/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/210307.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 7, 2021, Vol. 25, No. 65

                            Headlines

ACC TRUST 2019-1: Moody's Raises Class B Notes From Ba1
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2021-1: Fitch Gives BB(EXP) Rating on E Debt
ANCHORAGE CREDIT 4: Moody's Rates $52.5M Class E-R Notes 'Ba3'
ANGEL OAK 2021-1: Fitch Assigns B(EXP) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
APIDOS CLO XXXV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) on Class E Notes

ATLAS SENIOR XVI: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR17: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 12 Tranches
BENCHMARK TRUST 2021-B24: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
BENEFIT STREET II: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
BENEFIT STREET IV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D-RR Notes

BRAVO RESIDENTIAL 2021-HE1: Fitch Gives B(EXP) Rating on B-2 Notes
BUSINESS JET 2021-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB (sf) Rating on C Notes
CASCADE MH 2021-MH1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'B-(EXP)'
CFCRE TRUST 2018-TAN: S&P Affirms BB (sf) Rating on Class X Certs
CIM TRUST 2021-J1: Moody's Gives (P)B1 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes

COLUMBIA CENT 31: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
CSMC 2021-AFC1: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
ELLINGTON FINANCIAL 2021-1: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on B-2 Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-1: Fitch Gives Final B+ Rating on B-5 Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-1: Moody's Gives B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Notes

FREDDIE MAC 2021-DNA2: S&P Assigns BB- Prelim Rating on B-1B Notes
GCAT 2021-NQM1: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
GREYWOLF CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2018-SRP5: S&P Cuts Class X-NCP Notes Rating to CCC
GS MORTGAGE 2021-PJ2: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-5 Certs

ICG US CLO 2021-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
JP MORGAN 2004-PNC1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 9 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2021-3: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-5 Debt
JP MORGAN 2021-3: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
JP MORGAN 2021-CL1: Moody's Gives B1 Rating on Cl. M-5 Notes

KKR CLO 29: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on $4MM Class F Notes
MADISON PARK XLVIII: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
MARINER FINANCE 2021-A: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on E Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-UBS8: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2019-L2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs

N-STAR REAL IX: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 3 Tranches
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-FL1: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on ORP1 Certs
OFSI BSL VIII: S&P Stays B+ (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
OFSI BSL X: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-1: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to BB+

PIKES PEAK 7: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on $16M Class E Notes
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 2021-1R: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on B-2 Notes
SARATOGA INVESTMENT 2013-1: Moody's Rates Class E-R-3 Notes 'Ba3'
SCULPTOR CLO XXV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
SCULPTOR CLO XXV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on D Notes

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2004-1: S&P Cuts Class A Certs Rating to 'D (sf)'
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2021-1: Fitch Assigns B Rating on B-4 Certs
SG COMMERCIAL 2016-C5: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to 'CCC'
TICP CLO 2016-2: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
TOWD POINT 2021-HE1: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on 7 Tranches

TRINITAS CLO VI: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2013-C5: Moody's Cuts Class D Certs to B2
UNITED AUTO 2021-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on F Notes
VIBRANT CLO XII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) on Class D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2012-C8: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to 'B-'

WFRBS 2012-C7: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Csf'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C12: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on F Certs
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 16 Tobacco Settlement-Backed Trust

                            *********

ACC TRUST 2019-1: Moody's Raises Class B Notes From Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Class B notes issued by
ACC Trust 2019-1. The notes are backed by a pool of closed-end
retail automobile leases originated by RAC King, LLC. RAC Servicer,
LLC is the servicer and administrator for this transaction.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: ACC Trust 2019-1

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade was prompted by an increase in credit enhancement due
to the sequential pay structure in addition to the non-declining
reserve account and overcollateralization.

Moody's lifetime cumulative credit net loss (CNL) expectation is
40.00% for the underlying pool, reflecting an approximately 20%
increase to the remaining expected loss due to the performance
deterioration as a result of the slowdown in US economic activity
due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

Moody's analyzed credit losses as well as the residual risk of the
pool based on exposure to residual value risk, the historical
turn-in rate, and historical residual value performance. Non-prime
auto leases are more susceptible to the current economic slowdown
due to the relatively weak credit quality of the underlying
obligors.

The COVID-19 outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
consumer assets from the current weak US economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's regards the COVID-19 outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
December 2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. Moody's expectation of pool losses could decline as
a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in
the value of the vehicles leading to a residual value gain when the
vehicle is turned in at the end of the lease and remarketed.
Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the US job markets, the
market for used vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given our expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles leading to higher
residual value loss when the vehicle is turned in at the end of a
lease and remarketed. Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the
US job markets and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance,
and fraud.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2021-1: Fitch Gives BB(EXP) Rating on E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign ratings and Rating Outlooks to
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust (AMCAR) 2021-1.

DEBT              RATING
----              ------
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2021-1

A-1      ST  F1+(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-2      LT  AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-3      LT  AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B        LT  AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
C        LT  A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
D        LT  BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
E        LT  BB(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The social and market disruptions caused by the coronavirus
pandemic and related containment measures have negatively affected
the U.S. economy. To account for the potential impact on AMCAR
2021-1, Fitch's base case cumulative net loss (CNL) proxy was
derived by taking into account GMF's 2006-2008 recessionary
static-managed portfolio performance resulting from an elevated
unemployment environment, along with more recent GMF-managed
vintage performance. The sensitivity of the ratings to scenarios
more severe than currently expected is provided in the Rating
Sensitivities section of this report.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral and Concentration Risks - Consistent Credit Quality: The
pool has consistent credit quality compared to recent pools based
on the weighted average (WA) Fair Isaac Corp. (FICO) score of 586
and internal credit scores. Obligors with FICO scores of 600 and
greater total 43.1%, up from 42.3% in 2020-3 and 39.3% in 2020-2.
Extended-term (61+ month) contracts total 93.7%, which is
consistent with prior transactions. The 73-75 month contracts total
14.1%, in line with transactions since 2019-2. However, 2021-1 is
the third transaction to include 76-84 month contracts, at 9.0% of
the pool, up from 5.0% and 3.8% in 2020-3 and 2020-2,
respectively.

Forward-Looking Approach to Derive Base Case Loss Proxy: Fitch
considered economic conditions and future expectations by assessing
key macroeconomic and wholesale market conditions in deriving the
series loss proxy. Losses on GMF's managed portfolio and
securitizations have been normalizing in recent years, with
2015-2017 vintages tracking higher than the strong 2010-2014
vintages. However, overall performance continues to be within
Fitch's expectations. Fitch accounted for the weaker performance of
recent vintages when deriving the cumulative net loss (CNL) proxy
of 11.00%.

Payment Structure - Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Initial hard
credit enhancement (CE) is consistent with that of 2020-3 and
2020-2, totaling 34.35%, 27.10%, 18.10%, 11.25% and 8.40% for
classes A, B, C, D and E, respectively. Excess spread is expected
to be 9.12% per annum. Loss coverage for each class of notes is
sufficient to cover the respective multiples of Fitch's base case
CNL proxy.

Coronavirus Causing Economic Shock: Fitch made assumptions about
the spread of coronavirus and the economic impact of the related
containment measures. As a base-case scenario, Fitch assumes that
the global recession that took hold in 1H20 and subsequent activity
bounce in 2H20 is followed by a slower recovery trajectory in early
2021 with GDP remaining below its 4Q19 level for 18 months-30
months. Under this scenario, Fitch's initial base case CNL proxy
was derived utilizing 2006-2008 recessionary static managed
portfolio performance and 2015-2016 vintages that have experienced
slightly weaker performance, while also considering ABS
performance.

As a downside (sensitivity) scenario provided in the Rating
Sensitivity section, Fitch considers a more severe and prolonged
period of stress with recovery to pre-crisis GDP levels delayed
until 2023 in the U.S. Under the downside case, Fitch also
completed a rating sensitivity by doubling the initial base case
loss proxy. Under this scenario, the notes could be downgraded by
up to three categories.

Seller/Servicer Operational Review - Consistent
Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: Fitch rates GM and GMF
'BBB-/F3'/Stable. GMF demonstrates adequate abilities as
originator, underwriter and servicer, as evidenced by historical
portfolio and securitization performance. Fitch deems GMF capable
of adequately servicing this series.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Stable-to-improved asset performance driven by stable
    delinquencies and defaults would lead to increasing CE levels
    and consideration for potential upgrades. If CNL is 20% less
    than the projected proxy, the expected ratings would be
    maintained for the class A notes at stronger rating multiples
    and the subordinate notes could be upgraded by up to two
    categories.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults could
    produce CNL levels that are higher than the base case and
    would likely result in declines of CE and remaining net loss
    coverage levels available to the notes. Additionally,
    unanticipated declines in recoveries could also result in a
    decline in net loss coverage. Decreased net loss coverage may
    make certain note ratings susceptible to potential negative
    rating actions depending on the extent of the decline in
    coverage.

-- Hence, Fitch conducts sensitivity analyses by stressing both a
    transaction's initial base case CNL and recovery rate
    assumptions and examining the rating implications on all
    classes of issued notes. The CNL sensitivity stresses the CNL
    proxy to the level necessary to reduce each rating by one full
    category, to non-investment grade (BBsf) and to 'CCCsf' based
    on the break-even loss coverage provided by the CE structure.

-- Additionally, Fitch conducts increases of 1.5x and 2.0x to the
    CNL proxy, representing moderate and severe stresses,
    respectively. Fitch also evaluates the impact of stressed
    recovery rates on an automobile loan ABS structure and the
    rating impact with a 50% haircut. These analyses are intended
    to provide an indication of the rating sensitivity of the
    notes to unexpected deterioration of a trust's performance. A
    more prolonged disruption from the pandemic is accounted for
    in the severe downside stress of 2.0x and could result in
    downgrades of up to three rating categories.

Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the U.S. and the broader global
economy remain under stress, with elevated unemployment and
pressure on businesses stemming from government-led social
distancing guidelines. Unemployment pressure on the consumer base
may result in increases in delinquencies. In addition, an inability
to repossess and recover on vehicles from charged off contracts
might delay recovery cashflows available to the notes. For
sensitivity purposes, Fitch assumes a 2.0x increase in delinquency
stress. The results indicate no adverse rating impact to the notes.
Fitch acknowledges that lower prepayments and longer recovery lag
times due to a delayed ability to repossess and recover on vehicles
may result from the pandemic. However, changes in these
assumptions, with all else equal, would not have an adverse impact
on modeled loss coverage, and Fitch has maintained its stressed
assumptions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and recomputation of
certain characteristics with respect to 185 randomly selected
sample loan contracts. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis, and it did not have an effect on Fitch's analysis or
conclusions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


ANCHORAGE CREDIT 4: Moody's Rates $52.5M Class E-R Notes 'Ba3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
CDO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Anchorage
Credit Funding 4, Ltd. (the "Issuer").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$375,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2039
(the "Class A-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$90,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2039
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$48,750,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2039 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A3 (sf)

US$33,750,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2039 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$52,500,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
Due 2039 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on our methodology and
considers all relevant risks particularly those associated with the
CDO's portfolio and structure.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by corporate
bonds and loans. At least 30% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, senior secured notes, and eligible
investments, and up to 15% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (the "Manager") will continue to
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's extended five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest up to 50% of unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on February 25, 2021
(the "Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
originally issued on December 14, 2016 (the "Original Closing
Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced
Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and
subordinated notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features will occur in connection with the refinancing. These
include: extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the
stated maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral
quality tests; changes to the overcollateralization test levels,
the inclusion of alternative benchmark replacement provisions;
additions to the CDO's ability to hold workout and restructured
assets; and changes to the definition of "Adjusted Weighted Average
Moody's Rating Factor".

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Portfolio par: $750,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3440

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.8%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 35.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 11 years

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak U.S. economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


ANGEL OAK 2021-1: Fitch Assigns B(EXP) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage
Trust 2021-1 (AOMT 2021-1).

DEBT               RATING  
----               ------  
AOMT 2021-1

A-1     LT  AAA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
A-2     LT  AA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A-3     LT  A(EXP)sf     Expected Rating
M-1     LT  BBB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B-1     LT  BB(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B-2     LT  B(EXP)sf     Expected Rating
B-3     LT  NR(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
A-IO-S  LT  NR(EXP)sf    Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed
certificates to be issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust 2021-1,
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2021-1 (AOMT 2021-1) as
indicated above. The certificates are supported by 509 loans with a
balance of$272.29 million as of the cutoff date. This will be the
14th Fitch-rated AOMT transaction.

The certificates are secured primarily by mortgage loans that were
originated by Angel Oak affiliated entities (collectively Angel
Oak), which include Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (AOMS)
(89.7%), and Angel Oak Home Loans LLC (AOHL) (7.9%). The remaining
loans were originated by third-party originators each contributing
less than 2% to the pool. Of the loans in the pool, 89.3% are
designated as nonqualified mortgage (non-QM), and 10.7% are
investment properties not subject to Ability to Repay rule. There
are no loans designated as QM in the pool.

There is LIBOR exposure in this transaction. The collateral
consists of 0.8% adjustable-rate loans, which reference one-year
LIBOR. The certificates are fixed-rate and capped at the net
weighted average coupon (WAC).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Expanded Prime Credit Quality (Mixed): The collateral consists
mainly of 30-year fixed rate fully amortizing loans (approximately
98%), 40-year fully amortizing fixed rate with 10-year I/O (1.7%),
and 30-year fully amortizing ARM loans (0.8%). The pool is seasoned
approximately 6 months in aggregate, as determined by Fitch. The
borrowers in this pool have strong credit profiles with a 743
weighted average (WA) FICO score and 35% DTI, as determined by
Fitch, and relatively high leverage (82% sLTV).

In addition, the pool contains five loans over $1 million, with and
the largest at $2.9 million. Self-employed (non-debt service
coverage ratio [DSCR]) borrowers make up 86.5% of the pool,
salaried non-DSCR borrowers make up 8.3% of the pool, and 5.2% of
the loans in the pool are investor cash flow (DSCR) loans.
Approximately 11% of the pool comprises loans on investor
properties (5.5% underwritten to the borrowers' credit profile and
5.2% comprising investor cash flow loans). None of the borrowers
have subordinate financing, there are no second lien loans, and
only 1.3% of borrowers were viewed by Fitch as having a prior
credit event in the past seven years.

Although the credit quality of the borrowers is higher than prior
AOMT transactions, the pool characteristics resemble non-prime
collateral, and therefore, the pool was analyzed using Fitch's
non-prime model.

Loan Documentation (Negative): Approximately 88% of the pool was
underwritten to less than full documentation. 81.5% was
underwritten to a 12- or 24- month bank statement program for
verifying income in accordance with either AOHL's or AOMS's
guidelines, which is not consistent with Appendix Q standards or
Fitch's view of a full documentation program. To reflect the
additional risk, Fitch increases the probability of default (PD) by
1.5x on the bank statement loans. Besides loans underwritten to a
bank statement program, 1% is an asset depletion product and 5.2%
is DSCR product.

Geographic Concentration (Neutral): Approximately 28.9% of the pool
is concentrated in Florida. The largest MSA concentration is in the
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL MSA (14.3%), followed by the
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA (11.8%) and the
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA MSA (6.7%). The top three MSAs
account for 32.8% of the pool. As a result, there was no adjustment
for geographic concentration.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Neutral): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A
certificates while shutting out the subordinate bonds from
principal until all three classes have been reduced to zero. To the
extent that either the cumulative loss trigger event or the
delinquency trigger event occurs in a given period, principal will
be distributed sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds
until they are reduced to zero.

Payment Holidays Related to Coronavirus Pandemic (Neutral): There
are no loans currently on an active forbearance plan. All the loans
that were previously on a forbearance plan are no longer on a plan
as the plan has expired.

For the loans that are contractually current as of the cutoff but
had a prior delinquency due to a forbearance plan (dirty current
loans), Fitch treated these loans as clean current even though the
loans had a prior delinquency due to being on a coronavirus relief
plan. This treatment was applied since all prior mortgage payments
have been repaid and the borrower demonstrated the ability and
willingness to repay the prior mortgage debt.

Angel Oak is offering borrowers up to an initial three-month
payment forbearance plan (some borrowers have been offered a
two-month payment forbearance plan). Beginning in month three (or
the expiration of the forbearance plan), the borrower can opt to
reinstate (i.e. repay the three missed mortgage payments in a lump
sum) or repay the missed amounts with a repayment plan. If
reinstatement or a repayment plan is not affordable, the missed
payments will be added to the end of the loan term due at payoff or
maturity as a deferred principal. If the borrower does not become
current under a repayment plan or is not able to make payments
after a deferral plan was granted, other loss mitigation options
will be pursued (including extending the forbearance term).

The servicer will continue to advance during the forbearance
period. Recoveries of advances will be repaid either from
reinstated or repaid amounts from loans where borrowers are on a
repayment plan. For loans with deferrals of missed payments, the
servicer can recover advances from the principal portion of
collections, which may result in a mismatch between the loan
balance and certificate balance. While this may increase realized
losses, the 473 bps of excess spread as of the closing date should
be available to absorb these amounts and reduce the potential for
writedowns.

Investor Property Concentration (Negative): Of the pool, 10.7%
comprises investment properties. Specifically, 5.5% of loans were
underwritten using the borrower's credit profile, while the
remaining 5.2% were originated through the originators' investor
cash flow program that targets real estate investors qualified on a
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) basis. The borrowers of the
non-DSCR investor properties in the pool have weaker credit
profiles, with a WA FICO of 744 (as calculated by Fitch) and an
original CLTV of approximately 69.3% and DSCR loans have a WA FICO
of 758 (as calculated by Fitch) and an original CLTV of roughly
65%. Fitch increased the PD by approximately 2.0x for the cash flow
ratio loans (relative to a traditional income documentation
investor loan) to account for the increased risk.

The percent of investment properties and DSCR loans is less than
half the amount seen in prior AOMT transactions, which Fitch views
positively.

Foreign National Concentration (Negative): Approximately 0.6% of
the loans in the pool (six loans) were underwritten to foreign
nationals or non-permanent residents. These borrowers were mostly
granted loans through Angel Oak's foreign national non-prime loan
programs. Fitch reviewed the underwriting guidelines for this
program and found them to be robust.

Stop Advance Structure (Mixed): The transaction has a stop advance
feature where the servicer will advance delinquent principal and
interest (P&I) up to 180 days. While the limited advancing of
delinquent P&I benefits the pool's projected loss severity (LS), it
reduces liquidity. To account for the reduced liquidity of a
limited advancing structure, principal collections are available to
pay timely interest to the 'AAAsf', 'AAsf' and 'Asf' rated bonds.
Fitch expects 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated bonds to receive timely
payments of interest and all other bonds to receive ultimate
interest. Additionally, as of the closing date, the deal benefits
from approximately 379 bps of excess spread, which will be
available to cover shortfalls prior to any writedowns.

The servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), will provide P&I
advancing on delinquent loans (even the loans that become subject
to a coronavirus forbearance plan). If SPS is not able to advance,
the master servicer (Wells Fargo Bank) will advance P&I on the
certificates.

Stronger Credit Quality From Prior Transactions (Positive): This
transaction is the eighth Fitch rated securitization in the past
year by this issuer. All of these transactions have been
collateralized with generally comparable credit-quality and assets
and have used the identical structure and similar transaction
parties. This transaction consists of newly originated loans and
has a stronger credit profile compared with prior AOMT
transactions. Fitch's projected asset losses and the transaction's
credit enhancement is in line with prior Non-QM transactions with
similar collateral attributes and credit enhancement.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Angel Oak employs sound
sourcing and underwriting processes and is assessed by Fitch as an
'Average' originator. Primary and master servicing responsibilities
will be performed by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and
Wells Fargo Bank, NA (Wells Fargo), rated 'RPS1-' and 'RMS1-',
respectively, by Fitch. Fitch decreased its expected loss at the
'AAAsf' rating stress by approximately 162bps to reflect strong
counterparties with established servicing platforms and operating
experience in non-agency private label securitization. The
sponsor's retention of an eligible horizontal residual interest of
at least 5% helps ensure an alignment of interest between the
issuer and investors.

R&W Framework (Negative): AOHL will be providing loan-level
representations and warranties (R&W) to the loans in the trust. If
the entity is no longer an ongoing business concern, it will assign
to the trust its rights under the mortgage loan purchase agreements
with the originators, which include repurchase remedies for R&W
breaches. While the loan-level reps for this transaction are
substantially consistent with a Tier I framework, the lack of an
automatic review for loans other than those with ATR realized loss
and the nature of the prescriptive breach tests, which limit the
breach reviewers' ability to identify or respond to issues not
fully anticipated at closing, resulted in a Tier 2 framework. Fitch
increased its loss expectations (65 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
category) to mitigate the limitations of the framework and the
counterparty risk of the provider.

Due Diligence Review Results (Positive): Third-party due diligence
was performed on 100% of loans in the transaction pool. The reviews
were conducted by five different third-party review (TPR) firms,
all of which are reviewed and approved by Fitch. The five TPR firms
are: AMC Diligence, LLC, Clayton Services LLC, Edge Mortgage
Advisory Company LLC, Consolidated Analytics, Inc. and Infinity
IPS.

The results of the review confirm sound origination practices with
minimal incidence of material exceptions. Loans that received a
final grade of 'B' had immaterial exceptions and either had strong
compensating factors or accounted for in Fitch's loan loss model.
Fitch applied a credit for the high percentage of loan level due
diligence which reduced the 'AAAsf' loss expectation by 49 bps.

AOMT 2021-1 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Transaction
Parties and Operational Risk. Operational risk is well controlled
for in AOMT 2021-1, including strong transaction due diligence as
well as 'RPS1-' Fitch-rated servicer, which resulted in a reduction
in expected losses and is relevant to the rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are only
an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or
that may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Sensitivity analyses was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool, as well
as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national
    level, or positive home price growth with no assumed
    overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth
    of 10.0%. Excluding the senior classes, which are already
    'AAAsf' rated, the analysis indicates there is potential
    positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined negative stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in
    addition to the model projected 7.6% at the base case. This
    analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
    migration with higher MVDs compared with the model projection.

-- This section provides insight into the model-implied
    sensitivities the transaction faces when one assumption is
    modified, while holding others equal. The modeling process
    uses the modification of these variables to reflect asset
    performance in up and down environments. The results should
    only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
    transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It
    should not be used as an indicator of possible future
    performance. For enhanced disclosure of Fitch's stresses and
    sensitivities, please refer to the transaction's presale
    report.

Fitch has also added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that
contemplates a more severe and prolonged economic stress caused by
a re-emergence of infections in the major economies, before a slow
recovery begins in 2Q21. Under this severe scenario, Fitch expects
the ratings to be affected by changes in its sustainable home price
model due to updates to the model's underlying economic data
inputs. Any long-term impact arising from coronavirus disruptions
on these economic inputs will likely affect both investment- and
speculative-grade ratings Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity
analysis are discussed in its presale report "Angel Oak Mortgage
Trust 2021-1".

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC, Clayton, Consolidated Analytics, Infinity, and
EdgeMAC. The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E
focused on three areas: compliance review, credit review and
valuation review. Fitch considered this information in its analysis
and, as a result, Fitch did not make any adjustment(s) to its
analysis. Based on the results of the 100% due diligence performed
on the pool, the overall expected loss was reduced by 0.49%.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." AMC,
Clayton, Consolidated Analytics, Infinity and EdgeMAC were engaged
to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were
given compliance, credit and valuation grades, and assigned initial
grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were
noted in the due diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due
Diligence section for more detail. Fitch also utilized data files
that were made available by the issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5
designated website. Fitch received loan-level information based on
the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) data layout format, and
the data are considered to be comprehensive. The ASF data tape
layout was established with input from various industry
participants, including rating agencies, issuers, originators,
investors and others to produce an industry standard for the
pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization market.
The data contained in the ASF layout data tape were reviewed by the
due diligence companies, and no material discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

AOMT 2021-1 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Transaction
Parties and Operational Risk. Operational risk is well controlled
for in AOMT 2021-1, including strong transaction due diligence as
well as 'RPS1-' Fitch-rated servicer, which resulted in a reduction
in expected losses and is relevant to the rating.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


APIDOS CLO XXXV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Apidos CLO
XXXV/Apidos CLO XXXV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 26,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Apidos CLO XXXV/Apidos CLO XXXV LLC

  Class A, $315.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $65.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $31.25 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $28.75 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E, $17.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $53.60 million: Not rated


ATLAS SENIOR XVI: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Atlas Senior Loan Fund
XVI Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund XVI LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Atlas Senior Loan Fund XVI Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund XVI LLC

  Class A, $305.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $41.25 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $33.75 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-1 (deferrable), $26.57 million: A (sf)
  Class C-2 (deferrable), $3.43 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $30.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $17.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $50.95 million: Not rated



BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR17: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 12 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has affirmed 55 distressed classes in four U.S. CMBS 1.0
transactions.

    DEBT             RATING           PRIOR
    ----             ------           -----
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR17

C 07388QAN9    LT  CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf
D 07388QAQ2    LT  Csf    Affirmed    Csf
E 07388QAS8    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
F 07388QAU3    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
G 07388QAW9    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
H 07388QAY5    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
J 07388QBA6    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
K 07388QBC2    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
L 07388QBE8    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
M 07388QBG3    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
N 07388QBJ7    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
O 07388QBL2    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
P 07388QBN8    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
Q 07388QBQ1    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2005-1

B 05947UD62    LT  Csf    Affirmed    Csf
C 05947UD70    LT  Csf    Affirmed    Csf
D 05947UD88    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
E 05947UE20    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
F 05947UE38    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
G 05947UE46    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
H 05947UE53    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
J 05947UE61    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
K 05947UE79    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
L 05947UE87    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
M 05947UE95    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
N 05947UF29    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
O 05947UF37    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13

D 07388LAN0    LT  Csf    Affirmed    Csf
E 07388LAP5    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
F 07388LAQ3    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
G 07388LAR1    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
H 07388LAS9    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
J 07388LAT7    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
K 07388LAU4    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
L 07388LAV2    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
M 07388LAW0    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
N 07388LAX8    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
O 07388LAY6    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf

J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage Securities Trust 2008-C2

A-J 46632MCL2  LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
A-M 46632MCJ7  LT  Csf    Affirmed    Csf
B 46632MAG5    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
C 46632MAJ9    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
D 46632MAL4    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
E 46632MAN0    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
F 46632MAQ3    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
G 46632MAS9    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
H 46632MAU4    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
J 46632MAW0    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
K 46632MAY6    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
L 46632MBA7    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
M 46632MBC3    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
N 46632MBE9    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
P 46632MBG4    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
Q 46632MBJ8    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf
T 46632MBL3    LT  Dsf    Affirmed    Dsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has affirmed all distressed classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc, Series 2005-1. Losses from the remaining
asset, Mall at Stonecrest, are expected to impact all remaining
classes, rated 'Csf' and 'Dsf'. The regional mall is located in
Lithonia, GA. The borrower previously proposed an A/B Note split,
but failed to execute the plan. The borrower and special servicer
are continuing to discuss a potential discounted payoff.

Fitch has affirmed all distressed classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates. Losses from the second largest asset
(27% of the pool) are expected to impact class D, the most senior
class in the transaction and currently rated 'Csf'. The loan is in
foreclosure and the asset, a retail property, is undergoing
environmental remediation.

Fitch has affirmed all distressed classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2007-PWR17 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates. Fitch's overall loss
expectations on the specially serviced loans/REO assets remain
high. Four assets are currently in special servicing and REO, and
comprise 75% of the remaining pool. Fitch expects losses for these
assets to be significant based on the servicer's most recent
values. The largest REO is City Center Englewood, a 218,076 sf
retail center located in Englewood, CO. The center is part of the
larger development, including a 425-unit apartment complex and a
Walmart and has been identified in an Opportunity Zone. The
property is not currently being marketed for sale while the special
servicer works through rent relief requests due to the pandemic.

Fitch has affirmed all classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage Trust
2008-C2 at their distressed ratings of 'Csf' and 'Dsf'. The largest
remaining loan is collateralized by two Westin resort hotels: the
487 room Westin La Paloma in Tucson, AZ and the 416 room oceanfront
Westin Hilton Head in Hilton Head, SC. As part of the borrower's
bankruptcy, the loan was modified to a 30-year loan term with a 0%
interest rate with fixed monthly payments of $248,000 for this
transaction. The transaction is incurring a monthly modification
expense of approximately $258,000 per month, which is applied as a
realized loss each month. The loan's modified maturity date is in
2033. Losses from this expense are expected to impact class AM,
currently rated 'Csf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Expected Losses: All of the transactions have high expected
losses, as a significant concentration of the remaining assets are
in special servicing.

Low Credit Enhancement (CE): Each of the remaining classes has low
CE. The distressed ratings on the bonds reflect insufficient CE to
absorb the expected losses.

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2005-1 has an ESG score of
5 for Social Impact due to exposure to sustained structural shift
in secular preferences affecting consumer trends, occupancy trends,
etc. which, on an individual basis, has a significant impact on the
rating.

J.P. Morgan Chase Mtg Securities Trust 2008-C2 has an ESG score of
5 for Transaction and Collateral Structure for exposure to asset
isolation; resolution/insolvency remoteness; legal structure;
structural risk mitigants; complex structures which, on an
individual basis, has a significant impact on the rating.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Although not expected, factors that could lead to upgrades
    include significant improvement in valuations and performance
    of the remaining assets.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- All classes in these transactions are distressed. Further
    downgrades to 'Dsf' are expected as losses are incurred.
    Classes currently rated 'Dsf' will remain unchanged as losses
    have already been incurred.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2005-1 has an ESG score of
5 for Social Impact due to exposure to sustained structural shift
in secular preferences affecting consumer trends, occupancy trends,
etc. which, has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is
highly relevant to the ratings, each of which are distressed.

J.P. Morgan Chase Mtg Securities Trust 2008-C2 has an ESG score of
5 for Transaction and Collateral Structure for exposure to asset
isolation; resolution/insolvency remoteness; legal structure;
structural risk mitigants; complex structures which has a negative
impact on the credit profile, and is highly relevant to the
ratings, each of which are distressed.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BENCHMARK TRUST 2021-B24: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Benchmark 2021-B24 Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2021-B24 as follows:

-- $11,152,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $73,848,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $81,111,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $135,000,000a class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $444,281,000a class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $25,562,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $857,686,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $99,123,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $86,732,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $49,562,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $49,561,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $57,822,000bc class X-D 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;

-- $28,910,000bc class X-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $12,391,000bc class X-G 'B-sf; Outlook Stable;

-- $31,664,000c class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $26,158,000c class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $28,910,000c class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $12,391,000c class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

-- $45,431,418c class NR;

-- $45,431,418bc class X-NR;

-- $20,859,855cd class RR;

-- $37,106,641cd RR Interest.

(a) The initial certificate balances of classes A-4 and A-5 are
unknown and expected to be $579,281,000 in the aggregate, subject
to a 5% variance. The certificate balances will be determined based
on the final pricing of those classes of certificates. The expected
class A-4 balance range is $0 to $270,000,000, and the expected
class A-5 balance range is $309,281,000 to $579,281,000. Fitch's
certificate balances for classes A-4 and A-5 are assumed at the
midpoint of the range for each class.

(b) Notional amount and interest only (IO).

(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(d) Non-offered vertical credit risk retention interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 1, 2021.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 fixed-rate loans secured by
71 commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,159,329,914 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Citi Real Estate Funding Inc, JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association, German American Capital Corporation and
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 23.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analyses of 94.7% of the pool, and asset
summary reviews on 100% of the pool.

Coronavirus Impact: The ongoing containment effort related to the
coronavirus pandemic may have an adverse impact on near-term
revenue (i.e. bad debt expense, rent relief) and operating expenses
(i.e. sanitation costs) for some properties in the pool.
Delinquencies may occur in the coming months as forbearance
programs are put in place, although the ultimate impact on credit
losses will depend heavily on the severity and duration of the
negative economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic and to what
degree fiscal interventions by the U.S. federal government can
mitigate the impact on consumers.

Per the offering documents, all the loans are current and are not
subject to any ongoing forbearance requests; however, the sponsors
for four loans, Dawson Marketplace (3.8% of the pool), JW Marriott
Nashville (3.0% of the pool), Willoughby Commons (1.5% of the
pool), and Holiday Inn Philadelphia South (0.5% of the pool) have
negotiated loan amendments/modifications.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage Exceeds that of Recent Transactions: This pool has a
higher leverage than those of other recent multiborrower
transactions rated by Fitch Ratings. The pool's Fitch trust
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 104.1% is higher than the 2020 and
2019 averages of 99.6% and 103.0%, respectively. Additionally, the
pool's trust Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.34x is
in-line with the 2020 average of 1.32x and above the 2019 average
of 1.26x. Excluding credit opinion loans, the pool's weighted
average (WA) Fitch trust DSCR and LTV are 1.26x and 111.9%,
respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: The pool includes two loans,
representing 13.8% of the pool, that received investment-grade
credit opinions. This is below the 2020 and 2019 averages of 24.5%
and 14.2%, respectively. 410 Tenth Avenue (6.9% of the pool)
received a credit opinion of 'Asf*' on a stand-alone basis and MGM
Grand & Mandalay Bay (6.9%) received a credit opinion of 'BBB+sf*'
on a stand-alone basis.

High Office Exposure: Loans secured by office properties account
for 54.3% of the pool's cutoff balance, which is higher than the
2020 and 2019 averages of 41.2% and 34.2%, respectively. Seven of
the top 10 loans are secured by office properties, including the
largest loan, 410 Tenth Avenue (6.9% of the pool). Industrial
properties have the next highest property type concentration at
15.3%, which is above the 2020 and 2019 averages of 9.8% and 7.3%,
respectively. The pool's retail property concentration of 12.6% is
below the 2020 and 2019 averages of 16.3% and 23.6%, respectively,
and the pool's hotel concentration of 10.5% is slightly above the
2020 average of 9.2%, but below the 2019 average of 12.0%.

Limited Amortization: Twenty-seven loans, representing 76.2% of the
pool's cutoff balance, are interest only (IO) for either the
entirety of their respective loan terms or up to the anticipated
repayment date (ARD). This concentration of full-term IO loans is
greater than the 2020 and 2019 averages of 67.7% and 60.3%,
respectively. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool
will pay down at 3.5% by maturity, which is below the 2020 and 2019
averages of 5.3% and 5.9%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This section provides insight into the sensitivity of ratings when
one assumption is modified, while holding others equal. For U.S.
CMBS, the sensitivity reflects the impact of changes to property
net cash flow (NCF) in up- and down-environments. The result below
should only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It should
not be used as an indicator of possible future performance.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Improvement in cash flow increases property value and capacity to
meet its debt service obligations. The table below indicates the
model implied rating sensitivity to changes in one variable, Fitch
NCF:

Original Rating: 'AAAsf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-sf'
/'BB-sf' / 'B-sf'.

20% NCF Increase: 'AAAsf' / 'AAAsf' / ' AA+sf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' /
'BBBsf' / 'BBB-sf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Similarly, declining cash flow decreases property value and
capacity to meet its debt service obligations. The table below
indicates the model implied rating sensitivity to changes to the
same one variable, Fitch NCF:

Original Rating: 'AAAsf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-sf'
/'BB-sf' / 'B-sf'.

10% NCF Decline: 'Asf' / 'BBB+sf' / 'BBB-sf' / 'BB+sf' / 'Bsf'
/'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

20% NCF Decline: 'BBB+sf' / 'BBB-sf' / 'BBsf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf '
/ 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

30% NCF Decline: 'BBB-sf' / 'BBsf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'/ 'CCCsf' /
'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.

DATA ADEQUACY

Sufficient data, including asset summaries, three years of property
financials, when available, and third-party reports on the
properties were received from the issuer. Ongoing performance
monitoring, including the data provided, is described in the
Surveillance section of the presale report.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BENEFIT STREET II: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
X-R2, A-1-R2, A-2-R2, and B-R2 replacement notes from Benefit
Street Partners CLO II Ltd., a CLO originally issued in 2013 and
subsequently reset in 2017, that is managed by Benefit Street
Partners LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture. The class C-R and D-R notes will not be
refinanced.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 8, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

  REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

  Replacement Notes

  Class   Amount (mil. $)   Interest rate (%)

  X-R2        0.625         Benchmark + 0.65

  A-1-R2    307.336         Benchmark + 0.87

  A-2-R2     61.900         Benchmark + 1.45

  B-R2       40.000         Benchmark + 1.90

  Original Notes

  Class    Amount (mil. $)   Interest rate (%)

  X           0.625          LIBOR + 1.70

  A-1-R     307.336          LIBOR + 1.25

  A-2-R      61.900          LIBOR + 1.75

  B-R        40.000          LIBOR + 2.55

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Benefit Street Partners CLO II Ltd.

  Replacement class   Rating    Amount (mil $)

    X-R2              AAA (sf)     0.625
  
    A-1-R2            AAA (sf)   307.336

    A-2-R2            AA (sf)     61.900

    B-R2              A (sf)      40.000

  OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

  Benefit Street Partners CLO II Ltd.

  Class    Rating

   C-R     BB+ (sf)

   D-R     B- (sf)

  Subordinated notes   NR

  NR--Not rated.



BENEFIT STREET IV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D-RR Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-RRR,
A-2A-RRR, A-2B-RRR, B-RRR, C-RRR, and D-RR replacement fixed- and
floating-rate notes and a new class X note from Benefit Street
Partners CLO IV Ltd., a CLO originally issued in 2014 that is
managed by Benefit Street Partners LLC. The replacement notes were
issued via a supplemental indenture.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available
is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

On the Feb. 25, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes redeemed the original notes. At
that time, S&P withdrew the ratings on the original notes and
assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-1-RRR, B-RRR, C-RRR, and D-RR notes
were issued at lower floating spreads than the original notes.

-- The replacement class A-2A-RRR and A-2B-RRR notes were issued
at a floating spread and fixed coupon, respectively, replacing the
current floating spread.

-- There was an addition of a new class X note, which pays a
floating spread.

-- The stated maturity, reinvestment period, and weighted average
life test date were extended three years.

  Ratings Assigned
  Benefit Street Partners CLO IV Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO
IV LLC

  Class X, $5.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1-RRR, $310.0 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2A-RRR, $60.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class A-2B-RRR, $10.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-RRR (deferrable), $30.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-RRR (deferrable), $30.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-RR (deferrable), $17.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $66.48 million: Not rated

  Ratings Withdrawn

  Benefit Street Partners CLO IV Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO
IV LLC
  Class A-1-RR: to not rated from AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-RR: to not rated from AA (sf)
  Class B-RR: to not rated from A (sf)
  Class C-RR: to not rated from BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R: to not rated from B (sf)


BRAVO RESIDENTIAL 2021-HE1: Fitch Gives B(EXP) Rating on B-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to Bravo Residential
Funding Trust 2021-HE1 (BRAVO 2021-HE1)

DEBT                             RATING  
----                             ------  
BRAVO 2021-HE1

A-1                  LT  AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
A-2                  LT  AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
A-3                  LT  A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
M-1                  LT  BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B-1                  LT  BB(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-2                  LT  B(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B-3                  LT  NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
A-IO-S               LT  NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
XS                   LT  NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
Trust Certificates   LT  NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed notes backed
by seasoned first and second lien, open and closed home equity line
of credit (HELOC) and home equity loans on residential properties
to be issued by BRAVO Residential Funding Trust 2021-HE1 (BRAVO
2021-HE1). This is the first transaction that includes HELOCs with
open draws on the BRAVO shelf.

The collateral pool consists of 5,408 seasoned performing loans
(SPL) and re-performing loans (RPL) totaling $305.66 million. As of
the cut-off date, approximately $192.40 million of the collateral
consists of second liens while the remaining $113.26 million
comprises first liens. The maximum available draw amount as of the
cut-off date is expected to be $158.52 million, as determined by
Fitch.

The loans were originated or acquired by affiliates of Capital One,
National Association, which exited the mortgage originations
business in 2018, and were subsequently purchased by an a
PIMCO-managed private fund in a bulk sale and are serviced by
Rushmore Loan Management Services (Rushmore).

Distributions of principal are based on a modified sequential
structure subject to the transaction's performance triggers.
Interest payments are made sequentially, while losses are allocated
reverse sequentially.

Draws will be funded first by the servicer, which will be
reimbursed from principal collections. If funds from principal
collections are insufficient, the servicer will be reimbursed from
the variable funding account (VFA). The VFA will be funded up
front, and the holder of the trust certificates will be obligated,
in certain circumstances (only if the draws exceed funds in the
VFA), to remit funds to the VFA on behalf of the holder of the
class R note in order to reimburse the servicer for certain draws
made with respect to the mortgage loans. Any amounts remitted by
the holder of the trust certificates will be added to the principal
balance of the trust certificates. The servicer, Rushmore, will not
be advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Seasoned Prime Credit Quality (Positive): The pool in aggregate is
seasoned almost nine years with the first-lien portion seasoned
roughly eight years and the second-lien portion seasoned roughly 10
years. Of the loans, 99.2% are current and 0.8% are currently 30
days delinquent. Nearly 88% of the loans have been performing for
at least the previous 24 months and, therefore, received a credit
in Fitch's US RMBS Loan Loss model. Approximately 2% of loans have
received a prior modification. The pool exhibits a relatively
strong credit profile as shown by the Fitch determined 754 weighted
average (WA) FICO as well as the 63.7% sustainable loan-to-value
ratio (sLTV).

Geographic Concentration (Negative): Approximately 25.1% of the
pool is concentrated in Maryland. The largest MSA concentration is
in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD MSA (32.2%),
followed by the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
MSA (24.6%) and the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA MSA (7.8%). The
top three MSAs account for 64.6% of the pool. As a result, there
was a 1.2x Probability of Default (PD) penalty for geographic
concentration.

Modified Sequential Structure (Positive): The transaction has a
modified sequential structure that distributes principal pro-rata
to the senior classes to the extent that the performance triggers
are passing. To the extent they are failing, it is paid
sequentially. The transaction also benefits from excess spread that
can be used to reimburse for realized and cumulative losses and cap
carryover amounts. Excess spread is not being used to turbo down
the bonds, and as a result, more credit enhancement compared to
expected loss is needed.

If the triggers are passing, the Trust Certificates will receive
their pro-rata share of principal and the residual principal
balance will receive its pro-rata share of losses up to the trust
certificates' writedown amount for such payment date. If triggers
are failing, the Trust Certificates will be paid principal after
all other classes have been paid in full and the trust certificate
will take losses first followed by the subordinate, mezzanine and
senior notes.

No Servicer Advancing (Positive): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I. Because P&I advances
made on behalf of loans that become delinquent and eventually
liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level
loss severities (LS) are less for this transaction than for those
where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I.

HELOC Collateral (Negative): This pool consists of various product
types, including both open and closed-end HELOCs in the first- and
second-lien positions. Roughly 36% of the pool are first-lien
loans, with the remaining 64% junior liens. About 77% of this
population are open HELOCs, with the ability for borrowers to draw
down additional amounts or the line is temporarily frozen, but the
borrower may be able to draw in the future. The utilization rate on
the HELOCs is 59%. The max draw amount for open or temporarily
frozen HELOC loans was used in Fitch's loss analysis and for
determining applicable LTVs.

Second Lien 100% Loss Severity (Negative): Fitch assumed no
recovery and 100% LS on defaulted second-lien loans based on the
historical behavior of second-lien loans in economic stress
scenarios. Fitch assumes second-lien loans default at a rate
comparable to first-lien loans, after controlling for credit
attributes; thus, no additional default penalty was applied. Unlike
some other HELOC transactions, this transaction does not write off
the delinquent second-lien loans at 180 days.

Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage (MIM) (Negative): 58 loans, or 0.58%
of the pool, are MIM loans. A MIM is a loan (which are a mortgage
product specific to Louisiana) where the borrower owes more than
one debt secured by a property. Unlike a traditional mortgage where
a promissory note is used to secure the loan, a MIM directly
secures the credit extension or loan advances on a line of credit
basis. At origination, the borrower is approved for a loan of a
certain amount, and later can borrow up to that amount. However,
the product does not require any additional adjustment, because for
all MIMs in the pool, no additional funding on the MIMs can be
exercised since the seller agreed not to originate any additional
mortgage loans under the MIMs following the closing date...
Additionally, to the extent a borrower had previously exercised an
additional MIM financing, Fitch considered all balances to be
cross-collateralized for its analysis.

For this transaction, Fitch added the external debt to the current
unpaid balance, in addition to the original loan amount, to capture
the added risk.

Payment Holidays Related to Coronavirus Pandemic: 27 loans (0.5% of
the pool) were previously on coronavirus forbearance plans that
have since expired and 160loans (3.1%) went on coronavirus deferral
plans. None of the loans in the pool are on active forbearance
plans. Of the loans that were previously on forbearance plans, six
loans in the pool received paystring adjustments and were treated
as clean current for the coronavirus forbearance period if they
were cash flowing once the relief period ended. All loans that were
previously on coronavirus plans had HELOC lines either permanently
closed or temporarily frozen.

Stronger Credit Profile than Legacy HELOC Transactions (Positive):
This transaction benefits from a credit profile that is materially
stronger than that of legacy HELOC transactions. The WA FICO of 754
is roughly 35 points higher than historical levels. Borrowers for
both the first- and second-lien loans have a meaningful amount of
equity in the properties with an original CLTV of 57.5% and sLTV of
63.3%. The aggregate seasoning of approximately nine years for
these loans provides an additional benefit and insight into the
performance of these borrowers. As a result of these key
differences, a comparison to historical transactions is not likely
to provide much context in how this deal will perform compared to
legacy deals. A stronger credit profile and a more supportive
structure should provide for a meaningful positive difference in
performance.

Variable Funding Account (VFA): Borrower draws following deal
closing will be funded first from the servicer and reimbursed from
principal collections received on the mortgage loans. If principal
collected is insufficient to reimburse the servicer, the paying
agent will withdraw the needed funds from the VFA and increase the
residual principal balance of the Trust Certificates by the amount.
If the funds in the VFA are not sufficient to reimburse the
servicer, the paying agent will reimburse the servicer and increase
the residual principal balance. If the servicer needs to reimburse
itself from subsequent principal collections, the residual
principal balance will not be increased.

If the triggers are passing, the Trust Certificates will receive
their pro-rata share of principal and the residual principal
balance will receive its pro-rata share of losses up to the trust
certificates write-down amount for such payment date. If triggers
are failing, the Trust Certificates will be paid principal after
all other classes have been paid in full and the trust certificate
will take losses first followed by the subordinate, Mezzanine, and
senior notes.

The holder of the trust certificate is responsible for funding the
VFA on behalf of the class R note. The holder of the trust
certificate is permitted to finance these funding obligations,
including by obtaining financing secured by the trust certificate
with a third-party lender.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. PIMCO is the primary aggregator
and is assessed as an 'Above Average' aggregator by Fitch due to
the established acquisition history for single family residential
loans of certain investment vehicles managed by PIMCO. Rushmore,
rated RPS1- by Fitch, is the named servicer for the transaction.
Fitch decreased the 'AAAsf' expected loss by 0.24% due Rushmore's
RPS1- servicer rating. PIMCO's 'Above Average' aggregator
assessment received neutral treatment in the model. Issuer
retention of at least 5% of the bonds also helps ensure an
alignment of interest between both the issuer and investor.

R&Ws Have Limited Representations and Warranties (Negative): The
rep and warranty (R&W) framework is generally consistent with Tier
2 quality. The framework contains an optional breach review for
loans with a realized loss, which is triggered at the discretion of
the controlling holder. However, 25% of the aggregate bond holders
may also initiate a review. Loan level R&Ws also include knowledge
qualifiers without a proper clawback provision. The aggregate
adjustment resulted in a 196-bp addition to the expected losses at
the 'AAAsf' rating stress. See R&W Assessment section for more
detail.

Third-Party Due Diligence results: A third-party due diligence
compliance review was performed on approximately 16.7% of the loans
in the transaction pool (Fitch was comfortable with the sample size
since all the loans came from a single originator). The review was
performed by Digital Risk, which is assessed by Fitch as an
'Acceptable - Tier 2' third-party review (TPR) firm. The due
diligence results indicated moderate operational risk with
approximately 7.0%% of loans receiving a final grade of 'C' or 'D'.
Approximately 2.3% of the sample received LS adjustments for
missing or estimated final HUD-1 documents necessary for testing
compliance with predatory lending regulations. These regulations
are not subject to statute of limitations unlike the majority of
compliance exceptions, which ultimately exposes the trust to added
assignee liability risk. Since due diligence was performed on a
sample, Fitch extrapolated the compliance results to the remaining
loan population that did not receive due diligence to reflect the
absence of predatory lending testing. Fitch adjusted its loss
expectation at the 'AAAsf' rating category by approximately 20 bps
in aggregate to account for this added risk.

Limited Title and Lien Search: 100% of the pool received a tax and
title lien search using a Corelogic Lien Report Lite (Lite)
product. Unlike a more orthodox title search, the Lite product
primarily acts as a cursory tax and title lien search and may not
be able to fully confirm all lien positions. The report indicated
that approximately 64% of the first liens were in first-lien
position, while the remaining 36% of loans were either not
confirmed to be in first-lien position or did not receive a hit on
the cursory search. Solidifi conducted an additional search on a
sample set of the loans that did not return a hit from the initial
Corelogic search. Fitch treated the loans that the second search
could not determine the lien position or were not included in the
Solidifi lien search as second liens in Fitch's loss model and
these loans received 100% LS treatment to reflect to possibility
that these lien positions are not prioritized for proceeds in the
event of liquidation. The 'AAAsf' expected loss levels increased by
approximately 55 bps to reflect this lien treatment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national
    level, or positive home price growth with no assumed
    overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth
    of 10%. Excluding the senior class, which is already 'AAAsf',
    the analysis indicates there is potential positive rating
    migration for all of the rated classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
    ratings would react to steeper market value declines at the
    national level. The analysis assumes market value declines of
    10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model projected 4.0% at
    the base case. The analysis indicates that there is some
    potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
    classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a
    10% additional decline in home prices would lower all rated
    classes by two or more full categories.

-- This section provides insight into the model-implied
    sensitivities the transaction faces when one assumption is
    modified, while holding others equal. The modeling process
    uses the modification of these variables to reflect asset
    performance in up and down environments. The results should
    only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
    transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It
    should not be used as an indicator of possible future
    performance.

Fitch has added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that includes a
prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer demand and
a protracted period of below-trend economic activity that delays
any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this severe scenario,
Fitch expects the ratings to be affected by changes in its
sustainable home price model due to updates to the model's
underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term effects arising from
coronavirus-related disruptions on these economic inputs will
likely affect both investment and speculative-grade ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Digital Risk and Solidifi. The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on compliance (Digital
Risk) and tax and title search (Solidifi). Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and, as a result, Fitch made the
following adjustment(s) to its analysis: increased the loss
severity due to HUD-1 issues and extrapolated the results to the
loans that did not receive diligence grades and for all loans where
the first-lien status could not be confirmed, Fitch assumed the
loan was a second lien. These adjustment(s) resulted in an increase
in the expected loss of approximately 0.75%.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on approximately 16.7% of the pool by loan count. The
third-party due diligence was generally consistent with Fitch's
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." Digital Risk was engaged to perform
the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were given
compliance, grades and assigned initial grades for each
subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due
diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section
for more detail. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section for
more detail.

Fitch also used data files that were made available by the issuer
on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received loan-level
information based on the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) data
layout format, and the data are considered to be comprehensive. The
ASF data tape layout was established with input from various
industry participants, including rating agencies, issuers,
originators, investors and others to produce an industry standard
for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization
market. The data contained in the ASF layout data tape were
reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BUSINESS JET 2021-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB (sf) Rating on C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Business Jet
Securities 2021-1 LLC's class A, B, and C fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction.
Upon closing, the note proceeds, together with the proceeds of the
issuance of the subordinated, will be used to acquire the
receivables and aircraft interests and ownership from the
originators and to repay the existing debt from the BJETS 2018-2
issuance (not rated by S&P Global Ratings). The collateral will
consist of loans and leases related to 49 aircraft with an initial
aggregate asset value of $780.175 million as of the cut-off date,
the corresponding security or ownership interests in the underlying
aircraft, and shares and beneficial interests in entities that
directly and indirectly receive aircraft portfolio cash flows,
among others.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 24,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The likelihood of timely interest on the class A notes
(excluding the post-anticipated repayment date (ARD) additional
interest or deferred post-ARD additional interest) on each payment
date; the timely interest on the class B notes (excluding the
post-ARD additional interest or deferred post-ARD additional
interest) when class A notes are no longer outstanding on each
payment date; and the ultimate payment of interest and principal on
the class A, B, and C notes on or before the legal final maturity
at the respective rating stress ('A', 'BBB', and 'BB',
respectively).

-- The approximately 69% LTV (based on the aggregate asset value)
on the class A notes, the 79% LTV on the class B notes, and the 85%
LTV on the class C notes.

-- A fairly diversified and young portfolio of business jets that
are either on loan, finance lease, or operating lease to corporates
or high net worth individuals.

-- The scheduled amortization profile, which is a straight line
over 12.5 years for the class A and B notes and six years for the
class C notes. However, the amortization of all classes will switch
to full turbo after year six.

-- The transaction's debt service coverage ratios, net loss
trigger, and utilization trigger, which, if failed, will result in
sequential turbo amortization of the notes.

-- The transaction's LTV test (class A notes balance divided by
aggregate asset value), which, if failed, will result in turbo
amortization of the class A notes until the test is brought back to
compliance.

-- The subordination of class C notes' interest and principal to
the class A and B notes' interest and principal.

-- The sequential partial sweep payments to the class A and B
notes: for the first 48 payment dates from the closing date, 22.5%
of remaining available funds after all payments, and from the 49th
payment date to and including the 72nd payment date, 25.0%.

-- A liquidity reserve account, which is available to cover senior
expenses and interest on the class A and B notes. The amount
available will equal nine months of interest on the class A and B
notes, fully funded on the closing date.

-- The class C interest reserve account, which will be funded in
the payment priority subject to available amounts in an amount
equal to nine months' interest on the C notes.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Business Jet Securities 2021-1 LLC

  Class A, $538.3 million: A (sf)
  Class B, $78.0 million: BBB (sf)
  Class C, $46.8 million: BB (sf)



CASCADE MH 2021-MH1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'B-(EXP)'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the notes to be issued by Cascade MH
Asset Trust 2021-MH1 (CMHAT 2021-MH1).

DEBT             RATING
----             ------
Cascade MH Asset Trust 2021-MH1

A-1     LT  AAA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
A-2     LT  AA-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
M-1     LT  A-(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
M-2     LT  BBB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B-1     LT  BB-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-2     LT  B-(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B-3     LT  NR(EXP)sf    Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch Ratings expects to rate the notes to be issued by Cascade MH
Asset Trust 2021-MH1 (CMHAT 2021-MH1). This is Cascade's second
transaction (and first rated transaction) backed by loans secured
by manufactured homes (MH). While this is the third post-crisis MH
transaction rated by Fitch, this is the first rated post-crisis MH
deal consisting of new origination MH loans. The transaction is
expected to close on March 5, 2021. The collateral pool is backed
by 1,889 MH contracts, all of which were current using the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) methodology as of the cutoff date. The
pool totals $162.8 million.

Distributions of P&I and loss allocations are based on a
traditional senior-subordinate, sequential-pay structure. The
sequential-pay structure locks out principal to the subordinated
notes until the most senior notes outstanding are paid in full. The
servicer will not be advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Manufactured Housing Collateral (Negative): The transaction is
backed by 100% new origination MH loans, which are seasoned
approximately 12 months. 72% of the pool is comprised of loans
backed by chattel properties (secured with the structure only) and
the remaining 28% is comprised of land/home MH. MH loans typically
experience higher default rates and lower recoveries than
site-built residential homes. Fitch applied a loan-level loss model
developed specifically for MH loans based on the historical
observations of more than one million MH loans originated from
1993-2002, with performance tracked through 2018.

Credit Attributes (Mixed): All of the loans in the pool are fixed
rate, and the borrowers in the pool have a WAVG model FICO of 637.
A total of 72% of the MH units are double or multi-wide, and 98% of
the MH units were built within the last four years. All of the
loans are currently current based on the OTS methodology, and 3.1%
of the loans have experienced a delinquency in the past 24 months.

Geographic Concentration (Negative): Approximately 49% of the pool
is concentrated in Texas. The largest MSA concentration is in the
San Antonio, TX MSA (7%), followed by the Houston, TX MSA (5%) and
the Dallas, TX MSA (4%). The top three MSAs account for 16% of the
pool. As a result, there was a 1.09x probability of default (PD)
penalty for geographic concentration.

Sequential Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure. The subordinate classes do not
receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in full.
Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order. Furthermore, the
provision to reallocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions is
highly supportive of timely interest payments to that class in the
absence of servicer advancing. In addition, excess spread will be
used to pay down principal on the notes on each payment date on
which a cumulative loss trigger event is in effect.

No Servicer P&I Advancing (Positive): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I. Because P&I advances
made on behalf of loans that become delinquent and eventually
liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level
loss severities (LS) are less for this transaction than for those
where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is controlled for
this transaction. 100% of the collateral consists of MH loans
originated by Southwest Stage funding, LLC dba Cascade Financial
Services (Cascade). Fitch conducted a review of Cascade's
origination platform and found it to have sufficient risk controls;
Cascade is assessed by Fitch as an 'Average' originator by Fitch.
Cascade is also the named servicer for this transaction and holds a
servicer rating of 'RPS3-/Stable' specifically for MH loans. The
issuer is also expected to retain at least 5% of the issued
securities helps to ensure an alignment of interest between issuer
and investor.

Due Diligence Review Results (Neutral): Third-party due diligence
review was performed on a random sample of approximately 34% of the
initial transaction pool, by loan count. The review was conducted
by Digital Risk, LLC (Digital Risk) and Regulatory Solutions, LLC
(Regulatory Solutions), as part of Cascade's internal post-closing
quality control process. Digital Risk reviewed the land home loans
while Regulatory Solutions reviewed the chattel loans. Fitch has
conducted operational reviews for both firms; Digital Risk is
assessed by Fitch as an 'Acceptable - Tier 2' TPR firm and
Regulatory Solutions is assessed as an 'Acceptable - Tier 3' firm.

The results indicate moderate operational risk with approximately
7.8% of reviewed loans receiving a final grade of 'C' or 'D',
primarily due to credit exceptions. However, Fitch did not apply
loan level adjustments based on these results as the majority of
these loans are seasoned past 24 months in which case a credit
review is not applicable. Fitch believes that initial underwriting
guidelines do not play as large of a role in determining future
ability and willingness to repay as the delinquency status and pay
history of the respective borrowers. Loans with material exceptions
had strong pay history to date with minimal delinquencies. See the
due diligence section for additional details.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch considers
the representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism
construct for this transaction to be generally consistent with a
Tier 2 framework due to the minor loan level rep variances, limited
life of the rep provider and low due diligence percentage performed
on the pool. The seller, as rep provider, will only be obligated to
repurchase a loan due to breaches up to the 36th payment date. A
reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due to noteholders
for loans identified as having material rep breaches if the seller
is unable to cover the amount and after the rep provider sunset.

The RW&E framework for this transaction is more typically seen in
RMBS backed by seasoned collateral - rep provider sunset,
availability of a breach reserve account as well as performance
triggers used to cause a breach review. Fitch considered the
framework sufficient for this transaction given the collateral
profile, loss expectations as well as the substantial amount of
excess spread available even after applying haircut. Fitch
increased its base case loss expectations by roughly 160 bps to
account for both the limitations of the RW&E framework as well as
the noninvestment-grade counterparty risk of the provider.

Significant Excess Spread (Positive): The structure has a notable
amount of excess spread due to the difference in coupon on the
collateral and the coupon on the bonds. Because of the significant
amount of excess spread, the deal CE is lower than Fitch's expected
losses. Excess cash flow will be used to pay down principal on the
notes on each payment date on which a cumulative loss trigger event
is in effect, and in the absence of cumulative loss trigger event,
excess cash flow will be used to pay the notes up to current and
prior period losses.

Furthermore, Fitch applied a conservative WAC deterioration stress
to all loans which increases by rating stress. This stress is meant
to address the possibility that loans could be modified into lower
coupons and therefore result in less excess spread available. Fitch
assumed a linear interpolation WAC deterioration, which starts at
0.00% on day 1 and increases to a set rate which varies by rating
category, until period 120.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Noninterest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $55,397 (0.03%) of the UPB are
outstanding on 207 loans. A total of 199 of these loans had
deferrals related to the coronavirus pandemic - all borrowers that
were on a coronavirus-related deferral plan are now current. Fitch
did not penalize these loans for having deferred payments, as all
borrowers resumed making payments and are currently cash-flowing.

Deferred balances were included as a junior lien amount, and
therefore accounted for in the CLTV calculation, since the balances
will be due at loan maturity. The average deferred balance is
approximately $270. The inclusion resulted in a higher PD and LS
than if there were no deferrals.

Aggregate Servicing Fee (Neutral): Fitch views the servicing fee of
100bps as sufficient to service MH loans, and the structure was
tested assuming this fee. Additionally, should a replacement
servicer be needed, the transaction documents allow the indenture
trustee to negotiate a fee with a successor servicer which may
exceed the original stated servicing fee.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to additional losses. The implied rating
sensitivities are only an indication of some of the potential
outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or that may be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

The defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to additional losses. As shown in the presale
report, the analysis indicates some potential of rating migration
with an increase in loss.

The defined rating sensitivities determine the increase in loss
that would reduce a rating by one full category, to noninvestment
grade and to 'CCCsf'. The percentage points shown in the presale
report reflect the additional loss that would have to occur to
affect ratings for each defined sensitivity for this transaction.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E ("Form 15E") as
prepared by Digital Risk and Regulatory Solutions. The review was
bifurcated between land home and chattel loans; Digital Risk
reviewed all land home loans, while Regulatory Solutions reviewed
all chattel loans.

Land home MH loans received a full new origination review scope
that consisted of credit, compliance, property valuation (where
applicable) and data integrity.

Chattel loans received a credit, compliance and data integrity
check but did not receive a valuation review. Chattel properties
are valued solely on the housing unit, which excludes the land they
reside upon. Therefore, appraisals are not performed on chattel
units, which results in a valuation review not being applicable.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CFCRE TRUST 2018-TAN: S&P Affirms BB (sf) Rating on Class X Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on three classes of
commercial pass-through certificates from CFCRE Trust 2018-TAN, a
stand-alone single-borrower CMBS transaction.

S&P said, "We affirmed our ratings on classes C and D even though
the indicated ratings were lower than the classes' current rating
levels. The affirmations are based on qualitative considerations,
including the high quality of the underlying collateral, the
hotel's premium Caribbean beachfront location, the significant
market value decline that would be needed before these classes
experience losses, the liquidity provided in the form of servicer
advancing, and the relative positioning of the classes in the
waterfall.

"We affirmed the rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO security would not be higher than that
of the lowest-rated reference class. The notional amount of class X
references the class A, B, C, and D certificates."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

Transaction Summary

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
fixed-rate IO mortgage loan secured by the borrowers' leasehold
interest in the Aruba Marriott Resort and Stellaris Casino, a
411-guestroom full-service Caribbean beachfront destination resort
hotel located in Palm Beach, Aruba. As of the Feb. 18, 2021,
trustee remittance report, the loan has a trust and whole loan
balance of $195.0 million, the same as at issuance. The loan is IO
for its entire five-year term, pays a per annum fixed interest rate
of 6.496%, and matures on Feb. 6, 2023. To date, the trust has not
incurred any principal losses.

The borrowers, bankruptcy-remote special purpose entities
indirectly owned by a joint venture between an affiliate of DLJ
Real Estate Capital Partners LLC and MetaCorp International Inc.,
are current on their debt service payments as of the Feb. 18, 2021,
trustee remittance report. However, the loan has been on the master
servicer's watchlist since January 2021 due to low reported debt
service coverage (DSC), which was 0.66x as of year-end 2020, down
from 2.99x as of year-end 2019.

The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, has relayed that
the borrowers have not requested relief. However, the borrowers
applied for and are receiving monthly salary subsidies from the
Government of Aruba. As of April 2020, the Government of Aruba is
assisting qualifying employers by subsidizing salaries via the
Financial Aid and Salary Subsidy for Employment Retention. From
April 2020 to December 2020, the borrowers have received a total of
$6.0 million, and the subsidy is expected to continue until at
least June 30, 2021.

Property Analysis

Aruba Marriott Resort and Stellaris Casino offer a variety of
amenities, including the Stellaris casino, which is the largest
casino in Aruba. Additional amenities include nine restaurants and
bars, 35,000 sq. ft. of meeting space, two outdoor pools, a fitness
center, spa, and retail stores. The property also offers a unique
"hotel within a hotel" concept for members of the Marriott
Tradewinds Club. This includes 49 separate guestrooms that have
access to private amenities.

The property is also part of a larger Marriott campus that includes
the Ocean Club and Surf Club timeshare resorts, with a total of
1,200 units developed and owned by Marriott Vacation Club
International. The timeshare properties provide a significant
customer base for the collateral property's food and beverage and
casino venues, which contribute a major share of the property's
total revenues.

The property was built in 1995 and is still one of the newest
hotels in its competitive set, given the lack of new hotel supply
stemming from Aruba's moratorium on new resort development on most
of the island. Additionally, almost all the land in Aruba is owned
by the government and can only be obtained on a long-term lease.
The property's ground lease has an initial expiration in 2052, with
fixed annual payments of $103,030.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the hotel exhibited strong
performance. The hotel's revenue per available room (RevPAR) was
$329.24 in the trailing-12-months (TTM) ended September 2017,
$386.91 in 2018, and $421.01 in 2019. The reported net cash flow
(NCF) was $28.8 million in the TTM ended September 2017, $33.8
million in 2018, and $38.4 million in 2019. S&P's sustainable NCF
at issuance (and currently) was $23.3 million, which is 39.3% below
the 2019 servicer reported NCF.

The hotel has maintained a strong RevPAR penetration rate, which
measures the RevPAR of the hotel relative to its
competitors--including Hilton Aruba Caribbean Resort & Casino,
Hyatt Regency Aruba Resort Spa & Casino, Renaissance Aruba Resort &
Casino, and Holiday Inn Resort Aruba Beach & Casino--with 100%
indicating parity with competitors. The resort's RevPAR penetration
rate exceeded 100% for the TTM periods ended Sept. 30, 2019
(157.0%) and Sept. 30, 2020 (169.7%), according to a report by
Smith Travel Research.

The hotel's occupancy was above 85% since 2017, but dropped to
59.1% as of the TTM ended Sept. 30, 2020, as the pandemic took
hold. Due to COVID-19 containment efforts, the hotel suspended
operations on March 23, 2020, and reopened on July 10, 2020.
Further, in August 2020 and September 2020, COVID-19 cases surged
throughout Aruba. Hence, the U.S. government implemented a travel
advisory level 3 (reconsider travel) and the hotel subsequently
experienced several cancellations. At the end of September 2020,
Aruba's largest markets--New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut--added a mandatory 14-day quarantine for returning
travelers. The sponsor has indicated that the hotel has been fully
operational as of January 2021.

Based on sponsor-provided full-year 2020 financials, the property's
RevPAR was $165.41, representing a 60.7% decline from 2019, and
2020 NCF was $9.7 million, representing a 74.8% decline from 2019.
Based on the sponsor's 2021 budget, RevPAR and NCF are forecasted
to increase to $176.22 and $13.0 million, respectively,
representing a 6.5% and 34.7% increase from 2020; however, these
metrics are still significantly below pre-COVID-19 levels.

The pandemic has brought about unprecedented social distancing and
curtailment measures, which are resulting in a significant decline
in corporate, leisure, and group travel. Since the outbreak, there
has been a dramatic decline in airline passenger miles stemming
from government restrictions on international travel and a
significant decline in domestic travel. In an effort to curtail the
spread of the virus, most group meetings (both corporate and
social) have been cancelled, corporate transient travel has been
restricted, and leisure travel has slowed due to fear of travel and
the closure/cancellation of demand generators such as amusement
parks, casinos, concerts, and sporting events.

The pandemic's negative effects on lodging properties have been
particularly severe for hotels like the Aruba Marriott Resort and
Stellaris Casino, which is highly dependent on international
travelers, primarily from the U.S. The hotel generates over 75% of
its demand from the leisure and casino-related segment. Relative to
hotels that have a more diverse mix of corporate, leisure, and
group demand--and because the hotel is a fly-to destination
resort--the property is more susceptible to volatility,
particularly in light of the pandemic. Significant uncertainty
remains regarding not only the duration of the pandemic, but also
the time needed for lodging demand to return to normalized levels.
Unlike some U.S. hotel properties, the property's location does not
enable it to benefit from leisure drive-to demand, a source of
travel that has helped bolster occupancy for some lodging
properties during the pandemic.

Analytical Considerations

S&P said, "In our current analysis, instead of revising the S&P
Global Ratings sustainable NCF of $23.3 million derived at
issuance, we increased our capitalization rate to 13.40% (up 125
basis points from 12.15% at issuance) to account for the adverse
impact of COVID-19 and the responses to it, considering that the
property is currently operating at very low occupancy levels. We
consequently arrived at an S&P Global Ratings' value of $173.9
million ($423,091 per guestroom, down 9.3% from our issuance
valuation), a loan-to-value ratio of 112.1%, and a value variance
of 44.8% to the January 2018 appraisal report ($315.0 million).

"We will continue to monitor for updated information and may take
further rating actions as we deem appropriate."

  Ratings Affirmed

  CFCRE Trust 2018-TAN

  Commercial pass-through certificates

  Class C: BBB- (sf)
  Class D: BB (sf)
  Class X: BB (sf)


CIM TRUST 2021-J1: Moody's Gives (P)B1 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 58
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by CIM
Trust 2021-J1 (CIM 2021-J1). The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to
(P)B1 (sf).

CIM 2021-J1 is a securitization of prime residential mortgages. It
is backed by a pool of 30-year fixed rate, non-conforming
mortgages. This transaction represents the first prime jumbo
issuance by Chimera Investment Corporation (the sponsor) in 2021.
The transaction includes 425 fixed rate, first lien-mortgages with
an unpaid principal balance of $404,775,979. The pool consists of
100% non -conforming mortgage loans. The mortgage loans for this
transaction have been acquired by the affiliate of the sponsor,
Fifth Avenue Trust (the Seller) from Bank of America, National
Association (BANA). BANA acquired the mortgage loans through its
whole loan purchase program from various originators.
Approximately, 87.5% of the loans in the pool are underwritten to
Chimera Investment Corporation's (Chimera) guidelines.

All the loans are designated as qualified mortgages (QM) either
under the QM/Non-HPML or TQM/Non-HPML. Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (SMS) will service the loans and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(Aa2, long term debt) will be the master servicer. SMS will be
responsible for advancing principal and interest and servicing
advances, with the master servicer backing up SMS' advancing
obligations if SMS cannot fulfill them.

Three third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan level information that we received from the Sponsor. These
firms conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data accuracy
and compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage loans in the
collateral pool. The TPR results indicate that there are no
material compliance, credit, or data issues and no appraisal
defects.

Moody's analyzed the underlying mortgage loans using Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. Moody's also compared the
collateral pool to other prime jumbo securitizations. In addition,
Moody's adjusted its expected losses based on qualitative
attributes, including the financial strength of the representation
and warranties (R&W) provider and TPR results.

CIM 2021-J1 has a shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination floor and
a subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool. In
Moody's analysis of tail risk, Moody's considered the increased
risk from borrowers with more than one mortgage in the pool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIM Trust 2021-J1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO21*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO22*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO23*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-IO1*, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-IO2*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.23%
at the mean and 0.11% at the median and reaches 2.56% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high.
Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(10.4% for the mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely
performance deterioration resulting from the slowdown in US
economic activity due to the coronavirus outbreak.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

Moody's assessed the collateral pool as of the cut-off date of
February 1, 2021. CIM 2021-J1 is a securitization of 425 mortgage
loans with an aggregate principal balance of $404,775,979. This
transaction consists of fixed-rate fully amortizing loans, which
will not expose the borrowers to any interest rate shock for the
life of the loan or to refinance risk. All the mortgage loans are
secured by first liens on single-family residential properties,
condominiums, townhouses and planned unit developments. The loans
have a weighted average seasoning of approximately 1.6 months.

Overall, the credit quality of the mortgage loans backing this
transaction is better than recently issued prime jumbo
transactions. The WA FICO of the aggregate pool is 783 (786 CIM
Trust 2020-J2 and 772 in CIM Trust 2020-J1) with a WA LTV of 62.2%
(63.7% in CIM Trust 2020-J2 and 66.6% in CIM Trust 2020-J1) and WA
CLTV of 62.4% (63.8% in CIM 2020-J2 and 66.9% in CIM Trust
2020-J1). Approximately 13.5% (by loan balance) of the pool has an
LTV ratio greater than 75% compared to 21.3% in CIM Trust 2020-J2
and to 29.9% in CIM Trust 2020-J1.

Exterior-only appraisals: In response to the COVID-19 national
emergency, many originators/aggregators have temporarily
transitioned to allowing exterior-only appraisals, instead of a
full interior and exterior inspection of the subject property, on
many mortgage transactions. There are 5 loans in the pool, 1.4% by
unpaid principal balance, that do not have a full appraisal that
includes an exterior and an interior inspection of the property.
Instead, these loans have an exterior-only appraisal. Moody's did
not make any adjustments to Moody's losses for such loans primarily
because of strong credit characteristics such as high FICO score,
low LTV and DTI ratios, and significant liquid cash reserves. In
addition, none of these borrowers have any prior history of
delinquency.

Loans with delinquency and forbearance history: Although there are
no loans in the pool that are currently delinquent, there are 3
loans in the pool that have some history of delinquency. Of these 3
delinquent loans, 1 delinquency was COVID-19 related and under a
forbearance plan. The remaining 2 loans were delinquent because of
servicing transfers. Moody's increased its model-derived median
expected losses by 15% (10.4% for the mean) and Moody's Aaa losses
by 5% to reflect the likely performance deterioration resulting
from of the slowdown in US economic activity due to the coronavirus
outbreak. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk
under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications for
public health and safety.

Origination Quality

There are 11 originators in the transaction, some of which may have
limited history of securitizing prime jumbo mortgages. The largest
originators in the pool with more than 10% by balance are
Guaranteed Rate Inc. and Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC
(collectively 48.1%), PrimeLending (13.4%) and Wintrust Mortgage
(10.7%). Approximately 87.5% of the mortgage loans by stated
principal balance as of the cut-off date were acquired by BANA from
those mortgage loan originators or sellers through its jumbo whole
loan purchase program. For the rest of the pool, approximately
12.5% of the mortgage loans (by stated principal balance as of the
cut-off date) were acquired by BANA and originated pursuant to the
guidelines of either loanDepot.com, LLC (loanDepot) or Quicken
Loans LLC (Quicken).

Moody's increased its base case and Aaa loss expectations for all
loans underwritten to Chimera's underwriting guidelines, as Moody's
consider such mortgage loans to have been acquired to slightly less
conservative prime jumbo underwriting standards. Additionally,
within those loans acquired by BANA and originated pursuant of
either loanDepot or Quicken guidelines, Moody's increased its loss
assumption for mortgage loans originated by Quicken to account for
the limited performance data of Quicken Loans' prime jumbo
originations. While the performance of such loans was strong and
comparable to that of other originators such as JPMorgan Chase and
Wells Fargo, to date the volume of Quicken Loans' prime jumbo
originations is much lower.

Third Party Review

Three third-party review (TPR) firms, Clayton Services LLC,
Consolidated Analytics, Inc, and Opus Capital Markets Consultants,
LLC, verified the accuracy of the loan level information that the
sponsor gave us. These firms conducted detailed credit, property
valuation, data accuracy and compliance reviews on 100% of the
mortgage loans in the collateral pool. The TPR results indicate
that the majority of reviewed loans were in compliance with
respective originators' underwriting guidelines, no material
compliance or data issues, and no appraisal defects.

For property valuation, of the 425 loans reviewed, the TPR firms
identified all loans as either A or B level grades. All the loans
in the pool have CDAs. There were 8 loans the appraisal of which
was not supported by the desk review (variance between the
appraisal value and the desk review was greater than -10%). A field
review was subsequently ordered, and this valuation came out in
line with the appraisal. Therefore, Moody's did not make any
additional adjustments to Moody's base case and Aaa loss
expectations for TPR.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

All loans were aggregated by BANA through its whole loan
aggregation program. Each originator will provide comprehensive
loan level reps and warranties for their respective loans. BANA
will assign each originator's R&W to the seller, who will in turn
assign to the depositor, which will assign to the trust. To
mitigate the potential concerns regarding the originators' ability
to meet their respective R&W obligations, the R&W provider will
backstop the R&Ws for all originators' loans. The R&W provider's
obligation to backstop third party R&Ws will terminate five years
after the closing date, subject to certain performance conditions.
The R&W provider will also provide gap reps. Moody's considered the
R&W framework in Moody's analysis and found it to be adequate.
Moody's therefore did not make any adjustments to Moody's losses
based on the strength of the R&W framework.

The R&W framework is adequate in part because the results of the
independent TPRs revealed a high level of compliance with
underwriting guidelines and regulations, as well as overall
adequate appraisal quality. These results give confidence that the
loans do not systemically breach the R&Ws the originators have made
and that the originators are unlikely to face material repurchase
requests in the future. The loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in
general, either meet or exceed the baseline set of credit-neutral
R&Ws Moody's identified for US RMBS. Among other considerations,
the R&Ws address property valuation, underwriting, fraud, data
accuracy, regulatory compliance, the presence of title and hazard
insurance, the absence of material property damage, and the
enforceability of mortgage.

In a continued effort to focus breach reviews on loans that are
more likely to contain origination defects that led to or
contributed to the delinquency of the loan, an additional carve out
has been included in recent transactions Moody's have rated from
other issuers relating to the delinquency review trigger.
Similarly, in this transaction, exceptions exist for certain
excluded disaster mortgage loans that trip the delinquency trigger.
These excluded disaster loans include COVID-19 forbearance loans.

Tail Risk and Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.20% of the closing pool balance,
which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time. Additionally, there is a
subordination lock-out amount which is 0.85% of the cut-off pool
balance.

Other Considerations

In CIM 2021-J1, the controlling holder has the option to hire at
its own expense the independent reviewer upon the occurrence of a
review event. If there is no controlling holder (no single entity
holds a majority of the Class Principal Amount of the most
subordinate class of certificates outstanding), the trustee shall,
upon receipt of a direction of the certificate holders of more than
25% of the aggregate voting interest of all certificates and upon
receipt of the deposit, appoint an independent reviewer at a cost
to the trust. However, if the controlling holder does not hire the
independent reviewer, the holders of more than 50% of the aggregate
voting interests of all outstanding certificates may direct (at
their expense) the trustee to appoint an independent reviewer. In
this transaction, the controlling holder can be the depositor or a
seller (or an affiliate of these parties). If the controlling
holder is affiliated with the depositor, seller or Sponsor, then
the controlling holder may not be motivated to discover and enforce
R&W breaches for which its affiliate is responsible.

The servicer will not commence foreclosure proceedings on a
mortgage loan unless the servicer has notified the controlling
holder at least five business days in advance of the foreclosure
and the controlling holder has not objected to such action. If the
controlling holder objects, the servicer has to obtain three
appraisals from the appraisal firms as listed in the pooling and
servicing agreement. The cost of the appraisals is borne by the
controlling holder. The controlling holder will be required to
purchase such mortgage loan at a price equal to the highest of the
three appraisals plus accrued and unpaid interest on such mortgage
loan as of the purchase date. If the servicer cannot obtain three
appraisals there are alternate methods for determining the purchase
price. If the controlling holder fails to purchase the mortgage
loan within the time frame, the controlling holder forfeits any
foreclosure rights thereafter. Moody's consider this credit neutral
because a) the appraiser is chosen by the servicer from the
approved list of appraisers, b) the fair value of the property is
decided by the servicer, based on third party appraisals, and c)
the controlling holder will pay the fair price and accrued
interest.

Servicing Arrangement / COVID-19 Impacted Borrowers

In the event a borrower enters into or requests a COVID-19 related
forbearance plan after February 1, 2021, such mortgage loan will
remain in the mortgage pool and the servicer will be required to
make advances in respect of delinquent interest and principal (as
well as servicing advances) on such mortgage loan during the
forbearance period (to the extent such advances are deemed
recoverable). Forbearances are being offered in accordance with
applicable state and federal regulatory guidelines and the
homeowner's individual circumstances. At the end of the forbearance
period, as with any other modification, to the extent the related
borrower is not able to make a lump sum payment of the forborne
amount, the servicer may, subject to the servicing matrix, offer
the borrower a repayment plan, enter into a modification with the
borrower (including a modification to defer the forborne amounts)
or utilize any other loss mitigation option permitted under the
pooling and servicing agreement.

As with any other modification, it is anticipated that the servicer
will reimburse itself at the end of the forbearance period for any
advances made by it with respect to such mortgage loan, whether
that be from any lump sum payments made by the related borrower,
from any increased payments received with respect to any repayment
plan entered into by the borrower, or, if modified and capitalized
in connection therewith, at the time of such modification as a
reimbursement of such capitalized advances from principal
collections on all of the mortgage loans. The servicer also has the
right to reimburse itself for any advance from all collections on
the mortgage loans at any time it deems such advance to be
non-recoverable. With respect to a mortgage loan that was the
subject of a servicing modification, the amount of principal of the
mortgage loan, if any, that has been deferred and that does not
accrue interest will be treated as a realized loss and to the
extent any such amount is later recovered, will result in the
allocation of a subsequent recovery.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2020.


COLUMBIA CENT 31: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Columbia Cent CLO 31
Ltd./Columbia Cent CLO 31 Corp.'s fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed primarily by
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Columbia Cent CLO 31 Ltd./Columbia Cent CLO 31 Corp.

  Class X(i), $4.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1, $235.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-F, $25.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $44.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $26.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $14.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $36.00 million: Not rated

(i)Class X notes are expected to begin amortizing using interest
proceeds beginning in July 2021. It is expected that $200,000 will
be paid down on each payment date for the first 20 payment dates.


CSMC 2021-AFC1: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CSMC 2021-AFC1 Trust's
mortgage pass-through notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by first-lien,
fixed- and adjustable-rate, fully amortizing residential mortgage
loans to both prime and nonprime borrowers (some with interest-only
periods). The loans are secured by single-family residential
properties (including one townhouse property), planned-unit
developments, condominiums, and two- to four-family residential
properties to prime and nonprime borrowers. The pool consists of
531 non-qualified mortgage (non-QM/ability to repay [ATR]
compliant) and ATR-exempt loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, representation and warranty framework, and geographic
concentration;

-- The mortgage aggregator, DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc.;

-- The mortgage originator, AmWest Funding Corp.; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

  Ratings Assigned(i)

  CSMC 2021-AFC1 Trust

  Class A-1, $207,668,000 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $12,030,000 million: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $20,007,000 million: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $8,357,000 million: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $3,191,000 million: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $1,621,000 million: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $380,240 million: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii) Not rated
  Class XS, notional(iii) Not rated
  Class PT(iv), $253,254,240 million: Not rated
  Class R, not applicable: Not rated

(i)The ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.
(ii)The notional amount will equal the aggregate interest-bearing
principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the first day of the
related due period and is initially $253,254,240.
(iii)The notional amount will equal the aggregate principal balance
of the mortgage loans as of the first day of the related due period
and is initially $253,254,240.
(iv)Certain initial exchangeable notes are exchangeable for the
exchangeable notes and vice versa.


ELLINGTON FINANCIAL 2021-1: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating on B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Ellington Financial
Mortgage Trust 2021-1's mortgage pass-through certificate.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by U.S.
residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The representation and warranty (R&W) framework for this
transaction;
-- The mortgage aggregator, Ellington Financial Inc.;
-- The impact that the economic stress brought on by COVID-19 is
likely to have on the performance of the mortgage borrowers in the
pool and liquidity available in the transaction.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

  Ratings Assigned

  Ellington Financial Mortgage Trust 2021-1

  Class A-1, $188,702,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $13,470,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $28,324,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $9,442,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $6,797,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $3,777,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $1,258,835: not rated
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): not rated
  Class X, notional(ii): not rated
  Class R, not applicable: not rated

(i)The ratings address our expectation for the ultimate payment of
interest and principal.
(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' stated principal balance.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-1: Fitch Gives Final B+ Rating on B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates issued by Flagstar Mortgage Trust
2021-1 (FSMT 2021-1).

DEBT             RATING             PRIOR
----             ------             -----
FSMT 2021-1

A-1     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-2     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-3     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-4     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-5     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-6     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-7     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-8     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-9     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-10    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-12    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-11    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-11X   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-13    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-14    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-15    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-16    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-17    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-18    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-19    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-20    LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-1   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-2   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-3   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-4   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-5   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-6   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-7   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-8   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-9   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-13  LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-17  LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
B-1     LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-1-X   LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-1-A   LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-2     LT  A+sf    New Rating    A+(EXP)sf
B-2-X   LT  A+sf    New Rating    A+(EXP)sf
B-2-A   LT  A+sf    New Rating    A+(EXP)sf
B-3     LT  BBB+sf  New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf
B-3-X   LT  BBB+sf  New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf
B-3-A   LT  BBB+sf  New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf
B-4     LT  BB+sf   New Rating    BB+(EXP)sf
B-5     LT  B+sf    New Rating    B+(EXP)sf
B-6-C   LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B       LT  BBB+sf  New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf
B-X     LT  BBB+sf  New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 574 newly originated, fixed-rate
prime-quality first liens on one- to four-family residential homes.
The pool consists of both non-agency jumbo and agency eligible
mortgage loans. The total balance of these loans is approximately
$489 million as of the cutoff date. The pool comprises loans that
Flagstar originated through its retail, broker and correspondent
channels. The transaction is similar to previous Fitch-rated prime
transactions, with a standard senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
deal structure. All the loans in the pool were underwritten to the
Ability to Repay Rule (ATR) and qualify as qualified mortgages
(QMs). Flagstar Bank, FSB (RPS2-/Negative) will be the servicer and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (RMS1-/Negative) will be the master
servicer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of 30-year, fully amortizing, non-agency jumbo and agency eligible
fixed-rate loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles and low
leverage. All the loans are designated as safe harbor QMs (SHQMs)
or TILA QMs (TQMs). The pool has a weighted average (WA) original
FICO score of 773, which is indicative of high credit-quality
borrowers. Approximately 79% of the loans have current FICO scores
at or above 750. In addition, the original combined loan to value
(CLTV) ratio is 67.7%, which represents substantial borrower equity
in the property. Only 5.0% of the loans have known subordinate
financing. The pool's attributes, together with Flagstar's sound
origination practices, support Fitch's low default risk
expectations.

Geographic Diversification (Neutral): The pool's primary
concentration is in California, representing 47% of the pool.
Approximately 32% of the pool is located in the top three U.S.
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) — Los Angeles (14.8%), San
Francisco (11.7%) and Houston (5.6%). The pool's regional
concentration did not add to Fitch's 'AAAsf' loss expectations.

Shifting Interest Structure (Mixed): The mortgage cash flow and
loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure whereby the subordinate classes receive
only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

Full Servicer Advancing (Mixed): Flagstar Bank, as servicer, will
provide full advancing for the life of the transaction. Although
full P&I advancing will provide liquidity to the certificates, it
will also increase the loan-level loss severity (LS) since the
servicer looks to recoup P&I advances from liquidation proceeds,
which results in less recoveries. Wells Fargo Bank (RMS1-/Negative;
AA-/Negative) is the master servicer in this transaction and will
advance delinquent P&I on the loans if the servicer is not able
to.

Subordination Floor (Positive): A CE or subordination floor of
1.00% has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and
loss exposure as pool size declines and performance volatility
increases due to adverse loan selection and small loan count
concentration.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): Extraordinary trust
expenses including indemnification amounts, costs of arbitration
and fess/expenses incurred by the reviewer for a review will reduce
the net WA coupon (WAC) of the loans, which does not affect the
contractual interest due on the certificates. Fitch did not make
any adjustment for expenses that reduce the net WAC.

Payment Forbearance (Neutral): No loans in the pool are on a
coronavirus forbearance or deferral plan as of the cutoff date. If
a borrower seeks pandemic-related relief after the cutoff date but
prior to the closing date, the loan will be removed from the pool.
If a borrower seeks pandemic-related relief after the closing date,
it is up to the servicer, Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar Bank), to
determine what type of coronavirus relief plan will work best for
the borrower.

For borrowers who request coronavirus-related relief or relief
related to a FEMA Major Disaster Declaration or other nationally
declared event after the closing date, the servicer will allow the
related borrower to suspend or reduce the related P&I owed on such
mortgage loan for a limited period (i) of up to six months, with a
possible extension granted at the servicer's sole discretion, or
(ii) as mandated by federal or state relevant legislation or
regulation. At the end of the disaster-related forbearance period,
the servicer will require the related borrower to pay all amounts
suspended during the disaster-related forbearance period (potential
options for eligible borrowers include repayment over a series of
months following such period, including extending the original
mortgage loan term by a number of months equal to the related
disaster-related forbearance period or by capitalizing related
arrearages, fees and expenses into an unpaid principal balance
(UPB) of the mortgage loan and extending such mortgage loan to, at
least, its original term) or enter other modification or loss
mitigation processes.

Loans on a disaster-related forbearance plan will be counted as
delinquent until the amounts suspended under the plan are fully
repaid, or the loan is modified accordingly. Flagstar Bank will
still be obligated to advance on delinquent loans, even if they are
on a pandemic relief plan. If Flagstar is not able to advance, the
master servicer (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.) will advance delinquent
P&I payments. Servicer advancing helps to provide liquidity to the
trust, but may create losses if the servicer reimburses itself for
advances all at once.

As of the cutoff date, five borrowers in the pool previously
inquired about entering into a disaster-related forbearance plan
but, to date, have not entered into such plan with the servicer.
All five of these borrowers are currently current and have not
missed a payment since origination.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is well controlled
in this transaction. Flagstar is experienced in originating and
securitizing prime loans and is considered an 'Average' originator
by Fitch. Flagstar is also the named servicer for the transaction
and is responsible for performing primary servicing functions. The
platform is rated 'RPS2-' with a Negative Rating Outlook. Fitch did
not adjust its loss levels based on these operational assessments.

Tier 1 Representation and Warranty Framework (Neutral): The
representation and warranty (R&W) framework is consistent with
Fitch's tier 1 framework. The strong framework combined with the
financial condition of the R&W provider led to neutral treatment in
Fitch's loss model and did not warrant adjustments at the 'AAAsf'
level.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): A third-party due
diligence review was performed on approximately 39.5% (by loan
count) of the initial transaction pool by Consolidated Analytics,
which is assessed by Fitch as an 'Acceptable - Tier 3' third-party
review (TPR) firm. The review was performed on a statistically
significant random sample based on a confidence interval of 95%
with a 5% error rate and did not indicate material defects. Fitch
did not apply an adjustment to losses based on the unreviewed
population of the pool based on the due diligence results. A credit
was given to loans that received a due diligence review, which
decreased Fitch's loss expectations by 7bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
stress.

No Meaningful Changes from Prior Prime Transactions (Neutral): This
transaction is very comparable to other recently issued prime
transactions in both the collateral composition and transaction
structure. Fitch's projected asset loss for the transaction's CE is
in line with that of other prime transactions with similar
collateral attributes.

The model indicated slightly higher ratings for the B-2-A, B-3-A,
B-4 and B-5 subordinate classes than the ratings that were
assigned. The ratings were limited to one rating tick higher than
the ratings typically assigned to prime shifting-interest
structures, given each class's position in the capital structure
and the thin bond sizes, even though CE would allow the class to
achieve a higher rating under Fitch's stresses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national
    level; that is, positive home price growth with no assumed
    overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth
    of 10.0%.

-- Excluding the senior classes, which are already 'AAAsf', the
    analysis indicates there is potential positive rating
    migration for all of the rated classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The defined negative stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in
    addition to the model-projected 7.0%. The analysis indicates
    there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs
    compared to the model projection.

-- This section provides insight into the model-implied
    sensitivities the transaction faces when one assumption is
    modified, while holding others equal. The modeling process
    uses the modification of these variables to reflect asset
    performance in up and down environments. The results should
    only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
    transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It
    should not be used as an indicator of possible future
    performance. For enhanced disclosure of Fitch's stresses and
    sensitivities, refer to the transaction's presale report.

Fitch has also added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that
contemplates a more severe and prolonged economic stress caused by
a reemergence of infections in the major economies, before a slow
recovery begins in 2Q21. Under this severe scenario, Fitch expects
the ratings to be affected by changes in its sustainable home-price
model due to updates to the model's underlying economic data
inputs. Any long-term impact arising from coronavirus disruption on
these economic inputs will likely affect both investment- and
speculative-grade ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Consolidated Analytics. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on credit, compliance, property
valuation and data integrity. Fitch considered this information in
its analysis. Fitch did not apply an adjustment to losses based on
the unreviewed population of the pool based on the due diligence
results. A credit was given to loans that received a due diligence
review, which decreased Fitch's loss expectations by 7bps at the
'AAAsf' rating stress.

A third-party due diligence review was performed by Consolidated
Analytics on a sample of loans from the transaction pool. The
sample was determined by a statistically significant selection
methodology based on a 95% confidence level with a 5% error rate.
Flagstar adopted this methodology in 2019 when it had previously
selected loans for review at a fixed rate. This is the third RMBS
issued by Flagstar that Fitch has rated, which incorporates the
statistical significance approach in which approximately 39.8% of
the final pool, by loan count, was reviewed. For loans that were
reviewed, the diligence scope consisted of a review of credit,
regulatory compliance and property valuation. Both the sample size
and review scope are consistent with Fitch criteria for diligence
sampling.

All the loans in the review sample received a final diligence grade
of 'A' or 'B', and the results did not indicate material defects.
The sample exhibited strong adherence to underwriting guidelines as
approximately 99% of loans received a final credit grade of 'A'.

The sample had a low concentration of compliance 'B' exceptions
(6.6%) compared to the average prime jumbo non-agency transactions
(42%). Compliance exceptions were primarily related to fees that
were over tolerance thresholds. However, the amounts were deemed by
the TPR firm to be immaterial and ultimately acknowledged by the
lender.

Five loans were removed from the initial pool due to issues related
to securitization timing or were removed by the sponsor because
they did not meet the sponsor's program parameters.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on approximately 39.5% of the pool by loan count. The
third-party due diligence was generally consistent with Fitch's
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria," and Consolidated Analytics was engaged
to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were
given compliance, credit and valuation grades, and assigned initial
grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were
noted in the due diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due
Diligence section for more detail.

Fitch also used data files that were made available by the issuer
on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received loan-level
information based on the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) data
layout format, and the data are considered to be comprehensive. The
ASF data tape layout was established with input from various
industry participants, including rating agencies, issuers,
originators, investors and others to produce an industry standard
for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization
market. The data contained in the ASF layout data tape were
reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2021-1: Moody's Gives B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
forty-five classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
issued by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-1 (FSMT 2021-1). The ratings
range from Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

FSMT 2021-1 is a securitization of first-lien prime jumbo and
agency eligible mortgage loans. The transaction is backed by 574
30-year fixed rate prime jumbo and agency eligible mortgage loans
with an aggregate stated principal balance of $488,656,342. There
are 463 (84.00% by unpaid principal balance) and 111 (14.00% by
unpaid principal balance) prime jumbo and agency eligible mortgage
loans, respectively. The average stated principal balance is
$851,318.

All the loans are designated as Qualified Mortgages (QM) either
under the QM safe harbor or the GSE temporary exemption under the
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules. 100% of the loans are originated by
Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar).

Flagstar (Long Term Issuer Baa3) will service the mortgage loans.
Servicing compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee
structure. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Long Term Issuer Aa2) will be
the master servicer. Flagstar will be responsible for principal and
interest advances as well as other servicing advances. The master
servicer will be required to make principal and interest advances
if Flagstar is unable to do so.

One third-party review (TPR) firm verified the accuracy of the loan
level information that we received from the sponsor. These firms
conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data accuracy and
compliance reviews on approximately 39.55% of the mortgage loans in
the collateral pool. The TPR results indicate that there are no
material compliance, credit, or data issues and no appraisal
defects. However, the sample size of 227 loans reviewed did not
meet our credit neutral criteria. Moody's made adjustment to our
loss levels to account for this risk.

Moody's analyzed the underlying mortgage loans using Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. Moody's also compared the
collateral pool to other prime jumbo securitizations. Overall, this
pool has average credit risk profile as compared to that of recent
prime jumbo transactions.

The securitization has a shifting interest structure with a
five-year lockout period that benefits from a senior floor and a
subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-1

Cl. A-1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-5*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-6*, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-7*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-8*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-9*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-13*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-17*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3-X*, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-X*, Assigned A3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

Rating Rationale

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.37%
at the mean, 0.20% at the median, and reaches 3.73% at a stress
level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's increased our model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(10.21% for the mean) and Moody's Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the
likely performance deterioration resulting from a slowdown in US
economic activity in 2020 due to the coronavirus outbreak.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
our assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2021-1 (FSMT 2021-1) is the first issuance
from Flagstar Mortgage Trust in 2021. Flagstar Bank, FSB is the
sponsor of the transaction. FSMT 2021-1 is a securitization of
first-lien prime jumbo and agency eligible mortgage loans. The
transaction is backed by 463 (84% by unpaid principal balance) and
111 (16% by unpaid principal balance) 30-year fixed rate prime
jumbo and agency eligible mortgage loans, respectively, with an
aggregate stated principal balance of $488,656,342. The average
stated principal balance is $851,318 and the weighted average (WA)
current mortgage rate is 3.19%. Borrowers of the mortgage loans
backing this transaction have strong credit profiles demonstrated
by strong credit scores and low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The
weighted average primary borrower original FICO score and original
LTV ratio of the pool is 778 and 67.03%, respectively. The WA
original debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is 32.64%. The average borrower
total monthly income is $27,906 with an average $246,280 of liquid
cash reserves. Approximately, 43.41% by loan balance of the
borrowers in the pool have more than one mortgage. However, there
is no single borrower with multiple mortgages in the pool.

Overall, the credit quality of the mortgage loans backing the
transaction is comparable to those of other recently issued prime
jumbo transactions rated by Moody's.

Approximately half of the mortgages (46.57% by loan balance) are
backed by properties located in California. The next largest
geographic concentration is Florida (11.22% by loan balance), Texas
(9.59% by loan balance), and Colorado (5.34% by loan balance). All
other states each represent 4% or less by loan balance.
Approximately 0.70% (by loan balance) of the pool is backed by
properties that are 2-to4 unit residential properties whereas loans
backed by single family residential properties represent 64.38% (by
loan balance) of the pool. Approximately 39.41% of the loans (by
loan balance) were originated through the correspondent channel.
Additionally, 35.91% (by loan balance) of the loans were originated
through the broker channel and the remaining 24.68% (by loan
balance) were originated through the retail channel.

Origination Quality and Underwriting Guidelines

100% of the loans in the pool are originated by Flagstar. The prime
jumbo loans in the pool are underwritten per Flagstar's Jumbo
(70.87% by unpaid principal balance) and Jumbo Express (13.14% by
unpaid principal balance) underwriting guidelines. Both programs
offer 30-yr fixed rate loans. However, loans originated under the
Jumbo program require manual underwriting and loans originated
under the Jumbo Express program require a valid Desktop Underwriter
(DU) response. The maximum loan amount under the Jumbo Express
program is limited to that of high balance conforming loan limit of
$822,375. Moody's consider Flagstar an adequate originator of prime
jumbo and conforming mortgages. As a result, Moody's did not make
any adjustments (positive or negative) to losses based on Moody's
assessment of origination quality.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate. Flagstar will service the mortgage loans. Flagstar
will be responsible for principal and interest advances as well as
other servicing advances. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the master
servicer, will be required to make principal and interest advances
if Flagstar is unable to do so. Moody's did not make any
adjustments to Moody's base case and Aaa stress loss assumptions
based on this servicing arrangement.

Covid-19 Impacted Borrowers

As of the cut-off date, no borrower in the pool has entered a
COVID-19 related forbearance plan with the servicer. However, there
are five borrowers in the pool that had previously inquired about
the forbearance plan but never entered it. Also, if any borrower
enters or requests a COVID-19 related forbearance plan from the
cut-off date to the closing date, then the associated mortgage loan
will be removed from the pool. In the event a borrower enters or
requests a COVID-19 related forbearance plan after the closing
date, such mortgage loan (and the risks associated with it) will
remain in the mortgage pool.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base fee of $20.5 for all
performing loans and increases according to certain delinquent and
incentive fee schedules. By establishing a base servicing fee for
performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans, the
fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The servicer receives
higher fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less labor
intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction.

Third-party review

The credit, compliance, property valuation, and data integrity
portion of the third-party review (TPR) was conducted on a total of
approximately 39.55% (227 loans) of the pool (by loan count). 100%
of the loans reviewed received a grade B or higher with 92.07% of
loans receiving an A grade.

While the TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for most of the loans, no material
compliance issues and no material appraisal defects, the total
sample size of 227 loans reviewed did not meet Moody's credit
neutral criteria. Moody's, therefore made an adjustment to loss
levels to account for this risk.

Representations and Warranties Framework

Flagstar Bank, FSB (Long Term Issuer Baa3), the originator as well
as an investment-grade rated entity, makes the loan-level
representation and warranties (R&Ws) for the mortgage loans. The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed
the baseline set of credit neutral R&Ws Moody's have identified for
US RMBS. Further, R&W breaches are evaluated by an independent
third party using a set of objective criteria to determine whether
any R&Ws were breached when (1) the loan becomes 120 days
delinquent, (2) the servicer stops advancing, (3) the loan is
liquidated at a loss or (4) the loan becomes between 30 days and
119 days delinquent and is modified by the servicer. Similar to
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) transactions, the transaction
contains a "prescriptive" R&W framework. These reviews are
prescriptive in that the transaction documents set forth detailed
tests for each R&W that the independent reviewer will perform.

Moody's assessed the R&W framework for this transaction as
adequate. Moody's analyzed the strength of the R&W provider, the
R&Ws themselves and the enforcement mechanisms. The R&W provider is
rated investment grade, the breach reviewer is independent, and the
breach review process is thorough, transparent and objective.
Moody's did not make any additional adjustment to Moody's base case
and Aaa loss expectations for R&Ws.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior floor and a subordinate floor. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments and
then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then interest and
principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all transactions
with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds benefit from a
cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments to the senior
bond for a specified period and increasing amounts of prepayments
to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but only if loan performance
satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

All certificates (except Class B-6-C) in this transaction are
subject to a net WAC cap. Class B-6-C will accrue interest at the
net WAC minus the aggregate delinquent servicing and aggregate
incentive servicing fee. For any distribution date, the net WAC
will be the greater of (1) zero and (2) the weighted average net
mortgage rates minus the capped trust expense rate.

Realized losses are allocated reverse sequentially among the
subordinate, starting with most junior, and senior support
certificates and on a pro-rata basis among the super senior
certificates.

Tail risk & subordination floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit enhancement
over time and increased performance volatility, known as tail risk.
To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a senior
subordination floor of 1.00% which mitigates tail risk by
protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time. Additionally, there is a subordination lock-out amount which
is 1.00% of the closing pool balance.

Moody's calculate the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in Moody's principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor and the subordinate floor of 1.00% are
consistent with the credit neutral floors for the assigned
ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2020.


FREDDIE MAC 2021-DNA2: S&P Assigns BB- Prelim Rating on B-1B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Freddie Mac
STACR REMIC Trust 2021-DNA2's notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by 100% conforming
residential mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The credit enhancement provided by the subordinated reference
tranches, as well as the associated structural deal mechanics;

-- A REMIC structure that reduces the counterparty exposure to
Freddie Mac for periodic principal and interest payments, but, at
the same time, pledges the support of Freddie Mac (a highly rated
counterparty) to cover shortfalls, if any, on interest payments and
to make up for any investment losses;

-- The issuer's aggregation experience and the alignment of
interests between the issuer and noteholders in the deal's
performance, which, in S&P's view, enhances the notes' strength;

-- The enhanced credit risk management and quality control
processes Freddie Mac uses in conjunction with the underlying
representations and warranties framework; and

-- The impact that COVID-19 is likely to have on the U.S. economy
and the U.S. housing market and the additional structural
provisions included to address corresponding forbearance and
subsequent defaults.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2021-DNA2

  A-H(i), $54,294,365,349: NR
  M-1, $264,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-1H(i), $14,432,642: NR
  M-2, $396,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2A, $198,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-2AH(i), $10,824,482: NR
  M-2B, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2BH(i), $10,824,482: NR
  M-2R, $396,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2S, $396,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2T, $396,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2U, $396,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2I, $396,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2AR, $198,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-2AS, $198,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-2AT, $198,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-2AU, $198,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-2AI, $198,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  M-2BR, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2BS, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2BT, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2BU, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2BI, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2RB, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2SB, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2TB, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  M-2UB, $198,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  B-1, $264,000,000: BB- (sf)
  B-1A, $132,000,000: BB+ (sf)
  B-1AR, $132,000,000: BB+ (sf)
  B-1AI, $132,000,000: BB+ (sf)
  B-1AH(i), $7,216,321: NR
  B-1B, $132,000,000: BB- (sf)
  B-1BH(i), $7,216,321: NR
  B-2, $264,000,000: NR
  B-2A, $132,000,000: NR
  B-2AR, $132,000,000: NR
  B-2AI, $132,000,000: NR
  B-2AH(i), $7,216,321: NR
  B-2B, $132,000,000: NR
  B-2BH(i), $7,216,321: NR
  B-3H(i), $139,216,321: NR

(i)Reference tranche only and will not have corresponding notes.
Freddie Mac retains the risk of each of these tranches.
NR--Not rated.



GCAT 2021-NQM1: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to GCAT
2021-NQM1's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The note issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by first-lien,
fixed- and adjustable-rate, fully amortizing, and interest-only
residential mortgage loans primarily secured by single-family
residential properties, planned-unit developments, condominiums,
cooperatives, and two- to four-family residential properties to
both prime and nonprime borrowers. The pool has 535 loans, which
are nonqualified or ATR-exempt mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The asset pool's collateral composition;
-- The transaction's credit enhancement;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The transaction's geographic concentration;
-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework;
-- The mortgage aggregator, Blue River Mortgage II LLC; and
-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and the liquidity
available in the transaction.

An S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit
moderating, uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus
pandemic and its economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up
and rollouts are gathering pace around the world. Widespread
immunization, which will help pave the way for a return to more
normal levels of social and economic activity, looks to be
achievable by most developed economies by the end of the third
quarter. However, some emerging markets may only be able to achieve
widespread immunization by year-end or later. S&P said, "We use
these assumptions about vaccine timing in assessing the economic
and credit implications associated with the pandemic. As the
situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates
accordingly."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  GCAT 2021-NQM1

  Class A-1, $217,781,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $17,220,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $32,849,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $11,142,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $5,788,000; BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $3,618,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $1,013,266: Not rated
  Class A-IO-S, Notional(i): Not rated
  Class X, Notional(i): Not rated
  Class R, N/A: Not rated

(i)The notional amount equals the aggregate stated principal
balance of the loans.


GREYWOLF CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes and new
class X notes from Greywolf CLO IV Ltd. (Reissue)/Greywolf CLO IV
LLC (Reissue), a CLO originally issued in April 2019 that is
managed by Greywolf Loan Management LP. The replacement notes will
be issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels. The replacement notes are expected to be issued at a lower
spread than the original notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 26,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 17, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which will outline the terms of the replacement notes.
Based on provisions in the proposed supplemental indenture:

-- The stated maturity will be extended by four years.

-- The reinvestment period will be extended by five years.

-- The non-call period will be extended by three years.

-- Of the underlying collateral obligations, 99.26% have credit
ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- Of the underlying collateral obligations, 94.56% have recovery
ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Greywolf CLO IV Ltd. (Reissue)/Greywolf CLO IV LLC (Reissue)

  Class X, $3.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1-R, $310.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-R, $70.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-1-R (deferrable), $20.00 million: A (sf)
  Class B-2-R (deferrable), $10.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-R (deferrable), $25.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R (deferrable), $21.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes A, $32.55 million: Not rated
  Subordinated notes B, $24.75 million: Not rated



GS MORTGAGE 2018-SRP5: S&P Cuts Class X-NCP Notes Rating to CCC
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on five classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. Trust 2018-SRP5, a U.S. CMBS transaction.

This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by a
floating-rate interest-only (IO) mortgage loan secured by the
borrowers' fee simple and/or leasehold interests in five enclosed
regional malls totaling 5.9 million sq. ft. (of which 3.7 million
sq. ft. is collateral) located in California, Ohio, and
Washington.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The downgrades on classes A, B, C, and D reflect our
reevaluation of the mall portfolio, based on our review of the
updated lower-than-expected August 2020 appraisal values released
in January 2021 and the performance data for the year-to-date (YTD)
period ended June 30, 2020, that were provided by the special
servicer after our July 2020 review.

"We lowered our aggregate expected-case valuation by 18.0% to
$492.0 million based on the updated August 2020 appraisal values
totaling $557.0 million (which were 54.9% lower than the aggregated
appraisal values at origination) and performance information.
Specifically, the lower S&P Global Ratings expected-case value
reflects a lower S&P Global Ratings net cash flows (NCF) and our
application of higher overall S&P Global.

Ratings capitalization rates.

S&P said, "The downgrades on classes A, B, C, and D reflect the
increased susceptibility to liquidity interruption and losses due
to our revised lower combined expected case value and the lower
appraisal values, in total, of $557.0 million. In addition, we
considered the decline in the reported YTD June 2020 performance
partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the class D
downgrade reflects our view that, based on the significantly
reduced appraisal values and an S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio higher than 100%, the risk of default and loss on the
class has increased due to uncertain market conditions.

"However, while the model-indicated ratings on classes A and B were
lower than the classes' revised rating levels, we tempered our
downgrades because we qualitatively considered the classes'
relative positions in the waterfall and the potential that the
operating performance of some of the malls in the portfolio, given
the malls' dominance in their respective trade areas, could improve
above our expectations. However, if there are any reported negative
changes in the portfolio or the transaction's performance beyond
what we have already considered, we may revisit our analysis and
adjust our ratings as necessary.

"The downgrade on the class X-NCP IO certificates is based on our
criteria for rating IO securities, in which the rating on the IO
security would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class. Class X-NCP's notional amount references classes
A, B, C, and D.

"In addition to the lower-than-expected appraisal values and the
portfolio's overall declining performance, our analysis also
considered that the loan transferred to the special servicer on
June 3, 2020, because the borrowers requested COVID-19 forbearance
relief. It is our understanding that the subordinate creditors have
succeeded in having a trustee appointed to take control of the
borrower entities. The Israeli trustee replaced the property
manager and is working with KeyBank Real Estate Capital, as the
special servicer, on finalizing a modification agreement of the
senior loan that may include extending the maturity date to August
2023. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a 2.38x
debt service coverage for the three months ended March 31, 2020,
compared with 2.28x as of year-end 2019." Wells Fargo indicated
that, as of January 2021, the loan was brought current after $15.2
million was applied to the outstanding amounts, including $7.9
million in outstanding principal and interest advances.
Additionally, $17.5 million is currently held at the property
accounts. According to the special servicer, all these funds were
captured via the hard lockbox that remains in place.

Transaction Summary

According to the Feb. 16, 2021, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust balance and whole loan balance of $549.0
million, unchanged from issuance. The loan pays a per annum
floating rate at weighted average spread of 2.4% over LIBOR and
currently matures on June 9, 2021, subject to two consecutive
one-year extension options and a subsequent third extension option
of two months and 16 days with a fully extended maturity date of
Aug. 25, 2023. In addition, there is $252.8 million of unsecured
subordinate debt that was funded via a public bond offering in
Israel. The debtor for the Israeli debt financing (ILS debt) is a
wholly owned entity of the sponsor, Starwood Retail Partners. The
trust loan is not cross-defaulted to the ILS debt. It is our
understanding from KeyBank that the sponsor has defaulted on the
ILS debt, resulting in ongoing litigation. To date, the trust has
not incurred any principal losses. However, Wells Fargo has
calculated an appraisal reduction amount of $38.3 million on the
senior loan.

Property-Level Analysis

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the portfolio's
declining occupancy and declining servicer-reported net operating
income (NOI). The NOI is down 1.5% in 2017, 8.8% in 2018, and 6.6%
in 2019, which we attribute to lower base rent income from an
overall higher vacancy. In addition, we considered the increased
tenant bankruptcies and store closures, as well as the
recently-improved-yet-still-low billed rent collection rates (which
are a combined 66.8% as of November 2020, up from 29.1% in June
2020), due to COVID-19. To account for these risks, we increased
our lost rent assumptions and excluded income from those tenants
who are no longer listed on the respective mall directory websites
or those that have filed for bankruptcy protection or announced
store closures. Consequently, we derived an overall sustainable NCF
of $51.0 million (down 7.9% from our last review).

"In addition, we increased our overall weighted average
capitalization rate to 10.28% from 9.16% in the last review to
account for ongoing cash flow volatility due to weakening trends
within the retail mall sector, the overall perceived increase in
the market risk premium for this property type, and vacant and weak
anchor and major tenants. We arrived at our aggregate expected-case
value of $492.0 million, down from $600.0 million in the last
review. Our expected-case value yielded an S&P Global Ratings LTV
ratio of 111.6% on the trust balance."

Details The Five Regional Malls

Plaza West Covina ($152.3 million allocated loan amount [ALA])
A 1.2 million-sq.-ft. (of which 667,814 sq. ft. is collateral)
regional mall in West Covina (Los Angeles), Calif., anchored by
J.C. Penney (210,274 sq. ft.; noncollateral), Macy's (180,000 sq.
ft.; noncollateral), and an anchor space formerly occupied by Sears
(137,820 sq. ft.; noncollateral). According to the September 2020
rent roll, the collateral was 85.5% occupied, down from the
servicer-reported 97.9% occupancy rate in 2019. The
servicer-reported NOI declined by 2.8% in 2017, 2.9% in 2018, 7.0%
in 2019, and 11.2% for the trailing 12 months ended May 31, 2020.
According to the September 2020 rent roll, the five largest tenants
made up 26.8% of the collateral net rentable area (NRA). In
addition, the NRA includes leases that expire in 2021 (17.4%), 2022
(16.6%), 2023 (14.5%), and 2024 (5.7%). It is S&P's understanding
from KeyBank that the borrower collected 53.9% of the total billed
rent in November 2020, up from 26.1% in June 2020.

Franklin Park Mall ($126.5 million ALA)

A 1.3 million-sq.-ft. (of which 705,503 sq. ft. is collateral)
regional mall in Toledo, Ohio, anchored by J.C. Penney (222,990 sq.
ft.; noncollateral), Dillard's (192,182 sq. ft.; noncollateral),
Macy's (186,621 sq. ft.; noncollateral), Rave Cinemas (83,443 sq.
ft.), and Dick's Sporting Goods (75,000 sq. ft.). According to the
September 2020 rent roll, the collateral property was 90.1%
occupied, down slightly from the servicer-reported 95.8% occupancy
rate in 2019. The servicer-reported NOI decreased by 0.3% in 2017
and 16.1% in 2018 and increased by 7.3% in 2019. According to the
September 2020 rent roll, the five largest tenants made up 33.2% of
the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA includes leases that
expire in 2021 (11.8%), 2022 (8.7%), 2023 (10.0%), and 2024 (6.5%).
According to KeyBank, the borrower collected 76.9% of the total
billed rent in November 2020, up from 31.2% in June 2020.

Parkway Plaza ($116.7 million ALA)

A 1.3 million-sq.-ft. (of which 944,728 sq. ft. is collateral)
regional mall in El Cajon (San Diego), Calif., anchored by Walmart
(160,000 sq. ft.), J.C. Penney (153,047 sq. ft.; ground leased),
and Macy's (115,612 sq. ft.; noncollateral). There is also a vacant
anchor space formerly occupied by Sears (255,622 sq. ft.;
noncollateral). According to the September 2020 rent roll, the
collateral was 76.8% occupied (after considering J.C. Penney
vacated its space), which was relatively unchanged from the 77.6%
servicer-reported occupancy rate in 2019. The servicer-reported NOI
declined by 4.9% in 2017, 4.4% in 2018, and 9.2% in 2019. According
to the September 2020 rent roll, the five largest tenants,
excluding J.C. Penney, made up 37.3% of the collateral NRA. In
addition, the NRA includes leases that expire in 2021 (9.5%), 2022
(19.9%), 2023 (14.2%), and 2024 (18.4%). According to KeyBank, the
borrower collected 65.7% of the total billed rent in November 2020,
up from 35.3% in June 2020.

Capital Mall ($90.8 million ALA)

An 804,065-sq.-ft. regional mall in Olympia, Wash., anchored by
Macy's (113,190 sq. ft.; ground leased), J.C. Penney (93,481 sq.
ft.; ground leased), Dick's Sporting Goods (51,060 sq. ft.), and
Century Theatres (45,171 sq. ft.). According to the September 2020
rent roll, the collateral was 90.5% occupied, which was relatively
unchanged from the servicer-reported 91.9% occupancy rate in 2019.
The servicer-reported NOI declined by 1.4% in 2017, 8.3% in 2018,
and 20.8% in 2019. According to the September 2020 rent roll, the
five largest tenants made up 43.7% of the collateral NRA. In
addition, the NRA includes leases that expire in 2021 (7.4%), 2022
(16.3%), 2023 (20.9%), and 2024 (20.5%). It is our understanding
from KeyBank that the borrower collected 80.3% of the total billed
rent in November 2020, up from 30.4% in June 2020.

Great Northern Mall ($62.7 million ALA)

A 1.2 million-sq.-ft. (606,933 sq. ft. is collateral) regional mall
in North Olmstead (Cleveland), Ohio, anchored by Macy's (238,261
sq. ft.; noncollateral), Dillard's (214,653 sq. ft.;
noncollateral), Sears (179,624 sq. ft.; noncollateral), J.C. Penney
(165,428 sq. ft.), and Regal Cinemas (43,955 sq. ft.). According to
the September 2020 rent roll, the collateral was 91.3% occupied,
down slightly from the servicer-reported 96.9% occupancy rate in
2019. The servicer-reported NOI increased by 5.1% in 2017,
decreased by 14.5% in 2018, and increased by 4.5% in 2019.
According to the September 2020 rent roll, the five largest tenants
made up 54.2% of the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include
leases that expire in 2021 (39.2%), 2022 (6.3%), 2023 (6.5%), and
2024 (5.2%). According to KeyBank, the borrower collected 60.5% of
the total billed rent in November 2020, up from 20.1% in June
2020.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

-- Health and safety.

  Ratings Lowered

  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2018-SRP5

  Class A: to A- (sf) from AA- (sf)
  Class B: to BBB- (sf) from A- (sf)
  Class C: to B- (sf) from BB- (sf)
  Class D: to CCC (sf) from B- (sf)
  Class X-NCP: to CCC (sf) from B- (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2021-PJ2: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-5 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates issued by GS Mortgage-Backed
Securities Trust 2021-PJ2 (GSMBS 2021-PJ2). The transaction is
expected to close on Feb. 26, 2021. The certificated are supported
by 435 conforming and nonconforming loans with a total balance of
approximately $427.61 million as of the cutoff date.

DEBT             RATING             PRIOR
----             ------             -----
GSMBS 2021-PJ2

A-1     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-2     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-3     LT  AA+sf   New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
A-4     LT  AA+sf   New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
A-5     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-6     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-7     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-8     LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-9     LT  AA+sf   New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
A-10    LT  AA+sf   New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
A-X-1   LT  AA+sf   New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
A-X-2   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-3   LT  AA+sf   New Rating    AA+(EXP)sf
A-X-5   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-7   LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
B-1     LT  AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
B-2     LT  Asf     New Rating    A(EXP)sf
B-3     LT  BBBsf   New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
B-4     LT  BBsf    New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
B-5     LT  Bsf     New Rating    B(EXP)sf
B-6     LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
A-R     LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
A-IO-S  LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists
entirely of 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) fully amortizing
loans seasoned approximately four months in aggregate. The
borrowers in this pool have strong credit profiles (770 model FICO)
and relatively low leverage (a 75% sustainable loan to value ratio
[sLTV]). The 100% full documentation collateral comprises mostly
nonconforming prime-jumbo loans (99.3%), with a small mix of
conforming agency-eligible loans (0.7%), while 100% of the loans
are safe harbor qualified mortgages (SHQM). Of the pool, 97.4% are
of loans for which the borrower maintains a primary residence,
while 2.6% are for second homes. Additionally, over 91% of the
loans were originated through a retail channel.

Shifting-Interest Deal Structure (Mixed): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure whereby the subordinate classes receive
only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. While there is
only minimal leakage to the subordinate bonds early in the life of
the transaction, the structure is more vulnerable to defaults
occurring at a later stage compared to a sequential or modified
sequential structure. To help mitigate tail risk, which arises as
the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination
floor of 1.25% of the original balance will be maintained for the
senior certificates, and a subordination floor of 0.90% of the
original balance will be maintained for the subordinate
certificates. Shellpoint Servicing will provide full advancing for
the life of the transaction. While this helps the liquidity of the
structure, it also increases the expected loss due to unpaid
servicer advances.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is well controlled
for in this transaction. Goldman Sachs is assessed as an 'Above
Average' aggregator by Fitch due to its robust sourcing strategy
and seller oversight, experienced senior management and staff, and
strong risk management and corporate governance controls. Primary
servicing responsibilities are performed by Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (Shellpoint), rated 'RPS2-' by Fitch. Additionally, Fitch
has conducted originator reviews on over 80% of the underlying
originators.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party due
diligence was performed on 100% of the loans in the transaction.
Due diligence was performed by AMC, Opus, Digital Risk and
Consolidated Analytics, which Fitch assesses as Acceptable - Tier
1, Acceptable - Tier 2, Acceptable - Tier 2 and Acceptable - Tier
3, respectively. The review scope is consistent with Fitch
criteria, and the results are generally similar to prior prime RMBS
transactions. Credit exceptions were supported by strong mitigating
factors, and compliance exceptions were primarily cured with
subsequent documentation. Fitch applied a credit for the high
percentage of loan-level due diligence, which reduced the 'AAAsf'
loss expectation by 21 bps.

No Meaningful Changes from Prior Transactions (Neutral): This
transaction is the eighth securitization by this issuer under this
PJ shelf. All transactions have been collateralized with comparable
credit quality and assets, and they have used the identical
structure and transaction parties. Fitch's projected asset loss for
the transaction's CE is consistent with prior transactions. Fitch's
expected losses for this transaction are slightly lower due to
improved LTV's and higher amount of liquid reserves.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
    ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
    analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
    model-projected 5.7%. As shown in the table included in the
    presale report, the analysis indicates that some potential
    rating migration exists with higher MVDs compared with the
    model projection.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Additionally, the defined rating sensitivities determine the
    stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
    category, to noninvestment grade and to 'CCCsf'.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch relied in its analysis on an independent third-party due
diligence review performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due
diligence was consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, Opus, Digital Risk and Consolidate Analytics were engaged
to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were
given compliance, credit and valuation grades and assigned initial
grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were
noted in the due diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due
Diligence section of this report for further details.

Fitch also used data files that were made available by the issuer
on its SEC Rule 17g-5-designated website. Fitch received loan-level
information based on the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) data
layout format, and the data are considered comprehensive. The ASF
data tape layout was established with input from various industry
participants, including rating agencies, issuers, originators,
investors and others, to produce an industry standard for the
pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization market.
The data contained in the ASF layout data tape were reviewed by the
due diligence companies, and no material discrepancies were noted.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied in its analysis on an independent third-party due
diligence review performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due
diligence was consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, Opus, Digital Risk and Consolidate Analytics were engaged
to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were
given compliance, credit and valuation grades and assigned initial
grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were
noted in the due diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due
Diligence section of this report for further details.

Fitch also used data files that were made available by the issuer
on its SEC Rule 17g-5-designated website. Fitch received loan-level
information based on the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) data
layout format, and the data are considered comprehensive. The ASF
data tape layout was established with input from various industry
participants, including rating agencies, issuers, originators,
investors and others, to produce an industry standard for the
pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization market.
The data contained in the ASF layout data tape were reviewed by the
due diligence companies, and no material discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


ICG US CLO 2021-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to ICG US CLO
2021-1 Ltd./ICG US CLO 2021-1 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 2,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  ICG US CLO 2021-1 Ltd./ICG US CLO 2021-1 LLC

  Class A-1, $244.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $12.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $48.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $12.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $43.45 million: Not rated


JP MORGAN 2004-PNC1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 9 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corporation (JPMCC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2004-PNC1.

    DEBT             RATING           PRIOR
    ----             ------           -----
J. P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2004-PNC1

E 46625M5N5   LT  CCCsf  Affirmed     CCCsf
F 46625M5R6   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
G 46625M5S4   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
H 46625M5T2   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
J 46625M5U9   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
K 46625M5V7   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
L 46625M5W5   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
M 46625M5X3   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
N 46625M5Y1   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf
P 46625M5Z8   LT  Dsf    Affirmed     Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations; Pool Concentration and Adverse Selection:
The pool is concentrated, with only eight of the original 101
loans/assets remaining. Fitch's loss expectations on the REO asset,
which is the largest asset comprising 37.3% of the pool, remain
high. Additionally, proceeds received from the repayment of
performing loans in the pool are being taken to recover outstanding
servicer advances on the REO asset.

The REO Tri County Crossing asset (37.3% of pool) is a 146,279-sf
retail property located in Springdale, OH. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in 2016 due to the departure of the
collateral's largest tenant, Dick's Sporting Goods (formerly 43% of
the NRA). The asset became REO in April 2018. Property occupancy
further dropped to 17% as of October 2020 from 57% in December 2019
when Best Buy (39.9% of NRA) vacated at expiration in March 2020.
The only remaining tenant is K&G Men's (17% of NRA leased through
December 2023). Both the former Dick's Sporting Goods and Best Buy
spaces remain vacant. The property is currently being marketed for
lease; the special servicer is evaluating new tenant prospects with
the intent to lease up and sell. The most recent appraisal dated
May 2019 indicated an 83% decline since issuance.

Exposure to Coronavirus Pandemic: Retail comprises 41.7% of the
pool and multifamily comprises 36% of the pool. Outside of the
three defeased loans in the pool (22.3%), the remaining four
non-specially serviced loans are comprised of three loans (36%;
maturing between March and May 2022) secured by multifamily
properties located in secondary and tertiary markets of Texas and
California, including one low income property (El Pueblo Dorado;
19.3%) and one senior housing property (El Centro Senior Villas;
3.1%), and one loan (Bellechase Commons; 4.3%; maturing March
2024), which is designated a Fitch Loan of Concern, secured by a
retail property located in Lake in the Hills, IL with upcoming
lease rollover concerns. Due to the concentrated nature of the
pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the
remaining loans based on timing and likelihood for repayment from
maturing defeased and performing loans and by expected losses from
the liquidation of specially serviced REO asset; the ratings
reflect this sensitivity analysis. Fitch's distressed ratings
consider the potential for negative impact on potential sales, loan
refinanceability and workout strategies.

Decreased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has decreased
since Fitch's last rating action due to an additional $26 million
in realized losses from the disposition of the Employers
Reinsurance I loan in July 2020. As of the February 2021
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 98.2% to $19.8 million from $1.1 billion at issuance.
Realized losses since issuance total $75.1 million (6.8% of
original pool balance). Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.6 million are currently affecting classes F, H, and L through
NR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of class E is unlikely given the significant pool
    concentration and adverse selection, but may occur with
    significantly better than expected recoveries on the REO asset
    and stable to improved performance on the non-specially
    serviced loans in the pool.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Class E may be downgraded with greater certainty of losses
    and/or as losses are realized.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


JP MORGAN 2021-3: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on B-5 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to JP Morgan Mortgage
Trust 2021-3 (JPMMT 2021-3).

DEBT              RATING               PRIOR
----              ------               -----
JPMMT 2021-3

A-1       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-2       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-3       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-3-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-3-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-4       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-4-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-4-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-5       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-5-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-5-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-6       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-6-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-6-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-7       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-7-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-7-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-8       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-8-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-8-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-9       LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-9-X     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-9-A     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-10      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-10-A    LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-10-X    LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-11      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-11-A    LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-11-AI   LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-11-B    LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-11-BI   LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-11-X    LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-12      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-13      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-14      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-15      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-16      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-17      LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-1     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-2     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-3     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-X-4     LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
B-1       LT  AA-sf   New Rating     AA-(EXP)sf
B-1-A     LT  AA-sf   New Rating     AA-(EXP)sf
B-1-X     LT  AA-sf   New Rating     AA-(EXP)sf
B-2       LT  Asf     New Rating     A(EXP)sf
B-2-A     LT  Asf     New Rating     A(EXP)sf
B-2-X     LT  Asf     New Rating     A(EXP)sf
B-3       LT  BBB-sf  New Rating     BBB-(EXP)sf
B-4       LT  BBsf    New Rating     BB(EXP)sf
B-5       LT  Bsf     New Rating     B(EXP)sf
B-6       LT  NRsf    New Rating     NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 1,179 loans with a total balance
of approximately $1.099 billion as of the cutoff date. The pool
consists of prime quality fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) from various
mortgage originators. The servicers in the transactions consist of
JP Morgan Chase Bank and various other servicers. Nationstar
Mortgage LLC will be the master servicer.

100% of the loans qualify as Safe Harbor Qualified Mortgage (SHQM),
Rebuttable Presumption QM, or Agency Safe Harbor QM loans.

There is no exposure to LIBOR in this transaction. The collateral
is 100% fixed rate loans, the certificates are fixed rate, based
off of the net WAC, or floating/inverse floating rate based off of
the SOFR index and capped at the net WAC. This is the third
Fitch-rated JPMMT transaction to use SOFR as the index rate for
floating/inverse floating-rate certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of very
high-quality 30-year, 25-year, and 20-year fixed-rate fully
amortizing loans. 100% of the loans qualify as Safe Harbor
Qualified Mortgage (SHQM), Rebuttable Presumption QM, or Agency
Safe Harbor QM loans. The loans were made to borrowers with strong
credit profiles, relatively low leverage, and large liquid
reserves. The loans are seasoned an average of four months
according to Fitch (two months per the transaction documents).

The pool has a weighted average (WA) original FICO score of 780 (as
determined by Fitch), which is indicative of very high
credit-quality borrowers. Approximately 89% of the loans have a
borrower with an original FICO score above 750. In addition, the
original WA CLTV ratio of 69.6% (sLTV 73.7%) represents substantial
borrower equity in the property and reduced default risk.

97.8% of the pool are nonconforming loans, while the remaining 2.2%
are conforming loans. 100% of the loans are designated as QM loans
with roughly 79% of the pool being originated by a retail channel.

The pool consists of 91.4% of loans where the borrower maintains a
primary residence, while 8.6% is a second home (there are no
investor properties in the pool). Single-family homes make up 92.8%
and condos make up 6.1% of the pool. Cash-out comprise only 6.7% of
the pool while purchases comprise 47.1% and rate refinances
comprise 46.2%. Based on the information provided, there are no
nonpermanent residents in the pool.

354 loans in the pool are over $1 million, and the largest loan is
$2.99 million.

Geographic Concentration (Neutral): Approximately 49.5% of the pool
is concentrated in California. The largest MSA concentration is in
the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA (14.4%), followed by
the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA (14%) and the San
Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA MSA (7.7%). The top three MSAs
account for 36.2% of the pool. As a result, there was no PD penalty
for geographic concentration.

Shifting Interest Structure (Mixed): The mortgage cash flow and
loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

CE Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor of 0.55%
has been considered in order to mitigate potential tail end risk
and loss exposure for senior tranches as pool size declines and
performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and
small loan count concentration. A junior subordination floor of
0.50% has been considered in order to mitigate potential tail-end
risk and loss exposure for subordinate tranches as pool size
declines and performance volatility increases due to adverse loan
selection and small loan count concentration.

Payment Forbearance (Neutral): As of the cutoff date, none of the
borrowers in the pool are on a coronavirus forbearance plan;
however, there were loans that had previously been on a coronavirus
forbearance plan, or inquired about a coronavirus forbearance plan,
but have continued to make their full contractual payment and were
never considered delinquent.

As of the cutoff date, approximately 0.19% (two loans) of the
borrowers of the mortgage loans have previously entered into a
coronavirus-related forbearance plan with the related servicer,
each of which is no longer active. However, with respect to each
such mortgage loan, the related borrower had nonetheless made all
of the scheduled payments due during the related forbearance period
and was therefore never delinquent. In addition, none of the
borrowers of the mortgage loans have inquired about or requested
forbearance plans with the related servicer and subsequently
declined to enter into any forbearance plan with such servicer and
remain current as of the cutoff date.

Fitch did not make any adjustment to the loans previously on a
coronavirus forbearance plan, since they continued to make their
payments under the plan (no delinquencies) and the plans are no
longer active.

Any loan that enters a coronavirus forbearance plan between the
cutoff date and the settlement date will be removed from the pool
(at par) within 45 days of closing. For borrowers who enter a
coronavirus forbearance plan post-closing, the principal and
interest (P&I) advancing party will advance P&I during the
forbearance period. If at the end of the forbearance period, the
borrower begins making payments, the advancing party will be
reimbursed from any catch-up payment amount.

If the borrower does not resume making payments, the loan will
likely become modified and the advancing party will be reimbursed
from principal collections on the overall pool. This will likely
result in writedowns to the most subordinate class, which will be
written back up, as subsequent recoveries are realized. Since there
will be no borrowers on a coronavirus forbearance plan as of the
closing date, and forbearance requests have significantly declined,
Fitch did not increase its loss expectation to address the
potential for writedowns due to reimbursement of servicer
advances.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. JP Morgan has an extensive
operating history in mortgage aggregations and is assessed by Fitch
as an 'Above Average' aggregator. JP Morgan has a developed
sourcing strategy and maintains strong internal controls that
leverage the company's enterprise wide risk management framework.
Approximately 91% of loans are serviced by JP Morgan Chase (Chase),
rated 'RPS1-'. Nationstar is the Master Servicer and will advance
if the servicer is not able to. If the Master Servicer is not able
to advance, then the Securities Administrator (Citibank) will
advance. Due to the low operational risk, the 'AAA' loss was
reduced by 0.29%.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): The loan-level
representations and warranties (R&Ws) are mostly consistent with a
higher tier framework but have knowledge qualifiers without a
clawback provision contributed to its Tier 2 assessment. Fitch
increased its loss expectations 26 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
category to mitigate the limitations of the framework and the
non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the providers.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Positive): Third-party due diligence was
performed on 100% of loans in the transaction by three different
third-party review firms; two firms are assessed by Fitch as
'Acceptable- Tier 1', and 'Acceptable-Tier 2'. The review confirmed
strong origination practices; no material exceptions were listed
and loans that received a final 'B' grades were due to non-material
exceptions that were mitigated with strong compensating factors.
Fitch applied a credit for the high percentage of loan level due
diligence which reduced the 'AAAsf' loss expectation by 17 bps.

Full Servicer Advancing (Mixed): The servicers will provide full
advancing for the life of the transaction (the servicer is expected
to advance delinquent P&I on loans that enter a coronavirus
forbearance plan). Although full P&I advancing will provide
liquidity to the certificates, it will also increase the loan-level
loss severity (LS) since the servicer looks to recoup P&I advances
from liquidation proceeds, which results in less recoveries.

Nationstar is the master servicer and will advance if the servicer
is not able to. If the master servicer is not able to advance, then
the securities administrator (Citibank) will advance.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the certificates.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$550,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full.

JPMMT 2021-3 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Transaction
Parties and Operational Risk. Operational risk is well controlled
for in JPMMT 2021-3, including strong transaction due diligence as
well as an aggregator assessed as 'Above Average' by Fitch and an
'RPS1-' Fitch-rated servicer, which resulted in a reduction in
expected losses and is relevant to the rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are only
an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to, or
that may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool, and lower
MVDs illustrated by a gain in home prices.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national
    level, or positive home price growth with no assumed
    overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth
    of 10%. Excluding the senior class, which is already 'AAAsf',
    the analysis indicates there is potential positive rating
    migration for all of the rated classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
    ratings would react to steeper market value declines at the
    national level. The analysis assumes market value declines of
    10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the model projected MVD,
    which is 5.6% in the base case. The analysis indicates that
    there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for
    all rated classes, compared with the model projection.
    Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home prices would
    lower all rated classes by two or more full categories.

-- This section provides insight into the model-implied
    sensitivities the transaction faces when one assumption is
    modified, while holding others equal. The modelling process
    uses the modification of these variables to reflect asset
    performance in up and down environments. The results should
    only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
    transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It
    should not be used as an indicator of possible future
    performance.

Fitch has added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that includes a
prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer demand and
a protracted period of below-trend economic activity that delays
any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this severe scenario,
Fitch expects the ratings to be affected by changes in its
sustainable home price model, due to updates to the model's
underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term effects arising from
coronavirus-related disruptions on these economic inputs will
likely affect both investment and speculative-grade ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by SitusAMC, Clayton, and Inglet Blair. The third-party
due diligence described in Form 15E focused on four areas:
compliance review, credit review, valuation review, and data
integrity. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and,
as a result, Fitch did not make any adjustments to its analysis.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, Clayton, and IngletBlair were engaged to perform the
review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were given compliance,
credit and valuation grades and assigned initial grades for each
subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due
diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section
for more detail.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

JPMMT 2021-3 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Transaction
Parties and Operational Risk. Operational risk is well controlled
for in JPMMT 2021-3, including strong transaction due diligence as
well as an aggregator assessed as 'Above Average' by Fitch and an
'RPS1-' Fitch-rated servicer, which resulted in a reduction in
expected losses and is relevant to the rating.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


JP MORGAN 2021-3: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 51
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) 2021-3. The ratings range from
Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 1,179 fully-amortizing fixed-rate
mortgage loans with a total balance of $1,098,975,861 as of the
January 31, 2020 cut-off date. The loans have original terms to
maturity of up to 30 years. JPMMT 2021-3 includes predominantly
prime jumbo non-agency eligible (97.8%) and GSE eligible (2.2%)
mortgages purchased by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp.
(JPMMAC), the sponsor and mortgage loan seller, from various
originators and MaxEx Clearing, LLC (MaxEx). The characteristics of
the mortgage loans underlying the pool are generally comparable to
those of other JPMMT transactions backed by prime mortgage loans
that Moody's have rated. As of the cut-off date, no borrower under
any mortgage loan is in a COVID-19 related forbearance plan with
the servicer. However, two borrowers had previously entered a
COVID-19 related forbearance plan but continued making timely
interest and principal payments without going delinquent.

Approximately 39.1% of the loans in the pool are purchased from
MaxEx. Guaranteed Rate Inc, together with its affiliates Guaranteed
Affinity, LLC & Proper Rate, LLC, and Finance of America Mortgage,
LLC originated approximately 13.7% and 10.7% of the mortgage loans
(by balance), respectively in the pool. All other originators
accounted for less than 10% of the pool by balance. With respect to
the mortgage loans, each originator and MaxEx, as applicable, made
a representation and warranty (R&W) that the mortgage loan
constitutes a qualified mortgage (QM) under the QM rule.

NewRez LLC f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing ("Shellpoint") will interim service approximately about
90.9%, loanDepot.com, LLC (loanDepot) will service about 8.1%
(subserviced by Cenlar, FSB), Johnson Bank will service about 0.8%,
First Republic will service about 0.1% and USAA Federal Savings
Bank (USAA) will service about 0.1% (subserviced by Nationstar).
Shellpoint will act as interim servicer from the closing date until
the servicing transfer date, which is expected to occur on or about
April 1, 2021 (but which may occur after such date). After the
servicing transfer date, these mortgage loans will be serviced by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, (JPMCB).

The servicing fee for loans serviced by JPMCB (Shellpoint, until
the servicing transfer date) and loanDepot will be based on a
step-up incentive fee structure and additional fees for servicing
delinquent and defaulted loans. Johnson Bank, First Republic Bank,
and USAA Federal Savings Bank ("USAA") have a fixed fee servicing
framework. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the master
servicer and Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) will be the securities
administrator and Delaware trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will
be the representations and warranties breach reviewer.

Three third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan level information. These firms conducted detailed credit,
property valuation, data accuracy and compliance reviews on 100% of
the mortgage loans in the collateral pool.

Distributions of principal and interest (P&I) and loss allocations
are based on a typical shifting interest structure that benefits
from senior and subordination floors. Moody's coded the cash flow
to each of the certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash
flow tool. In coding the cash flow, Moody's took into account the
step-up incentive servicing fee structure.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2021-3

Cl. A-1, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-A, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-AI, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-B, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-BI, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
0.28%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.14%, and reaches 2.87% at
a stress level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's increased our model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(9.8% for the mean) and our Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely
performance deterioration resulting from of a slowdown in US
economic activity due to the coronavirus outbreak.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence, and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2021-3 is a securitization of a pool of 1,179
fully-amortizing fixed-rate prime jumbo non-conforming (97.8%) and
GSE-eligible conforming (2.2%) mortgage loans with a total balance
of $1,098,975,861 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted average
(WA) remaining term to maturity of 357 months, and a WA seasoning
of 2 months. The WA original FICO score is 784 and the WA original
combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is 69.6%. About 4.0% and 16.5%
(by loan balance) of mortgage loans were originated through
correspondent and broker channels, respectively.

The borrowers have high monthly income (about $32,451 on WA.
average), and significant liquid cash reserve (about $377,861 on
average), all of which have been verified as part of the
underwriting process and reviewed by the third-party review firms.
The GSE-eligible loans have an average balance of $679,165 compared
to the average GSE balance of approximately $238,000. The higher
conforming loan balance is attributable to the greater amount of
properties located in high-cost areas, such as the metro areas of
Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York City. The GSE-eligible
loans, which make up about 2.2% of the JPMMT 2021-3 pool by loan
balance, were underwritten pursuant to GSE guidelines and were
approved by DU/LP. All the loans are subject to the QM and
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules.

Overall, the characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to those of other JPMMT transactions backed by
prime mortgage loans that Moody's have rated.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's consider JPMMAC's aggregation platform to be adequate and
Moody's did not apply a separate loss-level adjustment for
aggregation quality. In addition to reviewing JPMMAC as an
aggregator, Moody's have also reviewed the originator(s)
contributing a significant percentage of the collateral pool (above
10%) and MaxEx. Additionally, Moody's did not make an adjustment
for GSE-eligible loans, since those loans were underwritten in
accordance with GSE guidelines. Moody's increased its base case and
Aaa loss expectations for certain originators of non-conforming
loans where Moody's do not have clear insight into the underwriting
practices, quality control and credit risk management.

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate given the strong servicing arrangement of the
servicers, as well as the presence of a strong master servicer to
oversee the servicers. The servicers are contractually obligated to
the issuing entity to service the related mortgage loans. However,
the servicers may perform their servicing obligations through
sub-servicers. In this transaction, Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc. corporate family rating B2) will
act as the master servicer. The servicers are required to advance
P&I on the mortgage loans. To the extent that the servicers are
unable to do so, the master servicer will be obligated to make such
advances. In the event that the master servicer, Nationstar, is
unable to make such advances, the securities administrator,
Citibank, N.A. (rated Aa3) will be obligated to do so to the extent
such advance is determined by the securities administrator to be
recoverable.

COVID-19 Impacted Borrowers

As of the cut-off date, 0.19% of the borrowers had entered into a
COVID-19 related forbearance plan with the servicer but are no
longer active. However, these borrowers continued to pay their
contractual principal and interest obligations while in the
forbearance plan and were never delinquent. JPMMAC will be removing
any mortgage loan with respect to which the related borrower
requests or enters into a COVID-19 related forbearance plan after
the cut-off date but on or prior to the closing date, which would
be a closing date substitution amount treated like a prepayment at
month one. In the event that after the closing date a borrower
enters into or requests a COVID-19 related forbearance plan, such
mortgage loan (and the risks associated with it) will remain in the
mortgage pool.

Typically, the borrower must contact the servicer and attest they
have been impacted by a COVID-19 hardship and that they require
payment assistance. The servicer will offer an initial forbearance
period to the borrower, which can be extended if the borrower
attests that they require additional payment assistance.

At the end of the forbearance period, if the borrower is unable to
make the forborne payments on such mortgage loan as a lump sum
payment or does not enter into a repayment plan, the servicer may
defer the missed payments, which could be added as a
non-interest-bearing payment due at the end of the loan term. If
the borrower can no longer afford to make payments in line with the
original loan terms, the servicer would typically work with the
borrower to modify the loan (although the servicer may utilize any
other loss mitigation option permitted under the pooling and
servicing agreement with respect to such mortgage loan at such time
or any time thereafter).

However, it should be noted that servicing practices, including
tracking COVID-19-related loss mitigation activities, may vary
among servicers in this particular transaction. These
inconsistencies could impact reported collateral performance and
affect the timing of any breach of performance triggers, servicer
advance recoupment, the extent of servicer fees, and additional
expenses for R&W breach reviews when loans become seriously
delinquent.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for loans serviced by JPMCB (and Shellpoint,
until the servicing transfer date) and loanDepot will be based on a
step-up incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $40 per
loan and additional fees for delinquent or defaulted loans. Johnson
Bank, and USAA will be paid a monthly flat servicing fee equal to
one-twelfth of 0.25% of the remaining principal balance of the
mortgage loans.

By establishing a base servicing fee for performing loans that
increases when loans become delinquent, the fee-for-service
structure aligns monetary incentives to the servicer with the costs
of servicing. The servicer receives higher fees for labor-intensive
activities that are associated with servicing delinquent loans,
including loss mitigation, than they receive for servicing a
performing loan, which is less costly and labor-intensive. The
fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and adequate for this
transaction because it better aligns the servicer's costs with the
deal's performance. Furthermore, higher fees for the more
labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these loans to another
servicer easier, should that become necessary.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $40 for all performing loans and increases according to a
pre-determined delinquent and incentive servicing fee schedule. The
delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from the
available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-Party Review

Three TPR firms, AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), Clayton Services, LLC
(Clayton), and Inglet Blair, LLC (IB) (collectively, TPR firms)
reviewed 100% of the loans in this transaction for credit,
regulatory compliance, property valuation, and data accuracy. Each
mortgage loan was reviewed by only one of the TPR firms and each
TPR firm produced one or more reports detailing its review
procedures and the related results. The TPR results indicated
compliance with the originators' underwriting guidelines for
majority of loans, no material compliance issues, and no material
appraisal defects. Overall, the loans that had exceptions to the
originators' underwriting guidelines had strong documented
compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves,
high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms also
identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations related to
fees that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed.

In addition, there are twelve loans (1.2% by balance) that have
exterior only appraisal due to COVID-19, instead of full appraisal.
These exterior-only loans are all non-conforming loans,
underwritten through Guaranteed Rate's guidelines except one loan
which is underwritten to Supreme Lending's guidelines. Since the
exterior-only appraisal only covers the outside of the property
there is a risk that the property condition cannot be verified to
the same extent had the appraiser been provided access to the
interior of the home. Also, two loans representing 0.2% of pool
balance are appraisal waiver loans. These loans do not have a
traditional appraisal but instead an estimate of value or sales
price is provided, typically, by the seller. Moody's did not make
any specific adjustment for exterior-only appraisal or appraisal
waiver loans since they make a de minimis portion of the pool.

The TPR firms compared third-party valuation products to the
original appraisals. Property valuation was conducted using a
third-party collateral desk appraisal (CDA), field review and
automated valuation model (AVM) or a Collateral Underwriter (CU)
risk score. For a portion of the mortgage loans in the pool, a CDA
or a field review or AVM was not provided and had a CU risk score
less than or equal to 2.5. Moody's consider the use of CU risk
score for non-conforming loans to be credit negative due to (1) the
lack of human intervention which increases the likelihood of
missing emerging risk trends, (2) the limited track record of the
software and limited transparency into the model and (3) GSE focus
on non-jumbo loans which may lower reliability on jumbo loan
appraisals. Moody's did not apply an adjustment to the loss for
such loans because (i) the statistically significant sample size
and valuation results of the loans that were reviewed using a
third-party valuation product such as a CDA and field review is
sufficient, (ii) the original appraisal balances for non-conforming
loans (average of approximately $1.4 million) were not
significantly higher than that of appraisal values for GSE-eligible
loans and (iii) the borrowers of such loans have strong credit
characteristics including high FICO scores, low LTV and adequate
reserves.

R&W Framework

JPMMT 2021-3's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework considers the financial
strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers
and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms. The creditworthiness of
the R&W provider determines the probability that the R&W provider
will be available and have the financial strength to repurchase
defective loans upon identifying a breach. An investment grade
rated R&W provider lends substantial strength to its R&Ws. Moody's
analyze the impact of less creditworthy R&W providers case by case,
in conjunction with other aspects of the transaction.

Moody's applied an adjustment to all R&W providers that are unrated
and/or financially weaker entities. For loans that JPMMAC acquired
via the MaxEx platform, MaxEx under the assignment, assumption and
recognition agreement with JPMMAC, will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws
provided by MaxEx to JPMMAC and assigned to the trust are in line
with the R&Ws found in other JPMMT transactions, hence Moody's
applied the same adjustment as other loans in the pool.

No other party will backstop or be responsible for backstopping any
R&W providers who may become financially incapable of repurchasing
mortgage loans. With respect to the mortgage loan R&Ws made by such
originators or MaxEx, as applicable, as of a date prior to the
closing date, JPMMAC will make a "gap" representation covering the
period from the date as of which such R&W is made by such
originator or MaxEx, to the cut-off date or closing date, as
applicable. Additionally, no party will be required to repurchase
or substitute any mortgage loan until such loan has gone through
the review process.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction Delaware trustee is Citibank. The custodian's
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by Citibank.
Nationstar, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, servicer termination and for the appointment of any
successor servicer. In addition, Nationstar is committed to act as
successor if no other successor servicer can be found. The master
servicer is required to advance P&I if the servicer fails to do so.
If the master servicer fails to make the required advance, the
securities administrator is obligated to make such advance.

Transaction Structure

The transaction has a shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bonds have been reduced to zero i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds (other than the
Class A-R Certificates) is based on the net WAC as reduced by the
sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and (ii) the capped trust
expense rate. In the event that there is a small number of loans
remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate can be reduced to
zero.

The Class A-11, Class A-11-A, Class A-11-B Certificates will have a
pass-through rate that will vary directly with the SOFR rate and
the Class A-11-X Certificates will have a pass-through rate that
will vary inversely with the SOFR rate.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.55% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. The
subordinate bonds benefit from a floor as well. When the total
current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus the aggregate
balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior to it amount to
less than 0.50% of the original pool balance, those tranches that
are junior to it do not receive principal distributions. The
principal those tranches would have received is directed to pay
more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

In addition, until the aggregate class principal amount of the
senior certificates (other than the interest only certificates) is
reduced to zero, if on any distribution date, the aggregate
subordinate percentage for such distribution date drops below 6.00%
of current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will
include all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero.

Moody's calculate the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in our principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor is equal to an amount which is the sum of the
balance of the six largest loans at closing multiplied by the
higher of their corresponding MILAN Aaa severity or a 35% severity.
The credit neutral floor for Aaa rating is $6,044,367. The senior
subordination floor of 0.55% and subordinate floor of 0.50% are
consistent with the credit neutral floors for the assigned
ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2020.


JP MORGAN 2021-CL1: Moody's Gives B1 Rating on Cl. M-5 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of credit risk transfer notes issued by J.P. Morgan Wealth
Management Reference Notes, Series 2021-CL1. The ratings range from
Aa3 (sf) to B1 (sf).

J.P. Morgan Wealth Management Reference Notes, Series 2021-CL1 is
the first credit linked notes transaction issued by JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A (JPMCB) from the JPMorgan Wealth Management Mortgage
platform (JPMWM) to transfer credit risk to noteholders through a
hypothetical tranched credit default swap on a reference pool of
mortgages.

Principal payments on the notes are based on the performance of a
reference pool consisting of 2,471 fully amortizing fixed-rate
prime jumbo non-conforming mortgages with a total balance of
$2,363,945,883, with original terms to maturity of 30 years. The
notes are uncapped secured overnight financing rate (SOFR) floaters
and are unsecured obligations of JPMCB. Unlike principal payment,
interest payment to the notes is not dependent on the performance
of the reference pool except for loss mitigation modification. This
deal is unique in that the source of payments for the notes will be
JPMCB's own funds, and not the collections on the loans or note
proceeds held in a segregated trust account. As a result, Moody's
capped the ratings of the notes at JPMCB's Senior Unsecured rating
(Aa2).

The credit risk exposure of the notes depends on the actual
realized losses and modification losses incurred by the reference
pool. This transaction has a pro-rata structure, which is more
beneficial to the subordinate bondholders than the shifting
interest structure that is typical of prime jumbo transactions.
However, the mezzanine and junior bondholders will not receive any
principal unless performance tests are satisfied.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Wealth Management Reference Notes, Series
2021-CL1

Cl. M-1, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary credit analysis and rating rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
0.36%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.21%, and reaches 3.26% at
a stress level consistent with our Aaa ratings.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around our forecasts is unusually high.
Moody's increased its median expected losses by 15% (10.2% for the
mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely performance
deterioration resulting from of a slowdown in US economic activity
because of the outbreak.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the Senior
Unsecured rating of JPMCB (Aa2), the credit quality of the mortgage
loans, the structural features of the transaction, Moody's
assessments of the origination quality and servicing arrangement,
the strength of the third-party due diligence, and the eligibility
criteria framework of the transaction.

Collateral description

The reference pool consists of 2,471 fully amortizing fixed-rate
prime jumbo non-conforming mortgages with a total balance of
$2,363,945,883, with original terms to maturity of 30 years. The
pool has a weighted average (WA) primary borrower FICO score of
773, a WA Loan-to-Value (LTV) of 68.7% and a WA Debt-to-Income
(DTI) ratio of 34.4%.

All of the mortgage loans in the pool are non-QM. The loans were
underwritten to JPMWM underwriting guidelines. The loans are
designated non-QM because the QM status was not tested. As part of
the origination quality review and in consideration of the
loan-level third-party diligence reports, Moody's assess whether
there are any particular issues that could result in a significant
risk because these loans are non-QM. Moody's did not make any
adjustments to the loss levels because the borrowers are
high-net-worth clients of JPMWM. They have the ability to pay,
based on their significant financial assets and high reserves.

About 28% of the pool are loans that were modified. Moody's did not
make any adjustments to the loss levels because the modifications
were relationship modifications offered to clients for retention
purposes, and were heavily offered in 2019 and 2020 to align coupon
rates on seasoned mortgages with the market rate. The borrowers are
high net-worth individuals with significant financial assets and
had been current on their mortgage payments before the
modification.

Approximately 14.4% of the pool (by balance) are asset depletion
loans. These loans are designed for high net-worth individuals who
have in excess of $1 million of unencumbered liquid assets, are of
retirement age, or trust beneficiaries with portfolios that could
be easily converted into cash for mortgage payments. The income
stream is derived from estimating a cash flow stream by applying an
amortization period equal to the term of the loan (15 or 30 years)
to a diversified portfolio of verified cash and marketable
securities using a rate of return determined at least annually by
Chase Home Lending. JPMWM required proof of assets for these loans.
Moody's did not make any adjustments to the loss levels for these
loans.

Origination quality

The mortgage loans in the collateral pool were underwritten in
accordance with JPMWM prime jumbo underwriting guidelines. Moody's
consider JPMWM an adequate originator of prime jumbo and Moody's
did not make an adjustment to the loss levels.

JPMorgan Wealth Management (JPMWM) originates prime jumbo loans and
offers fixed-rate, adjustable-rate, interest-only mortgages and
Home Equity Line of Credits (HELOCs). JPMWM originations target
high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth wealth management clients.
Most of the clients are high wage earners, business owners and
retirees with significant financial assets. The clients are US
nationals and foreign nationals who are currently residing in the
US.

Underwriting

JPMWM has thorough and strict underwriting guidelines. Any
exceptions to the guidelines must be documented with all the
compensating factors before approval. The underwriters review
documentation and analyze income, assets and liabilities. The
underwriting team is split between the US, India and the
Philippines, and is seasoned and well-trained. The underwriting
approval process is centralized in the US, while India and the
Philippines have underwriting activity and quality control (QC)
reviews.

Quality assurance (QA) is performed through post-funding reviews.
QC reviews are performed during loan production from application
through funding. All the loans are subject to a pre-funding QC
review that validates data and requirements using a 100+ questions
checklist. Underwriting QC staff include more than 20 full-time
employees located in the US and India. Post-fund QA is performed on
a sample of funded and denied loans monthly on a 95/5/5 statistical
sampling basis. Both QC and QA reviews are inclusive of compliance,
collateral and credit checkpoints. Loans are also subject to
periodic internal and external corporate audits.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
adequate because of the experience and financial strength of Chase
as the servicer. Chase is not required to advance principal and
interest on the mortgage loans, but JPMCB is responsible to pay
interest to the notes at their respective note rates. Chase will be
obligated to make advances with respect to taxes, insurance
premiums and the cost of the property's preservation if deemed
recoverable. Chase is a seasoned servicer with more than 20 years
of experience servicing residential mortgage loans and has
demonstrated adequate servicing ability as a primary servicer of
prime residential mortgage loans.

Third-party review

The results of the third-party review (TPR) are weaker than those
for other J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation
(JPMMAC)-sponsored transactions. On behalf of JPMCB, Clayton
conducted an independent third-party pre-securitization due
diligence review on 600 out of 2,471 loans. One loan had a final
credit grade C, three loans had a final compliance grade C or D,
and 11 loans had a final valuation grade D because of the missing
updated valuation to support the original appraised value. Moody's
extrapolated the 15 loans with a final grade C or D to the broader
pool because the due diligence was not performed on 100% of the
pool. Two loans with valuations grade D and five loans flagged for
final grades of C and/or D for compliance were dropped from the
final pool. In addition, data integrity was performed on 600 loans
and findings indicated notable discrepancies in key fields between
the initial tape data and the review data. The issuer has corrected
the data issues for all the loans in the final tape (including the
un-sampled loans). Moody's made a small adjustment to the loss
levels as a result of the TPR results.

Strong eligibility criteria framework

JPMCB has provided clear loan-level eligibility criteria with
respect to the reference pool. JPMWM 2021-CL1's eligibility
criteria, which are the equivalent of a traditional JPMMT R&W
framework, are in line with those of other JPMorgan Mortgage Trust
(JPMMT) transactions where an independent reviewer is named at
closing, and costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at
issuance. Moody's review of the eligibility criteria framework
takes into account the financial strength of JPMCB, scope of
eligibility criteria (including qualifiers and sunsets) and
enforcement mechanisms. There are provisions for binding
arbitration in the event there is a dispute between the issuer and
a representative appointed by the noteholders, regarding
satisfaction of the eligibility criteria. Further, eligibility
criteria breaches are evaluated by an independent third-party using
a set of objective criteria. The transaction contains breach review
triggers: (i) a severely delinquent reference obligation, (ii) a
liquidated reference obligation, or (iii) a delinquent modified
reference obligation.

The notes

JPMCB creates a hypothetical structure of senior reference
certificates (A-R1) and multiple classes of subordinate reference
certificates (M-R1, M-R2, M-R3, M-R4, M-R5 and B-R1). The principal
payments and losses on the Class M-1, Class M-2, Class M-3, Class
M-4, Class M-5 and Class B notes will be based on the principal
amounts and losses that would hypothetically be based on the Class
M-R1, Class M-R2, Class M-R3, Class M-R4, Class M-R5 and Class B-R1
certificates, respectively, included in the hypothetical
structure.

Transaction structure

Credit enhancement in this transaction is comprised of
subordination provided by mezzanine and junior tranches. Realized
losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order starting with
the Class B tranche.

Interest due on the notes is determined by the outstanding
principal balance and the interest rate of the notes. The interest
payment amount is the interest accrual amount of a class of notes
minus any modification loss amount allocated to such class on each
payment date. Of note, relationship modification is not part of the
modification loss amount. The modification loss is calculated by
taking the respective positive and negative difference between the
original accrual rate of the loans, multiplied by the unpaid
balance of the loans, and the current accrual rate of the loans,
multiplied by the interest bearing unpaid balance.

Principal payments will be allocated pro rata among the senior and
subordinate notes (mezzanine and junior) based on their respective
senior and subordinate percentages so long as performance triggers
and nonperforming loan test are satisfied. The senior note will
receive 100% of the principal distributions if either the
delinquent trigger or the cumulative loss trigger fails during the
payment period. The senior will receive 100% of the prepayment or
unscheduled payment if the nonperforming loan test fails during the
payment period.

Realized Loss and Modification Loss

Realized losses are applied reverse sequentially starting with
first with Class B until the principal balance has been reduced to
zero. Modification loss will be applied after the allocation of
realized loss.

Modification loss amounts are applied reverse sequentially first to
the distributable interest and principal of the Class B to reduce
the current interest distributable to zero and then to reduce the
principal distributable to zero.

Of note, any principal forbearance/forgiveness amount created in
connection with any modification (whether as a result of a COVID-19
forbearance or otherwise) will result in the allocation of
modification loss. Modifications performed in accordance with the
loss mitigation process of the servicer will not result in the
allocation of realized losses or certificate write-down amount
unless the borrower receives a principal forgiveness or the
modified borrower defaults without enough liquidation proceeds to
cover the unpaid principal balance.

Cash flow features

Moody's took the pro rata principal payments to the notes and
performance triggers into consideration in Moody's cash flow
analysis. Moody's applied a 20% CPR to the cash flow as a
sensitivity for the pro rata feature. In a high prepayment
environment, the senior and the subordinate notes are amortizing
faster. As a result, less subordination will be available to
protect the senior subordinate certificates from losses.

Tail risk

This deal has a pro-rata structure with a subordination lockout
class, which protects the mezzanines of high priority if the
applicable credit support percentage levels are not maintained. The
mezzanine and junior bondholders will not receive any principal
unless performance tests are satisfied. The mezzanine and junior
notes will be locked out of principal payment entirely if the
current applicable credit percentage for such class is less than
the sum of its original applicable credit percentage and 25% of the
nonperforming reference loan percentage. The principal those
tranches would have received are directed to pay more senior
subordinate bonds pro rata.

In addition, the transaction has a subordination floor of 0.40% of
the original pool balance to protect the subordinate notes against
losses that occur late in the life of the pool. The floor is
consistent with the credit neutral floor for the assigned ratings
according to Moody's methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
April 2020.


KKR CLO 29: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on $4MM Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to KKR CLO 29 Ltd./KKR CLO
29 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  KKR CLO 29 Ltd./KKR CLO 29 LLC

  Class A, $248.0 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $56.0 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.0 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $22.0 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $15.0 million: BB- (sf)
  Class F (deferrable)(i), $4.0 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $37.3 million: Not rated.


MADISON PARK XLVIII: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Madison Park Funding
XLVIII Ltd./Madison Park Funding XLVIII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Madison Park Funding XLVIII Ltd./Madison Park Funding XLVIII LLC

  Class A, $544.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $102.00 million: AA (sf)  
  Class C (deferrable), $51.00 million: A(sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $51.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $29.75 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $72.00 million: Not rated



MARINER FINANCE 2021-A: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Mariner
Finance Issuance Trust 2021-A's asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an ABS securitization backed by personal
consumer loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 2,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The availability of approximately 60.58%, 50.19%, 45.27%,
39.60%, and 31.47% credit support to the class A, B, C, D, and E
notes, respectively, in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread. These
credit support levels are sufficient to withstand stresses
commensurate with the preliminary ratings on the notes based on
S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

-- S&P said, "Our worst-case weighted average base-case loss
assumption for this transaction of 20.66%. This base-case is a
function of the transaction-specific reinvestment criteria, actual
Mariner Finance LLC (Mariner) loan performance to date, and a
moderate adjustment in response to the COVID-19 pandemic-related
macroeconomic environment. Our base-case further reflects
year-over-year performance volatility observed in annual loan
vintages across time."

-- S&P said, "Liquidity analyses that we conducted to assess the
impact of a temporary disruption in loan principal and interest
payments over the next 12 months as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic. The disruptions included elevated deferment levels and a
reduction of voluntary prepayments to 0%. Based on our analyses,
the note interest payments and transaction expenses are a small
component of the total collections from the pool of receivables,
and, accordingly, we believe the transaction could withstand
temporary, material declines in collections and still make full
interest payments on every payment date and principal payments by
the note final maturity dates."

-- That, to date, Mariner's Baltimore headquarters and branch
network remain open and operational. The company's technology
infrastructure allows employees to work remotely and service loans
across the entire branch network. Since March 11, 2020, Mariner has
had the capacity to close and fund loans remotely using digital and
phone technologies.

Mariner's tightening of its underwriting and enhanced servicing
procedures for its portfolio in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Mariner selectively eliminated loans to lower-credit grade new
borrowers, and reduced advances to lower-credit grade existing
borrowers. Employment, income, and fraud verification procedures
have been enhanced, and requests to approve exceptions must pass
through higher credit authorities. Since the third quarter of 2020,
Mariner has gradually begun to reverse these policies.

Mariner's introduction of new reduced-payment deferral options to
borrowers negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. While
deferment levels rose through March and peaked in April 2020, they
decreased through the summer to historic trend levels. Transaction
documents dictate that a reinvestment criteria event will occur if
loans subject to deferment during the previous collection period
exceed 4.0% of the aggregate principal balance.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, the assigned preliminary ratings
will be within the limits specified in the credit stability section
of "S&P Global Ratings Definitions," published Aug. 7, 2020.

-- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to be
made by the final maturity date under stressed cash flow modeling
scenarios appropriate to the assigned ratings.

-- The securitized pool characteristics, which include loans with
smaller balances and shorter original terms relative to other
lenders in the industry. The transaction has a five-year revolving
period in which the loan composition can change. As such, S&P
considered the worst-case conceivable pool according to the
transaction's concentration limits.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Mariner Finance Issuance Trust 2021-A(i)

  Class A, $157.200 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $34.12 million: AA- (sf)
  Class C, $15.96 million: A- (sf)
  Class D, $17.34 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E, $25.38 million: BB- (sf)

(i)The actual size of the tranches and the respective interest
rates will be determined on the pricing date.



MORGAN STANLEY 2015-UBS8: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 and affirmed four classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust (MSCI) Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2015-UBS8. Fitch has also revised the Rating
Outlooks for four classes to Negative from Stable.

    DEBT                 RATING           PRIOR
    ----                 ------           -----
MSCI 2015-UBS8

A-3 61691ABK8     LT  AAAsf  Affirmed     AAAsf
A-4 61691ABL6     LT  AAAsf  Affirmed     AAAsf
A-S 61691ABN2     LT  AA-sf  Downgrade    AAAsf
A-SB 61691ABJ1    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed     AAAsf
B 61691ABP7       LT  A-sf   Downgrade    AA-sf
C 61691ABQ5       LT  BBBsf  Downgrade    A-sf
D 61691AAQ6       LT  B-sf   Downgrade    BBBsf
E 61691AAS2       LT  CCCsf  Downgrade    B-sf
F 61691AAU7       LT  CCsf   Downgrade    CCCsf
G 61691AAW3       LT  Csf    Downgrade    CCsf
X-A 61691ABM4     LT  AAAsf  Affirmed     AAAsf
X-B 61691AAA1     LT  A-sf   Downgrade    AA-sf
X-D 61691AAC7     LT  CCCsf  Downgrade    B-sf
X-F 61691AAG8     LT  CCsf   Downgrade    CCCsf
X-G 61691AAJ2     LT  Csf    Downgrade    CCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades reflect increased loss
expectations for the pool since Fitch's last rating action,
primarily due to the continued underperformance of the two largest
specially serviced loans, Mall de las Aguilas (3.1% of pool) and
the REO WPC Department Store Portfolio (2.6%). Twenty-one
loans/assets (51.4%) were designated Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs), including 11 (17.0%) in special servicing.

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 11.3%. The
Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB, A-3, A-4, A-S, B, C, D,
X-A and X-B reflect losses that could reach 14.9% when factoring
additional pandemic-related stresses, as well as potential outsized
losses on the Mall de las Aguilas, Grove City Premium Outlets and
Gulfport Premium Outlets loans.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest change in loss since the last
rating action is the specially serviced Mall de las Aguilas loan
(3.1%), which is secured by a 356,877-sf enclosed regional mall
located in Eagle Pass, TX. The loan transferred to special
servicing in October 2020 due to imminent monetary default caused
by the pandemic and has been delinquent since September 2020.

Fitch's base loss expectation on this loan has increased to 65%
from 16% at the last rating action. Fitch's loss is based on a 25%
cap rate and 20% haircut to the YE 2019 NOI and considers the
sponsor, MSGT, LLC, which is managed by Enterprise Asset
Management, wishing to proceed with a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure
per the servicer. Fitch noted at issuance that 60% of the demand at
the subject comes from Mexican nationals from Piedras Negras, a
Mexican city just across the Rio Grande to the west.

Collateral occupancy fell to 87.4% as of the May 2020 rent roll
from 95.5% at YE 2019 after Forever 21 RED (6.2% of NRA) closed in
4Q19. Total mall occupancy was 90% as of May 2020. Near-term lease
rollover includes 14.1% of the collateral NRA in 2021, 28.2% in
2022, 17.7% in 2023 and 7.1% in 2024. The largest collateral
tenants are JCPenney (22.5% of NRA; through November 2022), Bealls
(17.5%; November 2023), Ross Dress for Less (8.5%; January 2026)
and a seven-screen Cinemark Theatre (6.5%, September 2025). The
servicer-provided NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) fell to
1.82x as of YE 2019 from 1.97x at YE 2018.

The largest overall contributor to loss is the REO WPC Department
Store Portfolio (2.6%), which is secured by a portfolio of five
(originally six) single-tenant retail properties that were 100%
leased by Bon-Ton stores at issuance. The properties are within
regional malls located in the Milwaukee MSA (3), Joliet, IL and
Fargo, ND.

The loan transferred to the special servicer when Bon-Ton filed for
bankruptcy in February 2018 and the portfolio subsequently became
REO in October 2019. As part of the bankruptcy, Bon-Ton surrendered
its leases and vacated the properties. Fitch modeled a 100% loss,
up from 78% at the last rating action, due to the fully vacant
nature of the remaining five properties in the portfolio, negative
retail outlook and increasing loan exposure.

Per the servicer, an auction was held in October 2020 where the
former Younkers box at Bay Park Square in Ashwaubenon, WI sold for
$3 million. The remaining five properties did not sell and remain
fully vacant with no leasing prospects. The servicer previously
noted that the six properties had high carrying costs and debt
service totaling approximately $4.5 million annually.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2021
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 5.2% to $763.4 million from $805.0 million at issuance
and by 1.0% since Fitch's last rating action. Only one loan (0.8%
of the original pool balance) has paid off since issuance. There
have been no realized losses to date; however, the non-rated
classes F, G, H and J have accumulated $1.7 million in interest
shortfalls to date. One loan (0.9% of the current pool balance) is
fully defeased.

Eight loans (30.8%) are full-term interest-only, including three of
the top five loans, and the remainder of the pool is currently
amortizing. All of the remaining loans in the pool mature in 2025.

Coronavirus Exposure: Eleven loans (15.9%) are secured by hotel
properties. The weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR for the hotel loans
is 1.60x; these hotel loans could sustain a decline in NOI of 4.9%
before NOI DSCR falls below 1.0x.

Nineteen loans/assets (44.5%) are secured by retail properties,
including one regional mall (Mall de las Aguilas, 3.1%; Eagle Pass,
TX), one REO asset (WPC Department Store Portfolio; 2.6%) and four
Simon-owned retail outlet centers (19.5%) in the top 15. As of YTD
June and September 2020, the four retail outlet centers reported
occupancies between 73.9% and 85.5% and NOI DSCRs between 2.26x and
5.36x.

Two of the retail outlet loans, Grove City Premium Outlets and
Gulfport Premium Outlets, have been designated FLOCs due to
occupancy and cash flow decline; as of YTD September 2020, Grove
City Premium Outlets reported declining occupancy and NOI DSCR of
77.5% and 2.26x, respectively, from 87.3% and 2.86x at YE 2017, and
Gulfport Premium Outlets reported similar declines to 80.5% and
2.76x, respectively, from 89.5% and 3.11x at YE 2017. Excluding the
REO asset, the WA NOI DSCR for the 18 retail loans is 2.35x; these
retail loans could sustain a decline in NOI of 52.9% before DSCR
falls below 1.0x.

Ten loans (12.5%) are secured by multifamily properties. The WA NOI
DSCR for the multifamily loans is 1.76x; these multifamily loans
could sustain a decline in NOI of 39.8% before DSCR falls below
1.0x.

Fitch applied additional stresses to eight hotel loans and five
retail loans to account for potential cash flow disruptions due to
the coronavirus pandemic; this analysis contributed to the Negative
Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB, A-3, A-4, A-S, B, C, D, X-A and
X-B.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario that assumed a potential outsized loss of 100%
on the Mall de las Aguilas loan given the declining occupancy and
cash flow, lack of recent sales data, heavy reliance on
international customers and upcoming deed in lieu of foreclosure
and 25% on the current balances of the Grove City Premium Outlets
(5.2%) and Gulfport Premium Outlets (3.1%) loans to reflect
maturity concerns given their declining occupancy, sales and cash
flow, while also factoring in the expected paydown of the
transaction from the defeased loan. This scenario contributed to
the Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB, A-3, A-4, A-S, B, C,
D, X-A and X-B.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB, A-3, A-4, A-S, B, C,
D, X-A and X-B reflect the potential for downgrade due to concerns
surrounding the ultimate impact of the coronavirus pandemic and
performance concerns associated with the FLOCs, primarily the
specially serviced Mall de las Aguilas and REO WPC Department Store
Portfolio, and maturity concerns associated with the Grove City
Premium Outlets and Gulfport Premium Outlets loans.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable
    to improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or
    defeasance. Upgrades of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would
    only occur with significant improvement in credit enhancement
    (CE) and/or defeasance and with the stabilization of
    performance on the FLOCs, particularly Mall de las Aguilas and
    WPC Department Store Portfolio.

-- An upgrade to the 'BBBsf' category also would consider these
    factors, but would be limited based on sensitivity to
    concentrations or the potential for future concentration.
    Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is
    likelihood for interest shortfalls.

-- An upgrade to the 'Bsf' category is not likely until the later
    years in a transaction and only if the performance of the
    remaining pool is stable and/or properties vulnerable to the
    coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and there is
    sufficient CE to the classes.

-- Upgrades to the 'Csf', 'CCsf' and 'CCCsf' categories are
    unlikely absent significant performance improvement on the
    FLOCs and substantially higher recoveries than expected on the
    specially serviced loans.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an
    increase in pool level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans. Downgrades of classes A-SB, A-3, A
    4, A-S, B, X-A and X-B would occur should expected losses for
    the pool increase substantially, all of the loans susceptible
    to the coronavirus pandemic suffer losses, all of the retail
    mall/outlet loans incur outsized losses and/or if interest
    shortfalls occur.

-- A downgrade of the 'BBBsf' category would occur if overall
    pool losses increase substantially, performance of the FLOCs
    further deteriorates, properties vulnerable to the coronavirus
    fail to stabilize to pre-pandemic levels and/or losses on the
    specially serviced loans are higher than expected.

-- A downgrade of the 'B-sf' rated class would occur should loss
    expectations increase and if performance of the FLOCs or loans
    vulnerable to the coronavirus pandemic fail to stabilize or
    additional loans default and/or transfer to the special
    servicer.

-- Further downgrades of the 'Csf', 'CCsf' and 'CCCsf' rated
    classes would occur with increased certainty of losses or as
    losses are realized.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
negative rating actions, including further downgrades and/or
Negative Rating Outlook revisions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MORGAN STANLEY 2019-L2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2019-L2 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2019-L2 and maintains Negative Rating Outlooks on classes F-RR and
G-RR.

     DEBT               RATING            PRIOR
     ----               ------            -----
MSC 2019-L2

A-1 61768HAS5     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-2 61768HAT3     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-3 61768HAV8     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-4 61768HAW6     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-S 61768HAZ9     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-SB 61768HAU0    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
B 61768HBA3       LT  AA-sf   Affirmed    AA-sf
C 61768HBB1       LT  A-sf    Affirmed    A-sf
D 61768HAC0       LT  BBBsf   Affirmed    BBBsf
E 61768HAE6       LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed    BBB-sf
F-RR 61768HAG1    LT  BB-sf   Affirmed    BB-sf
G-RR 61768HAJ5    LT  B-sf    Affirmed    B-sf
X-A 61768HAX4     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
X-B 61768HAY2     LT  AA-sf   Affirmed    AA-sf
X-D 61768HAA4     LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed    BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Loss expectations have increased since
issuance due to fourteen Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) (28.3%)
including five specially serviced loans (12.3%). Fitch's current
ratings incorporate a base case loss of 4.30%. The Negative
Outlooks on classes F-RR and G-RR reflect losses that could reach
5.10% when factoring in additional stresses related to the
coronavirus pandemic.

FLOCs: The largest contributor to loss expectations is Lincoln
Commons (3.2%), which is secured by a 105,527 square foot (sf)
grocery anchored retail center located in Lone Tree, CO. The
property is anchored by Sprouts (23%, exp. September 2025) and the
largest tenants include Indie Salons (6.5%, exp. July 2030); Newk's
Eatery (5%, exp. August 2027) and Wellhaven Pethealth (4.7%, exp.
August 2028). The property was 86% occupied as of September 2020.
There is approximately 4% lease rollover in 2021 with significant
rollover in 2025 and 2023 of 29% and 15%; respectively. Per the
master servicer, the borrower has not requested coronavirus relief
at this time. The property's year-end (YE) 2019 NOI is 14% below
Fitch issuance. Per the YE 2019 OSAR, expenses have increased 20%
largely due to higher real estate taxes. As of the 4th quarter (4Q)
2020, asking rents in the South retail submarket of Denver were
$13.59 per square foot (sf), according to REIS compared with $27
psf at the property as the September 2020 rent roll. The property's
rents are approximately 52% higher than the market rate. Fitch's
modeled loss of 20% reflects the year-end 2019 NOI with no
additional stresses given the anchor tenant is an essential
business.

The second largest contributor to loss expectations is Ohana
Waikiki Malia Hotel & Shops (6.8%), which is secured by a limited
service 327 key hotel located in Honolulu, HI. The loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist for low debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR) due to a 74% decrease in annualized 2020
effective gross income (EGI) when compared with 2019. The decrease
in revenue can be attributed to the impact the coronavirus pandemic
is having on the hotel industry. Per the master servicer, the
borrower requested relief in June 2020, but then subsequently
withdrew the request. No additional requests have been received to
date. Per the Sept. 30, 2020 Smith Travel Research report (STR),
the trailing twelve month (TTM) occupancy, average daily rate (ADR)
and revenue per available room (RevPAR) were 43.5%, $142.82 and
$62.19, respectively, compared with 52.4%, $160.84 and $84.23 for
its competitive set. The property's performance for the same period
in 2019 was 85%, $142.02 and $120.75, respectively. The property is
significantly underperforming when compared to the prior year's
performance. Fitch's modeled loss of 9% reflects a 26% stress to
year-end 2019 NOI given performance concerns due to the pandemic.

The third largest contributor to loss expectations is the specially
serviced loan, 199 Lafayette St (2.3%), which is secured by a
20,000 net rentable sf ground floor and basement retail condominium
component within a commercial condominium building located in the
Soho neighborhood of Manhattan. The building was constructed in
1900, converted to condominium ownership 1987 and totals
approximately 74,539 sf. Major tenants at the Property include Gran
Tivoli Restaurant (7,500 sf; 37.5% of NRA; exp. March 2033), Koio
(2,900 sf; 14.5% NRA, exp. January 2023) and Despana (2,700 sf;
16.6% NRA; exp. September 2028). The property was 85.7% occupied as
of June 2020 with upcoming rollover of 18% in 2023. The property
experienced a decline in occupancy in 2019 due to tenants vacating.
The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020 for imminent
monetary default at the borrowers request as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic. The special Servicer is in receipt of
borrowers updated proposal for relief and discussions with the
borrower are ongoing.

The fourth largest contributor to loss expectations is the
specially serviced loan, Shingle Creek Crossing (2.5%), which is
secured by an 173,107-sf anchored retail center located in Brooklyn
Center, MN. The property is shadow-anchored by Super-Walmart and
anchored by LA Fitness, TJ Maxx and Michael's. Largest tenants
include Five Below and Rainbow. The property was 92.4% occupied as
of March 2020. There is upcoming rollover of 2.3% in 2021; 6.5% in
2022; and 11.5% in 2023. The loan transferred to special servicing
due to a borrower declared imminent monetary default on May 18,
2020 as a result of the impact from the coronavirus pandemic. Per
the special servicer, they are currently in discussions with the
borrower regarding potential reinstatement terms and returning the
loan to the master servicer absent any further coronavirus issues.
Fitch's modeled loss of 13% reflects a 15% haircut to the YE 2019
NOI for rollover and LA Fitness exposure.

The fifth largest contributor to loss expectations is 92nd Second
Avenue (1%), which is secured by a 10-unit apartment building with
one retail tenant located in New York, NY. The decrease in DSCR is
due to drop in occupancy of the apartment building per the Sept.
30, 2020 rent roll to 60%; retail tenant is still occupying its
space. Cash flows from retail tenant represent 37% of the
underwritten net cash flow. The economic occupancy of multifamily
units and retail space is 73.6%. Per the master servicer, the
borrower recently started marketing the vacancies and has had many
inquiries. Fitch's modeled loss of 32% reflects a 15% NOI haircut
to YE 2019 NOI for decline in occupancy.

The sixth largest contributor to loss expectations is the specially
serviced, Sheraton Grand Nashville (2.1%), which is secured by a
482-room hotel located in Downtown Nashville. The hotel operates
under a franchise agreement with Starwood Hotels and Resorts, now
Marriott International, as a Sheraton Grand. The asset underwent a
$30 million renovation that was completed from 2016 to 2019. The
hotel offers two restaurants, a rooftop lounge, a coffee shop, an
indoor swimming pool, an enclosed parking garage, and approximately
23,000 square feet of meeting space. The loan transferred to
special servicing on June 12, 2020 due to payment default and is
due for the April 6, 2020 payment. The TTM Nov. 30, 2020 loan
reflects 24.6% occupancy, $188.6 ADR and $46.3 RevPAR, and an NOI
DSCR of .08. The hotel remains open for business. The property
significantly underperforms its competitive set, which includes the
341-key DoubleTree by Hilton Hotel Nashville, the 673-key
Renaissance Nashville Hotel and the 339-key Loews Vanderbilt Plaza
Hotel. Per the special servicer, the borrower is marketing the
property for sale via loan assumption and is preparing to present a
proposal for lender approval. Fitch's modeled loss of 13% reflects
a haircut to the most recent appraisal provided by the special
servicer.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable
    to improved asset performance, particularly on the FLOCs,
    coupled with additional paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to
    classes B, C and X-B would occur with significant improvement
    in CE and/or defeasance and with the stabilization of
    performance on the FLOCs and/or the properties affected by the
    coronavirus pandemic; however, adverse selection and increased
    concentrations could cause this trend to reverse.

-- Upgrades to classes D, E and X-D would also take into account
    these factors, but would be limited based on sensitivity to
    concentrations or the potential for future concentration.
    Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if interest
    shortfalls are likely. Upgrades to classes F-RR and G-RR are
    not likely until the later years in the transaction and only
    if the performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or
    properties vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre
    pandemic levels, and there is sufficient CE.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an
    increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to classes A-1, A
    2, A-3, A-4, A-SB, A-S, B, X-A and X-B are not likely due to
    the position in the capital structure and expected increases
    in credit enhancement, but may occur should interest
    shortfalls affect these classes.

-- Downgrades to classes C, D, E and X-D are possible should
    expected losses for the pool increase significantly.
    Downgrades to classes F-RR and G-RR are possible if
    performance of the FLOCs or loans susceptible to the
    coronavirus pandemic do not stabilize and/or additional loans
    default or transfer to special servicing.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
additional negative rating actions, including downgrades and/or
additional Negative Outlook revisions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


N-STAR REAL IX: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 3 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 25 classes from four
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligations (CRE CDOs).
Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on six classes from one CRE
CDO.

                 DEBT                       RATING          PRIOR
                 ----                       ------          -----
Sorin Real Estate CDO I, Ltd./Corp.

C Floating Rate Subordinate 83586TAG9   LT  AAsf  Upgrade    CCCsf

D Floating Rate Subordinate 83586TAJ3   LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
E Floating Rate Subordinate 83586TAL8   LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
F Fixed Rate Subordinate 83586TAN4      LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf

N-Star Real Estate CDO IX, Ltd.

A-2 Floating Rate Notes 628983AB4       LT  Dsf   Affirmed   Dsf
A-3 Floating Rate Notes 628983AC2       LT  Dsf   Affirmed   Dsf
B Floating Rate Notes 628983AD0         LT  Dsf   Affirmed   Dsf
C Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes 628983AE8 LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
D Deferrable Fltg Rate Notes 628983AF5  LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
E Deferrable Fltg Rate Notes 628983AG3  LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
F Deferrable Fltg Rate Notes 628983AH1  LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
G Deferrable Fltg Rate Notes 628983AJ7  LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
H Deferrable Fltg Rate Notes 628983AK4  LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
J Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes 628983AL2 LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
K Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes 628983AM0 LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization, Inc.

E 039280AE2                             LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
E 039280AE2                             LT  WDsf  Withdrawn  Csf
F 039280AF9                             LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
F 039280AF9                             LT  WDsf  Withdrawn  Csf
G 039280AG7                             LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
G 039280AG7                             LT  WDsf  Withdrawn  Csf
H 039280AH5                             LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
H 039280AH5                             LT  WDsf  Withdrawn  Csf
J 039280AJ1                             LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
J 039280AJ1                             LT  WDsf  Withdrawn  Csf
K 039280AK8                             LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
K 039280AK8                             LT  WDsf  Withdrawn  Csf

G-Star 2003-3 Ltd./Corp.

A-2 36241WAC6                           LT  BBBsf Affirmed   BBBsf

A-3 36241WAE2                           LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
B-1 36241WAG7                           LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
B-2 36241WAJ1                           LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf
Preferred Shares 36241T208              LT  Csf   Affirmed   Csf

Fitch has affirmed all six remaining classes of ARCap 2003-1
Resecuritization, Inc. at 'Csf'; default is considered inevitable
at or prior to legal final maturity as these classes are
undercollateralized. Fitch has subsequently withdrawn the ratings
on these six classes as they are no longer considered relevant to
the agency's coverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has upgraded class C of Sorin Real Estate CDO I, Ltd./Corp to
'AAsf' from 'CCCsf' and revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from
Stable. The upgrade is due to increased credit enhancement from
additional principal paydowns and positive ratings migration of the
underlying pool since the last rating action. Given the significant
and increasing pool concentration, whereby 95% of the remaining
assets are RMBS bonds, a look-through analysis of the collateral
was performed.

This class is reliant on collateral rated 'AAsf'/Outlook Positive
by Fitch to repay. In addition, Fitch expects the class will pay
off by the June 2021 payment date based on expected continued
amortization of the collateral. At the last rating action, the
rating had been capped at 'CCCsf due to increasing concentration
and adverse selection concerns on the underlying collateral, as
well as the class becoming the senior most class of outstanding
notes, which required timely payment of interest per the
transaction documents.

Fitch has affirmed classes A-2, A-3 and B of N-Star Real Estate CDO
IX at 'Dsf' as a result of the transaction entering an Event of
Default in April 2018 due to the class A/B Principal Coverage Ratio
being less than 100%.

Fitch has affirmed class A-2 of G-Star 2003-3 Ltd./Corp. at
'BBBsf'/Outlook Stable. Given the pool concentration, whereby over
90% of the remaining assets are RMBS bonds, a look-through analysis
of the collateral was performed; this class is reliant on
collateral with credit characteristics consistent with a 'BBBsf'
rating to repay.

The classes affirmed at 'Csf' in these transactions indicate
default is considered inevitable at or prior to legal final
maturity due to their undercollateralization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of class C in Sorin Real Estate CDO I is not
    considered likely due to the high credit enhancement, strong
    collateral quality coverage and expectation of near-term
    repayment, but may occur with significant negative ratings
    migration of the underlying pool.

-- A downgrade of class A-2 in G-Star 2003-3 Ltd./Corp. would
    occur with negative ratings migration of the underlying
    collateral pool.

-- A downgrade of the classes rated 'Csf' would occur at or prior
    to legal final maturity as default is inevitable due to their
    undercollateralization. Classes rated 'Dsf' cannot be
    downgraded further.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of class C in Sorin Real Estate CDO I and class A-2
    in G-Star 2003-3 Ltd./Corp. are possible with positive ratings
    migration of the underlying pool and/or improved credit
    enhancement with additional paydowns.

-- Upgrades to classes rated 'Csf' are not possible due to their
    undercollateralization.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.


NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-FL1: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on ORP1 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on eight classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Natixis
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-FL1, a U.S. CMBS
transaction. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 18 other
classes from the same transaction.

This is a U.S. large loan CMBS transaction backed by five uncrossed
floating-rate, interest-only (IO) mortgage loans. These loans are
secured by retail, lodging, office, and/or industrial properties in
various U.S. states.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by year
end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about vaccine
timing in assessing the economic and credit implications associated
with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will update our
assumptions and estimates accordingly."

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The downgrades on the class B, C, and D pooled
certificates reflect primarily our reevaluation of the open-air
lifestyle retail center securing the Promenade Shops at Centerra
loan ($83.7 million; 29.8% of the pooled trust balance), based on
our review of the updated lower-than-expected Oct. 25, 2020,
appraisal value and the performance data for the trailing 12-months
(TTM) ended Sept. 30, 2020, that were provided by the special
servicer after our November 2020 review. Furthermore, we considered
that, according to the February 2021 trustee remittance report,
class D had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding totaling
$78,903 due primarily to appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction amounts totaling $78,160 on the Promenade Shops at
Centerra loan.

"We lowered our expected-case valuation on the retail property
securing the Promenade Shops at Centerra loan by 26.5% to $76.7
million based on the updated October 2020 appraisal value totaling
$77.5 million (which was 52.6% lower than the $163.5 million
appraisal value at origination) and performance information.
Specifically, the lower S&P Global Ratings' expected-case value on
the Promenade Shops at Centerra loan reflects a lower S&P Global
Ratings' net cash flow (NCF) and our application of a higher S&P
Global Ratings' capitalization rate."

The downgrades on the class B, C, and D pooled certificates are
generally in line with the model-indicated ratings and reflect the
increased susceptibility to liquidity interruption and losses due
to our revised lower expected-case value and the lower appraisal
value for the Promenade Shops at Centerra loan. Specifically, the
class D downgrade reflects our view that, based on the
significantly reduced appraisal value and an S&P Global Ratings'
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio higher than 100%, the risk of default and
loss on the class has increased due to uncertain market conditions.
In addition, S&P considered the outstanding interest shortfalls
affecting class D, as noted above.

S&P said, "While the model-indicated rating on class A was lower
than the class' current rating level, we affirmed our rating on
class A. In addition, we tempered our downgrade on class B even
though the model-indicated rating was lower than the class' revised
rating level. We considered qualitatively the classes' relative
positions in the waterfall as well as the fact that these classes
do not rely solely on the Promenade Shops at Centerra loan to pay
off. However, if there are any reported negative changes to the
remaining loans in the pool beyond what we have already considered,
we may revisit our analysis and adjust our ratings as necessary.

"We lowered our ratings on the class X-CP, X-EXT, and X-F IO
certificates and affirmed our ratings on the class X-FMC, X-FNH,
and X-FWB IO certificates based on our criteria for rating IO
securities, which states that the ratings on the IO securities
would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated reference class."
The notional amounts of classes X-CP, X-EXT, and X-F reference
classes A, B, C, and D. The notional amount of class X-FMC
references classes MCR1 and MCR2. The notional amount of class
X-FNH references classes NHP1 and NHP2. The notional amount of
class X-FWB references classes WAN1 and WAN2.

The downgrades on the class V-P and V-XF certificates reflect the
ratings of the certificates for which they can be exchanged. Class
V-P can be exchanged for classes A, X-CP, X-EXT, B, C, and D. Class
V-XF can be exchanged for class X-F.

S&P said, "We affirmed our ratings on the class MCR1, MCR2, NHP1,
NHP2, ORP1, ORP2, WAN1, and WAN2 non-pooled certificates because
the current rating levels are generally in line with the model
indicated ratings. The class MCR non-pooled certificates' payments
are derived solely from the subordinate component of the Mission
Critical Portfolio loan, while the subordinate component of The
National Select Service Hotel Portfolio loan supports the class NHP
certificates. The subordinate component of The Olathe Retail
Portfolio loan supports the class ORP certificates, while the
subordinate component of The Wanamaker Building loan supports the
class WAN certificates. Specifically, our 'CCC (sf)' ratings on
classes NHP2 and ORP2 reflect our view that, based on S&P Global
Ratings' LTV ratios higher than 100% for the National Select
Service Hotel Portfolio and Olathe Retail Portfolio loans,
respectively, the risk of default and losses on these classes have
increased due to uncertain market conditions."

The affirmations on the class V-MCR, V-WAN, V-FMC, V-FWB, V-FNH,
and V-NHP certificates reflect the ratings of the certificates for
which they can be exchanged. Class V-MCR can be exchanged for
classes MCR1 and MCR2. Class V-WAN can be exchanged for classes
WAN1 and WAN2. Classes V-FMC, V-FWB, and V-FNH can be exchanged for
classes X-FMC, X-FWB, and X-FNH, respectively. Class V-NHP can be
exchanged for classes NHP1 and NHP2.

Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 16, 2021, trustee remittance report, the transaction
had a pooled trust balance of $280.7 million and an aggregate trust
balance of $354.0 million (including the non-pooled loan
components), down from $292.9 million and $370.2 million,
respectively, at issuance. The trust has not incurred any principal
losses to date.

As noted above, S&P's property-level analysis included a
reevaluation of the Promenade Shops at Centerra loan. Our analysis
remains the same as our November 2020 review for the remaining four
loans in the pool. Details of the five loans follow.

Promenade Shops at Centerra loan

The Promenade Shops at Centerra loan has an $83.7 million pooled
trust balance (unchanged from issuance and last review). The IO
loan pays interest at an annual floating rate of LIBOR plus a 2.45%
gross margin. The loan initially matures on March 9, 2021, and has
two one-year extension options. In addition, there is a $31.3
million mezzanine loan. The loan transferred to special servicing
on June 5, 2020, due to monetary default because the borrower was
unwilling to inject additional capital to support the loan. The
loan has a reported 30-days delinquent payment status. According to
the special servicer, a receiver has been appointed at the property
and resolution strategy discussion is ongoing. The special servicer
stated that the rental collection rate was approximately 29% in May
2020 before increasing to about 78% in June, 111% in July
(reflecting some tenants paying their August 2020 rent in advance),
53% in August, and 71% in September 2020.

The loan is secured by the borrower's fee simple interests in a
493,160-sq.-ft. open-air lifestyle retail center in Loveland, Colo.
that includes 3,063 parking spaces. Anchors at the property
includes Macy's (non-collateral) and Dick's Sporting Goods
(collateral). The property is located off I-25, approximately 46
miles north of the Denver central business district (CBD) and 12
miles southeast of Fort Collins.

S&P's property-level analysis considered the decline in
servicer-reported occupancy to 89.0% and NCF of $5.3 million as of
the TTM ended Sept. 30, 2020, down from 90.8% and $9.7 million,
respectively, in 2019 and 91.2% and $10.2 million in 2018.
According to the May 2020 rent roll, the property was 86.9%
occupied. However, the property faces significant rollover risk
between 2020 and 2022, with about 49.7% of the net rentable area
(NRA) rolling, including three of the top five tenants. The five
largest tenants comprised 37.2% of the NRA: Dick's Sporting Good
(13.4% of NRA; January 2021 expiration; confirmed open during our
visit to the property); MetroLux Theaters (10.1%; January 2026);
Best Buy (6.1%; March 2021); Barnes & Noble (5.3%; February 2021);
and Glow Golf (2.3%; August 2021 expiration after renewing its
lease for one year from August 2020).

S&P said, "We briefly toured the property on Feb. 17, 2021; we
noted that it was well maintained and that the parking lots
appeared relatively active. Based on our observations, the vacant
units were concentrated at one section of the property.

"In our current analysis, in addition to the upcoming rollover
risk, we considered the increased retailer bankruptcies and store
closures, as well as the lower billed rent collection rates, due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. To account for these risks, we excluded
income from tenants that are no longer listed on the mall directory
website or those that have announced store closures. We also
increased our capitalization rate by 150 basis points (bps) from
last review in November 2020 to account for ongoing cash flow
volatility due to declining and weakening trends within the retail
mall sector, the overall perceived increase in market risk premium
for this property type, and competition in the mall's trade area.

"We derived an S&P Global Ratings' NCF of $7.5 million, down 13.2%
from the last review (at $8.6 million). We then divided our NCF by
a 9.75% S&P Global Ratings' capitalization rate (up from 8.25% in
the last review) to determine our expected-case value, which was
$76.7 million, down from $104.4 million in the last review. This
yielded an S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio of 109.1% on the trust
balance. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a
1.44x debt service coverage (DSC) for the TTM ended September
2020."

Mission Critical Portfolio loan

The Mission Critical Portfolio loan had a $101.5 million original
whole loan balance that was split into a $77.2 million senior
pooled component and a $24.3 million subordinate non-pooled
component that supports the class MCR1 and MCR2 certificates.
Following the release of two properties (the 139,796-sq.-ft.
warehouse/distribution Burner Systems property in Chattanooga,
Tenn. in August 2019 for a $5.8 million release amount and the
183,440-sq.-ft. warehouse/distribution Lynch Exhibits property in
Burlington, N.J. in March 2019 for a $9.2 million release amount),
the whole loan balance declined to $86.5 million, of which $65.8
million is pooled and $20.7 million is non-pooled. The IO whole
loan pays interest at an annual floating rate of LIBOR plus a 2.65%
gross margin. The loan initially matures on Jan. 9, 2022, and has
two one-year extension options. The whole loan is currently secured
by the borrower's fee simple interests in a portfolio of four
single-tenanted medical/suburban office and 20 single-tenanted
industrial (flex, warehouse/distribution, or manufacturing)
properties totaling 2.0 million sq. ft. in 14 U.S. states.

S&P's property-level analysis considered the relatively stable
servicer-reported occupancy and NCF, which was 92.1% and $9.2
million, respectively, in 2018; 100.0% and $9.2 million in 2019;
and 100.0% and $6.8 million for the nine months ended Sept. 30,
2020. According to the Aug. 31, 2020, rent rolls, the portfolio was
100.0% occupied with an average in-place rent of $5.66 per sq. ft.
as calculated by S&P Global Ratings. The five largest tenants
comprised 37.5% of the NRA: The Spencer Turbine Company (9.3% of
the NRA; November 2034 expiration); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. (7.4%;
June 2029); Foldcraft Co. (7.1%; January 2028); Rich Products
(6.9%; March 2028); and AR Metallizing (6.8%; August 2032). The
tenant lease rollover schedule consists of 6.7% of the NRA in 2023,
0.0% in 2024, and 2.7% in 2025.

S&P said, "Using an 8.6% weighted average vacancy loss assumption,
the same as at issuance and our last review, and adjusting for the
two property releases, we derived an S&P Global Ratings'
sustainable NCF of $7.9 million for the remaining portfolio.
Applying an S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization
rate of 8.32% yielded an S&P Global Ratings' expected-case value of
$95.7 million, or $48 per sq.-ft., our LTV ratio was 90.7% on the
whole loan trust balance. Wells Fargo reported a 2.53x DSC for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2020, up from 1.95x as of year-end
2019."

Wanamaker Building loan

The Wanamaker Building loan has a $124.0 million whole loan balance
that is split into a $62.4 million senior pooled trust component, a
$15.3 million senior non-trust component, a $22.1 million
subordinate non-pooled trust component that supports the class WAN1
and WAN2 certificates, and a $24.2 million subordinate non-trust
component, unchanged from issuance and our last review. The $62.4
million senior pooled trust, the $22.1 million subordinate
non-pooled trust, and the $15.3 million senior non-trust components
are pari passu to each other and senior in right of payment to the
$24.2 million subordinate non-trust component. The IO whole loan
pays interest at an annual floating rate of LIBOR plus a 2.85%
gross margin. The loan initially matures on June 9, 2022, and has
three one-year extension options. The whole loan is secured by a
portion of the landmarked 1.4 million-sq.-ft. class A office
building located in the heart of Philadelphia's CBD, adjacent to
city hall. The collateral consists of 954,363 sq. ft. of office
space on floors 4-12 and a three-story subterranean parking garage
totaling 660 parking spaces. Floors 1-3 of the building are not
owned by the sponsor and are currently used as retail space by
Macy's department store (non-collateral). The building offers easy
access to public transportation and is designated a national
historic landmark.

S&P's property-level analysis considered the stable
servicer-reported occupancy and NCF, which was 95.9% and $12.0
million, respectively, in 2017; 94.5% and $10.0 million in 2018;
87.3% and $10.1 million in 2019; and 90.0% and $7.1 million for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2020. According to the June 1, 2020,
rent roll, the property was 91.4% occupied. The five largest
tenants comprised 81.2% of the collateral's NRA: Children's
Hospital of Philadelphia (32.1% of NRA; June 2027 expiration); GSA
(30.9%; 2021, 2022, and 2028 expiration); Digitas Inc. (11.0%;
November 2023); Finley Catering Company (4.6%; March 2024); and
Pennsylvania Bar Institute (2.6%; January 2025). The tenant lease
rollover schedule consists of 18.8% of the NRA in 2021, 15.5% in
2022, 12.5% in 2023, and 6.6% in 2024.

According to the June 2020 rent roll, the average office in-place
gross rent was $24.44 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings. This compares to the year-to-date 2020 CoStar's Market
Street East office submarket, where the property is located, and
market rent of $31.41 per sq. ft. The office submarket's vacancy
and availability rates were 5.7% and 9.4%, respectively. While
CoStar is currently projecting the market to remain stable at a
vacancy rate of about 6.2% in 2021 and 2022 (with modest annual
rent growth to $33.95 per sq. ft. in 2022), S&P considered that the
property underperformed the market recently and faces significant
near-term rollover risk and tenant concentration.

S&P said, "Using a 91.4% in place occupancy, we derived an S&P
Global Ratings' NCF of $8.1 million, which is the same as at
issuance and 19.0% lower than the 2019 servicer-reported NCF. We
divided it by a 7.62% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average
capitalization rate and added $3.6 million for the present value of
investment-grade rated tenants' rent steps to determine our
expected-case value, which was $110.5 million, or $116 per sq. ft.,
the same as at issuance and our last review." This yielded an S&P
Global Ratings' LTV ratio of 90.3% on the trust balance and 112.3%
on the whole loan balance. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 1.81x for
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2020, up from 1.56x for year-end
2019.

National Select Service Hotel Portfolio loan

The National Select Service Hotel Portfolio loan has an $83.5
million whole loan balance that is split into a $58.0 million
senior pooled component and a $25.5 million subordinate non-pooled
component that supports the class NHP1 and NHP2 certificates. The
IO whole loan pays interest at an annual floating rate of LIBOR
plus a 2.96% gross margin. The loan initially matures on April 9,
2021, and has two one-year extension options. In addition, there is
a $20.0 million mezzanine loan. The whole loan is secured by the
borrower's fee simple interests in a portfolio of 12
select-service, limited-service, and extended-stay lodging
properties totaling 1,461 rooms (ranging between 62 and 196 rooms).
The portfolio is managed by Hospitality Ventures Management Group.
The portfolio's property mix consists of eight Courtyard properties
(74.5% of the allocated loan amount [ALA]), two Fairfield Inn
properties (10.7%), one Residence Inn property (8.1%), and one
Hyatt House property (6.7%). The properties are majorly located in
or near major metropolitan statistical areas in five U.S. states:
Texas (33.4% of the ALA), Georgia (25.7%), Michigan (18.9%),
Indiana (15.1%), and Ohio (6.8%).

The loan, which has a reported current payment status, was
transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 16, 2020, because the
borrower requested for COVID-19-related relief. According to the
special servicer, Greystone Servicing Co. LLC, a loan modification
was closed on Dec. 18, 2020, and the terms, among others, included
the borrower providing $4.0 million in new working capital and the
final maturity date extended to Dec. 31, 2023. Greystone reported
that the portfolio's 2020 occupancy, average daily room rate, and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) were 34%, $96, and $33,
respectively, compared to 69%, $115, and $79, respectively, as of
2019.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the RevPAR and NCF were relatively
stable: $83.66 and $12.6 million, respectively, in 2017, $82.05 and
$11.9 million in 2018, and $80.13 and $12.8 million in 2019.
However, according to Greystone, the 2020 RevPAR dropped
significantly to about $33.00, and the portfolio was operating at a
reported net loss.

S&P said, "Since we considered the negative effect that COVID-19
has had on the portfolio's operating performance in our last review
in November 2020, as well as the time needed for demand to return
to normalized levels following the vaccine rollout, we used the S&P
Global Ratings' sustainable NCF of $9.6 million (the same as at
issuance and our last review) and an S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average capitalization rate of 11.36% (same as in the last review).
We arrived at an S&P Global Ratings' expected-case value of $84.9
million, or $58,092 per guestroom, the same as in our last review.
Our LTV ratio was 98.4% on the whole loan trust balance."

Olathe Retail Portfolio loan

The Olathe Retail Portfolio loan had a $40.3 million original whole
loan balance that consists of an $11.7 million senior pooled trust
component; a $5.3 million subordinate non-pooled trust component
that supports the class ORP1, ORP2, and ORP3 certificates; a $16.3
million senior non-trust component; and a $7.0 million subordinate
non-trust component. The $11.7 million senior pooled trust, the
$5.3 million subordinate non-pooled trust, and the $16.3 million
senior non-trust components are pari passu to each other and senior
in right of payment to the $7.0 million subordinate non-trust
component. Following a pre-contemplated principal paydown, the
pooled trust balance was reduced to $10.8 million and the
non-pooled trust balance to $4.7 million. The IO whole loan pays
interest at an annual floating rate of LIBOR plus a 4.25% gross
margin. The loan initially matured on Jan. 9, 2020. and has two
one-year extension options. The loan transferred to special
servicing on May 13, 2020, due to maturity default. The borrower
was unable to exercise its extension options because the loan
failed the 8.0% debt yield requirement. According to the special
servicer, the lender agreed to a forbearance through Aug. 9, 2020.
However, since the borrower has not been able to find lenders to
refinance the loan, the special servicer is currently pursing
foreclosure proceeding.

The whole loan is secured by two retail properties totaling 172,627
sq. ft. that are about a mile from each other in Olathe, Kan.:
Olathe Pointe, a 144,149-sq.-ft. retail center that is anchored by
Whole Foods (21.8% of NRA, April 2035 expiration) and
Marshall's/Homegoods (35.4%, April 2026); and Olathe Gateway, a
28,478-sq.-ft. retail property.

S&P's property-level analysis considered the stable
servicer-reported occupancy and NCF: 97.6% and $3.1 million,
respectively in 2018, 97.6% and $2.9 million in 2019, and 93.0% and
$2.9 million as of the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2020. According
to the June 2020 rent roll, the two properties were 97.6% occupied.
The properties face minimal rollover risk in the near term, with
8.0% of the NRA expiring in 2022. The tenants rolling in 2022
include Humana (5.0%) and Jason's Deli (3.0%). The significant
rollover occurs in 2026 when 52.7% of the NRA expires.

S&P said, "Excluding the performance of the recently vacant
outparcel formerly occupied by Houlihans, we derived an S&P Global
Ratings' NCF of $2.0 million, the same as in our last review. We
then divided our NCF by a 7.29% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average capitalization rate (the same as at issuance and our last
review) to determine our expected-case value, which was $31.8
million, the same as in our last review. Our expected-case value
includes $3.5 million of transportation development district
incentives." This incentive imposes an additional 1.00% sales tax
on taxable sales within the site of the subject, which the district
then reimburses the ownership entity. The incentive program started
in 2006 and runs through 2032. This yielded an S&P Global Ratings
LTV ratio of 103.9% on the trust balance and 125.9% on the whole
loan balance. Wells Fargo reported a 1.18x DSC for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2020.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

  -- Health and safety.

  Ratings Lowered

  Natixis Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-FL1

  Class B: to 'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'
  Class C: to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)'
  Class D: to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'
  Class X-CP: to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf) '
  Class X-EXT: to CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'
  Class X-F: to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'
  Class V-P: to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'
  Class V-XF: to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'

  Ratings Affirmed

  Natixis Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-FL1

  Class A: AAA (sf)
  Class MCR1: BB- (sf)
  Class MCR2: B- (sf)
  Class X-FMC: B- (sf)
  Class V-MCR: B- (sf)
  Class WAN1: BB- (sf)
  Class WAN2: B- (sf)
  Class X-FWB: B- (sf)
  Class V-WAN: B- (sf)
  Class V-FMC: B- (sf)
  Class V-FWB: B- (sf)
  Class NHP1: B (sf)
  Class NHP2: CCC (sf)
  Class X-FNH: CCC (sf)
  Class V-FNH: CCC (sf)
  Class V-NHP: CCC (sf)
  Class ORP1: B+ (sf)
  Class ORP2: CCC (sf)


OFSI BSL VIII: S&P Stays B+ (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from OFSI BSL VIII Ltd., a
CLO originally issued in 2017 that is managed by OFS CLO Management
LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture. The class E notes will not be refinanced.

The preliminary ratings reflect its opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 4, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement notes issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

  REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

  Replacement Notes
  Class        Amount (mil. $)    Interest rate (%)
  A-R                   252.00    Benchmark + 1.00  
  B-R                    56.00    Benchmark + 1.50  
  C-R                    20.00    Benchmark + 2.00  
  D-R                    20.00    Benchmark + 3.80

Original Notes
  Class         Amount (mil. $)   Interest rate (%)
  A                     252.00    Benchmark + 1.32  
  B                      56.00    Benchmark + 1.80  
  C                      20.00    Benchmark + 2.40  
  D                      20.00    Benchmark + 3.97  

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OFSI BSL VIII Ltd.

  Replacement class   Rating     Amount (mil $)
  A-R                 AAA (sf)              252
  B-R                 AA (sf)                56
  C-R                 A (sf)                 20
  D-R                 BBB (sf)               20

  OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS OFSI BSL VIII Ltd.

  Class                Rating
  E                    B+ (sf)
  Subordinated notes   NR

  NR--Not rated.



OFSI BSL X: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to OFSI BSL X
Ltd./OFSI BSL X LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured term loans
that are governed by collateral quality tests. The notes are
managed by OFS CLO Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 2,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  OFSI BSL X Ltd./OFSI BSL X LLC

  Class A, $199.95 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $35.65 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $18.60 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $17.05 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $11.60 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $30.30 million: Not rated


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-1: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on 29 classes and affirmed
its ratings on 11 classes from OneMain Financial Issuance Trust
(OMFIT) series 2015-3, 2016-3, 2017-1, 2018-1, 2018-2, 2019-1, and
2019-2 and Springleaf Funding Trust (SLFT) series 2015-B and
2017-A.

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect collateral performance to
date and our expectations regarding future collateral performance,
as well as each transaction's structure and credit enhancement. Our
analysis also incorporated secondary credit factors, including
credit stability, payment priorities under various scenarios, and
sector- and issuer-specific analyses. Considering all of these
factors, we believe the notes' creditworthiness is consistent with
the raised and affirmed rating levels."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P uses these assumptions about vaccine timing
in assessing the economic and credit implications associated with
the pandemic. As the situation evolves, S&P will update its
assumptions and estimates accordingly. The upgrades and
affirmations reflect its view that the total credit support as a
percentage of the pool balances, compared with our expected
defaults, is commensurate with each raised and affirmed rating.

S&P said, "We upgraded the subordinate class B notes in SLFT 2015-B
and SLFT 2017-A to 'AAA (sf)' based on the transactions' actual
performance to date, the total credit enhancement available for the
respective class B notes, and our expectation that in each
transaction the class A notes will be fully paid off within 12
months, leaving class B as the most senior class outstanding.

"We similarly upgraded the subordinate class B and C notes in OMFIT
2017-1 based on the transactions' actual performance to date, the
total credit enhancement available for the respective class B and C
notes, and our expectation that the class A and B notes will be
fully paid off within 12 months, leaving class C as the most senior
class outstanding."

Of the nine OMFIT transactions under review, four are currently in
their revolving periods and are scheduled to enter amortization
between 2021 and 2026: OMFIT 2016-3 on April 30, 2021, OMFIT 2018-1
on Feb. 28, 2021, OMFIT 2018-2 on March 31, 2023, and OMFIT 2019-2
on Sept. 30, 2026. Our original cash flow modelling assumed each
pool would revolve to the worst-case composition permitted by the
transaction documents. However, the pool compositions are currently
stronger than the worst-case concentrations, as also shown by each
pool's loss performance. As of the February 2021 distribution date,
the annualized three-month net loss percentages for OMFIT 2016-3,
2018-1, 2018-2, and 2019-2 were 3.67%, 4.90%, 4.09%, and 4.27%,
respectively. These are all well below the reinvestment criteria
event triggers of 17.00% for each transaction.

Further, as of the February 2021 distribution date, the weighted
average coupons of the receivables pools for OMFIT 2016-3, 2018-1,
2018-2, and 2019-2 were 25.37%, 25.66%, 26.32%, and 25.97%,
respectively--well above each trust's respective reinvestment
criteria event triggers of 22.0%, 23.0%, 23.0%, and 23.5%. OMFIT
2015-3 entered amortization on Aug. 31, 2020; OMFIT 2017-1, on
Sept. 30, 2019; OMFIT 2019-1, on Jan. 31, 2021; SLFT 2015-B, on
March 31, 2020; and SLFT 2017-A, on June 30, 2020. With the
exception of OMFIT 2019-1, which recently entered amortization,
these transactions have paid down significantly, with current total
note factors ranging from 32%-67%, while their credit enhancement
levels have significantly grown.

Each OMFIT and SLFT transaction is backed by a pool of fixed-rate
personal consumer loans and contains a sequential principal payment
structure in which the note classes are paid principal by
seniority. The transactions also benefit from credit enhancement in
the form of a nonamortizing reserve account (with the exception of
the OMFIT 2019-2 transaction, which has a reserve account required
amount calculated as the greater of 0.50% as a percentage of the
aggregate note balance and $250,000), overcollateralization,
subordination for the higher-rated tranches, and excess spread.

  Table 1

  Current Capital Structure

  As of the February 2021 distribution date

                         Current    Note
                         balance   factor     Coupon   Maturity
  Transaction   Class   (mil. $)      (%)        (%)   date
  OMFIT 2015-3  A          111.6       53       3.63   11/18/2028
  OMFIT 2015-3  B           26.6      100       4.16   11/18/2028
  OMFIT 2015-3  C           26.6      100       5.82   11/18/2028
  OMFIT 2015-3  D           29.9      100       6.94   11/18/2028
  OMFIT 2016-3  A          248.7      100       3.83   06/18/2031
  OMFIT 2016-3  B           38.7      100       5.61   06/18/2031
  OMFIT 2016-3  C           29.5      100       6.86   06/18/2031
  OMFIT 2016-3  D           33.1      100       7.50   06/18/2031
  OMFIT 2017-1  A-1         72.5       12       2.37   09/14/2032
  OMFIT 2017-1  A-2         15.1       12   1ML+0.80   09/14/2032
  OMFIT 2017-1  B           58.3      100       2.79   09/14/2032
  OMFIT 2017-1  C           63.7      100       3.35   09/14/2032
  OMFIT 2017-1  D           91.4      100       4.52   09/14/2032
  OMFIT 2018-1  A          441.7      100       3.30   03/14/2029
  OMFIT 2018-1  B           57.2      100       3.61   03/14/2029
  OMFIT 2018-1  C           36.8      100       3.77   03/14/2029
  OMFIT 2018-1  D           38.7      100       4.08   03/14/2029
  OMFIT 2018-1  E           57.2      100       5.52   03/14/2029
  OMFIT 2018-2  A          255.4      100       3.57   03/14/2033
  OMFIT 2018-2  B           33.1      100       3.89   03/14/2033
  OMFIT 2018-2  C           21.3      100       4.04   03/14/2033
  OMFIT 2018-2  D           26.5      100       4.29   03/14/2033
  OMFIT 2018-2  E           32.2      100       5.77   03/14/2033
  OMFIT 2019-1  A          413.5       96       3.48   02/14/2031
  OMFIT 2019-1  B           58.6      100       3.79   02/14/2031
  OMFIT 2019-1  C           37.6      100       3.89   02/14/2031
  OMFIT 2019-1  D           47.4      100       4.22   02/14/2031
  OMFIT 2019-1  E           57.9      100       5.69   02/14/2031
  OMFIT 2019-2  A          651.3      100       3.14   10/14/2036
  OMFIT 2019-2  B           91.4      100       3.41   10/14/2036
  OMFIT 2019-2  C           59.2      100       3.66   10/14/2036
  OMFIT 2019-2  D           98.1      100       4.05   10/14/2036
  SLFT 2015-B   A           77.7       31       3.48   05/15/2028
  SLFT 2015-B   B           31.6      100       3.80   05/15/2028
  SLFT 2015-B   C           12.8      100       5.25   05/15/2028
  SLFT 2015-B   D           20.2      100       6.50   05/15/2028
  SLFT 2017-A   A          255.0       49       2.68   07/15/2030
  SLFT 2017-A   B           36.0      100       3.10   07/15/2030
  SLFT 2017-A   C           41.5      100       3.86   07/15/2030
  SLFT 2017-A   D           57.5      100       5.02   07/15/2030

  Table 2

  Hard Credit Support (%)(i)

  As of the February 2021 distribution date

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust

                       Total hard   Current total hard
                   credit support       credit support
  Series   Class      at issuance       (% of current)
  2015-3   A                37.28                51.72
  2015-3   B                29.20                39.96
  2015-3   C                21.11                28.22
  2015-3   D                12.04                15.03
  2016-3   A                38.33            40.95(ii)
  2016-3   B                28.58            31.61(ii)
  2016-3   C                21.14            24.49(ii)
  2016-3   D                12.81            16.51(ii)
  2017-1   A-1              26.20            77.95(ii)
  2017-1   A-2              26.20            77.95(ii)
  2017-1   B                20.30            62.39(ii)
  2017-1   C                13.85            45.38(ii)
  2017-1   D                 4.60            20.99(ii)
  2018-1   A                32.60            35.81(ii)
  2018-1   B                23.80            27.43(ii)
  2018-1   C                18.15            22.05(ii)
  2018-1   D                12.20            16.39(ii)
  2018-1   E                 3.40             8.01(ii)
  2018-2   A                33.40            36.58(ii)
  2018-2   B                24.70            28.30(ii)
  2018-2   C                19.10            22.97(ii)
  2018-2   D                12.15            16.35(ii)
  2018-2   E                 3.70             8.30(ii)
  2019-1   A                34.75            38.79(ii)
  2019-1   B                25.80            30.06(ii)
  2019-1   C                20.05            24.45(ii)
  2019-1   D                12.80            17.37(ii)
  2019-1   E                 3.95             8.73(ii)
  2019-2   A                31.72            34.98(ii)
  2019-2   B                22.08            25.79(ii)
  2019-2   C                15.83            19.84(ii)
  2019-2   D                 5.48             9.98(ii)

  Springleaf Funding Trust

                       Total hard   Current total hard
                   credit support       credit support
  Series   Class      at issuance   (% of current)(ii)
  2015-B   A                26.51                58.55
  2015-B   B                17.11                40.95
  2015-B   C                13.31                33.84
  2015-B   D                 7.31                22.60
  2017-A   A                25.05                45.00
  2017-A   B                19.80                37.14
  2017-A   C                13.75                28.08
  2017-A   D                 5.35                15.50

(i)Calculated as a percentage of the total gross receivable pool
balance, consisting of a reserve account, overcollateralization,
and subordination.
(ii)Hard enhancement includes an increase made to the required
overcollateralization amount as per a May 2020 amendment.

COLLATERAL OVERVIEW

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, OneMain has tightened
underwriting and enhanced servicing procedures for their portfolio,
proactively reducing their exposure to lower credit quality and
first-time obligors. OneMain also extended one-month reduced or
deferred payment options to borrowers negatively affected by the
pandemic. Deferment levels generally rose through March and peaked
in April and subsequently decreased over the course of the summer
of 2020 and have now largely normalized to pre-pandemic lows.

S&P said, "We generally expect non-prime and subprime obligors to
be most vulnerable to default following the termination of
government support programs and issuer-specific deferment options.
Even so, rising delinquencies and losses have yet to materialize in
our rated transactions, indicating that borrowers have resumed
making loan payments. Nonetheless, given its relatively limited
performance history in comparison to more-established ABS sectors,
there is some uncertainty as to how the personal loan ABS sector
will fare through the evolution of the pandemic. Our base-case
default rate assumptions include, among other factors, a
qualitative adjustment due to macroeconomic uncertainty caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic.

"We ran stressed break-even cash flow scenarios to determine the
total credit enhancement available to each transaction's notes
(including excess spread). The total credit enhancement is defined
as the maximum loss rate a break-even stressed cash flow scenario
could withstand while still making interest payments on every
distribution date and principal payments on the notes by the legal
maturity dates."

S&P's assumptions included:

-- A 10.0% constant prepayment rate for voluntary prepayments in
the 'AAA' to 'BBB' scenarios and 15.0% in the 'BB' scenario;

-- A weighted average remaining term and weighted average coupon
as defined by the reinvestment criteria of each transaction;

-- A servicing fee as defined in each transaction; and

-- A back-up servicing fee as defined in each transaction.

S&P said, "In addition to our break-even cash flow analysis, we
also conducted sensitivity analyses to test each transaction's
ability to absorb defaults higher than our base-case default
assumption and remain within our ratings stability limits. We
calculated a 'BBB' default rate by applying a 2.0x stress multiple
to the base-case default assumption. We then compared each
transaction's total credit support (including excess spread) to its
'BBB' default rate. In our view, the coverage multiples
demonstrated that all of the classes have credit support consistent
with the limits specified in the credit stability section of "S&P
Global Ratings Definitions" published Jan. 5, 2021, and all of the
classes have adequate credit enhancement at the raised or affirmed
rating levels.

"We conducted additional liquidity analyses to assess the impact of
a temporary disruption in loan principal and interest payments as a
result of the COVID-19 pandemic. These liquidity analyses include
elevated deferment levels and a reduction of voluntary prepayments
to 0%. Based on our analyses, the note interest payments and
transaction expenses are a small component of total collections
from the pools of receivables, and, accordingly, we believe the
transactions can generally withstand temporary material declines in
payment levels and still make full and timely liability payments.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in our view, to cover our default expectations
under our stress scenarios for each of the rated classes."

  RATINGS RAISED

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-3

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  A       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
  B       AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
  C       A (sf)      BBB (sf)
  D       BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-3

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  A       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
  B       AA (sf)     A+ (sf)
  C       A- (sf)     BBB (sf)
  D       BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2017-1

               Rating
  Class   To         From
  A-1     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
  A-2     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
  B       AAA (sf)   A (sf)
  C       AAA (sf)   BBB (sf)
  D       A (sf)     BB (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-1

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  C       A+ (sf)     A (sf)
  D       BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf
  E       BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-2

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  C       A+ (sf)     A (sf)
  D       BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf
  E       BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2019-1

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  C       A+ (sf)     A (sf)
  E       BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

  Springleaf Funding Trust 2015-B

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  A       AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)
  B       AAA (sf)    BBB(sf)
  C       AA (sf)     BB (sf)
  D       A (sf)      B (sf)

  Springleaf Funding Trust 2017-A

               Rating
  Class   To          From
  A       AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
  B       AAA (sf)    A(sf)
  C       AA (sf)     BBB (sf)
  D       BBB (sf)    BB (sf)  

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-1

  Class   Rating
  A       AAA (sf)
  B       AA (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-2

  Class   Rating
  A       AAA (sf)
  B       AA (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2019-1

  Class   Rating
  A       AAA (sf)
  B       AA (sf)
  D       BBB (sf)

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2019-2

  Class   Rating
  A       AAA (sf)
  B       AA (sf)
  C       A (sf)
  D       BBB- (sf)



PIKES PEAK 7: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on $16M Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service as assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Pikes Peak CLO 7 (the "Issuer" or "Pikes Peak 7").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2034
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$56,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2034
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2034 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Pikes Peak 7 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans, provided that not more than 5% of the portfolio may consist
of second lien loans or permitted securities (senior secured bonds,
senior unsecured bonds and senior secured notes, subject to certain
criteria). The portfolio is approximately 85% ramped as of the
closing date.

Partners Group US Management CLO LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 67

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.5%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak U.S. economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 2021-1R: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Residential Mortgage
Loan Trust 2021-1R's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by first-lien
fixed- and adjustable-rate amortizing (some with interest-only
periods) residential mortgage loans secured primarily by
single-family residences, planned-unit developments, two- to
four-family residences and condominiums to both prime and nonprime
borrowers. The pool has 338 loans, which are primarily nonqualified
mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;

-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;

-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework;

-- The geographic concentration;

-- The mortgage aggregator, Seer Capital Management L.P.; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

  Ratings Assigned

  Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2021-1R(i)

  Class A-1, $85,354,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $7,237,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $11,195,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $6,185,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $5,628,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $3,340,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $4,763,399: not rated
  Class XS, notional(ii): not rated
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): not rated
  Class R, not applicable: not rated

(i)The collateral and structural information in this report
reflects the term sheet dated Feb. 17, 2021. The ratings address
the ultimate payment of interest and principal.
(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated
principal balance.



SARATOGA INVESTMENT 2013-1: Moody's Rates Class E-R-3 Notes 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of CLO refinancing notes issued by Saratoga Investment
Corp. CLO 2013-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$357,500,000 Class A-1-R-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2033 (the "Class A-1-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$65,000,000 Class A-2-R-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2033 (the "Class A-2-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$60,500,000 Class B-FL-R-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2033 (the "Class B-FL-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
(sf)

US$11,000,000 Class B-FXD-R-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2033 (the "Class B-FXD-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
(sf)

US$26,000,000 Class C-FL-R-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2033 (the "Class C-FL-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating
Assigned A2 (sf)

US$6,500,000 Class C-FXD-R-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes
due 2033 (the "Class C-FXD-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$39,000,000 Class D-R-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2033 (the "Class D-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$27,625,000 Class E-R-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2033 (the "Class E-R-3" Notes), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks particularly those associated with the
CLO's portfolio and structure.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans. At least 95%
of the portfolio must consist of first lien senior secured loans,
cash, and eligible investments, and up to 5% of the portfolio may
consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.

Saratoga Investment Corp. (the "Manager") will continue to direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's three-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the manager may not reinvest and
all proceeds received will be used to amortize the notes in
sequential order.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, the Issuer
will incorporate a variety of other changes to transaction features
in connection with the refinancing. These include: issuing an
additional class of secured notes, extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; changes to the
overcollateralization test levels; the inclusion of alternative
benchmark replacement provisions; additions to the CLO's ability to
hold workout and restructured assets; and changes to the definition
of "Adjusted Weighted Average Rating Factor".

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Portfolio par: $650,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3056

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.2 years

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak U.S. economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


SCULPTOR CLO XXV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Sculptor CLO XXV
Ltd./Sculptor CLO XXV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Sculptor CLO XXV Ltd./Sculptor CLO XXV LLC

  Class X, $3.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1, $186.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $42.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B (deferrable), $18.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $16.50 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $12.75 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $30.00 million: not rated


SCULPTOR CLO XXV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Sculptor CLO
XXV Ltd./Sculptor CLO XXV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 24,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Sculptor CLO XXV Ltd./Sculptor CLO XXV LLC

  Class X, $3.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1, $186.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $42.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B (deferrable), $18.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $16.50 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $12.75 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $30.00 million: not rated


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2004-1: S&P Cuts Class A Certs Rating to 'D (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class A certificates
from Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-1, a U.S.RMBS transaction issued
in 2004 to 'D (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' due to observed principal
write-downs affecting the transaction. At the same time, S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where they had been placed
with negative implications on Dec. 22, 2020. The rating was
subsequently withdrawn in line with its procedures.

Rating Action Rationale

The rating action reflects the cumulative impact of principal
write-downs experienced by the transaction over the past several
months.

Beginning in May 2020, the class A credit support balance started
to decline more rapidly than in prior months. Class A had credit
support of 11.63% as of May 2020 (up from an original credit
support of 3.80%), which declined to (0.06)% as of October 2020.
The deterioration in credit support occurred because of principal
write-downs that were allocated to the remaining subordinate
certificate, class B-1. According to the securities administrator,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the principal write-downs allocated to class
B-1 were not solely attributable to actual losses on the underlying
mortgage loan collateral, but rather were primarily the result of
adjustments that reduced the funds available for distribution to
certificate holders. While unable to provide a specific break-down,
the securities administrator confirmed that typical adjustments can
include such things as adjustments for non-advancing loans,
reimbursements on non-advancing loans, modification-related
incentives and adjustments, as well as the trust's expenses.

For example, in July 2020, the total interest and principal funds
received from the collateral was $663,371.86 and the realized
collateral loss amount for the period was $41.08. However, due in
large part to the adjustments of the type described above, the
total amount of interest and principal deposited by the servicer in
the certificate account was $157,832.28. This created an aggregate
principal shortfall with respect to the mortgage loan collateral of
$501,273.96. The transaction documents provide that if the total
principal balance of all outstanding certificates exceeds the
stated principal balance of all outstanding mortgage loans on any
distribution date, then this difference in amount will reduce the
principal balance of the lowest outstanding subordinate class. As a
result, class B-1 incurred a principal write-down of $501,273.96
and the remaining credit support available to class A decreased.

Similar adjustments have taken place in other performance periods
over the prior nine months, which has ultimately resulted in the
subordinate certificate balance to be written down to zero.

Unlike the provision described above, the transaction documents do
not require class A principal to be written down if the mortgage
loan balance falls below the class A balance. As a result of
ongoing adjustments of the type described above, the deal is now
undercollateralized, and class A has a negative credit support
balance of $201,089 as of January 2021.

In total, since May 2020, class A's credit support balance has
decreased $1.3 million, or approximately 6x more than the decrease
that occurred over the nine months prior to May 2020. Moreover, as
of January 2021, class A has an outstanding principal write-down of
$59.20 due to realized losses on the collateral and not due to the
adjustments described above. S&P said, "Therefore, we have lowered
our rating on class A to 'D (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and because we
believe an upgrade above 'D (sf)' to be unlikely, we subsequently
withdrew the rating, which is consistent with our procedures."

Analytical Considerations

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

Given the dynamic circumstances associated with the coronavirus
pandemic, S&P will continue to evaluate and update this disclaimer
as warranted.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2021-1: Fitch Assigns B Rating on B-4 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the residential certificates
to be issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2021-1.

DEBT            RATING              PRIOR
----            ------              -----
SEMT 2021-1

A-1      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-10     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-11     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-12     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-13     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-14     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-15     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-16     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-17     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-18     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-19     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-2      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-20     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-21     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-22     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-23     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-24     LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-3      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-4      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-5      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-6      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-7      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-8      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-9      LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO1    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO10   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO11   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO12   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO13   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO14   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO15   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO16   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO17   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO18   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO19   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO2    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO20   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO21   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO22   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO23   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO24   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO25   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO26   LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO3    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO4    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO5    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO6    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO7    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO8    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A-IO9    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
B-1      LT  AA-sf  New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
B-2      LT  A-sf   New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
B-3      LT  BBB-sf New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
B-4      LT  Bsf    New Rating    B(EXP)sf
B-5      LT  NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 613 loans with a total balance of
approximately $527.4 million as of the cutoff date. The pool
consists of prime fixed-rate mortgages acquired by Redwood
Residential Acquisition Corp. from various mortgage originators.
Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of very
high-quality 30-year, 20-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans
to borrowers with strong credit profiles, relatively low leverage
and large liquid reserves. The pool has a weighted average (WA)
original model FICO score of 779 and an original WA combined loan
to value (CLTV) ratio of 68%. All the loans in the pool consist of
Safe Harbor Qualified Mortgages (SHQM).

Interest Reduction Risk (Negative): The transaction incorporates a
structural feature most commonly used by Redwood's program for
loans more than 120 days delinquent (a stop-advance loan). Unpaid
interest on stop-advance loans reduces the amount of interest that
is contractually due to bondholders in reverse-sequential order.
While this feature helps limit cash flow leakage to subordinate
bonds, it can result in interest reductions to rated bonds in
high-stress scenarios.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): The operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Redwood is assessed as an
'Above Average' aggregator. The aggregator has a robust sourcing
strategy and maintains experienced senior management and staff,
strong risk management and corporate governance controls, and a
robust due diligence process. Primary and master servicing
functions will be performed by entities rated 'RPS2' and 'RMS2+',
respectively.

Credit Enhancement Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which
arises as the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a
subordination floor of 0.75% of the original balance will be
maintained for the certificates. The floor is sufficient to protect
against the five largest loans defaulting at Fitch's 'AAA(EXP)sf'
average loss severity of 38%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
The implied rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of
the potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that
the transaction may become exposed to or that may be considered in
the surveillance of the transaction. Sensitivity analyses was
conducted at the state and national levels to assess the effect of
higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated
by a gain in home prices.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national
    level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in
    addition to the model-projected 39.8% at 'AAA'. The analysis
    indicates that there is some potential rating migration with
    higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
    projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
    prices would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national
    level, or in other words positive home price growth with no
    assumed overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home
    price growth of 10%. Excluding the senior class, which is
    already rated 'AAA(EXP)sf', the analysis indicates there is
    potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
    classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result
    in a full category upgrade for the rated class excluding those
    being assigned ratings of 'AAA(EXP)sf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

CRITERIA VARIATION

There was one variation to Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria'.
Fitch expects to conduct an originator review for all entities that
make up 15% or more of a transaction. Quicken Loans currently
contributes 33% of the collateral. Given the strong credit profile,
the clean diligence results and Redwood's Above Average aggregator
assessment, Fitch did not view the lack of a review as a heightened
risk and no adjustment was made.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by five separate third party review firms. The third-party
due diligence described in Form 15E focused on credit, compliance
and property valuations. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and, as a result, Fitch made the following adjustment to
its analysis:

A 5% credit was applied to each loan's probability of default to
the extent diligence was performed, This adjustment resulted in a
16bps reduction to the 'AAAsf' expected loss.

DATA ADEQUACY

There were no issues with the data provided by the issuer and used
in Fitch's analysis.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


SG COMMERCIAL 2016-C5: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 11 classes of SG
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2016-C5 (SGCMS 2016-C5). Fitch
has also maintained the Negative Outlooks on three classes and
revised the Outlooks on five classes to Negative from Stable.

     DEBT                 RATING          PRIOR
     ----                 ------          -----
SGCMS 2016-C5

A-1 78419CAA2     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-2 78419CAB0     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-3 78419CAC8     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-4 78419CAD6     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-M 78419CAF1     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
A-SB 78419CAE4    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
B 78419CAK0       LT  AA-sf   Affirmed    AA-sf
C 78419CAL8       LT  A-sf    Affirmed    A-sf
D 78419CAV6       LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed    BBB-sf
E 78419CAX2       LT  B-sf    Downgrade   BB-sf
F 78419CAZ7       LT  CCCsf   Downgrade   B-sf
X-A 78419CAG9     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed    AAAsf
X-B 78419CAH7     LT  AA-sf   Affirmed    AA-sf
X-E 78419CAP9     LT  B-sf    Downgrade   BB-sf
X-F 78419CAR5     LT  CCCsf   Downgrade   B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades and Negative Outlooks
reflect increased loss expectations and performance deterioration
on a greater number of Fitch Loans of Concerns (FLOCs) that have
been impacted by the slowdown in economic activity amid the
coronavirus pandemic. Twenty-seven loans (56.4% of pool), including
two loans in the top 15 secured by regional malls (8.6%) and 11
loans in special servicing (21.9%), were designated as FLOCs.
Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 7.10%. The
Negative Outlooks reflect losses, which could reach 9.30%, if
additional coronavirus specific stresses materialize.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest contributor in loss expectation
and largest increase since Fitch's prior review, the Peachtree Mall
loan (3.0%), is secured by 621,367 sf of an 822,443 sf regional
mall in Columbus, GA and sponsored by Brookfield Properties Retail
Group. The loan was designated a FLOC due to near term rollover
concerns, declining tenant sales and risks associated with a
secular shift away from regional malls. Fitch's loss expectation of
approximately 28% in the base case is based on a 20% cap rate and
25% total haircut to YE 2019 NOI.

Per the September 2020 rent roll, near term rollover includes
leases for 8.5% of the net rentable area (NRA) scheduled to expire
in 2020 and 23% in 2021. The rollover in 2021 is concentrated with
At Home, which leases 13.8% NRA and has lease expiration in October
2021. Comparable in-line sales were $343 psf as of the TTM ended
November 2020, down from $409 at YE 2015 at issuance.

The collateral anchors are Macy's, which leases 22.4% NRA through
September 2022 and JCPenney, which leases 13.3% NRA through
November 2024. Dillard's is a non-collateral anchor. Collateral
occupancy was 95% as of September 2020, and servicer-reported NOI
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for this amortizing loan was
1.66x as of the YTD June 2020 compared to 94% and 1.69x at YE 2019
and 90% and 1.98x at issuance.

The second largest contributor to Fitch's loss expectation,
Marriott Saddle Brook (2.0%), is secured by a 241-key, full service
hotel in Saddle Brook, NJ. The loan, which is sponsored by Columbia
Sussex, recently transferred to special servicing for Imminent
Monetary Default in November 2020 at the borrower's request as a
result of the coronavirus pandemic. The borrower has confirmed
intention to transition the property to the lender. Fitch's loss
expectation of approximately 36% in the base case is based on
11.25% cap rate and a 26% total haircut to YE 2019 NOI.

Occupancy was 30% as of the TTM ended September 2020, down from 60%
at YE 2019 and 64% at issuance. Servicer-reported NOI was negative
for TTM ended September 2020 with a DSCR of -0.03x, down from 1.45x
at YE 2019 and 1.99x at issuance. Per STR and as of the TTM ended
June 2020, the hotel was outperforming its competitive set with a
RevPAR penetration rate of 104.63%.

The largest loan in the pool, The Mall at Rockingham Park (5.6%),
is secured by 540,867 sf of an approximate one million sf regional
mall in Salem, NH. The loan was designated a FLOC due to low
occupancy after departure of collateral anchor, Lord and Taylor
(29.3% of NRA and 2.7% of base rents), which closed this location
in December 2020 after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As a
result, collateral occupancy declined to 60% from 89% as of
September 2020. Fitch's loss expectation of approximately 5% in the
base case is based on a 15% cap rate and 15% total haircut to YE
2019 NOI.

Per the September 2020 rent roll, near term rollover includes 3.7%
NRA in 2020, 4.6% in 2021 and 10.6% in 2022. Servicer-reported NOI
DSCR for this full term interest only loan was 1.97x as of the YTD
September 2020, down from 2.11x at YE 2019 and 2.31x at issuance.
In-line tenant sales were $816 psf ($413 psf excluding Apple) as of
the TTM ended November 2020, down from $1,020 psf at YE 2019 ($542
psf excluding Apple) at YE 2019.

The loan is sponsored by Mayflower Realty (joint venture of Simon
Property Group and the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board) and
Institutional Mall Investors . The remaining anchors are Macy's and
JCPenney, which are both non-collateral. Dicks Sporting Goods
subleases a portion of a non-collateral (Seritage owned) former
Sears space. In addition, a 12-screen Cinemark theater opened on
the Seritage parcel in December 2019.

The largest hotel loan, Holiday Inn Express - Nashville Downtown
(4.5%), is secured by a 287-key, limited service hotel built in
1968 and renovated in 2015 and a leasehold interest in an adjoining
parking lot located in downtown Nashville, TN. The loan, which was
assumed by Highland Capital in January 2019 after they purchased
the hotel from JRK Property Holdings, transferred to special
servicing for Imminent Monetary Default in June 2020 at borrowers
request as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The special
servicer filed a foreclosure action; however, the borrower has
since resumed forbearance discussions with the special servicer and
is working on finalizing an agreement.

Occupancy and servicer-reported NOI DSCR for this amortizing loan
were 36% and 0.32x as of YTD September 2020. This is down from 83%
and 1.96x at YE 2019 and 83% and 2.20x at issuance. Per the Smith
Travel Research report for TTM ended July 2019, the hotel was
underperforming its competitive set with a RevPAR penetration rate
of 74%. Fitch's base case loss expectation is approximately 9%,
based off a 35% haircut to the servicer's October 2020 appraisal
value and implies a 10.5% cap rate and 26% haircut to the YE 2019
NOI.

Exposure to Coronavirus Pandemic: Twelve loans (20.2%) are secured
by hotel properties. The weighted average NOI DSCR for the hotel
loans is 1.85x. These hotel loans could sustain a weighted average
decline in NOI of 46% before DSCR falls below 1.00x. Twelve loans
(31.8%) are secured by retail properties. The weighted average NOI
DSCR for the retail loans is 1.96x. These retail loans could
sustain a weighted average decline in NOI of 49% before DSCR falls
below 1.00x. Additional coronavirus specific stresses were applied
to all 12 hotel loans (20.2%), seven retail loans (14.7%), one
multifamily loan (3.4%) and one office loan (0.2%). These
additional stresses contributed to the Negative Outlooks on classes
A-M, B, C, D, E, X-A, X-B and X-E.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement (CE) since issuance. As of the February 2021
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 3.9% to $708.9 million from $736.8 million at issuance. All
original 47 loans remain in the pool. Nine loans (33.1%) are
full-term interest only. Eleven loans (23.4%) have a partial-term
interest only component of which eight have begun to amortize. Six
loans (12.7%) are scheduled to mature in by July 2021. There are no
defeased loans. Interest shortfalls of $710,899 are currently
impacting classes F and G.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 44.5% of the pool.
Loan maturities are concentrated in 2026 (66.1%). Six loans (12.7%)
mature in 2021 and 10 loans (21.2%) in 2025. Based on property
type, the largest concentrations are retail at 31.8%, office at
31.4% and hotel at 20.2%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes A-M, B, C, D, E, X-A, X-B and X-E
reflects the potential for downgrades due to concerns on the FLOCs
and concerns surrounding the ultimate impact of the coronavirus
pandemic with additional loan transfers to special servicing and
potentially higher than expected losses. The Stable Outlooks on
classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-SB reflect overall stable
performance for the majority of the pool, and the expectation of
continued paydown from scheduled amortization.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to Upgrades would include stable
    to improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or
    defeasance. The Negative Outlooks on classes A-M and X-A,
    could be revised if non-delinquent loans maturing in 2021
    (11%) pay in full, including Plaza Mexico-Los Angeles (5.1%),
    which is currently in special servicing but remains current
    and/or expected losses decline due to improved performance of
    the FLOCs. Upgrades of classes B and X-B would only occur with
    significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance and with the
    stabilization of performance on the FLOCs and/or the
    properties affected by the coronavirus pandemic.

-- Upgrades of classes C and D are not likely until the later
    years in the transaction and only if the performance of the
    remaining pool is stable and/or properties vulnerable to
    coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels and there is
    sufficient CE to the classes. Classes E, F, X-E and X-F are
    unlikely to be upgraded absent significant performance
    improvement on the FLOCs, primarily the regional malls and
    loans expected to be impacted by the coronavirus pandemic in
    the near term but could occur if performance of the FLOCs
    improves significantly and/or if there is sufficient CE.
    Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a
    likelihood for interest shortfalls.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that may lead to downgrades include an
    increase in pool level expected losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans. Downgrades of classes A-1 through A
    SB are not likely due to the expected receipt of continued
    amortization.

-- A downgrade of classes A-M, B, C, D and X-A, X-B could occur
    should loss expectations increase and if performance and
    valuations of the FLOCs or loans vulnerable to the coronavirus
    pandemic fail to stabilize or additional loans default and/or
    transfer to the special servicer. Classes E, F, X-E and X-F
    would be downgraded further if performance of FLOCs declines
    and/or losses are realized.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
further negative rating actions, including additional downgrades
and/or Negative Outlook revisions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


TICP CLO 2016-2: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to TICP CLO VI 2016-2
Ltd./TICP CLO VI 2016-2 LLC's floating-rate notes.

This is a refinancing of TICP CLO VI 2016-2 Ltd.'s December 2016
transaction, which S&P Global Ratings did not rate.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests. The notes
are managed by TICP CLO VI 2016-2 Management LLC.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  TICP CLO VI 2016-2 Ltd./TICP CLO VI 2016-2 LLC

  Class X-R, $4.50 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-R2, $240.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R2, $60.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-R2 (deferrable), $26.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R2 (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R2 (deferrable), $16.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $46.50 million: Not rated


TOWD POINT 2021-HE1: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on 7 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to Towd Point HE Trust
2021-HE1 (TPHT 2021-HE1).

DEBT                RATING             PRIOR
----                ------             -----
TPHT 2021-HE1

A1         LT  AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
A2         LT  AA-sf   New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
M1         LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M2         LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
B1         LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B2         LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B3         LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4         LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B5         LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
A3         LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
A4         LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
A5         LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
A2A        LT  AA-sf   New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2AX       LT  AA-sf   New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2B        LT  AA-sf   New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
A2BX       LT  AA-sf   New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
M1A        LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1AX       LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1B        LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M1BX       LT  A-sf    New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
M2A        LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2AX       LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2B        LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2BX       LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2C        LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
M2CX       LT  BBB-sf  New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
B1A        LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1AX       LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1B        LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1BX       LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1C        LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B1CX       LT  BB-sf   New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
B2A        LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2AX       LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2B        LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2BX       LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2C        LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B2CX       LT  B-sf    New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
B3A        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3AX       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3B        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3BX       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3C        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B3CX       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4A        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4AX       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4B        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4BX       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4C        LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
B4CX       LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
D          LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XA         LT  NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Quality (Mixed): The pool in aggregate is seasoned almost 12
years with the first lien portion seasoned roughly 11 years and the
second lien portion seasoned roughly 12 years. 97.5% of the loans
are current and 2.5% are currently 30-days delinquent. Nearly 63%
of the loans have been performing for at least the previous 36
months, and therefore received a credit in Fitch's model.
Additionally, 29% of loans have received a prior modification. The
pool exhibits a relatively strong credit profile as shown by the
724 weighted average (WA) FICO, as well as the 66.9% sustainable
loan-to-value ratio (sLTV).

HELOC Collateral (Negative): This pool consists of various product
types including both open and closed-end HELOCs in the first and
second lien positions. Roughly 31% of the pool are first lien loans
with the remaining 69% being junior liens. About 26% of this
population are open HELOCs, with the ability for borrowers to draw
down additional amounts. The first lien portion is currently
utilizing 56% of the total line and the second lien portion using
62%. To address this risk, the max draw amount was used in Fitch's
loss analysis and for determining applicable LTVs.

100% Loss Severity Applied to Junior Liens (Negative): Fitch
assumed no recovery and 100% LS on defaulted second lien loans
based on the historical behavior of second lien loans in economic
stress scenarios. Fitch assumes second lien loans default at a rate
comparable to first lien loans, after controlling for credit
attributes, no additional default penalty was applied.

Realized Loss and Writedown Feature (Positive): Second lien loans
that are delinquent for 180 days or more under the MBA method, will
be considered a realized loss and, therefore, will cause the most
subordinated class to be written down. Despite the 100% LS assumed
for each defaulted loan, Fitch views the writedown feature
positively, as cash flows will not be needed to pay timely interest
to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' notes during loan resolution by the
servicers. In addition, subsequent recoveries realized after the
writedown at 180 days delinquent will be passed on to bondholders
as principal.

Modified Sequential Structure (Positive): The transaction utilizes
a modified sequential pay structure in which principal collections
are paid pro-rata to classes A1, A2 and M1 subject to transaction
performance triggers with all classes below class M1 paying down
sequentially. The class D certificates will receive their pro rata
share of principal collections concurrently with classes A1 through
B5, so long as performance triggers are passing. Additionally,
excess cash flow, can be used to pay down the notes in the same
order of priority of principal subject to the same triggers. To the
extent any of the triggers are failing, all allocations of
principal and excess cash flow are paid sequentially. In all
instances, interest is paid sequentially with losses distributed
reverse sequentially.

No Servicer Advancing (Positive): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of principal and interest.
Because P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become delinquent
and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust,
the loan-level loss severities (LS) are less for this transaction
than for those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I.

Payment Holidays Related to Coronavirus Pandemic (Negative): There
are 14 loans (0.51% of UPB) on an active coronavirus-related
forbearance plan included in this pool, two of which are currently
delinquent. Additionally, there are 402 loans (9.13% of UBP) that
were previously on coronavirus-related forbearance plans that have
since ended. Of this population, 41 resulted in deferred balances,
26 were modified and 16 are on a repayment plan. Due to the
delinquency status of these loans Fitch did not make any
adjustments to the pay strings. Additionally, none of the open
HELOC loans are on an active forbearance plan and only 40 of the
loans that were previously on a forbearance plan are open HELOCs,
none of which have been modified, deferred or on a repayment plan.

Stronger Credit Profile than Legacy HELOC Transactions (Positive):
This transaction benefits from a credit profile that is materially
stronger than that seen in legacy HELOC transactions. This
transaction benefits from a WA credit score of more than 14 points
higher than historical levels. Borrowers for both the first and
second lien loans have a meaningful amount of equity in the
properties with an original CLTV of 77%, which is lower than the
historical CLTV of 83%. The aggregate seasoning of these loans over
10 years provides additional benefit, as there has been meaningful
home price growth since origination, as well as insight into the
performance of these borrowers. As a result of these key
differences, a comparison to historical transactions is not likely
to provide much context in how this deal will perform compared with
legacy deals. A stronger credit profile and a more supportive
structure should provide for a meaningful positive difference in
performance.

Variable Funding Account (Neutral): Borrower draws following deal
closing will be funded first from the servicer and reimbursed from
principal collections received on the mortgage loans. To the extent
principal collected is insufficient, draws will be funded by the
servicer and reimbursed by the holder of the class D certificates
through deposits made into the VFA held by the indenture trustee.
Any draws funded by the class D certificate holder will result in a
corresponding increase in the class D certificate balance. Class D
receives a pro rata share of principal and losses concurrently with
the notes; however, if performance triggers fail, the deal reverts
to a straight sequential pay structure with the class D
certificates locked out from principal collected until the classes
A, M and B notes are paid in full and will absorb all losses up to
the outstanding balance, effectively increasing the available loss
protection to the class A, M and B notes.

Representations and Warranty (R&W) Framework Includes Knowledge
Qualifiers and Excludes Certain Reps (Negative): The transaction
has two different loan-level representations and warranties (R&Ws)
frameworks to cover first liens and second liens, respectively.
Both frameworks are consistent with a Tier 3 framework. In addition
to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers and the exclusion of
several representations, such as loans identified as having unpaid
taxes, the frameworks do not benefit from a high percentage of due
diligence on the pool, which can help mitigate missing
representations. The low due diligence percentage on the pool,
approximately 21%, contributes to the Tier 3 assessment.
Separately, based on Fitch's calculation, approximately 5.8% of the
pool is considered newly originated, and are subject to additional
representations that are not included in either framework. Fitch
treated these loans as Tier 4. Fitch increased its loss
expectations by 310 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating category to account
for both the limitations of the R&W framework as well as the
non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the R&W provider.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Negative): Third-party due diligence was
performed on approximately 20.9%/43.7% of the loans in the
transaction pool by loan count/UPB. The review was conducted by
SitusAMC and Clayton, both of which are assessed by Fitch as
'Acceptable - Tier 1' TPR firms.

The results of the review indicate moderate operational risk with
approximately 17.7% of the reviewed loans assigned a 'C' or 'D'
grade. However, only 7.8% of loans that are graded 'C' or 'D'
received loan level adjustments due to missing final documents that
required to properly test for compliance with predatory lending
regulations. Because the review was sampled from the transaction
pool, Fitch extrapolated the results to the non-reviewed population
and adjusted its loss expectation at the 'AAAsf' rating category by
approximately 205bps to account for potential assignee liability
associated with material compliance exceptions.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC has an
established operating history acquiring different mortgage
products, including second liens and HELOCs; the aggregator is
assessed as 'Above Average' by Fitch. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. (SPS) and Specialized Loan Servicing (SLS) are the named
servicers for this transaction and are rated 'RPS1-' and 'RPS2+',
respectively. High-rated servicers reflect strong and established
operational capabilities, which have the potential to mitigate
losses given borrower default. Fitch decreased its initial loss
expectations by 38bps at the 'AAAsf' rating category to reflect the
servicer's strong ratings. Issuer retention of at least 5% of the
bonds also helps ensure an alignment of interest between both the
issuer and investor.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to, or may be considered in, the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates
    how the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national
    level; that is, positive home price growth with no assumed
    overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth
    of 10.0%. Excluding the senior class, which is already
    'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential positive
    rating migration for all of the rated classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
    ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
    analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
    model-projected 6.2% at the base case. The analysis indicates
    that there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs
     compared with the model projection.

-- This section provides insight into the model-implied
    sensitivities the transaction faces when one assumption is
    modified, while holding others equal. The modeling process
    uses the modification of these variables to reflect asset
    performance in up- and down environments. The results should
    only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
    transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It
    should not be used as an indicator of possible future
    performance. For enhanced disclosure of Fitch's stresses and
    sensitivities, please refer to the transaction's presale
    report.

Fitch has also added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that
contemplates a more severe and prolonged economic stress caused by
a re-emergence of infections in the major economies, before a slow
recovery begins in 2Q21. Under this severe scenario, Fitch expects
the ratings to be affected by changes in its sustainable home price
model due to updates to the model's underlying economic data
inputs. Any long-term impact arising from coronavirus disruptions
on these economic inputs will likely affect both investment- and
speculative-grade ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated four criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."

The first variation related to the due diligence sample size.
Fitch's criteria looks for a 20% minimum due diligence sample on
second liens regardless of originator. Fitch did not make an
adjustment to the losses for this variation. Fitch applies a 100%
loss severity to all second lien loans and therefore any adjustment
for due diligence, which is primarily applied to loss severity,
would not further penalize the loss levels. This variation had no
rating impact.

The second variation relates to the age of the tax/title review.
Per criteria, Fitch expects updated tax and title to be performed
within 6 months of the transaction cutoff date. For loans that
received a tax and title search, approximately 91.5% of the sample
was reviewed in July 2020 of later, which is a variation to Fitch's
criteria. However, approximately 92.6% of the sample loans were
reviewed within 12 months and almost all the remaining loans were
reviewed no more than 24 months ago. No adjustment was made and the
review was completed just slightly outside of Fitch's expected
timeframe. Additionally, the servicer is monitoring the tax and
title status as part of standard practice and the servicer will
advance where deemed necessary to keep the first lien position of
each loan.

The third variation relates to the due diligence scope for newly
originated loans. Fitch expects that loans seasoned less than 24
months receive a full credit, compliance and valuation review as
part of its due diligence scope. Approximately 6% of the loans in
the transaction pool were originated within 24 months, these loans
received a seasoned due diligence scope which consists of a
compliance review but no credit or property valuation review.
However, all non-reviewed newly originated first liens are HELOCs
and do not carry the same industry underwriting requirements as
first lien residential mortgage loans. HELOCs are exempt from
ATR/QM and typically do not receive a full appraisal when
originated. Additionally, 84% of the newly originated loans (by
loan count) are second liens and are therefore being treated as
100% loss severity. Fitch also treated the RW&E framework for newly
originated loans as Tier 4 given that new origination reps were not
provided. This variation increased the loss expectations by 6bps at
'AAA'.

The fourth and final variation relates to due diligence not being
performed on 22 loans (0.16% by loan count), which were sourced
from an unknown entity. Per criteria, Fitch requests that
compliance review is performed on 100% of loans from unknown
sources. All 22 of these loans are all first lien non-HELOC loans.
To address this variation, Fitch applied the indeterminate HUD1
adjustment to each of these loans. While these loans may not carry
material defects, the adjustment reflects the fact that compliance
review was not performed and cannot confirm adherence to predatory
lending regulations. The adjustment applies a 100% LS to the loan
in states included on Freddie Mac's "Do Not Purchase" list and a 5%
LS penalty to all remaining loans. This variation had no rating
impact, as the number of loans impacted represents a very small
portion of the overall pool.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC and Clayton Services LLC. The
third-party due diligence reviews were completed on approximately
20.9% (combined) of the initial loan population for this
transaction. The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E
focused on regulatory compliance review, modification review,
payment history review, tax and title review, servicing comments
review and a data integrity check.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result
made the following adjustments to its analysis: (1) Applied loss
adjustments on 223 reviewed loans which received a final grade of
'D', (2) Extrapolated the rate of indeterminate findings to the
non-reviewed first lien loan population (14% by loan count) from
known sources, (3) Applied a three-month liquidation timeline
extension on 42 loans that had missing modification agreements, and
(4) Increased the LS to account for outstanding taxes found on 171
loans in the tax and title review. These adjustments resulted in
corresponding reductions to Fitch's loss expectations at all rating
stresses.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on approximately 20.9% of the pool by loan count. The
third-party due diligence was generally consistent with Fitch's
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." AMC and Clayton were engaged to
perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement were given
compliance grades, and assigned an initial grade. Minimal
exceptions and waivers were noted in the due diligence reports.
Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section for more detail.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered to be
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



TRINITAS CLO VI: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class X, A-RR, B-R1,
B-R2, C-RR1, C-RR2, D-R1, D-R2, D-R3, D-R4, E-R, and F replacement
notes from Trinitas CLO VI Ltd./Trinitas CLO VI LLC, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in June 2017
that is managed by Trinitas Capital Management LLC. The floating-
and fixed-rate replacement notes will be issued via a supplemental
indenture. On the Feb. 25, 2021, refinancing date, the proceeds
from the issuance of the replacement notes redeemed the original
notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Trinitas CLO VI Ltd./Trinitas CLO VI LLC

  Class X, $5.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-RR, $437.50 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-R1, $62.50 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-R2, $32.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C-RR1 (deferrable), $18.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-RR2 (deferrable), $22.50 million: A (sf)
  Class D-R1 (deferrable), 9.20 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D-R2 (deferrable), 12.50 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R3 (deferrable), 15.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D-R4 (deferrable), $3.30 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E-R (deferrable), $26.25 million: BB- (sf)
  Class F (deferrable), $11.75 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $81.00 million: not rated


UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2013-C5: Moody's Cuts Class D Certs to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
and downgraded the ratings on five classes in UBS-Barclays
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-C5, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2020
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2020 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. EC**, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2020
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

** Reflects exchangeable classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because of their
credit support and the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on four P&I classes, Cl. C, D, E, and F, were
downgraded due to a decline in pool performance, driven primarily
by higher anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled
loans which are mainly secured by retail properties. The largest
specially serviced loan is Harborplace (5.5% of the pool) which has
been in special servicing since February 2019 and is last paid
through November 2019. Furthermore, the two largest loans in the
pool, representing 36% of the pool, are secured by regional malls
which have both experienced declining revenues in 2020 and the
Valencia Town Center's (16.9% of the pool) net operating income
(NOI) has now declined below its 2012 levels.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. EC was downgraded due to
a decline in the credit quality of the referenced exchangeable
classes.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around our forecasts is unusually high. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 6.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.3% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in September 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 12, 2021 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 22% to $1.15 billion
from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 76 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 54.3% of the pool. Twenty-one loans,
constituting 21% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

As of the February 2021 remittance report, loans representing 91%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 2% were beyond their grace period but less than 30 days
delinquent and 7% were between greater than 90 days delinquent.

Eighteen loans, constituting 18.8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, of which five loans, representing 6% of the
pool, indicate the borrower has received loan modifications in
relation to the coronavirus impact on the property. The watchlist
includes loans that meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly
reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 23%). Two loans, constituting 7.1% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Harborplace Loan ($63.8
million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in an approximately 149,000 SF lifestyle retail center in
Baltimore, Maryland. The property is located less than 0.5 miles
south of the Baltimore Central Business District (CBD), right on
the harbor waterfront. The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2019 due to payment default. Several major tenants have
vacated the property since securitization, including Ripley's,
Urban Outfitters, Banana Republic, Five Guys, M&S Grill and Noodles
& Co. Furthermore, the Urban Outfitters' departure triggered
co-tenancy provisions which resulted in additional tenant
departures. The loan's DSCR has been below 1.00X since 2017 and has
continued to decline due to lower rental revenues and higher
expenses. Any tenant renewals have generally been at lower rents.
The property was 52% leased as of September 2020, compared to 64%
in January 2020, 67% in December 2018, and 95% at securitization. A
receiver was appointed in May 2019 who is currently marketing the
property for lease and working through tenant requests for rent
relief. The loan has amortized almost 16% since securitization but
has accumulated over $5 million in cumulative servicer P&I and
other expense advances. Due to the significant decline in
performance, Moody's expects a significant loss on this loan.

The second specially serviced loan is the Chatham Retail Loan
($18.0 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 34,140
SF retail component located on the basement (parking garage),
ground and second floors of a 32-story residential condominium. The
loan was transferred to special servicing during June 2020 due to
payment default. The former largest tenant Pier 1 (51% of NRA)
vacated the property during 2019 and the borrower is in the process
of renovating and sub-dividing the space into multiple tenant
spaces. Three new leases have been recently signed with the new
tenants expected to move in during 2021. The loan is interest-only
for the entire term and is last paid through its March 2020 payment
date. A recent appraisal values the collateral at an amount which
exceeds the loan balance and therefore no appraisal reduction has
been recognized on the loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, The Village of Cross Keys constituting 1.7% of the
pool. The troubled loan is secured by an approximately 297,000 SF
mixed-use property located roughly five miles northwest of the
Baltimore CBD. The property consists of 119,334 SF of office,
147,140 SF of retail space and a 30,292 SF outparcel. The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2019 due to imminent
default after the borrower indicated an unwillingness to cover
continued cash flow shortfalls, and a request to discuss a
potential modification of the loan. The property has underperformed
expectations at securitization and the 2019 net operating income
(NOI) has decreased approximately 61% since 2012 as a result of
lower rental revenue and higher expenses. Furthermore, the
property's NOI has been below 1.00X since 2018. The property was
only 42% leased as of March 2020, compared to 62% in November 2019,
66% in September 2018 and 79% at securitization. The loan was
recently assumed by a new sponsor, brought current on its debt
service payments and returned to the master servicer. However, due
to the low occupancy and DSCR, Moody's identified this as a
troubled loan. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $53
million (a 52% expected loss on average) from these specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjust the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between our sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan balance that reflects each
loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this publication
reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in the
methodology.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2020 operating results for 83% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 100%, compared to 99% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 25% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.08X and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 2.04X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 38% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Santa Anita Mall Loan ($215 million -- 18.6% of
the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $285 million
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 956,343 SF portion of a
1.47 million SF super-regional mall located in Arcadia, California.
The property is adjacent to the Santa Anita Park, a thoroughbred
racetrack, which is a demand driver for the mall. The mall is
anchored by J.C. Penney, Macy's, and Nordstrom, all of which are
owned by their respective tenants and are not contributed as loan
collateral. As of December 2020, the property was 89% leased
compared to 94% in March 2020 and 98% in December 2018. As of
September 2020, inline occupancy was 90%, compared to 97% in
December 2018. Total occupancy was negatively impacted by the
departure of a large Forever 21 space (117,817 SF), which vacated
in January 2020 and the 2020 NOI declined 10% year over year
primarily due to lower rental revenues. However, the property's
rental revenue has improved significantly since securitization and
the reported 2020 NOI was still 22% higher than in 2012. The 2020
actual NOI DSCR was 3.46X. The loan is interest only for its entire
term and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.13X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Valencia Town Center Loan ($195
million -- 16.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 646,121 SF
portion of a 1.1 million SF super-regional mall located in
Valencia, California. The mall is currently anchored by Macy's and
JC Penney. A former anchor, Sears (122,000 SF), vacated in 2018 and
the space remains vacant. The three anchor units are not included
as collateral for the loan. Major collateral tenants include a
12-screen Edward's Theater (68,780 SF; lease expiration in May
2024) and Gold's Gym (29,100 SF; lease expiration in November
2027). The mall was expanded in 2010, adding roughly 180,000 SF of
outdoor space at a cost of approximately $131 million. The property
was 82% leased as of September 2020, compared to 85% in December
2019 and 96% in September 2017. Inline occupancy was 92% in
December 2019 compared to 95% in December 2018. In 2019, the
sponsor announced plans for an upcoming renovation, called the
Patios Connection, which closely followed a $20 million renovation
of the center interior completed the same year and includes
additional expansion and development plans for the former Sears
space. After improving annually since securitization, the
property's NOI declined below securitization levels in 2019 due to
lower rental revenue and increased expenses. The property's revenue
continued to decline in 2020 amongst the coronavirus pandemic. The
property benefits from strong demographics and being the only mall
serving the Santa Clarita Valley submarket. The loan is interest
only for its entire term and had an in-place DSCR of 2.84X as of
September 2020. However, due to the recent declines in performance
and overall retail environment, the mall may face elevated
refinance risk at its loan maturity in January 2023. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to
121% and 0.87X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the True Value Distribution Centers
Portfolio Loan ($25.6 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by three industrial warehouse distribution center located
in Corsicana, Texas; Woodland, California and Kansas City,
Missouri. The collateral represents a sale-leaseback between True
Value Hardware (the tenant) and the sponsor. The triple net (NNN)
leases were extended from 2022 to 2036 and all three properties
continue to be 100% occupied. Each property has been outfitted with
stacking and railway transport systems. The loan has amortized 21%
since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and
1.79X, respectively, compared to 62% and 1.74X at the last review.


UNITED AUTO 2021-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to United Auto
Credit Securitization Trust 2021-1's automobile receivables-backed
notes series 2021-1.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 25,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The availability of approximately 59.73%, 51.82%, 43.60%, 35.25%,
29.30%, and 25.80% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, E, and
F notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash flow
scenarios (including excess spread). These credit support levels
provide coverage of approximately 2.70x, 2.33x, 1.92x, 1.55x,
1.27x, and 1.10x our expected net loss range of 21.25%-22.25% for
the class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes, respectively.

The likelihood of timely interest and principal payments by the
assumed legal final maturity dates under stressed cash flow
modeling scenarios that are appropriate for the assigned
preliminary ratings.

S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, our ratings will be within the
limits specified by section A.4 of the Appendix contained in our
article, "S&P Global Ratings Definitions," published Jan. 5, 2021.
Credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

"The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
securitized. It is approximately six months seasoned, with a
weighted-average original term of approximately 51 months and an
average remaining term of about 45 months. As a result, we expect
that the pool will pay down more quickly than many other subprime
pools that are usually characterized by longer weighted-average
original and remaining terms.

"Our analysis of nine years of static pool data following the
credit crisis and after United Auto Credit Corp. (UACC) centralized
its operations and shifted toward shorter loan terms. We also
reviewed the performance of UACC's three outstanding
securitizations, as well as its paid-off securitizations.
UACC's more than 20-year history of originating, underwriting, and
servicing subprime auto loans."

The transaction's payment and legal structures.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2021-1

  Class A, $122.07 mil.: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $33.54 mil.: AA (sf)
  Class C, $29.64 mil.: A (sf)
  Class D, $29.38 mil: BBB (sf)
  Class E, $20.80 mil.: BB (sf)
  Class F, $13.91 mil.: B (sf)



VIBRANT CLO XII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Vibaasnt CLO
XII Ltd./Vibrant CLO XII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 2,
2021. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Vibrant CLO XII Ltd./Vibrant CLO XII LLC

  Class A-1, $279.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $63.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-1 (deferrable)(i), $10.50 million: A (sf)
  Class B-2-A (deferrable)(i), $3.75 million: AA- (sf)
  Class B-2-B (deferrable)(i), $3.75 million: A (sf)
  Class B-3 (deferrable)(i), $9.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $22.50 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $19.13 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $47.53 million: Not rated

(i)The class B-1, B-2-A and B-2-B (treated as a single class B-2),
and B-3 notes are all pari passu, but the allocation to B-2 is
distributed to class B-2-A prior to any distribution to class
B-2-B.



WELLS FARGO 2012-C8: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class, affirmed 12 classes and
revised the Rating Outlook on two classes of Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C8
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates (WFRBS 2012-C8).

     DEBT                 RATING             PRIOR
     ----                 ------             -----
WFRBS 2012-C8

A-3 92936YAC5       LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-FL 92936YAH4      LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-FX 92936YBB6      LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-S 92936YAE1       LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
A-SB 92936YAD3      LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
B 92936YAF8         LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
C 92936YAG6         LT  Asf     Affirmed     Asf
D 92936YAP6         LT  BBB+sf  Affirmed     BBB+sf
E 92936YAR2         LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed     BBB-sf
F 92936YAT8         LT  BBsf    Affirmed     BBsf
G 92936YAV3         LT  B-sf    Downgrade    Bsf
X-A 92936YAK7       LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf
X-B 92936YAM3       LT  AAAsf   Affirmed     AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Loss expectations have increased since
the prior review due to increased loss expectations on a greater
number of Fitch Loans of Concerns (FLOCs) that have been affected
by the slowdown in economic activity related to the coronavirus
pandemic, including two regional malls (15.1%). Eleven loans (23%
of the pool balance) have been identified as FLOC's, including two
loans in special servicing (7.50%).

Fitch's current ratings, including the downgrade to class G,
incorporate a base case loss of 7.10%. Increased loss expectations
in the base case analysis are primarily driven by the specially
serviced Town Center at Cobb loan. The Negative Rating Outlooks on
classes F and G reflect losses that could reach 9.4% after
factoring in additional stresses on loans expected to be negatively
affected by the pandemic and do not stabilize, a potential outsized
loss on the Northridge Fashion Center loan and upcoming refinance
concerns given the entire pool matures before the second half of
2022.

Regional Mall Loans of Concern: The largest contributor to overall
loss expectations and the largest increase in loss since the last
rating action is the Town Center at Cobb loan (6.8%), which is
secured by a 1.3 million sf regional mall located in Kennesaw, GA,
approximately 22 miles northwest of Atlanta. The Fitch base case
loss of 58% considers a discount to the updated appraisal value and
the sponsor, Simon Property Group, transferring title via a
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. Fitch's loss implies a 22% cap rate on
the FYE December 2019 NOI and is consistent with Fitch stressed
values on similar defaulted mall properties.

The loan was transferred to special servicing in June 2020 for
payment default. The borrower indicated that property performance
has been significantly affected by the coronavirus pandemic and was
unable to meet debt service obligations. A deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure is anticipated to take place in February 2021.

The loan collateral consists of a 128,819-sf Belk anchor box, a
31,026-sf portion of the JCPenney anchor box and 400,095-sf of
in-line space. Non-collateral anchors include Macy's, Macy's
Furniture and JCPenney. A non-collateral Sears closed its store in
2020. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR declined to 1.26x for YTD
September 2020 from 1.33x at YE 2019 and 1.43x at YE 2018.
Occupancy has remained in the mid-80% range over the past several
years and was 82% as of September 2020. The declining NOI has been
attributed to increased operating expenses. Total in-line tenant
sales were $387 psf as of YE 2019, down from $392-psf at YE 2018.
Leases accounting for approximately 50% of the collateral NRA are
scheduled to expire over the next 24 months, including Belk (23% of
NRA) in August 2022. Belk recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in February 2021.

The second regional mall is the Northridge Fashion Center loan
(8.0%), which is secured by 643,564sf of a 1.52 million-sf regional
mall located in Northridge, CA, approximately 25 miles northwest of
Downtown Los Angeles. Fitch's base case loss expectation on this
loan has increased to 11% from 0% at the last rating action due to
anticipated refinance challenges in the current environment given
the large outstanding total debt of $208 million, of which $75.4
million is contributed to this transaction. Fitch's loss is based
on a 12% cap rate and a 15% haircut to the FYE 2020 NOI. Fitch also
applied an additional sensitivity that considered a potential
outsized loss of 33%, which is based on a 15% cap rate and 20%
haircut to the FYE 2020 NOI.

The sponsor, Brookfield Properties, was granted coronavirus debt
relief in the form of a consent agreement, which allowed the
borrower to utilize existing reserve funds to cover debt service
payments beginning April 2020 through December 2020. The loan,
which was current as of February 2021, is scheduled to mature in
December 2021.

Non-collateral anchors include JCPenney, Macy's, and Macy's Men's &
Home. A non-collateral Sears vacated in January 2020; per the
master servicer, no co-tenancy clauses were triggered by Sears
closure. Major collateral tenants include Dave & Busters (8.3% of
NRA), Pacific Theaters (8%), Ross Dress for Less (5.2%), Forever 21
(3.8%) and Old Navy (3.3%).

The servicer reported FYE 2020 occupancy and NOI DSCR was 91% and
1.60x. Prior to the pandemic, tenant sales were considered strong
and had improved since issuance, with YE 2019 in-line sales less
than 10,000sf at $679psf ($557psf excluding Apple).

Increasing Credit Enhancement (CE): CE has increased since issuance
due to amortization and loan repayments, with 30% of the original
pool balance repaid. Twenty-four loans (21% of the pool) are fully
defeased. Over the past 12 months, one loan (0.76% of original pool
balance) prepaid with yield maintenance. Since issuance, one loan
had liquidated while in special servicing: Shops at Freedom (0.65%
of original pool balance) was disposed in September 2017, with a
$26,689 loss absorbed by class H. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class H. All loans are scheduled to mature over the next
10-18 months.

Coronavirus Exposure: Significant economic impact to certain
hotels, retail and multifamily properties is expected from the
coronavirus pandemic, due to the recent and sudden reductions in
travel and tourism, temporary property closures and lack of clarity
on the potential length of the impact. The pandemic has prompted
the closure of several hotel properties in gateway cities as well
as malls, entertainment venues and individual stores.

Five loans (4.4% of the pool) are secured by hotel loans, including
one specially serviced loan (0.70%). Eighteen Loans (41.5%) are
backed are by retail properties, including eight (35%) within the
top 15. Two loans (15.1%) are secured by regional malls, both of
which are anchored by non-collateral JCPenney and Macy's, both had
Sears (non-collateral) vacate in 2020. Retail properties
representing 10% of the pool are anchored by a grocery tenant
greater than 25% of the NRA.

Fitch applied additional stresses to the five non-specially
serviced hotel loan, and seven retail loans to account for
potential cash flow disruptions, due to the pandemic. This
sensitivity analysis contributed to the Negative Outlooks on
classes F and G.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlook on class F and class G reflects the
potential for downgrade due to concerns surrounding the ultimate
impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the performance concerns
associated with the FLOCs. This includes concerns over the regional
malls and larger retail FLOC's within the top 15, which are
expected to face challenges in stabilizing and their ability to
refinance at their 2021 or 2022 loan maturities, or the servicer to
progress in workouts. The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1
through E reflect the increasing credit enhancement, continued
expected amortization and defeasance, and relatively stable
performance of the majority of the pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable
    to improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or
    defeasance. Upgrades to class C would likely occur with
    significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or
    defeasance; however, adverse selection, increased
    concentrations and further underperformance of the FLOCs or
    loans expected to be negatively affected by the coronavirus
    pandemic could cause this trend to reverse.

-- Upgrades to the classes D and E would be limited based on
    sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
    concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
    there is likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to
    classes F and G are not likely due to the high loss
    expectations surrounding the FLOC's, and would be considered
    only if the performance and valuations of the FLOC's improve
    significantly and/or properties vulnerable to the coronavirus
    return to pre-pandemic levels, and there is sufficient credit
    enhancement to the classes.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that may lead to downgrades of classes B
    through G are possible should loss expectations increase and
    if performance and valuations of the FLOCs or loans vulnerable
    to the coronavirus pandemic fail to stabilize or additional
    loans default and/or transfer to the special servicer. This
    includes additional loans such as Northridge Fashion Center
    that may fail to refinance and default at maturity and
    transfer to the special servicer.

Additionally, if workouts are prolonged on the specially serviced
loans, fees and expenses could continue to increase loan exposures
and loss expectations will continue to increase. Classes F and G
could be downgraded should losses be realized or become more
certain. Downgrades to classes A-1 through A-S are not likely due
to the position in the capital structure, high defeasance and
expected benefit from maturing loans and amortization, but may
occur should interest shortfalls affect the classes.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
negative rating actions, including downgrades and/or further
Negative Rating Outlook revisions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


WFRBS 2012-C7: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Csf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes of Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A.'s WFRBS 2012-C7 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
and placed one class on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

     DEBT                 RATING                PRIOR
     ----                 ------                -----
WFRBS 2012-C7

A-2 92936TAB8     LT  AAAsf  Rating Watch On    AAAsf
A-FL 92936TAH5    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed           AAAsf
A-FX 92936TAZ5    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed           AAAsf
A-S 92936TAC6     LT  BBBsf  Downgrade          AAAsf
B 92936TAD4       LT  BBsf   Downgrade          Asf
C 92936TAE2       LT  B-sf   Downgrade          BBBsf
D 92936TAJ1       LT  CCCsf  Downgrade          Bsf
E 92936TAK8       LT  CCsf   Downgrade          B-sf
F 92936TAL6       LT  Csf    Downgrade          CCCsf
G 92936TAM4       LT  Csf    Downgrade          CCsf
X-A 92936TAF9     LT  BBBsf  Downgrade          AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced Loans: The
Downgrades and RWN reflect significantly higher loss expectations
since the last rating action on the four regional mall loans which
comprise 41.3% of the remaining pool balance; three of these
regional mall loans are specially serviced and in foreclosure
(26.5% of pool).

Fitch's current ratings reflect a base case loss of 20.6%. The
Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-S, X-A, B and C reflect
losses which could reach 23.8% after factoring in additional
pandemic-related stresses, a potential outsized loss on the
Northridge Fashion Center loan and upcoming refinance concerns
given the entire pool matures before 2H22.

The RWN placement on class A-2 reflects the potential for a
Downgrade should performing loans that are scheduled to mature in
late 2021 and in 2022, including Northridge Fashion Center, do not
obtain refinancing, transfer to special servicing and/or default at
or before maturity. The RWN is expected to be resolved once there
is greater clarity in the next few months on the refinance
prospects on the Northridge Fashion Center as well as other
performing loans in the pool. If loans continue to perform and pay
in full, the class would be affirmed. If loans are considered
likely to default at or prior to maturity, the class may be
downgraded by one or two rating categories.

The largest contributor to overall loss expectations and the
largest increase in loss since the last rating action is the Town
Center at Cobb loan (12.8%), which is secured by a 1.3 million-sf
regional mall located in Kennesaw, GA, approximately 22 miles
northwest of Atlanta. Fitch's base loss expectation on this loan
has increased to 58% from approximately 25% at the last rating
action; the loss considers a discount to the updated appraisal
value and the sponsor, Simon Property Group, transferring title via
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. Fitch's loss implies a 22% cap rate
on the YE 2019 NOI and is consistent with Fitch stressed values on
similar defaulted mall properties.

The loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 for payment
default. The borrower indicated property performance had been
significantly affected by the coronavirus pandemic and was unable
to meet debt service obligations. A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure is
anticipated to take place in February 2021.

The loan collateral consists of a 128,819-sf Belk anchor box, a
31,026-sf portion of the JCPenney anchor box and 400,095-sf of
in-line space. Non-collateral anchors include Macy's, Macy's
Furniture and JCPenney. A non-collateral Sears closed its store in
2020. The servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
declined to 1.26x for YTD September 2020 from 1.33x at YE 2019 and
1.43x at YE 2018. Occupancy has remained in the mid-80% range over
the past several years and was 82% as of September 2020. The
declining NOI has been attributed to increased operating expenses.
Total in-line tenant sales were $387 psf as of YE 2019, down from
$392 psf at YE 2018. Leases accounting for approximately 50% of the
collateral NRA are scheduled to expire over the next 24 months,
including Belk (23% of NRA) in August 2022. Belk recently filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in February 2021.

The second largest increase in loss expectations since the last
rating action is the Northridge Fashion Center loan (14%), which is
secured by 643,564-sf of a 1.52 million-sf regional mall located in
Northridge, CA, approximately 25 miles northwest of Downtown Los
Angeles. Fitch's base loss expectation on this loan has increased
to 11% from 0% at the last rating action due to anticipated
refinance challenges in the current environment given the large
outstanding total debt of $208 million, of which $132.6 million is
contributed to this transaction. Fitch's loss is based on a 12% cap
rate and 15% haircut to the YE 2020 NOI. Fitch also applied an
additional sensitivity which considered a potential outsized loss
of 33%, which is based on a 15% cap rate and 20% haircut to the YE
2020 NOI.

The sponsor, Brookfield Properties, was granted coronavirus debt
relief in the form of a consent agreement, which allowed the
borrower to use existing reserve funds to cover debt service
payments beginning April 2020 through December 2020. The loan,
which was current as of February 2021, is scheduled to mature in
December 2021.

Non-collateral anchors include JCPenney, Macy's, and Macy's Men's &
Home. A non-collateral Sears vacated in January 2020; per the
master servicer, no co-tenancy clauses were triggered by Sears'
closure. Major collateral tenants include Dave & Busters (8.3% of
NRA), Pacific Theaters (8%), Ross Dress for Less (5.2%), Forever 21
(3.8%) and Old Navy (3.3%). The servicer-reported YE 2020 occupancy
and NOI DSCR were 91% and 1.60x. Prior to the pandemic, tenant
sales were considered strong and had improved since issuance, with
YE 2019 in-line sales for tenants less than 10,000-sf at $679 psf
($557 psf, excluding Apple).

The third largest increase in loss expectations since the last
rating action is the Florence Mall loan (10%), which is secured by
384,111-sf of a 957,443-sf regional mall located in Florence, KY.
Fitch's base loss expectation increased to 62% from 58% at the
prior rating action; the loss considers a discount to the updated
appraisal value and the sponsor, Brookfield Properties,
transferring title via a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. Fitch's loss
equates to a 26% cap rate on the YE 2019 NOI and is consistent with
Fitch stressed values on similar defaulted mall properties.

The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020 due to
imminent monetary default related to the ongoing pandemic.
Non-collateral anchors include JCPenney and Macy's. A
non-collateral Sears closed in November 2018. The largest
collateral tenant is Cinemark (17.6% of NRA; through June 2028).
Total in-line sales were $309 psf in 2019.

Loss expectations on The Fashion Square loan (3.7%), which is
secured by 446,288-sf of a 711,114-sf regional mall located in
Saginaw, MI, remain high at 61%, consistent with the last rating
action; the loss considers a discount to the updated appraisal
valuation. The loan's sponsor, Namdar Realty Group, is offering a
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure if coronavirus debt relief is not
granted by the servicer; the loan is classified as in foreclosure.
Fitch's loss implies a 31% cap rate to the YE 2019 NOI.

The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020 for imminent
monetary default. The special servicer is working to appoint a
receiver and will proceed with foreclosure once the foreclosure
moratorium has been lifted. The property is anchored by a
non-collateral Macy's and a collateral JCPenney. A non-collateral
Sears closed in 2019. The property has suffered from declining
occupancy since 2017. In-line sales for tenants less than 10,000 sf
were $206 psf as of TTM September 2019.

Improved Credit Enhancement (CE) to Senior Classes: The senior
classes have benefited from increased CE due to loan payoffs,
scheduled amortization and defeased collateral. Seventeen loans are
fully defeased (15.4%). As of the February 2021 remittance, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 18.7% to
$897.8 million from $1.1 billion at issuance. The pool has
experienced $5.1 million in realized losses to date (0.5% of
original pool), which have been isolated to the non-rated class H
certificates. Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.4 million
are affecting classes F through H.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario on the Northridge Fashion Center loan, which
considered a potential outsized loss of 33%, while factoring in the
paydown of defeased loans; this contributed to the Negative
Outlooks on classes A-S, X-A, B and C.

The Affirmation and Stable Outlooks on classes A-FL and A-FX
reflect their senior position in the capital structure and payment
priority; these classes are covered by defeased collateral and
low-leveraged loans expected to pay off at maturity.

Fitch also considered an additional scenario where the four
regional mall loans are the remaining loans/assets in the pool.
Classes A-2 and below are reliant on these malls to repay. Class
A-S does not need recoveries from the special serviced mall loans
in foreclosure to repay, but relies on all of the remaining
performing loans in the pool to refinance. Classes B and below,
which have been downgraded to below investment grade ratings, are
fully reliant on the specially serviced mall loans in foreclosure.

Coronavirus Exposure: Six loans (7.9%) are secured by hotel loans,
15 loans (56.8%) are secured by retail properties and two loans
(4.4%) are secured by multifamily properties. The hotel loans have
a weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR of 2.75x and can sustain an
average decline of 63.6% before the NOI DSCR would fall below 1.0x.
The retail loans have a WA NOI DSCR of 1.78x and can sustain an
average decline of 40.3% before the NOI DSCR would fall below 1.0x.
Fitch applied additional stresses to three hotel, four retail and
one multifamily loan to account for potential cash flow disruptions
due to the coronavirus pandemic; this contributed to the Negative
Outlooks on classes A-S, X-A, B and C.

Upcoming Maturities/Refinancing Concerns: Two loans (15.7%) mature
in 2021, including the largest loan, Northridge Fashion Center
(14.8%) in December 2021. The remainder of the pool has maturity
dates between March and June 2022. The weighted average coupon for
the pool is 4.9%.

WFRBS 2012-C7: Exposure to Social Impacts: 4. The transaction has
exposure to sustained structural shift in secular preferences
affecting consumer trends, occupancy trends, etc. which, in
combination with other factors, impacts the rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-S, X-A, B and C reflect
the potential for further Downgrades due to performance concerns on
the regional malls and loans impacted by the pandemic. The Stable
Outlooks on classes A-FL and A-FX reflects the payment priority for
these senior bonds and anticipation that they are expected to pay
in full.

The RWN placement of class A-2 reflects downgrade concerns should
performing loans that are scheduled to mature in late 2021 and in
2022, including Northridge Fashion Center, not obtain refinancing,
transfer to special servicing and/or default at or before maturity.
The RWN is expected to be resolved once there is greater clarity
over the next few months on refinance prospects on the Northridge
Fashion Center as well as other performing loans in the pool. If
loans continue to perform and are expected to pay in full, the
class would be affirmed. If loans are considered likely to default
at or prior to maturity, the class may be downgraded by one or two
rating categories.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Upgrades are currently not expected given the retail outlook
    on regional malls, the uncertainty surrounding the duration of
    the pandemic and the expectation that Northridge Ridge Fashion
    Center and other loans susceptible to the coronavirus pandemic
    will have difficulties refinancing at their 2021 and 2022
    maturities. Sensitivity factors that could lead to Upgrades
    would include stable to improved asset performance,
    particularly on the FLOCs, coupled with additional paydown
    and/or defeasance.

-- Upgrades to classes A-S, X-A, B and C may only occur with the
    payoff, modification and/or workout of the regional mall loans
    and other loans susceptible to the pandemic that may result in
    scenarios better than currently expected. Classes would not be
    upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood of interest
    shortfalls. Distressed-rated classes would only be upgraded
    should valuations significantly improve and liquidations occur
    at better recoveries than expected.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to Downgrades include an
    increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to classes A-FL
    and A-FX are not likely due to their seniority and payment
    priority in the capital structure, but may occur should
    interest shortfalls affect these classes.

-- Downgrades to classes A-2, A-S, X-A, B and C may occur with an
    outsized loss on the NorthRidge Fashion Center loan or should
    overall loss expectations increase significantly due to a
    continued decline in the performance of the FLOCs, if
    additional loans default and/or transfer to special servicing
    and/or loans susceptible to the pandemic not stabilize.
    Further Downgrades of classes D, E, F and G will occur as
    losses are realized or with greater certainty of losses.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021.
Should this scenario play out, Downgrades to the senior classes
could occur and classes with Negative Outlooks could be downgraded
one or more categories.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

WFRBS 2012-C7 has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Social Impacts
which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the ratings in conjunction other factors. The transaction has
exposure to sustained structural shift in secular preferences
affecting consumer trends, occupancy trends, and more, which, in
combination with other factors, impacts the rating.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C5, Commercial
Mortgage-Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C5:

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2019 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high. Stress
on commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.8% at the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in September 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2021 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31.1% to $751.4
million from $1.09 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 48 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 58% of the pool. Twenty-five loans,
constituting 35% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of six, compared to ten at Moody's last review.

As of the February 2021 remittance report, loans representing 96.9%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments and 1.1% were beyond their grace period but less than 30
days delinquent.

Nine loans, constituting 20.7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $2.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 23.9%). Two loans, constituting 2.0% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Both loans transferred to special
servicing since April 2020.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Marriott Courtyard
Monroeville ($7.9 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is secured by
a 98 room lodging property located in Monroeville, Pennsylvania,
approximately 15 miles east of Pittsburgh. The surrounding area is
a mix of single and multi-family homes & a few commercial
properties. Year end 2019 financials report a DSCR of 0.86X with
68.4% occupancy compared to 0.81X and 71.8% in the prior year. The
loan had been on the watchlist since August 2014 and has been in a
cash trap since October 2018. The loan transferred to special
servicing for imminent monetary default at the borrower's request
as a result of the coronavirus outbreak. The special servicer is
negotiating with the borrower to determine a workout strategy.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Poughkeepsie
Galleria II ($7.1 million -- 0.9% of the pool), which is secured by
an 82,000 square foot (SF) retail space is attached to the
Poughkeepsie Galleria, the 1.2 million SF super-regional mall
located in Poughkeepsie, New York. The collateral is 100% occupied
by three tenants, Best Buy, Old Navy, and H&M. The loan transferred
for imminent monetary default at the borrower's request as a result
of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $4.2 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (28% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 2.2% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $3.2 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans. The largest
troubled loan is the 8301 Professional Place loan ($14.1 million --
1.8% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 137,000 SF,
Class B office building located in Landover, Maryland. As of
December 2019, the property was 69% occupied with a 0.62X DSCR.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjust the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan balance that reflects each
loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this publication
reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in the
methodology.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2020 operating results for 80% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 90%, compared to 83% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.26X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 38.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is The Domain Loan ($175.8 million -- 23.4% of the
pool), which is secured by an 879,000 SF component of a 1,225,000
SF open-air lifestyle center located in Austin, Texas. The property
is located approximately eight miles north of the CBD in Austin's
"Golden Triangle." The property was developed for $388 million
($441/sf) in 2007-2008 and also includes 828 residential units that
are not part of the collateral. The subject is anchored by
Dillard's (non-collateral), Macy's (non-collateral), Neiman Marcus,
Dick's Sporting Goods and an 8-screen IPIC Theatres. The collateral
component of the property was 91% leased as of September 2020,
compared to 92% as of December 2019 and 2018. The borrower had
requested relief as a result of the coronavirus outbreak, but
subsequently withdrew the request. The loan has amortized
approximately 15% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 71% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to 62% and 1.45X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arbor Walk and Palms Crossing Loan
($69.2 million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by two
anchored retail properties located in Austin, Texas (Arbor Walk)
and McAllen, Texas (Palms Crossing). Arbor walk is a 465,000 SF
retail center anchored by Home Depot, Marshalls, and Jo-Ann Fabrics
and is located eight miles north of the Austin CBD in close
proximity to The Domain. The Arbor Walk property is subject to a
ground lease with the University of Texas which expires in 2056.
Palms Crossing is an 328,000 SF retail center anchored by a Hobby
Lobby and Overstock. The property is located six miles north of the
border with Mexico. As of September 2020, the properties were
collectively 92% leased, compared to 89% leased in December 2018
and 98% leased in December 2017. Arbor Walk was approximately 98%
leased as of September 2020, while Palms Crossing was approximately
82% leased following the permanent closure of anchor Beall's in
2020. The loan was initially on the watchlist due to the parent
company of Babies R Us, Toys R Us filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in 2017. The borrower is currently in negotiations with
a prospective tenant for the entire space with lease commencement
in November 2020 but has been extended to April 2021. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 91%
and 1.09X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Village of Rochester Hills Loan
($45.7 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a Class A
lifestyle center located in Rochester Hills, Michigan, 33 miles
north of the Detroit CBD. The property encompasses approximately
375,500 SF anchored by Whole Foods, and to be shadow anchored by a
Von Maur, which is backfilling a former Carsons. Other national
tenants include Barnes & Noble, Pottery Barn, GAP and Banana
Republic. The property was 96% leased as of September 2020,
unchanged from December 2019 and improved from 88% as of December
2018. Property performance has declined since 2016, and the
property has never achieved the underwritten levels. The loan
remains current. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 143% and 0.81X,
respectively, compared to 122% and 0.95X at the last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C12: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust (WFRBS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-C12.

     DEBT                RATING          PRIOR
     ----                ------          -----
WFRBS 2013-C12

A-3 92937FAC5     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-3FL 92937FAQ4   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-3FX 92937FAS0   LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-4 92937FAD3     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-S 92937FAF8     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
A-SB 92937FAE1    LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
B 92937FAG6       LT  AAsf    Affirmed   AAsf
C 92937FAH4       LT  A-sf    Affirmed   A-sf
D 92937FAU5       LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed   BBB-sf
E 92937FAW1       LT  BBsf    Affirmed   BBsf
F 92937FAY7       LT  CCCsf   Affirmed   CCCsf
X-A 92937FAJ0     LT  AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf
X-B 92937FAL5     LT  A-sf    Affirmed   A-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: While the majority of the pool
continues to exhibit stable performance, loss expectations have
increased since Fitch's last rating action primarily due to an
increased number of Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), some of which
have been affected by the slowdown in economic activity related to
the coronavirus pandemic. Five loans (21.8% of the pool) are
considered FLOCs, including three hotel loans (17.8%) and one
regional mall loan (3.4%) in the top 15.

Fitch's current ratings incorporated a base case loss of 3.5%. The
Negative Outlooks on class E reflects losses could reach 5.7% when
factoring in additional coronavirus-related stresses and a
potential outsized loss on the Victoria Mall loan.

The Grand Beach Hotel (14%) is the largest in the pool and has been
designated a FLOC due to performance declines attributed to the
pandemic and the loan's payment default status in 2020. The loan is
secured by a 424-key full service, oceanfront hotel located in
Miami Beach, FL. After transferring to special servicing in May
2020 for imminent monetary default, a forbearance agreement was
executed in December 2020 and the loan has been cured. According to
the servicer, the loan is being monitored to ensure compliance
under the terms of the forbearance agreement.

Reported September 2020 DSCR was 0.89x, and according to the TTM
September 2020 STR report, occupancy, ADR and RevPar were 43%,
$277.70 and $119.29, respectively, down from 67.5%, $340.19 and
$229.56, respectively, at January 2020. Reported YE 2020 DSCR was
0.744, down from 2.52x at YE 2019. The loan matures in March 2023.

The second largest FLOC is Victoria Mall (3.4%). The loan is
secured by a 679,502-sf (448,935 sf collateral) enclosed regional
mall located in Victoria, TX, approximately 90 miles southeast of
San Antonio and 100 miles southwest of Houston. The mall is
anchored by J.C. Penney (non-collateral), Dillard's (two
non-collateral stores), Cinemark Theater (9.7% of the NRA), and a
dark Sears (18.4% of NRA), whose lease runs through October 2030.

As of September 2020, the reported debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 1.99x, and according to the September 2019 rent roll,
total mall occupancy was 81%. Reported comparable in-line sales
were $288 psf for TTM ending December 2019, compared to $302 psf
for the TTM ending March 2018 and $367 psf at issuance. Due to
concerns with the mall's declining in-line sales, vacant Sears and
tertiary location, Fitch's base case analysis includes a 35% NOI HC
to the annualized September 2020 NOI and a 20% cap rate.

Increased Credit Enhancement and Defeasance: As of the January 2021
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 34.7% to $801.4 million from $1.2 billion at issuance.
Defeased collateral accounts for 14.5% of the pool. The pool has
experienced $5.3 million (0.4% of original pool balance) in
realized losses to date from the liquidation of a specially
serviced asset in 2018 and interest shortfalls are currently
impacting class G.

Co-Op Collateral: There are 12 loans (2.3% of the pool) secured by
co-op properties, all of which mature in the second and third
quarter of 2021. These co-op loans generally have very low leverage
statistics. At issuance, the co-op loans within the transaction had
an average Fitch DSCR and loan-to-value of 3.74x and 37.8%,
respectively.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch's analysis included an
additional sensitivity scenario that factored the paydown from the
defeased loans and the aforementioned co-op loans maturing in 2021.
Additionally, a potential outsized loss of 75% was applied to the
maturity balance of the Victoria Mall loan to reflect refinance
concerns; this analysis supports the Negative Outlook on class E.

Additional Stresses Applied due to Coronavirus Exposure: Loans
secured by retail, hotel and multifamily properties represent 26.8%
of the pool (23 loans), 19.7% (five loans) and 0.3% (one loan),
respectively. The retail loans have a weighted average (WA) NOI
DSCR of 2.16x and can withstand an average 53.7% decline to NOI
before DSCR falls below 1.00x. The hotel loans have a WA NOI DSCR
of 2.37x and can withstand an average 57.8% decline to NOI before
DSCR falls below 1.00x. The multifamily loan has an NOI DSCR of
1.79x and can withstand a 44% decline to NOI before DSCR falls
below 1.00x.

Fitch's analysis applied additional coronavirus-related stresses on
nine retail loans (7%) and three hotel loans (4.7%) to account for
potential cash flow disruptions due to the coronavirus pandemic.
These additional stresses contributed to the Negative Rating
Outlook on class E.

The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to a mall that is underperforming as a result of
changing consumer preference to shopping, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the
ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Positive Outlook for class B reflects continued amortization,
expected paydown and sufficient credit support from subordinate
classes. The Negative Rating Outlook on class E reflects the
additional sensitivity scenario applied to the Victoria Mall loan,
as well as concerns surrounding the ultimate impact of the pandemic
and the performance concerns associated with the FLOCs. The Stable
Rating Outlooks on classes A-3, A-3FL, A-3FX, A-4, A-SB, A-S, C and
D reflect the increasing credit enhancement and the relatively
stable performance of the majority of the pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade to class B is likely as loans with near-term
    maturities pay off. Upgrades to classes C through E are
    currently not expected given the retail outlook, the
    uncertainty surrounding the duration of the pandemic and the
    expectation that the Victoria Mall and other loans susceptible
    to the pandemic will have difficulties refinancing at their
    respective maturities.

-- Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades would include
    stable to improved asset performance, particularly on the
    FLOCs, coupled with additional paydown and/or defeasance.
    Upgrades to classes C, D and E may occur with the payoff,
    modification and/or workout of the Victoria Mall loan and
    other loans susceptible to the pandemic that may result in
    scenarios better than currently expected. Classes would not be
    upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood of interest
    shortfalls.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an
    increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to classes A-3, A
    3FL, A-3FX, A-4, A-SB and A-S are not likely due to the
    position in the capital structure and high credit enhancement
    but may occur should interest shortfalls affect these classes.

-- A downgrade to classes E may occur with an outsized loss on
    Victoria Mall loan and downgrades to classes B, C and D may
    occur should overall loss expectations increase due to a
    continued decline in the performance of the FLOCs, additional
    loans default and/or transfer to special servicing and/or
    loans susceptible to the pandemic not stabilize.

-- A downgrade to the distressed class F may occur as losses are
    realized. In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also
    envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
    prolonged beyond 2021. Should this scenario play out, classes
    with Negative Rating Outlooks may be downgraded one or more
    categories.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to a mall that is underperforming as a result of
changing consumer preference to shopping, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the ratings.
Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 16 Tobacco Settlement-Backed Trust
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings reviewed the ratings on 215 tranches of tobacco
settlement bonds for 16 transactions. As a result of this review,
it downgraded its ratings on four tranches, upgraded ratings on 16
tranches, affirmed ratings on 195 tranches, and removed S&P's
negative outlook on three tranches. These note issuances are ABS
transactions backed by state-pledged tobacco settlement revenues
resulting from the master settlement agreement payments, the
liquidity reserve accounts, and the interest income.

S&P said, "On April 22, 2020, the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) released its annual domestic cigarette volume data,
reporting a decline of 4.98% for the 2019 sales years, which was
higher than our expected range of decline of 4.00%-4.50%. We did
not change our consumption stress sensitivity shown in table 1
because we apply other sensitivities to the bonds in addition to
this base volume decline, which is applied over a long time
horizon."

In spring 2020, there was evidence of stockpiling at the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by higher-than-usual consumption,
as people were working from home and were permitted to smoke more
frequently. S&P said, "As the year progressed, we learned more
about the coronavirus and its respiratory implications. While we
will not know the NAAG's rate of decline for the sales year 2020
until April 2021, we anticipate the number to be lower than our
stress sensitivity. As of Dec. 31, 2020, Altria reported that
volumes for 2020 were unchanged in comparison to the prior year."

For the sales years 2021 and beyond, S&P will continue to monitor
any impact (or anticipated impact) resulting from the recessionary
environment, new political leadership, potential tax increases to
make up for COVID-19-related municipal budget shortfalls, and the
continuing introduction of new products.

  Table 1

  Shipment Volume Stress Scenario
  Constant decline starting year 1

   B     B+     BB-    BB     BB+   BBB-   BBB    BBB+     A-    
(4.25) (4.42) (4.58) (4.75) (4.92) (5.08) (5.25) (5.42) (5.58)

   A
(5.75)

RATING RESULTS

  Table 2
  Rating Results

  Affirmations     Upgrades     Downgrades
      195             16            4

During this review, S&P applied a cash flow analysis including a
cigarette volume decline test, participating manufacturer
bankruptcy test, and non-participating manufacturer adjustment, as
well as additional sensitivity stress on market share shifts and
spikes in volume decline. S&P's cash flow results reflect the
transactions' ability to pay timely interest and scheduled
principal at each bond's stated maturity date with their underlying
credit support and payment priority.  

The upgrades reflect the following: many of the bonds have paid
down further than S&P's stress assumptions implied from the 2019
review, and the shorter remaining time to maturity has moved some
of the bonds into different maturity buckets for notching. For
example, a bond that previously had 20 years until maturity now has
19 years, and, therefore, only received a one-notch adjustment
instead of the prior two-notch adjustment.

S&P said, "The downgrades reflect the fact that the actual volume
decline in the 2019 sales year was higher than our volume decline
stress for the lower-rated bonds, and, therefore, these bonds
received less funds than anticipated in 2020 and could no longer
pass the stress at the same rating level. For example, our BB+
scenario assumed a 4.91% decline, while the actual 2019 decline was
4.98%, so any tranches previously rated 'BB+' or below had a lower
anticipated volume decline stress than was actualized.

"Consistent with our prior review, current interest bonds that
previously could have achieved a rating of 'B- (sf)' have to also
pass a steady state test, defined as 0% consumption decline with
'B- (sf)' recovery assumptions. If it cannot, a 'CCC+ (sf)' rating
is assigned. To differentiate the capital appreciation bonds (CABs)
that do not pass any rating tests defined in the criteria, the CABs
were downgraded to 'CCC- (sf)'. Previously the CABs were rated
'CCC+ (sf)' and 'CCC (sf)' depending on the structure of the
deal."

In addition to the tenor notch adjustments, steady state runs, and
quantitative stresses outlined above, there were several
transactions where the model-implied rating differed from the
assigned rating for the reasons below:

Children's Trust series 2002: We removed the negative outlooks on
three tranches from the Children's Trust transaction (backed by
100% of the settlement revenue received by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico) and affirmed our 'BB (sf)' ratings. The transaction's
three tranches maturing in 2033, 2039, and 2043 were downgraded to
'BB (sf)' and placed on CreditWatch with negative implications on
April 25, 2016. Then, on Feb. 16, 2018, all three tranches were
removed from CreditWatch and the ratings were affirmed with a
negative outlook to reflect the continued uncertainty presented by
the Commonwealth's state of financial emergency. At this time,
there is still no clarity on whether or not the securitization
bonds could join the general obligation bonds under the territory's
moratorium. Therefore, despite the fact that the bonds are paying
timely interest and principal and are passing our cash flow runs at
higher rating levels, we are affirming the 'BB' ratings to reflect
the continued risk of inclusion in the debt moratorium. According
to S&P Global Ratings, an outlook is generally assigned as an
ongoing component to long-term issuer credit ratings on corporate
and government entities, so we removed the outlook on these bonds.

Tobacco Settlement Authority series 2005 (Iowa): S&P affirmed the
class A notes maturing in 2023 at 'BBB'. Although the tranche did
not pass the sensitivity run at its current rating level, assuming
a 20% steep decline in year one, we view the probability of a
decline in year one as remote given the primary manufacturers'
year-end 2020 volume results.

Tobacco Securitization Authority of Southern California series
2019: S&P affirmed the class B-1 notes maturing in 2048 at 'BBB-',
although S&P's rating runs exhibited de minimus interest shortfalls
in payment dates more than 20 years from now. Due to the size and
timing of the failure, S&P was comfortable affirming the rating at
this time, but we will continue to track the performance of this
deal. TSASC Inc.: S&P affirmed the class B notes maturing in 2021,
2022, and 2045. Even though they passed at higher rating levels,
S&P continues to notch the sub-serial bonds for subordination.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P uses these assumptions about vaccine timing
in assessing the economic and credit implications associated with
the pandemic. As the situation evolves, S&P will update our
assumptions and estimates accordingly.

S&P will continue to monitor the tobacco sector and the tobacco
settlement bonds and assess any potential impact on its outstanding
ratings.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

             https://bit.ly/3qUktrj


                            *********

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