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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, August 29, 2021, Vol. 25, No. 240

                            Headlines

A10 BRIDGE 2020-C: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Notes
ACCESS GROUP 2004-2: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
AIMCO CLO 15: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 9: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
ANGEL OAK 2021-4: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-2 Debt

APIDOS CLO XXXVI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
AREIT 2019-CRE3: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2021-JACX: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to F Certs
BANK 2021-BNK35: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class J Certs
BENEFIT STREET XX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes

BOMBARDIER CAPITAL 1999-A: S&P Affirms B- (sf) Rating on A-5 Notes
BRAVO RESIDENTIAL 2021-NQM2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on B2 Notes
BX TRUST 2019-IMC: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class HRR Certs
BXHPP TRUST 2021-FILM: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class E Certs
CFCRE 2018-TAN: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class HRR Certs

CIM RETAIL 2021-RETL: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class F Certs
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2021-INV2: DBRS Gives B(high) Rating on B5 Certs
COMM 2014-CCRE21: DBRS Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to C
COMM 2015-CCRE27: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. F Debt
CSMC 2021-INV1: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on Class B-5 Notes

DT AUTO 2021-3: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2021-3: S&P Assigns BB (sf) Rating on E Notes
FIRST INVESTORS 2021-2: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-7: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on B-5 Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-7: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-5 Debt

FRTKL 2021-SFR1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class F Certs
GCAT 2021-NQM4: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
GOLDENTREE LOAN 8: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating on F-R Notes
GOLDMAN SACHS 2019-GC42: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on G-RR Certs
HAYFIN US XIV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes

HMH TRUST 2017-NSS: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Certs
ICON BRAND 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'B- (sf)' Rating on Class A-2 Notes
IMPERIAL FUND 2021-NQM2: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on B-2 Certs
JAMESTOWN CLO IX: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating D-RR Notes
MAN GLG 2021-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to $18.375MM D Notes

MANHATTAN WEST 2020-1MW: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on HRR Certs
MELLO MORTGAGE 2021-INV2: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to B-5 Certs
MFA 2021-NQM2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
MOFT 2020-B6: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class C Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C8: Fitch Corrects August 23 Ratings Release

MORGAN STANLEY 2018-MP: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
NASSAU 2021-I: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $14MM Class E Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2021-INV1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to B5 Certs
OBX 2021-NQM3: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
POST CLO 2021-1: S&P Assigned Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes

REALT 2017: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class G Certs
SCF PREFERRED: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Preferred Shares
SLM STUDENT 2008-4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-4 Notes to B1
TRIANGLE RE 2021-3: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Cl. M-2 Notes
VELOCITY COMMERCIAL 2021-2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on 3 Classes

VOYA CLO 2014-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on $23MM Cl. D Notes to Ba3
VOYA CLO 2020-2: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E-R Notes
WELLFLEET CLO 2020-2: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB-' Rating on E-R Notes
WHITEHORSE VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $26.25MM E Notes to Caa1
[*] S&P Places 252 Ratings from 114 US CLO Deals on Watch Positive

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 114 Classes from 20 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

A10 BRIDGE 2020-C: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
notes issued by A10 Bridge Asset Financing 2020-C, LLC:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations. In conjunction with this press release, DBRS
Morningstar has published a rating action report with in-depth
analysis and credit metrics for the transaction with business plan
updates on the select loans.

The initial collateral consisted of 58 loans secured by cash
flowing assets, many of which are in a period of transition with
plans to stabilize and improve the asset value. Of those 58 loans,
32 were cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into separate
portfolios. At issuance, the pool had an initial trust balance of
$398.2 million comprising loan assets and $10.8 million held in a
reserve account to fund future funding participations.

As of the July 2021 remittance report, 46 of the original 58 loans
remain in the pool and 27 of the remaining loans are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into its respective
portfolios. The current trust balance of $329.7 million consists of
an outstanding aggregate loan balance of $323.2 million with $6.6
million held in reserve, representing a collateral reduction of
17.6% since issuance. According to the collateral manager,
cumulative future funding of $22.3 million has been released to
individual borrowers to date to aid in business plan completion and
$24.2 million of future funding remains outstanding. No loans are
in special servicing but seven loans, representing 20.8% of the
maximum trust balance, are on the servicer's watchlist.

The transaction consists of both recently originated loans and
loans that were originated in 2017 or earlier. Currently, 19 loans,
representing 59.7% of the pool balance, were originated in 2019 or
2020 with the remaining loans, representing 40.3% of the pool,
originated prior to 2018. There is the potential for adverse
selection in the transaction as properties secured by the seasoned
loans have generally needed more time than originally projected to
stabilize; however, these loans also generally have moderate
leverage based on updated appraised values ordered prior to the
subject transaction, which was securitized in September 2020. As of
the July 2021 reporting, the transaction had a weighted-average
as-is loan-to-value ratio of 52.4%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



ACCESS GROUP 2004-2: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on two Access Group
Trusts. Fitch affirmed the ratings for both classes of Access
Funding LLC 2015-1. The Rating Outlook for class A remains Negative
due to the Negative Outlook on the U.S. Sovereign Fitch revised the
Outlook to Stable from Negative for class B. Fitch upgraded class
A-3 from Access Group 2004-2 to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf' and assigned it
a Positive Outlook. Fitch also affirmed the ratings for the
remaining classes.

   DEBT                RATING           PRIOR
   ----                ------           -----
Access Group, Inc. - Federal Student Loan Notes, Series 2004-2

A-3 00432CBW0    LT  Bsf    Upgrade     CCCsf
A-4 00432CBX8    LT  CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf
A-5 00432CBY6    LT  CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf
B 00432CBZ3      LT  CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf

Access Funding 2015-1 LLC

A 00435TAA9      LT  AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
B 00435TAB7      LT  AAsf   Affirmed    AAsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transactions passed Fitch's cash flow model stresses for the
respective ratings.

Class A-3 for Access Group 2004-2 is the only senior note receiving
principal because of the sequential pay structure. Should the
transaction continue on its current pay-down speed, positive rating
action could be taken again in the next one to two years.

In Fitch's modeling of the 2015-1 transaction, the class B note
passed all 'AAAsf' credit and maturity stresses; however,
Fitch-calculated parity is below the level required for 'AAAsf' per
Fitch's FFELP criteria. Fitch revised the Outlook to Stable due to
improved performance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trusts' collateral comprises Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Negative.

Collateral Performance: Based on transaction-specific performance
to date, Fitch assumed a sustainable constant default rate
assumption (sCDR) of 2.0% for 2004-2 and 2.5% for 2015-1. The
sustainable constant prepayment rate (sCPR) for 2004-2 is increased
to 6.25% from 5.5% and maintained at 16% for 2015-1. The TTM levels
of deferment and forbearance are 1.5% and 3.8%, respectively, for
2004-2 and 2.8%, and 7.1%, respectively, for 2015-1. These levels
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines and increases in the above assumptions are modeled per
Fitch's criteria.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for this transaction
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for SAP and the securities. As of the end of the most
recent collection period, all trust student loans are indexed to
either 91-day T-bill or one-month LIBOR, and all notes are indexed
to either three-month or one-month LIBOR.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread and the class A notes benefit from subordination provided by
the class B notes. Reported senior and total parity is 110.8% and
101% respectively for 2004-2 C. All transactions are releasing
excess cash as the parity of 101% is maintained for 2004-2 and the
specified overcollateralization amount of the greater of 2.25% of
the pool balance and $1,070,000 is maintained for 2015-1. Liquidity
support is provided by a reserve accounts sized at $1.1 million,
and $303,814 for 2004-2 and 2015-1, respectively.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Nelnet, Inc., which Fitch believes to be an acceptable servicer of
student loans due to its long servicing history.

Coronavirus Impact: Fitch has revised the U.S. GDP growth forecast
for 2021 up to 6.8%. GDP growth will improve unemployment, but this
will be tempered by a recovery in labor force participation as
restrictions are eased. Fitch expects unemployment to remain above
4.0% through YE 2022. Payment rates and IBR utilization are
susceptible to unemployment levels, so to account for current
pandemic economic conditions, Fitch performed maturity risk rating
sensitivities representing a 25% decrease in CPR, 25% increase in
IBR usage and 25% increase in remaining term. These stresses
indicate a one category change to the model implied ratings for
2004-2 and no changes for 2015-1.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign, by nature of the reinsurance
provided by the Department of Education. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults, basis risk and loan extension risk
account for the majority of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan
transactions.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transactions face when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. Fitch conducts credit and maturity stress
sensitivity analysis by increasing or decreasing key assumptions by
25% and 50% over the base case. The credit stress sensitivity is
viewed by stressing both the base case default rate and the basis
spread. The maturity stress sensitivity is viewed by stressing
remaining term, IBR usage and prepayments. The results below should
only be considered as one potential outcome, as the transaction is
exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors and should not be used as
an indicator of possible future performance.

Access Group, Inc. - Federal Student Loan Notes, Series 2004-2

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/downgrade:

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default decrease 25%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf', class A
    5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf',
    class A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR increase 25%: class A-3 'Asf', A-4 'BBBsf', class A-5
    'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- IBR Usage decrease 25%: class A-3 'Asf', A-4 'Bsf', class A-5
    'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf',
    class A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default increase 25%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf', class A-
    5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Default increase 50%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf', class A-
    5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf',
    class A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Basis Spread increase 0.5%: class A-3 'AAAsf', A-4 'AAAsf',
    class A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR decrease 25%: class A-3 'Bsf', A-4 'CCCsf', class A-5
    'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- CPR decrease 50%: class A-3 'CCCsf', A-4 'CCCsf', class A-5
    'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A-3 'BBBsf', A-4 'CCCsf', class
    A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A-3 'BBBsf', A-4 'CCCsf', class
    A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A-3 'Bsf', A-4 'CCCsf',
    class A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

-- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A-3 'CCCsf', A-4 'CCCsf',
    class A-5 'CCCsf''; class B 'CCCsf'

Access Funding 2015-1 LLC

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/downgrade:

Class A is rated 'AAAsf' and is at its highest attainable rating.
The results shown below are for class B.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf'

-- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class B 'AAAsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR increase 25%: class B 'AAAsf'

-- IBR Usage decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf'

-- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf'

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default increase 25%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'Asf'

-- Default increase 50%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'Asf'

-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAsf'

-- Basis Spread increase 0.5%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'AAsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'

-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'

-- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'

-- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'

-- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'

-- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'. class B 'AAAsf'

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

CRITERIA VARIATION

The rating of 'Bsf' for class A-3 is more than one category lower
than the lowest model implied rating of 'BBBsf'. Under Fitch's
FFELP criteria, if the final ratings are different from the model
results by more than one rating category it constitutes a criteria
variation. Today's upgrade of class A-3 was tempered by continued
uncertainty about how changing economic conditions stemming from
the pandemic will change trust performance. If Fitch had not
applied this variation, the notes could have been upgraded to
'BBBsf'.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


AIMCO CLO 15: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to AIMCO CLO 15
Ltd./AIMCO CLO 15 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Allstate Investment Management Co.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of August 23,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  AIMCO CLO 15 Ltd./AIMCO CLO 15 LLC

  Class A, $248.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $56.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $16.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $42.00 million: Not rated



ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 9: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class B-R2, C-R2,
D-R2, and E-R2 replacement notes from Anchorage Capital CLO 9
Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 9 LLC, a CLO transaction backed by
broadly syndicated loans that was reset in 2019 and is managed by
Anchorage Capital Group LLC. At the same time, S&P withdrew its
ratings on the class B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes following payment
in full on the August 24, 2021 refinancing date. S&P did not rate
the class A-R notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture,
which outlined the terms of the replacement notes. According to the
supplemental indenture

-- $1.5 million of new class X-R notes was issued.

-- The replacement class A-R2, C-R2, and D-R2 notes were issued
with higher subordination than the original notes.

-- The replacement class B-R2 notes were issued with lower
subordination than the original notes.

-- The required overcollateralization ratios for the replacement
class B-R2, D-R2, and E-R2 notes are lower than the original
notes.

-- The required overcollateralization ratio for the replacement
class C-R2 notes is higher than the original notes.

-- The end of the non-call period will be July 15, 2022.

  Replacement And Original Note Issuances

  Replacement notes

  Class A-R2, $337.000 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.14%
  Class B-R2, $71.500 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.75%
  Class C-R2, $31.800 million: Three-month LIBOR + 2.25%
  Class D-R2, $34.000 million: Three-month LIBOR + 3.60%
  Class E-R2, $24.900 million: Three-month LIBOR + 6.82%

  Refinanced notes

  Class A-R, $347.825 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.37%
  Class B-R, $58.650 million: Three-month LIBOR + 1.95%
  Class C-R, $39.050 million: Three-month LIBOR + 2.85%
  Class D-R, $33.000 million: Three-month LIBOR + 4.00%
  Class E-R, $20.680 million: Three-month LIBOR + 6.41%

New notes

-- Class X-R, $1.500 million: Three-month LIBOR + 0.95%

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Ratings Assigned

  Anchorage Capital CLO 9 Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 9 LLC

  Class B-R2, $71.500 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R2, $31.800 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R2, $34.000 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R2, $24.900 million: BB- (sf)

  Ratings Withdrawn

  Anchorage Capital CLO 9 Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 9 LLC

  Class B-R to not rated from 'AA (sf)'
  Class C-R to not rated from 'A (sf)'
  Class D-R to not rated from 'BBB- (sf)'
  Class E-R to not rated from 'BB- (sf)'

  Other Outstanding Notes

  Anchorage Capital CLO 9 Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 9 LLC

  Class X-R: Not rated
  Class A-R2: Not rated
  Subordinated notes: Not rated



ANGEL OAK 2021-4: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage
Trust 2021-4 (AOMT 2021-4).

DEBT             RATING               PRIOR
----             ------               -----
AOMT 2021-4

A-1       LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-2       LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
A-3       LT  Asf     New Rating    A(EXP)sf
M-1       LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
B-1       LT  BBsf    New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
B-2       LT  Bsf     New Rating    B(EXP)sf
B-3       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XS        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
A-IO-S    LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has assigned ratings for the residential mortgage-backed
certificates to be issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust 2021-4,
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2021-4 (AOMT 2021-4) as
indicated above. The certificates are supported by 632 loans with a
balance of $316.65 million as of the cut-off date. This will be the
16th Fitch-rated AOMT transaction.

The certificates are secure by mortgage loans that were originated
by Angel Oak Home Loans LLC and Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC
(referred to as Angel Oak originators) and two other originators
that originated less than 10% of the loans. Of the loans in the
pool, 79.9% are designated as non-qualified mortgage (Non-QM), and
20.1% are investment properties not subject to Ability to Repay
(ATR) Rule. No loans are designated as QM in the pool.

There is LIBOR exposure in this transaction. 0.20% of the pool
comprises adjustable-rate mortgage (ARMs) loans that reference
one-year Libor. The offered certificates are fixed rate and capped
at the net weighted average coupon (WAC).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Non-QM Credit Quality (Mixed): The collateral consists of 632
loans, totaling $317 million and seasoned approximately six months
in aggregate (eight months based on Fitch's analysis). The
borrowers have a strong credit profile (739 FICO and 37% DTI as
determined by Fitch), and relatively high leverage with an original
CLTV of 74% that translates to a Fitch calculated sLTV of 81.6%. Of
the pool, 75.5% consists of loans where the borrower maintains a
primary residence, while 24.6% comprises an investor property or
second home based on Fitch's analysis; 18.8% of the loans were
originated through a retail channel. Additionally, 79.9% are
designated as Non-QM, while the remaining 20.1% are exempt from QM
since they are investor loans.

The pool contains 55 loans over $1 million, with the largest $2.9
million. 20.1% comprises loans on investor properties (10.2%
underwritten to the borrowers' credit profile and 9.9% comprising
investor cash flow loans). Of the borrowers, 0.3% have subordinate
financing; there is one second lien loan, and Fitch views 4.1% of
borrowers as having a prior credit event in the past seven years.

None of the loans in the pool had a deferred balance.

There are two foreign nationals in the pool. Fitch treated these
borrowers as investor occupied, coded as ASF1 (no documentation)
for employment and income documentation, and removed the liquid
reserves.

The largest concentration of loans is in California (33.3%),
followed by Florida and Georgia. The largest MSA is Los Angeles MSA
(15.1%) followed by Miami MSA (12%) and Atlanta MSA (6.4%). The top
three MSAs account for 33.5% of the pool. As a result, there was no
adjustment for geographic concentration.

Although the credit quality of the borrowers is higher than prior
AOMT transactions, the pool characteristics resemble non-prime
collateral, and therefore, the pool was analyzed using Fitch's
non-prime model.

Loan Documentation (Negative): Approximately 80.4% of the pool was
underwritten to borrowers with less than full documentation. Of
this amount, 67.1% was underwritten to a 12-month or 24-month bank
statement program for verifying income, which is not consistent
with Appendix Q standards and Fitch's view of a full documentation
program. To reflect the additional risk, Fitch increases the PD by
1.5x on the bank statement loans. Besides loans underwritten to a
bank statement program, 2.7% is an asset depletion product, and
9.9% is a DSCR product. The pool does not have any loans
underwritten to a CPA or PnL product, which Fitch viewed as a
positive.

Limited Advancing (Mixed): The deal is structured to six months of
servicer advances for delinquent principal and interest. The
limited advancing reduces loss severities as there is a lower
amount repaid to the servicer when a loan liquidates and
liquidation proceeds are prioritized to cover principal repayment
over accrued but unpaid interest. The downside to this is the
additional stress on the structure side as there is limited
liquidity in the event of large and extended delinquencies

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Neutral): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while excluding the subordinate bonds from principal until all
three classes are reduced to zero. To the extent that either a
cumulative loss trigger event or delinquency trigger event occurs
in a given period, principal will be distributed sequentially to
the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds until they are reduced to zero.

Macro or Sector Risks (Positive): Consistent with the Additional
Scenario Analysis section of Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Coronavirus-Related
Analytical Assumptions" criteria, Fitch will consider applying
additional scenario analysis based on stressed assumptions as
described in the section to remain consistent with significant
revisions to Fitch's macroeconomic baseline scenario or if actual
performance data indicate the current assumptions require
reconsideration.

In response to revisions made to Fitch's macroeconomic baseline
scenario, observed actual performance data, and the unexpected
development in the health crisis arising from the advancement and
availability of coronavirus vaccines, Fitch reconsidered the
application of the coronavirus-related ERF floors of 2.0 and used
ERF floors of 1.5 and 1.0 for the 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' rating stresses,
respectively.

Fitch's "Global Economic Outlook - June 2021" and related base-line
economic scenario forecasts have been revised to 6.8% U.S. GDP
growth for 2021 and 3.9% for 2022 following a 3.5% GDP decline in
2020. Additionally, Fitch's U.S. unemployment forecasts for 2021
and 2022 are 5.6% and 4.5%, respectively, which is down from 8.1%
in 2020. These revised forecasts support Fitch reverting to the 1.5
and 1.0 ERF floors described in Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria."

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was conducted at the
state and national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for
the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in
home prices.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to a positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to positive home price growth of
    10% with no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class,
    which is already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there
    is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
    classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result
    in a full category upgrade for the rated class excluding those
    being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to a negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in
    addition to the model-projected 42.8% at 'AAA'. The analysis
    indicates that there is some potential rating migration with
    higher MVDs for all rated classes compared with the model
    projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
    prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC, Clayton, Infinity and Consolidated Analytics. The
third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on three
areas: compliance review, credit review, and valuation review.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result,
Fitch did not make any adjustment(s) to its analysis due to the due
diligence findings. Based on the results of the 100% due diligence
performed on the pool, the overall expected loss was reduced by
0.48%.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the loans. The third-party due diligence was
consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." The sponsor,
Angel Oak Mortgage Operating Partnership, LP engaged American
Mortgage Consultants, Inc., Clayton Services, Consolidated
Analytics, Inc. and Infinity IPS to perform the review. Loans
reviewed under these engagements were given compliance, credit and
valuation grades and assigned initial grades for each subcategory.

An exception and waiver report was provided to Fitch, indicating
the pool of reviewed loans has a number of exceptions and waivers.
Fitch determined that the exceptions and waivers do not materially
affect the overall credit risk of the loans due to the presence of
compensating factors such as having liquid reserves or FICO above
guideline requirements or LTV or DTI lower than guideline
requirement. Therefore, no adjustments were needed to compensate
for these occurrences.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. The loan-level
information Fitch received was provided in the American
Securitization Forum's (ASF) data layout format. The ASF data tape
layout was established with input from various industry
participants, including rating agencies, issuers, originators,
investors and others, to produce an industry standard for the
pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization market.
The data contained in the data tape layout were populated by the
due diligence company and no material discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

AOMT 2021-4 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4+' for Transaction
Parties & Operational Risk due to strong transaction due diligence
and a 'RPS1-' Fitch-rated servicer, which resulted in a reduction
in expected losses, and is relevant to the rating in conjunction
with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


APIDOS CLO XXXVI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Apidos CLO
XXXVI/Apidos CLO XXXVI LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by CVC Credit Partners U.S. CLO
Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Apidos CLO XXXVI/Apidos CLO XXXVI LLC

  Class A-1, $300.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $20.00 million: Not rated
  Class B, $60.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $30.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $30.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $18.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $49.68 million: Not rated



AREIT 2019-CRE3: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-CRE3
issued by AREIT 2019-CRE3 Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

Classes E and F have Negative trends. All other trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. The Negative trends on Classes E and F reflect
DBRS Morningstar's concerns with select loans experiencing
performance issues, specifically those secured by hotel properties.
Additionally, two loans, representing 3.3% of the pool, are in
special servicing. In conjunction with this press release, DBRS
Morningstar has published a rating action report with in-depth
analysis and credit metrics for the transaction with business plan
updates on the select loans.

At issuance, the collateral consisted of 30 floating-rate mortgage
loans secured by 31 mostly transitional real estate properties with
a cut-off balance totaling $717.9 million, excluding approximately
$93.9 million of future funding commitments. As of the July 2021
remittance report, 26 loans remain in the pool, with an aggregate
trust balance of $664.8 million as four loans have successfully
paid out of the transaction, resulting in collateral reduction of
6.1%. The Permitted Funded Companion Participation Acquisition
Account had a balance of $9.1 million, which the Issuer can use to
acquire funded loan participation interests during the Permitted
Funded Companion Participation Acquisition Period (expires with the
August 2022 Payment Date). According to an update from the
collateral manager, a cumulative amount of $48.8 million in future
funding commitments has been released to individual borrowers as of
August 2021 with unfunded commitments totaling $29.5 million. Of
the $48.8 million advanced to borrowers, $44.3 million has been
purchased into the Trust.

As of the July 2021 remittance, 11 loans, representing 46.2% of the
pool, are on the servicer's watchlist and two loans, representing
3.3% of the pool, are in special servicing. The two largest loans
on the watchlist, comprising 22.2% of the pool, are being monitored
for upcoming maturity dates but are performing in line with
expectations. Four loans, representing 13.4% of the pool, are
secured by hotel properties, which have received Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) relief request and experienced depressed cash
flows in 2020. The remaining five loans, representing 10.6% of the
pool, are being monitored for low debt service coverage ratios
(DSCRs); however, as these properties generally had renovation and
lease-up business plans, in-place cash flows and occupancy rates
are expectedly low and, as such, DBRS Morningstar does not believe
there is elevated risk associated with these loans as the
individual borrowers are executing the respective business plans.

The SIXTY Hotel LES loan (Prospectus ID#11, 3.4% of the pool),
secured by an upscale full-service hotel in the Lower East Side of
Manhattan, is currently flagged as over 120 days delinquent and is
being monitored on the servicer's watchlist for low DSCR and a
coronavirus relief request. The loan was initially modified in May
2020 to defer the collection of interest payments and allow the use
of existing furniture, fixtures, and equipment (FF&E) reserves to
cover operating shortfalls for a period of three months from May
2020 through July 2020. Due to the soft lodging market, the
borrower requested consent to extend its use of FF&E reserves and
cash management funds to cover debt service shortfalls for six
additional months starting in December 2020. The loan has been
delinquent since February 2021 and, as of July 2021, the loan is
over 120 days past due. Despite negative cash flow in 2020, the
loan reports reserves including $37,500 in FF&E reserves, $623,000
in other reserves, and, after a $1.0 million deposit in July 2021,
$1.3 million in debt service reserves. DBRS Morningstar analyzed
this loan with an elevated probability of default to reflect the
ongoing concerns with the hospitality industry and the delayed
stabilization of the property.

The largest loan in special servicing, 75 North 7th Street
(Prospectus ID#23, 2.2% of the pool), transferred to special
servicing in December 2020 for payment default. The loan is secured
by a newly constructed mixed-use retail and office property in the
Williamsburg neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York, and was 100%
vacant at issuance. The sponsor had initially signed a co-working
tenant to take 100% of the property's office space (47.9% of the
net rentable area (NRA)); however, as a result of the pandemic and
soft co-working market, the tenant opted to terminate its lease,
paying an upfront termination fee of $500,000 in Q3 2020 and an
additional $400,000 or $500,000 in either 12 or 18 months
afterward. All proceeds from termination fees will be deposited in
a debt service reserve to fund operating shortfalls. Two retail
tenants, representing 30.0% of the NRA, have since signed leases at
the property; however, with the property vacant for most of 2020,
cash flow remained depressed and the loan became delinquent in
September 2020 after an initial deferral period in the summer. The
sponsor is currently in talks with perfume brand Le Labo to take
the remaining retail and office space to serve as its corporate
headquarters. The current discussed terms include a seven-year term
at a rental rate of $69.00 per square foot. An updated appraisal as
of February 2021 valued the property on an as-is basis at $14.0
million, representing a 36.3% decline from the issuance as-is value
of $22.0 million, resulting in an implied loan-to-value ratio over
100%. The appraiser also provided an estimated stabilized value at
$18.0 million. According to special servicer commentary, a loan
modification and forbearance was agreed to in May 2021, which
includes a loan extension as the initial maturity date occurred in
March 2021. The loan modification will extend the loan term two
additional years to February 2023, reduce the loan's interest rate,
and require the sponsor to deposit $500,000 into a TI/LC reserve.
The loan is expected to be returned to the master servicer. DBRS
Morningstar analyzed this loan with a liquidation scenario given
the steep value decline, with an implied loss severity exceeding
20.0%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2021-JACX: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by BAMLL Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2021-JACX, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2021-JACX

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. X-CP*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by a Class A office property
comprised of two, 26-story office towers connected by a four-story
podium with approximately 1.19 million rentable square feet,
located at 28-07 Jackson Avenue in Long Island City, NY. Moody's
ratings are based on the credit quality of the loan and the
strength of the securitization structure.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both Moody's Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS methodology and Moody's IO Rating methodology. The
rating approach for securities backed by a single loan compares the
credit risk inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit
protection offered by the structure. The structure's credit
enhancement is quantified by the maximum deterioration in property
value that the securities are able to withstand under various
stress scenarios without causing an increase in the expected loss
for various rating levels. In assigning single borrower ratings,
Moody's also consider a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjust the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan balance that reflects each
loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this publication
reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in the
methodology.

The Moody's first-mortgage DSCR is 2.23x and Moody's first-mortgage
stressed DSCR at a 9.25% constant is 0.81x. Moody's DSCR is based
on Moody's stabilized net cash flow.

The Moody's LTV ratio for the first-mortgage balance is 128.2%. The
Moody's LTV ratio is based on Moody's value.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The average property
quality grade is 1.52.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: Property's superior
quality, institution tenants on long-term leases, high occupancy
rate and institutional quality sponsor.

Notable concerns of the transaction include: High Moody's LTV, full
term interest-only floating-rate mortgage loan profile, no
operating history and tenant concentration.

Moody's rating approach considers sequential pay in connection with
a collateral release as a credit neutral benchmark. Although the
loans' release premium mitigates the risk of a ratings downgrade
due to adverse selection, the pro rata payment structure limits
ratings upgrade potential as mezzanine classes are prevented from
building enhancement. The benefit received from pooling through
cross-collateralization is also reduced.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in September
2020.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

Factors that would lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


BANK 2021-BNK35: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class J Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-BNK35 issued by BANK 2021-BNK35:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C-1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C-2 at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C-X1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C-X2 at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-H at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-J at B (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class H at BB (sf)
-- Class J at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, X-FG, X-H, X-J, X-K, D, E, F, G, H, J, and K will be
privately placed. Class RR will be a non-offered certificate.

The Class A-4-1, Class A-4-2, Class A-4-X1, Class A-4-X2, Class
A-5-1, Class A-5-2, Class A-5-X1, Class A-5-X2, Class A-S-1, Class
A-S-2, Class A-S-X1, Class A-S-X2, Class B-1, Class B-2, Class
B-X1, Class B-X2, Class C-1, Class C-2, Class C-X1, and Class C-X2
certificates are also offered certificates. Such classes of
certificates, together with the Class A-4, Class A-5, Class A-S,
Class B, and Class C certificates, constitute the Exchangeable
Certificates. The Class A-1, Class A-2, Class A-SB, Class A-3,
Class D, Class E, Class F, Class G, and Class H certificates,
together with the RR Interest and the Exchangeable Certificates
with a certificate balance, are referred to as the principal
balance certificates.

The collateral consists of 76 fixed-rate loans secured by 109
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. Three loans, representing
10.6% of the pool, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS
Morningstar. Additionally, 27 loans in the pool, representing 9.5%
of the pool, are backed by residential co-operative loans, which
typically have very low expected losses. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off balances were measured
against the DBRS Morningstar Net Cash Flow and their respective
actual constants, the initial DBRS Morningstar Weighted-Average
(WA) Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of the pool was 3.04 times
(x). The pool additionally includes seven loans, representing 13.2%
of the allocated pool balance, that exhibit a DBRS Morningstar
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio in excess of 67.1%, a threshold generally
indicative of above-average default frequency. The WA DBRS
Morningstar LTV of the pool at issuance was 54.9%, and the pool is
scheduled to amortize down to a DBRS Morningstar WA LTV of 52.7% at
maturity. These credit metrics are based on the A note balances.
Excluding the shadow-rated loans, the deal still exhibits a
favorable WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of 60.0%.

Twenty-three loans, representing 17.6% of the pool, are in areas
identified as DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks 7 or 8, which are
generally characterized as highly dense urbanized areas that
benefit from increased liquidity driven by consistently strong
investor demand, even during times of economic stress. Markets with
these ranks benefit from lower default frequencies than less dense
suburban, tertiary, and rural markets. Urban markets represented in
the deal include New York and San Francisco.

Forty-one loans, representing 45.8% of the pool balance, have
collateral in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Group 3, which
represents the best-performing group in terms of historical
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) default rates among
the top 25 MSAs. MSA Group 3 has a historical default rate of
17.2%, which is nearly 40.0% lower than the overall CMBS historical
default rate of 28.0%. Additionally, only two loans, representing
just 0.9% of the pool, are located in MSA Group 1, which has
historically shown higher probability of default resulting in
greater loan-level expected losses.

Three of the loans – Four Constitution Square, River House Coop,
and Three Constitution Square – exhibit credit characteristics
consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings. Combined, these
loans represent 10.6% of the pool. Four Constitution Square has
credit characteristics consistent with a AA shadow rating. River
House Coop has credit characteristics consistent with a AAA shadow
rating. Three Constitution Square has credit characteristics
consistent with a AA (low) shadow rating.

Twenty-seven loans in the pool, representing 9.5% of the
transaction, are backed by residential co-operative loans.
Residential co-operatives tend to have minimal risk, given their
low leverage and low risk to residents if the co-operative
associations default on their mortgages. The WA DBRS Morningstar
LTV for these loans is 17.1%.

Fifty loans, representing a combined 48.9% of the pool by allocated
loan balance, exhibit issuance LTVs of less than 59.3%, a threshold
historically indicative of relatively low-leverage financing and
generally associated with below-average default frequency. Even
with the exclusion of the shadow-rated loans and the loans secured
by co-operative properties, collectively representing 16.2% of the
pool, the deal exhibits a favorable DBRS Morningstar Issuance LTV
of 60.0%.

Term default risk is low, as indicated by a strong DBRS Morningstar
DSCR of 3.04x. Even with the exclusion of the shadow-rated loans
and the loans secured by co-operative properties, the deal exhibits
a very favorable DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 2.53x.

Nine loans, representing 28.3% of the pool balance, received a
property quality of Average + or better, including three loans,
representing 8.4%, deemed to have Above Average quality and one
loan, representing 3.9%, deemed to have the highest property
quality of Excellent.

Five loans, representing 18.1% of the pool, were classified by DBRS
Morningstar as having Strong sponsorship strength. Furthermore,
DBRS Morningstar identified only one loan, representing 3.2% of the
pool, with Weak sponsorship strength.

While the pool demonstrates favorable loan metrics with WA DBRS
Morningstar Issuance and Balloon LTVs of 54.9% and 52.7%,
respectively, it also exhibits heavy leverage barbelling. There are
three loans, accounting for 10.6% of the pool, with
investment-grade shadow ratings and a WA LTV of 36.9% and 27 loans,
representing 9.5% of the transaction, secured by co-operatives with
a WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of 17.1%. The pool also has 50 loans,
representing a combined 48.9% of the pool by allocated loan
balance, with an issuance LTV lower than 59.3%, a threshold
historically indicative of relatively low-leverage financing. There
are seven loans, comprising a combined 13.2% of the pool balance,
with an issuance LTV higher than 67.1%, a threshold historically
indicative of relatively high-leverage financing and generally
associated with above-average default frequency. The WA expected
loss of the pool's investment-grade and co-operative component was
approximately 0.2%, while the WA expected loss of the pool's
conduit component was substantially higher at approximately 2.1%,
further illustrating the barbelled nature of the transaction.

The WA DBRS Morningstar expected loss exhibited by the loans that
were identified as representing relatively high-leverage financing
was 4.3%. This is significantly higher, more than double, than the
conduit component's WA expected loss of 2.1%, and the pool's credit
enhancement reflects the higher leverage of this component of seven
loans with an issuance LTV in excess of 67.1%. While there is some
leverage barbelling occurring, it is mostly caused by extremely low
leverage and low expected loss loans on one end of the spectrum, as
opposed to extremely high leverage and high expected losses. Even
the higher leverage component of this pool is fairly benign, and
there is not a large component of the pool that represents a
substantial outlier expected loss concentration.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
office and retail properties with 23 loans, representing 51.3% of
the pool balance. The ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic continues to pose challenges globally, and the future
demand for office and retail space is uncertain, with many store
closures, companies filing for bankruptcy or downsizing, and more
companies extending their remote-working strategy. Two of the 14
office loans, Four Constitution Square and Three Constitution
Square, representing 25.2% of the office concentration, are
shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS Morningstar. Furthermore,
70.6% of the office loans are located in MSA Group 3, which
represents the lowest historical CMBS default rates. The office and
retail properties exhibit favorable WA DBRS Morningstar DSCRs of
3.52x and 3.31x, respectively. Additionally, both property types
exhibit favorable WA Morningstar LTVs at 52.0% and 57.5%,
respectively. Three of the loans secured by office properties,
representing 40.0% of the concentration, have sponsors that were
deemed to be Strong. Additionally, two of the loans secured by
retail properties, representing 30.6% of the concentration, have
sponsors deemed to be Strong.

Forty-eight loans, representing 74.8% of the pool balance, are
structured with full-term interest-only (IO) periods. An additional
six loans, representing 9.2% of the pool balance, are structured
with partial-IO terms ranging from 24 months to 60 months. Of the
48 loans structured with full-term IO periods, 27 loans,
representing 42.5% of the pool by allocated loan balance, are
located in areas with a DBRS Morningstar MSA Group 2 or 3. These
markets benefit from increased liquidity even during times of
economic stress. Three of the loans, representing 10.6% of the
total pool balance, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS
Morningstar: Four Constitution Square, River House Coop, and Three
Constitution Square. The full-term IO loans are effectively
pre-amortized, as evidenced by the very low WA DBRS Morningstar
Issuance LTV of only 50.3% for these loans.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BENEFIT STREET XX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-L loans and
class A-R, A-L, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from
Benefit Street Partners CLO XX Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO XX
LLC, a CLO originally issued in June 2020 that is managed by
Benefit Street Partners LLC.

On the August 24, 2021 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes were used to redeem the original notes. At that
time, we withdrew our ratings on the original notes and assigned
ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture,
which outlined the terms of the replacement notes. According to the
supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-L loans and class A-R, A-L, C-R, D-R,
and E-R notes were issued at a lower spread over three-month LIBOR
than the original notes.

-- The replacement class B-R notes were issued at a floating
spread and replaced the class B-1 floating spread and B-2 fixed
coupon notes.

-- The replacement class A-R and A-L notes pay pro rata and
replaced the class A-1 and A-2 notes, which paid sequentially.

-- The issuer, through a credit agreement, issued class A-L loans,
which can be converted into class A-L notes at a future date and
are paid pro rata with the class A-R and A-L notes.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period was extended by
approximately three years, and the target par amount was increased
to $450 million from $400 million.

-- The documents had a number of updates, including adding the
ability to purchase bonds and workout related assets and the
capacity to account for the replacement of LIBOR.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Ratings Assigned

  Benefit Street Partners CLO XX Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO
XX LLC

  Class A-L loans(i) $143.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-L notes(i) $0.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-R $136.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R $63.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable) $27.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable) $27.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable) $15.75 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes $38.20 million: Not rated

(i)The class A-L loans can be converted to up to $143.00 million in
class A-L notes.

  Ratings Withdrawn

  Benefit Street Partners CLO XX Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO
XX LLC

  Class A-1 to not rated from 'AAA (sf)'
  Class B-1 to not rated from 'AA (sf)'
  Class B-2 to not rated from 'AA (sf)'
  Class C to not rated from 'A (sf)'
  Class D to not rated from 'BBB- (sf)'
  Class E to not rated from 'BB- (sf)'



BOMBARDIER CAPITAL 1999-A: S&P Affirms B- (sf) Rating on A-5 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B (sf)' rating on class A from
Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp.'s series 1998-C
and the 'B- (sf)' ratings on classes A-4 and A-5 from series
1999-A. Series 1998-C and 1999-A are ABS transactions backed by
manufactured housing loans originated by Bombardier Capital Inc.

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect the transactions' collateral
performance to date and structure, our views regarding future
collateral performance, and the credit enhancement available.
Furthermore, our analysis incorporated secondary credit factors
such as credit stability, payment priorities under certain
scenarios, and sector- and issuer-specific analysis.

"Although both transactions have performed worse than our initial
expectations, the pace of losses over the past few years has
generally remained stable. We are maintaining our expected lifetime
cumulative net loss range for both transactions."

  COLLATERAL PERFORMANCE
  (As of the August 2021 distribution)
                                              Expected
                 Pool factor    Current       lifetime
  Series   Mo.           (%)        CNL (%)        CNL(i)(%)
  1998-C   273          4.94      43.91    45.00-48.00
  1999-A   271          5.38      44.47    45.00-48.00

(i)Lifetime CNL expectation based on current performance data.

CNL--Cumulative net loss.

Both transactions were initially structured with
overcollateralization and subordination. Because of
higher-than-expected losses, both series have minimal or no
overcollateralization. The only other hard support for both
transactions is the subordinated class M-1 certificates, which
continue to experience monthly principal write-downs. However, the
pace of class A principal payments currently outperforms the speed
of the principal write-downs. This has helped maintain sufficient
credit enhancement for the class A certificates, which are senior
in priority to the class M-1 certificates. The class M-1
certificates currently provide 70.65% credit support for the class
A certificates in series 1998-C and 67.96% credit support for the
class A certificates in series 1999-A. Each is a percentage of the
current collateral balance.

S&P Global Ratings will continue to monitor the performance of
these transactions and take rating actions as S&P considers
appropriate.

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp.

  Series    Class     Rating
  1998-C    A         B (sf)
  1999-A    A-4       B- (sf)
  1999-A    A-5       B- (sf)



BRAVO RESIDENTIAL 2021-NQM2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on B2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2021-NQM2 (the Notes) to be issued by
BRAVO Residential Funding Trust 2021-NQM2:

-- $183.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.6 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $27.7 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $17.5 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $16.3 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $12.8 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 37.30% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinate certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 31.65%,
22.20%, 16.25%, 10.70%, and 6.35% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime and nonprime first-lien residential mortgages
funded by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 657
loans with a total principal balance of $293,273,102 as of the
Cut-Off Date (June 30, 2021).

The top originator for the mortgage pool is Sprout Mortgage
Corporation (49.2%). The remaining originators each comprise less
than 15.0% of the mortgage loans. The Servicers of the loans are
Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC (94.8%) and Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc. (5.2%).

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as a Master Servicer. Citibank,
N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar), an
affiliate of Citigroup Inc. (rated A (high) with a Stable trend by
DBRS Morningstar), will act as Indenture Trustee, Paying Agent,
Note Registrar, and Owner Trustee. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA
with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as Custodian.

The proposed pool is about 27 months seasoned on a weighted-average
basis, although seasoning may span from 15 to 58 months. Except for
20 loans (3.2% of the pool) that were 30 to 59 days delinquent as
of the Cut-Off Date, the loans have been performing since
origination.

In accordance with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 52.8% of the loans by balance are
designated as non-QM. Ability to repay (ATR) exempt loans consist
of loans made to investors for business purposes (46.9%). One loan
(0.3% of the pool) is designated as Safe Harbor.

There will be no advancing of delinquent principal or interest on
any mortgage loan by the Servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the Servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance, the cost of preservation,
restoration and protection of mortgaged properties, and any
enforcement or judicial proceedings, including foreclosures and
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

The Sponsor or a majority-owned affiliate of the Sponsor will
acquire and intends to retain an eligible horizontal residual
interest in the Issuer in the amount of not less than 5.0% of the
aggregate fair value of the Notes (other than the Class SA, Class
FB, and Class R Notes) to satisfy the credit risk-retention
requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

The holder of the Trust Certificates may, at its option, on or
after the earlier of (1) the payment
date in July 2024 or (2) the date on which the total loans' and
real estate owned (REO) properties' balance falls to or below 30%
of the loan balance as of the Cut-Off Date (Optional Termination
Date), purchase all of the loans and REO properties at the optional
termination price described in the transaction documents.

The Depositor, at its option, may purchase any mortgage loan that
is 90 days or more delinquent under the Mortgage Banker Association
(MBA) method (or in the case of any loan that has been subject to a
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic-related forbearance plan,
on any date from and after the date on which such loan becomes 90
days MBA delinquent following the end of the forbearance period) at
the repurchase price (Optional Purchase) described in the
transaction documents. The total balance of such loans purchased by
the Depositor will not exceed 10% of the Cut-Off Date balance.

The transaction's cash flow structure is similar to that of other
non-QM securitizations. The transaction employs a sequential-pay
cash flow structure with a pro rata principal distribution among
the senior tranches subject to certain performance triggers related
to cumulative losses or delinquencies exceeding a specified
threshold (Credit Event). Principal proceeds can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes (IIPP)
before being applied sequentially to amortize the balances of the
senior and subordinated notes. For the Class A-3 Notes (only after
a Credit Event) and for the mezzanine and subordinate classes of
notes (both before and after a Credit Event), principal proceeds
will be available to cover interest shortfalls only after the more
senior notes have been paid off in full. Also, the excess spread
can be used to cover realized losses first before being allocated
to unpaid Cap Carryover Amounts due to Class A-1 down to Class
B-2.

Coronavirus Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an immediate economic contraction, leading to sharp
increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for many
consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in delinquencies for many
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes,
shortly after the onset of the coronavirus.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of forbearance,
which are generally short-term payment reliefs that may perform
very differently from traditional delinquencies. At the onset of
the coronavirus, because the option to forbear mortgage payments
was so widely available, it drove forbearance to a very high level.
When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid, low
loan-to-value ratio, and good underwriting in the mortgage market
in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes, delinquencies
have been gradually trending down in recent months as the
forbearance period comes to an end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BX TRUST 2019-IMC: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class HRR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-IMC issued by BX Trust
2019-IMC as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class D at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (high) (sf)

In addition, Classes E, F, G, and HRR were removed from Under
Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on April
24, 2020. DBRS Morningstar changed the trends for Classes A, B,
X-NCP, C, and D to Stable from Negative. All other trends are
Stable.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect the generally
improved outlook for the underlying collateral as compared with the
uncertainty driven by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic
that drove the rating actions taken at last review when DBRS
Morningstar placed the lowest-rated classes Under Review with
Negative Implications and changed the trends on the remainder to
Negative from Stable.

The collateral for the first-mortgage loan is a portfolio of 16
properties comprising 9.6 million square feet (sf) of premier
showroom space situated across two campuses (or markets) in High
Point, North Carolina, and Las Vegas, Nevada. The collateral
represents 88.0% and 92.7% of the Class A trade show and showroom
space in the High Point and Las Vegas markets, respectively, with
the allocated loan balance split between the 13 High Point
properties (50.1%) and the three Las Vegas properties (49.9%).

Each market holds biannual home and furnishings trade shows,
staggered so that an event occurs once every quarter throughout the
year with the spring and fall events held in High Point and the
summer and winter events held in Las Vegas. The High Point market
is convenient for its proximity to manufacturers, while the Las
Vegas market serves as a regional hub for buyers in the western
U.S. The quarterly events are the most important demand drivers for
the portfolio, positioned as business-to-business trade shows
focused on the home furnishings and decor as well as gift
industries. The events are essential for buyers to efficiently
access and view products in the highly fragmented industries with
thousands of manufacturers and more than 60,000 commercial buyers
attending each event.

While the coronavirus pandemic has had a significant effect on the
trade shows, with the subject portfolio's year-end (YE) 2020
weighted-average occupancy declining to 73.4% from 83.9% at YE2019,
the overall impact was relatively minimal as only the Spring 2020
event at the High Point Market was outright canceled, with others
postponed. Attendance at the August 2020 event (which was
originally scheduled for July) at the Las Vegas market was
reportedly down 80% compared with the previous year, but attendance
at the April 2021 event at the Las Vegas market had surged 346%
compared to the August 2020 figures. Organizers have also noted in
an April 2021 press release that a recent surge in demand for home
furnishings has led to more than 60 new, relocated, expanded, and
recommitted showrooms at the International Home Furnishings Center
property alone. That asset is the largest of the High Point
properties and represents 27.8% of the total portfolio net rentable
area. The summer event at the Las Vegas market is currently
scheduled for August 22 to 26, 2021 (pushed from July), and
coincides with two other trade shows in Las Vegas, the ASD Market
Week at the Las Vegas Convention Center, and the HD Expo +
Conference at the Mandalay Bay, a factor that should increase
overall attendance.

The loan is sponsored by affiliates of the Blackstone Group Inc.
(Blackstone), which began purchasing individual properties in the
High Point market in 2011 and has owned all of the collateral
properties since 2017, when it purchased the three World Market
Center properties in Las Vegas and the 2.66 million-sf
International Home Furnishings Center in High Point. Property
management is provided by International Market Centers (IMC), an
affiliate of Blackstone, which is the largest operator of premier
showroom space for the furniture, gift, home decor, rug, and
apparel industries in the world. Including its ownership of the
non-collateral AmericasMart Atlanta, the sponsor owns the majority
of the Class A showroom space throughout the United States. At loan
closing, Blackstone maintained $400.0 million of cash equity in the
deal. The initial maturity was scheduled for April 2021, but the
sponsor has exercised the first of three one-year extension options
available.

In response to the ongoing pandemic, Blackstone increased the pace
and emphasis of its digital strategies. IMC continues to develop
and offer virtual experiences and buyer options. DBRS Morningstar
expects these initiatives to work in concert with the physical
quarterly events rather than compete with them directly as the
in-person trade shows will likely continue to be the most important
demand drivers for the collateral.

YE2020 net cash flow (NCF) was $153.3 million, up 18.3% from the
DBRS Morningstar NCF of $129.6 million and up 8.0% from the
issuer's underwritten NCF of $142.0 million. The increase is
largely the result of decrease in expenses, which declined 20.1%
from the issuer's NCF, while revenue remained in line with the
issuer's figure.

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar utilized the DBRS Morningstar NCF
derived at issuance and applied a cap rate of 10.5%, which resulted
in a DBRS Morningstar value of $1.23 billion, a variance of -25.1%
from the issuance appraised value of $1.65 billion. The DBRS
Morningstar value implies a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 93.2%
compared with the LTV of 69.8% using the issuance appraised value.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the higher end of the
range of DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for retail properties,
reflecting the specialty use of the collateral as trade show and
convention space.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 3.5%
to account for property quality and market fundamentals.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



BXHPP TRUST 2021-FILM: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-FILM to
be issued by BXHPP Trust 2021-FILM (BXHPP 2021-FILM):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (sf)
-- Class X-FP at A (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at A (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-CP, X-FP, and X-NCP are interest-only (IO) classes whose
balances are notional.

The BXHPP 2021-FILM transaction is collateralized by five Class A
creative office buildings and three studio lots in the Hollywood
section of Los Angeles. DBRS Morningstar continues to take a
positive view on the joint venture partnership established between
Blackstone Property Partners and Hudson Pacific Properties L.P.
(HPP) to own and operate the collateral, which represents a
high-barrier-to-entry real estate portfolio that serves as a hub
for a growing industry (digital content). The properties come
together to form a synergistic creative campus in Hollywood that is
attractive for tenants in the content creation space; a similar
dynamic exists in some of the biomedical office portfolios in
markets such as Boston and Cambridge that benefit from their
synergistic proximity to research universities.

The office component has no scheduled lease expirations until over
five years after loan maturity, and the studio component benefits
from longer-term lease structures that are less commonly seen when
it comes to studio properties. The properties have also performed
well despite initial disruptions in production schedules related to
the ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Collections
have been 100% across the portfolio over the past 16 months.

While studio leases are generally shorter term—typically six to
12 months—the sponsor has successfully executed longer-term lease
agreements with the studio tenants, which currently have a
weighted-average lease term of 7.23 years. Recent leasing spreads
for the sound stages have been significant, with a 30% positive
leasing spread on the Confidential Tenant's right-of-first-offer
(ROFO) on four stages at Sunset Gower and approximately 13.0% for
the Station 19 renewal at Sunset Las Palmas. Furthermore, the
sponsor has negotiated must-take minimums with various tenants for
grip and light rentals, which reduces the volatility of the grip
and light revenue line item.

The properties, specifically the studio component, benefit from
high barriers to entry. There have been no substantial deliveries
of new studio space to the Los Angeles market in the past 20 years,
in part because the high cost of land makes it economically
unattractive to construct new studio space. The office and studio
components collectively form what is effectively a creative campus
for digital content, which DBRS Morningstar believes to be
synergistic for tenants at both the office and the studio parcels.

DBRS Morningstar believes that growing demand for creative digital
content is likely to continue, and the properties collectively
serve as a major creative hub for one of the largest digital
streaming services and content producers in the world. The
streaming provider added more than 15 million subscribers in Q1
2020 and currently has more than 209 million total subscribers.
Furthermore, the firm plans to spend approximately $17 billion on
content in 2021.

The studio component of the transaction requires specialized
knowledge and expertise in order to operate and lease effectively.
For example, HPP handles leasing of the studio component through an
in-house sales team that specializes in managing relationships with
various space users. The pool of potential buyers either for the
studio component or the portfolio as a whole may be more limited
than other, more traditional property types.

Approximately 88% of DBRS Morningstar in-place base rent for the
office component was attributable to a single tenant (Confidential
Tenant). Furthermore, approximately 5% of the DBRS Morningstar
in-place base rent is in the form of leases not yet signed.
However, a significant upfront reserve was established to address
this risk, which DBRS Morningstar determined was adequate to offset
the risk that any of the letters of intent do not get signed.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CFCRE 2018-TAN: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class HRR Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-TAN
issued by CFCRE Trust 2018-TAN:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes A and B to Stable
from Negative. While the trend on Class C is Stable, the trends on
Classes D, E, F, HRR, and X are Negative because of the continued
negative impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic on
the underlying collateral. Additionally, DBRS Morningstar removed
the ratings on Classes C, D, E, F, HRR, and X from Under Review
with Negative Implications where they had been placed on October
14, 2020.

DBRS Morningstar also added the Interest in Arrears designation to
the rating on Class HRR because of interest shortfalls reported in
the latest remittance report. DBRS Morningstar notes that the
interest shortfall is associated with the special servicing fee
when the loan was transferred to the special servicer on February
24, 2021, as a result of the borrower's request to access the
furniture, fixtures, and equipment reserve to pay monthly debt
service. The borrower has since withdrawn the request and the loan
will be returned to the master servicer.

The current rating actions reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. The loan is current and the borrower has made all debt
service payments in full and on time in 2020 and 2021, despite the
severe impact of the pandemic that has led to a significant drop in
revenue.

The subject loan is secured by a 411-key oceanfront hotel located
on the island of Aruba. The hotel is situated on a 10.1-acre site
on the northern end of the island along Palm Beach, a two-mile
strip of beach known for its white sand and turquoise waters where
the majority of the upscale hotels on the island are located. The
subject is part of a larger Marriott campus that includes the
Marriott Aruba Surf Club, Marriott Aruba Ocean Club, and two
timeshare projects totaling 1,200 keys. The collateral includes
nine food and beverage outlets, 93,269 square feet (sf) of meeting
space, two outdoor pools, a fitness center, and four retail stores.
Also included in the collateral is the 17,000-sf Stellaris Casino,
the largest casino on the island, featuring 523 slot machines and
27 gaming tables. The property has undergone $51.9 million
($126,192 per key) in renovations since 2010, including a complete
overhaul to comply with Marriott brand standards. The subject is
currently encumbered by a ground lease with the Government of
Aruba, which has an initial expiration date in 2052; however, the
lessor has a statutory obligation to enter into a new lease when
the ground lease expires. The sponsor for this loan represents a
joint venture between DLJ Real Estate Investment Partners and
MetaCorp International. DLJ is a private equity real estate
investment firm and MetaCorp is a real estate company based in
Aruba.

DBRS Morningstar notes that the negative impact of the pandemic has
constrained the property performance as evidenced by significant
occupancy and revenue decline. The servicer reported a decrease in
NCF to $8.5 million in YE2020 from $38.4 million in YE2019.
Consequently, the debt service coverage ratio dropped to 0.77 times
(x) in YE2020 from 2.99x in YE2019. Nevertheless, the subject has
outperformed the competitive set according to the January 2021
Smith Travel Research report in which the subject reported trailing
twelve-month and three-month occupancies of 34.2% and 35.0%,
respectively, and revenues per available room of $165.70 and
$163.10, respectively, compared with the competitive set average of
32.2% and 30.8% and $96.90 and $81.00, respectively, for the same
periods. Furthermore, the subject property benefits from a
dedicated sponsor that has been using its cash equity to make debt
service payments to keep the loan current during the pandemic.

Considering the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the subject
and the uncertainty surrounding the recovery of Aruba's tourism
industry to pre-pandemic levels, DBRS Morningstar applied a
stressed cap rate of 11.5% in its analysis, which resulted in a
DBRS Morningstar Value of $227.7 million, a variance of 27.7% from
the appraised value of $315.0 million at issuance. The DBRS
Morningstar Value implies a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 85.6%
compared with the LTV of 61.9% on the appraised value at issuance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CIM RETAIL 2021-RETL: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2021-RETL issued by CIM Retail Portfolio Trust 2021-RETL (CIM
2021-RETL):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at BBB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-CP and X-EXT are interest-only (IO) classes whose
balances are notional.

CIM 2021-RETL is a single-asset/single-borrower transaction
collateralized by the borrower's fee-simple interest in a
diversified portfolio of 113 retail properties across 27 U.S.
states and 85 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The portfolio
consists of 50 anchored shopping centers, 61 single-tenant retail
properties, one office property, and an industrial property. DBRS
Morningstar generally takes a positive view on the credit profile
of the overall transaction based on the portfolio's broad
diversification, favorable leverage profile, and strong
essential-business anchor tenancy. Despite these strengths, the
portfolio continues to experience above-market vacancy levels and
there remains secular uncertainty around the retail sector more
broadly. The subject transaction also represents the first
post-Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) retail portfolio to be financed
in the commercial mortgage-backed securities market.

The cross-collateralized portfolio benefits from granular tenancy
and broad diversification. The portfolio has a property Herfindahl
(Herf) score of 69.4 by allocated loan amount (ALA), a state Herf
score of 22.3 by ALA, and an MSA Herf score of 46.3, which makes
the transaction one of the most diversified retail portfolios
analyzed by DBRS Morningstar. Furthermore, with the exception of LA
Fitness and PetSmart, no other tenants in the portfolio account for
more than 5.0% of the DBRS Morningstar In-Place Base Rent.

The portfolio primarily consists of power center retail properties
anchored or shadow anchored by the national grocery store or home
improvement chains including Lowe's, DICK'S Sporting Goods,
PetSmart, Stop & Shop, Home Depot, and Walmart, among many others.
DBRS Morningstar generally views retail properties occupied by
large essential retailers more favorably, and 49.4% of the
portfolio's tenants never closed during the coronavirus pandemic
despite broad local lockdown orders, underscoring the
essential-business concentration of the transaction.

Investment-grade tenants comprise 34.1% of the DBRS Morningstar
In-Place Base Rent (37.5% of the net rentable area), which is a
favorable proportion. However, none of the tenants qualified for
long-term credit tenant cash flow treatment based on their lease
expiry dates.

The portfolio's rent collection history (excluding deferrals and
abatements) through the coronavirus pandemic has been relatively
favorable for a retail portfolio, again underscoring the
essential-business nature of the tenancy. Collections dropped to
78.5% in April 2020 during the height of the first wave of the
pandemic, but rebounded quickly to 92.4% in July 2020 and have
since averaged 95.4%.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to virtually all major commercial real estate property types
and has created significant uncertainty around the long-term
viability of a wide array of retail businesses. Mandated closures
and the weakened state of the macroeconomy have only accelerated
consumer purchasing trends in favor of e-commerce, leaving retail
properties, even those more heavily occupied by essential
retailers, vulnerable to store closures and tenant bankruptcies
over the medium term to long term (particularly nonanchor in-line
tenants). While DBRS Morningstar does not view these issues as
imminent threats to most of the portfolio's tenancy for reasons
previously mentioned, the long-term headwinds in the retail sector
will likely persist even after the coronavirus pandemic abates. For
DBRS Morningstar's perspective, specifically with respect to LA
Fitness (7.6% of base rent), please refer to the Tenant Summary and
Lease Terms section of the presale report.

The portfolio is currently 17.7% vacant based on the DBRS
Morningstar concluded vacancy figure, which is significantly above
the appraiser's concluded WA market vacancy of 5.0% for the
portfolio. However, the portfolio has historically performed
favorably, with a three-year historical WA vacancy of 5.9% from
2018 through 2020. DBRS Morningstar views the portfolio's current
vacancy to be elevated because of rollover and fallout from the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic and believes occupancy is likely to
improve over time, if only modestly, as the macroeconomy continues
to recover.

The sponsor is withdrawing approximately $633.9 million of cash to
pay down an existing corporate facility, a term loan, and a secured
loan as a part of the subject transaction, which DBRS Morningstar
views less favorably from an alignment-of-incentive perspective
than cash-in or cash-neutral financings. This leaves the sponsor
with significantly less market equity to protect, which could
potentially disincentivize investment in the portfolio to the
detriment of certificateholders. However, CIM will have
approximately $478 million in remaining implied equity in the
transaction, which is significant.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2021-INV2: DBRS Gives B(high) Rating on B5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-INV2 to be issued by
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2021-INV2 as follows:

-- $158.8 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-1W at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2A at AAA (sf)
-- $52.9 million Class A-2B at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $66.2 million Class A-2W at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3A at AAA (sf)
-- $211.7 million Class A-3B at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $264.6 million Class A-3W at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4A at AAA (sf)
-- $15.4 million Class A-4B at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-4W at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5A at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $283.9 million Class A-5W at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6A at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $39.7 million Class A-6W at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7A at AAA (sf)
-- $158.8 million Class A-7B at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $198.5 million Class A-7W at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8-IOX at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8A at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8-IO1W at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8-IO2W at AAA (sf)
-- $105.9 million Class A-8W at AAA (sf)
-- $42.3 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $42.3 million Class A-11-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $79.4 million Class A-11A at AAA (sf)
-- $79.4 million Class A-11A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $42.3 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $12.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $12.0 million Class B-1-IO at AA (sf)
-- $12.0 million Class B-1-IOX at AA (sf)
-- $12.0 million Class B-1-IOW at AA (sf)
-- $12.0 million Class B-1W at AA (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2-IO at A (low) (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2-IOX at A (low) (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2-IOW at A (low) (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2W at A (low) (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class B-3 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class B-3-IO at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class B-3-IOX at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class B-3-IOW at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class B-3W at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $3.4 million Class B-4 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $0.8 million Class B-5 at B (high) (sf)

Classes A-1-IO1, A-1-IO2, A-1-IOX, A-1-IO3, A-1-IO1W, A-1-IO2W,
A-2-IO1, A-2-IO2, A-2-IOX, A-2-IO3, A-2-IO1W, A-2-IO2W, A-3-IO1,
A-3-IO2, A-3-IOX, A-3-IO3, A-3-IO1W, A-3-IO2W, A-4-IO1, A-4-IO2,
A-4-IOX, A-4-IO3, A-4-IO1W, A-4-IO2W, A-5-IO1, A-5-IO2, A-5-IOX,
A-5-IO3, A-5-IO1W, A-5-IO2W, A-6-IO1, A-6-IO2, A-6-IOX, A-6-IO3,
A-6-IO1W, A-6-IO2W, A-7-IO1, A-7-IO2, A-7-IOX, A-7-IO3, A-7-IO1W,
A-7-IO2W, A-8-IO1, A-8-IO2, A-8-IOX, A-8-IO3, A-8-IO1W, A-8-IO2W,
A-11-IO, A-11A-IO, B-1-IO, B-1-IOX, B-1-IOW, B-2-IO, B-2-IOX,
B-2-IOW, B-3-IO, B-3-IOX, and B-3-IOW are interest-only
certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1-IO3, A-1-IO1W, A-1-IO2W, A-1W, A-2A, A-2B,
A-2-IO3, A-2-IO1W, A-2-IO2W, A-2W, A-3, A-3-IO1, A-3-IO2, A-3-IOX,
A-3A, A-3B, A-3-IO3, A-3-IO1W, A-3-IO2W, A-3W, A-4A, A-4B, A-4-IO3,
A-4-IO1W, A-4-IO2W, A-4W, A-5, A-5-IO1, A-5-IO2, A-5-IOX, A-5A,
A-5-IO3, A-5-IO1W, A-5-IO2W, A-5W, A-6A, A-6-IO3, A-6-IO1W,
A-6-IO2W, A-6W, A-7, A-7-IO1, A-7-IO2, A-7-IOX, A-7A, A-7B,
A-7-IO3, A-7-IO1W, A-7-IO2W, A-7W, A-8, A-8-IO1, A-8-IO2, A-8-IOX,
A-8A, A-8-IO3, A-8-IO1W, A-8-IO2W, A-8W, A-11, A-11-IO, A-11A,
A-11A-IO, A-12, B-1-IOW, B-1W, B-2-IOW, B-2W, B-3-IOW, and B-3W are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of initial exchangeable certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-1A, A-1W, A-2, A-2A, A-2B, A-2W, A-3, A-3A, A-3B,
A-3W, A-4B, A-6, A-6A, A-6W, A-7, A-7A, A-7B, A-7W, A-8, A-8A,
A-8W, A-11, A-11A, and A-12 certificates are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
the senior support certificates (Classes A-4, A-4A, A-4B, and A-4W)
with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 8.80% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(low) (sf), BBB (high) (sf), BB (high) (sf), and B (high) (sf)
ratings reflect 4.95%, 2.95%, 2.25%, 1.15%, and 0.90% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This deal is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime conventional investment-property residential
mortgages funded by the issuance of the certificates. The
Certificates are backed by 1,037 loans with a total principal
balance of $311,338,321 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 1, 2021).

The portfolio consists of conforming mortgages with original terms
to maturity of primarily 30 years, acquired by PennyMac Corp.
(PennyMac). The loans were underwritten using an automated
underwriting system designated by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and
were eligible for purchase by such agencies. In addition, the pool
contains a moderate concentration of loans (24.8%) that were
granted appraisal waivers by the agencies, as well as loans that
had exterior only appraisals at origination (1.4%). In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar applied property value haircuts to such
loans, which increased the expected losses on the collateral.

PennyMac is the Initial Seller and Servicer of the mortgage loans.
Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. is the Mortgage Loan Seller
and Sponsor of the transaction. Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
will act as Depositor of the transaction. U.S. Bank National
Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as the Trust Administrator. U.S. Bank Trust
National Association will serve as Trustee, and Deutsche Bank
National Trust Company will serve as Custodian.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC IMPACT

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in
delinquencies for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes shortly after the onset of the pandemic.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term payment reliefs that
may perform very differently from traditional delinquencies. At the
onset of the pandemic, the option to forebear mortgage payments was
widely available and it drove forbearances to a very high level.
When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced forbearances in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid, low
loan-to-value ratios, and good underwriting in the mortgage market
in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes, delinquencies
have been gradually trending down in recent months as the
forbearance period comes to an end for many borrowers.

As of the Cut-Off Date, no borrower within the pool has been
subject to a coronavirus-related forbearance plan with the
Servicer.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.




COMM 2014-CCRE21: DBRS Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to C
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the following ratings on the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-CCRE21 issued by
COMM 2014-CCRE21 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class X-C to B (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D to B (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E to CCC (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to C (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class G to C (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the ratings on the
following classes:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also withdrew the ratings on Classes X-D and X-E
as they reference Classes E, F, and G, which carry ratings of CCC
(sf) or lower. Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends to
Negative on Classes X-B, C, and PEZ. Classes D, E, F, and G also
carry Negative trends. The remaining trends are Stable. Classes D,
E, F. and G continue to carry Interest in Arrears designations

The rating downgrades and additional Negative trends primarily
reflect DBRS Morningstar's heightened concern with the workout
strategy and value decline of the largest loan in special
servicing, Kings' Shops (Prospectus ID#3; 7.4% of the current pool
balance). The loan transferred to special servicing in September
2020 for payment default after the borrower stopped making debt
service payments and requested Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19)-related relief. Foreclosure has been filed and a
receivership has been granted by the court.

The loan is secured by a 69,023 square foot (sf) retail property in
Waikoloa, Hawaii, with demand stemming from tourists visiting the
two nearby resorts: the Waikoloa Beach Marriott Resort & Spa and
the Hilton Waikoloa Village. In January 2020, Macy's (14.5% of the
net rentable area (NRA)) vacated, causing occupancy to fall to
75.6%. In addition, roughly 40.0% of the property's NRA is
scheduled to expire prior to December 2022, which could
significantly increase vacancy. Tenancy is primarily composed of
local eateries or high-quality tenants that benefit from proximity
to the tourism hubs. The property was reappraised in February 2021
with an as-is value of $22.2 million ($321 per square foot (psf)),
a drastic decline from the issuance value of $84.0 million ($1,216
psf). While the appraisal does provide a stabilized value of $34.8
million, reflecting a potential upside, that value is still well
below the issuance figure and contemplates a four-year
stabilization period concluding a year after loan maturity, which
is in November 2024. The loan was previously securitized in the
GSMS 2005-GG4 transaction and upon resolution incurred a loss of
$34.0 million, reflecting a loss severity of nearly 50.0%. Given
the asset's recent decline in value and the appointment of the
receiver, DBRS Morningstar liquidated the loan in its analysis for
this review with a loss severity in excess of 60.0%.

As of the July 2021 remittance, the pool composition remains
relatively consistent from DBRS Morningstar's prior review in
December 2020 with 51 loans remaining in the pool with minimal
additional paydown and two additional defeased loans, which now
total 10.6% of the current pool balance. The same six loans (20.9%
of the current pool balance) remain in special servicing, all of
which have received updated values below their issuance values.
There are currently 15 loans (31.4% of the current pool balance) on
the servicer's watchlist, 11 of which were added for net cash flow
declines and/or coronavirus-related relief requests.

The second-largest loan in special servicing is secured by the
Hilton College Station (Prospectus ID#7; 4.9% of the current pool
balance), a 303-key full-service hotel in College Station, Texas,
in proximity to Texas A&M University. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in August 2019 and has been real estate owned
since June 2020. According to the servicer commentary, the sponsor
attributed the decline in the subject's performance to oversupply
in the market as there are more than 11 other hotels within a mile
of the subject that all compete for the same demand from generators
such as collegiate sports and conventions. In addition, the
borrower didn't have adequate funds to complete the Hilton property
improvement plan required upon acquisition, which resulted in newer
properties outperforming the subject. The property has experienced
multiple appraisal reductions since issuance, most recently
reporting a April 2021 value of $16.9 million ($55,775 per key),
representing a 69.1% decline from the issuance value of $54.8
million ($180,693 per key). While this is an increase from the
value received in September 2020 of $12.8 million, servicer
advances, which total $4.4 million as of July 2021, partially
offset the implied value increase. DBRS Morningstar liquidated the
loan in its analysis for this review with a loss severity in excess
of 70.0%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



COMM 2015-CCRE27: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. F Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2015-CCRE27 Mortgage Trust.

    DEBT                RATING             PRIOR
    ----                ------             -----
COMM 2015-CCRE27

A-3 12635QBF6     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-4 12635QBG4     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-M 12635QBJ8     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-SB 12635QBE9    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
B 12635QBK5       LT  AA-sf   Affirmed     AA-sf
C 12635QBL3       LT  A-sf    Affirmed     A-sf
D 12635QAL4       LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed     BBB-sf
E 12635QAN0       LT  BB-sf   Affirmed     BB-sf
F 12635QAQ3       LT  CCCsf   Affirmed     CCCsf
X-A 12635QBH2     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
X-B 12635QAA8     LT  AA-sf   Affirmed     AA-sf
X-C 12635QAC4     LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed     BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Loss Expectations: Fitch's loss expectations have declined
since the prior rating action due to a combination of better than
expected performance in 2020 and improved recovery expectations on
several of the specially serviced loans. Twenty loans (37.5% of
pool), including nine (21.2%) in special servicing, were designated
as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs). No additional loans have
transferred to special servicing since Fitch's prior rating
action.

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 6.80%. The
Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D, E, and X-C reflect losses
that could reach 7.30% when factoring additional pandemic-related
stresses where Fitch is utilizing 2019 performance in its
analysis.

Fitch Loans of Concern/Specially Serviced Loans: The largest
contributor to Fitch's loss expectations and the seventh largest
loan in the pool, Hotel deLuxe (3.6%), was transferred to the
special servicer in June 2020 for imminent monetary default due to
the pandemic. The loan has been 90+ days delinquent since August
2020. The loan is secured by a 130 room, full-service hotel located
in Portland, Oregon in proximity to a number of attractions
including the Oregon Convention Center, Memorial Coliseum, MODA
Center and Portland International Airport.

Property-level NOI declined by 16% between 2018 and 2019, with NOI
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) falling to 1.34x at YE 2019 from
1.61x at YE 2018, which indicated the property was already facing
performance challenges prior to the coronavirus outbreak due to
increased competition. According to the March 2021 STR report, the
property is under renovation. Per the March 2020 STR report, the
hotel's TTM March 2020 occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 76%, $155 and
$118, respectively, which was below the 77%, $161 and $124 reported
for its competitive set and the 80%, $180 and $144 achieved by the
hotel around the time of issuance. Fitch's base case loss of 25% is
based on a stress to the most recent appraised value and reflects a
stressed value of approximately $190,000 per key.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses and the largest
specially serviced loan in the pool, NMS Los Angeles Multifamily
Portfolio (8.0%), transferred to the special servicer in July 2020
after the borrower requested coronavirus relief. The loan remains
current as of August 2021. The loan is secured by a portfolio of
six multifamily properties totaling 384 units and located in Santa
Monica, Los Angeles, Northridge and Canoga Park, California. As of
March 2021, the portfolio was 92.4% occupied, an improvement from
84% at YE 2020, 88% at YE 2019 and 92.2% at YE2018. The loan is
full-term interest only and matures in September 2025. The special
servicer continues to evaluate the borrower's COVID-19 relief
request. Fitch's modeled loss of 11% is based on the YE 2019 NOI
and takes into consideration the quality of the properties in the
portfolio and their strong locations.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses and the fourth
largest loan in the pool, The Drake (5.4%), is secured by a
leasehold interest in a 218-unit multifamily property located in
the Dupont Circle submarket of Washington, D.C. The property's
occupancy declined during the pandemic, to 72% as of March 2021 and
69% as of YE 2020 from 99% at issuance. YE 2020 NOI fell by 17%
from YE 2019, but remains 7% above Fitch's NOI at issuance. Fitch's
modeled loss of 11% reflects a 9% cap rate and a 5% stress to the
YE 2020 NOI.

The fourth largest contributor to modeled losses and the fifth
largest loan in the pool, Midwest Shopping Center Portfolio (4.2%),
transferred to the special servicer in July 2020 for imminent
monetary default due to the coronavirus pandemic. Per the servicer,
the mezzanine loan has been in payment default since April 2020 and
the servicer is moving forward to appoint a receiver and initiate
foreclosure proceedings. The loan's guarantor has been under
investigation for alleged connections to fraud and bribery. The
loan is secured by a portfolio of six retail properties located in
Iowa, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Missouri with a total of 889,413 sf.
As of April 2020, the property was 84.5% occupied, down from 90% at
issuance. The borrower has been delinquent in financial reporting
and no recent financials have been provided. YE 2019 NOI DSCR was
1.63x compared to 1.54x at YE 2018. Fitch's modeled loss of 14% is
based upon a 9% cap rate and 25% stress to the YE 2019 NOI.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the August 2021 remittance, the
aggregate pool balance has been paid down by 12.9% to $810.8
million from $931.6 million at issuance. Nine loans (10.4% of the
pool) are defeased, up from seven loans (7.6%) at Fitch's last
rating action. Eight loans (23.7%), including the two largest loans
in the pool, are full-term, interest only, and one loan (5.4%)
remains in its partial interest-only period and is set to expire
next month.

Exposure to Coronavirus Pandemic: Seven loans (12.8%) are secured
by hotel properties and 18 loans (20.8%) are secured by retail
properties. Fitch applied additional pandemic-related stresses to
the pre-pandemic cash flows for one hotel loan and two retail
loans; these additional pandemic-related stresses contributed to
the Negative Outlooks on classes D, E, and X-C.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 49.8% of the pool.
All loans mature in 2025. The largest property concentrations are
multifamily at 33.3%, retail at 20.8% and office at 20.2%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes D, E and X-C reflect performance
concerns over the FLOCs, including the high concentration of
specially serviced loans, as well as the ultimate impact of the
pandemic. The Stable Outlooks on classes A-3 through C, X-A and X-B
reflect the decline in loss expectations and increasing CE from
continued amortization.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

-- Stable to improved asset performance, particularly on the
    FLOCs, coupled with additional paydown and/or defeasance.
    Upgrades to the 'AA-sf' and 'A-sf' rated classes are not
    expected but would likely occur with significant improvement
    in CE and/or defeasance and/or the stabilization of
    performance for the properties impacted by the pandemic.
    Upgrades of the 'BBB-sf' and 'BB-sf' rated classes are
    considered unlikely in the near term and would be limited
    based on the sensitivity to concentrations or the potential
    for future concentrations.

-- Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were
    likelihood of interest shortfalls. The 'CCCsf' rated class is
    unlikely to be upgraded absent significant performance
    improvement on the FLOCs and substantially higher recoveries
    than expected on the specially serviced loans/assets.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to the super
    senior 'AAAsf'-rated classes are not likely due to their high
    CE, position in the capital structure and expected continued
    amortization, but could occur if there are interest
    shortfalls, or if a high proportion of the pool defaults and
    expected losses increase significantly. A downgrade to the
    junior 'AAAsf' rated class (class A-M) is possible should
    expected losses for the pool increase significantly and/or
    should many of the loans susceptible to the pandemic suffer
    losses.

-- Downgrades to 'AA-sf'- and 'A-sf'-rated classes are possible
    should performance of the FLOCs continue to decline, if
    additional loans transfer to special servicing and/or should
    loans susceptible to the pandemic not stabilize. Downgrades to
    'BBB-sf' and 'BB-sf' rated classes with Negative Outlooks
    would occur should loss expectations increase due to an
    increase in specially serviced loans, the disposition of a
    specially serviced loan/asset at a high loss above
    expectations, or continued performance declines of the FLOCs.
    The Negative Outlooks may be revised back to Stable if
    performance of the FLOCs improves and/or properties vulnerable
    to the pandemic stabilize. The 'CCCsf' rated class could be
    further downgraded should losses become more certain or are
    realized.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CSMC 2021-INV1: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on Class B-5 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CSMC
2021-INV1 Trust's mortgage-backed notes.

The issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by first-lien,
fixed-rate, fully amortizing residential mortgage loans secured by
one- to four-family residential properties, planned-unit
developments, and condominiums to prime borrowers. The pool
consists of 7,158 investor mortgage loans and 130
secondary-occupancy mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on the preliminary private
placement memorandum term sheet dated Aug. 24, 2021. Subsequent
information may result in the assignment of final ratings that
differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The high-quality collateral in the pool;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement;

-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;

-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework;

-- The three originators contributing collateral to this
transaction;

-- The geographic concentration;

-- The due diligence results consistent with the represented loan
characteristics; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned(i)

  CSMC 2021-INV1 Trust

  Class A-1, $255,759,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $236,675,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3, $198,807,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3A, $198,807,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3X, $198,807,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-4, $149,105,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-4A, $149,105,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-4X, $149,105,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-5, $49,702,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-5A, $49,702,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-5X, $49,702,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-6, $119,284,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-6A, $119,284,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-6X, $119,284,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-7, $79,523,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-7A, $79,523,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-7X, $79,523,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-8, $29,821,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-8A, $29,821,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-8X, $29,821,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-9, $12,216,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-9A, $12,216,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-9X, $12,216,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-10, $37,486,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-10A, $37,486,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-10X, $37,486,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-11, $37,868,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-11X, $37,868,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-12, $37,868,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-13, $37,868,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-14, $19,084,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-15, $19,084,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-X1, $255,759,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-X2, $255,759,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-X3, $37,868,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class A-X4, $19,084,000(ii): AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $6,266,000: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $5,847,000: A (sf)
  Class B-3, $4,734,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-4, $2,645,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-5, $1,810,000: B (sf)
  Class B-6, $1,392,929: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, $278,453,929 (ii): Not rated
  Class PT, $278,453,929(ii): Not rated
  Class R, not applicable: Not rated

(i)The collateral and structural information in this report reflect
the preliminary private placement memorandum dated Aug. 24, 2021.

(ii)Notional balance.

IO--Interest only.



DT AUTO 2021-3: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2021-3:

-- $251,900,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $57,200,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $73,700,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $98,450,000 Class D Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $15,950,000 Class E Notes at BB (low) (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of the following
analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund, and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under
various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

(2) DTAOT 2021-3 provides for Classes A, B, C, D, and E coverage
multiples that are slightly below the DBRS Morningstar range of
multiples set forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS
Morningstar believes that this is warranted, given the magnitude of
expected loss, company history, and structural features of the
transaction.

(3) The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 28.55% based on the
expected pool composition.

(4) The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, available in its
commentary "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios - June 2021 Update,"
published on June 18, 2021. DBRS Morningstar initially published
macroeconomic scenarios on April 16, 2020, which have been
regularly updated. The scenarios were last updated on June 18,
2021, and are reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis. The
assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined
in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as the
primary anchor for the current ratings. The moderate scenario
factors in continued success in containment during the second half
of 2021, enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

(5) The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

(6) The quality and consistency of historical static pool data for
DriveTime originations and performance of the DriveTime auto loan
portfolio.

(7) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the nonconsolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with DriveTime, that the trust has a
valid first-priority security interest in the assets, and the
consistency with the "DBRS Morningstar Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance."

The transaction represents a securitization of a portfolio of motor
vehicle retail installment sales contracts originated by DriveTime
Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator). The Originator is a
direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of DriveTime. DriveTime is a
leading used-vehicle retailer in the United States that focuses
primarily on the sale and financing of vehicles to the subprime
market.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 55.70% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated Notes in the pool,
the reserve account (1.50%), and overcollateralization (9.60%). The
ratings on the Class B, C, D, and E Notes reflect 45.30%, 31.90%,
14.00%, and 11.10% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2021-3: S&P Assigns BB (sf) Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Exeter Automobile
Receivables Trust 2021-3's automobile receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 59.2%, 51.7%, 43.3%, 34.6%,
and 27.5% credit support for the class A (made up of classes A-1,
A-2, and A-3), B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on
stressed cash flow scenarios (including excess spread). This credit
support provides coverage of approximately 2.90x, 2.50x, 2.05x,
1.55x, and 1.27x S&P's 19.75%-20.75% expected cumulative net loss
range. These break-even scenarios withstand cumulative gross losses
of approximately 91.1%, 79.6%, 69.2%, 55.4%, and 44.1%,
respectively.

-- S&P's expectation for timely interest and principal payments on
the notes, based on stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which,
in its view, are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.55x our expected loss level), all else being equal, our ratings
will be within the credit stability limits specified by section A.4
of the Appendix in "S&P Global Ratings Definitions," published Jan.
5, 2021.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction.

-- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
structures.

  Ratings Assigned

  Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2021-3

  Class A-1, $124.00 million: A-1+ (sf)
  Class A-2, $309.89 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3, $199.80 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $206.55 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $189.17 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $187.16 million: BBB (sf)
  Class E, $80.22 million: BB (sf)



FIRST INVESTORS 2021-2: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to First Investors Auto
Owner Trust 2021-2's asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an ABS securitization backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The availability of approximately 36.5%, 31.4%, 24.6%, 19.3%,
and 15.6% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including
excess spread). These credit support levels provide approximately
3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.40x coverage of S&P's
9.75%-10.25% expected cumulative net loss range for the class A, B,
C, D, and E notes, respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments by the legal final
maturity date made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that
we deem appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.

-- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.75x our expected loss level), all else being equal, S&P's
ratings will be within the limits specified within the credit
stability section of "S&P Global Ratings Definitions," published
Jan. 5, 2021.

-- The collateral characteristics of the pool, which includes
44.91% of direct-originated loans. Direct loans, historically, have
lower losses than indirect-originated loans.

-- The prefunding that will be used in this transaction in the
amount of approximately $64.55 million, about 20% of the pool. The
subsequent receivables, with eligibility criteria similar to those
established for the initial receivables pool, are expected to be
transferred into the trust within three months from the closing
date.

-- First Investors Financial Services Inc.'s 31-year history of
originating and underwriting auto loans, 18-year history of
self-servicing auto loans, track record of securitizing auto loans
since 2000, and 14 years of origination static pool data, segmented
by direct and indirect loans.

-- Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s experience as the committed back-up
servicer.

-- The transaction's sequential payment and credit structure,
which builds credit enhancement based on a percentage of
receivables as the pool amortizes.

  Ratings Assigned

  First Investors Auto Owner Trust 2021-2

  Class A, $249.44 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $21.94 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $26.81 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $17.06 million: BBB (sf)
  Class E, $9.75 million: BB- (sf)



FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-7: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-7 to be issued by Flagstar
Mortgage Trust 2021-7 as follows:

-- $561.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $561.9 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $337.1 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $337.1 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $421.4 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $421.4 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $449.5 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $449.5 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.3 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.3 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.1 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.1 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.4 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.4 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.4 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.4 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $140.5 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $140.5 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.8 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.8 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $63.5 million Class A-21 at AAA (sf)
-- $63.5 million Class A-22 at AAA (sf)
-- $625.4 million Class A-23 at AAA (sf)
-- $625.4 million Class A-24 at AAA (sf)
-- $625.4 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $561.9 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $337.1 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $421.4 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $449.5 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.3 million Class A-X-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.1 million Class A-X-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.4 million Class A-X-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.4 million Class A-X-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $140.5 million Class A-X-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.8 million Class A-X-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $63.5 million Class A-X-22 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.2 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $13.2 million Class B-1-A at AA (sf)
-- $13.2 million Class B-1-X at AA (sf)
-- $7.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $7.6 million Class B-2-A at A (sf)
-- $7.6 million Class B-2-X at A (sf)
-- $7.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.6 million Class B-3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $7.6 million Class B-3-X at BBB (sf)
-- $2.6 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.3 million Class B-5 at B (sf)
-- $28.4 million Class B at BBB (sf)
-- $28.4 million Class B-X at BBB (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-4, A-X-6, A-X-8, A-X-10, A-X-12, A-X-14,
A-X-16, A-X-18, A-X-20, A-X-22, B-1-X, B-2-X, B-3-X, and B-X are
interest-only certificates. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-11, A-13, A-14,
A-15, A-17, A-18, A-19, A-20, A-21, A-23, A-24, A-X-2, A-X-6,
A-X-8, A-X-14, A-X-18, A-X-20, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-X, and B are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11,
A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-16, A-17, A-18, A-19, and A-20
certificates are super-senior certificates. These classes benefit
from additional protection from the senior support certificates
(Classes A-21 and A-22) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 5.40% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 3.40%, 2.25%,
1.10%, 0.70%, and 0.50% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien, fixed-rate, prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 740 loans with a total principal
balance of $661,063,941 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 1, 2021).

Flagstar Bank, FSB is the originator and servicer of all mortgage
loans and the sponsor of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as
the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator, and Custodian.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will serve as Trustee.
PentAlpha Surveillance LLC will act as the Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of 30 years. Approximately 9.4% of the
pool are agency eligible mortgage loans that were eligible for
purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

As of the Cut-Off Date, none of the loans are currently subject to
a coronavirus-related forbearance plan. In the event a borrower
requests or enters into a coronavirus-related forbearance plan
after the Cut-Off Date but prior to the Closing Date, the Sponsor
will remove such loan from the mortgage pool and remit the related
Closing Date substitution amount. Loans that enter a
coronavirus-related forbearance plan after the Closing Date will
remain in the pool.

Coronavirus Pandemic Impact

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. DBRS Morningstar saw increases in
delinquencies for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes shortly after the onset of the pandemic.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term payment reliefs that
may perform very differently from traditional delinquencies. At the
onset of the pandemic, the option to forebear mortgage payments was
widely available and it drove forbearances to a very high level.
When the dust settled, coronavirus-induced forbearances in 2020
performed better than expected, thanks to government aid, low
loan-to-value ratios, and good underwriting in the mortgage market
in general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes, delinquencies
have been gradually trending down in recent months as the
forbearance period comes to an end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-7: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-5 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has assigned final ratings to Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-7
(FSMT 2021-7).

DEBT             RATING             PRIOR
----             ------             -----
FSMT 2021-7

A-1       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-2       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-3       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-4       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-5       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-6       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-7       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-8       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-9       LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-10      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-11      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-12      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-13      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-14      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-15      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-16      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-17      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-18      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-19      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-20      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-21      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-22      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-23      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-24      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-1     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-2     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-4     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-6     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-8     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-10    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-12    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-14    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-16    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-18    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-20    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-22    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
B-1       LT  AAsf   New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-1-A     LT  AAsf   New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-1-X     LT  AAsf   New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-2       LT  Asf    New Rating    A(EXP)sf
B-2-A     LT  Asf    New Rating    A(EXP)sf
B-2-X     LT  Asf    New Rating    A(EXP)sf
B-3       LT  BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
B-3-A     LT  BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
B-3-X     LT  BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
B-4       LT  BBsf   New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
B-5       LT  Bsf    New Rating    B(EXP)sf
B-6-C     LT  NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B         LT  BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
B-X       LT  BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
LT-R      LT  NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
R         LT  NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch assigned final ratings to the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-7 (FSMT 2021-7)
as indicated above. The certificates are supported by 740 newly
originated, fixed-rate, prime-quality first liens on one- to
four-family residential homes and condominiums. The pool consists
of both non-agency jumbo and agency eligible mortgage loans. The
total balance of these loans is approximately $661 million, as of
the cutoff date. This is the 17th post-financial crisis issuance
from Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar) that was rated by Fitch.

The pool comprises loans that Flagstar originated through its
retail, broker and correspondent channels. The transaction is
similar to previous Fitch-rated prime transactions, with a standard
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest deal structure. 100% of the
loans in the pool were underwritten to the Ability to Repay rule
and qualify as safe-harbor or temporary qualified mortgages (SHQMs
and TQMs, respectively). Flagstar (RPS2/Stable) will be the
servicer, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (RMS1-/Negative) will be the
master servicer.

Fitch upgraded Flagstar's servicer rating from RPS2-/Negative to
RPS2/Stable after the presale for FSMT 2021-7 was published. The
upgrade to RPS2/Stable is viewed favorably by Fitch, but did not
have an impact on Fitch's loss expectation, analysis, or ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Prime Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of
very high-quality, 30-year fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans to
prime quality borrowers. The loans were made to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, relatively low leverage and large liquid
reserves. The loans are seasoned at an average of two months,
according to Fitch (two months per the transaction documents). The
pool has a weighted average (WA) original FICO score of 771 and
32.3% DTI (as determined by Fitch), which is indicative of a very
high credit-quality borrower.

Approximately 77.8% of the loans have a borrower with an original
FICO score at or above 750. In addition, Fitch determined the
original WA combined loan to value ratio to be 66.6%, translating
to a sustainable loan to value ratio of 75.1%, represents
substantial borrower equity in the property and reduced default
risk.

The pool consists of 93.6% of loans where the borrower maintains a
primary residence, while 6.4% is a second home. Single-family homes
comprise 94.8% of the pool, and condominiums make up 3.9%. Cashout
refinances comprise 13.1% of the pool, purchases, 45.5%, and
rate-term refinances, 41.4%. All the loans were originated through
a retail channel.

A total of 186 loans in the pool are over $1 million, and the
largest loan is $2.5 million.

No loans in the pool were made to foreign nationals/non-permanent
residents. Fitch viewed this as a positive attribute for the
transaction. In addition, there are no loans in the pool that have
their QM status determined by APOR QM standard.

Shifting-Interest Structure and Full Servicer Advancing (Mixed):
The mortgage cash flow and loss allocation are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure whereby the
subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal and are locked
out from receiving unscheduled principal or prepayments for five
years. The lockout feature helps maintain subordination for a
longer period should losses occur later in the life of the deal.
The applicable credit support percentage feature redirects
subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if specified
credit enhancement (CE) levels are not maintained.

The servicer, Flagstar (RPS2/Stable), will provide full advancing
for the life of the transaction. Although full P&I advancing will
provide liquidity to the certificates, it will also increase the
loan-level loss severity since the servicer looks to recoup P&I
advances from liquidation proceeds, which results in less
recoveries. Wells Fargo Bank (servicer rating of RMS1-/Negative;
IDR of AA-/Negative) is the master servicer in this transaction and
will advance delinquent P&I on the loans if Flagstar is not able
to.

Subordination Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor
of 0.80% has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk
and loss exposure for senior tranches as the pool size declines and
performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and
small loan count concentration. Additionally, a junior
subordination floor of 0.60% has been considered to mitigate
potential tail-end risk and loss exposure for subordinate tranches
as the pool size declines and performance volatility increases due
to adverse loan selection and small loan count concentration.

Updated Economic Risk Factor (Positive): Consistent with the
"Additional Scenario Analysis" section of Fitch's "U.S. RMBS
Coronavirus-Related Analytical Assumptions" criteria, Fitch will
consider applying additional scenario analysis based on stressed
assumptions as described in the section to remain consistent with
significant revisions to its macroeconomic baseline scenario or if
actual performance data indicate the current assumptions require
reconsideration.

In response to revisions made to Fitch's macroeconomic baseline
scenario, observed actual performance data, and the unexpected
development in the health crisis arising from the advancement and
availability of Covid-19 vaccines, Fitch reconsidered the
application of the coronavirus-related Economic Risk Factor (ERF)
floors of 2.0 and used ERF floors of 1.5 and 1.0 for the 'BBsf' and
'Bsf' rating stresses, respectively. Fitch's June 2021 Global
Economic Outlook and related base-line economic scenario forecasts
have been revised to a 6.8% U.S. GDP growth for 2021 and 3.9% for
2022 following a -3.5% GDP growth in 2020.

Additionally, Fitch's U.S. unemployment forecasts for 2021 and 2022
are 5.6% and 4.5%, respectively, which is down from 8.1% in 2020.
These revised forecasts support Fitch reverting to the 1.5 and 1.0
ERF floors described in its "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria."

The B-5 certificates passed Fitch's 'BBsf' stresses, however the
committee decided to assign a 'Bsf' rating to the class due to its
position in the capital structure and tranche size.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how
    the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
    (MVDs) than assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was
    conducted at the state and national levels to assess the
    effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower
    MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

-- This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in
    addition to the model-projected 42.0% at 'AAA'. The analysis
    indicates that there is some potential rating migration with
    higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
    projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
    prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how
    the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
    (MVDs) than assumed at the MSA level. Sensitivity analyses was
    conducted at the state and national levels to assess the
    effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower
    MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to positive home price growth of
    10% with no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class,
    which is already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there
    is potential positive rating migration for all the rated
    classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result
    in a full category upgrade for the rated class excluding those
    being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Canopy Financial Technology Partners, LLC. The
third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on credit,
compliance, property valuation and data integrity. Fitch considered
this information in its analysis. Fitch applied an adjustment to
losses based on the unreviewed population of the pool as described
below. A credit was given to loans that received a due diligence
review, which decreased Fitch's loss expectations by 7bps at the
'AAAsf' rating stress.

The sample was determined by a statistically significant selection
methodology based on a 95% confidence level with a 5% error rate.
Flagstar adopted this methodology in 2019 when it had previously
selected loans for review at a fixed rate. For loans that were
reviewed, the diligence scope consisted of a review of credit,
regulatory compliance, property valuation and data integrity. Both
the sample size and review scope are consistent with Fitch criteria
for diligence sampling.

100% of the loans in the review sample received a final diligence
grade of 'A' or 'B' and the results did not indicate material
defects. The sample exhibited strong adherence to underwriting
guidelines as approximately 98% of loans received a final credit
grade of 'A'.

The sample had a low concentration of compliance 'B' exceptions
(2.8%) compared to the average prime jumbo non-agency transactions
(46%). Approximately 0.4% of loans in the sample had initial TRID
exceptions graded 'C' that were ultimately cured to a 'B' by
Flagstar through the re-issuance of post-closing documentation.
While Fitch does not typically adjust its loss expectations for
compliance 'B' exceptions, due diligence was only performed on 34%
of the initial pool, which led Fitch to extrapolate the findings to
the remainder of the pool.

Since more than half of the pool did not receive due diligence,
Fitch assumed that 0.4% of the non-reviewed loans have potential
TRID exceptions that would be identified as material and not cured
with post-closing documentation. Fitch applies a standard loss
adjustment of $15,500 to the loss amount for material TRID
exceptions as these loans can carry an increased risk of statutory
damages. However, the aggregate loss severity adjustment was
negligible at the 'AAAsf' level, and Fitch did not make any further
adjustments to the model output.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on approximately 34% of the pool. The third-party due
diligence was generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating
Criteria," and Canopy Financial Technology Partners, LLC was
engaged to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement
were given compliance, credit and valuation grades, and assigned
initial grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers
were noted in the due diligence reports. Refer to the "Third-Party
Due Diligence" section for more detail.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered to be
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


FRTKL 2021-SFR1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Single-Family Rental
Pass-Through Certificates to be issued by FRTKL 2021-SFR1 Trust
(FRTKL 2021-SFR1) as follows:

-- $143.3 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B at AAA (sf)
-- $21.8 million Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- $24.7 million Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- $29.4 million Class E-1 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $32.3 million Class E-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $24.7 million Class F at BB (sf)
-- $28.5 million Class G at B (high) (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A and B Certificates reflects
60.3% and 52.6% of credit enhancement provided by subordinated
notes in the pool. The AA (high) (sf), A (high) (sf), BBB (high)
(sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (sf), and B (high) (sf) ratings reflect
46.6%, 39.7%, 31.6%, 22.6%, 15.8%, and 7.9% credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

FRTKL 2021-SFR1 ) 1,791 properties are in 17 states, with the
largest concentration by broker price opinion value in Texas
(26.6%). The largest metropolitan statistical area (MSA) by value
is Oklahoma City (12.9%), followed by Amarillo, Texas (10.9%). The
geographic concentration dictates the home-price stresses applied
to the portfolio and the resulting market value decline (MVD). The
MVD at the AAA (sf) rating level for this deal is 48.5%. FRTKL
2021-SFR1 has properties from 78 MSAs, many of which experienced
dramatic home price index declines in the housing crisis of 2008.

DBRS Morningstar assigned the provisional ratings for each class of
certificates by performing a quantitative and qualitative
collateral, structural, and legal analysis. This analysis uses DBRS
Morningstar's single-family rental subordination model and is based
on DBRS Morningstar's published criteria. DBRS Morningstar
developed property-level stresses for the analysis of single-family
rental assets. DBRS Morningstar will finalize the provisional
ratings on each class based on the level of stresses each class can
withstand and whether such stresses are commensurate with the
applicable rating level. DBRS Morningstar's analysis includes
estimated base-case net cash flows (NCFs) by evaluating the gross
rent, concession, vacancy, operating expenses, and capital
expenditure data. The DBRS Morningstar NCF analysis resulted in a
minimum debt service coverage ratio of higher than 1.0 times.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



GCAT 2021-NQM4: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to GCAT
2021-NQM4 Trust's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, fully amortizing, and
interest-only residential mortgage loans primarily secured by
single-family residential properties, planned-unit developments,
condominiums, condotels, townhomes, two- to four-family residential
properties, and manufactured housing properties to both prime and
nonprime borrowers. The pool has 463 loans, which are nonqualified
or ability-to-repay (ATR)-exempt mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of August 20,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The asset pool's collateral composition;
-- The transaction's credit enhancement;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The transaction's geographic concentration;
-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework;
-- The mortgage aggregator, Blue River Mortgage III LLC; and
-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Preliminary Ratings(i) Assigned

  GCAT 2021-NQM4

  Class A-1, $198,749,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1X, $198,749,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $15,133,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $28,393,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $11,250,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $6,563,000; BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $4,553,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $3,214,876: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, Notional(ii): Not rated
  Class X, Notional(ii): Not rated
  Class R, N/A: Not rated

(i)The information in this report reflects the term sheet dated
August 18, 2021. The preliminary ratings address the ultimate
payment of interest and principal.

(ii)The notional amount will equal the aggregate principal balance
of the mortgage loans as of the first day of the related due
period, which initially is $267,855,876.



GOLDENTREE LOAN 8: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating on F-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
X-R, A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, E-R, and F-R replacement notes from
GoldenTree Loan Management U.S. CLO 8 Ltd./GoldenTree Loan
Management U.S. CLO 8 LLC, a CLO originally issued in August 2020
that is managed by GoldenTree Loan Management II GP LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Sept. 3, 2021 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes will be used to redeem the original notes. S&P
said, "At that time, we expect to withdraw our ratings on the
original notes and assign ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm our
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which outlines the terms of the replacement notes.
According to the proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class X-R, A-R, C-R, and D-R notes are expected
to be issued at a lower spread over three-month LIBOR than the
original notes.

-- The replacement class E-R and F-R notes are expected to be
issued at a higher spread over three-month LIBOR than the original
notes.

-- The replacement class B-R notes are expected to be issued at a
floating spread, replacing the current class B-1 floating spread
and class B-2 fixed coupon notes.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended
3.25 years.

-- The EU risk retention language and benchmark replacement
language related to the workout assets are expected to be amended.

-- A cap of 2.5% on the senior unsecured bonds will be added.

-- Of the identified underlying collateral obligations, 99.72%
have credit ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- Of the identified underlying collateral obligations, 95.99%
have recovery ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  GoldenTree Loan Management U.S. CLO 8 Ltd./
  GoldenTree Loan Management U.S. CLO 8 LLC

  Class X-R, $3.20 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-R, $330.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R, $68.10 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $31.40 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $31.40 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $19.70 million: BB- (sf)
  Class F-R (deferrable), $10.50 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $21.35 million: Not rated



GOLDMAN SACHS 2019-GC42: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on G-RR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Goldman Sachs Mortgage
Securities Trust 2019-GC42 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

    DEBT                RATING           PRIOR
    ----                ------           -----
GSMS 2019-GC42

A-1 36257UAH0     LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-2 36257UAJ6     LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-3 36257UAK3     LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-4 36257UAL1     LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-AB 36257UAM9    LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-S 36257UAQ0     LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
B 36257UAR8       LT AA-sf   Affirmed    AA-sf
C 36257UAS6       LT A-sf    Affirmed    A-sf
D 36257UAA5       LT BBBsf   Affirmed    BBBsf
E 36257UAC1       LT BBB-sf  Affirmed    BBB-sf
F-RR 36257UAD9    LT BB-sf   Affirmed    BB-sf
G-RR 36257UAE7    LT B-sf    Affirmed    B-sf
X-A 36257UAN7     LT AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
X-B 36257UAP2     LT A-sf    Affirmed    A-sf
X-D 36257UAB3     LT BBB-sf  Affirmed    BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The overall pool performance remains relatively
stable. Five loans (8.0%) are flagged as Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOC), one of which is delinquent and in special servicing.
Fitch's ratings incorporate a base case loss of 4.4%.

The largest FLOC is Millennium Park Plaza (2.8% of the pool). It is
secured by a 560,083-sf mixed-use tower located in Chicago,
Illinois comprising 557 multifamily units, 64,465 sf of office
space and 18,450 sf of retail space. The subject is well-located in
the downtown Chicago Loop, approximately two blocks north of Maggie
Daley Park and two-and-a half blocks west of the Chicago River. YE
2020 occupancy was 85%, down from 93% at issuance.

The decline is primarily attributable to the property's multifamily
component, which was 82.7% occupied as of October 2020 down from
99.8% at issuance. Fitch's modeled loss of 4.6% reflects the
property's strong location and the expectation that ongoing
performance is likely to stabilize.

114 Fordham Road (0.7% of the pool) is the only specially serviced
loan in the pool. The loan is secured by an 8,350-sf unanchored
retail property located in Bronx, NY. It transferred to special
servicing in April 2020 due to imminent default. The subject
property was closed for several months during 2020 due to NY
pandemic orders with the majority of the tenants not paying rent.
The borrower and servicer are discussing the terms of a loan
modification/forbearance. A recent appraisal indicates a property
value that is in excess of the total loan exposure.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement: As of the August 2021
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
0.36% to $1.057 billion from $1.060 billion at issuance. The pool
contains 28 loans that are full interest-only (82.0% of the pool),
five loans that are partial interest-only (8.8% of the pool), and
five loans that are amortizing balloon loans (9.2% of the pool). At
issuance, based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool was
expected to pay down by 3.2% prior to maturity, which is lower than
the average for transactions of a similar vintage. There has been
no defeasance, no loans have paid off and there have been no
recognized losses.

Coronavirus Exposure: Hotel properties represent 4.4% of the pool.
These loans were modeled with an additional haircut to the
pre-pandemic figures, given the significant declines to 2020 NOI
related to reduced reservations and/or temporary closures as a
result of the pandemic.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the 'AA-sf' through
    'AAAsf' rated-classes are not considered likely as performance
    remains stable and they are senior in the capital structure
    but may occur should interest shortfalls affect these classes.
    Downgrades to the 'BBB-sf' through 'A-sf' rated classes may
    occur should expected losses for the pool increase
    substantially. Downgrades to the 'B-sf' and 'BB-sf' rated
    classes would occur should base case losses expectations
    increase and/or as losses are realized.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The Stable Outlooks on classes reflect the overall stable
    performance of the majority of the pool and expected continued
    amortization.

-- Stable to improved asset performance, particularly on the
    FLOCs, coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the
    'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' rated classes would likely occur with
    significant improvement in credit enhancement (CE) and/or
    defeasance; however, adverse selection and increased
    concentrations, or underperformance of the FLOCs, could cause
    this trend to reverse.

-- Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' and below-rated classes are considered
    unlikely in the near term and would be limited based on
    sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
    concentrations. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
    there is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. Additionally, an
    upgrade to the 'BB-sf' and 'B-sf' rated classes is not likely
    until later years of the transaction and only if the
    performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or there is
    sufficient CE, which would likely occur when the nonrated
    class is not eroded and the senior classes pay off.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


HAYFIN US XIV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Hayfin US XIV
Ltd./Hayfin US XIV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Hayfin Capital Management LLC.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Hayfin US XIV Ltd./Hayfin US XIV LLC

  Class A-1, $290.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-F, $10.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $64.80 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $28.80 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $28.80 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $18.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $47.37 million: Not rated



HMH TRUST 2017-NSS: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-NSS issued by HMH Trust
2017-NSS as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Negative. The Interest in Arrears designation on
Class E has been removed, as shortfalls were recouped.

DBRS Morningstar maintained the Negative trends on all classes to
reflect the continued stress the underlying collateral faces amid
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the unknowns
surrounding the workout for the loan, which is in special servicing
and has been delinquent for more than a year with more than $11.0
million of total outstanding advances as of the August 2021
remittance.

The loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2020 as a
result of imminent monetary default after the borrower stopped
making debt service payments in April 2020 and requested
coronavirus-related relief. While there were initial discussions of
the mezzanine lender taking title through a loan assumption and
modification, terms were not reached. Amid the workout
negotiations, the controlling class representative exercised its
right to replace the special servicer, appointing Midland Loan
Services to take over for AEGON USA Realty Advisors, LLC. The
borrower has since consented to a court-appointed receiver that has
the authority to sell the assets through the receivership. Broker
proposals have been obtained and the servicer is currently
evaluating which broker to use and when to take the portfolio out
to market.

At issuance, the collateral was valued at an as-is value of $356.6
million ($123,690 per key). The special servicer obtained an
updated appraisal in November 2020 that estimated a cumulative
as-is value of $173.2 million ($60,076 per key). A second appraisal
was obtained in February 2021, with a cumulative as-is value of
$295.8 million ($102,601 per key). The cumulative appraised value
amount resulted in an adequate loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 69.0%
based on the mortgage balance; however, the February 2021 value is
26.1% lower than the cumulative appraised value at issuance. In
addition, the LTV ratio increases to 72.7% when including the
outstanding servicer advances. The February 2021 appraisal reports
indicate value-add potential to the portfolio, projecting a
stabilized value of $396.9 million ($137,669 per key), with
stabilization periods in a two- or three-year time frame, beyond
loan maturity. Per a Q2 2021 Smith Travel Research report, the
portfolio had year-to-date occupancy, average daily rate, and
revenue per available room figures of 56.0%, $113, and $65,
respectively, reflecting penetration rates of 111.5%, 112.5%, and
128.1%, respectively.

The $204.0 million ($70,760 per key) trust loan is secured by the
fee-simple interest in one hotel and leasehold interests in 21
hotels across nine different states, with the largest
concentrations in California, Florida, and North Carolina. The
properties have solid brand affiliation, with either Hilton
Worldwide Holdings Inc., Hyatt Hotels Corporation, Marriott
International, Inc., or Choice Hotel International, Inc. flags on
each hotel. All franchise agreements expire subsequent to loan
maturity. Nearly half the pool operates as extended-stay hotels,
with the remaining operating as either limited-service or
select-service hotels.

The capital stack includes a $25.0 million mezzanine loan held
outside of the trust, and the trust permits an additional $26.0
million mezzanine loan; however, additional mezzanine debt has not
been obtained. The mezzanine loans are co-terminus with the trust
mortgage loan, which matures in July 2022. All loans, except for
the Choice Comfort Inn—Fayetteville hotel, are encumbered by a
ground lease. According to the servicer, the receiver has been
paying ground lease payments from portfolio cash flow. The sponsor
for the loan is Jay H. Shidler, founder of The Shidler Group, which
was founded in 1972 and is headquartered in Honolulu.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ICON BRAND 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'B- (sf)' Rating on Class A-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B- (sf)' ratings on Icon Brand
Holdings LLC's series 2012-1 class A-1, A-2, and series 2013-1
class A-2 notes before withdrawing them at the issuer's request.

Icon Brand Holdings LLC is a corporate securitization transaction
backed by royalty payments from licensing agreements associated
with various brands managed by Iconix Brand Group Inc. (Iconix,
NR/--). S&P Global Ratings discontinued its 'CCC-' corporate credit
rating on Iconix because the company was acquired by private
holding company Lancer Capital LLC and the Iconix's term loan was
repaid as part of the acquisition.

Since the securitization closed in November 2012, the class A-2
notes have paid down significantly to an outstanding balance of
$312.12 million, approximately 36% of the initial issuance, and the
A-1 variable-funding note is drawn at $93.52 million.

The class A-1 senior notes pay interest at three-month LIBOR or the
commercial paper funding rate plus a fixed margin. In 2017, the
Financial Conduct Authority, which oversees LIBOR administration,
announced that it will not compel banks to continue providing LIBOR
quotes after December 2021. In 2019, the Federal Reserve's
Alternative Reference Rates Committee published recommended
guidelines for fallback language in new securitizations, and the
language in the transaction is generally consistent with its key
principles: trigger events, a list of alternative rates, and a
spread adjustment.

All timely interest has been paid. The transaction has an interest
reserve account to cover any liquidity issues that would impair
timely interest payments for up to three months.

While the debt service coverage had been steadily decreasing since
the deal closed through September 2019, the interest-only debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) has remained relatively constant.
Since it is in rapid amortization and there is no scheduled
principal, S&P looks to the interest-only DSCR to compare
performance over time. The transaction breached various cash trap
DSCR (principal plus interest) triggers over the last three years,
including a 100% cash trapping mechanism in January 2019 and a
rapid amortization event in April 2019. As of the June 30, 2021,
payment date report, the DSCR was 2.03x.

  Table 1
  
  Principal And Interest DSCR Triggers

  DSCR trigger (x)        Cash trap (%)   Commencement date
            1.45                    25    July 25, 2018
            1.35                    50    Oct. 25, 2018
            1.25                   100    Jan. 25, 2019
            1.10    Rapid amortization    April 25, 2019

  DSCR--Debt service coverage ratio.

A manager termination event and an event of default will be
triggered if the interest-only DSCR drops below 1.20x and 1.10x,
respectively. The current interest-only DSCR is 2.03x.

S&P said, "In our stressed cash flow runs, the transaction can pay
timely interest and ultimate principal before the legal final
maturity in the indicative rating's stressed scenario.

"Per our corporate securitization criteria, the business volatility
score considers the vulnerable business risk profile of Iconix.
After applying the five analytical steps in this criteria and
reviewing legal, operational, counterparty, and credit analysis, we
affirmed our 'B- (sf)' ratings on the notes before withdrawing the
rating."

  RATINGS AFFIRMED AND WITHDRAWN

  Icon Brand Holdings LLC, Series 2012-1

                       Rating        Current outstanding
  Class               To   From       balance   (mil. $)
  A-1                 NR   B- (sf)                93.525
  A-2                 NR   B- (sf)               210.282
  Series 2013-1 A-2   NR   B- (sf)               101.834

  NR--Not rated.



IMPERIAL FUND 2021-NQM2: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on B-2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Imperial Fund Mortgage
Trust 2021-NQM2's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate fully amortizing residential
mortgage loans that are secured by single-family residential
properties, planned-unit developments, condominiums, and two- to
four-family residential properties to prime and nonprime borrowers.
The pool has 523 loans backed by 533 properties, which are
non-qualified or exempt mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition and geographic
concentration;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, and representation and warranty (R&W) framework;

-- The mortgage originators, primarily A&D Mortgage LLC; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and the liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Ratings Assigned

  Imperial Fund Mortgage Trust 2021-NQM2(i)

  Class A-1, $161,924,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $17,807,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $27,541,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $10,328,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $8,073,000: BB+ (sf)
  Class B-2, $6,885,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $4,867,844: NR
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): NR
  Class X, notional(ii): NR
  Class R, not applicable: NR

(i)The ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.

(ii)Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal
balance.

NR--Not rated.



JAMESTOWN CLO IX: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating D-RR Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Jamestown
CLO IX Ltd.'s floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 23,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Jamestown CLO IX Ltd.

  Class X, $4.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1-RR, $247.50 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-RR, $47.70 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-RR, $29.70 million: A (sf)
  Class C-RR, $23.10 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-RR, $15.30 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $61.825 million: Not rated


MAN GLG 2021-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to $18.375MM D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Man GLG US CLO 2021-1 Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Man
GLG 2021-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$224,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$38,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class B-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned A2 (sf)

US$5,500,000 Class B-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned A2 (sf)

US$20,125,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,375,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Man GLG 2021-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured
loans and permitted non-loan assets (i.e., senior secured bonds and
senior secured floating rate notes). The portfolio is approximately
95% ramped as of the closing date.

GLG LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five-year reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to
certain restrictions, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $350,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2841

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


MANHATTAN WEST 2020-1MW: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on HRR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued by Manhattan
West Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction, which remains in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations. The transaction is collateralized by a trophy
70-story Class A office building in the Hudson Yards submarket of
Manhattan. The property is certified Gold in Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design and boasts panoramic views of the Hudson
River to the west, midtown to the east, and the financial district
to the south. The building was completed in July 2019 and is a
component of Brookfield Property Partners' larger Manhattan West
mixed-use development project.

The $1.8 billion whole loan is composed of six senior A notes
totaling $1.150 billion, five junior B notes totaling $350 million,
a senior mezzanine loan totaling $100 million, and a junior
mezzanine loan totaling $200 million. Five of the six senior A
notes and all of the junior B notes are securitized in this
transaction for a total trust balance of $1.43 billion. Both
mezzanine loans are held by third parties. The whole loan proceeds
were used to refinance existing construction financing, return
equity to the sponsor, fund upfront reserves, and pay closing
costs. Based on the appraiser's as-is valuation of $2.525 billion,
the sponsor had approximately $725 million of unencumbered market
equity remaining in the property at the time of issuance.

The building benefits from long-term, institutional-grade tenancy
with a weighted-average remaining lease term of roughly 17 years,
which has largely shielded the property from any short- or
medium-term dislocations in the Manhattan office market resulting
from the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. There is
virtually zero lease rollover during the loan term and existing
tenants have contractual rent increases built into many of their
leases. The earliest scheduled lease expirations of any of the
major tenants (Skadden, E&Y, Accenture, NHL, McKool Smith, and W.P.
Carey), which together are responsible for 94.5% of base rent, is
almost eight full years after loan maturity. Nonetheless, the
property's tenancy is heavily concentrated, with the top three
tenants (Skadden, E&Y, and Accenture) accounting for 74.5% of the
building's net rentable area (NRA) and 76.8% of base rent.

According to the March 2021 rent roll, the property had an
occupancy rate of 93.8% with an average rental rate of $91.03 per
square foot, which remains relatively unchanged from issuance. The
building's superior asset quality and convenient location between
the Hudson Yards development and Penn Station as well as commuter
rail and subway access positioned to the east and west of the
building make the remaining vacant square footage (approximately
128,000 square feet (sf); 6.2% of the NRA) an attractive option for
a variety of tenants. In addition, the Hudson Yards submarket has
also become one of the most desirable office locations in Manhattan
as major space users have opted to move west and sign major
leases.

The transaction benefits from strong, experienced institutional
sponsorship in the form of a joint venture partnership between
Brookfield Property Partners L.P. (BPY) and the Qatar Investment
Authority. BPY, together with its affiliate Brookfield Asset
Management, is one of the largest commercial landlords in New York
City. BPY's core office portfolio includes interests in 134 Class A
office buildings in gateway markets around the world totaling 72.6
million sf.

Although the coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to virtually all major commercial real estate property types,
the Manhattan office market continues to show signs of recovery as
employers focus on the return to office. Despite the disruptions
and uncertainty throughout the pandemic, the collateral has largely
remained unaffected. No tenants have requested rent relief or are
currently subject to any kind of rent deferral.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



MELLO MORTGAGE 2021-INV2: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to B-5 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
forty-seven classes of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) issued by Mello Mortgage Capital Acceptance 2021-INV2 (MMCA
2021-INV2). The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B3 (sf).

MMCA 2021-INV2 is a securitization of GSE eligible first-lien
investment property loans. 100.0% of the pool by loan balance is
originated by loanDepot.com, LLC ("loanDepot"). All the loans are
underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae
guidelines, which take into consideration, among other factors, the
income, assets, employment and credit score of the borrower as well
as loan-to-value (LTV). These loans are run through one of the
government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE) automated underwriting
systems (AUS) and have received an "Approve" or "Accept"
recommendation.

In this transaction, the Class A-11, Class A-11-A, and Class A-11-B
notes' coupon is indexed to SOFR. In addition, the coupon on Class
A-11-X, Class A-11-AI, and Class A-11-BI is also impacted by
changes in SOFR. However, based on the transaction's structure, the
particular choice of benchmark has no credit impact. First,
interest payments to the notes, including the floating rate notes,
are subject to the net WAC cap, which prevents the floating rate
notes from incurring interest shortfalls as a result of increases
in the benchmark index above the fixed rates at which the assets
bear interest. Second, the shifting-interest structure pays all
interest generated on the assets to the bonds and does not provide
for any excess spread.

Servicing compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee
structure. Servicing fee includes base fee plus delinquency and
incentive fees. Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted
reverse sequentially starting from the Class B-6 interest payment
amount first and could result in interest shortfall to the
certificates depending on the magnitude of the delinquency and
incentive fees.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Mello Mortgage Capital Acceptance 2021-INV2

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-AI*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-B, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-BI*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.94%
at the mean, 0.64% at the median, and reaches 7.13% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

The action reflects the coronavirus pandemic's residual impact on
the ongoing performance of US RMBS as the US economy continues on
the path toward normalization. Economic activity will continue to
strengthen in 2021 because of several factors, including the
rollout of vaccines, growing household consumption and an
accommodative central bank policy. However, specific sectors and
individual businesses will remain weakened by extended pandemic
related restrictions.

Moody's regard the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 10.0%
(8.04% for the mean) and Moody's Aaa losses by 2.5% to reflect the
likely performance deterioration resulting from a slowdown in US
economic activity in 2020 due to the coronavirus outbreak. These
adjustments are lower than the 15% median expected loss and 5% Aaa
loss adjustments Moody's made on pools from deals issued after the
onset of the pandemic until February 2021. Moody's reduced
adjustments reflect the fact that the loan pool in this deal does
not contain any loans to borrowers who are not currently making
payments. For newly originated loans, post-COVID underwriting takes
into account the impact of the pandemic on a borrower's ability to
repay the mortgage. For seasoned loans, as time passes, the
likelihood that borrowers who have continued to make payments
throughout the pandemic will now become non-cash flowing due to
COVID-19 continues to decline.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

As of the cut-off date of August 1, 2021, the $416,188,820 pool
consisted of 1,164 mortgage loans secured by first liens on
residential investment properties. The average stated principal
balance is $357,551 and the weighted average (WA) current mortgage
rate is 3.5%. The majority of the loans have a 30 year term, with 6
loans with 25 year term. All of the loans have a fixed rate. The WA
original credit score is 765 for the primary borrower only and the
WA combined original LTV (CLTV) is 65.1%. The WA original
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is 35.3%. Approximately, 12.9% by loan
balance of the borrowers have more than one mortgage loan in the
mortgage pool.

Over a third of the mortgages (35.2% by loan balance) are backed by
properties located in California. The next largest geographic
concentration is New York (12.4% by loan balance), Washington (8.5%
by loan balance), and Texas (6.8% by loan balance). All other
states each represent less than 5.0% by loan balance. Loans backed
by single family residential properties represent 39.5% (by loan
balance) of the pool. Approximately 2.3% of the mortgage loans by
count are "Appraisal Waiver" (AW) loans, whereby the sponsor
obtained an AW for each such mortgage loan from Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac through their respective programs. In each case,
neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac required an appraisal of the
related mortgaged property as a condition of approving the related
mortgage loan for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, as
applicable.

Origination quality

LoanDepot originated 100% of the loans in the pool. These loans
were underwritten in conformity with GSE guidelines with
predominantly non-material overlays. Moody's consider loanDepot's
origination quality to be in line with its peers due to: (1)
adequate underwriting policies and procedures, (2) acceptable
performance with low delinquency and repurchase and (3) adequate
quality control. Therefore, Moody's have not applied an additional
adjustment for origination quality.

Servicing arrangements

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate. Cenlar FSB (Cenlar) will service all the mortgage
loans in the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Long term debt
Aa2) will serve as the master servicer. The servicing
administrator, loanDepot, will be primarily responsible for funding
certain servicing advances of delinquent scheduled interest and
principal payments for the mortgage loans, unless the servicer
determines that such amounts would not be recoverable. The master
servicer will be obligated to fund any required monthly advance if
the servicing administrator fails in its obligation to do so.
Moody's did not make any adjustments to Moody's base case and Aaa
stress loss assumptions based on this servicing arrangement.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The servicer receives higher
fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less labor
intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary.

Third-party review

Three third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan level information that Moody's received from the sponsor. Of
the 1,164 loans in the pool, detailed credit, compliance, property
valuation and data accuracy reviews were conducted on 337 (29.0% by
loan count) mortgage loans and valuation only review was conducted
on remaining loans (i.e. 100% of the loans went through property
valuation review). Based on the review, the TPR results indicate
that there are no material compliance, credit, or data issues and
no appraisal defects. Moody's calculated the credit-neutral sample
size using a confidence interval, error rate and a precision level
of 95%/5%/2%. The number of loans that went through a full due
diligence review (337) is above Moody's calculated threshold.

However, unlike in other deals (that have sampling) in which the
loans are picked randomly for due diligence from the total pool of
loans, in this deal, majority of the first loans funded went
through full due diligence and the remaining loans in the pool had
valuation only review. Since the loans were not picked randomly
from the total pool of loans, there is a risk that the sample of
loans might not be representative of the overall pool of loans.
However, Moody's did not make an adjustment to Moody's Aaa loss and
EL as all the loans are GSE-eligible loans underwritten to agency
guidelines, originated by a single originator and funded within a
short period of time (around 22.4% and 73.2% of the loans in the
pool were funded during June and May 2021 respectively). In
addition, the credit profile of the loans funded in June and May
are similar and the TPR results are satisfactory with no material
exceptions. Furthermore, loanDepot to date, has had consistent
operations and performance.

Overall, Moody's did not make any adjustment to its Aaa loss or EL
based on the third party due diligence.

Representations and Warranties Framework

The R&W provider and the guarantor are both loanDepot entities,
which may not have the financial wherewithal to purchase defective
loans. The Guarantor (LD Holdings Group LLC) will guarantee certain
performance obligations of the R&W provider (loanDepot.com, LLC).
Moreover, unlike other transactions that Moody's have rated, the
R&W framework for this transaction does not include a mechanism
whereby loans that experience an early payment default (EPD) are
repurchased. Moody's have adjusted its Aaa CE and expected losses
to account for these weaknesses in the R&W framework.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments
to the senior bond for a specified period of time, and increasing
amounts of prepayments to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but
only if loan performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next, realized losses
are allocated to super senior bonds until their principal balance
is written off.

Tail risk & subordination floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit enhancement
over time and increased performance volatility, known as tail risk.
To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a senior
subordination floor of 0.95% which mitigates tail risk by
protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time. Additionally, there is a subordination lock-out amount which
is 0.85% of the closing pool balance.

Moody's calculate the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in its principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor and the subordinate floor of 0.95% and 0.85%,
respectively, are consistent with the credit neutral floors for the
assigned ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


MFA 2021-NQM2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-NQM2 to be issued by MFA
2021-NQM2 Trust (MFA 2021-NQM2):

-- $210.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $27.8 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $13.7 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $9.0 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $5.4 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects 27.30%
of credit enhancement provided by subordinate certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 21.60%,
12.00%, 7.25%, 4.15%, and 2.30% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate nonprime first-lien residential mortgages funded by
the issuance of the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by
678 mortgage loans with a total principal balance of $289,279,453
as of the Cut-Off Date (June 30, 2021).

The pool is, on average, 13 months seasoned with loan age ranges
from two months to 58 months. Citadel Servicing Corporation doing
business as Acra Lending (CSC) is the Originator and Servicer for
all loans in this pool. Approximately 97.1% of the mortgage loans
will be subserviced by ServiceMac, LLC (ServiceMac), pursuant to a
subservicing agreement, dated as of September 18, 2020. Each of
these mortgage loans were boarded onto ServiceMac's servicing
system on March 1, 2021.

CSC has three programs under which it originates loans. The
Non-Prime and Maggi Plus (Maggi+) products are CSC's core mortgage
programs, with Maggi+ aimed at higher credit profiles. CSC's
Outside Dodd-Frank products include loans exempt from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) rules.

Although the applicable mortgage loans were originated to satisfy
the CFPB Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers
who generally do not qualify for agency, government, or
private-label nonagency prime jumbo products for various reasons.
In accordance with the Qualified Mortgage (QM)/ATR rules, 73% of
the loans are designated as non-QM. Approximately 27.0% of the
loans are made to investors for business purposes or foreign
nationals, which are not subject to the QM/ATR rules.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible horizontal interest consisting
of the Class B-3 and XS Certificates representing at least 5% of
the aggregate fair value of the Certificates to satisfy the credit
risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the distribution date in July 2024
or (2) the date when the aggregate unpaid principal balance of the
mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the
Depositor, at its option, may redeem all of the outstanding
Certificates at a price equal to the class balances of the related
Certificates plus accrued and unpaid interest, including any Cap
Carryover Amounts and any pre-closing deferred amounts due to the
Class XS Certificates (optional redemption). After such purchase,
the Depositor must complete a qualified liquidation, which requires
(1) a complete liquidation of assets within the trust and (2)
proceeds to be distributed to the appropriate holders of regular or
residual interests.

On any date following the date on which the aggregate unpaid
principal balance of the mortgage loans is less than or equal to
10% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the Servicing Administrator will
have the option to terminate the transaction by purchasing all of
the mortgage loans and any real estate owned (REO) property from
the issuer at a price equal to the sum of the aggregate unpaid
principal balance of the mortgage loans (other than any REO
property) plus accrued interest thereon, the lesser of the fair
market value of any REO property and the stated principal balance
of the related loan, and any outstanding and unreimbursed servicing
advances, accrued and unpaid fees, and expenses that are payable or
reimbursable to the transaction parties (optional termination). An
optional termination is conducted as a qualified liquidation.

For this transaction, the Servicer will not fund advances of
delinquent principal and interest (P&I) on any mortgage. However,
the Servicer is obligated to make advances in respect of taxes,
insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing of properties (servicing advances).

Of note, if the Servicer defers or capitalizes the repayment of any
amounts owed by a borrower in connection with the borrower's loan
modification, the Servicer is entitled to reimburse itself from the
excess servicing fee, first, and from principal collections,
second, for any previously made and unreimbursed servicing advances
related to the capitalized amount at the time of such
modification.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches subject
to certain performance triggers related to cumulative losses or
delinquencies exceeding a specified threshold (Trigger Event).
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 Certificates (IIPP) before being applied
sequentially to amortize the balances of the senior and
subordinated certificates. For more subordinate Certificates,
including Class A-3 Certificates after a Trigger Event, principal
proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls as the more
senior Certificates are paid in full. Also, the excess spread can
be used to cover realized losses first before being allocated to
unpaid Cap Carryover Amounts due to Class A-1 down to Class B-2.

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Impact

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
pandemic, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies for
many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term periods of payment
relief that may perform very differently from traditional
delinquencies. At the onset of the pandemic, the option to forbear
mortgage payments was widely available, driving forbearances to an
elevated level. When the dust settled, loans with
coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020 performed better than
expected, thanks to government aid, low loan-to-value ratios, and
acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in general. Across
nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months, delinquencies have
been gradually trending downward, as forbearance periods come to an
end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



MOFT 2020-B6: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by MOFT 2020-B6 Mortgage Trust as
follows:

-- Class A at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class D at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations in the year since issuance. The underlying loan is
secured by a 314,400-square-foot (sf) Class A office building in
Sunnyvale, California. The collateral is one of six identical
buildings that make up the Moffett Place campus within the greater
Moffett Park development. The subject was constructed in 2020 and
is 100.0% leased to Google LLC (Google) through January 2029.
Google's parent company, Alphabet Inc., is rated investment grade.
The whole loan of $200.0 million is composed of eight pari passu
senior notes with an aggregate principal balance of $133.1 million
and two junior notes with an aggregate principal balance of $66.9
million. The total trust portion is $67.0 million, which consists
of the two junior notes and $500,000 of senior debt. In addition,
there is mezzanine debt of $49.0 million. The 10-year, fixed-rate
loan is interest only through the loan term.

Whole-loan proceeds repaid $164.5 million of existing debt; funded
$12.1 million in free rent reserves, $2.8 million in leasing
reserves, and $2.5 million in debt service reserves; covered $10.1
million of closing costs; and returned $57.2 million of equity to
the sponsor. According to the July 2021 loan-level reserve report,
it appears that all funds from the leasing and free rent reserves
have been disbursed, with the debt service reserve reporting a
remaining balance of $2.5 million.

The build-out work for Google began in May 2020 and, as of issuance
for the subject transaction, the work remained ongoing, and Google
had not taken occupancy or commenced rent payments as of the
closing date. According to the terms of the lease, Google started
paying its base rent in May 2021 and the build-out was scheduled to
be completed by October 2021; however, the servicer has confirmed
that the anticipated completion date has since been pushed to
November 2021. This coincides with Google's plan to extend its
work-from-home policy to Q3 2021 amid the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. Google's initial lease is scheduled to expire
before the August 2030 loan maturity, and there are two seven-year
renewal options available. The appraiser's estimated market rent
was $60.00 per sf (psf) at issuance, which is higher than Google's
base rental rate for year one of $49.56 psf; however, the lease is
structured with annual rent steps of approximately 2.0%, and a
renewal would be at a market rental rate. In addition, the loan is
structured with a cash flow sweep if notice to renew is not
received 20 months prior to lease expiration. The sweep is expected
to generate $12.3 million (approximately $40.00 psf) for future
re-leasing costs.

Since the beginning of 2021, Google has been reported to be
offering employees the option of applying for a fully remote work
arrangement. An August 11, 2021, article by The Register cited an
estimate from the company's chief executive officer (CEO) that
stated that four out of five of the company's employees would
continue to work in physical office locations once coronavirus
restrictions are fully lifted. The same article referenced an
earlier statement by the CEO that approximately 60.0% of the
workforce was working in some capacity in offices that had reopened
or partially reopened thus far in 2021. Finally, the article also
noted that Google may be reducing pay for employees in some areas
that choose to work remotely, a factor that could reduce the final
number of workers choosing that option. It's unclear to what extent
the shifts in how and where Google employees work (and employees of
other companies across the country) will affect office usage, but
it seems likely that some level of increase in remote work is here
to stay. The subject transaction benefits from the long-term lease
to Google and the collateral building's strong location, which
should support its continued desirability for Google or other firms
with a need for a presence in a prominent area of Silicon Valley.

The sponsor for this transaction is an affiliate of Jay Paul
Company, which is a privately held real estate development firm
founded in 1975 and based in San Francisco. Jay Paul Company
focuses on the acquisition and development of high-end
build-to-suit office projects for large Silicon Valley technology
firms. The sponsor has developed more than 13 million sf of
institutional office space for clients including Apple, Amazon,
Facebook, Microsoft, Nokia Corporation, and Tencent Holdings Ltd.
Several other sponsor-owned Moffett Park buildings have been
securitized in previous DBRS Morningstar-rated transactions, such
as MOFT Trust 2020-ABC and MFTII 2019-B3B4 Mortgage Trust. The
collateral is one of 25 buildings developed by the sponsor within
the Moffett Park office campus.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C8: Fitch Corrects August 23 Ratings Release
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrects a rating action commentary on Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust  published on Aug. 23, 2021. It
includes the rating sensitivities section, which was omitted from
the original release.

The amended release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust (MSBAM), commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2013-C8. Fitch has also revised
the Rating Outlook on class D to Stable from Negative.

    DEBT                RATING
    ----                ------
MSBAM 2013-C8

A-3 61761QAD5    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed
A-4 61761QAE3    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed
A-S 61761QAG8    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed
ASB 61761QAC7    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed
B 61761QAH6      LT  AA-sf   Affirmed
C 61761QAK9      LT  A-sf    Affirmed
D 61761QAN3      LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed
E 61761QAQ6      LT  BBsf    Affirmed
F 61761QAS2      LT  Bsf     Affirmed
PST 61761QAJ2    LT  A-sf    Affirmed
X-A 61761QAF0    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed
X-B 61761QAL7    LT  AA-sf   Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall performance and loss expectations
for the majority of the pool remain stable. Fitch's current ratings
incorporate a base case loss of 5.2%. Losses could reach 8.3% when
factoring potential outsized losses on loans secured by a regional
mall (2% of pool) and two outlet centers (combined, 18.6%); the
Negative Outlooks reflect this scenario.

There are 10 Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 12.7% of pool),
including six specially serviced loans/assets (7%).

Largest Contributors to Loss: The largest contributor to loss is
the Anderson Mall loan (2% of the pool), which consist of a
315,561sf portion of a 671,000-sf regional mall located in
Anderson, SC. The mall is anchored by a non-collateral Belk and
Dillard's, and a collateral JCPenney (39.5% of NRA, through
February 2022). A non-collateral Sears vacated in September 2018
and its space remains dark.

JCPenney initially listed this location for closing, but per local
media reports, reversed the decision with the store now expected to
remain open in the near term. The second largest collateral tenant,
Books-A-Million (5.4% NRA), recently extended its lease three years
through January 2024. Approximately 15% of the collateral NRA is
scheduled to roll in 2021, with an additional 37% in 2022. Per the
March 2021 rent roll, collateral occupancy was 93%. The mall's
in-line tenant mix consists of a mix of local and national
retailers.

The servicer-reported YE 2019 NOI DSCR was 0.82x, down from 1.58x
at YE 2018. A YE 2020 operating statement has not been provided.
Fitch has an outstanding servicer request for recent financials and
tenant sales, but has not received any to date. In-line sales were
most recently reported at $268 psf at TTM February 2017.

The loan, which is sponsored by Simon Property Group, transferred
to special servicing in April 2020 due to imminent monetary
default. A receiver is in place and the special servicer is
reportedly moving forward with a consensual foreclosure. Fitch
modeled a base case loss of approximately 72% on the loan, which
reflects an implied cap rate of approximately 22% on the YE 2019
NOI. Fitch applied an additional scenario, which assumed a
potential outsized loss of 100% for this loan.

The next largest contributor to loss is the REO One Concourse asset
(1.6%), which is a 110,167-sf suburban office property located in
Fishers, IN. The loan transferred to special servicing in December
2018 for imminent monetary default and became REO in February 2020.
The servicer is working to stabilize property occupancy prior to
marketing it for sale. As of the April 2021 rent roll, occupancy
was 26% while YTD June 2020 NOI was negative. Updated operating
statements have not been provided by the servicer. Fitch modeled a
loss of 39%, which reflects a stressed value of $98 psf.

The next largest contributor to loss is the specially serviced 2929
Briarpark loan (1.4%), which is secured by a 140,392 sf office
property located in the Westchase submarket of Houston, TX. The
loan transferred to special servicing in September 2020 due to
imminent monetary default. Per the servicer, the property was 92%
occupied before losing its largest tenant at YE 2020. No
replacement tenant has been found. While the loan remained current
until June 2021, the borrower indicates it is no longer interested
in covering debt service shortfalls; the servicer is reportedly
moving forward with the appointment of a receiver and foreclosure.
Fitch modeled a loss of 27%, which reflects a stressed value of $62
psf.

The next largest contributor to loss is the 11451 Katy Freeway loan
(2.4%), which is secured by a six-story 117,261 sf suburban office
building located in Houston, TX. Performance and loss expectations
on the loan have improved significantly over the past year due to
better cash flow performance. Per the June 2021 rent roll,
occupancy was 90%. Occupancy had declined to 51% in 2018 primarily
due to the loss of a bankrupt tenant that occupied 35% of the NRA.

The servicer-reported YE 2020 NOI was up over 80% from YE 2019. The
servicer reported NOI DSCR increased to 1.20x at YE 2020 from 0.64x
at YE 2019, primarily due to new tenants' rent abatement periods
expiring. Upcoming scheduled tenant roll over the next year is less
than 5% of the NRA. Per Reis (2Q 2021) report, the West Katy
Freeway submarket had a 27.6% vacancy rate with average asking
rents of $27.87 psf. Per the June 2020 rent roll, average in place
rent at the subject was $18.11 psf. Fitch modeled a base case loss
of 15%, which is based on a 9.25% cap rate and a 5% stress to the
YE 2020 NOI.

Increased Credit Enhancement; Significant Defeasance: As of the
July 2021 distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been
paid down by 29% to $809.5 million from $1.14 billion at issuance.
Eleven loans (24.1% of the pool) are fully defeased. There have
been no realized losses to date and interest shortfalls are
currently affecting the non-rated class G. Three loans (7.5%) are
full-term interest-only, and all other performing loans are now
amortizing. All loans are scheduled to mature between December 2022
and January 2023.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch considered an additional
sensitivity scenario whereby a potential outsized loss of 100% was
applied to the specially serviced Anderson Mall loan and 15%
outsized losses were applied to the maturity balance of The
Crossings Premium Outlets (12.6%) and Carolina Premium Outlets
(5.1%) loans to address the potential refinance risk at these
outlet loans' imminent maturities; this sensitivity scenario drove
the Negative Outlooks.

The Crossings Premium Outlet loan is secured by a 411,223-sf retail
outlet center located in Tannersville, PA within the Poconos
Mountains. The property has granular tenancy with the largest
tenant being Forever 21 (3.5% NRA through January 2023).
Performance has remained relatively stable during the pandemic with
a servicer reported YE 2020 NOI DSCR of 2.92x compared with 3.00x
at YE 2019. As of the March 2021 rent roll, occupancy was 85%.
Upcoming rollover at the property includes 10% of the NRA in 2021
and 21.4% in 2022. Recent tenant sales have been requested from the
servicer, but not yet provided. The loan matures in December 2022.

The Carolina Premium Outlets loan is secured by a 439,009-sf outlet
center located 25 miles southeast of the Raleigh CBD. The largest
tenant at the property is Carolina Pottery (23% NRA through
December 2023). The next largest tenant comprises only 2.5% of the
NRA. Upcoming rollover at the property includes 7.6% of the NRA in
2021 and 17.7% in 2022. As of the March 2021 rent roll, occupancy
was 85%. Performance has remained relatively stable during the
pandemic with a servicer reported YE 2020 NOI DSCR of 3.68x
compared with 3.94x at YE 2019. The loan matures in December 2022.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The Negative Outlooks reflect performance concerns over the
    FLOCs, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate
    impact of the pandemic on the payoff and/or workout of the
    mall and outlet center loans. The Stable Outlooks reflect the
    increasing credit enhancement, significant defeasance, stable
    performance of the majority of the pool and expected continued
    amortization.

-- An increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to the 'AAAsf' and
    'AA-sf' rated classes are not likely due to their position in
    the capital structure, significant defeasance and the high
    credit enhancement, but may occur with the possibility of
    interest shortfalls.

-- Downgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'BBB-sf' rated classes would
    occur if loss expectations increase significantly and/or with
    outsized losses on the mall and outlet center loans.
    Downgrades to the classes rated 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' would occur
    if the performance of the mall and outlet center loans and or
    FLOC decline and/or fail to stabilize or should losses from
    specially serviced loans/assets be larger than expected.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Stable to improved asset performance, particularly on the
    FLOCs, coupled with additional paydown and/or defeasance.
    Upgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' rated classes would only
    occur with significant improvement in credit enhancement
    and/or defeasance and with the stabilization of performance on
    the FLOCs, particularly the regional mall and outlet center
    loans and/or the properties affected by the coronavirus
    pandemic; however, adverse selection and increased
    concentrations, or the underperformance of the FLOCs, could
    reverse this trend.

-- Upgrades to the 'BBB-sf' class is considered unlikely and
    would be limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the
    potential for future concentration. Classes would not be
    upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood for interest
    shortfalls.

-- Upgrades to classes rated 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' are not likely
    until the later years in a transaction and only if the
    performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or properties
    vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels,
    and there is sufficient credit enhancement to the classes.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

MSBAM 2013-C8 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to large exposure to a regional mall and two
outlet center properties as a result of changing consumer
preferences to shopping, which has a negative impact on the credit
profile, and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other
factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MORGAN STANLEY 2018-MP: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on all classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-MP issued by Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2018-MP as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar removed the Under Review with Negative
Implications designations that had been placed on all classes in
September 2020, given the negative impact of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic on the underlying collateral. The
trends on all classes are Stable except Classes D and E, which
carry Negative trends. The Negative trends reflect the significant
exposure to the non-investment-grade tenants, Equinox Fitness and
AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., that have been greatly affected
by the coronavirus pandemic.

The rating confirmations reflect the relatively stable performance
of the transaction since the DBRS Morningstar ratings were assigned
in September 2020. The subject whole loan consists of a $710.0
million first mortgage and a mezzanine loan in the amount of $280.2
million, which is held outside of the trust. Of the first mortgage
amount, $225.9 million consists of non-pooled pari passu notes that
were securitized in commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions. The trust amount includes $175.0 million of senior
debt and $289.3 million of subordinate debt.

The loan is secured by the fee simple and leasehold interest in the
Millennium Partners Portfolio, an eight-property portfolio of
cross-collateralized retail and office condominiums located across
dense urban locations including New York City, Boston, Miami, San
Francisco, and Washington, D.C. The collateral consists of
approximately 1.5 million square feet (sf) of space as well as
parking garages included as collateral at Four Seasons Miami;
Ritz-Carlton Washington, D.C.; and Ritz-Carlton Georgetown Retail.
The loan sponsor is Millennium Partners, a Manhattan-based real
estate development and management firm established in 2009.
Millennium Partners places a focus on operating and developing
luxury, mixed-use properties in gateway cities across the United
States. At issuance, the sponsor's portfolio was valued at more
than $2.2 billion and included more than 3,200 condominium units,
10 luxury hotels, 1.4 million sf of office space, 0.9 million sf of
retail space, five movie theaters, and five health clubs.

The properties are in desirable central business district markets
and most of the condominium properties are part of larger,
higher-end luxury uses and include quality fit-outs. All eight
properties are subject to complex condominium structures, which are
not controlled by the borrowers. The portfolio is geographically
diverse as the properties are located in four states and the
District of Columbia. There is relatively low lease rollover risk,
with 48.1% of the portfolio's net rentable area (NRA) scheduled to
expire during the loan term. The whole loan loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) totaled 141.6%, based on the DBRS Morningstar value of $822.7
million, while the total mortgage debt amounts to an LTV of
101.5%.

The loan reported YE2020 net cash flow (NCF) of $57.5 million,
which is in line with the DBRS Morningstar NCF of $55.9 million,
but well below the YE2019 NCF of $72.7 million. The occupancy rate
has been holding steady at 92.6%, per the April 2021 rent rolls,
compared with the 94.3% occupancy rate at issuance. There is
minimal lease rollover risk in the near term with eight tenants,
representing 3.7% of NRA, having lease expirations in 2021 and an
additional eight tenants, representing 2.4% of NRA, having lease
expirations in 2022.

The primary risk with this portfolio is the exposure to Equinox
Fitness and AMC, which represent 26.0% and 14.3% of NRA,
respectively. Equinox Fitness agreed to several lease modifications
last year that deferred rent payments until 2021; however, there
are several articles throughout 2021 indicating that Equinox
Fitness has not honored similar agreements at other noncollateral
locations and those landlords are suing Equinox Fitness. In
addition, Equinox Fitness carries a highly speculative credit
rating because of its high leverage and weak liquidity position.
AMC has rebounded in 2021, given the substantial amount of capital
it has been able to raise through issuance of new shares and the
sale of company-owned stock during peaks of volatile market
pricing. AMC no longer appears to be on the verge of filing
bankruptcy; however, the credit rating for the company is still
speculative despite the improvement.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



NASSAU 2021-I: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $14MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Nassau 2021-I Ltd.'s
fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Nassau 2021-I Ltd.

  Class A-1, $181.295 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $35.705 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $22.450 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $26.550 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $21.000 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $17.500 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E, $14.000 million: BB- (sf)
  Class A subordinated notes, $18.125 million: Not rated
  Class B subordinated notes, $18.125 million: Not rated



NEW RESIDENTIAL 2021-INV1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to B5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
twenty-seven classes of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2021-INV1
(NRMLT 2021-INV1). The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

NRMLT 2021-INV1 is the first securitization of 100% GSE eligible
first-lien investment property mortgage loans sponsored by New
Residential Investment Corp. (New Residential). Approximately 81.4%
and 18.6% of the pool by loan balance is originated by NewRez LLC
("NewRez") and Caliber Home Loans Inc. ("Caliber"), respectively.
All the loans are underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae guidelines, which take into consideration, among other
factors, the income, assets, employment and credit score of the
borrower as well as loan-to-value (LTV). These loans were run
through one of the government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE)
automated underwriting systems (AUS) and received an "Approve" or
"Accept" recommendation.

Servicing compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee
structure. Servicing fee includes base fee plus delinquency and
incentive fees. Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted
reverse sequentially starting from the Class B6 interest payment
amount first and could result in interest shortfall to the
certificates depending on the magnitude of the delinquency and
incentive fees.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2021-INV1

Cl. A1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A3, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A5, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A6, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A7, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A8, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A9, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A10, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX1*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX2*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX3*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX5*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX7*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX10*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. BX*, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B1A, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. BX1*, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B2, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B2A, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. BX2*, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B3, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B5, Assigned B3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.87%
at the mean, 0.61% at the median, and reaches 6.01% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

The action reflects the coronavirus pandemic's residual impact on
the ongoing performance of US RMBS as the US economy continues on
the path toward normalization. Economic activity will continue to
strengthen in 2021 because of several factors, including the
rollout of vaccines, growing household consumption and an
accommodative central bank policy. However, specific sectors and
individual businesses will remain weakened by extended pandemic
related restrictions.

Moody's regard the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 10.0%
(7.62% for the mean) and Moody's Aaa losses by 2.5% to reflect the
likely performance deterioration resulting from a slowdown in US
economic activity in 2020 due to the coronavirus outbreak. These
adjustments are lower than the 15% median expected loss and 5% Aaa
loss adjustments Moody's made on pools from deals issued after the
onset of the pandemic until February 2021. Moody's reduced
adjustments reflect the fact that the loan pool in this deal does
not contain any loans to borrowers who are not currently making
payments. For newly originated loans, post-COVID underwriting takes
into account the impact of the pandemic on a borrower's ability to
repay the mortgage. For seasoned loans, as time passes, the
likelihood that borrowers who have continued to make payments
throughout the pandemic will now become non-cash flowing due to
COVID-19 continues to decline.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the thirdparty due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

As of the cut-off date of August 1, 2021, the $336,995,132 pool
consisted of 1,230 mortgage loans secured by first liens on
residential investment properties. The average stated principal
balance is $273,980 and the weighted average (WA) current mortgage
rate is 3.35%. The majority of the loans have a 30-year term, with
175 loans having a term between 10-29 years. All of the loans have
a fixed rate. The WA original credit score is 776 for the primary
borrower only and the WA combined original LTV and CLTV is 62.7%
and 62.8%, respectively. The WA original debt-to-income (DTI) ratio
is 36.5%. Approximately, 80.7% by loan balance of the borrowers
have more than one mortgage loan in the mortgage pool.

All the loans in the pool are current as of the cut-off date.
However, there are 9 loans in the pool which have prior delinquency
history. 8 of the loans had 30-days delinquency which were servicer
transfer related. There is 1 loan that had 60-days delinquency, but
the borrower self-cured. There is also one loan in the pool the
borrower of which has a bankruptcy history that is approximately 98
months old.

A significant percentage of the mortgage loans by loan balance
(38.1%) are backed by properties located in California. The next
largest geographic concentration of properties are Washington and
New Jersey, which represents 6.9% and 5.5% by loan balance,
respectively. All other states each represent less than 5% by loan
balance. Approximately 22.8% (by loan balance) of the pool is
backed by properties that are 2-4 unit residential properties
whereas loans backed by single family residential properties
represent 44.5% (by loan balance) of the pool.

Approximately 12.3% of the mortgage loans by count are "Appraisal
Waiver" (AW) loans, whereby the sponsor obtained an AW for each
such mortgage loan from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac through their
respective programs. In each case, neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie
Mac required an appraisal of the related mortgaged property as a
condition of approving the related mortgage loan for purchase by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, as applicable. These loans may present a
greater risk as the value of the related mortgaged properties may
be less than the value ascribed to such mortgaged properties.
Moody's made an adjustment in Moody's analysis to account for the
increased risk associated with such loans. However, Moody's have
tempered this adjustment by taking into account the GSEs' robust
risk modeling, which helps minimize collateral valuation risk, as
well as the GSEs' conservative eligibility requirements for AW
loans which helps to support deal collateral quality.

Origination quality

100% of the loans in the pool are originated by NewRez LLC (81.36%)
and Caliber Home Loans Inc. (18.64%).

These loans were underwritten in conformity with GSE guidelines
without any overlays. Moody's consider origination quality to be in
line with its peers due to: (1) adequate underwriting policies and
procedures, (2) acceptable performance with low delinquency and
repurchase and (3) adequate quality control. Therefore, Moody's
have not applied an additional adjustment for origination quality.

Servicing arrangements

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate. Moody's did not make any adjustments to Moody's base
case and Aaa stress loss assumptions based on the servicing
arrangement. Moody's also consider the presence of a strong master
servicer to be a mitigant against the risk of any servicing
disruptions.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The servicer receives higher
fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less labor
intensive. The fee-forservice compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary.

Third-party review

Two third-party review (TPR) firms, Recovco Mortgage Management
(Recovco) and Infinity IPS (Infinity) verified the accuracy of the
loan level information that we received from the sponsor. These
firms conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data accuracy
and compliance reviews on 345 and 57 mortgage loans in the final
collateral pool, respectively, for a total of 402 (32.7% by loan
count) mortgage loans. CU scores were provided for a majority of
the loans in the pool, including for loans that were not included
in the due diligence sample. A vast majority of loans in the pool
have a CU score >2.5 along with loans that do not have a CU
score and for which only an automated valuation model (AVM) and/or
a broker price opinion (BPO) was ordered. Moody's consider AVM and
BPO as less reliable secondary valuation as compared to CDAs.
Moody's therefore adjusted Moody's losses to account for this
valuation weakness.

Representations and Warranties Framework

The R&W provider is NRZ Sponsor VIII LLC. Moody's increased its
loss levels to account for weakness in the overall R&W framework
due to the financial weakness of the R&W provider (unrated) and the
lack of repurchase mechanism for loans experiencing an early
payment default. The R&W provider may not have the financial
wherewithal to purchase defective loans. Moreover, unlike other
comparable transactions that Moody's have rated, the R&W framework
for this transaction does not include a mechanism whereby loans
that experience an early payment default (EPD) are repurchased. In
the event of a breach of a representation and warranty that
materially and adversely affects the value of the related mortgage
loan, the seller will be required to cure the breach, repurchase
the related mortgage loan, or in certain circumstances, substitute
for or pay the loss amount in respect of such mortgage loan.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments
to the senior bond for a specified period of time, and increasing
amounts of prepayments to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but
only if loan performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next, realized losses
are allocated to super senior bonds until their principal balance
is written off.

Tail risk & subordination floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit enhancement
over time and increased performance volatility, known as tail risk.
To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a senior
subordination floor of 0.85% which mitigates tail risk by
protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time. Additionally, there is a subordination lock-out amount which
is 0.85% of the closing pool balance.

Moody's calculate the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in Moody's principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor and the subordinate floor of 0.85% and 0.85%,
respectively, are consistent with the credit neutral floors for the
assigned ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in August 2021.


OBX 2021-NQM3: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OBX 2021-NQM3 Trust's
mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by first-lien,
fixed-rate, and adjustable-rate residential mortgage loans to prime
and nonprime borrowers, including mortgage loans with initial
interest-only periods. The loans are primarily secured by
single-family residential properties, planned-unit developments,
townhomes, condominiums, two- to four-family residential
properties, and mixed-use properties. The pool has 539 loans, which
are primarily non-qualified mortgage/ability to repay (ATR)
compliant and ATR-exempt loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, representation and warranty framework, and geographic
concentration;

-- The mortgage aggregator, Onslow Bay Financial LLC, and the
originators, which include AmWest Funding Corp and Sprout Mortgage
LLC; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

  Ratings Assigned

  OBX 2021-NQM3 Trust

  Class A-1, $286,605,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $18,715,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $27,805,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $10,694,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $6,951,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $4,456,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $1,248,394: NR
  Class A-IO-S, notional(i): NR
  Class XS, notional(ii): NR
  Class R: NR

(i)For the class A-IO-S notes, the notional amount equals the
loans' stated principal balance for loans serviced by Select
Portfolio Servicing Inc., Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, and
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing.

(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' stated principal balance.


NR--Not rated.



POST CLO 2021-1: S&P Assigned Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Post CLO
2021-1 Ltd./Post CLO 2021-1 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed primarily by
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests. The transaction is
managed by Post Advisory Group LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 26,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Post CLO 2021-1 Ltd./Post CLO 2021-1 LLC

  Class A, $252.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $52.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $23.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $13.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $43.40 million: Not rated


REALT 2017: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust (REAL-T) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2017. Additionally, the Rating Outlook on class
B has been revised to Positive from Stable, and the Rating Outlook
on class G has been revised to Stable from Negative.

DEBT                    RATING           PRIOR
----                    ------           -----
REAL-T 2017

A-1 75585RPY5    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-2 75585RPZ2    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
B 75585RQB4      LT  AAsf    Affirmed    AAsf
C 75585RQC2      LT  Asf     Affirmed    Asf
D-1 75585RQD0    LT  BBBsf   Affirmed    BBBsf
D-2              LT  BBBsf   Affirmed    BBBsf
E                LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed    BBB-sf
F                LT  BBsf    Affirmed    BBsf
G                LT  Bsf     Affirmed    Bsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Loss Expectations: Loss expectations for the pool have
improved since Fitch's prior rating action due to better than
anticipated 2020 performance for some of the retail and multifamily
loans, which were expected to be negatively affected by the
coronavirus pandemic. Overall pool performance remains in line with
issuance expectations.

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 2.10%.
Fitch considered an additional sensitivity scenario that reflects
losses could reach 2.50% when factoring additional pandemic-related
stresses, while also accounting for the expected paydown from
defeasance and loans scheduled to mature through September 2022;
this sensitivity scenario supported the Rating Outlook revisions.

There are three Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 9.4% of pool),
including the largest loan, Skyline Thunder Centre (7.8%), due to
declining occupancy and cash flow since issuance. The loan, which
is the largest contributor to overall loss expectations, is secured
by a 168,087-sf anchored shopping center located in Thunder Bay,
ON. The property is located across the street from Intercity
Shopping Centre, the largest enclosed shopping mall in Thunder
Bay.

Property-level YE 2020 NOI declined 41% from YE 2019 due to lower
rental income from increased vacancy and reduced rent paid by Old
Navy as a result of a co-tenancy clause trigger. Collateral
occupancy was 74.9% as of December 2020, up from 65.6% as of May
2020, but below the 93.2% reported at YE 2018. Occupancy had fallen
following the departures of Home Outfitters (18.8% of NRA) and
Mark's Work Wearhouse (8.7%) in 2019, together which previously
contributed approximately 26% of combined gross rent at issuance.
Prior to these tenant departures, occupancy averaged over 98%
between 2011 and 2017.

The recent occupancy improvement is due to a new lease with Giant
Tiger for a portion of the former Home Outfitters space (15.8% of
NRA leased through June 2030) that commenced in June 2020. Giant
Tiger is now the property's largest tenant and its total annual
rent is approximately 28% below what was previously paid by Home
Outfitters. Of the former Home Outfitters space, 4,968 sf (3%)
remained vacant as of the December 2020 rent roll. However, the
increased occupancy was partially offset by Pier 1 Imports (5.6% of
NRA; 8% of total base rents) vacating during the second half of
2020, ahead of its scheduled February 2021 lease expiration.

Other major tenants at the property include Michaels (13%; February
2026), Old Navy (8.9%; November 2024) and Dollarama (7.2%; November
2021). Upcoming lease rollover includes 7.2% of the NRA (one
tenant; Dollarama) in November 2021, 6% (two tenants) in 2022 and
9% (three tenants) in 2023.

Michaels, Old Navy and six in-line tenants have termination clauses
or co-tenancy clauses tied to anchor departures and/or occupancy
falling below 65% to 70%. Per the servicer, Old Navy exercised its
co-tenancy clause in 2019 and is currently paying 50% of its
scheduled rent. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR fell to 0.55x as of
YE 2020 from 0.93x at YE 2019. At issuance, the loan carried a full
recourse guarantee from the sponsor, Skyline Retail Real Estate
LP.

Improved Credit Enhancement: The Positive Rating Outlook on class B
reflects increasing credit enhancement since the prior rating
action due to loan payoffs and continued scheduled amortization.

As of the August 2021 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 12.2% to $357 million from
$407 million at issuance. Since Fitch's prior rating action, four
loans ($14.3 million) were repaid at their scheduled 2020 and 2021
maturity dates. Additionally, one loan (James Street Multifamily;
2.3% of pool) is fully defeased. All loans in the pool are
amortizing. The transaction is scheduled to pay down by 17.8% of
the original pool balance prior to maturity.

Upcoming loan maturities include one loan (Heron Drive Apartments;
0.4%) in November 2021, 20 loans (34.6%) in 2022, one loan (Skyline
Carroll Street Retail; 0.9%) in 2023 and the remainder of the pool
(44 loans; 64%) between 2024 and 2027.

Exposure to Coronavirus: Loans secured by retail and multifamily
properties represent 30.9% (18 loans) and 24% (14 loans) of the
pool, respectively. There are no hotel loans. Of the multifamily
exposure, one loan (Georgian Drive Multifamily; 5.2%) is secured by
a student housing property (7.2%) and one loan (Oxford & Division
Retirement Home; 0.6%) is secured by a senior housing property;
both sub-sectors exhibit greater performance volatility than
traditional multifamily.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch's analysis included an
additional sensitivity scenario that factored additional
pandemic-related stresses to five retail loans (12.7%) and the one
senior housing loan, while also accounting for the expected paydown
from defeasance and loans with upcoming 2021 and 2022 maturities.
This sensitivity scenario supported the Rating Outlook revisions of
class B to Positive from Stable, and class G to Stable from
Negative.

Canadian Loan Attributes: The ratings reflect strong historical
Canadian commercial real estate loan performance, including a low
delinquency rate and low historical losses of less than 0.1%, as
well as positive loan attributes, such as short amortization
schedules, recourse to the borrower and additional guarantors on
many loans. As of August 2021, approximately 68% of the pool
features either full or partial recourse to the borrowers, sponsors
or additional guarantors.

Energy Market Concentration: Twelve (22.3%) are secured by
properties located in the Saskatchewan or Alberta provinces, of
which 10 (17%) are secured by traditional multifamily properties or
manufactured housing communities. The Saskatchewan and Alberta
provinces have experienced volatility from the energy sector in the
past few years; however, current performance remains stable. The
weighted average most recent full-year, servicer-reported
occupancies and NOI DSCRs for these 12 loans were 95.1% and 1.60x,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1, A-2 and C through G
reflect the increasing credit enhancement, continued amortization
and relatively stable performance of the majority of the pool. The
Positive Rating Outlook on class B reflects the possibility of an
upgrade with continued expected paydown as loans near their
respective maturity dates and/or properties vulnerable to the
coronavirus pandemic return to pre-pandemic levels.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Stable to improved asset performance coupled with pay down
    and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories
    would likely occur with significant improvement in credit
    enhancement and/or defeasance. However, adverse selection,
    increased concentrations and further underperformance of the
    FLOCs or loans expected to be negatively affected by the
    coronavirus pandemic could cause this trend to reverse.

-- Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' and 'BBB-sf' categories would also
    take in to account these factors, but would be limited based
    on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
    concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
    there were likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
    'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories are not likely until the later
    years in a transaction and only if the performance of the
    remaining pool is stable and/or properties vulnerable to the
    coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and there is
    sufficient credit enhancement to the classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the 'Asf', 'AAsf' and
    'AAAsf' categories are not likely due to the position in the
    capital structure, but may occur at the 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf'
    categories should interest shortfalls occur.

-- Downgrades to the 'BBBsf' and 'BBB-sf' category would occur
    should overall pool losses increase and/or one or more large
    loans have an outsized loss, which would erode credit
    enhancement. Downgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories
    would occur should loss expectations increase due to an
    increase in specially serviced loans and/or the loans
    vulnerable to the coronavirus pandemic not stabilize.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


SCF PREFERRED: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Preferred Shares
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned a Provisional Rating of BB with a Stable
trend to the Series A Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Shares to be
issued by SCF Preferred Equity, LLC. Net proceeds from the issuance
will be used for general corporate purposes.

RATING DRIVERS

Consistent expansion in earnings with appropriate returns, while
maintaining sound credit and asset performance and balance sheet
leverage below 5.0x, would result in an upgrade in the ratings. A
significant deterioration in the Company's credit or asset
performance, weakening earnings generation, or a reduced cushion
relative to its leverage covenant, would lead to a downgrade.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



SLM STUDENT 2008-4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-4 Notes to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded six tranches issued by
four FFELP student loan securitizations sponsored and administered
by Navient Solutions, LLC. The securitizations are backed by
student loans originated under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP) that are guaranteed by the US government for a
minimum of 97% of defaulted principal and accrued interest.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2007-7

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2021
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-1

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-3

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2021
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-4

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2021
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade actions are primarily due to the increased likelihood
of occurrence of an event of default (EOD) on the transactions due
to the inability of the Class A notes to pay off in full on their
legal final maturity dates. The maturities for these tranches are
between October 2021 and July 2022.

In the action, Moody's considered Navient's willingness and ability
to support and prevent the Class A notes from defaulting at their
legal final maturity dates. Because the pool factors of these
transactions are expected to be above 10% at the tranches' legal
final maturity dates (when Navient can exercise the optional
redemption), other than borrowing from a revolving credit facility,
Navient has limited options to support the full repayment of the
Class A notes prior to their maturities. Navient had previously
amended the transactions to establish a revolving credit facility
that enables the trust to borrow money from Navient Corporation on
a subordinated basis in order to pay off the notes.

The downgrade actions on Class B notes further consider the
interest suspension on Class B notes upon default of the Class A
notes for the periods that the Class A notes remaining outstanding
after their final maturities. However, although transaction
structures stipulate that Class B interest is diverted to pay Class
A principal upon occurence of event of default, Moody's analysis
indicates that the cash flow available to make payments on the
Class B notes will be sufficient to make all required payments,
including accrued interest, to Class B noteholders by their final
maturity dates, which occur much later than the final maturity
dates of the Class A notes. Therefore, Moody's ratings on the Class
A notes of the affected transactions are lower than the ratings on
the subordinated Class B notes. The Class B maturities of the
affected transactions range between October 2070 to April 2083.

The actions also reflect the updated performance of the
transactions and updated expected loss on the tranches across
Moody's cash flow scenarios. Moody's quantitative analysis derives
the expected loss for a tranche using 28 cash flow scenarios with
weights accorded to each scenario.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in April 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the loan
pool increases as a result of declining borrower usage of
deferment, forbearance and IBR, increasing voluntary prepayment
rates, or prepayments with proceeds from sponsor repurchases of
student loan collateral. Moody's could also upgrade the ratings
owing to a build-up in credit enhancement.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the
loan pool declines as a result of lower than expected voluntary
prepayments, and higher than expected deferment, forbearance and
IBR rates, which would threaten full repayment of the class by its
final maturity date. In addition, because the US Department of
Education guarantees at least 97% of principal and accrued interest
on defaulted loans, Moody's could downgrade the rating of the notes
if it were to downgrade the rating on the United States government.


TRIANGLE RE 2021-3: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Cl. M-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to three
classes of mortgage insurance credit risk transfer notes issued by
Triangle Re 2021-3 Ltd.

Triangle Re 2021-3 Ltd. is the fifth transaction issued under the
Triangle Re program, which transfers to the capital markets the
credit risk of private mortgage insurance (MI) policies issued by
Genworth Mortgage Insurance (Genworth, the ceding insurer) on a
portfolio of residential mortgage loans. The notes are exposed to
the risk of claims payments on the MI policies, and depending on
the notes' priority, may incur principal and interest losses when
the ceding insurer makes claims payments on the MI policies.

On the closing date, Triangle Re 2021-3 Ltd. (the issuer) and the
ceding insurer will enter into a reinsurance agreement providing
excess of loss reinsurance on mortgage insurance policies issued by
the ceding insurer on a portfolio of residential mortgage loans.
Proceeds from the sale of the notes will be deposited into the
reinsurance trust account for the benefit of the ceding insurer and
as security for the issuer's obligations to the ceding insurer
under the reinsurance agreement. The funds in the reinsurance trust
account will also be available to pay noteholders, following the
termination of the trust and payment of amounts due to the ceding
insurer. Funds in the reinsurance trust account will be used to
purchase eligible investments and will be subject to the terms of
the reinsurance trust agreement.

Following the instruction of the ceding insurer, the trustee will
liquidate assets in the reinsurance trust account to (1) make
principal payments to the notes as the insurance coverage in the
reference pool reduces due to loan amortization or policy
termination, and (2) reimburse the ceding insurer whenever it pays
MI claims after the Class B-2 coverage level (or class B-3 if class
B-2 notes are issued pursuant to a class B-2 reopening) is written
off. While income earned on eligible investments is used to pay
interest on the notes, the ceding insurer is responsible for
covering any difference between the investment income and interest
accrued on the notes' coverage levels.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Triangle Re 2021-3 Ltd.

Cl. M-1A, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1B, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expect this insured pool's aggregate exposed principal
balance to incur 2.50% losses in a base case scenario-mean, and
17.95% losses under a Aaa stress scenario. The aggregate exposed
principal balance is the product, for all the mortgage loans
covered by MI policies, of the unpaid principal balance of each
mortgage loan and the MI coverage percentage.

The action reflects the coronavirus pandemic's residual impact on
the ongoing performance of US RMBS as the US economy continues on
the path toward normalization. Economic activity will continue to
strengthen in 2021 because of several factors, including the
rollout of vaccines, growing household consumption and an
accommodative central bank policy. However, specific sectors and
individual businesses will remain weakened by extended pandemic
related restrictions.

Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 7.5%
(approximately 6.4% for the mean) and Moody's Aaa loss by 2.5% to
reflect the likely performance deterioration resulting from the
slowdown in US economic activity due to the coronavirus outbreak.
These adjustments are lower than the 15% median expected loss and
5% Aaa loss adjustments Moody's made on pools from deals issued
after the onset of the pandemic until February 2021. Moody's
reduced adjustments reflect the fact that the loan pool in this
deal does not contain any loans to borrowers who are not currently
making payments. For newly originated loans, post-COVID
underwriting takes into account the impact of the pandemic on a
borrower's ability to repay the mortgage. For seasoned loans, as
time passes, the likelihood that borrowers who have continued to
make payments throughout the pandemic will now become non-cash
flowing due to COVID-19 continues to decline. Moody's regard the
coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework,
given the substantial implications for public health and safety.

In addition, Moody's considered that for this transaction, similar
to other mortgage insurance credit risk transfer deals, payment
deferrals are not claimable events and thus are not treated as
losses; rather they would only result in a loss if the borrower
ultimately defaults after receiving the payment deferral and a
mortgage insurance claim is filed.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included, but were not limited to,
adjustments for origination quality.

Collateral Description

Each mortgage loan has an insurance coverage effective date on or
after Jan 1, 2021, but on or before June 30, 2021. The reference
pool consists of 167,263 prime, fixed- and adjustable-rate, one- to
four-unit, first-lien fully-amortizing, predominantly conforming
mortgage loans with a total insured loan balance of approximately
$49 billion. Most of the loans in the reference pool had a
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination that was greater than 80%,
with a weighted average of 91%. The borrowers in the pool have a
weighted average FICO score of 745, a weighted average
debt-to-income ratio of 36.1% and a weighted average mortgage rate
of 3.0%.

The weighted average LTV of 91% is far higher than those of recent
private label prime jumbo deals, which typically have LTVs in the
high 60's range, however, it is in line with those of recent MI CRT
and STACR high-LTV transactions. Most of these insured loans in the
reference pool were originated with LTV ratios greater than 80%.
100% of insured loans were covered by mortgage insurance at
origination with 98.3% covered by BPMI and 1.7% covered by LPMI
based on unpaid principal balance.

Underwriting Quality

Moody's took into account the quality of Genworth's insurance
underwriting, risk management and claims payment process in Moody's
analysis

Lenders submit mortgage loans to Genworth for insurance either
through delegated underwriting or non-delegated underwriting
program. Under the delegated underwriting program, lenders can
submit loans for insurance without Genworth re-underwriting the
loan file. Genworth issues an MI commitment based on the lender's
representation that the loan meets the insurer's underwriting
requirement. Genworth does not allow exceptions for loans approved
through its delegated underwriting program. Lenders eligible under
this program must be pre-approved by Genworth. Under the
non-delegated underwriting program, insurance coverage is approved
after full-file underwriting by the insurer's underwriters.

Genworth generally aligns with the GSE underwriting guidelines via
DU/LP. Genworth restricts its coverage to mortgage loans that meet
or exceed its thresholds with respect to borrower Credit Scores,
maximum DTI levels, maximum loan-to-value levels and documentation
requirements. Genworth's underwriting guidelines also seek to limit
the coverage it provides for certain higher-risk mortgage loans,
including those for cash-out refinancings, second homes or
investment properties, although certain Mortgage Loans covered by
the Reinsurance Agreement will contain such higher-risk
characteristics. Servicers file a claim within 60 days of taking
title or sale of the property. Claims are submitted by uploading or
entering on Genworth's website, electronic transfer or paper.
Claims documentation include: F/C chronology, servicing notes,
invoices, BPOs, closing docs, and modification agreement. All
claims are validated and audited by Genworth. Within 90 days after
the claim settlement, a supplemental claim may be filed for
trailing advances not included on the initial claim for loss.
Claims not perfected within 120 days of receipt will be denied.

Genworth performs an internal quality assurance review on a sample
basis of delegated and non-delegated underwritten loans to ensure
that (i) the reported risk exposure of insured mortgage loans is
accurately represented; (ii) lenders are submitting loans under
delegated authority are adhering to contractual requirements and
(iii) internal underwriters are following guidelines and
maintaining consistent underwriting standards and processes.

Genworth has a solid quality control process to ensure claims are
paid timely and accurately. Similar to the above procedure,
Genworth's claims management reviews a sample of paid claims each
month. Findings are used for performance management as well as
identified trends. In addition, there is strong oversight and
review from internal and external parties such as GSE audits,
Department of Insurance audits, audits from an independent account
firm, and Genworth's internal audits and compliance. Genworth is
also SOX compliant.

Third-Party Review

Genworth engaged Wipro Opus Risk Solutions, LLC to perform a data
analysis and diligence review of a sampling of mortgage loans files
submitted for mortgage insurance. This review included validation
of credit qualifications, verification of the presence of material
documentation as applicable to the mortgage insurance application,
updated valuation analysis and comparison, and a tape-to-file data
integrity validation to identify possible data discrepancies. The
scope does not include a compliance review.

The scope of the third-party review is weaker than most other MI
CRT transactions Moody's rated because the sample size was small
(only 325 of the total loans in the initial reference pool). Once
the sample size was determined, the files were selected randomly to
meet the final sample count of 325 files out of a total of 167,263
loan files.

In spite of the small sample size and a limited TPR scope for
Triangle Re 2021-3 Ltd., Moody's did not make an additional
adjustment to the loss levels because, (1) approximately 32.4% of
the loans in the reference pool were submitted through
non-delegated underwriting, which have gone through full
re-underwriting by the ceding insurer, (2) the underwriting quality
of the insured loans is monitored under the GSEs' stringent quality
control system, and (3) MI policies will not cover any costs
related to compliance violations.

Scope and results. The third-party due diligence scope focuses on
the following:

Appraisals: The third-party diligence provider also reviewed
property valuation on 100% of the loans in the sample pool.

Credit: The third-party diligence provider reviewed credit on 100%
of the loans in the sample pool. The third-party diligence provider
reviewed each mortgage loan file to determine the adherence to
stated underwriting or credit extension guidelines, standards,
criteria or other requirements provided by Genworth.

Data integrity: The third-party review firm was provided a data
file with loan level data, which was audited against origination
documents to determine the accuracy of data found within the data
tape.

Reps & Warranties Framework

The ceding insurer does not make any representations and warranties
to the noteholders in this transaction. Since the insured mortgages
are predominantly GSE loans, the individual sellers would provide
exhaustive representations and warranties to the GSEs that are
negotiated and actively monitored. In addition, the ceding insurer
may rescind the MI policy for certain material misrepresentation
and fraud in the origination of a loan, which would benefit the MI
CRT noteholders.

Transaction Structure

The transaction structure is very similar to other MI CRT
transactions. The ceding insurer will retain the senior coverage
level A, B-2 and B-3 coverage level at closing. The offered notes
benefit from a sequential pay structure. The transaction
incorporates structural features such as a 12.5-year bullet
maturity and a sequential pay structure for the non-senior
tranches, resulting in a shorter expected weighted average life on
the offered notes.

Funds raised through the issuance of the notes are deposited into a
reinsurance trust account and are distributed either to the
noteholders, when insured loans amortize or MI policies terminate,
or to the ceding insurer for reimbursement of claims paid when
loans default. Interest on the notes is paid from income earned on
the eligible investments and the coverage premium from the ceding
insurer. Interest on the notes will accrue based on the outstanding
balance of the notes, but the ceding insurer will only be obligated
to remit coverage premium based on each note's coverage level.

Credit enhancement in this transaction is comprised of
subordination provided by mezzanine and junior tranches. The rated
Class M-1A, Class M-1B and Class M-2 offered notes have credit
enhancement levels of 5.25%, 3.65% and 2.75%, respectively. The
credit risk exposure of the notes depends on the actual MI losses
incurred by the insured pool. MI losses are allocated in a reverse
sequential order starting with the coverage level B-3. Investment
deficiency amount losses are allocated in a reverse sequential
order starting with the class B-2 note.

So long as the senior coverage level is outstanding, and no
performance trigger event occurs, the transaction structure
allocates principal payments on a pro-rata basis between the senior
and non-senior reference tranches. Principal is then allocated
sequentially amongst the non-senior tranches. Principal payments
are all allocated to senior reference tranches when trigger event
occurs.

A trigger event with respect to any payment date will be in effect
if the coverage level amount of coverage level A for such payment
date has not been reduced to zero and either (i) the preceding
three month average of the sixty-plus delinquency amount for that
payment date equals or exceeds 75.00% of Class A subordination
amount or (ii) the subordinate percentage (or with respect to the
first payment date, the original subordinate percentage) for that
payment date is less than the target CE percentage (minimum C/E
test: 7.75%).

Premium Deposit Account (PDA)

The premium deposit account will benefit the transaction upon a
mandatory termination event (e.g. the ceding insurer fails to pay
the coverage premium and does not cure, triggering a default under
the reinsurance agreement), by providing interest liquidity to the
noteholders, when combined with the income earned on the eligible
investments, of approximately 70 days while the reinsurance trust
account and eligible investments are being liquidated to repay the
principal of the notes.

On the closing date, the ceding insurer will establish a cash and
securities account (the PDA), and the deposit amount will be made
to the account by the ceding insurance because the premium deposit
event is triggered. The premium deposit event will be triggered (1)
with respect to any class of notes, if the rating of that class of
notes exceeds the insurance financial strength (IFS) rating of the
ceding insurer or (2) with respect to all classes of notes, if the
ceding insurer's IFS rating falls below Baa3. If the note ratings
exceed that of the ceding insurer, the insurer will be obligated to
deposit into and maintain in the premium deposit account the
required PDA amount (see next paragraph) only for the notes that
exceeded the ceding insurer's rating. If the ceding insurer's
rating falls below Baa3, it will be obligated to deposit the
required PDA amount for all classes of notes.

The required PDA amount for each class of notes and each month is
equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the coupon rate of the note
multiplied by (a) the applicable funded percentage, (b) the
coverage level amount for the coverage level corresponding to such
class of notes and (c) a fraction equal to 70/360, over (ii) two
times the investment income collected (but not yet distributed) on
the eligible investments.

Moody's believe the requirement that the PDA be funded only upon a
rating trigger event does not establish a linkage between the
ratings of the notes and the IFS rating of the ceding insurer
because, 1) the required PDA amount is small relative to the entire
deal, 2) the risk of PDA not being funded could theoretically occur
only if the ceding insurer suddenly defaults, causing a rating
downgrade from investment grade to default in a very short period,
which is a highly unlikely scenario, and 3) even if the insurer
becomes insolvent, there would be a strong incentive for the
insurer's insolvency regulator to continue to make the interest
payments to avoid losing reinsurance protection provided by the
deal.

Claims Consultant

To mitigate risks associated with the ceding insurer's control of
the trust account and discretion to unilaterally determine the MI
claims amounts (i.e. ultimate net losses), the ceding insurer will
engage Wipro Opus Risk Solutions, LLC, as claims consultant, to
verify MI claims and reimbursement amounts withdrawn from the
reinsurance trust account once the coverage level B-2 has been
written down (or class B-3 if class B-2 notes are issued pursuant
to a class B-2 reopening). The claims consultant will review on a
quarterly basis a sample of claims paid by the ceding insurer
covered by the reinsurance agreement. In verifying the amount, the
claims consultant will apply a permitted variance to the total paid
loss for each MI Policy of +/- 2%. The claims consultant will
provide a preliminary report to the ceding insurer containing
results of the verification. If there are findings that cannot be
resolved between the ceding insurer and the claims consultant, the
claims consultant will increase the sample size. A final report
will be delivered by the claims consultant to the trustee, the
issuer and the ceding insurer. The issuer will be required to
provide a copy of the final report to the noteholders and the
rating agencies.

Unlike RMBS transactions where there is typically some level of
independent third party oversight by the trustee, the master
servicer and/or the securities administrator, MI CRT transactions
typically do not have such oversight. As noted, the ceding insurer
not only has full control of the trust account but can also
determine, at its discretion, the MI claims amount. The ceding
insurer will then direct the trustee to withdraw the funds to
reimburse for the claims paid. Since the trustee is not required to
verify the MI claims amount, there could be a scenario where funds
are withdrawn from the reinsurance trust account in excess of the
amounts necessary to reimburse the ceding insurer. As such, Moody's
believe the claims consultant in this transaction will provide the
oversight to mitigate such risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
August 2021.


VELOCITY COMMERCIAL 2021-2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on 3 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage-Backed
Certificates, Series 2021-2 to be issued by Velocity Commercial
Capital Loan Trust 2021-2 as follows:

-- $148.3 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $148.3 million Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- $148.3 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $15.4 million Class M-1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $15.4 million Class M1-A at AA (low) (sf)
-- $15.4 million Class M1-IO at AA (low) (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class M-2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class M2-A at A (low) (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class M2-IO at A (low) (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class M-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class M3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class M3-IO at BBB (sf)
-- $4.3 million Class M-4 at BB (sf)
-- $4.3 million Class M4-A at BB (sf)
-- $4.3 million Class M4-IO at BB (sf)
-- $3.1 million Class M-5 at B (sf)
-- $3.1 million Class M5-A at B (sf)
-- $3.1 million Class M5-IO at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, M1-IO, M2-IO, M3-IO, M4-IO, and M5-IO are
interest-only certificates. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A, M-1, M-2, M-3, M-4, and M-5 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
initial exchangeable certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 27.70% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (low)
(sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect
20.20%, 16.70%, 9.90%, 7.80%, and 6.30% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

VCC 2021-2 is a securitization of a portfolio of newly originated
fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien residential mortgages
collateralized by investor properties with one to four units
(residential investor loans) and small-balance commercial mortgages
(SBC) collateralized by various types of commercial, multifamily
rental, and mixed-use properties. The securitization is funded by
the issuance of the Certificates, which are backed by 541 mortgage
loans with a total principal balance of $205,177,758 as of the
Cut-Off Date (July 1, 2021).

Approximately 53.7% of the pool is comprised of residential
investor loans and about 46.3% of SBC loans. All but one of the
loans in this securitization (99.5% of the pool) were originated by
Velocity Commercial Capital, LLC (Velocity or VCC), and one loan
(0.5% of the pool) was acquired by Velocity from a third-party
originator. The loans were underwritten to program guidelines for
business-purpose loans where the lender generally expects the
property (or its value) to be the primary source of repayment (No
Ratio). The lender reviews mortgagor's credit profile, though it
does not rely on the borrower's income to make its credit decision.
However, the lender considers the property-level cash flows or
minimum debt-service coverage (DSCR) ratio in underwriting SBC
loans with balances over $750,000 for purchase transactions and
over $500,000 for refinance transactions. Since the loans were made
to investors for business purposes, they are exempt from the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Ability-to-Repay rules and
TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure rule.

The pool is about one-month seasoned on a weighted average (WA)
basis, although seasoning may span from zero up to 15 months.
Except for seven loans (1.0% of the pool) that have missed one or
more payments, the loans have been performing since origination. Of
the seven loans that were delinquent, two have cured the
delinquency as of the Cut-Off Date and become current.

PHH Mortgage Corporation will service all loans within the pool for
a servicing fee of 0.30% per annum. In addition, Velocity will act
as a Special Servicer servicing the loans that defaulted or became
60 or more days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association
(MBA) method and other loans, as defined in the transaction
documents (Specially Serviced Loans). The Special Servicer will be
entitled to receive compensation based on an annual fee of 0.75%
and the balance of Specially Serviced Loans. Also, the Special
Servicer is entitled to a liquidation fee equal to 2.00% of the net
proceeds from the liquidation of a Specially Serviced Loan, as
described in the transaction documents.

The Servicer will fund advances of delinquent principal and
interest (P&I) until the advances deemed unrecoverable. Also, the
Servicer is obligated to make advances with respect to taxes,
insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing properties.

U.S. Bank National Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend
by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Trustee, Paying Agent, and
Custodian.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, is expected to retain an eligible horizontal residual
interest consisting of the Class P and Class XS Certificates, and,
to the extent required, the Class M-7 Certificates, collectively
representing at least 5% of the fair value of all Certificates, to
satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

On or after the later of the (1) three-year anniversary of the
Closing Date or (2) date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Closing Date
balance, the Depositor may purchase all outstanding Certificates
(Optional Purchase) at a price equal to the sum of the remaining
aggregate balance of the Certificates plus accrued and unpaid
interest, and any fees, expenses, and indemnity payments due and
unpaid to the transaction parties, including any unreimbursed P&I
and servicing advances, and other amounts due as applicable. The
Optional Purchase will be conducted concurrently with a qualified
liquidation of the Issuer.

Additionally, if on any date on which the unpaid mortgage loan
balance and the value of real estate owned (REO) properties has
declined to less than 10% of the initial mortgage loan balance as
of the Cut-off Date, the Directing Holder, the Special Servicer, or
the Servicer, in that order of priority, may purchase all of the
mortgages, REO properties, and any other properties from the Issuer
(Optional Termination) at a price specified in the transaction
documents. The Optional Termination will be conducted as a
qualified liquidation of the Issuer. The Directing Holder
(initially, the Seller) is the representative selected by the
holders of more than 50% of the outstanding subordinate
certificates with the lowest priority of principal distributions.

The transaction uses a structure sometimes referred to as a
modified pro rata structure. Prior to the Class A credit
enhancement (CE) falling below 10.0% of the loan balance as of the
Cut-off Date (Class A Minimum CE Event), the principal
distributions allow for amortization of all senior and subordinate
bonds based on CE targets set at different levels for performing
(same CE as at issuance) and nonperforming (higher CE than at
issuance) loans. Each Class's target principal balance is
determined based on the CE targets and the performing and
nonperforming (those that are 90 or more days MBA delinquent, in
foreclosure and REO, and subject to a servicing modification within
the prior 12 months) loan amounts. As such, the principal payments
are paid on a pro rata basis, up to each Class's target principal
balance, so long as no loans in the pool are nonperforming. If the
share of nonperforming loans grows, the corresponding CE target
increases. Thus, the principal payment amount increases for the
senior and senior subordinate classes and falls for the more
subordinate bonds. The goal is to distribute the appropriate amount
of principal to the senior and subordinate bonds each month, to
always maintain the desired level of CE, based on the performing
and nonperforming pool percentages. After the Class A Minimum CE
Event, the principal distributions are made sequentially.

Relative to the sequential pay structure, the modified pro rata
structure is more sensitive to the timing of the projected defaults
and losses as the losses may be applied at a time when the amount
of credit support is reduced as the bonds' principal balances
amortize over a life of the transaction. That said, the excess
spread can be used to cover realized losses after being allocated
to the unpaid net WA coupon shortfalls.

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (CMBS) METHODOLOGY

Of the 200 loans, 197 loans, representing 98.2% of the SBC portion
of the pool, have a fixed interest rate with a straight average of
7.8%. The three floating-rate loans have interest rate floors
(excluding rate margins) ranging from 3.88% to 3.99% with a
straight average of 3.92% and interest rate margins ranging from
4.75% to 5.00% with a straight average of 4.92%. To determine the
probability of default (POD) and loss given default inputs in the
CMBS Insight Model, DBRS Morningstar applied a stress to the
various indexes that corresponded with the remaining fully extended
term of the loans and added the respective contractual loan spread
to determine a stressed interest rate over the loan term. DBRS
Morningstar looked to the greater of the interest rate floor or the
DBRS Morningstar stressed index rate when calculating stressed debt
service. The WA modeled coupon rate was 7.60%. Most of the loans
have original term lengths of 30 years and fully amortize over
30-year schedules. However, one loan that comprises 1.1% of the SBC
pool has a 10-year term and amortizes over a 30-year schedule. When
the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS
Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants or stressed interest rates, there were 154 loans,
representing 85.6% of the SBC pool, with term DSCRs below 1.15
times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of term
default.

All SBC loans were originated between March 2020 and June 2021,
resulting in minimal seasoning of 1.1 months on average. The SBC
pool has a WA original term length of 357.3 months, or 29.8 years,
with a WA remaining term of 356.1 months, or 29.7 years. Based on
the current loan amount, which reflects approximately 8 basis
points (bps) of amortization, and the current appraised values, the
SBC pool has a WA LTV ratio of 66.1%. However, DBRS Morningstar
made LTV adjustments to 37 loans that had an implied capitalization
rate more than 200 bps lower than a set of minimal capitalization
rates established by DBRS Morningstar Market Rank. The DBRS
Morningstar minimal capitalization rates range from 5.0% for
properties located in Market Rank 8 to 8.0% for properties located
in Market Rank 1. This resulted in a higher DBRS Morningstar LTV of
74.5%. Lastly, all but one loan fully amortize over their
respective remaining terms, resulting in a 99.8% expected
amortization; this amount of amortization is greater than what is
typical for CMBS conduit pools. DBRS Morningstar's research
indicates that, for CMBS conduit transactions securitized between
2000 and 2019, average amortization by year has ranged between
7.50% and 21.09%, with an overall medial rate of 18.80%.

As contemplated and explained in DBRS Morningstar's Rating North
American CMBS Interest-Only Certificates methodology, the most
significant risk to an IO cash flow stream is term default risk. As
noted in that methodology, for a pool of approximately 63,000 CMBS
loans that fully cycled through to their maturity dates, DBRS
Morningstar noted that the average total default rate across all
property types was approximately 17%, the refinance default rate
was 6% (approximately one-third of the total rate), and the term
default rate was approximately 11%. DBRS Morningstar recognizes the
muted impact of refinance risk on IO certificates by notching the
IO rating up by one notch from the Reference Obligation rating.
When using the 10-year Idealized Default Table default probability
to derive a POD for a CMBS bond from its rating, DBRS Morningstar
estimates that, in general, a one-third reduction in the CMBS
Reference Obligation POD maps to a tranche rating that is
approximately one notch higher than the Reference Obligation or the
Applicable Reference Obligation, whichever is appropriate.
Therefore, similar logic regarding term default risk supported the
rationale for DBRS Morningstar to reduce the POD in the CMBS
Insight Model by one notch because refinance risk is largely absent
for this SBC pool of loans.

STRENGTHS – SBC LOANS

-- The CMBS pool has a WA expected loss of 4.37%, which is lower
than recently analyzed comparable small balance transactions.
Contributing factors to the low expected loss include pool
diversity, moderate leverage, and fully amortizing loans.

-- The SBC pool is quite diverse based on loan size, with an
average balance of $475,366, a concentration profile equivalent to
that of a transaction with 117 equal-size loans, and a top-10 loan
concentration of 18.9%. Increased pool diversity helps to insulate
the higher-rated classes from event risk.

-- The loans are mostly secured by traditional property types
(i.e., retail, multifamily, office, and industrial) with no
exposure to higher-volatility property types, such as hotels,
self-storage, or manufactured housing communities.

-- All but one loan in the SBC pool fully amortize over their
respective remaining loan terms between 352 and 360 months,
reducing refinance risk.

CHALLENGES AND STABILIZING FACTORS – SBC LOANS

-- As classified by DBRS Morningstar for modeling purposes, the
SBC pool contains a significant exposure to retail (19.1% of the
SBC pool) and a smaller exposure to office (10.8% of the SBC pool),
which are two of the higher-volatility asset types. Loans counted
as retail include those identified as automotive and potentially
commercial condo. Combined, they represent nearly one-third of the
pool balance. Retail, which has struggled because of the pandemic,
comprises the second-largest asset type in the transaction.

-- DBRS Morningstar applied a 20.0% reduction to the NCF for
retail properties and a 30.0% reduction for office assets in the
SBC pool, which is above the average NCF reduction applied for
comparable property types in CMBS-analyzed deals.

-- Multifamily comprises the fourth-largest property type
concentration in the SBC pool (18.3%); based on DBRS Morningstar's
research, multifamily properties securitized in conduit
transactions have had lower default rates than most other property
types.

-- DBRS Morningstar did not perform site inspections on loans
within its sample for this transaction. Instead, DBRS Morningstar
relied upon analysis of third-party reports and online searches to
determine property quality assessments. Of the 60 loans DBRS
Morningstar sampled, 6.7% were Average, 81.2% were Average –,
11.0% were Below Average, and 1.0% were Poor quality.

-- DBRS Morningstar assumed unsampled loans were Average –
quality, which has a slightly increased POD level. This is more
conservative than the assessments from sampled loans and is
consistent with other SBC transactions.

-- Limited property-level information was available for DBRS
Morningstar to review. Asset summary reports, property condition
reports, Phase I/II environmental site assessment (ESA) reports,
and historical financial cash flows were generally not available
for review in conjunction with this securitization.

-- DBRS Morningstar received and reviewed appraisals for the top
30 loans, which represent 40.1% of the SBC pool balance. These
appraisals were issued between November 2019 and June 2021 when the
respective loans were originated. DBRS Morningstar was able to
perform loan-level cash flow analysis on the top 30 loans, as well
as the 32nd-largest loan in the SBC pool. The haircuts ranged from
-2.5% to -100.0%, with an average of -24.5%; however, DBRS
Morningstar generally applied more conservative haircuts on the
unsampled loans.

-- No ESA reports were provided and are not required by the
Issuer; however, all of the loans are placed onto an environmental
insurance policy that provides coverage to the Issuer and the
securitization trust in the event of a claim.

-- DBRS Morningstar received limited borrower information, net
worth or liquidity information, and credit history.

-- DBRS Morningstar generally initially assumed loans had Weak
sponsor strength scores, which increases the stress on the default
rate. The initial assumption of Weak reflects the generally less
sophisticated nature of small balance borrowers and assessments
from past small balance transactions.

-- Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar received a 12-month pay history
on each loan as of July 16, 2021. If any loan had more than two
late pays within this period or was currently 30 days past due,
DBRS Morningstar applied an additional stress to the default rate.
This occurred for only two loans, representing 0.7% of the SBC pool
balance.

-- Finally, DBRS Morningstar received a borrower FICO score as of
July 16, 2021, for 197 loans or 98.8% of the SBC pool balance, with
an average FICO score of 724. While the CMBS Methodology does not
contemplate FICO scores, the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
(RMBS) Methodology does and would characterize a FICO score of 724
as near-prime, whereas prime is considered greater than 750.
Borrowers with a FICO score of 724 could generally be described as
potentially having had previous credit events (foreclosure,
bankruptcy, etc.) but, if they did, it is likely that these credit
events were cleared about two to five years ago.

RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (RMBS) METHODOLOGY

The collateral pool consists of 341 mortgage loans with a total
balance of approximately $110.1 million collateralized by one- to
four-unit investment properties. The mortgage loans were
underwritten by Velocity to No Ratio program guidelines for
business-purpose loans.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures caused an immediate economic contraction,
leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income
reductions for many consumers. Shortly after the onset of the
pandemic, DBRS Morningstar saw an increase in the delinquencies for
many residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes.

Such mortgage delinquencies were mostly in the form of
forbearances, which are generally short-term periods of payment
relief that may perform very differently from traditional
delinquencies. At the onset of the pandemic, the option to forbear
mortgage payments was widely available, driving forbearances to an
elevated level. When the dust settled, loans with
coronavirus-induced forbearance in 2020 performed better than
expected, thanks to government aid, low loan-to-value ratios
(LTVs), and acceptable underwriting in the mortgage market in
general. Across nearly all RMBS asset classes in recent months
delinquencies have been gradually trending downward, as forbearance
periods come to an end for many borrowers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



VOYA CLO 2014-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on $23MM Cl. D Notes to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Voya CLO 2014-3, Ltd. (the "CLO" or "Issuer"):

US$31,250,000 Class C-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class C-R Notes"), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
January 27, 2021 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class D Notes"), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on October 5,
2020 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

The Class C-R Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Upgraded Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since January 2021. The Class
A-1-R notes have been paid down in full and the Class A-2A notes
have been paid down by approximately 32.9% or $17.7 million since
that time. Based on the trustee's July 2021 report [1], the OC
ratios for the Class C notes, and Class D notes are reported at
128.48%, and 107.75% respectively, versus levels of 118.31%, and
104.55% respectively, in the trustee's January 2021 report[2].
Moody's notes that the July 2021 reported OC ratios reported above,
do not reflect the $16.3 million payment to the Class A notes on
the July 26th payment date[3].

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, weighted average spread, diversity
score, and the weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers or the metrics calculated based on the current portfolio.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $139,725,718

Defaulted Securities: $845,013

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3171

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 3.27

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for LIBOR floors):
3.34%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.29%

Par haircut in OC tests and interest diversion test: 2.78%

Finally, Moody's notes that it also considered the information in
the August 2021 trustee report[4] which became available
immediately prior to the release of this announcement.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

In addition to base case analysis, Moody's considered additional
scenarios where outcomes could diverge from the base case. These
additional scenarios include, among others, deterioration in credit
quality, near term defaults by companies facing liquidity pressure,
and lower recoveries on defaulted assets.

Factors that would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.


VOYA CLO 2020-2: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Voya
CLO 2020-2 Ltd., a CLO originally issued in August 2020 that is
managed by Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Sept. 2, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes will be used to redeem the original notes. At
that time, S&P expects to withdraw its ratings on the original
notes and assign ratings to the replacement notes. However, if the
refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm its ratings on the
original notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings on the
replacement notes.

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which outlines the terms of the replacement notes.
According to the proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes are
expected to be issued at lower spreads over three-month LIBOR than
the original notes.

-- The replacement class A-2-R notes are expected to be issued at
a floating spread with a payment priority that is subordinate to
the class A-1-R notes, replacing the current fixed coupon tranche
that is pari passu with the original class A-1 notes.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended by
three years, and the non-call period will be extended by two
years.

-- The collateral portfolio will be upsized to $700 million,
representing a 75% increase from the pre-reset portfolio.

-- The ability to purchase middle-market assets up to 10% of the
total portfolio amount has been added.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Voya CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Voya CLO 2020-2 LLC

  Class A-1-R, $420.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-R, $21.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R, $91.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $42.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $42.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $28.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $54.00 million: Not rated



WELLFLEET CLO 2020-2: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB-' Rating on E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes and proposed new
class X notes from Wellfleet CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Wellfleet CLO 2020-2
LLC, a CLO originally issued in August 2020 that is managed by
Wellfleet Credit Partners LLC and was not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 20,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the August 24, 2021 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes will be used to redeem the original notes. S&P
said, "At that time, we expect to withdraw our ratings on the
original notes and assign ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm our
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which outlines the terms of the replacement notes.
According to the proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes are expected
to be issued at a lower spread over three-month LIBOR than the
original notes.

-- The replacement class B-R notes are expected to be issued at a
floating spread, replacing the current class B-1 floating spread
and class B-2 fixed coupon notes.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended
three years.

-- The waterfall will be adjusted so that principal proceeds will
be used after the reinvestment period to cure the coverage tests
before interest proceeds.

-- A 5% limit on corporate bonds will be added to the
concentration limits.

-- New class X notes will be issued in connection with this
refinancing. These notes are expected to be paid down using
interest proceeds during the first 10 payment dates, beginning in
October 2021.

-- 99.74% of the identified underlying collateral obligations have
credit ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- 96.88% of the identified underlying collateral obligations have
recovery ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction data in the
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and the
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis (and other qualitative factors, as applicable)
demonstrated, in our view, that the outstanding rated classes all
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Wellfleet CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Wellfleet CLO 2020-2 LLC

  Class X, $3.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-R, $248.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R, $56.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $15.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $34.00 million: Not rated



WHITEHORSE VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $26.25MM E Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgrades the ratings on the following
notes issued by WhiteHorse VIII, Ltd.:

US$31,500,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferable Floating Rate
Notes Due May 1, 2026, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on January
27, 2021 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$26,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferable Floating Rate Notes
Due May 1, 2026, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on August 31,
2020 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

WhiteHorse VIII, Ltd., originally issued in May 2014 and partially
refinanced in November 2017 is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes
are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in May 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since January 2021. The Class A
notes have been paid down in full and the Class B notes have been
paid down by approximately 82% or $60.7 million since that time.
Based on the trustee's July 2021 report[1], the OC ratios for the
Class B, Class C, and Class D notes are reported at 375.75%,
191.57%, and 130.50%, respectively, versus January 2021 levels of
209.17%, 149.37%, and 117.35%, respectively. Moody's notes that the
July 2021 reported OC ratios do not reflect the $20.9 million
payment to the Class B notes on the August payment date.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $110,327,036

Defaulted par: $2,935,072

Diversity Score: 30

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3395

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for LIBOR floors):
3.37%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.63%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 2.71 years

Par haircut in OC tests and interest diversion test: 2.10%

In addition to base case analysis, Moody's considered additional
scenarios where outcomes could diverge from the base case. These
additional scenarios include, among others, deterioration in credit
quality of the portfolio, and lower recoveries on defaulted
assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated notes.


[*] S&P Places 252 Ratings from 114 US CLO Deals on Watch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on 252 classes from 114 U.S.
CLO transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications. At the
same time, three tranches currently rated in the 'CCC' category
were also placed on CreditWatch with negative implications.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

            https://bit.ly/3zccb22

Nearly all the CLOs in the CreditWatch placements had one or more
tranches downgraded during the pandemic last year. S&P said,
"During those actions, our analysis considered a number of factors
under our criteria, including the tranche's cash flow results and
the CLO's exposure to 'CCC'/'CCC-' rated collateral. Since then,
the overall market and sentiment have improved significantly with
the strong economic rebound, and a significant number of corporate
loan issuers have seen their ratings raised out of the 'CCC' range.
We note that the reduction in CLO portfolio exposure to 'CCC'
assets has been particularly prominent for CLOs still within their
reinvestment period. As a result, overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios for these CLOs have increased. This, combined with the
overall improvement in credit quality of CLO portfolios made some
of the previously downgraded tranches potential candidates for an
upgrade, in our view."

S&P said, "About a third of the CLOs affected by the CreditWatch
placements are CLOs in their amortization phase. While paydowns to
senior notes are generally a positive for tranche credit
enhancement, portfolio concentration can increase the credit risk
of the mezzanine and junior CLO notes. This was a limiting factor
for our analysis of which ratings to place on CreditWatch positive
for some amortizing transactions.

"We also placed three junior note ratings (all in the 'CCC'
category) from three CLOs on CreditWatch with negative implications
given that their O/C has decreased and they are now failing their
O/C tests by a significant margin.

"We intend to resolve these CreditWatch placements within 90 days,
following cash flow analysis and committee review for ratings on
the affected transactions. We will continue to monitor the
transactions we rate and take rating actions, including CreditWatch
placements, as we deem appropriate."



[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 114 Classes from 20 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 114 ratings from 15 U.S.
RMBS transactions issued in 2002 and 2007. These transactions are
backed by various U.S. RMBS collateral types. The review yielded
four upgrades, six downgrades, 100 affirmations, three withdrawals,
and one discontinuance.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/3zpkgR7

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance and/or structural
characteristics, and their potential effects on certain classes.
Some of these considerations may include:

-- Factors related to the COVID-19 pandemic,

-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends,

-- Increase or decrease in available credit support,

-- Small loan count, and

-- Reduced interest payments due to loan modifications.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The rating changes reflect our view regarding the
associated transaction-specific collateral performance, their
structural characteristics, and/or the application of specific
criteria applicable to these classes.

"The ratings affirmations reflect our view that our projected
credit support, collateral performance, and credit-related
reductions in interest on these classes have remained relatively
consistent with our prior projections.

"We withdrew our ratings on three classes from one transaction due
to the small number of loans remaining within the related group or
structure. Once a pool has declined to a de minimis amount, we
believe there is a high degree of credit instability that is
incompatible with any rating level."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***