronavirus pandemic and its impact on the overall economy. A
sponsor's failure to execute the business plan could result in a
term default or the inability to refinance the fully funded loan
balance. DBRS Morningstar sampled a large portion of the loans,
representing 74.6% of the pool cut-off date balance. Five physical
site inspections, including the top four loans, were also
performed, including management meetings. The transaction's WA DBRS
Morningstar BPS of 1.99 is generally in the range of recently rated
CRE CLO transactions by DBRS Morningstar. DBRS Morningstar made
relatively conservative stabilization assumptions and, in each
instance, considered the business plan to be rational and the loan
structure to be sufficient to execute such plans. In addition, DBRS
Morningstar analyzes LGD based on the as-is credit metrics,
assuming the loan is fully funded with no NCF or value upside.
Future Funding companion participations have been structured to
provide the sponsor with sufficient funds to execute on the
business plan. The future funding companion participations will be
held by affiliates of GPMT and have the obligation to make future
advances. GPMT agrees to indemnify the Issuer against losses
arising out of the failure to make future advances when required
under the related participated loan. Furthermore, GPMT will be
required to meet certain liquidity requirements on a quarterly
basis.

The eligibility criteria allow for a maximum Stabilized LTV of
80.0% and a minimum DSCR of 1.15x. This is considerably more
aggressive than the current pool's Issuer Stabilized WA LTV of
67.9% and DSCR of 2.27x. The maximum Stabilized LTV of 80.0% and a
minimum DSCR of 1.15x thresholds are only apply to the multifamily
property type, which is relatively less risky compared with other
property types. The eligibility criteria generally requires a
stabilized LTV of 65% to 75% and a stabilized DSCR of 1.25x to
1.40x for the rest of the property types. Before the collateral
manager can acquire new loans, the loans will be subject to a No
Downgrade Confirmation by DBRS Morningstar.

All 23 loans have floating interest rates and have original terms
of 36 months to 48 months, which creates interest rate risk. All
loans are IO throughout the original term and through extension
options. All loans are short-term loans, and, even with extension
options, they have a fully extended maximum loan term of 60 to 61
months. For the floating-rate loans, DBRS Morningstar used the
one-month Libor index, which is based on the lower of a DBRS
Morningstar stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining fully
extended term of the loans or the strike price of the interest rate
cap with the respective contractual loan spread added to determine
a stressed interest rate over the loan term. The borrowers of all
loans have purchased Libor rate caps with strike prices that range
from 0.5% to 4.0% to protect against rising interest rates through
the duration of the loan term.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: DBRS Confirms C Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc downgraded its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2011-GC5 as follows:

-- Class C to C (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D to C (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class E to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the following ratings:

-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)

DBRS Morningstar maintained the Stable trend on Classes A-S and X-A
and the Negative trend on Class B. Classes C, D, E, and F have
ratings that do not carry a trend. The downgrades and Negative
trends reflect the elevated risk profile of the remaining five
loans in the pool, all of which have passed their maturity dates
and four of which are with the special servicer. With this review,
DBRS Morningstar removed the Interest in Arrears designation on
Class F.

The largest loan remaining in the pool, 1551 Broadway (Pros ID#2;
37.7% of the remaining pool), continues to be monitored on the
servicer's watchlist after the loan matured in July 2021. The loan,
which is backed by a 26,500-sf single-tenant retail building in the
Times Square submarket of Manhattan, received a 60-day forbearance
to grant additional time for the borrower to secure takeout
financing. According to the October 2021 servicer commentary, the
master and special servicer are evaluating a letter of intent (LOI)
for either a sale or refinance of the property. If the LOI is
deemed satisfactory, the forbearance would be extended for an
additional 60 days through November 6, 2021. The property is 100%
leased to American Eagle Outfitters (AEO) and includes a 25-story
LED sign tower. The lease for AEO expires in February 2024 and
includes three five-year renewal options. Per a Bloomberg article
from January 2020, the AEO space was being marketed for sublease;
in addition, AEO has announced plans to close more than 200 stores.
However, the tenant remains in operation at the subject property
per AEO's website.

The remaining four loans in the pool are in special servicing.
These loans, which are all backed by regional malls, include Park
Place Mall (Pros Id#1; 34.3% of the pool), Parkdale Mall & Crossing
(Pros Id#5; 14.7% of the pool), Ashland Town Center (Pros Id#9;
7.2% of the pool), and Champlain Center (Pros Id#13; 6.1% of the
pool). The malls are located in secondary markets and have been
affected by a combination of factors including anchor closures,
cash flow declines, and sponsorship issues. As a result, DBRS
Morningstar's loss severities across the four loans range from
49.2% to 62.7%.

DBRS Morningstar's primary concern about the specially serviced
loans is associated with the transaction's largest loan at
issuance, Park Place Mall, which is secured by a 1.1 million-sf
regional mall in Tucson, Arizona. At issuance, the mall was
anchored by Sears (which vacated in July 2018 and later backfilled
the space with Round 1 Bowling & Amusement), Macy's (which
permanently closed in Q2 2020), and Dillard's, all of which own
their improvements and are not part of the collateral. The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2020 because of
imminent monetary default resulting from business disruptions
stemming from the pandemic; the loan subsequently matured in May
2021. The sponsor, Brookfield Properties, has now indicated that it
will no longer support the property with any additional equity.
Performance has been trending downward year-over-year as the mall's
most recent financial reporting as of June 2021 reported an
occupancy rate of 85%, down from 90% as of YE2020 and 97% as of
YE2019. As of the most recent year-end reporting, the YE2020 net
cash flow was down 23.5% compared with issuance with a debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) that has fallen to 1.06 times (x). An updated
July 2021 appraisal valued the property at $88.0 million, which is
about 70% below the issuance value. The as-is value implies a
$102.5 million loss to the trust in a liquidation scenario,
equating to a 62.7% loss severity.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Parkdale Mall and
Crossing, is secured by a 663,000-sf portion of a 1.3 million-sf
regional mall and adjacent 80,000-sf strip center in Beaumont,
Texas. The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2021
for imminent default in advance of its March 2021 maturity. Net
cash flow in 2020 was down 30.8% compared with issuance and it was
barely above breakeven with a DSCR of 1.03x as of YE2020. In
addition to the performance concerns, the loan's sponsor, CBL
Properties (CBL), filed for bankruptcy in November 2020. While the
company is expected to emerge from bankruptcy in November 2021,
CBL's long-term plans for its Tier 2 properties, which are
classified as malls with tenant sales greater than $300 psf but
less than $375 psf, remain unclear. According to the servicing
commentary, the special servicer is dual-tracking foreclosure while
CBL has expressed interest in either a modification or a discounted
payoff. An updated July 2021 appraisal valued the property at
$41.2. million, which is about 72.3% below the issuance value. The
as-is value implies a $41.1 million loss to the trust in a
liquidation scenario, which results in a 58.5% loss severity.

The two remaining specially serviced loans in the pool, Ashland
Town Center and Champlain Center, both transferred to special
servicing for maturity default in 2021. The underlying properties
are both located in tertiary markets with exposure to weak
sponsorship in Washington Prime Group and Pyramid Management Group,
respectively. Ashland Town Center, which is secured by a
single-level regional mall in Ashland, Kentucky, has maintained
stable performance as the YE2020 net cash flow (NCF) was 12.5%
higher than the issuance level while covering with a DSCR of 1.98x.
Further, occupancy increased to 99% as of the June 2021 reporting,
up from 95% as of YE2020. Despite the relatively strong
performance, the mall reported in-line tenant sales of just $255
psf as of the 12 months ended February 28, 2021, which is down from
the prior sales figures of $415 psf in 2019. Champlain Center is
secured by regional mall in Plattsburgh, New York. The mall's
performance has deteriorated in recent years as occupancy has
decreased to its current level of 78% as of June 2021, down from
91% at issuance. The drop in occupancy along with a decrease in
base rents has caused the YE2020 NCF to trail issuance by 54.0%,
resulting in a below breakeven DSCR of 0.98x. A June 2021 appraisal
valued the property at $21.0 million, which reflects a 61% value
decline from the issuance appraisal. The as-is value implies a loss
of $41.1 million loss, which results in a 49.2% loss severity.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



GS MORTGAGE 2018-GS10: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G-RR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-GS10 issued by GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2018-GS10 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which remains in line with expectations at
issuance. At issuance, the transaction comprised 33 fixed-rate
loans secured by 57 commercial and multifamily properties with a
trust balance of $810.7 million. Per the October 2021 remittance
report, all loans and properties remain in the pool with a trust
balance of $803.5 million, representing a 0.9% collateral reduction
since issuance.

Only two loans, totaling 2.5% of the trust balance, are secured by
hospitality properties. Given the unique stresses for hotel
properties amid the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, this
is considered a strength for the transaction. Additionally, the
collateral exhibits relatively low leverage with a weighted-average
(WA) loan-to-value ratio of 59.7% based on the appraised values at
issuance. The pool also demonstrated strong debt service coverage
ratios (DSCRs) with a WA preceding-year DSCR of 2.43 times (x),
compared to the WA DBRS Morningstar Term DSCR of 2.10x at issuance.
Three loans (1000 Wilshire, Aliso Creek Apartments, and Marina
Heights State Farm), totaling 19.4% of the trust balance, were
shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS Morningstar at issuance. With
this review, DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the loans continue to
perform in line with the investment-grade shadow ratings.

The pool has minimal expected loan amortization throughout the life
of the transaction as there are 14 loans, representing 60.8% of the
trust balance, that are interest-only (IO) throughout the loan
terms and an additional 10 loans, representing 23.5% of the trust
balance, with partial IO terms. Ten loans, representing 20.9% of
the trust balance, are secured by properties in tertiary or rural
markets. Per the October 2021 remittance, eight loans, totaling
15.3% of the trust balance, are on the servicer's watchlist for low
occupancy rates, upcoming lease maturities, or a low DSCR. All loan
payments across the watchlist loans remain current.

DBRS Morningstar is closely monitoring the largest loan in the
pool, GSK North American HQ (Prospectus ID#1 – 9.4% of the trust
balance), as the single tenant announced it will vacate the
property in early 2022. The subject loan is secured by the
fee-simple interest in a Class A office complex in the Navy Yard
submarket of Philadelphia. The office was built-to-suit for
GlaxoSmithKline plc (GSK) for a cost of $80.0 million in 2013 and
GSK executed a 15-year lease (expiring in September 2028) with no
termination options. Per a BizJournals article dated October 2021,
GSK is relocating corporate operations from the subject property to
the FMC Tower in University City. The company plans to sublease its
space when it vacates. GSK is considered a long-term credit tenant
as the corporate entity is rated investment grade and the subject
lease expires more than five years beyond the June 2023 loan
maturity date. The loan is structured with an excess cash flow that
is triggered should GSK vacate or go dark in at least 90% of its
space, other than certain subleases by GSK. Per Q2 2021 Reis data,
average asking rent in the market is $28.67 per square foot (psf)
and average vacancy rate is 1.3% for Class A properties. Reis
projects stable performance of average asking rents and average
vacancy rate through 2026. The subject's in-place base rent of
$41.88 psf as of June 2021 is well above market rents as indicated
by Reis. DBRS Morningstar will follow the subleasing updates for
the subject space as well as the triggering of the excess cash flow
reserve. Loan payments are expected to remain current throughout
the life of the loan; however, refinance risk at loan maturity has
increased.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



GS MORTGAGE 2021-ARDN: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-ARDN to
be issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2021-ARDN
(GSMS Trust 2021-ARDN) as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes H, HRR, and ELP are not rated by
DBRS Morningstar.

Class X is an interest-only (IO) class whose balance is notional.

The GSMS Trust 2021-ARDN transaction is collateralized by the
borrower's fee-simple interest in a portfolio of 140 flex buildings
consisting of approximately 5.2 million square feet in 26 business
parks (including 25 flex industrial properties and one flex office
property). The properties are currently 92.4% leased with locations
spanning eight cities including the greater metro areas of Atlanta,
Georgia; Charlotte, North Carolina; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Texas;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San Antonio, Texas; Tampa, Florida; and
Indianapolis, Indiana. Overall, the subject markets have solid
fundamentals with positive annual growth in rents while absorbing
new supply and compressing vacancies. DBRS Morningstar has a
favorable view of the flex/warehouse sector despite uncertainties
and risks that the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic has
created across all commercial real estate asset classes. Rent
collections were 99% in the portfolio during the pandemic.

Further enhancing the portfolio's stability is granularity of the
rent roll. There are in excess of 700 tenants in the portfolio with
no tenant contributing over 2.4% of base rent. Furthermore, the top
20 tenants are responsible for only approximately 17.4% of the base
rent. DBRS Morningstar also notes the stickiness of the tenants,
with approximately 20% of the rent roll having tenancy for over 10
years. The portfolio is spread across eight markets spanning seven
U.S. states including Georgia (35.3% of the net operating income
(NOI)), North Carolina (8.1% of the NOI), Ohio (11.0% of the NOI),
Texas (5.3% of the NOI), Pennsylvania (11.1% of the NOI), Florida
(14.1% of the NOI), and Indiana (15.1% of the NOI). The collateral
is generally well located, proximate to dense population centers
and industrial gateway markets with high demand for industrial
space.

The sponsorship is a joint venture between Arden Group and Arcapita
Group (Arcapita). Founded in 1989, Arden Group is a vertically
integrated real estate company that focuses on hotel, office, and
industrial assets. Arden Group's track record consists of over $6
billion in owned real estate and over $11 billion in assets
managed. The portfolio was assembled by Arden Group in five
transactions beginning in 2018 and is being recapitalized through a
49% acquisition by Arcapita. The actual ownership percentages at
closing will change because of real estate investment trust tax
issues whereby Arcapita will true-up to the 49% interest over the
next 18 months. It is expected that 56.4% of the portfolio will be
transferred by March 2022. Arcapita's core business relates to
Shariah-compliant alternative investments for corporate and
individual investors, with an emphasis on real estate and private
equity investment. Arcapita's teams have completed investments in
these areas globally, and both areas have portfolio management
teams that maintain continuous oversight of each investment. Since
1997, the management team at Arcapita has completed over 80
transactions with a cumulative value exceeding $30 billion.

The loan was structured to comply with Shariah (Islamic) law. Title
to the properties is held by an accommodation party, which is the
mortgagor and which master leases the properties to
Shariah-compliant investors' entities. The rent payable pursuant to
the master lease is intended to cover the debt service payments
required under the related mortgage loan, as well as reserve
payments and any other sums due under the mortgage loan. By its
terms, the master lease is expressly subordinate to the mortgage
loan. There is a risk that in a bankruptcy case of the master
lessee, the master lease could be recharacterized as a financing
lease. If such recharacterization occurred, the master lessee could
be deemed to own the fee interest in the related mortgaged property
and the master lease itself would be viewed as a loan.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



GS MORTGAGE 2021-GR3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 38
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust (GSMBS) 2021-GR3. The ratings
range from Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2021-GR3 (GSMBS 2021-GR3) is
the fourth investment property transaction in 2021 issued by
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company (GSMC), the sponsor and the mortgage
loan seller. GSMC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs
Bank USA and Goldman Sachs. The certificates are backed by 1,568
first lien, primarily 30-year, fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage
loans on residential investment properties with an aggregate unpaid
principal balance (UPB) of $406,127,049 as of the November 1, 2021
cut-off date. All loans in the pool are originated by Guaranteed
Rate parties. Overall, pool strengths include the high credit
quality of the underlying borrowers, indicated by high FICO scores,
strong reserves, loans with fixed interest rates and no
interest-only loans. As of the cut-off date, all of the mortgage
loans are current, and no borrower has entered into a COVID-19
related forbearance plan with the servicer.

Approximately 1.6% of the mortgage loans by stated principal
balance as of the cut-off date were subject to debt consolidation
in which the related funds were used by the related mortgagor for
consumer, family or household purposes (personal-use loans). Vast
majority of the personal-use loans are "qualified mortgages" under
Regulation Z as result of the temporary provision allowing
qualified mortgage status for loans eligible for purchase,
guaranty, or insurance by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and certain
other federal agencies). With the exception of personal-use loans,
all other mortgage loans in the pool are not subject to the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) because each such mortgage loan is an
extension of credit primarily for a business purpose and is not a
"covered transaction" as defined in Section 1026.43(b)(1) of
Regulation Z. As of the closing date, the sponsor or a majority-
owned affiliate of the sponsor will retain at least 5% of the
initial certificate principal balance or notional amount of each
class of certificates (other than Class A-R certificates) issued by
the trust to satisfy U.S. risk retention rules.

NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) will
service all of the loans in the pool. Computershare Trust Company,
N.A. will be the master servicer and securities administrator. U.S.
Bank Trust National Association will be the trustee. Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC will be the representations and warranties (R&W)
breach reviewer.

Two third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan level information. These firms conducted detailed credit,
property valuation, data accuracy and compliance reviews on 33.9%
(by loan count) of the mortgage loans in the collateral pool.

Moody's analyzed the underlying mortgage loans using Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. In addition, Moody's
adjusted its losses based on qualitative attributes, including
origination quality, the strength of the R&W framework and
third-party review (TPR) results.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a typical shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior and subordination floor.
Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the certificate classes
using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2021-GR3

Cl. A-1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-5*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-6*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-7*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12-X*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-X*, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-X*, Assigned Baa1 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
1.11%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.84%, and reaches 6.11% at
stress level consistent with Moody's Aaa rating.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, strength of the TPR and the R&W framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

Moody's assessed the collateral pool as of November 1, 2021, the
cut-off date. The aggregate collateral pool as of the cut-off date
consists of 1,568 first lien, primarily 30-year, fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans on residential investment properties with
an aggregate unpaid principal balance (UPB) of $406,127,049 and a
weighted average mortgage rate of 3.7%.

All the mortgage loans are secured by first liens on one-to-four
family residential properties, planned unit developments and
condominiums. 1,495 mortgage loans have original terms to maturity
of 30 years, 5 loans have original term to maturity of 25 years, 68
loans have original term to maturity of 20 years.

The WA current FICO score of the borrowers in the pool is 770. The
WA Original LTV ratio of the mortgage pool is 66.6%, which is in
line with that of comparable transactions.

The mortgage loans in the pool were originated mostly in California
(22.2% by loan balance) and in high cost metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) Boston (10.2%), Chicago (9.1%), Los Angeles (8.1%),
New York (4.4%), and others (16.5%). The average loan balance of
the pool is $259,010. Moody's made adjustments in its analysis to
account for this geographic concentration risk. Top 10 MSAs
comprise 48.3% of the pool, by loan balance. Approximately 12.3% of
the pool balance is related to borrowers with two or more mortgages
in the pool.

Aggregator/Origination Quality

GSMC is the loan aggregator and the mortgage seller for the
transaction. GSMC's general partner is Goldman Sachs Real Estate
Funding Corp. and its limited partner is Goldman Sachs Bank USA.
Goldman Sachs Real Estate Funding Corp. is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Bank USA. GSMC is an affiliate of
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. GSMC is overseen by the mortgage capital
markets group within Goldman Sachs. Senior management averages 16
years of mortgage experience and 15 years of Goldman Sachs tenure.
The mortgage loans for this transaction were acquired by GSMC, the
sponsor and the mortgage loan seller from Guaranteed Rate, Inc and
Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC. The mortgage loan seller does not
originate any mortgage loans, including the mortgage loans included
in the mortgage pool. Instead, the mortgage loan seller acquired
the mortgage loans pursuant to contracts with the originators.

Overall, Moody's consider GSMC's aggregation platform to be
comparable to that of peer aggregators and therefore did not apply
a separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation quality.

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate, and as a result Moody's did not make any adjustments
to its base case and Aaa stress loss assumptions based on the
servicing arrangement.

Shellpoint will be the named primary servicer for this transaction
and will service 100% of the pool. Shellpoint is an approved
servicer in good standing with Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Shellpoint's primary servicing location is in Greenville,
South Carolina. Shellpoint services residential mortgage assets for
investors that include banks, financial services companies, GSEs
and government agencies. Computershare Trust Company, N.A.
(Computershare) will act as master servicer and securities
administrator under the sale and servicing agreement and as
custodian under the custodial agreement. Computershare is a
national banking association and a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Computershare Ltd (Baa2, long term rating), an Australian financial
services company with over $5 billion (USD) in assets as of June
30, 2021. Computershare Ltd and its affiliates have been engaging
in financial service activities, including stock transfer related
services since 1997, and corporate trust related services since
2000.

Third-party Review

Evolve Mortgage Services (Evolve) and Consolidated Analytics, Inc.
(Consolidated Analytics), collectively the TPR firms, reviewed
33.9% of the loans for regulatory compliance, credit, property
valuation and data accuracy. The due diligence results confirm
compliance with the originators' underwriting guidelines for the
vast majority of mortgage loans, no material compliance issues, and
no material valuation defects. The mortgage loans that had
exceptions to the originators' underwriting guidelines had
significant compensating factors that were documented.

Representations & Warranties

GSMBS 2021-GR3's R&W framework is in line with that of prior GSMBS
transactions Moody's have rated where an independent reviewer is
named at closing, and costs and manner of review are clearly
outlined at issuance. Moody's review of the R&W framework takes
into account the financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of
R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets) and the R&W enforcement
mechanism. The loan-level R&Ws meet or exceed the baseline set of
credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's have identified for US RMBS. R&W
breaches are evaluated by an independent third-party using a set of
objective criteria. The transaction requires mandatory independent
reviews of mortgage loans that become 120 days delinquent and those
that liquidate at a loss to determine if any of the R&Ws are
breached. There is a provision for binding arbitration in the event
of a dispute between the trust and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

The creditworthiness of the R&W providers determines the
probability that the R&W provider will be available and have the
financial strength to repurchase defective loans upon identifying a
breach. An investment-grade rated R&W provider lends substantial
strength to its R&Ws. Moody's analyze the impact of less
creditworthy R&W providers case by case, in conjunction with other
aspects of the transaction. Here, because the R&W providers are
unrated and/or exhibit limited financial flexibility, Moody's
applied an adjustment to the mortgage loans for which these
entities provided R&Ws.

Tail Risk and Locked Out Percentage

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 0.85% of the cut-off date pool
balance, and a subordination lock-out amount of 0.85% of the
cut-off date pool balance. The floors are consistent with the
credit neutral floors for the assigned ratings according to Moody's
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


GS MORTGAGE 2021-PJ11: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 38
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2021-PJ11. The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B3 (sf).

GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2021-PJ11 (GSMBS 2021-PJ11) is
the eleventh prime jumbo transaction in 2021 issued by Goldman
Sachs Mortgage Company (GSMC), the sponsor and the primary mortgage
loan seller. Overall, pool strengths include the high credit
quality of the underlying borrowers, indicated by high FICO scores,
strong reserves for prime jumbo borrowers, mortgage loans with
fixed interest rates and no interest-only loans. As of the cut-off
date, none of the mortgage loans are subject to a COVID-19 related
forbearance plan.

GSMC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Bank USA and
Goldman Sachs. The mortgage loans for this transaction were
acquired by GSMC, the sponsor and the primary mortgage loan seller
(approximately 94.6% by UPB), and MCLP Asset Company, Inc. (MCLP)
(approximately 5.4% by UPB), the mortgage loan sellers, from
certain of the originators or the aggregator, MAXEX Clearing LLC
(which aggregated 3.5% of the mortgage loans by UPB).

NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) will
service 91.6% (by loan balance) and United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC
(UWM) will service 8.4% (by loan balance) of the mortgage loans on
behalf of the issuing entity which will be subserviced by Cenlar
FSB (Cenlar), as subservicer. Computershare Trust Company, N.A.
(Computershare) will be the master servicer for this transaction.

Moody's analyzed the underlying mortgage loans using Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. In addition, Moody's
adjusted its losses based on qualitative attributes, including
origination quality, the strength of the R&W framework and
third-party review (TPR) results.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a typical shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior and subordination floor.
Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the certificate classes
using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2021-PJ11

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-5*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-9*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-13*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
0.51%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.32% and reaches 4.05% at
stress level consistent with Moody's Aaa rating.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, strength of the TPR and the R&W framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

As of the November 1, 2021 cut-off date, the aggregate collateral
pool comprises 493 (99.9% by UPB) prime jumbo (non-conforming) and
two (0.1% by UPB) conforming, 30-year loan-term, fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans, none of which have the benefit of
primary mortgage guaranty insurance, with an aggregate stated
principal balance (UPB) $535,258,290 and a weighted average (WA)
mortgage rate of 3.1%. The WA current FICO score of the borrowers
in the pool is 772. The WA Original LTV ratio of the mortgage pool
is 71.2%, which is in line with GSMBS 2021-PJ10 and also with other
prime jumbo transactions. Top 10 MSAs comprise 61.5% of the pool,
by UPB. The high geographic concentration in high cost MSAs is
reflected in the high average balance of the pool ($1,081,330).

All the mortgage loans in the aggregate pool are QM, with the prime
jumbo non-conforming mortgage loans meeting the requirements of the
QM-Safe Harbor rule (Appendix Q) or the new General QM rule (see
below), and the GSE eligible mortgage loans meeting the temporary
QM criteria applicable to loans underwritten in accordance with GSE
guidelines. The other characteristics of the mortgage loans in the
pool are generally comparable to that of GSMBS 2021-PJ9 and recent
prime jumbo transactions.

A portion of the loans purchased from various sellers into the pool
were originated pursuant to the new general QM rule (82.9% of the
pool by loan balance). The majority of these loans are UWM loans
underwritten to GS AUS underwriting guidelines. The third-party
reviewer verified that the loans' APRs met the QM rule's
thresholds. Furthermore, these loans were underwritten and
documented pursuant to the QM rule's verification safe harbor via a
mix of the Fannie Mae Single Family Selling Guide, the Freddie Mac
Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide, and applicable program
overlays. As part of the origination quality review and in
consideration of the detailed loan-level third-party diligence
reports, which included supplemental information with the specific
documentation received for each loan, Moody's concluded that these
loans were fully documented loans, and that the underwriting of the
loans is acceptable. Therefore, Moody's ran these loans as "full
documentation" loans in Moody's MILAN model, but increased Moody's
Aaa and expected loss assumptions due to the lack of performance,
track records and substantial overlays of the AUS-underwritten
loans.

Aggregator/Origination Quality

GSMC is the loan aggregator and the primary mortgage seller for the
transaction. GSMC's general partner is Goldman Sachs Real Estate
Funding Corp. and its limited partner is Goldman Sachs Bank USA.
Goldman Sachs Real Estate Funding Corp. is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Bank USA. GSMC is an affiliate of
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. GSMC is overseen by the mortgage capital
markets group within Goldman Sachs. Senior management averages 16
years of mortgage experience and 15 years of Goldman Sachs tenure.
The mortgage loans for this transaction were acquired by GSMC, the
sponsor and the primary mortgage loan seller (94.6% by UPB), and
MCLP Asset Company, Inc. (MCLP) (5.4% by UPB), the mortgage loan
sellers, from certain of the originators or the aggregator, MAXEX
Clearing LLC (which aggregated 3.5% of the mortgage loans by UPB).
The mortgage loans in the pool are underwritten to either GSMC's
underwriting guidelines, or seller's applicable guidelines. The
mortgage loan sellers do not originate any mortgage loans,
including the mortgage loans included in the mortgage pool.
Instead, the mortgage loan sellers acquired the mortgage loans
pursuant to contracts with the originators or the aggregator.

Overall, Moody's consider GSMC's aggregation platform to be
comparable to that of peer aggregators and therefore did not apply
a separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation quality. In
addition to reviewing GSMC's aggregation quality, Moody's have also
reviewed the origination quality of each of the originators which
contributed at least approximately 10% of the mortgage loans (by
UPB) to the transaction. For these originators, Moody's reviewed
their underwriting guidelines, performance history, and quality
control and audit processes and procedures (to the extent
available, respectively). Approximately 41.4% and 11.2% of the
mortgage loans, by a UPB as of the cut-off date, were originated by
UWM and Guaranteed Rate affiliates (including Guaranteed Rate, Inc.
(GRI) and Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC (GRA)) respectively. No
other originator or group of affiliated originators originated more
than approximately 10% of the mortgage loans in the aggregate.
Moody's made an adjustment to its losses for loans originated by
UWM primarily due to the fact that underwriting prime jumbo loans
mainly through DU is fairly new and no performance history has been
provided to Moody's on these types of loans. More time is needed to
assess UWM's ability to consistently produce high-quality prime
jumbo residential mortgage loans under this program.

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate, and as a result Moody's did not make any adjustments
to Moody's base case and Aaa stress loss assumptions based on the
servicing arrangement.

Shellpoint and UWM will act as the servicer's for this transaction.
Shellpoint will service 91.6% of the pool by balance and UWM will
service 8.4% of the pool by balance. Shellpoint is an approved
servicer in good standing with Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Shellpoint's primary servicing location is located in
Greenville, South Carolina. Shellpoint services residential
mortgage assets for investors that include banks, financial
services companies, GSEs and government agencies. Furthermore,
Computershare as master servicer.

Computershare is a national banking association and a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Computershare Ltd. (Baa2, long term rating), an
Australian financial services company with over $5 billion (USD) in
assets as of June 30, 2021. Computershare Ltd. and its affiliates
have been engaging in financial service activities, including stock
transfer related services since 1997, and corporate trust related
services since 2000.

Third-party Review

The transaction benefits from TPR on 100% of the mortgage loans for
regulatory compliance, credit and property valuation. The TPR
results confirm compliance with the originator's underwriting
guidelines for the vast majority of loans, no material regulatory
compliance issues, and no material property valuation issues. The
loans that had exceptions to the originator's underwriting
guidelines had significant compensating factors that were
documented.

Similar to GSMBS 2021-PJ10, a relatively high number of the B
graded exceptions were related to title insurance, compared to
those in prime transactions Moody's recently rated. While many of
these may be rectified in the future by the servicer or by
subsequent documentation, there is a risk that these exceptions
could impair the deal's insurance coverage if not rectified and
because the R&Ws specifically exclude these exceptions. Moody's
have considered this risk in its analysis.

Representations & Warranties

GSMBS 2021-PJ11's R&W framework is in line with that of prior GSMBS
transactions Moody's have rated where an independent reviewer is
named at closing, and costs and manner of review are clearly
outlined at issuance. Moody's review of the R&W framework takes
into account the financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of
R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets) and the R&W enforcement
mechanism. The loan-level R&Ws meet or exceed the baseline set of
credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's have identified for US RMBS. R&W
breaches are evaluated by an independent third-party using a set of
objective criteria. The transaction requires mandatory independent
reviews of mortgage loans that become 120 days delinquent and those
that liquidate at a loss to determine if any of the R&Ws are
breached. There is a provision for binding arbitration in the event
of a dispute between the trust and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

The creditworthiness of the R&W provider determines the probability
that the R&W provider will be available and have the financial
strength to repurchase defective loans upon identifying a breach.
An investment-grade rated R&W provider lends substantial strength
to its R&Ws. Moody's analyze the impact of less creditworthy R&W
providers case by case, in conjunction with other aspects of the
transaction. Here, because most of the R&W providers are unrated
and/or exhibit limited financial flexibility, Moody's applied an
adjustment to the mortgage loans for which these entities provided
R&Ws. In addition, a R&W breach will be deemed not to have occurred
if it arose as a result of a TPR exception disclosed in Appendix I
of the Private Placement Memorandum. There were a relatively high
number of B-grade exceptions in the TPR review, the disclosure of
which weakens the R&W framework.

Tail Risk and Locked Out Percentage

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.40% of the cut-off date pool
balance, and as subordination lock-out amount of 1.40% of the
cut-off date pool balance. The floors are consistent with the
credit neutral floors for the assigned ratings according to Moody's
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


HOME PARTNERS 2021-2: DBRS Gives (P) B Rating on Class G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Single-Family Rental Pass-Through Certificates (the Certificates)
to be issued by Home Partners of America 2021-2 Trust (HPA
2021-2):

-- $894.7 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $315.0 million Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- $113.4 million Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- $163.8 million Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- $207.9 million Class E1 at BBB (sf)
-- $94.5 million Class E2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $201.6 million Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- $151.2 million Class G at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Certificates reflects 60.99% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(high) (sf), AA (low) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (sf), BBB (low) (sf),
BB (low) (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 47.25%, 42.31%, 35.17%,
26.10%, 21.98%, 13.19%, and 6.60% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

HPA 2021-2 contains 6,148 properties in 21 states, with the largest
concentration by broker price opinion value in Colorado (15.0%).
The largest metropolitan statistical area (MSA) by value is Atlanta
(13.3%), followed by Charlotte (3.1%). The geographic concentration
dictates the home-price stresses applied to the portfolio and the
resulting market value decline (MVD). The MVD at the AAA (sf)
rating level for this deal is 53.0%. HPA 2021-2 has properties from
67 MSAs, many of which experienced dramatic home price index
declines in the housing crisis of 2008.

DBRS Morningstar assigned the provisional ratings for each class of
certificates by performing a quantitative and qualitative
collateral, structural, and legal analysis. This analysis uses DBRS
Morningstar's single-family rental subordination model and is based
on DBRS Morningstar's published criteria. DBRS Morningstar
developed property-level stresses for the analysis of single-family
rental assets. DBRS Morningstar will finalize the provisional
ratings on each class based on the level of stresses each class can
withstand and whether such stresses are commensurate with the
applicable rating level. DBRS Morningstar's analysis includes
estimated base-case net cash flows (NCF) by evaluating the gross
rent, concession, vacancy, operating expenses, and capital
expenditure data. The DBRS Morningstar NCF analysis resulted in a
minimum debt service coverage ratio of higher than 1.0 times.

Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar reviewed the third-party participants
in the transaction, including the property manager, servicer, and
special servicer. These transaction parties are acceptable to DBRS
Morningstar. DBRS Morningstar also conducted a legal review and
found no material rating concerns.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



ICG US 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from ICG US CLO 2020-1 Ltd./ICG
US CLO 2020-1 LLC. ICG US CLO 2020-1 Ltd. is a CLO previously
issued in October 2020 and is managed by ICG Debt Advisors LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 1,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Dec. 7, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes will be used to redeem the original notes. S&P
said, "At that time, we expect to withdraw our ratings on the
original notes and assign ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm our
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which outlines the terms of the replacement notes.
According to the proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes are
expected to be issued at a lower spread over three-month LIBOR than
the original notes.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended by
four years.

-- Of the identified underlying collateral obligations, 99.91%
have credit ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- Of the identified underlying collateral obligations, 94.80%
have recovery ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  ICG US CLO 2020-1 Ltd./ICG US CLO 2020-1 LLC

  Class A-R, $244.00 mil.: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R, $56.00 mil.: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $28.00 mil.: A (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $22.00 mil.: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $17.00 mil.: BB- (sf)
  Sub notes, $39.80 mil.: Not rated



IMPERIAL FUND 2021-NQM3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-NQM3 issued by
Imperial Fund Mortgage Trust 2021-NQM3:

-- $192.6 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $23.0 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $36.8 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $19.7 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $10.8 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects 36.90%
of credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 29.35%,
17.30%, 10.85%, 6.30%, and 2.75% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and adjustable-rate
prime and non-prime first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by 669
loans with a total principal balance of approximately $305,152,173
as of the Cut-Off Date (October 1, 2021).

All of the mortgage loans in the pool were originated by A&D
Mortgage LLC (ADM). ADM originated the mortgages primarily under
the following five programs:

-- Super Prime
-- Prime
-- DSCR
-- Foreign National – Full Doc
-- Foreign National – DSCR

ADM is the Servicer for all loans. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC
will subservice the mortgage loans beginning on or about the
Closing Date. Imperial Fund will act as the Sponsor and Servicing
Administrator and Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the Master
Servicer. Citibank, N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by
DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Securities Administrator and
Certificate Registrar. Wilmington Trust, National Association
(rated AA (low) with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will
serve as the Custodian, and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
will act as the Trustee.

In accordance with U.S. credit risk retention requirements,
Imperial Fund as the Sponsor, either directly or through a
Majority-Owned Affiliate, will retain an eligible horizontal
residual interest consisting of the Class X Certificates and the
requisite amount of the Class B-3 Certificates (together, the Risk
Retained Certificates) representing not less than 5% economic
interest in the transaction, to satisfy the requirements under
Section 15G of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the
regulations promulgated thereunder. Such retention aligns Sponsor
and investor interest in the capital structure.

Although the applicable mortgage loans were originated to satisfy
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ability-to-repay
(ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers who generally do not
qualify for agency, government, or private-label nonagency prime
products for various reasons described above. In accordance with
the CFPB Qualified Mortgage (QM)/ATR rules, 63.0% of the loans are
designated as non-QM. Approximately 37.0% of the loans are made to
investors for business purposes and are thus not subject to the
QM/ATR rules.

The Servicer will generally fund advances of delinquent principal
and interest (P&I) on any mortgage until such loan becomes 90 days
delinquent, contingent upon recoverability determination. The
Servicer is also obligated to make advances in respect of taxes,
insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing of properties.

The Seller will have the option, but not the obligation, to
repurchase any nonliquidated mortgage loan that is 90 or more days
delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) method (or,
in the case of any Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) forbearance loan,
such mortgage loan becomes 90 or more days MBA Delinquent after the
related forbearance period ends) at the Repurchase Price, provided
that such repurchases in aggregate do not exceed 7.5% of the total
principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date.

On or after October 2024, Imperial Fund II Mortgage Depositor LLC
(the Depositor) has the option to purchase all outstanding
certificates (Optional Redemption) at a price equal to the
outstanding class balance plus accrued and unpaid interest,
including any cap carryover amounts. After such a purchase, the
Depositor then has the option to complete a qualified liquidation,
which requires a complete liquidation of assets within the Trust
and the distribution of proceeds to the appropriate holders of
regular or residual interests.

On any date following the date on which the collateral pool balance
is less than or equal to 10% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the
Servicing Administrator and the Servicer will have the option to
terminate the transaction by purchasing all of the mortgage loans
and any real estate owned (REO) property at a price equal to the
sum of the aggregate stated principal balance of the mortgage loans
(other than any REO property) plus applicable accrued interest
thereon, the lesser of the fair market value of any REO property
and the stated principal balance of the related loan, and any
outstanding and unreimbursed advances, accrued and unpaid fees, and
expenses that are payable or reimbursable to the transaction
parties (Optional Termination). An Optional Termination is
conducted as a qualified liquidation.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches subject
to certain performance triggers related to cumulative losses or
delinquencies exceeding a specified threshold (Credit Event).
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 Certificates (IIPP) before being applied
sequentially to amortize the balances of the senior and
subordinated certificates after a Credit Event has occurred. For
the Class A-3 Certificates (only after a Credit Event) and for the
mezzanine and subordinate classes of certificates (both before and
after a Credit Event), principal proceeds will be available to
cover interest shortfalls only after the more senior certificates
have been paid off in full. Furthermore, the excess spread can be
used to cover realized losses and prior period bond writedown
amounts first before being allocated to unpaid cap carryover
amounts to Class A-1 down to Class M-1.

For this transaction, 98 loans comprising 20.5% of the pool balance
are backed by properties located in counties designated by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency as having been affected by a
natural disaster, not related to the coronavirus pandemic as of the
Cut-Off Date. The Sponsor confirmed that as of October 5, 2021, no
borrowers in these areas reported any property damage.

Coronavirus Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures
caused an immediate economic contraction, leading to sharp
increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for many
consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in delinquencies for many
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes shortly
after the onset of the pandemic.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term payment reliefs that
may perform very differently from traditional delinquencies.
Because the option to forebear mortgage payments was so widely
available at the onset of the pandemic, it drove forbearances to a
very high level. When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced
forbearances in 2020 performed better than expected, thanks to
government aid, low loan-to-value ratios, and good underwriting in
the mortgage market in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset
classes, delinquencies have been gradually trending down in recent
months as the forbearance period comes to an end for many
borrowers.

As of the Cut-Off Date, there are no loans that are subject to an
active coronavirus-related forbearance plan with the Servicer.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE 2013-3: DBRS Cuts Class G Certs Rating to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-3 issued
by Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc., Series 2013-3 as
follows:

-- Class F to CCC (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class G to D (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed its ratings on the remaining
classes as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

The rating on Class X has been withdrawn as two reference classes
now have a CCC (sf) and a D (sf) rating. Class E continues to carry
a Negative trend; all other trends are Stable.

Since DBRS Morningstar's March 2021 rating actions for this
transaction, two loans that were previously in special servicing,
Deerfoot Court (Prospectus ID#5) and Airways Business Plaza
(Prospectus ID#12), have been liquidated from the pool as of the
September 2021 remittance, resulting in a $5.5 million loss to the
trust. The loss took out the full balance of the $5.0 million
unrated Class H certificate with the remainder of the loss applied
to the Class G certificate.

The Deerfoot Court loan was secured by a 76,000-square-foot (sf)
Class B mid-rise office property in Northeast Calgary, located
approximately nine kilometers from the Calgary central business
district (CBD). The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2020 following the bankruptcy filing by the Strategic
Group, the loan sponsor for both loans liquidated with the
September 2021 remittance. The property was sold for $4.5 million,
resulting in an actual realized loss of $4.7 million (loss severity
of 58.4%).

The Airways Business Plaza loan was secured by a 65,000-sf suburban
office building, located approximately 13 kilometers south of
Calgary International Airport. The property was sold at a price of
$5.5 million, resulting in an actual realized loss of $774,592
(loss severity of 16.8%). The combined loss for these two loans was
generally in line with DBRS Morningstar's projections at last
review, which assumed a loss scenario for both loans that resulted
in a total hypothetical loss of $5.9 million.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends on all but one class
reflect the overall stable performance of the pool as shown by the
significant paydown since issuance that has significantly increased
credit support for the higher rated classes. At issuance, the trust
was secured by 38 loans at the original trust balance of $250.0
million. Per the September 2021 remittance, 20 loans remain in the
trust at the current balance of $75.7 million, representing a
collateral reduction of 69.8% since issuance as a result of loan
repayment and scheduled loan amortization. As of the September 2021
remittance, four loans—three of which are backed by multifamily
properties in Fort McMurray, Alberta—that represent 21.1% of the
current pool balance, are on the servicer's watchlist. DBRS
Morningstar continues to have concerns about the Fort McMurray
loans in the pool, driving the Negative trend carried by the Class
E certificate.

The three loans secured by multifamily properties in Fort McMurray
are Lunar and Whimbrel Apartments (Prospectus ID#10; 6.0% of the
pool), Snowbird and Skyview Apartments (Prospectus ID#11; 5.7% of
the pool), and Parkland and Gannet Apartments (Prospectus ID#17;
4.9% of the pool). All three properties are located within the Fort
McMurray CBD and are of older construction, but all had
historically maintained high occupancy rates and rents prior to the
ongoing downturn in the oil and gas industry that began in late
2014. The sponsor for all three loans, an affiliate of Lanesborough
REIT, has worked with the servicer several times to paper loan
modifications that allowed for various forms of payment relief and
extensions to the maturity date and, as of the September 2021
remittance, all three loans reported current.

As of the most recent reporting available, the properties reported
occupancy rates between 48.0% and 94.0%, with some properties
previously affected by area flooding still under repair as of the
most recent servicer updates. Although occupancy rates have
improved for some of the properties, cash flows remain
significantly depressed from issuance; however, the sponsor's
continued commitment to these and other Fort McMurray loans in
other CMBS transactions is noted and is considered a mitigating
factor for the increased risks from issuance.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.



JP MORGAN 2013-C16: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C16, issued by JP Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C16 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends remain Stable.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect the overall
stable performance of the transaction. Per the October 2021
remittance, 48 of the original 60 loans remain in the pool, with an
aggregate principal balance of $744.2 million, representing a
collateral reduction of 34.5% since issuance as a result of loan
repayments, scheduled amortization, and the liquidation of one
loan. In addition, 18 loans, representing 27.0% of the current pool
balance, are defeased.

The transaction is relatively diverse by property type, with
multifamily, office, and retail properties securing 22.0%, 19.9%,
and 16.2%, respectively, of the current nondefeased pool balance.
Only three loans, representing 11.2% of the current pool balance,
are secured by lodging properties, which is noteworthy as these
property types were the most immediately affected by the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The pool displays some
concentration from a loan size perspective as its largest loan, The
Aire, accounts for 16.4% of the current pool balance. This loan,
secured by a 310-unit luxury apartment on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan, has been on the servicer's watchlist since February 2017
because of a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below breakeven,
primarily as a result of a steady rise in real estate taxes as the
property's 10-year tax abatement burns off, leading to tax
increases of 20.0% every two years since 2014. The poor performance
was recently further exacerbated as a result of the pandemic, with
occupancy falling to a low of 73.0% as of March 2020, at which
point the loan's DSCR fell to 0.22 times (x). However, per the July
2021 rent roll, occupancy has rebounded to 95.0% with an average
rental rate of $5,885 per unit, in line with historical figures
from before the pandemic. While cash flow continues to
significantly trail expectations, the sponsor has kept the loan
current with no missed payments reported to date. Given the
continuing performance struggles, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this
loan with an increased probability of default (POD) for this
review.

According to the October 2021 remittance, 11 loans, representing
41.0% of the current pool balance, are on the servicer's watchlist.
These loans are being monitored for a number of reasons, including
low DSCRs, increased vacancy, near-term tenant rollover, and/or
pandemic-related hardships. Excluding The Aire loan, the other 10
loans on the watchlist had a weighted average DSCR of 0.97x, based
on the most recent reporting (primarily Q1 2021 and Q2 2021
financial reporting), an improvement from 0.84x at YE2020. Three
other loans, representing 8.2% of the current pool balance, are in
special servicing.

The largest loan in special servicing, Hilton Richmond Hotel & Spa
(Prospectus ID#7, 5.2% of the current pool balance), is secured by
a 254-key, full-service hotel in Richmond, Virginia. The property
has historically benefited from its proximity to several major
corporate headquarters as well as its 21,700 sf of meeting space,
but it has been severely negatively affected by the pandemic. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in April 2020 for imminent
default and is currently listed as 121+ days delinquent; however,
the borrower recently signed a reinstatement agreement and is now
working with the receiver to resume operating the property. While
terms have not been fully disclosed, the loan is pending a return
to the master servicer as of the October 2021 reporting as the
borrower works to bring the loan current.

Based on the STR report for the trailing three months (T-3) ended
July 31, 2021, the property reported occupancy, average daily rate
(ADR), and revenue per available room (RevPAR) figures of 61.3%,
$119, and $73, respectively, compared with the competitive set's
figures of 59.7%, $117, and $70, respectively. While these figures
are still well below those of the pre-pandemic T-3 ended July 31,
2019, at 73.3%, $146, and $102, respectively, performance is
trending in the right direction, with a RevPAR penetration rate of
105.2% during July 2021. While it appears foreclosure has been
avoided, there are still a number of obstacles for the borrower to
overcome and, as such, DBRS Morningstar has elevated the loan's POD
for this review. Based on the February 2021 as-is value of $47.7
million, the loan was leveraged to 82.3%.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Northpointe Center
(Prospectus ID#23, 1.7% of pool), is secured by a community retail
center with five single-story buildings totaling 90,000 sf in
Zanesville, Ohio. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
June 2020 for imminent default, with a receiver appointed in
September 2020 and a foreclosure sale in June 2021 resulting in the
loan becoming real estate owned as of September 2021. The property
was appraised in May 2021 with an as-is value of $9.6 million,
representing a 50.8% decline from the issuance value of $19.5
million, and an LTV of 143.7%, based on the total loan exposure.
The property was 37.0% occupied as of September 2021 with
additional risks of near-term tenant rollover and co-tenancy
clauses. DBRS Morningstar liquidated this loan from the trust in
its analysis for this review and anticipates a loss severity in
excess of 50.0% upon resolution.

Notes: All figures are in U.S dollars unless otherwise noted.



JP MORGAN 2018-6: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-4 Bonds From Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 66 classes
from 16 transactions issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust. The
transactions are securitizations of fixed rate, first-lien prime
jumbo and agency eligible mortgage loans.

A List of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3I59WCA.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2015-3

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2015-4

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2015-6

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-1

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-3

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2019 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-3

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2019 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-4

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-6

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-1

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2018 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-3

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-4

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-5

Cl. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-6

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-8

CL. A-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

CL. A-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

CL. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

CL. B-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

CL. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades reflect the increased levels of credit
enhancement available to the bonds, the recent performance, and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. In these
transactions, high prepayment rates averaging 26%-56% over the last
six months, driven by the low interest rate environment, have
benefited the bonds by increasing the paydown and building credit
enhancement.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk posed by
borrowers enrolled in payment relief programs. Moody's increased
its MILAN model-derived median expected losses by 15% and Moody's
Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the performance deterioration resulting
from a slowdown in US economic activity due to the COVID-19
outbreak.

For transactions where more than 4% of the loans in pool have been
enrolled in payment relief programs for more than 3 months, Moody's
further increased the expected loss to account for the rising risk
of potential deferral losses to the subordinate bonds. Moody's also
considered higher adjustments for transactions where more than 10%
of the pool is either currently enrolled or was previously enrolled
in a payment relief program. Specifically, Moody's account for the
marginally increased probability of default for borrowers that have
either been enrolled in a payment relief program for more than 3
months or have already received a loan modification, including a
deferral, since the start of the pandemic.

Moody's will reduce the adjustment to pool losses in instances
where the collateral has demonstrated strong performance since the
start of the pandemic. For transactions where (1) the current
proportion of loans enrolled in payment relief programs is lower
than 2.5%, and (2) the proportion of loans that are cash flowing
today but were previously enrolled in a payment relief program
since the start of the pandemic is lower than 5%, Moody's increase
the median expected loss by 10% and Moody's Aaa loss by 2.5%. The
reduced adjustment reflects the assumption that pools with a higher
proportion of borrowers that continued to make payments throughout
the pandemic are likely to have lower default rates as COVID-19
continues to decline.

Moody's estimated the proportion of loans granted payment relief in
a pool based on a review of loan level cashflows. In Moody's
analysis, Moody's considered a loan to be enrolled in a payment
relief program if (1) the loan was not liquidated but took a loss
in the reporting period (to account for loans with monthly
deferrals that were reported as current), or (2) the actual balance
of the loan increased in the reporting period, or (3) the actual
balance of the loan remained unchanged in the last and current
reporting period, excluding interest-only loans and pay ahead
loans. Based on Moody's analysis, the proportion of borrowers that
are enrolled in payment relief plans in the underlying pool ranged
between 0%-7.6% over the last six months.

Given the pervasive financial strains tied to the pandemic,
servicers have been making advances on increased amount of
non-cash-flowing loans, sometimes resulting in interest shortfalls
due to insufficient funds in subsequent periods when such advances
are recouped. Moody's expect such interest shortfalls to be
reimbursed over the next several months.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicers.

The action reflects the coronavirus pandemic's residual impact on
the ongoing performance of residential mortgage loans as the US
economy continues on the path toward normalization. Economic
activity will continue to strengthen in 2021 because of several
factors, including the rollout of vaccines, growing household
consumption and an accommodative central bank policy. However,
specific sectors and individual businesses will remain weakened by
extended pandemic related restrictions.

Moody's regard the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
August 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


JP MORGAN 2021-13: DBRS Gives (P) B(high) Rating on B5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-13 to be issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2021-13:

-- $1.6 billion Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $1.4 billion Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $1.3 billion Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $1.3 billion Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $1.3 billion Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $992.0 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $992.0 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $992.0 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $330.7 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $330.7 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $330.7 million Class A-5-B at AAA (sf)
-- $330.7 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $794.8 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $794.8 million Class A-6-A at AAA (sf)
-- $794.8 million Class A-6-X at AAA (sf)
-- $527.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $527.8 million Class A-7-A at AAA (sf)
-- $527.8 million Class A-7-B at AAA (sf)
-- $527.8 million Class A-7-X at AAA (sf)
-- $197.2 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $197.2 million Class A-8-A at AAA (sf)
-- $197.2 million Class A-8-X at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-9-A at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-9-X at AAA (sf)
-- $246.0 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $246.0 million Class A-10-A at AAA (sf)
-- $246.0 million Class A-10-X at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-11-A at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-11-AI at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-11-B at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-11-BI at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.2 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.2 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $114.2 million Class A-15-A at AAA (sf)
-- $38.1 million Class A-15-B at AAA (sf)
-- $38.1 million Class A-15-C at AAA (sf)
-- $1.5 billion Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $127.2 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $1.6 billion Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $1.6 billion Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $115.0 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.2 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $33.8 million Class B-1 at AA (high) (sf)
-- $33.8 million Class B-1-A at AA (high) (sf)
-- $33.8 million Class B-1-X at AA (high) (sf)
-- $25.4 million Class B-2 at A (high) (sf)
-- $25.4 million Class B-2-A at A (high) (sf)
-- $25.4 million Class B-2-X at A (high) (sf)
-- $16.1 million Class B-3 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $6.8 million Class B-4 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $5.9 million Class B-5 at B (high) (sf)

Classes A-3-X, A-4-X, A-5-X, A-6-X, A-7-X, A-8-X, A-9-X, A-10-X,
A-11-X, A-11-AI, A-11-BI, A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, B-1-X and
B-2-X are interest-only certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-3-X, A-4, A-4-A, A-4-X, A-5, A-5-A,
A-5-B, A-5-X, A-6, A-7, A-7-A, A-7-B, A-7-X, A-8, A-9, A-10,
A-11-A, A-11-AI, A-11-B, A-11-BI, A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-15-C,
A-16, A-17, A-X-2, A-X-3, B-1 and B-2 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
exchange certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, A-4-A, A-5, A-5-A, A-5-B, A-6, A-6-A,
A-7, A-7-A, A-7-B, A-8, A-8-A, A-9, A-9-A, A-10, A-10-A, A-11,
A-11-A, A-11-B, A-12 and A-13 are super-senior certificates. These
classes benefit from additional protection from the senior support
certificates (Classes A-14, A-15, A-15-A, A-15-B and A-15-C) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 6.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (high)
(sf), A (high) (sf), BBB (high) (sf), BB (high) (sf), and B (high)
(sf) ratings reflect 4.00%, 2.50%, 1.55%, 1.15%, and 0.80% of
credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien fixed-rate prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 1,697 loans with a total principal
balance of $1,691,343,269 as of the Cut-Off Date (October 1,
2021).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years and a
weighted-average loan age of three months. Approximately 98.7% of
the pool are traditional, nonagency, prime jumbo mortgage loans.
The remaining 1.3% of the pool are conforming, high-balance
mortgage loans that were underwritten using an automated
underwriting system designated by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and
were eligible for purchase by such agencies. In addition, 78.7% of
the pool were originated in accordance with the new general
qualified mortgages rule.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are United
Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (UWM; 63.7%), and various other
originators, each comprising less than 10% of the pool. The
mortgage loans will be serviced by UWM (63.7%), JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (JPMCB; rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar; 29.9%), and various other servicers and subservicers
each comprising less than 10.0% of the pool. With respect to the
Mortgage Loans serviced by loanDepot and UWM, Cenlar FSB, with
respect to the Mortgage Loans serviced by A&D, Specialized Loan
Servicing LLC and with respect to the Mortgage Loans serviced by
USAA, Nationstar Mortgage LLC.

Servicing will be transferred from Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing to
JPMCB on the servicing transfer date (December 1, 2021, or a later
date) as determined by the Issuing Entity and JPMCB. For this
transaction, the servicing fee payable for mortgage loans serviced
by JPMCB, loanDepot, SMS, and UWM is composed of three separate
components: the aggregate base servicing fee, the aggregate
delinquent servicing fee, and the aggregate additional servicing
fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency status of the related
loan and will be paid from interest collections before distribution
to the securities.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will act as the Master
Servicer. Citibank, N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by
DBRS Morningstar) will act as Securities Administrator and Delaware
Trustee. JPMCB and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Negative
trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as Custodian. Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC will serve as the Representations and Warranties
Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a precrisis structure.

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) PANDEMIC IMPACT

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in
delinquencies for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes shortly after the onset of the pandemic.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of forbearance,
which are generally short-term payment reliefs that may perform
very differently from traditional delinquencies. At the onset of
the pandemic, because the option to forebear mortgage payments was
so widely available, it drove forbearance to a very high level.
When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid, low
loan-to-value ratios, and good underwriting in the mortgage market
in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes, delinquencies
have been gradually trending down in recent months as the
forbearance period comes to an end for many borrowers.

As of the Cut-Off Date, none of the loans are currently subject to
a coronavirus-related forbearance plan. In the event a borrower
requests or enters into a coronavirus-related forbearance plan
after the Cut-Off Date but prior to the Closing Date, the Mortgage
Loan Seller will remove such loan from the mortgage pool and remit
the related Closing Date substitution amount. Loans that enter a
coronavirus-related forbearance plan after the Closing Date will
remain in the pool.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



JP MORGAN 2021-14: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Definitive ratings to 58
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) 2021-14. The ratings range from
Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

JPMMT 2021-14 is the fourteenth prime jumbo transaction in 2021
issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation (JPMMAC).
The credit characteristic of the mortgage loans backing this
transaction is similar to both recent JPMMT transactions and other
prime jumbo issuers that Moody's have rated. Moody's consider the
overall servicing framework for this pool to be adequate given the
servicing arrangement of the servicers, as well as the presence of
an experienced master servicer to oversee the servicers.

JPMMT 2021-14 has a shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination floor and
a subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool. In
coding the cash flow, Moody's took into account the step-up
incentive servicing fee structure.

In this transaction, the Class A-11, A-11-A and A-11-B notes'
coupon is indexed to SOFR. However, based on the transaction's
structure, the particular choice of benchmark has no credit impact.
First, interest payments to the notes, including the floating rate
notes, are subject to the net WAC cap, which prevents the floating
rate notes from incurring interest shortfalls as a result of
increases in the benchmark index above the fixed rates at which the
assets bear interest. Second, the shifting-interest structure pays
all interest generated on the assets to the bonds and does not
provide for any excess spread.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party review (TPR) and the
representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2021-14

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-AI*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-BI*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15-C, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3-A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
0.72%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.49% and reaches 5.07% at
a stress level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

Collateral Description

Moody's assessed the collateral pool as of November 1, 2021, the
cut-off date. The deal will be backed by 1,349 fully amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance (UPB) of $1,396,697,526 and an original term to maturity of
up to 30 years. The pool consists of prime jumbo non-conforming
(99.4% by UPB) and GSE-eligible conforming (0.6% by UPB) mortgage
loans. The GSE-eligible loans were underwritten pursuant to GSE
guidelines and were approved by DU/LP.

All the loans with the exception of 48 loans were underwritten
pursuant to the new general QM rule. The other loans in the pool
either meet Appendix Q to the QM rules or the QM GSE patch.

There are 1,301 loans originated pursuant to the new general QM
rule in this pool. The third-party review verified that the loans'
APRs met the QM rule's thresholds (APOR + 1.5%). Furthermore, these
loans are typically underwritten and documented pursuant to the QM
rule's verification safe harbor via a mix of the Fannie Mae Single
Family Selling Guide, the Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer
Guide, and the applicable program overlays. As part of the
origination quality review and based on the documentation
information Moody's received in the ASF tape, Moody's concluded
that these loans were fully documented and therefore, Moody's ran
these loans as "full documentation" loans in Moody's MILAN model.

Overall, the pool is of strong credit quality and includes
borrowers with high FICO scores (weighted average primary borrower
FICO of 764), low loan-to-value ratios (WA CLTV 70.7%), high
borrower monthly incomes (about $34,702 ) and substantial liquid
cash reserves (about $306,852 ), on a weighted-average basis,
respectively, which have been verified as part of the underwriting
process and reviewed by the TPR firms. Approximately 49.8% of the
mortgage loans (by balance) were originated in California which
includes metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) Los Angeles (19.2%
by UPB) and San Francisco (8.8% by UPB). The high geographic
concentration in high-cost MSAs is reflected in the high average
balance of the pool ($1,035,358). Approximately 2.2% of the
mortgage loans by balance are designated as safe harbor Qualified
Mortgages (QM) and meet Appendix Q to the QM rules, 0.4% of the
mortgage loans by balance are designated as Agency Safe Harbor
loans, and 97.4% of the mortgage loans by balance are designated as
Safe Harbor APOR loans, for which mortgage loans are not
underwritten to meet Appendix Q but satisfy AUS with additional
overlays of originators.

As of the cut-off date, none of the borrowers of the mortgage loans
have inquired about or requested forbearance plans with the related
servicer or have previously entered into a COVID-19 related
forbearance plan with the related servicer. Certain borrowers may
become subject to forbearance plans or other payment relief plans
following the cutoff date. In the event a borrower requests or
enters into a COVID-19 related forbearance plan after the cut-off
date but prior to the closing date, JPMMAC will remove such
mortgage loan from the mortgage pool and remit the related closing
date substitution amount. In the event that after the closing date
a borrower enters into or requests a COVID-19 related forbearance
plan, such mortgage loan (and the risks associated with it) will
remain in the mortgage pool.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's consider JPMMAC's aggregation platform to be adequate and
Moody's did not apply a separate loss-level adjustment for
aggregation quality. In addition to reviewing JPMMAC aggregation
quality, Moody's have also reviewed the origination quality of
originator(s) contributing a significant percentage of the
collateral pool (above 10%) and MAXEX Clearing LLC (an
aggregator).

United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (UWM) and loanDepot (loanDepot.com,
LLC) sold/originated approximately 78.2% and 17.9% of the mortgage
loans (by UPB) in the pool. The remaining originators each account
for less than 1.0% (by UPB) in the pool (3.9% by UPB in the
aggregate). Approximately 0.5% (by UPB) of the mortgage loans were
acquired by JPMMAC from MAXEX Cleaning, LLC (aggregator),
respectively, which purchased such mortgage loans from the related
originators or from an unaffiliated third party which directly or
indirectly purchased such mortgage loans from the related
originators.

Moody's did not make an adjustment for GSE-eligible loans, since
those loans were underwritten in accordance with GSE guidelines.
Moody's increased its base case and Aaa loss expectations for
certain originators of non-conforming loans where Moody's do not
have clear insight into the underwriting practices, quality control
and credit risk management (except being neutral for Caliber Home
Loans, JPMorgan Chase Bank, loanDepot and NewRez, under the old QM
guidelines and for JPMorgan Chase Bank, and Rocket Mortgage under
the new QM guidelines).

UWM originated approximately 78.2% of the mortgage loans by pool
balance. The majority of these loans were originated under UWM's
prime jumbo program which are processed using the Desktop
Underwriter (DU) automated underwriting system and are therefore
predominantly underwritten to Fannie Mae guidelines. The loans
receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due to the 1) loan amount
or 2) LTV for non-released prime jumbo cash-out refinances is over
80%. Moody's increased its loss expectations for UWM loans due
mostly to the fact that underwriting prime jumbo loans mainly
through DU is fairly new and no performance history has been
provided to Moody's on these types of loans. More time is needed to
assess UWM's ability to consistently produce high-quality prime
jumbo residential mortgage loans under this program.

The loan pool backing this transaction include 1,042 UWM loans
originated pursuant to the new general QM rule. To satisfy the new
rule, UWM implemented its prime jumbo underwriting overlays over
the GSE Automated Underwriting System (AUS) for applications on or
after March 1, 2021. Under UWM's new general QM underwriting, the
APR on all loans will not exceed the average prime offer rate
(APOR) +1.5%, and income and asset documentation will be governed
by the following, designed to meet the verification safe harbor
provisions of the new QM Rule: (i) applicable overlays, (ii) one of
(x) Fannie Mae Single Family Selling Guide or (y) Freddie Mac
guidelines and (iii) Desktop Underwriter.

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing framework for this pool to
be adequate given the servicing arrangement of the servicers, as
well as the presence of an experienced master servicer. Nationstar
Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) (Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc.
corporate family rating B2) will act as the master servicer.

United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (subserviced by Cenlar FSB),
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (JPMCB), loanDepot.com,
LLC (subserviced by Cenlar FSB) and A&D Mortgage LLC (subserviced
by Specialized Loan Servicing LLC) are the principal servicers in
this transaction and will service approximately 78.2%, 3.5%, 17.9%
and 0.3% of loans (by UPB of the mortgage), respectively.
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will act as interim servicer for the
mortgage loans serviced by JPMCB from the closing date until the
servicing transfer date, which is expected to occur on or about
February 1, 2022 (but which may occur after such date).

The servicers are required to advance P&I on the mortgage loans. To
the extent that the servicers are unable to do so, the master
servicer will be obligated to make such advances. In the event that
the master servicer, Nationstar, is unable to make such advances,
the securities administrator, Citibank, N.A. (rated Aa3) will be
obligated to do so to the extent such advance is determined by the
securities administrator to be recoverable. The servicing fee for
loans in this transaction will be predominantly based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $40 per loan and
additional fees for delinquent or defaulted loans (fixed fee
framework servicers, which will be paid a monthly flat servicing
fee equal to one-twelfth of 0.25% of the remaining principal
balance of the mortgage loans, account for less than 1.00% of
UPB).

Third-Party Review

The transaction benefits from a TPR on 100% of the loans for
regulatory compliance, credit, property valuation and data
integrity. The TPR results confirm compliance with the originator's
underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of loans, no material
regulatory compliance issues, and no material property valuation
issues. The loans that had exceptions to the originator's
underwriting guidelines had significant compensating factors that
were documented.

R&W Framework

Moody's review of the R&W framework takes into account the
financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including
qualifiers and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms. JPMMT 2021-14's
R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT transactions
Moody's have rated where an independent reviewer is named at
closing, and costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at
issuance. The loan-level R&Ws meet or exceed the baseline set of
credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's have identified for US RMBS. The R&W
framework is "prescriptive", whereby the transaction documents set
forth detailed tests for each R&W.

The originators and the aggregators each make a comprehensive set
of R&Ws for their loans. The creditworthiness of the R&W provider
determines the probability that the R&W provider will be available
and have the financial strength to repurchase defective loans upon
identifying a breach. JPMMAC does not backstop the originator R&Ws,
except for certain "gap" R&Ws covering the period from the date as
of which such R&W is made by an originator or an aggregator,
respectively, to the cut-off date or closing date. In this
transaction, Moody's made adjustments to its base case and Aaa loss
expectations for R&W providers that are unrated and/or financially
weaker entities.

Transaction Structure

The transaction has a shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bonds have been reduced to zero i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order. Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order,
first to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

The Class A-11, A-11-A and A-11-B Certificates will have a
pass-through rate that will vary directly with the SOFR rate and
the Class A-11-X Certificates will have a pass-through rate that
will vary inversely with the SOFR rate.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinate bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinate bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 0.75% of the cut-off date pool
balance, and as subordination lockout amount of 0.75% of the
cut-off date pool balance. Moody's calculate the credit neutral
floors as shown in its principal methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


JP MORGAN 2021-NYAH: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) on H Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-NYAH to
be issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2021-NYAH (JPMCC 2021-NYAH):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C-1 at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C-2 at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AA (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AA (sf)
-- Class D at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D-1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D-2 at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-CP and X-EXT are interest-only (IO) classes whose
balances are notional.

The collateral for JPMCC 2021-NYAH includes the borrowers'
fee-simple interest in 11 multifamily portfolios encompassing 31
properties, 53 buildings, 3,531 multifamily units, and 23,051
square feet of commercial space located throughout the Bronx,
Brooklyn, Queens, and Upper Manhattan boroughs of New York. The
transaction sponsor acquired all properties in the portfolio
between 2015 and 2017 for a total of $776.8 million and has a
current cost basis of approximately $907.4 million. While the
properties were originally built between 1915 and 1964, DBRS
Morningstar considers its concerns with the older construction
vintage to be mitigated by the sponsor's significant investment of
$130.6 million ($36,982 per unit) in capital improvements across
the properties since acquisition. Specifically, the sponsor has
completed $96.0 million ($27,202 per unit) of buildingwide capital
expenditures and 1,255 unit renovations with an additional 227 unit
renovations in progress at a cost of $34.5 million ($23,303 per
unit).

There are 3,069 affordable units (86.9% of total) across the
portfolio, which DBRS Morningstar generally views as favorable
because of the enhanced cash flow stability. The collateral had an
average occupancy of 92.4% from January 2019 through August 2021
despite having a considerable number of units under renovation.
Occupancy is slightly down at 90.5% as of the August 31, 2021, rent
roll, but DBRS Morningstar primarily attributes this to renovations
at more than 200 units. The submarkets across the portfolio
experienced average asking rent decreases in 2020 ranging from 0.2%
to 7.8% according to Reis. However, DBRS Morningstar recognizes
that the properties have limited exposure to rent declines as a
result of a heavy concentration of affordable units that already
have below-market rents. Ultimately, DBRS Morningstar's outlook on
the stability of multifamily assets in and around the New York
Metro area has historically been positive, as the region is
considered to be a top-tier, super-dense urban market and the
global epicenter for banking and financial services.

Four properties, representing 18.3% of the allocated loan amount,
benefit from some form of tax abatement or exemption, which poses
moderate refinance risk as rises in future tax rates resulting from
the loss of such benefits could diminish the value of the
underlying collateral as derived through income capability.
However, tax abatement benefits throughout the portfolio are
generally correlated with the provision of affordable housing
units. Such affordable units are generally considered to be leased
at below-market rates to make them affordable to tenants at limited
income levels. As a result, loss of tax abatement benefits might
also result in the ability to lease such affordable units at
market-rate rents, potentially offsetting reductions in net cash
flow otherwise incurred from a loss of abatement benefits. The
portfolio's favorable location in a super-dense urban market, the
strong fundamentals of the surrounding multifamily market, and the
sponsor's evidenced experience in the local market reinforce DBRS
Morningstar's comfort in the portfolio's ability to maintain cash
flow stability.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



LENDMARK FUNDING 2021-2: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the classes of
notes issued by Lendmark Funding Trust 2021-2 (Lendmark 2021-2), as
follows:

-- $283,160,000 Class A Notes at AA (sf)
-- $38,320,000 Class B Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- $32,000,000, Class C Notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $46,520,000 Class D Notes at BB (high) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar based the ratings on the Notes on its review of
the following considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns," published on September 8, 2021. These baseline
macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's moderate and
adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic scenarios, which
were first published in April 2020. The baseline macroeconomic
scenarios reflect the view that, although coronavirus remains a
risk to the outlook, uncertainty around the macroeconomic effects
of the pandemic has gradually receded. Current median forecasts
considered in the baseline macroeconomic scenarios incorporate some
risks associated with further outbreaks but remain fairly positive
on recovery prospects given expectations of continued fiscal and
monetary policy support. The policy response to coronavirus may
nonetheless bring other risks to the forefront in coming months and
years.

-- The transaction's form and sufficiency of available credit
enhancement.

-- Overcollateralization, note subordination, reserve account
amounts, and excess spread create credit enhancement levels that
are commensurate with the proposed ratings.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

-- Lendmark's capabilities with regard to originations,
underwriting, and servicing.

-- The credit quality and performance of Lendmark's consumer loan
portfolio.

-- DBRS Morningstar has performed an operational review of
Lendmark and considers the entity an acceptable originator and
servicer of unsecured personal loans with an acceptable back-up
servicer.

-- The legal structure and expected legal opinions that addressed
the true sale of the assets, the non-consolidation of the trust,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets, and the consistency with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria
for U.S. Structured Finance."

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



LOANCORE 2021-CRE6: DBRS Gives Provisional B(low) Rating on G Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by LoanCore 2021-CRE6 Issuer Ltd:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The initial collateral consists of 31 floating-rate mortgages
secured by 46 mostly transitional properties with a cut-off date
balance of $1.25 billion, excluding approximately $188.8 million of
future funding participations and $674.8 million of funded
companion participations. Included in the initial collateral amount
are two Targeted Mortgage Assets, which are expected to close on or
prior to the closing date or within 90 days after the closing date.
In addition, there is a two-year Reinvestment period during which
the Issuer may use principal proceeds to acquire additional
eligible loans, subject to the Eligibility Criteria, the
Acquisition Criteria, and other conditions. If a Targeted Mortgage
Asset is not likely to close or fund prior to the purchase
termination date or if the terms are materially different from the
terms described in the offering memorandum, then such Targeted
Mortgage Asset may be acquired in accordance with the terms
applicable to acquisitions of Reinvestment Mortgage Assets,
including satisfaction of the Eligibility Criteria. During the
Reinvestment period, the Issuer may acquire future funding
commitments, funded companion participations, and additional
eligible loans subject to the Eligibility Criteria, the Acquisition
Criteria, and other conditions. The transaction stipulates a $1.0
million threshold on companion participation acquisitions before a
No Downgrade Confirmation is required if there is already a
participation of the underlying loan in the trust.

The loans are mostly secured by currently cash flowing assets, many
of which are in a period of transition with plans to stabilize and
improve the asset value. In total, 21 loans, representing 74.7% of
the trust balance, have remaining future funding participations
totaling $188.8 million, which the Issuer may acquire in the
future.

For the floating-rate loans, DBRS Morningstar used the one-month
Libor index, which is based on the lower of a DBRS Morningstar
stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining fully extended
term of the loans or the strike price of the interest rate cap with
the respective contractual loan spread added to determine a
stressed interest rate over the loan term. When the cut-off
balances were measured against the DBRS Morningstar As-Is Net Cash
Flow (NCF), 22 loans, representing 68.3% of the initial pool, had a
DBRS Morningstar As-Is Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below
1.00 times (x), a threshold indicative of default risk. However,
the DBRS Morningstar Stabilized DSCRs for only four loans,
representing 6.6% of the initial pool balance, are below 1.00x. The
properties are often transitioning with potential upside in cash
flow; however, DBRS Morningstar does not give full credit to the
stabilization if there are no holdbacks or if other loan structural
features in place are insufficient to support such treatment.
Furthermore, even with the structure provided, DBRS Morningstar
generally does not assume the assets to stabilize above market
levels. The transaction will have a sequential-pay structure.

The transaction's sponsor is LCC REIT, which is managed by a
LoanCore Capital Credit Advisor LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of
LoanCore Capital (LoanCore). LoanCore is a leading investor and
commercial real estate lender with a credit-focused alternative
asset management platform that manages LLC REIT and LoanCore
Capital Markets (LCM). As of October 12, 2021, LoanCore had $14.6
billion in assets under management between LCC REIT and LCM. This
transaction represents LoanCore's seventh commercial real estate
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CLO) since 2013, and there have
been no realized losses to date in any of its issued CRE CLOs on
approximately $6.7 billion of mortgage assets contributed including
reinvestments.

An affiliate of LCC REIT, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
the Sponsor (as retention holder), will acquire the Class F Notes,
the Class G Notes, and the Preferred Shares (Retained Securities),
representing the most subordinate 16.375% of the transaction by
principal balance. Approximately 15.2% of the pool is located in a
DBRS Morningstar Mark Rank 8 (Beverly Hills, California, and New
York City). Approximately 51.2% of the pool is located in a DBRS
Morningstar Metropolitan Statistical Area Group 2 or 3. These
geographic locations have historically experienced lower
probabilities of default and loss given defaults (LGD).

Nine loans, representing 30.9% of the mortgage asset cut-off date
balance, had Above Average or Average + property quality scores
based on physical attributes and/or a desirable location within
their respective markets. Higher-quality properties are more likely
to retain existing tenants/guests and more easily attract new
tenants/guests, resulting in a more stable performance. No loans in
the DBRS Morningstar sample had property quality scores below
Average.

Twenty-two of the 31 loans, representing 72.5% of the mortgage
asset cut-off date balance, are for acquisition financing, where
the borrowers contributed material cash equity in conjunction with
the mortgage loan. Cash equity infusions from a sponsor typically
result in the lender and borrower having a greater alignment of
interests, especially compared with a refinancing scenario where
the sponsor may be withdrawing equity from the transaction.
Furthermore, the majority of the acquisitions occurred in 2021 and
take into consideration any Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
impacts.

Based on the initial pool balances, the overall weighted-average
(WA) DBRS Morningstar As-Is DSCR of 0.92x and WA As-Is
Loan-to-Value (LTV) of 76.9% generally reflect high-leverage
financing. Most of the assets are generally well positioned to
stabilize, and any realized cash flow growth would help to offset a
rise in interest rates and improve the overall debt yield of the
loans. DBRS Morningstar associates its LGD based on the assets'
as-is LTV, which does not assume that the stabilization plan and
cash flow growth will ever materialize. The DBRS Morningstar As-Is
DSCR for each loan at issuance does not consider the sponsor's
business plan, as the DBRS Morningstar As-Is NCF was generally
based on the most recent annualized period. The sponsor's business
plan could have an immediate impact on the underlying asset
performance that the DBRS Morningstar As-Is NCF is not accounting
for. When measured against the DBRS Morningstar Stabilized NCF, the
WA DBRS Morningstar DSCR is estimated to improve to 1.26x,
suggesting that the properties are likely to have improved NCFs
once the sponsors' business plans have been implemented.

The transaction is managed and includes a reinvestment period,
which could result in negative credit migration and/or an increased
concentration profile over the life of the transaction. The
Collateral Manager also has the option of acquiring future loans
secured by a variety of property types, including Office up to 40%,
Industrial up to 40%, Retail up to 25%, and Hospitality up to
20.0%. The risk of negative migration is partially offset by
eligibility criteria (detailed in the transaction documents) that
outline DSCR, LTV, Herfindahl score minimum, property type, and
loan size limitations for Reinvestment assets. The pool must
maintain a 40.0% Multifamily property type minimum. New
Reinvestment loans and companion participations of $1.0 million or
greater require a No Downgrade Confirmation from DBRS Morningstar.
DBRS Morningstar will analyze these loans for potential impacts on
ratings. Deal reporting includes standard monthly CRE Finance
Council reporting and quarterly business plan updates. DBRS
Morningstar will monitor this transaction on a regular basis.

DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow that
is, in some instances, above the in-place cash flow. It is possible
that the sponsors will not successfully execute their business
plans and that the higher stabilized cash flow will not materialize
during the loan term, particularly with the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic and its impact on the overall economy. A sponsor's failure
to execute the business plan could result in a term default or the
inability to refinance the fully funded loan balance. DBRS
Morningstar sampled a large portion of the loans, representing
71.1% of the of the mortgage asset cut-off date balance. The
transaction's WA DBRS Morningstar Business Plan Score of 1.96 is
generally in the range of recently rated CRE CLO transactions by
DBRS Morningstar. DBRS Morningstar made relatively conservative
stabilization assumptions and, in each instance, considered the
business plan to be rational and the loan structure to be
sufficient to execute such plans. In addition, DBRS Morningstar
analyzes LGD based on the as-is credit metrics, assuming the loan
is fully funded with no NCF or value upside. Future funding
companion participations will be held by affiliates of LLC REIT and
have the obligation to make future advances. LLC REIT agrees to
indemnify the Issuer against losses arising out of the failure to
make future advances when required under the related participated
loan. Furthermore, LLC REIT will be required to meet certain
liquidity requirements on a quarterly basis. Eight loans,
representing 18.8% of the pool balance, have a debt service reserve
to cover any interest shortfalls.

All loans are floating rate, indexed to the Libor one-month rate.
In the event the underlying interest rate index increases, a higher
debt service payment will be due from the borrower and defaults
could increase. Furthermore, the Libor index will be retired in
June 2023, affected loans will transition from Libor to a
replacement index. DBRS Morningstar incorporates a stressed
interest rate into the calculation of the DSCR rate for each loan.
The stressed rate takes into consideration potential interest rate
fluctuations, with consideration for rate floors and caps as
applicable. The borrowers of all loans have purchased Libor rate
caps with strike prices that range from 1.00% to 3.50% to protect
against rising interest rates through the duration of the loan
term. In addition to the fulfillment of certain minimum performance
requirements, exercise of any extension options would also require
the repurchase of interest rate cap protection through the duration
of the respectively exercised option. The transaction documents
provide for the transition to an alternative benchmark rate, which
is primarily contemplated to be Term Secured Overnight Financing
Rate.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



LUXE TRUST 2021-MLBH: DBRS Gives (P) B(low) Rating on G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-MLBH to
be issued by LUXE Trust 2021-MLBH:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Class J, Class HRR, and Class ELP are not
rated by DBRS Morningstar.

The LUXE Trust 2021-MLBH transaction is a $340.0 million
interest-only, floating-rate mortgage loan with an initial
three-year loan term and two successive one-year extension options.
The loan is secured by the fee-simple interest in Montage Resort &
Spa Laguna Beach, a 258-key luxury full-service hotel in Laguna
Beach, California. The resort was built in 2003 and spans more than
30 acres on the beachfront of the Pacific Ocean. It features AAA
Four Diamond and Four-Star restaurants, poolside bars/lounges,
20,000 square feet (sf) of spa-related amenities, and approximately
34,000 sf of indoor/outdoor function space for various events. DBRS
Morningstar has a positive view on the collateral and believes the
net cash flow (NCF) on Montage Resort & Spa Laguna Beach is
sustainable and will continue to grow over the term of the loan
considering the hotel's quality, historical performance, and
sponsorship.

The sponsor has invested approximately $32.4 million, or $125,628
per key, in capital improvements to the resort since 2015. In 2018
and 2019, the sponsor spent $22 million, or $85,200 per key, for a
full renovation that was completed in early 2019. With more than
$62,000 per key and $22,600 per key invested in guest rooms and
furniture, fixtures, and equipment, respectively, DBRS Morningstar
views the value-add renovation and constant upkeep of the resort a
key element to sustain and enhance the hotel's performance because
luxury resorts' guests typically demand new, high-quality, and
exceptional guest rooms and amenities.

Montage Resort & Spa Laguna Beach has been a consistent and solid
performer in the market and has ranked number one in both average
daily rate (ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPAR) out of its
competitive set each year since 2014. In fact, the property has
never had a RevPAR penetration rate below 185.7% since 2014. The
onset of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic in March 2020
had a severe impact on the lodging industry, causing occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR to decline by unprecedented levels domestically and
globally. Inevitably, the resort's RevPAR in 2020 dropped 32.4%
compared with 2019; however, the decline was less than the 47.5%
and 55% compared with the nationwide and the Anaheim-Santa Ana
submarket RevPAR declines, respectively. Despite the overall
decline in 2020, the hotel still outperformed its competitive set
with penetration rates of 100.4%, 188.8%, and 189.4% in occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR, respectively. The resort weathered the storm well
throughout the pandemic, remaining open and operational throughout
the entire time and demonstrating strong performance with trailing
12 month (T-12) ended August 2021 cash flow up nearly 154% from
2020. The property reported a T-12 ended August 2021 RevPAR of
$542.72 based on a 47.5% occupancy and $1,142 ADR. This represents
a penetration rate of 122.2%, 197.9%, and 241.9% for occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR, respectively. Based on forward bookings and the
sponsor's projections, cash flow for 2021 is expected to be up
roughly 17% over the highest pre-pandemic levels. In 2019, prior to
the pandemic, the hotel's occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR penetration
rates were 102.2%, 183.9%, and 188.1%, respectively.

DBRS Morningstar's concluded NCF and value reflect a stabilized
occupancy assumption of 72.5%, which is well above the 47.5%
occupancy for the T-12 ended August 2021 period. However, from 2015
to 2019, the property exhibited an average occupancy of close to
74%, and this included the 2018–19 renovation periods, which
somewhat affected the occupancy rate. The 72.5% occupancy was also
the T-12 ended February 2020 rate, reflecting the performance right
before the pandemic began. While occupancy has declined, the
sponsor has been successful in raising the rates above their
pre-pandemic highs, which has mitigated the impact of the pandemic
on the property's RevPAR. The resort offers tremendous
vacation/tourism appeal because of its luxurious amenities and
prime location. These demand drivers were reflected in an increase
to ADR, while occupancy remained affected by the pandemic. Overall,
the ADR increased by 57.0% to $1,141.31 for T-12 ended August 2021
from $726.98 in 2019. DBRS Morningstar assumed a stabilized ADR of
$726.22, 36.0% below the actual T-12 ended August 2021 ADR,
considering the demand segmentation at the resort will likely
normalize when group and business demand resume. Based on a
stabilized occupancy of 72.5% and an ADR of $726.22, DBRS
Morningstar concluded a RevPAR of $526.22. This RevPAR resembles
the pre-pandemic T-12 ended February 2020 RevPAR level. It is
approximately 3% higher than the 2019 RevPAR of $508.63 and 3%
lower than the actual T-12 ended August 2021 RevPAR of $542.54. The
2019 RevPAR reflected a partial-year renovation at the property
with some rooms being offline. From 2014 to 2019, the hotel
achieved an average RevPAR of $498.56. Overall, DBRS Morningstar
expects the RevPAR to increase subsequent to the completion of the
renovation in 2019. The property's NCF, occupancy, and ADR were all
trending upward when DBRS Morningstar compared the T-12 ended July
2021 financial statement with the T-12 ended August 2021 statement.
DBRS Morningstar elected to stabilize the property and assumed
occupancy in line with its pre-pandemic performance given the
best-in-class quality of the property, strong operating history,
and the experience and commitment of the management company and
sponsorship. DBRS Morningstar views the resort's ability to capture
upscale transient business and an affluent guest base as credit
positive since this allows the resort to eventually form its own
unique high-end market niche and hence help solidify the resort's
cash flow. DBRS Morningstar believes this market niche to be less
susceptible to revenue swings, making it more resilient during
economic downturns.

The sponsor of this transaction is an affiliate of Strategic Hotels
& Resorts (Strategic), a leading U.S. luxury hotel owner and asset
manager founded in Chicago in 1997. Strategic currently owns and
manages 15 luxury hotels across North America and Europe. The firm
employs brand-specific hotel management companies to operate its
management contracts and operating leases. The resort is managed by
Montage International, which is a luxury hotel and resort
management company based in Orange County, California. The resort
operates under the Montage brand through a management agreement
with an initial term expiring in December 2029 and a fully extended
term through December 2059.

DBRS Morningstar has a favorable outlook on Montage Resort & Spa
Laguna Beach in the long run, considering its location in a highly
sought-after market with high barriers to entry and its performance
during the pandemic. The land value of $122 million represents
about 36% of the loan amount. The resort benefits from heavy
drive-to leisure visitation from the greater Los Angeles and Orange
County metropolitan area and has successfully shifted its yield
strategy from group and convention business to leisure travelers
during the pandemic. However, the loan has an elevated DBRS
Morningstar loan-to-value ratio of 104.6%, which increases the term
and balloon risks. The loan is structured with a six-month debt
service reserve. The DBRS Morningstar debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) is 2.79 times (x) based on one-month Libor of 0.10% plus
2.35% spread. Based on the strike rate of 2.5% plus 2.35% spread,
DBRS Morningstar's DSCR will be 1.41x.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



LUXE TRUST 2021-TRIP: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on 2 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of LUXE Trust 2021-TRIP, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Class ELP is not rated by DBRS Morningstar.

The LUXE Trust 2021-TRIP transaction is secured by the fee-simple
and/or leasehold interests in nine luxury resorts and high-quality
full-service hotels primarily located in high-barrier-to-entry
urban and resort markets across five states with approximately
3,269 guest rooms, 616,140 sf of total function space, and numerous
award-winning amenities including restaurants, spas, fitness clubs,
golf courses, and beach activities. The portfolio is comprised of
four properties (828 keys) operating under the Four Seasons brand
family: Four Seasons Scottsdale, Four Seasons Jackson Hole, Four
Seasons Austin, and Four Seasons Silicon Valley; two properties
(1,437 keys) operating under the Fairmont brand family: Fairmont
Scottsdale Princess and Fairmont Chicago; two properties (657 keys)
operating under the Marriott (Ritz-Carlton) brand family:
Ritz-Carlton Laguna Niguel and Ritz-Carlton Half Moon Bay; and one
property (347 keys) operating under the Loews brand family: Loews
Santa Monica. The properties were constructed between 1984 and 2006
and have a WA year built of 1993 and WA renovation year of 2017.
DBRS Morningstar assigned a property quality grade of Above Average
or Excellent to each of the collateral properties.

The transaction sponsor is an affiliate of Strategic Hotels and
Resorts (Strategic). Founded in 1997, Strategic currently owns and
manages 15 luxury hotels across North America and Europe. Strategic
employs brand specific hotel management companies to operate its
management contracts and operating leases. Previously, Strategic
was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker
BEE and was subsequently acquired by AB Stable VIII, LLC (AB
Stable), an indirect subsidiary of Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd.
(Anbang), excluding the Hotel del Coronado. The borrower sponsor is
under common control with Anbang, the predecessor to the borrower
sponsor as owner of the borrowers

The trust collateral was originated by Goldman Sachs Bank USA and
Bank of America N.A. prior to the closing date and consists of a
mortgage loan in the amount of $1.8 billion. The mortgage loan is
expected to be evidenced by two promissory notes: Note A-1 with an
original principal balance of $1.17 billion and Note A-2 with an
original principal balance of $630 million. Both promissory notes
are expected to be contributed to the trust and support payments on
the rated certificates. The mortgage loan is expected to have an
initial term of 36 months, with two, one year extension option and
pay interest only at a rate of Libor + 2.6000%. The sponsor is
partially using proceeds from the loan to repatriate approximately
$500 million of equity. DBRS Morningstar views cash-out refinancing
transactions as less favorable than acquisition financings because
sponsors typically have less incentive to support a property
through times of economic stress if less of their own cash equity
is at risk. Based on the appraiser's as-is valuation of $2.8
billion, the sponsor will have approximately $1.1 billion of
unencumbered market equity remaining in the transaction.

The largest two properties by NCF are the Fairmont Scottsdale
Princess, which represents approximately 23.9% of NCF, and the
Ritz-Carlton Laguna Niguel, which represents approximately 21.9% of
NCF. No other property represents more than approximately 11.8% of
portfolio NCF. The properties average approximately 363 keys and
the largest hotel, Fairmont Scottsdale Princess, contains 750 keys,
or approximately 22.9% of the total aggregate keys in the
portfolio. The portfolio is located across five states with the
largest concentration by NCF in California, which accounts for
approximately 46.7% of NCF. The second largest concentration by NCF
is in Arizona, which accounts for approximately 32.3% of NCF,
followed by Wyoming at 9.0% of NCF, Texas at 7.8% of NCF, and
Illinois at 4.2% of NCF.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to virtually all major commercial real estate property types,
creating a substantial element of uncertainty around the recovery
of demand in the hospitality sectors, even in stronger markets that
have historically been highly liquid. As a result of the pandemic,
occupancy and RevPAR across the portfolio declined from 65.7% and
$467.08 as of YE2019 to 28.6% and $156.46 as of the T-12 ended
August 2021. All of the properties remained open during the
pandemic, with the exception of the Four Seasons Silicon Valley and
the Four Seasons Jackson Hole. The Four Seasons Silicon Valley
closed in mid-March2020, subsequently re-opened in October 2020,
and has remained open since. The Four Seasons Jackson Hole closes
every year for five weeks in the spring and for three to four weeks
in the fall in tandem with the closures at Jackson Hole Mountain
Resort. The date of the seasonal closure was moved forward slightly
in 2020 because of the pandemic, but the hotel reopened in mid-June
2020 and has experienced strong transient demand since. All debt
service associated with the properties' existing financing is
current and there have been no requests for forbearance.

Four properties, the Four Seasons Austin, Four Seasons Silicon
Valley, Fairmont Chicago, and Loews Santa Monica, all recorded
negative NCF during the T-12 ended August 2021. These properties
are primarily reliant on group and business demand, which has been
significantly affected by the pandemic and is one of the slowest
sectors to recover. Collectively, these four properties represent
25.0% of DBRS Morningstar's stabilized NCF. The loan is structured
with a 12-month debt service reserve that should be sufficient to
cover any ongoing operating losses from depressed occupancy at
these properties.

In 2019, prior to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
portfolio averaged 66.7% occupancy and reported a WA ADR and RevPAR
of $420 and $283, respectively. As of August 2021 YTD, WA RevPAR
penetration for the portfolio was 110% based on occupancy of 32.8%,
ADR of $539, and RevPAR of $193. The portfolio demonstrated strong
performance metrics prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic,
with 2019 WA (by NCF) occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR penetration rates
of 95.8%, 128.5%, and 125.7%, respectively. The 2018 WA occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR penetration rates were 95.3%, 133.6%, and 125.6%,
respectively. From 2014 to 2019, the portfolio exhibited WA
occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR penetration rates of 98.3%, 127.1%, and
124.5%, respectively. As of August 2021, weighted average RevPAR
penetration for the portfolio was approximately 119%, driven by the
August 2021 YTD average occupancy of 47.9%, ADR of approximately
$493, and RevPAR of approximately $258.

DBRS Morningstar's concluded NCF and value for the portfolio
reflect a stabilized occupancy assumption of 65.1%, which is well
above the 32.8% occupancy of the portfolio for August 2021 YTD
period. However, from 2014 to 2019, the portfolio exhibited an
average annual occupancy of 70%. Portfolio occupancy has overall
been trending upward since January 2021 and, as of August 2021, was
47.9%, the second highest since the pandemic began. DBRS
Morningstar elected to stabilize the portfolio and assumed
occupancy in line with its pre-pandemic performance given the
best-in-class brand affiliation and quality of the properties,
strong operating history, locations in high-barrier-to-entry
drive-to markets, and the experienced management/sponsorship of
Strategic. Although certain assets in the portfolio that are more
reliant on business and group demand experience a slower recovery,
others that are more focused on transient customers continue to see
rapid improvement. Additionally, the loan is structured with a
12-month debt service reserve that should be sufficient to cover
any ongoing operating losses from depressed occupancy until the
portfolio achieves a DSCR greater than 1.0x.

While occupancy has declined, Strategic has been successful in
maintaining ADR during the pandemic and, for a number of
properties, has been able to increase rates above their
pre-pandemic highs, which has somewhat mitigated the impact of the
pandemic on portfolio RevPAR. The Fairmont Scottsdale Princess,
Ritz-Carlton Laguna Niguel, Ritz-Carlton Half Moon Bay, the Four
Seasons Jackson Hole, and the Four Seasons Scottdale (which
together represent approximately 75.0% of DBRS Morningstar's
stabilized NCF) all benefited from increased domestic travel
because of international restrictions and the pent-up demand from
lockdowns. Additionally, these assets offer tremendous
vacation/tourism appeal because of their luxurious amenities and
prime locations. These demand drivers were reflected in an increase
to ADR, while occupancy remained affected by the pandemic. Overall,
portfolio ADR increased by 32.0% to $546.58 for the T-12 ended
August 2021 from $413.94 in 2019. DBRS Morningstar assumed a
stabilized ADR of $394.61, 38.5% below the actual August 2021 T-12
ADR, as demand segmentation in the portfolio will likely normalize
when international travel and group/business demand resume. Based
on a review of booking PACE reports, the portfolio will likely
experience the abovementioned increase in occupancy along with a
corresponding decrease in rates as management locks in lower priced
but guaranteed group room nights rather than to more lucrative but
less certain transient customer room nights.

Based on a stabilized occupancy of 65.1% and ADR of $394.61, DBRS
Morningstar's concluded RevPAR of $256.80 is approximately -5.5%
below the portfolio's 2019 RevPAR of $271.80, and -7.7% below its
peak RevPAR of $278.46 in 2018. From 2014 to 2019, the portfolio
achieved an average RevPAR of $260.48. As of the T-12 ended August
2021, the portfolio was 28.6% occupied and reported a WA ADR and
RevPAR of $546.58 and $156.46, respectively. DBRS Morningstar found
the seven properties it toured to be extremely well run and
maintained in keeping with the high expectations of travelers
staying at a luxury property. Staff were extremely friendly and
attentive and clearly focused on delivering the high level of
service that guests at high-end hotels expect. A number of the
properties have also clearly benefited from their drive-to location
during the pandemic and have successfully shifted their yield
strategy from group and convention business to leisure travelers.
Overall, DBRS Morningstar believes that as the pandemic continues
to abate, demand segmentation normalizes, and international and
business travel returns, the portfolio should revert to a level of
RevPAR consistent with its observed historical performance

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



MCA FUND III: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed and upgraded its ratings on the following
Notes issued by MCA III Holding LLC pursuant to the Indenture dated
October 28, 2020, between MCA Fund III Holding LLC, as the Issuer,
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS
Morningstar), as the Trustee and Calculation Agent.

-- Class A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class B Notes upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at BB (sf)

The ratings on the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, and the Class
C Notes address the ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the Final Maturity Date (as
defined in the Indenture referenced above).

RATING RATIONALE/DESCRIPTION

The rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction since issuance. The transaction is supported by a
portfolio of limited-partnership interests in leveraged buyout,
mezzanine debt, secondaries, and venture capital of 71
private-equity funds with a total portfolio net-asset-value (NAV)
of $688 million as of August 2021, up from $574 million in June
2020 recoveries/revisions in NAV and drawdown of capital calls for
investment purposes are the primary drivers for the significant
increase in portfolio NAV.

The Class A Notes and the Class B Notes have been deleveraging in
accordance to the target loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) supported by
cash distributions from strong performing sectors such as buyout
and mezzanine. As of the August 2021 payment date, credit
enhancement (CE) to the Notes increased since transaction
inception:

-- Class A: CE increased to 68.09% from 60.01%
-- Class B: CE increased to 54.13% from 42.50%
-- Class C: CE increased to 43.69% from 30.01%

Each class of Notes is able to withstand a percentage of tranche
defaults from a Monte Carlo asset analysis commensurate with its
respective rating. The respective rating actions for each of the
Notes differ from the ratings implied by the quantitative model,
which would have been higher than the confirmed and upgraded
ratings. DBRS Morningstar considers these differences to be a
material deviation from the model. The highest achievable rating
for all rated Notes is capped at A (sf) due to the exposure to the
counterparty risk in the form of future capital calls. The
transaction depends on the ability of Life Insurance Company (CMFG)
to fund the future unfunded commitments.

The ratings reflect the following primary considerations:

(1) The Indenture, dated October 28, 2020.
(2) The integrity of the transaction structure.
(3) DBRS Morningstar's assessment of the portfolio quality.
(4) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
loss rates under various cash-flow stress scenarios.
(5) DBRS Morningstar's assessment of the portfolio management
capabilities of MEMBERS Capital Advisors, Inc. as the Investment
Manager.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the resulting isolation
measures have caused an immediate economic contraction, leading in
some cases to increases in unemployment rates and income reductions
for many borrowers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies
may continue to increase in the coming months for many
transactions. The ratings are based on additional analysis to
expected performance as a result of the global efforts to contain
the spread of the coronavirus.

Notes: All figures are in U.S dollars unless otherwise noted.



MED TRUST 2021-MDLN: DBRS Gives (P) BB Rating on Class E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-MDLN to
be issued by MED Trust 2021-MDLN:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The subject transaction is a sale-leaseback transaction to Medline
Industries LP (Medline), a leading U.S. manufacturer and
distributor of healthcare supplies. The mission-critical portfolio
consists of 49 distribution, manufacturing, and office properties
across 30 states. The subject financing is part of a larger $34.0
billion leveraged buyout of Medline by a group of private equity
firms including Blackstone, Carlyle, and Hellman & Friedman. As a
part of the transaction, the Medline operating company (OpCo)
signed a brand-new, 15-year absolute triple-net (NNN) unitary
master lease covering all the properties in the portfolio. The
master lease has no termination options and has two, five-year
renewal options.

DBRS Morningstar has a favorable view on the functionality
characteristics of the distribution component of the portfolio,
which was mostly built to suit Medline, along with the credit
profile of the mortgage loan and the long-term NNN master lease to
a well-established tenant. Although Medline does not carry an
investment-grade rating, its business has demonstrated long-term
stability, with 2020 revenue of approximately $17.5 billion and
more than 23,000 employees. According to the arranger, the firm has
a 90% customer retention rate and virtually all of the company's
customers have been doing business with Medline for a decade or
more. The manufacturing and office components of the portfolio
(collectively 18.2% of the DBRS Morningstar Base Rent) also consist
of a variety of mission-critical production and headquarters office
space for Medline across various markets.

Approximately 86% of the portfolio by square feet (sf) consists of
build-to-suit warehouse and distribution space with very strong
functionality metrics. The distribution properties have a
weighted-average (WA) year built of 2015, which is the newest among
the myriad of industrial portfolios DBRS Morningstar analyzed over
the past several years. The properties also have a strong WA clear
height of approximately 37 feet, which compares very favorably with
other recently analyzed warehouse/distribution portfolios. The
average size of the distribution properties exceeds 700,000 sf,
which is favorable, and the percentage of office space is typically
minimal (single-digits percentage of the net rentable area).

The transaction benefits from strong cash flow stability
attributable to the unitary absolute NNN master lease that Medline
executed as a part of the sale-leaseback transaction. The master
lease provides for annual escalations of 2.0%, along with the
recovery of all operating expenses and capital costs at the
properties. There are no termination options during the loan term,
and Medline has two successive five-year renewal options.

The portfolio is mission-critical to Medline, and DBRS Morningstar
views it as highly unlikely that the firm would voluntarily
relocate to other properties for a variety of reasons. All but one
of the distribution properties were built to suit for Medline,
which has strategically located its warehouses near major client
and population centers to enable for 24-hour delivery turnaround
times. Furthermore, the largest of the portfolio's five office
properties serves as Medline's corporate headquarters space.

The DBRS Morningstar loan-to-value ratio on the trust loan is
significant at 136.4%, which is well above the typical leverage
point in single-asset/single-borrower transactions. The high
leverage point, combined with the lack of amortization, could
potentially result in elevated refinance risk and/or loss
severities in an event of default.

The portfolio entirely depends on lease income from the Medline
OpCo lessee and, unlike other industrial or office portfolios, the
transaction does not benefit from any tenant granularity or
diversification across industries. While DBRS Morningstar believes
it is unlikely Medline would elect to vacate at the end of the
initial lease term, demising and retenanting the entire portfolio
would require significant tenant improvement/leasing commission
funds. Additionally, demising some of the larger distribution
facilities and retenanting the manufacturing space could prove
difficult. Furthermore, a corporate-level bankruptcy or negative
credit event at Medline could put the master rent, and therefore
the mortgage loan, at an increased risk of default for nonpayment.

The borrowers have entered into an affiliate unitary master lease
agreement with the Master Tenant. While the borrowers and the
Master Tenant are not under common control and a true lease opinion
was provided, affiliate master lease arrangements may still pose a
risk of recharacterization of the master lease as a financing from
the borrowers to the Master Tenant. Furthermore, there is no limit
on the amount of secured financing the Master Tenant is permitted
to obtain; additional debt could reduce available cash flow and
negatively impact the Master Tenant's ability to make the lease
payment. The Master Tenant is also permitted to sublease up to 1
million sf of any property to any third party for ancillary use,
which DBRS Morningstar considers a de facto transfer provision for
properties under this threshold.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



MELLO MORTGAGE 2021-INV4: Moody's Gives B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
forty-seven classes of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) issued by Mello Mortgage Capital Acceptance 2021-INV4 (MMCA
2021-INV4). The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

MMCA 2021-INV4 is a securitization of GSE eligible, first-lien
investment property loans. Similarly to the prior three
transactions, 100% of the pool was originated by loanDepot.com, LLC
(loanDepot).

In this transaction, the Class A-11, Class A-11-A, and Class A-11-B
notes' coupon is indexed to SOFR. In addition, the coupons on Class
A-11-X, Class A-11-AI, and Class A-11-BI are also impacted by
changes in SOFR. However, based on the transaction's structure, the
particular choice of benchmark has no credit impact. First,
interest payments to the notes, including the floating rate notes,
are subject to the net WAC cap, which prevents the floating rate
notes from incurring interest shortfalls as a result of increases
in the benchmark index above the fixed rates at which the assets
bear interest. Second, the shifting-interest structure pays all
interest generated on the assets to the bonds and does not provide
for any excess spread.

Servicing compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee
structure. The servicing fee includes a base fee plus delinquency
and incentive fees. Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted
reverse sequentially starting from the Class B-6 interest payment
amount first and could result in interest shortfall to the
certificates depending on the magnitude of the delinquency and
incentive fees.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Mello Mortgage Capital Acceptance 2021-INV4

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-AI*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-BI*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.92%
at the mean, 0.64% at the median, and reaches 6.58% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

As of November 1, 2021 (the "cut-off date"), the approximate
$370,943,494 pool consisted of 952 mortgage loans secured by first
liens on residential investment properties. All the loans are
underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae
guidelines, which take into consideration, among other factors, the
income, assets, employment and credit score of the borrower as well
as loan-to-value (LTV). These loans are run through one of the
government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE) automated underwriting
systems (AUS) and have received an "Approve" or "Accept"
recommendation.

The average stated principal balance is $389,647 and the weighted
average (WA) current mortgage rate is 3.3%. The majority of the
loans have a 30 year term. All of the loans have a fixed rate. The
WA original credit score is 767 for the primary borrower only and
the WA combined original LTV (CLTV) is 64.1%. The WA original
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is 36.0%. Approximately, 9.1% by loan
balance of the borrowers have more than one mortgage loan in the
mortgage pool.

Over a third of the mortgages (37.3% by loan balance) are backed by
properties located in California. The next largest geographic
concentration is New York (9.1% by loan balance), Washington (8.5%
by loan balance),Texas (7.4% by loan balance) and New Jersey (5.6%
by loan balance). All other states each represent less than 5.0% by
loan balance. Loans backed by single family residential properties
represent 37.3% (by loan balance) of the pool. Approximately 1.9%
of the mortgage loans by count are "Appraisal Waiver" (AW) loans,
whereby the sponsor obtained an AW for each such mortgage loan from
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac through their respective programs. In
each case, neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac required an appraisal
of the related mortgaged property as a condition of approving the
related mortgage loan for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, as
applicable.

Origination quality

LoanDepot originated 100% of the loans in the pool. These loans
were underwritten in conformity with GSE guidelines with
predominantly non-material overlays. Moody's consider loanDepot's
origination quality to be in line with its peers due to: (1)
adequate underwriting policies and procedures, (2) acceptable
performance with low delinquency and repurchase and (3) adequate
quality control. Therefore, Moody's have not applied an additional
adjustment for origination quality.

Servicing arrangements

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate. Cenlar FSB (Cenlar) will service all the mortgage
loans in the transaction. Computershare Trust Company, N.A. will
serve as the master servicer. The servicing administrator,
loanDepot, will be primarily responsible for funding certain
servicing advances of delinquent scheduled interest and principal
payments for the mortgage loans, unless the servicer determines
that such amounts would not be recoverable. The master servicer
will be obligated to fund any required monthly advance if the
servicing administrator fails in its obligation to do so. Moody's
did not make any adjustments to Moody's base case and Aaa stress
loss assumptions based on this servicing arrangement.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The servicer receives higher
fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less labor
intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary.

Third-party review

Full due diligence (i.e. compliance, credit, property valuation and
data integrity review) was conducted by the TPR firms on a sample
of 206 loans in the pool and a valuation-only review was conducted
on the remaining loans (i.e. property valuation review was done on
100% of the loans in the pool). Moody's calculated the
credit-neutral sample size using a confidence interval, error rate
and a precision level of 95%/5%/2%. The number of loans that went
through a full due diligence review does not meet Moody's
calculated threshold. With sampling, there is a risk that loan
defects may not be discovered and such loans would remain in the
pool. Moreover, vulnerabilities of the R&W framework, such as the
lack of an automatic review of R&Ws by independent reviewer and the
weaker financial strength of the R&W provider, reduce the
likelihood that such defects would be discovered and cured during
the transaction's life. As a result, Moody's made an adjustment to
its Aaa loss and EL after taking account the risks associated with
these factors.

Representations and Warranties Framework

The R&W provider is mello Securitization Depositor LLC and the
guarantor is LD Holdings Group LLC. The Guarantor (LD Holdings
Group LLC) will guarantee certain performance obligations of the
R&W provider (mello Securitization Depositor LLC). These entities
may not have the financial wherewithal to purchase defective loans.
Moreover, unlike other transactions that Moody's have rated, the
R&W framework for this transaction does not include a mechanism
whereby loans that experience an early payment default (EPD) are
repurchased. In addition, the loss amount remedy is subject to
conflicts of interest and will likely not adequately compensate the
transaction for loans that breach R&Ws. Moody's have adjusted its
loss levels to account for these weaknesses in the R&W framework.

Unlike most other comparable transactions that Moody's have rated,
the R&W framework in this transaction has a "loss amount" remedy.
Specifically, in case there is a material breach to the R&Ws, the
depositor, who is the R&W provider, is tasked with calculating the
loss amount to indemnify the trust. Unlike buying a defective loan
at par, this loss amount remedy is subject to conflicts of
interest. The party determining the loss amount will have a natural
incentive to determine a low amount since it will have to pay that
amount. Furthermore, there may be no objective way to determine
such amount since the decrease in the value of a loan that breaches
a R&W may not be quantifiable at the time the breach is discovered.
The fact that the controlling holder can bring the depositor to
arbitration if it deems that a R&W breach is not resolved in a
satisfactory manner is a partial mitigant. However, there may be no
good way to prove in arbitration that the depositor's determination
is not adequate because the determination of the loss payment will
be, in many cases, subjective. Furthermore, the controlling holder
must expend its own funds to go to arbitration, which could
disincentivize it to pursue arbitration. Another partial mitigant
is that the loans in the pool were originated by loanDepot, an
originator whose repurchase statistics are equal to or better than
the GSEs' average.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments
to the senior bond for a specified period of time, and increasing
amounts of prepayments to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but
only if loan performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next, realized losses
are allocated to super senior bonds until their principal balance
is written off.

Tail risk & subordination floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit enhancement
over time and increased performance volatility, known as tail risk.
To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a senior
subordination floor of 0.95% which mitigates tail risk by
protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time. Additionally, there is a subordination lock-out amount which
is 0.85% of the closing pool balance.

Moody's calculate the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in Moody's principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor and the subordinate floor of 0.95% and 0.85%,
respectively, are consistent with the credit neutral floors for the
assigned ratings. Specifically, the subordinate floor is consistent
with a Aa1 rating or lower.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


MFA 2021-AEINV1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-AEINV1 issued by
MFA 2021-AEINV1 Trust (MFA 2021-AEINV1):

-- $292.8 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $265.5 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $212.4 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $212.4 million Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $212.4 million Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $159.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $159.3 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $159.3 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $127.4 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $127.4 million Class A-6-A at AAA (sf)
-- $127.4 million Class A-6-X at AAA (sf)
-- $84.9 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.9 million Class A-7-A at AAA (sf)
-- $84.9 million Class A-7-X at AAA (sf)
-- $31.9 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $31.9 million Class A-8-A at AAA (sf)
-- $31.9 million Class A-8-X at AAA (sf)
-- $10.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $10.6 million Class A-9-A at AAA (sf)
-- $10.6 million Class A-9-X at AAA (sf)
-- $42.5 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $42.5 million Class A-10-A at AAA (sf)
-- $42.5 million Class A-10-X at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-11-A at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-11-AI at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-11-B at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-11-BI at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.3 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.3 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $234.2 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $58.6 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $292.8 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $292.8 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.1 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.3 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $5.8 million Class B-1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $5.5 million Class B-2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $3.1 million Class B-3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $1.9 million Class B-4 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $1.1 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-3-X, A-4-X, A-5-X, A-6-X, A-7-X, A-8-X, A-9-X, A-10-X,
A-11-X, A-11-AI, A-11-BI, A-X-1 A-X-2, A-X-3, and A-X-4 are
interest-only (IO) certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-3-X, A-4, A-4-A, A-4-X, A-5, A-5-A,
A-5-X, A-6, A-7, A-7-A, A-7-X, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11-A, A-11-AI,
A-11-B, A-11-BI, A-12, A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-X-2, and A-X-3 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange certificates.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, A-4-A, A-5, A-5-A, A-6, A-6-A, A-7,
A-7-A, A-8, A-8-A, A-9, A-9-A, A-10, A-10-A, A-11, A-11-A, A-11-B,
A-12, and A-13 are super-senior certificates. These classes benefit
from additional protection from the senior support certificates
(Classes A-14 and A-15) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 6.25% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (low)
(sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (low) (sf), and B (sf)
ratings reflect 4.40%, 2.65%, 1.65%, 1.05%, and 0.70% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien, fixed-rate
prime conventional investment-property residential mortgages funded
by the issuance of the Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-AEINV1 (the Certificates). The Certificates are backed by 660
loans with a total principal balance of approximately $312,315,683
as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1, 2021).

loanDepot.com, LLC (loanDepot) is the Originator and the Servicer
of the mortgage loans. MFA Financial, Inc. is the Sponsor of the
transaction. MFRA NQM Depositor, LLC will act as the Depositor of
the transaction. DBRS Morningstar performed a review of loanDepot's
origination and servicing platform and believes the company is an
acceptable mortgage loan originator and servicer.

MFA 2021-AEINV1 is the first securitization by the Sponsor composed
of fully-amortizing, fixed-rate mortgages on non-owner-occupied
residential investment properties. The portfolio consists of
conforming mortgages with original terms to maturity of primarily
30 years, which were underwritten by loanDepot using an automated
underwriting system (AUS) designated by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
and were eligible for purchase by such agencies. Details on the
underwriting of conforming loans can be found in the related
Report. The pool is, on average, four months seasoned with a
maximum age of six months.

Cenlar FSB (Cenlar) will act as the Subservicer. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as the Master Servicer, Securities
Administrator, and Custodian. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
will serve as the Trustee.

For this transaction, the servicing fee is composed of three
separate components: the aggregate base servicing fee, the
aggregate delinquent servicing fee, and the aggregate additional
servicing fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency status of
the related loan and will be paid from interest collections before
distribution to the securities.

For this transaction, the Servicer will fund advances of delinquent
principal and interest (P&I) until deemed unrecoverable.
Additionally, the Servicer is obligated to make advances with
respect to taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred
in the course of servicing and disposing of properties (servicing
advances).

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible vertical interest consisting of
at least 5% of the Certificate Principal Amount or Class Notional
Amount, as applicable, of each class of Certificates (other than
the Class R Certificates) issued on the Closing Date to satisfy the
credit risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

On any date following the date on which the aggregate loan balance
is less than 10% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the Depositor will
have the option to terminate the transaction by purchasing all of
the mortgage loans and any real estate-owned (REO) property from
the issuer at the clean-up call price described in the transaction
documents (Clean-up Call). Similarly, on any date following the
date on which the loan balance is less than 5% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Servicer will have the option to terminate the
transaction by the Clean-up Call. However, once the Servicer
notifies the Depositor of its intent, the Depositor will have 30
days to exercise the Clean-up Call.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Coronavirus Pandemic Impact

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in
delinquencies for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes shortly after the onset of the pandemic.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term payment reliefs that
may perform very differently from traditional delinquencies. At the
onset of the pandemic, the option to forbear mortgage payments was
widely available and it drove forbearances to a very high level.
When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced forbearances in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid, low
loan-to-value ratios, and good underwriting in the mortgage market
in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes, delinquencies
have been gradually trending down in recent months as the
forbearance period comes to an end for many borrowers.

As of the Cut-Off Date, no borrower within the pool is currently
subject to a coronavirus-related forbearance plan with the
Servicer. In the event a borrower requests or enters into a
coronavirus related forbearance plan after the Cut-Off Date but
prior to the Closing Date, the Sponsor will remove such loan from
the mortgage pool and remit the related Closing Date substitution
amount. Loans that enter a coronavirus-related forbearance plan on
or after the Closing Date will remain in the pool.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C27: DBRS Confirms B Rating on 2 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C27 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2015-C27 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)
-- Class X-GH at B (sf)
-- Class H at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-D, D, X-E, E, X-F, F, G, X-GH, and H continue to carry
Negative trends given DBRS Morningstar's concerns regarding the
performance challenges for some of the loans on the servicer's
watchlist and/or in special servicing, as further detailed below.
All other trends are Stable.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 55 loans secured by 167
commercial and multifamily properties, with an aggregate principal
balance of $822.3 million. As of the October 2021 remittance, 52
loans remain in the pool, including six loans (3.1% of the current
trust) that have fully defeased. The current trust balance of
$730.0 million represents a collateral reduction of 12.8% since
issuance. Since the last DBRS Morningstar rating action, the 1
Emerson Lane loan (Prospectus ID#8, 3.8% of the issuance trust
balance), which was previously in special servicing, has been
repaid in full. The transaction is concentrated by property type as
16 loans, representing 22.6% of the current trust balance, are
secured by retail assets, whereas six loans, representing 18.2% of
the current trust balance, are secured by hotel assets.

As of the October 2021 remittance, there are three loans in special
servicing, representing 9.3% of the current trust balance. While
the largest of these loans, the Crowne Plaza – Hollywood loan
(Prospectus ID#2, 7.6% of the current trust balance) is expected to
be returned to the master servicer as a corrected loan following
the finalization of a forbearance agreement, DBRS Morningstar notes
the risk for this loan remains elevated as recent reporting shows
the hotel's rebound from Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) related
declines lags behind its competitive set. The loan is secured by a
311-key, full-service hotel located along Ocean Drive in Hallandale
Beach. According to the July 2021 STR report, the property reported
trailing three-month occupancy, average daily rate (ADR), and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) figures of 71.6%, $185, and
$133, respectively, reflecting penetration rates of 90.8%, 72.0%,
and 65.5%, respectively. At issuance, the subject's RevPAR was
$143, with a penetration rate of 101.4%. Staffing at the property
was reduced from 160 to 10 employees at the outbreak of the
pandemic and, according to the servicer, rehiring has commenced but
filling all needed positions has been a challenge. As of year-end
(YE) 2020, the loan reported a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of -0.14 times (x), well below historical pre-pandemic figures.

An updated appraisal dated June 2020 valued the property at $65.8
million, a figure that results in a loan to value (LTV) of 85.4%
based on total loan exposure as of the October 2021 remittance. The
June 2020 value is down 26.0% from the appraised value of $89.0
million at issuance. According to the terms of the loan
modification, the borrower is expected to repay advances, currently
totaling $2.2 million, by December 2022. The loan sponsor, Sotherly
Hotels, Inc. is a self-managed and self-administered lodging real
estate investment trust to own, acquire, renovate, and reposition
full-service hotel properties located in the mid-Atlantic and
southern United States. While the sponsor appears to be committed
to the property, the performance lags in comparison to the
competitive set, suggesting stabilization could take longer as
compared with similarly positioned properties. DBRS Morningstar
applied a probability of default (PoD) penalty in the analysis to
capture these increased risks and will continue to monitor the loan
for developments.

There are also 16 loans, representing 41.3% of the current trust
balance, on the servicer's watchlist as of the October 2021
reporting. These loans are being monitored for a variety of
reasons, including low DSCRs, occupancy declines, deferred
maintenance issues, and delinquent taxes. Excluding the four loans
on the watchlist for deferred maintenance, these loans reported a
YE2020 weighted-average DSCR of 1.07x, compared to the YE2019
figure of 1.75x. DBRS Morningstar applied PoD penalties to increase
the expected loss for those larger loans on the servicer's
watchlist, which were exhibiting significantly increased risks from
issuance.

Despite not being on the servicer's watchlist, DBRS Morningstar is
monitoring the Granite 190 loan (Prospectus ID#5, 5.5% of the
current trust balance) as occupancy has fallen by 20.9% since
issuance, with leases for the remaining tenants scheduled to expire
prior to loan maturity. The collateral for the loan is a pair of
three-story office buildings totaling 307,468 square feet (sf),
located in Richardson, Texas, a suburb of Dallas. The subject's
submarket is quite soft, with Reis reporting a vacancy rate of 27%
as of Q2 2021, up from 25.9% at YE2019. The occupancy declines have
built up over time, with smaller tenants departing in succession
between 2018 and March 2021, when United Healthcare (UHC) downsized
by 25,555 sf, reducing its footprint from 63.4% of the net rentable
area (NRA) at issuance to 56.2% of the NRA on a lease that expires
in June 2023. As of June 2021, the property was 76.1% occupied with
an average rental rate of $26.12 psf, compared to the average
vacancy rate and rental rate as of Q2 2021 within a two-mile radius
of the properties of 36.6% and $25.53, respectively.

The property's second-largest tenant, Parsons Service Company
(14.4% of NRA) also has a lease expiration in March 2025 and a
termination option in March 2023. The loan is structured with cash
flow sweep provisions tied to the 2023 lease roll for UHC, and a
termination fee for the 2021 downsize was collected in accordance
with the termination provision in the tenant's lease. According to
the October 2021 loan level reserve report, the collateral has $1.1
million in tenant reserve and $0.8 million in other reserves. As of
Q2 2021, the loan reported a DSCR of 1.21x, generally in line with
the DBRS Morningstar issuance figure of 1.19x. However, the DSCR is
expected to decline with the full YE2021 reporting when the loss of
rent related to UHC's downsizing is realized. Given the recent
developments paired with the soft market conditions, DBRS
Morningstar analyzed this loan with a PoD penalty to increase the
expected loss and will continue to monitor the loan for
developments.

With this review, DBRS Morningstar has confirmed the
investment-grade shadow rating on U-Haul Portfolio (prospectus
ID#4, 3.2% of the current trust balance). DBRS Morningstar
confirmed that the performance of this loan remains consistent with
the investment-grade loan characteristics.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



NEW RESIDENTIAL 2021-INV2: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B5 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
thirty-three classes of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2021-INV2
(NRMLT 2021-INV2). The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B2
(sf).

NRMLT 2021-INV2 is the second securitization of 100% GSE eligible
first-lien investment property mortgage loans sponsored by New
Residential Investment Corp. (New Residential). Approximately 64.0%
and 36.0% of the pool by loan balance is originated by NewRez LLC
("NewRez") and Caliber Home Loans Inc. ("Caliber"), respectively.
All the loans are underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae guidelines, which take into consideration, among other
factors, the income, assets, employment and credit score of the
borrower as well as loan-to-value (LTV). These loans were run
through one of the government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE)
automated underwriting systems (AUS) and received an "Approve" or
"Accept" recommendation.

Servicing compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee
structure. Servicing fee includes base fee plus delinquency and
incentive fees. Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted
reverse sequentially starting from the Class B6 interest payment
amount first and could result in interest shortfall to the
certificates depending on the magnitude of the delinquency and
incentive fees.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2021-INV1

Cl. A1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A3, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A5, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A11X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX1*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX2*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX3*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX4*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX6*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX8*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX12*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX13*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. BX*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B1A, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. BX1*, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B2A, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. BX2*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B5, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 1.01%
at the mean, 0.76% at the median, and reaches 5.80% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

As of the cut-off date of November 1, 2021, the $501,183,698 pool
consisted of 1,889 mortgage loans secured by first liens on
residential investment properties. The average stated principal
balance is $265,317 and the weighted average (WA) current mortgage
rate is 3.57%. The majority of the loans have a 30-year term, with
316 loans having a term between 10-29 years. All of the loans have
a fixed rate. The WA original credit score is 772 for the primary
borrower only and the WA combined original LTV and CLTV is 62.6%
and 62.6%, respectively. The WA original debt-to-income (DTI) ratio
is 34.3%. Approximately, 80.7% by loan balance of the borrowers
have more than one mortgage loan in the mortgage pool.

All the loans in the pool are current as of the cut-off date.
However, there are 94 loans in the pool which had 30 days
delinquency which were service transfer related. There were 4 loans
that had 60 days delinquency, but the borrower self cured.

A significant percentage of the mortgage loans by loan balance
(31.5%) are backed by properties located in California. The next
largest geographic concentration of properties are Florida, New
York and New Jersey, which represents 6.7%, 5.4% and 5.2% by loan
balance, respectively. All other states each represent less than 5%
by loan balance. Approximately 26.1% (by loan balance) of the pool
is backed by properties that are 2-4 unit residential properties
whereas loans backed by single family residential properties
represent 46.9% (by loan balance) of the pool.

Approximately 17.15% of the mortgage loans by count are "Appraisal
Waiver" (AW) loans, whereby the sponsor obtained an AW for each
such mortgage loan from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac through their
respective programs. In each case, neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie
Mac required an appraisal of the related mortgaged property as a
condition of approving the related mortgage loan for purchase by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, as applicable. These loans may present a
greater risk as the value of the related mortgaged properties may
be less than the value ascribed to such mortgaged properties.
Moody's made an adjustment in Moody's analysis to account for the
increased risk associated with such loans. However, Moody's have
tempered this adjustment by taking into account the GSEs' robust
risk modeling, which helps minimize collateral valuation risk, as
well as the GSEs' conservative eligibility requirements for AW
loans which helps to support deal collateral quality.

All the loans in the pool are current as of the cut-off date.
However, there are 98 loans in the pool which have prior
delinquency history, most of which are related to servicing
transfers between correspondents and the servicer. There are 4
loans that had 60-days delinquency, but the borrower self-cured.
Moody's considered mitigating factors for those loans including
strong borrower FICOs and low LTVs and did not make adjustment to
Moody's loss levels.

Origination quality

The majority of the loans in the pool are originated by NewRez LLC
(64.0%) and Caliber Home Loans Inc. (36.0%). These loans were
underwritten in conformity with GSE guidelines without any
overlays. Moody's consider origination quality to be in line with
its peers due to: (1) adequate underwriting policies and
procedures, (2) acceptable performance with low delinquency and
repurchase and (3) adequate quality control. Therefore, Moody's
have not applied an additional adjustment for origination quality.

Servicing arrangements

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate. Moody's did not make any adjustments to its base case
and Aaa stress loss assumptions based on the servicing arrangement.
Moody's also consider the presence of a strong master servicer to
be a mitigant against the risk of any servicing disruptions.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The servicer receives higher
fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less labor
intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary.

Third-party review

Three third-party review (TPR) firms, Consolidated Analytics, Inc,
Recovco Mortgage Management (Recovco), and Infinity IPS (Infinity)
verified the accuracy of the loan level information that Moody's
received from the sponsor. These firms conducted detailed credit,
property valuation, data accuracy and compliance reviews on a total
of 808 (42.8% by loan count) mortgage loans. CU scores were
provided for a majority of the loans in the pool, including for
loans that were not included in the due diligence sample. A vast
majority of loans in the pool have a CU score >2.5 along with
loans that do not have a CU score and for which only an automated
valuation model (AVM) and/or a broker price opinion (BPO) was
ordered. Moody's consider AVM and BPO as less reliable secondary
valuation as compared to CDAs, however, due to a sufficient sample
size of loans have CU score


OAKTOWN RE VII 2021-2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on 2 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Insurance-Linked Notes, Series 2021-2 issued by Oaktown Re VII Ltd.
(OMIR 2021-2):

-- $126.5 million Class M-1A at BBB (sf)
-- $110.7 million Class M-1B at BB (high)(sf)
-- $55.3 million Class M-1C at BB (low) (sf)
-- $51.4 million Class M-2 at B (sf)
-- $19.8 million Class B-1 at B (sf)

The BBB (sf), BB (high) (sf), BB (low) (sf), and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.85%, 3.45%, 2.75% and 1.85% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

OMIR 2021-2 is National Mortgage Insurance Corporation's (NMI; the
ceding insurer) sixth-rated mortgage insurance (MI)-linked note
transaction. Payments to the Notes are backed by reinsurance
premiums, eligible investments, and related account investment
earnings, in each case relating to a pool of MI policies linked to
residential loans. The Notes are exposed to the risk arising from
losses that the ceding insurer pays to settle claims on the
underlying MI policies. As of the cut-off date, the pool of insured
mortgage loans consists of 122,629 fully amortizing first-lien
fixed- and variable-rate mortgages. They all have been underwritten
to a full documentation standard, have original loan-to-value
ratios (LTVs) less than or equal to 97%, have never been reported
to the ceding insurer as 60 or more days delinquent, and have not
been reported to be in payment forbearance plan. The mortgage loans
have MI policies effective on or after December 2018.

On March 1, 2020, a new master policy was introduced to conform to
government-sponsored enterprises' revised rescission relief
principles under the Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility
Requirements (PMIERs) guidelines (see the Representations and
Warranties section in the related Rating Report for more details).
Approximately 99.4% of the mortgage loans were originated under the
new master policy.

On the closing date, the Issuer will enter into the Reinsurance
Agreement with the ceding insurer. Per the agreement, the ceding
insurer will receive protection for the funded portion of the MI
losses. In exchange for this protection, the ceding insurer will
make premium payments related to the underlying insured mortgage
loans to the Issuer.

The Issuer is expected to use the proceeds from selling the Notes
to purchase certain eligible investments that will be held in the
reinsurance trust account. The eligible investments are restricted
to AAA or equivalently rated U.S. Treasury money market funds and
securities. Unlike other residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) transactions, cash flow from the underlying loans will not
be used to make any payments; rather, in MI-linked note (MILN)
transactions, a portion of the eligible investments held in the
reinsurance trust account will be liquidated to make principal
payments to the noteholders and to make loss payments to the ceding
insurer when claims are settled with respect to the MI policy.

The Issuer will use the investment earnings on the eligible
investments, together with the ceding insurer's premium payments,
to pay interest to the noteholders.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
a reduction in the aggregate exposed principal balance on the
underlying MI policy. The subordinate Notes will receive their pro
rata share of available principal funds if the minimum credit
enhancement test and the delinquency test are satisfied. The
minimum credit enhancement test will purposely fail at the closing
date, thus locking out the rated classes from initially receiving
any principal payments until the subordinate percentage grows to
7.45% from 6.45%. The delinquency test will be satisfied if the
three-month average of 60+ days delinquency percentage is below 75%
of the subordinate percentage. Unlike earlier-rated NMI MILN
transactions where the delinquency test is satisfied when the
delinquency percentage falls below a fixed threshold, this
transaction incorporates a dynamic delinquency test.

The coupon rates for the Notes are based on the Secured Overnight
Financing Rate (SOFR). There are replacement provisions in place in
the event that SOFR is no longer available, please see the Offering
Circular for more details. DBRS Morningstar did not run
interest-rate stresses for this transaction, as the interest is not
linked to the performance of the underlying loans. Instead,
interest payments are funded via (1) premium payments that the
ceding insurer must make under the reinsurance agreement and (2)
earnings on eligible investments.

On the Closing Date, the ceding insurer will establish a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account. In case of the
ceding insurer's default in paying coverage premium payments to the
Issuer, the amount available in this account will be used to make
interest payments to the noteholders. The presence of this account
mitigates certain counterparty exposure that the trust has to the
ceding insurer. Unlike some prior OMIR transactions, the premium
deposit account will not be funded at closing. Instead, the ceding
insurer will make a deposit into this account up to the applicable
target balance only when one of the premium deposit events occur.
Please refer to the related rating report and/or offering circular
for more details.

The Notes are scheduled to mature on April 25, 2034, but will be
subject to early redemption at the option of the ceding insurer (1)
for a 10% clean-up call or (2) on or following the payment date in
October 2026, among others. The Notes are also subject to mandatory
redemption before the scheduled maturity date upon the termination
of the Reinsurance Agreement.

NMI will act as the ceding insurer. The Bank of New York Mellon
(rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act
as the Indenture Trustee, Paying Agent, Note Registrar, and
Reinsurance Trustee.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies
for many RMBS asset classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of forbearance,
which are generally short-term periods of payment relief that may
perform differently from traditional delinquencies. At the onset of
the pandemic, the option to forebear mortgage payments was widely
available, droving forbearances to an elevated level. When the dust
settled, loans with coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid and
acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in general. Across
nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months, delinquencies have
been gradually trending downward as forbearance periods come to an
end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



OPORTUN ISSUANCE 2021-C: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following notes
(the Notes) issued by Oportun Issuance Trust 2021-C (Oportun 2021-C
or the Issuer):

-- $377,033,000 Class A Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- $59,233,000 Class B Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- $48,734,000 Class C Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $15,000,000 Class D Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The ratings on the Notes are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following considerations:

(1) The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns, published on September 8, 2021. These baseline
macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's moderate and
adverse COVID-19 pandemic scenarios, which were first published in
April 2020. The baseline macroeconomic scenarios reflect the view
that, although COVID-19 remains a risk to the outlook, uncertainty
around the macroeconomic effects of the pandemic has gradually
receded. Current median forecasts considered in the baseline
macroeconomic scenarios incorporate some risks associated with
further outbreaks, but remain fairly positive on recovery prospects
given expectations of continued fiscal and monetary policy support.
The policy response to COVID-19 may nonetheless bring other risks
to the forefront in coming months and years.

-- DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the coronavirus. The DBRS Morningstar cumulative net
loss assumption is 10.28% based on the worst-case loss pool
constructed, giving consideration to the concentration limits
present in the structure.

-- DBRS Morningstar incorporated a hardship deferment stress into
its analysis as a result of an increase in utilization related to
the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on borrowers. DBRS
Morningstar stressed hardship deferments to test liquidity risk
early in the life of the transaction's cash flows.

(2) The transaction's form and sufficiency of available credit
enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the Reserve Account, and excess
spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS
Morningstar's stressed assumptions under various stress scenarios.

(3) The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final payment date.

(4) Oportun's capabilities with regard to originations,
underwriting, and servicing.

(5) The experience, underwriting, and origination capabilities of
MetaBank, N.A.

(6) The ability of Systems & Services Technologies, Inc. (SST) to
perform duties as a Back-Up Servicer. SST, as Back-Up Servicer, is
required to take over as successor servicer of the collateral in
the Oportun 2021-C transaction within 15 calendar days of notice of
a servicing termination event. SST and Oportun have developed a
detailed servicing transition plan to facilitate an orderly
transfer of servicing.

(7) On March 3, 2021, Oportun received a Civil Investigative Demand
(CID) from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The
stated purpose of the CID is to determine whether small-dollar
lenders or associated persons, in connection with lending and
debt-collection practices, have not been in compliance with certain
federal consumer protection laws over which the CFPB has
jurisdiction.

-- Oportun and PF Servicing believe that their practices have been
in full compliance with CFPB guidance and that they have followed
all published authority with respect to their practices, and
Oportun continues to cooperate with the CFPB with respect to this
matter. At this time, the Seller is unable to predict the outcome
of this CFPB investigation, including whether the investigation
will result in any action or proceeding or in any changes to the
Seller's or the Servicer's practices.

(8) The legal structure and legal opinions that address the true
sale of the unsecured consumer loans, the nonconsolidation of the
trust, and that the trust has a valid perfected security interest
in the assets and consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal
Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



PAWNEE EQUIPMENT 2021-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalizes its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes (the Notes) issued by Pawnee Equipment Receivables
(Series 2021-1) LLC (the Issuer):

-- $86,260,000 Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $198,740,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $28,310,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $13,300,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $15,200,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $14,253,000 Class E Notes at BB (low) (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement, which includes
overcollateralization, subordination, and amounts held in the
reserve account, to support the DBRS Morningstar-projected
cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under various stressed cash
flow scenarios.

-- The respective coverage multiples of the expected CNL, which
are afforded to each class of Notes by the available credit
enhancement. Under various stressed cash flow scenarios, credit
enhancement can withstand the expected loss using DBRS Morningstar
multiples of 5.40 times (x) with respect to the Class A Notes and
4.40x, 3.55x, 2.50x, and 1.65x with respect to the Class B, C, D,
and E Notes, respectively. DBRS Morningstar assumes an expected
base-case CNL of 4.15% for this transaction.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns," published on September 8, 2021. These baseline
macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's moderate and
adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic scenarios, which
were first published in April 2020. The baseline macroeconomic
scenarios reflect the view that, although COVID-19 remains a risk
to the outlook, uncertainty around the macroeconomic effects of the
pandemic has gradually receded. Current median forecasts considered
in the baseline macroeconomic scenarios incorporate some risks
associated with further outbreaks, but remain fairly positive on
recovery prospects given expectations of continued fiscal and
monetary policy support. The policy response to COVID-19 may
nonetheless bring other risks to the forefront in the coming months
and years.

-- Given the expectation of generally improving economic
environment and the strong rebound in delinquency and charge-off
performance metrics for equipment lessors following the initial
negative impact from the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar does not
apply any adjustments to its expected CNL assumption for the
transaction in consideration of the impact from the COVID-19
pandemic.

-- The capabilities of Pawnee Leasing Corporation (Pawnee or the
Company) with regard to originations, underwriting, and servicing.
DBRS Morningstar performed an operational review of Pawnee and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
equipment-backed lease and loan contracts. In addition, Vervent
acts as the Backup Servicer for this transaction. DBRS Morningstar
reviewed Vervent and believes that the entity is an acceptable
backup servicer.

-- The Asset Pool does not contain any significant concentrations
of obligors, brokers, or geographies and consists of a diversified
mix of the equipment types similar to those included in other
small-ticket lease and loan securitizations rated by DBRS
Morningstar.

-- The Company focuses on small-ticket financing ($500,000 cap for
prime credits and lower for near prime and nonprime credits). No
nonprime credits is included in the collateral for the Notes;
however, 24.28% of the collateral consists of B+ credits (with the
weighted-average nonzero guarantor Beacon Score of 714 as of the
Statistical Calculation Date compared with a score of 763 for A
credits as of the same date). Payment by automated clearinghouse is
in place for 95.05% of B+ credit contracts compared with about
75.02% for A credit contracts. In addition, as of the Statistical
Calculation Date, personal guarantees supported close to 99.90% of
B+ collateral in the Statistical Asset Pool compared with
approximately 86.81% for A credits.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer the nonconsolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Pawnee; and that the Indenture
Trustee, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets. DBRS Morningstar
also reviewed the transaction terms for consistency with its "Legal
Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



PFP 2019-6: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the following classes of
notes (the Notes) issued by PFP 2019-6, Ltd:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the collateral. The transaction benefits from its pool composition
as only one loan, representing 3.4% of the current pool balance, is
backed by a hospitality property, and four loans, representing 9.2%
of the current pool balance, are backed by retail properties. In
addition, 12 loans, representing 54.3% of the current pool balance,
are secured by properties in markets with a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 5, 6, 7, or 8, which are characterized as core market
locations and are more urbanized or densely suburban in nature.
These markets have historically benefitted from greater demand
drivers and available liquidity.

The initial collateral consisted of 36 floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 37 mostly transitional properties with a cut-off balance
totaling $760.1 million, excluding approximately $80.7 million of
future funding commitments. Most loans are in a period of
transition with plans to stabilize and improve the asset value.
During the Permitted Funded Companion Participation Acquisition
Period, the Issuer may acquire future funding commitments into the
Trust.

As of the September 2021 remittance, the Trust consisted of 24
loans with a current principal balance of $508.0 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 33.2% since issuance. To
date, the lender has advanced $35.5 million in loan future funding
to 15 individual borrower to aid in property stabilization. An
additional $28.5 million in loan future funding allocated to 11
individual borrowers remains outstanding. The Permitted Funded
Companion Participation Period will end with the January 2022
Payment Date and as of September 2021 reporting the Permitted
Funded Companion Participation Acquisition Account had a balance of
$2.0 million.

As of the September 2021 remittance, 11 loans, representing 29.0%
of the pool, are on the servicer's watchlist with no loans in
special servicing or any delinquencies noted. Three loans on the
servicer's watchlist were flagged for upcoming loan maturities, six
loans were flagged for low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs),
and the remaining loan was flagged for an occupancy decrease. In
total, there are five loans, representing 23.7% of the pool, that
have had loan modifications executed since 2020. The modifications
include the use of reserves to pay debt service, the deferral and
accrual of interest shortfalls, and the waiver of monthly reserve
deposits and replenishment obligations.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, SOMI Center &
Biltmore Building (Prospectus ID#11; 4.7% of the current pool
balance), is secured by two mixed-use properties in South Miami and
Coral Gables, Florida, totaling 97,218 square feet (sf) situated
approximately four miles from one another. The loan was added to
the servicer's watchlist in August 2021 ahead of its pending
November 2021 loan maturity date. The servicer has reported that
the borrower will be exercising the first of three one-year
extension options. The loan at issuance was structured with a
future funding component of $2.3 million, $250,000 of which was set
aside for minor renovation work, while the remainder was reserved
for leasing costs. The sponsor's business plan was focused on
optimizing the two mismanaged properties by leasing up the
properties to market occupancy and rental rates. As of the
September 2021 reporting, the loan has $2.1 million remaining in
its future funding account, $1.8 million for its leasing efforts,
and the $250,000 for capital improvements. As of the August 2021
rent roll, the properties reported a combined occupancy rate of
66.5%, a decline from the January 2021 occupancy rate of 79.8% and
the January 2020 rate of 74.1%. As of a Q2 2021 Reis report, the
Coral Gables submarket is reporting a vacancy rate of 17.1%. While
the leasing reserves have remained relatively untouched since
issuance, the immediate submarket's elevated vacancy rate and
continued depressed occupancy rate at the subject properties
indicate the borrower is struggling to complete its business plan.

The second-largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Palihotel
Seattle (Prospectus ID#16, 3.4% of the current pool balance), is
secured by a 96-key, full-service hotel in Seattle. The loan was
placed on the servicer's watchlist in August 2020 for a low DSCR as
the property closed in April 2020 as a result of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The subjet remained closed through
June 2021. The loan was granted relief in April 2020 with terms
including the waiver of monthly furnite fixture and equipment
(FF&E) reserve collections for 2020 (with collections recommencing
at a staggered rate over the next four years beginning in 2021). In
addition, interest shortfalls from May 2020 to July 2020 can be
deferred and can accrue until repaid and cash management debt-yield
test are delayed until December 2021. The sponsor's business plan
at issuance was focused on ramping the hotel to stabilization by
reducing dependence from online travel agencies and securing
corporate contracts, growing its brand awareness across its
portfolio of hotels, and optimizing operating expenses at the
subject. The loan is structured with a future funding commitment of
two separate earnouts of $2.0 million, and, as of the September
2021 collateral report, no funds have been disbursed as the
property has been unable to achieve the performance-based
debt-yield tests. The property's July 2021 operating statement
reported monthly occupancy, average daily rate, and revenue per
available room figures of 19.9%, $178.52, and $35.45,
respectively.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



PRESTIGE AUTO: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2021-1:

-- $41,900,000 Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $90,000,000 Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $42,460,000 Class A-3 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $42,910,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $46,810,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $29,900,000 Class D Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $14,790,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS Morningstar
of the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization (OC), amounts held in the reserve account,
and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to
support DBRS Morningstar-projected expected cumulative net loss
(CNL) assumptions under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the Legal Final Maturity Date.

(2) The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar has performed an operational review of
Prestige Financial Services, Inc. (Prestige or the Company) and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
subprime auto receivables. Additionally, the transaction has an
acceptable backup servicer.

-- The Company's management team has extensive experience.
Prestige has been lending to the subprime auto sector since 1994
and has considerable experience lending to Chapter 7 and 13
obligors.

(3) The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
Prestige's auto loan portfolio.

-- Prestige shared vintage CNL data with DBRS Morningstar that
dates back to 2009. The data was broken down by credit tier,
payment-to-income ratio, and other buckets. The analysis indicated
a pattern of increasing losses that was consistent with expected
trends.

-- The Company continues to evaluate and adjust its underwriting
standards as necessary to target and maintain the credit quality of
its loan portfolio.

-- DBRS Morningstar rating category loss multiples for each rating
assigned are within the published criteria.

(4) The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 13.95% based on the
expected cut-off date pool composition.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's
baseline macroeconomic scenarios for rated sovereign economies,
available in its commentary "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios For
Rated Sovereigns," published on September 8, 2021. These baseline
macroeconomic scenarios replace DBRS Morningstar's moderate and
adverse Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic scenarios, which
were first published in April 2020. The baseline macroeconomic
scenarios reflect the view that, although coronavirus remains a
risk to the outlook, uncertainty around the macroeconomic effects
of the pandemic has gradually receded. Current median forecasts
considered in the baseline macroeconomic scenarios incorporate some
risks associated with further outbreaks, but remain fairly positive
on recovery prospects given expectations of continued fiscal and
monetary policy support. The policy response to coronavirus may
nonetheless bring other risks to the forefront in the coming months
and years.

(5) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions will address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the nonconsolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Prestige, that the Issuer has a
valid first-priority security interest in the assets, and the
consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance."

The ratings on the Class A-1, Class A-2, and Class A-3 Notes
reflect 47.35% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by
subordinated notes in the pool (41.35%), the reserve account
(1.00%), and OC (5.00%). The ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class
D, and Class E Notes reflect 34.15%, 19.75%, 10.55%, and 6.00% of
initial hard credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit
support may be provided from excess spread available in the
structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



PRKCM 2021-AFC2: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on B-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to PRKCM
2021-AFC2 Trust's mortgage pass-through notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by first-lien,
fixed- and adjustable-rate, fully amortizing residential mortgage
loans to both prime and nonprime borrowers (some with interest-only
periods). The pool consists of 881 non-qualified mortgage
(non-QM/ATR compliant) and ATR-exempt loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 29,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, representation and warranty (R&W) framework, and
geographic concentration;

-- The mortgage originator, AmWest Funding Corp.; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and the liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  PRKCM 2021-AFC2 Trust(i)

  Class A-1, $329,204,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $15,413,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $15,215,000: A+ (sf)
  Class M-1, $16,204,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $9,682,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $5,928,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $3,557,490: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): Not rated
  Class XS, notional(iii): Not rated
  Class R, not applicable: Not rated



PROGRESS RESIDENTIAL 2021-SFR9: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Single-Family Rental Pass-Through Certificates issued by Progress
Residential 2021-SFR9 Trust (PROG 2021-SFR9):

-- $174.1 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $64.8 million Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- $27.0 million Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- $31.0 million Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- $47.2 million Class E-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $24.8 million Class E-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $75.0 million Class F at BB (sf)
-- $49.9 million Class G at B (low) (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A certificates reflects 67.6% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The
AA (high) (sf), A (high) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (sf), BBB (low)
(sf), BB (sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 55.5%, 50.5%,
44.7%, 35.9%, 31.3%, 17.3%, and 8.0% credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

PROG 2021-SFR9's 1,808 properties are in 12 states, with the
largest concentration by BPO value in Florida (20.6%). The largest
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) by value is Phoenix (16.3%),
followed by Atlanta (14.0%). The geographic concentration dictates
the home-price stresses applied to the portfolio and the resulting
market value decline (MVD). The MVD at the AAA (sf) rating level
for this deal is 56.5%. PROG 2021-SFR9 has properties from 22 MSAs,
many of which experienced dramatic home price index (HPI) declines
in the housing crisis of 2008.

DBRS Morningstar assigned the provisional ratings for each class of
certificates by performing a quantitative and qualitative
collateral, structural, and legal analysis. This analysis uses DBRS
Morningstar's single-family rental subordination model and is based
on DBRS Morningstar's published criteria. DBRS Morningstar
developed property-level stresses for the analysis of single-family
rental assets. DBRS Morningstar will finalize the provisional
ratings on each class based on the level of stresses each class can
withstand and whether such stresses are commensurate with the
applicable rating level. DBRS Morningstar's analysis includes
estimated base-case NCFs by evaluating the gross rent, concession,
vacancy, operating expenses, and capex data. The DBRS Morningstar
NCF analysis resulted in a minimum debt service coverage ratio of
higher than 1.0 times.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



PRPM 2021-RPL2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class M-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2021-RPL2 issued by PRPM 2021-RPL2,
LLC:

-- $188.0 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $8.9 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $9.5 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class M-2 at BB (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Notes reflects 21.60% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), and BB (sf) ratings reflect 17.75%, 14.05%, 10.10%,
and 6.50% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The Trust is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned performing
and reperforming first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of mortgage-backed securities (the Notes). The Notes are
backed by 1,452 loans with a total principal balance of
$239,816,435 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 31, 2021).

The mortgage loans are approximately 178 months seasoned. As of the
Cut-Off Date, all of the loans are current under the Mortgage
Bankers Association delinquency method, including 313 (19.1% of the
loans) bankruptcy-performing loans.

Although the number of months clean (consecutively zero times 30 (0
x 30) days delinquent) at issuance is weaker relative to other DBRS
Morningstar-rated seasoned transactions, the borrowers in this pool
demonstrate reasonable cash flow velocity (by number of payments
over time) in the past 12 months. Over the last 12 months, 1,446
loans, or 99.4%, have made six or more payments and 1,267 loans, or
86.1%, have made 12 or more payments.

Modified loans make up 84.3% of the portfolio. The modifications
happened more than two years ago for 77.4% of the modified loans.
Within the pool, 386 mortgages (26.6% of the pool by loan count)
have a total non-interest-bearing deferred amount of $14,546,894,
which equates to approximately 6.1% of the total principal
balance.

For the most part, the loans are single-family residential
first-lien mortgage notes where the borrowers are in a current
Chapter 13, Chapter 11, or Chapter 7 bankruptcy or have had their
bankruptcies dismissed or discharged. As of the Cut-off-date, 80.9%
of the portfolio is not in bankruptcy (never previously bankrupt or
bankruptcy was dismissed or discharged); 17.0% is in Chapter 13
bankruptcy; 1.9% is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy; and 0.2% is in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

To satisfy the credit risk retention requirements, as of the
Closing Date, the Sponsor or a majority-owned affiliate of the
Sponsors will hold the Class B Note and the Membership Certificate,
which represents the initial overcollateralization amount.

Following the transfer of servicing from BSI Financial Services to
Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC (Rushmore), Rushmore will
service approximately 10.7% of the loans and SN Servicing
Corporation will service approximately 89.3% of the loans in this
transaction. The Servicers will not advance any delinquent
principal and interest (P&I) on the mortgages; however, the
Servicers are obligated to make advances in respect of prior liens,
insurance, real estate taxes, and assessments as well as reasonable
costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing and
disposing of properties.

The Issuer has the option to redeem the Notes in full at a price
equal to the sum of (1) the remaining aggregate Note Amount of the
Notes; (2) any accrued and unpaid interest due on the Notes through
the redemption date (including any Cap Carryover); and (3) any fees
and expenses of the transaction parties, including any unreimbursed
servicing advances (Redemption Price). Such Optional Redemption may
be exercised three years after the Closing Date.

In addition, the Issuer is expected (but is not required) to redeem
the offered Notes in full on the payment date in October 2026
(Expected Redemption Date). Assuming an Event of Default has not
occurred, the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class M-1, Class M-2, and Class
B Notes are not entitled to any payments of principal prior to the
Expected Redemption Date (other than from net sale proceeds after
the Class A-1 Notes have been paid in full) and all Available Funds
(other than the portion of Available Funds representing net sale
proceeds) that would otherwise be available to pay the principal on
the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class M-1, Class M-2, and Class B Notes
after the Class A-1 Notes have been paid in full will instead be
deposited into a redemption account and applied to pay interest and
principal on the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class M-1, Class M-2, and
Class B Notes on the earlier of the Expected Redemption Date or the
occurrence of a Credit Event. If the Issuer does not redeem the
offered Notes in full on the Expected Redemption Date or an Event
of Default occurs and is continuing, a Credit Event will occur.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure. P&I
collections are commingled and are first used to pay interest and
Cap Carryover Amounts to the Notes and then to pay the classes
until reduced to zero, which may provide for timely payment of
interest to the rated Notes. On or after the occurrence of a Credit
Event, the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class M-1, Class M-2, and Class B
Notes will become accrual Notes, in which case the interest payment
amount and any cap carryover that would otherwise be available to
be paid to the these Notes will be paid as principal to the Class
A-1 Notes until the payment date on which the Class A-1 Notes have
been paid in full, with any Class A-2 accrual amount in excess of
the amount needed to pay the Class A-1 Notes in full on such
payment date being paid as principal to the Class A-2 Notes.
Thereafter, the same waterfall treatment will apply to the next
senior Note. Any Note accrual amount paid to the Class A-1 Notes or
to the next most senior Note as principal, on or after the
occurrence of a Credit Event, will be added to the principal
balance of the outstanding accrual Notes.

Coronavirus Impact

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
pandemic, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies for
many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term periods of payment
relief that may perform very differently from traditional
delinquencies. At the onset of the pandemic, the option to forbear
mortgage payments was widely available, driving forbearances to an
elevated level. When the dust settled, loans with
coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020 performed better than
expected, thanks to government aid, low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios,
and acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in general.
Across nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months delinquencies
have been gradually trending downward, as forbearance periods come
to an end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



REAL ESTATE 2021-1: DBRS Gives Provisional B Rating on G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-1 to
be issued by Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust, Series 2021-1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D-1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class D-2 at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes D-2, E, F, and G will be privately placed.

The collateral consists of 79 fixed-rate loans secured by 150
commercial properties. The transaction is a sequential-pay
pass-through structure. The conduit pool was analyzed to determine
the provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of
loan default within the term and its liquidity at maturity. When
the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS
Morningstar Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their respective
actual constants, the initial DBRS Morningstar Weighted-Average
(WA) Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) for the pool was 1.49 times
(x). DBRS Morningstar did not identify any loans as having a DBRS
Morningstar Term DSCR below 1.15x, a threshold indicative of a
higher likelihood of midterm default. The DBRS Morningstar WA
Loan-to-Value (LTV) of the pool at issuance was 65.3%, and the pool
is scheduled to amortize down to a DBRS Morningstar WA LTV of 54.6%
at maturity.

The pool includes 39 loans, representing 49.4% of the allocated
pool balance, that exhibit a DBRS Morningstar LTV ratio in excess
of 67.1%, a threshold generally indicative of above-average default
frequency. These credit metrics are based on the A-note balances.

Fifty loans, representing 57.3% of the pool, have been given
recourse credit in the DBRS Morningstar CMBS Insight model.

Recourse generally results in lower probability of default over the
term of the loan. Three loans, representing 7.3% of the pool, were
considered by DBRS Morningstar to have Strong sponsor strength. All
loans in the pool amortize for the entire loan term. Eighteen
loans, representing 13.3% of the pool, have approximately 25 years
or less of remaining amortization. The remaining loans have
remaining amortization ranges between 25 years and 30 years. The
expected amortization for the pool is approximately 16.4% during
the expected life of the transaction.

The DBRS Morningstar sample included 26 of the 79 loans in the
pool, representing 61.4% of the pool by allocated loan balance.
DBRS Morningstar performed site inspections on 67 of the 150
properties in the deal, comprising 39.1% of the pool by allocated
loan balance. The DBRS Morningstar sample had an average NCF
variance of -6.0% and ranged from -19.2% (Place Val Est) to +1.9%
(Cardill Cres Waterloo Multifamily). For loans not subject to an
NCF review, DBRS Morningstar applied the average NCF variance.

Based on the DBRS Morningstar sample and analysis, DBRS Morningstar
considered two loans (8.9% of the sample or 5.5% of the pool) to
have Above Average property quality and seven loans (35.7% of the
sample or 21.9% of the pool) to have Average + property quality.
Additionally, there is no loan modeled with Below Average property
quality.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.



RMF BUYOUT 2020-HB1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on M4 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed all ratings on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series
2020-HB1 issued by RMF Buyout Issuance Trust 2020-HB1 as follows:

-- Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- Class M2 at A (sf)
-- Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- Class M4 at BB (high)(sf)

Class AB is an exchangeable note. This class can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange notes as specified in the offering
documents.

These rating actions reflect asset performance and credit-support
levels that are consistent with the current ratings.

DBRS Morningstar's rating actions are based on the following
analytical considerations:

-- Key performance measures, as reflected in credit enhancement
increases since deal inception, and running total cumulative loss
percentages.

-- In connection with the economic stress assumed under its
moderate scenario (see "Baseline Macroeconomic Scenarios for Rated
Sovereigns" published on September 8, 2021), DBRS Morningstar
advances the mortality curve of all the reverse mortgage (RM)
borrowers by four years, advances all foreclosure timelines to a
AAA scenario timeline, and applies an immediate 10% valuation
haircut to all loans.

-- The pools backing the reviewed residential mortgage-backed
security transactions consist of RM collateral.

RM LOANS

Lenders typically offer RM loans to people who are at least 62
years old. Through RM loans, borrowers have access to home equity
through a lump sum amount or a stream of payments without
periodically repaying principal or interest, allowing the loan
balance to accumulate over a period of time until a maturity event
occurs. Loan repayment is required if (1) the borrower dies, (2)
the borrower sells the related residence, (3) the borrower no
longer occupies the related residence for a period (usually a
year), (4) it is no longer the borrower's primary residence, (5) a
tax or insurance default occurs, or (6) the borrower fails to
properly maintain the related residence. In addition, borrowers
must be current on any homeowner's association dues if applicable.
RMs are typically nonrecourse; borrowers do not have to provide
additional assets in cases where the outstanding loan amount
exceeds the property's value (the crossover point). As a result,
liquidation proceeds will fall below the loan amount in cases where
the outstanding balance reaches the crossover point, contributing
to higher loss severities for these loans.

Notes: The principal methodology is the U.S. Reverse Mortgage
Securitization Ratings Methodology (May 8, 2020), which can be
found on dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.



SCULPTOR CLO XXVIII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Sculptor CLO
XXVIII Ltd./Sculptor CLO XXVIII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 1,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Sculptor CLO XXVIII Ltd./Sculptor CLO XXVIII LLC

  Class A, $248.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $36.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $20.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-1 (deferrable), $16.00 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D-2 (deferrable), $8.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $16.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated A, $16.50 million: Not rated
  Subordinated B, $23.15 million: Not rated


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2021-9: Fitch Gives BB-(EXP) Rating to B4 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2021-9 (SEMT
2021-9).

DEBT                RATING
----                ------
SEMT 2021-9

A1      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A10     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A11     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A12     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A13     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A14     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A15     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A16     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A17     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A18     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A19     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A2      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A20     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A21     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A22     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A23     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A24     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A25     LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A3      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A4      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A5      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A6      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A7      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A8      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A9      LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO1    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO10   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO11   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO12   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO13   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO14   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO15   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO16   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO17   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO18   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO19   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO2    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO20   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO21   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO22   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO23   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO24   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO25   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO26   LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO3    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO4    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO5    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO6    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO7    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO8    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIO9    LT AAA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
AIOS    LT NR(EXP)sf     Expected Rating
B1      LT AA-(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B2      LT A-(EXP)sf     Expected Rating
B3      LT BBB-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B4      LT BB-(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B5      LT NR(EXP)sf     Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 578 loans with a total balance of
approximately $510.33 million as of the cutoff date. The pool
consists of prime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) acquired by Redwood
Residential Acquisition Corp. (Redwood) from various mortgage
originators. Distributions of principal and interest (P&I) and loss
allocations are based on a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists of
578 loans, totaling $510 million and seasoned approximately two
months in aggregate. The borrowers have a strong credit profile
(773 FICO and 32% DTI) and moderate leverage (74% sLTV, 65% cLTV).
The pool consists of 91.7% of loans where the borrower maintains a
primary residence, while 8.3% is an investor property or second
home. Additionally, 16.5% of the loans were originated through a
retail channel. 100% are designated as QM loans.

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to its updated view
on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values of
this pool as 11.4% above a long-term sustainable level (vs. 10.5%
on a national level). Underlying fundamentals are not keeping pace
with the growth in prices, which is a result of a supply/demand
imbalance driven by low inventory, low mortgage rates and new
buyers entering the market. These trends have led to significant
home price increases over the past year, with home prices rising
19.7% yoy nationally as of August 2021.

Shifting-Interest Structure (Negative): The mortgage cash flow and
loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps to maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

Interest Reduction Risk (Negative): The transaction incorporates a
structural feature most commonly used by Redwood's program for
loans more than 120 days delinquent (a stop-advance loan). Unpaid
interest on stop-advance loans reduces the amount of interest that
is contractually due to bondholders in reverse-sequential order.
While this feature helps to limit cash flow leakage to subordinate
bonds, it can result in interest reductions to rated bonds in high
stress scenarios.

120-Day Stop Advance (Mixed): The deal is structured to four months
of servicer advances for delinquent P&I. The limited advancing
reduces loss severities, as a lower amount is repaid to the
servicer when a loan liquidates.

CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the
pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor
of 0.85% of the original balance will be maintained for the
certificates.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how
    the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
    (MVDs) than assumed at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
    level. Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the state and
    national level to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the
    subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in
    home prices.

-- The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in
    addition to the model projected 42.4% at 'AAA'. The analysis
    indicates that there is some potential rating migration with
    higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
    projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
    prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to positive home price growth of
    10% with no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class,
    which is already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there
    is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
    classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result
    in a full rating tick upgrade for the rated class excluding
    those being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC, Clayton, and EdgeMac. The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on credit, compliance and
property valuations. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and, as a result, Fitch made the following adjustment to
its analysis: a 5% reduction to the loan's probability of default.
This adjustment resulted in a less than 10bps reduction to the
'AAAsf' expected loss.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied in its analysis on an independent third-party due
diligence review performed on about 60% of the pool. The
third-party due diligence was consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS
Rating Criteria." AMC, Clayton and EdgeMac were engaged to perform
the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were given
compliance, credit and valuation grades and assigned initial grades
for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in
the due diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence
section of the presale report for further details.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5-designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others, to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

SEMT 2021-9 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4'[+] for Transaction
Parties & Operational Risk. Operational risk is well controlled for
in SEMT 2021-9 and includes strong R&W and transaction due
diligence as well as a strong aggregator, which resulted in a
reduction in expected losses. This has a positive impact on the
credit profile and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with
other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


SREIT TRUST 2021-IND: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-IND issued by SREIT Trust 2021-IND (SREIT 2021-IND), as
follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The SREIT Trust 2021-IND single-asset/single-borrower transaction
is collateralized by the borrowers' fee-simple interest in a
portfolio of 15 industrial properties totaling nearly 2.5 million
sf. The portfolio is generally concentrated throughout infill areas
of the Phoenix (11 properties representing 83.0% of the portfolio's
allocated loan amount (ALA)) and Las Vegas (four properties
representing 17.0% of the portfolio's NRA) MSAs, both of which
placed in the top 10 markets nationally in terms of population
growth between 2017 and 2019 and are generally high-growth markets
with favorable industrial demand trends. DBRS, Inc. (DBRS
Morningstar) continues to take a favorable view on the long-term
growth and stability of the warehouse and logistics sector, despite
the uncertainties and risks that the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has created across all commercial real estate asset
classes. Increased consumer reliance on e-commerce and home
delivery during the pandemic has only accelerated pre-pandemic
consumer trends, and DBRS Morningstar believes that retail's loss
continues to be industrial's gain. The portfolio benefits from
favorable tenant granularity, strong sponsor strength, favorable
asset quality, and strong leasing trends, all of which contribute
to potential cash flow stability over time.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



SYCAMORE TREE 2021-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Sycamore Tree CLO 2021-1
Ltd./Sycamore Tree CLO 2021-1 LLC's fixed- and floating-rate debt.

The debt issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Sycamore Tree CLO Advisors L.P.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated debt through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Sycamore Tree CLO 2021-1 Ltd./Sycamore Tree CLO 2021-1 LLC

  Class AL, $223.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class AN, $25.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $28.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $28.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-1 (deferrable), $22.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-2 (deferrable), $2.0 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $13.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $38.34 million: Not rated



TABERNA PREFERRED V: Moody's Upgrades 2 Tranches to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Taberna Preferred Funding V, Ltd.:

US$100,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due August 2036
(current balance of $36,347,308) (the "Class A-1LA Notes"),
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 22, 2019 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

US$250,000,000 Class A-1LAD Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes Due
August 2036 (current balance of $90,868,267) (the "Class A-1LAD
Notes"), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 22, 2019
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due August 2036
(current balance of $69,664,554) (the "Class A-1LB Notes"),
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on December 8, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Taberna Preferred Funding V, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by a portfolio of REIT
trust preferred securities, corporate debts and CRE CDO tranches.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1LA and Class A-1LAD notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratio and the improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since November
2020.

The Class A-1LA and Class A-1LAD notes have paid down collectively
by approximately 4.0% or $5.3 million since November 2020, using
principal proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and
the diversion of excess interest proceeds. Based on Moody's
calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1AD and Class A-1LB
notes have improved to 171.5% and 110.8%, respectively, from the
November 2020 level of 162.4% and 107.0%. The Class A-1LA and Class
A-1LAD notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 2136 from 3087 in
November 2020.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par $218.1 million,
defaulted par of $84.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 27.6% (implying a WARF of 2136), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 11.7%.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in July 2021.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


TICP CLO XIV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned ratings to the replacement class A-1-R,
A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes from TICP CLO XIV Ltd./TICP CLO XIV
LLC, a CLO originally issued in 2019 that is managed by TICP CLO
XIV Management LLC. At the same time, S&P withdrew its ratings on
the original class A-1a, A-2, B, C, and D notes following payment
in full on the Dec. 1, 2021, refinancing date.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture,
which outlines the terms of the replacement notes. According to the
supplemental indenture:

-- All replacement classes were issued at lower spreads than the
original classes, which reduced the transaction's overall cost of
funding.

-- The original floating-rate class A-1a and A-1b notes were
combined into the floating-rate replacement class A-1-R notes.

-- The non-call period and weighted average life test were each
extended by one year, while the legal final maturity and
reinvestment period remained unchanged.

-- The transaction added the ability to purchase up to 5% partial
deferrable assets.

-- LIBOR replacement language was also added.

  Replacement And Original Note Issuances

  Replacement notes

  Class A-1-R, $254.40 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.08%
  Class A-2-R, $49.60 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.65%
  Class B-R, $24.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 2.20%
  Class C-R, $24.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 3.25%
  Class D-R, $14.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 6.70%

  Original notes

  Class A-1a, $248.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.34%
  Class A-1b, $6.40 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.70%
  Class A-2, $49.60 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.90%
  Class B, $24.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 2.70%
  Class C, $24.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 3.90%
  Class D, $14.00 million: Three-month LIBOR + 7.15%

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and the
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Ratings Assigned

  TICP CLO XIV Ltd./TICP CLO XIV LLC

  Class A-1-R, $254.40 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-R, $49.60 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-R, $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-R, $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R, $14.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $36.35 million: NR

  Ratings Withdrawn

  TICP CLO XIV Ltd./TICP CLO XIV LLC

  Class A-1a to NR from 'AAA (sf)'
  Class A-2 to NR from 'AA (sf)'
  Class B to NR from 'A (sf)'
  Class C to NR from 'BBB- (sf)'
  Class D to NR from 'BB- (sf)'

  NR--Not rated.



TOWD POINT 2021-SJ1: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on 7 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Towd Point Mortgage Trust
2021-SJ1 (TPMT 2021-SJ1).

DEBT          RATING               PRIOR
----          ------               -----
TPMT 2021-SJ1

A1     LT AAAsf    New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A1A    LT AAAsf    New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A1AX   LT AAAsf    New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A1B    LT AAAsf    New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A1BX   LT AAAsf    New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A2     LT AA-sf    New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2A    LT AA-sf    New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2AX   LT AA-sf    New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2B    LT AA-sf    New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2BX   LT AA-sf    New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A3     LT AA-sf    New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A4     LT A-sf     New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
A5     LT BBB-sf   New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
A6     LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B1     LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1A    LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1AX   LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1B    LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1BX   LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1C    LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1CX   LT BB-sf    New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B2     LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2A    LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2AX   LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2B    LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2BX   LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2C    LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2CX   LT B-sf     New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B3     LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3A    LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3AX   LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3B    LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3BX   LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3C    LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3CX   LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4     LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B5     LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
M1     LT A-sf     New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1A    LT A-sf     New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1AX   LT A-sf     New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1B    LT A-sf     New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1BX   LT A-sf     New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M2     LT BBB-sf   New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2A    LT BBB-sf   New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2AX   LT BBB-sf   New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2B    LT BBB-sf   New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2BX   LT BBB-sf   New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
R      LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
X      LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XA     LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XS1    LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XS2    LT NRsf     New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed notes backed by seasoned and re-performing (SPL,
RPL) closed-end, junior-lien, residential mortgage loans to be
issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2021-SJ1 (TPMT 2021-SJ1), as
indicated above.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
13,535 SPLs and RPLs junior-lien loans with a total balance of
approximately $661.8 million, including $30 million, or 5%, of the
aggregate pool balance in non-interest-bearing deferred principal
amounts, as of the statistical calculation date. The note balances
reflect the cut-off balances; Fitch's analysis on the collateral
was completed using data as of the statistical calculation date.

Distributions of P&I and loss allocations are based on a
traditional senior-subordinate, sequential structure. The
sequential-pay structure locks out principal to the subordinated
notes until the most senior notes outstanding are paid in full. The
servicers will not advance delinquent monthly payments of P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 10.4% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
10.5% on a national level). Underlying fundamentals are not keeping
pace with the growth in prices, which is the result of a
supply/demand imbalance driven by low inventory, low mortgage rates
and new buyers entering the market. These trends have led to
significant home price increases over the past year, with home
prices rising 18.6% yoy nationally as of June 2021.

Closed-End Junior Liens (Negative): The collateral pool consists of
100% closed-end, junior-lien, SPLs and RPLs with a weighted average
model credit score of 700, sustainable loan to value ratio of
60.8%, 50.5% 36 months of clean pay history (under the Mortgage
Bankers Association method) and seasoning of approximately 181
months, per Fitch's analysis. Of the pool, approximately 2.2% were
delinquent (DQ) as of the statistical calculation date. Roughly 68%
have been modified.

No recovery and 100% loss severity (LS) were assumed based on the
historical behavior of junior-lien loans in economic stress
scenarios, and a transactional feature that applies the balance of
a defaulted loan as a realized loss to the trust at 150 days DQ
using the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) methodology, excluding
forbearance mortgage loans. Fitch assumes junior-lien loans default
at a rate comparable with first-lien loans, after controlling for
credit attributes, no additional default penalty was applied.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AA-sf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing. Similar to the
prior Fitch-rated TPMT 2019-SJ3 transaction, excess cash flow will
not be used to turbo down the senior classes.

Realized Loss and Write-Down Feature (Positive): Loans that are DQ
for 150 days or more under the OTS method will be considered a
realized loss (excluding forbearance mortgage loans) and,
therefore, will cause the most subordinated class to be written
down. Despite the 100% LS assumed for each defaulted loan, Fitch
views the write-down feature positively, as cash flows will not be
needed to pay timely interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AA-sf' notes
during loan resolution by the servicers. In addition, subsequent
recoveries realized after the write-down at 150 days DQ (excluding
forbearance mortgage loans) will be passed on to bondholders as
principal.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicers will not advance DQ
monthly payments of P&I, which reduces liquidity to the trust. P&I
advances made on behalf of loans that become DQ and eventually
liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust. Due to the lack
of P&I advancing, the loan-level LS is less for this transaction
than for those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I.
Structural provisions and cash flow priorities, together with
increased subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to
the 'AAAsf' and 'AA-sf' rated classes.

ESG Impact Rating Relevant: TPMT 2021-SJ1 has an ESG Relevance
Score of '4' for Transaction Parties and Operational Risk, due to
elevated operational risk, which resulted in an increase in
expected losses. While the originator, aggregator and servicing
parties did not have an impact on the expected losses, the Tier 2
R&W framework with an unrated counterparty and the transaction due
diligence resulted in an increase in the expected losses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in
    addition to the model-projected 41.7% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis
    indicates that there is some potential rating migration with
    higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
    projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
    prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to positive home price growth of
    10% with no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class,
    which is already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there
    is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
    classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result
    in a full category upgrade for the rated class excluding those
    being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC, Clayton and Westcor. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on regulatory compliance, pay
history, servicing comments, the presence of key documents in the
loan file and data integrity. In addition, AMC and Westcor were
retained to perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a
review to confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant
local jurisdiction and the related assignment chains. A regulatory
compliance and data integrity review was completed on 29.5% of the
pool by loan count (36.2% of the pool by balance).

The regulatory compliance review indicated that 518 reviewed loans,
or approximately 13.0% of the total pool, received a final grade of
'C' or 'D'. For 168 of these loans, this was due to missing loan
documentation that prevented testing for predatory lending
compliance. The inability to test for predatory lending may expose
the trust to potential assignee liability, which creates added risk
for bond investors. Typically, Fitch makes LS adjustments to
account for this. However, all loans in the pool are already
receiving 100% LS; therefore, no adjustments were made.

Reasons for the remaining 350 'C' and 'D' grades include missing
final HUD1s that are not subject to predatory lending, missing
state disclosures and other compliance-related documents. Fitch
believes these issues do not add material risk to bondholders, as
the statute of limitations has expired. No adjustment to loss
expectations were made for any of the 518 loans that received
either a 'C' or 'D' grade. The diligence results indicated similar
operational risk as in prior TPMT transactions, as well as other
Fitch-reviewed RPL transactions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

TPMT 2021-SJ1 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Transaction
Parties and Operational Risk, due to elevated operational risk,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the rating in conjunction with other factors. While the
originator, aggregator and servicing parties did not have an impact
on the expected losses, the Tier 2 R&W framework with an unrated
counterparty and the transaction due diligence resulted in an
increase in the expected losses.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


TRICON RESIDENTIAL 2021-SFR1: DBRS Gives (P) BB Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Single-Family Rental Pass-Through Certificates to be issued by
Tricon Residential 2021-SFR1 Trust (TCN 2021-SFR1):

-- $315.6 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $78.4 million Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- $42.2 million Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- $52.3 million Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class E-1 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $48.3 million Class E-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $80.4 million Class F at BB (sf)
-- $40.2 million Class G at B (high) (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A certificates reflects 57.0% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The
AA (low) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (high) (sf), BBB (sf), BBB (low)
(sf), BB (low) (sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 46.3%, 40.5%,
33.4%, 29.8%, 23.3%, 12.3%, and 6.8% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

TCN 2021-SFR 1's 3,395 properties are in seven states, with the
largest concentration by BPO value in North Carolina (25.0%). The
largest MSA by value is Atlanta (19.2%), followed by Charlotte
(18.9%). The geographic concentration dictates the home-price
stresses applied to the portfolio and the resulting market value
decline (MVD). The MVD at the AAA (sf) rating level for this deal
is 45.4%. TCN 2021-SFR1 has properties from 27 MSAs, many of which
did not experience dramatic home price index (HPI) declines in the
housing crisis of 2008.

DBRS Morningstar assigned the provisional ratings for each class of
certificates by performing a quantitative and qualitative
collateral, structural, and legal analysis. This analysis uses DBRS
Morningstar's single-family rental subordination model and is based
on DBRS Morningstar's published criteria. DBRS Morningstar
developed property-level stresses for the analysis of single-family
rental assets. DBRS Morningstar will finalize the provisional
ratings on each class based on the level of stresses each class can
withstand and whether such stresses are commensurate with the
applicable rating level. DBRS Morningstar's analysis includes
estimated base-case NCFs by evaluating the gross rent, concession,
vacancy, operating expenses, and capex data. The DBRS Morningstar
NCF analysis resulted in a minimum debt service coverage ratio of
higher than 1.0 times.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



TRINITAS CLO VII: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Trinitas CLO VII
Ltd./Trinitas CLO VII LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.
Trinitas CLO VII Ltd. is a CLO originally issued in December 2017
that S&P Global did not previously rate.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Trinitas CLO VII Ltd./Trinitas CLO VII LLC

  Class X, $6.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1R, $363.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2R, $15.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1R, $63.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2R, $15.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $33.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-1R (deferrable), $6.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-2R (deferrable), $20.00 million: BBB+ (sf)
  Class D-3R (deferrable), $10.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $21.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Class F-R (deferrable), $9.00 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $73.30 million: Not rated



VELOCITY COMMERCIAL 2021-3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on 3 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. (finalized its provisional ratings on the
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2021-3 issued by Velocity
Commercial Capital Loan Trust 2021-3 (VCC 2021-3) as follows:

-- $139.7 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $139.7 million Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- $139.7 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $17.9 million Class M-1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $17.9 million Class M1-A at AA (low) (sf)
-- $17.9 million Class M1-IO at AA (low) (sf)
-- $11.3 million Class M-2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $11.3 million Class M2-A at A (low) (sf)
-- $11.3 million Class M2-IO at A (low) (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class M-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class M3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class M3-IO at BBB (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class M-4 at BB (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class M4-A at BB (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class M4-IO at BB (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class M-5 at B (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class M5-A at B (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class M5-IO at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, M1-IO, M2-IO, M3-IO, M4-IO, and M5-IO are
interest-only certificates. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A, M-1, M-2, M-3, M-4, and M-5 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
initial exchangeable certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 31.60% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (low)
(sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect
22.85%, 17.30%, 12.60, 9.85%, and 6.35% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

VCC 2021-3 is a securitization of a portfolio of newly originated
fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien residential mortgages
collateralized by investor properties with one to four units
(residential investor loans) and small-balance commercial mortgages
(SBC) collateralized by various types of commercial, multifamily
rental, and mixed-use properties The Certificates are backed by 455
mortgage loans with a total principal balance of $204,205,367 as of
the Cut-Off Date (October 1, 2021).

Approximately 52.3% of the pool is comprised of residential
investor loans and about 47.7% of SBC loans. All of the loans in
this securitization (100.0% of the pool) were originated by
Velocity Commercial Capital, LLC (Velocity or VCC). The loans were
underwritten to program guidelines for business-purpose loans where
the lender generally expects the property (or its value) to be the
primary source of repayment (No Ratio). The lender reviews
mortgagor's credit profile, though it does not rely on the
borrower's income to make its credit decision. However, the lender
considers the property-level cash flows or minimum debt-service
coverage (DSCR) ratio in underwriting SBC loans with balances over
$750,000 for purchase transactions and over $500,000 for refinance
transactions. Since the loans were made to investors for business
purposes, they are exempt from the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau's (CFPB's) Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules and TILA-RESPA
Integrated Disclosure rule.

The pool is about one-month seasoned on a weighted average (WA)
basis, although seasoning may span from zero up to 12 months.
Except for nine loans (1.7% of the pool) that have missed one or
more payments, the loans have been performing since origination. Of
the eight loans that were delinquent, none have cured the
delinquency as of the Cut-Off Date and become current.

PHH Mortgage Corporation (PMC) will service all loans within the
pool for a servicing fee of 0.30% per annum. In addition, Velocity
will act as a Special Servicer servicing the loans that defaulted
or became 60 or more days delinquent under Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) method and other loans, as defined in the
transaction documents (Specially Serviced Loans). The Special
Servicer will be entitled to receive compensation based on an
annual fee of 0.75% and the balance of Specially Serviced Loans.
Also, the Special Servicer is entitled to a liquidation fee equal
to 2.00% of the net proceeds from the liquidation of a Specially
Serviced Loan, as described in the transaction documents.

The Servicer will fund advances of delinquent principal and
interest (P&I) until the advances deemed unrecoverable. Also, the
Servicer is obligated to make advances with respect to taxes,
insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing properties.

U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank; rated AA (high) by DBRS
Morningstar; Trend: Stable) will act as the Trustee, Paying Agent,
and Custodian.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, is expected to retain an eligible horizontal residual
interest consisting of the Class P and Class XS Certificates,
collectively representing at least 5% of the fair value of all
Certificates, to satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements
under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the later of (1) the three year anniversary of the
Closing Date or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Closing Date
balance, the Depositor may purchase all outstanding Certificates
(Optional Purchase) at a price equal to the sum of the remaining
aggregate balance of the Certificates plus accrued and unpaid
interest, and any fees, expenses, and indemnity payments due and
unpaid to the transaction parties, including any unreimbursed P&I
and servicing advances, and other amounts due as applicable. The
Optional Purchase will be conducted concurrently with a qualified
liquidation of the Issuer.

Additionally, if on any date on which the unpaid mortgage loan
balance and the value of REO properties has declined to less than
10% of the initial mortgage loan balance as of the Cut-off Date,
the Directing Holder, the Special Servicer, or the Servicer, in
that order of priority, may purchase all of the mortgages, REO
properties, and any other properties from the Issuer (Optional
Termination) at a price specified in the transaction documents. The
Optional Termination will be conducted as a qualified liquidation
of the Issuer. The Directing Holder (initially, the Seller) is the
representative selected by the holders of more than 50% of the
outstanding subordinate certificates with the lowest priority of
principal distributions (the Controlling Class).

The transaction uses a structure sometimes referred to as a
modified pro rata structure. Prior to the Class A credit
enhancement (CE) falling below 10.0% of the loan balance as of the
Cut-off Date (Class A Minimum CE Event), the principal
distributions allow for amortization of all senior and subordinate
bonds based on CE targets set at different levels for performing
(same CE as at issuance) and nonperforming (higher CE than at
issuance) loans. Each Class' target principal balance is determined
based on the CE targets and the performing and nonperforming (those
that are 90 or more days MBA delinquent, in foreclosure and REO,
and subject to a servicing modification within the prior 12 months)
loan amounts. As such, the principal payments are paid on a pro
rata basis, up to each Class' target principal balance, so long as
no loans in the pool are nonperforming. If the share of
nonperforming loans grows the corresponding CE target increases.
Thus, the principal payment amount increases for the senior and
senior subordinate classes and falls for the more subordinate
bonds. The goal is to distribute the appropriate amount of
principal to the senior and subordinate bonds each month, to always
maintain the desired level of CE, based on the performing and
non-performing pool percentages. After the Class A Minimum CE
Event, the principal distributions are made sequentially.

Relative to the sequential pay structure, the modified pro rata
structure is more sensitive to the timing of the projected defaults
and losses as the losses may be applied at a time when the amount
of credit support is reduced as the bonds' principal balances
amortize over a life of the transaction. That said, the excess
spread can be used to cover realized losses after being allocated
to the unpaid net weighted average coupon shortfalls (Net WAC Rate
Carryover Amounts). Please see the Cash Flow Structure and Features
section of the report for more details.

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (CMBS) METHODOLOGY

Of the 153 loans, 151 loans, representing 99.7% of the small
balance commercial (SBC) portion of the pool, have a fixed interest
rate with a straight average of 7.88%. The two floating-rate loans
have interest rate floors (excluding rate margins) ranging from
4.49% to 4.99% with a straight average of 4.74% and interest rate
margins of 5.00%. To determine the probability of default (POD) and
loss given default (LGD) inputs in the CMBS Insight Model, DBRS
Morningstar applied a stress to the various indexes that
corresponded with the remaining fully extended term of the loans an
added the respective contractual loan spread to determine a
stressed interest rate over the loan term. DBRS Morningstar looked
to the greater of the interest rate floor or the DBRS Morningstar
stressed index rate when calculating stressed debt service. The
weighted-average (WA) modeled coupon rate was 7.58%. Most of the
loans have original loan term lengths of 30 years and fully
amortize over 30-year schedules. However, six loans that comprise
8.2% of the SBC pool have an initial IO period ranging from 60
months to 120 months and then fully amortize over shortened 20- to
25-year schedules.

All SBC loans were originated between June and August 2021,
resulting in minimal seasoning of 1.5 months on average. The SBC
pool has a WA original term length of 358.5 months, or 29.9 years.
Based on the current loan amount, which reflects approximately 11
basis points (bps) of amortization, and the current appraised
values, the SBC pool has a WA LTV ratio of 63.0%. However, DBRS
Morningstar made LTV adjustments to 28 loans that had an implied
capitalization rate more than 200 bps lower than a set of minimal
capitalization rates established by the DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank. The DBRS Morningstar minimum capitalization rates range from
5.0% for properties in Market Rank 8 to 8.0% for properties located
in Market Rank 1. This resulted in a higher DBRS Morningstar LTV of
74.0%. Lastly, all loans fully amortize over their respective
remaining terms, resulting in 100% expected amortization; this
amount of amortization is greater than what is typical for CMBS
conduit pools. DBRS Morningstar's research indicates that for CMBS
conduit transactions securitized between 2000 and 2019, average
amortization by year has ranged between 7.5% and 21.1%, with an
overall median rate of 18.8%.

As contemplated and explained in DBRS Morningstar's Rating North
American CMBS Interest-Only Certificates methodology, the most
significant risk to an IO cash flow stream is term default risk. As
noted in that methodology, for a pool of approximately 63,000 CMBS
loans that fully cycled through to their maturity defaults, DBRS
Morningstar noted that the average total default rate across all
property types was approximately 17%, the refinance default rate
was 6% (approximately one-third of the total rate), and the term
default rate was approximately 11%. DBRS Morningstar recognizes the
muted impact of refinance risk on IO certificates by notching the
IO rating up by one notch from the Reference Obligation rating.
When using the 10-year Idealized Default Table default probability
to derive a POD for a CMBS bond from its rating, DBRS Morningstar
estimates that, in general, a one-third reduction in the CMBS
Reference Obligation POD maps to a tranche rating that is
approximately one notch higher than the reference Obligation or the
Applicable Reference Obligation, whichever is appropriate.
Therefore, similar logic regarding term default risk supported the
rationale for DBRS Morningstar to reduce the POD in the CMBS
Insight Model by one notch because refinance risk is largely absent
for this SBC pool of loans.

The DBRS Morningstar CMBS Insight Model does not contemplate the
ability to prepay loans, which is generally seen as credit positive
because a prepaid loan cannot default. The CMBS predictive model
was calibrated using loans that have prepayment lockout features.
Those loans' historical prepayment performance is close to 0
conditional prepayment rate (CPR). If the CMBS predictive model had
an expectation of prepayments, DBRS Morningstar would expect the
default levels to be reduced. Any loan that prepays is removed from
the pool and can no longer default. This collateral pool does not
have any prepayment lockout features, and DBRS Morningstar expects
that this pool will have prepayments over the remainder of the
transaction. DBRS Morningstar applied the following to calculate a
default rate prepayment haircut: using Intex Dealmaker, a lifetime
constant default rate (CDR) was calculated that approximated the
default rate for each rating category. While applying the same
lifetime CDR, DBRS Morningstar applied a 2.0% CPR prepayment rate.
When holding the CDR constant and applying 2.0% CPR, the cumulative
default amount declined. The percentage change in the cumulative
default prior to and after applying the prepayments, subject to a
10.0% maximum reduction, was then applied to the cumulative default
assumption to calculate a fully adjusted cumulative default
assumption.

The SBC pool has a WA expected loss of 4.68%, which is lower than
recently analyzed comparable small-balance transactions.
Contributing factors to the low expected loss include pool
diversity, moderate leverage, and fully amortizing loans.

The SBC pool is quite diverse based on loan size, with an average
cut-off date loan balance of $636,327, a concentration profile
equivalent to that of a transaction with 70 equal-size loans, and a
top-10 loan concentration of 26.8%. Increased pool diversity helps
to insulate the higher-rated classes from event risk.

The loans are mostly secured by traditional property types (i.e.,
multifamily, retail, office, and industrial), with no exposure to
higher-volatility property types, such as hotels or other lodging
facilities.

All loans in the SBC pool fully amortize over their respective
remaining loan terms between 357 and 360 months, reducing refinance
risk.

As classified by DBRS Morningstar for modeling purposes, the SBC
pool contains a significant exposure to retail (20.4% of the SBC
pool) and a smaller exposure to office (15.7% of the SBC pool),
which are two of the higher-volatility asset types. Loans counted
as retail include those identified as automotive and potentially
commercial condominium. Combined, they represent more than
one-third of the SBC pool balance. Retail, which has struggled
because of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, comprises
the third-largest asset type in the transaction.

DBRS Morningstar applied a 20.0% reduction to the NCF for retail
properties and a 30.0% reduction for office assets in the SBC pool,
which is above the average NCF reduction applied for comparable
property types in CMBS analyzed deals.

Multifamily comprises the second-largest property type
concentration in the SBC pool (22.4%); based on DBRS Morningstar's
research, multifamily properties securitized in conduit
transactions have had lower default rates than most other property
types.

DBRS Morningstar did not perform site inspections on loans within
its sample for this transaction. Instead, DBRS Morningstar relied
upon analysis of third-party reports and online searches to
determine property quality assessments. Of the 50 loans DBRS
Morningstar sampled, 11 were Average quality (17.9%), 25 were
Average - (72.2%), 12 were Below Average (8.9%), and two were Poor
(1.0%).

DBRS Morningstar assumed unsampled loans were Average - quality,
which has a slightly increased POD level. This is more conservative
than the assessments from sampled loans and is consistent with
other small balance commercial transactions.

Limited property-level information was available for DBRS
Morningstar to review. Asset summary reports, property condition
reports (PCRs), Phase I/II environmental site assessment (ESA)
reports, and historical cash flows were generally not available for
review in conjunction with this securitization.

DBRS Morningstar received and reviewed appraisals for the top 30
loans, which represent 50.2% of the SBC pool balance. These
appraisals were issued between January 2021 and August 2021 when
the respective loans were originated. DBRS Morningstar was able to
perform loan-level cash flow analysis on 29 of the top 30 loans.
The haircuts ranged from -3.8% to -81.1%, with an average of
-24.4%; however, DBRS Morningstar generally applied more
conservative haircuts on the unsampled loans.

No ESA reports were provided and are not required by the Issuer;
however, all of the loans are placed onto an environmental
insurance policy that provides coverage to the Issuer and the
securitization trust in the event of a claim.

DBRS Morningstar received limited borrower information, net worth
or liquidity information, and credit history.
DBRS Morningstar generally initially assumed loans had Weak
sponsorship scores, which increases the stress on the default rate.
The initial assumption of Weak reflects the generally less
sophisticated nature of small balance borrowers and assessments
from past small balance transactions.

Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar received a 12-month pay history on
each loan as of October 1, 2021. If any loan had more than two late
pays within this period or was currently 30 days past due, DBRS
Morningstar applied an additional stress to the default rate. This
occurred for only three loans, representing 3.5% of the SBC pool
balance.

Finally, DBRS Morningstar received a borrower FICO score as of
October 1, 2021, for all loans, with an average FICO score of 723.
While the CMBS Methodology does not contemplate FICO scores, the
RMBS Methodology does and would characterize a FICO score of 723 as
near-prime, whereas prime is considered greater than 750. Borrowers
with a FICO score of 723 could generally be described as
potentially having had previous credit events (foreclosure,
bankruptcy, etc.) but, if they did, it is likely that these credit
events were cleared about two to five years ago.

RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (RMBS) METHODOLOGY

The collateral pool consists of 302 mortgage loans with a total
balance of approximately $106.8 million collateralized by one- to
four-unit investment properties. The mortgage loans were
underwritten by Velocity to No Ratio program guidelines for
business-purpose loans.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
pandemic, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies for
many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term periods of payment
relief that may perform very differently from traditional
delinquencies. At the onset of the pandemic, the option to forbear
mortgage payments was widely available, driving forbearances to an
elevated level. When the dust settled, loans with
coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020 performed better than
expected, thanks to government aid, low loan-to-value ratios
(LTVs), and acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in
general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months
delinquencies have been gradually trending downward, as forbearance
periods come to an end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



VERUS SECURITIZATION 2021-6: DBRS Gives (P) B Rating on B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgaged-Backed Notes, Series 2021-6 issued by Verus
Securitization Trust 2021-6 (Verus 2021-6):

-- $345.1 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.8 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $45.6 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $22.2 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $15.0 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $12.6 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 27.07% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinate notes. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 21.25%, 11.70%,
7.05%, 3.90%, and 1.25% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Verus 2021-6 is a securitization of a portfolio of primarily fixed-
and adjustable-rate, expanded prime and nonprime, first-lien
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Notes. The
Notes are backed by 841 mortgage loans with a total principal
balance of $477,345,716 as of the Cut-Off Date (October 1, 2021).

The top originator for the mortgage pool is Greenbox Loan Inc
(17.9%). The remaining originators each comprise less than 10.0% of
the mortgage loans. The Servicer of all loans within the pool is
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they
were made to borrowers who generally do not qualify for agency,
government, or private-label nonagency prime jumbo products for
various reasons. In accordance with the Qualified Mortgage (QM)/ATR
rules, 61.4% of the loans are designated as non-QM, 0.1% are
designated as QM Safe Harbor, and 0.6% are designated as QM
Rebuttable Presumption. Approximately 38.0% of the loans are made
to investors for business purposes and, hence, are not subject to
the QM/ATR rules.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible vertical interest, representing
at least 5% of the Notes to satisfy the credit risk-retention
requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the Payment Date occurring in
October 2024 or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Administrator, at the Issuer's option, may redeem all
of the outstanding Notes at a price equal to the greater of (A) the
class balances of the related Notes plus accrued and unpaid
interest, including any cap carryover amounts and (B) the class
balances of the related Notes less than 90 days delinquent with
accrued unpaid interest plus fair market value of the loans 90 days
or more delinquent and real estate-owned properties. After such
purchase, the Depositor must complete a qualified liquidation,
which requires (1) a complete liquidation of assets within the
Trust and (2) proceeds to be distributed to the appropriate holders
of regular or residual interests.

The Principal and Interest (P&I) Advancing Party will fund advances
of delinquent P&I on any mortgage until such loan becomes 90 days
delinquent. The P&I Advancing Party or Servicer has no obligation
to advance P&I on a mortgage approved for a forbearance plan during
its related forbearance period. The Servicers, however, are
obligated to make advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums,
and reasonable costs incurred in the course of servicing and
disposing properties.

This transaction incorporates a sequential-pay cash flow structure
with a pro rata feature among the senior tranches. Principal
proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the Class A-1
and A-2 certificates sequentially (IIPP) after a Trigger Event. For
more subordinated Notes, principal proceeds can be used to cover
interest shortfalls as the more senior Notes are paid in full.
Furthermore, excess spread can be used to cover realized losses and
prior period bond writedown amounts first before being allocated to
unpaid cap carryover amounts to Class A-1 down to Class B-2.

Approximately 26.2% of the loans were originated under a Property
Focused Investor Loan Debt Service Coverage Ratio program and 2.2%
were originated under a Property Focused Investor Loan program.
Both programs allow for property cash flow/rental income to qualify
borrowers for income.

Coronavirus Impact

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies
for many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset
classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term periods of payment
relief that may perform very differently from traditional
delinquencies. At the onset of coronavirus, the option to forebear
mortgage payments was widely available, driving forbearances to an
elevated level. When the dust settled, loans with
coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020 performed better than
expected, thanks to government aid, low loan-to-value ratios, and
acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in general. Across
nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months delinquencies have
been gradually trending downward, as forbearance periods come to an
end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



WELLS FARGO 2016-C36: DBRS Cuts Rating on 3 Tranches to B
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the following ratings of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C36 issued by Wells
Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C36:

-- Class E-2 to BB (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E to BB (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F-1 to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class F-2 to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class EF to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-1 to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class G-2 to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)
-- Class EFG to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)
-- Class G to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BBB (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes D, X-D, E-1, E-2,
and E to Negative from Stable. Classes F-1, F-2, EF, F, and G-1
continue to carry Negative trends. Following the downgrades to CCC
(sf), Classes G-2, EFG, and G no longer carry any trends. Classes
G-1, G-2, G, and EFG no longer carry an Interest in Arrears
designation.

The Negative trends and downgrades reflect the continued
performance challenges for the underlying collateral, much of which
has been driven by the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
global pandemic. As of the October 2021 remittance, there are eight
loans, representing 15.1% of the pool, in special servicing; DBRS
Morningstar assumed liquidation scenarios on two of the loans, with
loss severities exceeding 30.0%. In addition to the loans in
special servicing, there are 14 loans, representing 21.2% of the
pool, on the servicer's watchlist. These loans are generally being
monitored for coronavirus relief requests, low occupancy, and
declining debt service coverage ratios (DSCR). DBRS Morningstar
notes that the pool has a high concentration of retail properties,
representing 32.1% of the pool, and lodging properties,
representing 15.4% of the pool, as of the October 2021 remittance,
which have been disproportionately negatively affected by the
coronavirus pandemic.

The largest loan in the pool, Gurnee Mills (Prospectus ID#1, 9.5%
of the pool), is secured by a single-level enclosed regional mall
totaling 1.9 million square feet (sf), of which 1.7 million sf is
part of the collateral. Simon Property Group (Simon) owns and
operates the collateral portion of the property. At issuance, the
largest tenants were Sears, Bass Pro Shops, and Macy's. The Sears
closed in 2018 and the sponsor has yet to backfill the space. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in June 2020 as a result
of monetary default related to the effects of the coronavirus
pandemic. A forbearance was agreed upon, allowing the borrower to
defer debt service payments from May 2020 through February 2021,
with the loan converting to interest only (IO) during this period.
Beginning in March 2021, principal payments resumed and the
deferred payments are to be repaid in 24 equal monthly
installments. The loan was returned to the master servicer in May
2021 after the borrower made three consecutive payments. Occupancy
fell to 80.3% at Q1 2021 with the annualized Q1 2021 DSCR reported
at 1.09x.

Performance for the subject property was declining prior to the
coronavirus pandemic, with cash flow trending downward for the past
three consecutive years. The 2020 year-end net cash flow (NCF)
decreased 14.4% compared with year-end 2019 and declined 29.4%
compared with the Issuer's NCF. DBRS Morningstar notes the
increased risks for the loan from issuance given the difficulty in
backfilling the former Sears space and the property's exposure to
struggling retailers, including Macy's. Given these factors, as
well as the decline in performance prior to the pandemic, DBRS
Morningstar applied a stressed probability of default for this loan
in the analysis for this review, increasing the expected loss.

The Mall at Turtle Creek (Prospectus ID#7, 3.5% of the pool) is
secured by a portion of a single-storey regional mall in Jonesboro,
Arkansas, and is operated by an affiliate of Brookfield Properties.
The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2020 for
monetary default and has remained delinquent ever since. In
addition to business interruptions from the pandemic, the mall
sustained significant damage from a tornado in March 2020 and the
majority of the mall has been demolished. Non-collateral anchors
Dillard's, JCPenney, and Target received less damage than the
in-line space and have since reopened. A settlement is currently
under discussion that would have the lender take title of the
property. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with a liquidation
scenario with an implied loss severity in excess of 30.0%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



[*] DBRS Reviews 228 Classes From 30 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 228 classes from 30 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 228 classes
reviewed, DBRS Morningstar upgraded 40 ratings, confirmed 132
ratings, discontinued 51 ratings, and maintained Under Review with
Negative Implications statuses for five ratings.

The Affected Ratings are available at https://bit.ly/3CSZMSC

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating confirmations reflect asset
performance and credit-support levels that are consistent with the
current ratings. The discontinued ratings reflect the transactions
exercising their cleanup call option or the full repayment of
principal to bondholders. The Under Review with Negative
Implications statuses reflect the potential negative impact of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic on the bonds.

The pools backing the reviewed RMBS transactions consist of
mortgage insurance-linked notes, prime jumbo, alt-A, reperforming,
and ReRemic collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities listed below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS Morningstar
considers this difference to be a material deviation; however, in
this case, the ratings on the subject securities may either reflect
additional seasoning being warranted to substantiate a further
upgrade or actual deal/tranche performance that is not fully
reflected in the projected cash flows/model output.

-- Eagle Re 2020-2 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-2, Class M-2C

-- Eagle Re 2019-1 Ltd., Series 2019-1 Mortgage Insurance-Linked
Notes, Class M-1B

-- Eagle Re 2019-1 Ltd., Series 2019-1 Mortgage Insurance-Linked
Notes, Class M-2

-- Eagle Re 2019-1 Ltd., Series 2019-1 Mortgage Insurance-Linked
Notes, Class B-1

-- Eagle Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-1A

-- Eagle Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-1B

-- Eagle Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-2C

-- Eagle Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-2

-- Eagle Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class B-1

-- Radnor Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-1A

-- Radnor Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-1B

-- Radnor Re 2020-1 Ltd., Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series
2020-1, Class M-2B

CORONAVIRUS IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures
caused an immediate economic contraction, leading to sharp
increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for many
consumers. Shortly after the onset of the pandemic, DBRS
Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies for many RMBS
asset classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term periods of payment
relief that may perform very differently from traditional
delinquencies. At the onset of the pandemic, the option to forebear
mortgage payments was widely available, driving forbearances to an
elevated level. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent
months delinquencies have been gradually trending downward as
forbearance periods come to an end for many borrowers.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 22 Classes from 15 U.S. Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 22 ratings from 15 U.S.
manufactured housing ABS transactions issued between 1997 and 2002.
The review yielded one downgrade, 19 affirmations, and two
withdrawals.

The collateral pools backing the transactions that we reviewed
consist of manufactured housing loans that were originated by
Oakwood Acceptance Corp. LLC. The transactions are serviced by
Vanderbilt ABS Corp., which began servicing these transactions in
April 2004.

S&P said, "The affirmed 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect
our view that credit support will remain insufficient to cover our
expected losses for these classes. As defined in our criteria, the
'CCC (sf)' level ratings reflect our view that the related classes
are vulnerable to nonpayment and are dependent upon favorable
business, financial, and economic conditions in order to be paid
interest and/or principal according to the terms of each
transaction. The 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect our view that the
related classes remain virtually certain to default."

For the 1998-D transaction, while hard credit enhancement (HCE) in
the form of subordination provided by the M-1 class has remained
stable as a percentage of the current pool balance, the class M-1
notes are receiving principal payments in addition to being written
down. As the M-1 notes continue to be written down, the A-1 ARM's
HCE level as a percent of the current pool balance may decline in
the future. To account for this possibility, S&P has lowered the
rating on this class.

S&P said, "We withdrew our 'D (sf)' rating on OMI Trust 2001-C's
class A-3 notes because the notes were not paid in full by the
legal final maturity date. We also withdrew our 'D (sf)' rating on
OMI Trust 2001-C's class A-4 notes that continue to experience an
interest default in the form of a continually growing cumulative
interest shortfall, which in our view, will not be reimbursed.
Additionally, we do not expect full repayment of principal by the
legal final maturity date.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of the transactions
relative to their cumulative net loss expectations and the
available credit enhancement. We will take rating actions as we
consider appropriate."

  Ratings Affirmed

  Oakwood Mortgage Investors Inc.

  Series1997-A, class B-1: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 1998-B, class M-1: 'CCC- (sf)'

  OMI Trust

  Series 1999-C, class A-2: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 1999-D, class A-1: 'CCC- (sf)'
  Series 1999-E, class A-1: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2000-A, class A-3: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2000-A, class A-4: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2000-A, class A-5: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2000-C, class A-1: 'CCC- (sf)'
  Series 2000-D, class A-4: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2001-D, class A-3: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2001-D, class A-4: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2001-E, class A-3: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2001-E, class A-4: 'CC (sf)'
  Series 2002-A, class A-3: 'CCC+ (sf)'
  Series 2002-A, class A-4: 'CCC+ (sf)'
  Series 2002-B, class A-3: 'CCC (sf)'
  Series 2002-B, class A-4: 'CCC (sf)'
  Series 2002-C, class A-1: 'CCC+ (sf)'

  Ratings Lowered

  Oakwood Mortgage Investors Inc.

  Series 1998-D, class A1-ARM: to 'A (sf)' from 'AA (sf)'

  Ratings Withdrawn

  OMI Trust

  Series 2001-C, class A-3: to NR from 'D (sf)'
  Series 2001-C, class A-4: to NR from 'D (sf)'

  ARM--Adjustable rate mortgage.

  NR--Not rated.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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