/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/210124.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, January 24, 2021, Vol. 25, No. 23

                            Headlines

ARIVO ACCEPTANCE 2021-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class D Notes
BAIN CAPITAL 2020-2: S&P Affirms BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
BANK 2017-BNK6: DBRS Lowers Rating of Class X-F Certs to B
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: DBRS Cuts Rating of Class B Certs to BB
CD 2016-CD1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certificates

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on E Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-P8: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on X-F Certs
COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Certs
COMM 2016-CCRE28: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-E Certificates
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2001-CMLB1: Moody's Affirms B3 on X Certs

CPS AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class A Notes
CPS AUTO 2021-A: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating to Class E Notes
DT AUTO 2021-1: DBRS Assigns Provisional BB Rating to Class E Notes
GE COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: DBRS Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to D
GS MORTGAGE 2020-GC45: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-RR Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2021-PJ1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating to Class B-5 Certs
JP MORGAN 2021-1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2017-JP6: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on F-RR Certs
KKR INDUSTRIAL 2021-KDIP: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating to G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on F Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2018-H3: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on H-RR Certs
PALMER SQUARE 2015-1: S&P Affirms BB-(sf) Rating on D-R2 Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2021-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 Rating on Class D Notes
PIKES PEAK 7: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on $16MM Class E Notes
REAL ESTATE 2018-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certificates

SKOPOS AUTO 2019-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class E Notes
VERUS 2021-R1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B (low) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class H Certs
[*] Moody's Lowers Ratings on $173MM of US RMBS Issued 1999-2006

[*]DBRS Confirms 23 Ratings on 13 CPS Auto Receivables Transactions

                            *********

ARIVO ACCEPTANCE 2021-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Arivo Acceptance Auto Loan Receivables Trust
2021-1:

-- $165,719,000 Class A at A (sf)
-- $12,523,000 Class B at BBB (sf)
-- $6,213,000 Class C at BB (sf)
-- $8,543,000 Class D at B (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the cash collateral account, and
excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption
under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For the transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date. DBRS Morningstar assumptions for cash
flow modeling are described more fully under the Cash Flow Analysis
section of the corresponding report.

(2) DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). While
considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the intensity and
duration of the pandemic, DBRS Morningstar-projected CNL includes
an assessment of the expected impact on consumer behavior.

(3) DBRS Morningstar adjusted the expected loss assumption in
consideration of the period of stress related to the coronavirus
pandemic. This adjustment takes into account DBRS Morningstar's set
of macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, and they have been regularly updated. The scenarios were
last updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions consider the
moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the commentary, with
the moderate scenario serving as the primary anchor for current
ratings. The moderate scenario factors in increasing success in
containment during the first half of 2021, enabling the continued
relaxation of restrictions.

(4) DBRS Morningstar has performed an operational review of Arivo
Acceptance, LLC (Arivo) and considers the entity to be an
acceptable originator and servicer of subprime and nonprime auto
loans. The transaction structure provides for a transition of
servicing in the event a Servicer Termination Event occurs.
Wilmington Trust National Association (rated AA (low) with a
Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) is the Backup Servicer, and
Systems & Services Technologies, Inc. is the contracted subagent to
perform the backup servicer's duties.

(5) The credit quality of the collateral and performance of Arivo's
auto loan portfolio. The weighted-average (WA) remaining term of
the Initial Receivables is approximately 66 months with WA
seasoning of approximately five months. The nonzero WA credit score
of the pool is 558 and the WA annual percentage rate is 16.07%.

(6) Loss performance for Arivo's loan originations is limited. As a
result, in addition to Arivo's loan performance data, DBRS
Morningstar incorporated proxy analysis to help determine the
timing of expected losses for the pool. The proxy analysis
evaluated certain demographic characteristics of Arivo's
originations relative to those of other issuers where DBRS
Morningstar possessed more extensive performance history.

(7) DBRS Morningstar assigned the Class D notes a rating of B (sf).
While DBRS Morningstar's "Rating U.S. Retail Auto Loan
Securitizations" methodology does not set forth a range of
multiples for this asset class for the B (sf) level, the analytical
approach for this rating level is consistent with that contemplated
by the methodology. The typical range of multiples applied in the
DBRS Morningstar stress analysis for a B (sf) rating is 1.00 times
(x) to 1.25x.

(8) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the nonconsolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Arivo, that the trust has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets and the consistency
with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured
Finance" methodology.

The transaction is being structured as a Rule 144A transaction
offering four classes of notes: Class A, Class B, Class C, and
Class D. Initial Class A credit enhancement of 15.65% includes a
cash collateral account (1.00% of the aggregate pool balance (the
initial pool balance plus the subsequent receivable balance),
funded at inception and non-declining); overcollateralization (OC)
of 0.60% of the initial pool balance as of the initial cut-off
date; and subordination of 14.05% of the aggregate pool balance.
Initial Class B enhancement of 9.20% includes a 1.00% cash
collateral account, OC of 0.60% and 7.60% subordination. Initial
Class C enhancement of 6.00% includes a 1.00% cash collateral
account, OC of 0.60% and 4.40% subordination. Initial Class D
enhancement of 1.60% includes a 1.00% cash collateral account and
0.60% OC.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BAIN CAPITAL 2020-2: S&P Affirms BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Bain Capital Credit CLO
2020-2 Ltd./Bain Capital Credit CLO 2020-2 LLC's class F and G
floating-rate notes. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes from the same transaction.


The transaction is a CLO securitization backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests, which
closed in June 2020. The new class F and G notes are being issued
via a supplemental indenture. Other than the F and G notes, the
supplemental indenture did not introduce any other material changes
to the transaction. Although the class E and F notes have the same
assigned ratings, the class F notes are subordinated to the class E
notes in the priority of payments.

S&P said, "In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios
applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and
pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated
tranches."

The new ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

-- The affirmed ratings reflect our opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

  Ratings Affirmed

  Bain Capital Credit CLO 2020-2 Ltd./Bain Capital Credit CLO
2020-2 LLC
  Class A, $240.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $47.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $10.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $20.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $14.20 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $33.30 million: Not rated


BANK 2017-BNK6: DBRS Lowers Rating of Class X-F Certs to B
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded the ratings on four classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK6 issued by BANK
2017-BNK6 as follows:

-- Class X-E to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E to BB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F to B (high) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F to B (sf) from BB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating downgrades reflect ongoing performance issues with
select loans, specifically those in special servicing and those
secured by hotel and retail properties, which the ongoing
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic has disproportionately
affected. As of the December 2020 reporting, there are two loans
secured by hotel properties in special servicing, combining for
3.5% of the pool balance. In total, 25 loans in the transaction are
secured by hotel and retail properties, representing 41.5% of the
pool balance. There are also 25 loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 22.0% of the pool balance; however, 13 of these loans,
representing 3.7% of the pool balance, are secured by co-op
properties, which have minimal credit risk.

As of December 2020, the transaction is composed of 71 loans,
totaling $908.2 million. One of the original 72 loans has been
repaid, with total collateral reduction since issuance of 2.7%. The
transaction benefits from a concentration of office collateral as
nine loans, representing 26.9% of the current pool balance, are
secured by office properties, which have shown greater initial
resilience to cash flow declines during the pandemic. This includes
the largest loan in the transaction, General Motors Building
(Prospectus ID#1; 9.1% of the pool balance), which is secured by an
office tower in Manhattan. The transaction also includes nine loans
secured by self-storage properties, representing 10.9% of the
current pool balance. Additionally, one loan, representing 0.9% of
the current pool balance, has been defeased.

The largest loan in special servicing, Trumbull Marriott
(Prospectus ID#12; 2.3% of the pool), is secured by a full-service
hotel in Trumbull, Connecticut. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2020 for imminent default and remains outstanding
for the April 2020 debt service payment. According to the servicer,
the borrower has elected to give the property back to the servicer
and a stipulated receivership and friendly foreclosure is being
negotiated with the receiver order expected to be signed in the
immediate future. The property was re-appraised in August 2020 with
an as is value of $14.5 million, a significant decline from the
issuance value of $35.1 million. The appraiser also provided a
projected stabilized value of $19.4 million by August 2023. While
the loan is not expected to be resolved in the near future, based
on the outstanding loan balance of $21.1 million, the ultimate
resolution is expected to result in a significant realized loss to
the trust. While the expected loss is projected to be contained to
unrated bond, Class G, DBRS Morningstar expects the loss to
materially affect the credit support to Class E and Class F.

The other loan in special servicing, Hilton Garden Inn Bozeman
(Prospectus ID#23, 1.2% of the pool), is secured by a
limited-service hotel in Bozeman, Montana. The loan transferred to
special servicing in June 2020 for imminent default and remains
outstanding for the April 2020 debt service payment. According to
the servicer, negotiations with the borrower remain ongoing for a
forbearance with an agreement expected to be completed in the near
term that will include a deferral of debt service and reserve
payments. The property was re-appraised in August 2020 with an
as-is value of $18.2 million, a decline from the issuance value of
$21.4 million. The appraiser also provided a projected stabilized
value of $21.5 million to be achieved by September 2023. The loan
remains above water with a balance of $11.2 million as of December
2020 and the borrower maintains hard equity of $7.1 million in the
property, according to the servicer. The outstanding payment
default and general challenges for the hotel industry, however,
remain a factor; as such, in the analysis for this review, DBRS
Morningstar made adjustments to account for the increased credit
risk of the loan.

DBRS Morningstar maintains an investment-grade shadow rating on the
General Motors Building (Prospectus ID#1; 9.9% of the pool),
Gateway Net Lease Portfolio (Prospectus ID#2; 6.7% of the pool),
and Del Amo Fashion Center (Prospectus ID#3; 6.7% of the pool)
loans. DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the performance of these
loans remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: DBRS Cuts Rating of Class B Certs to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the rating on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR18 issued by Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18 as follows:

-- Class B to BB (sf) from BBB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes as follows:

-- Class C at C (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)

The trend on Class B remains Stable, while Class C and Class D have
ratings that do not carry trends. Class D continues to carry an
Interest in Arrears designation, as interest shortfalls remain
outstanding with the December 2020 remittance.

The rating downgrade reflects the increased likelihood of continued
and elevated performance challenges amid the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic for the remaining loan in the pool, Prospectus
ID#6 – Marriott Houston Westchase. The pool composition has
remained unchanged in the past 12 months with a collateral
reduction of 97.2% since issuance as a result of successful loan
repayments as well as realized losses and recovered proceeds from
loans liquidated from the pool.

The remaining loan is secured by a 600-room full-service hotel
located in Houston, Texas. In April 2020, following a second loan
modification that was approved by the servicer in December 2019,
the borrower reached out to the servicer to request relief, citing
pandemic-related hardship. According to the servicer's commentary,
the borrower requested a short-term forbearance and access to cash
balances and reserve funds controlled by the servicer while
negotiations continued regarding a more permanent third
modification to the original loan documents.

The hotel's performance has been down for several years since the
downturn in the energy markets, which led to a general disruption
in the local Houston economy and difficulties for commercial real
estate, particularly office and hotel properties, challenges which
predate and have been exacerbated by the impacts of the pandemic.
The most recently reported year-end (YE) 2019 financial statement
showed that even before the pandemic, the debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was quite low, at 0.81 times (x) compared with the
YE2018 DSCR of 0.74x and YE2017 DSCR of 0.95x. Revenue per
available room and the occupancy rate were reported at $83.80 and
69.5% respectively as of the YE2019 reporting.

As of the December 2020 remittance, the loan had an outstanding
principal balance of $69.9 million, with current and outstanding
advances of $283 thousand and $2.3 million, respectively. The
current exposure of approximately $120,340 per key is high given
the low DSCR and significant headwinds facing the local market and
the hotel sector at large, which supports the rating downgrade.
DBRS Morningstar considered a stressed cap rate on the in-place
YE2019 net cash flow to determine a stressed DBRS Morningstar
property value. Based on the DBRS Morningstar stressed value, DBRS
Morningstar is concerned that Class B could realize a loss when the
loan is resolved out of the trust. Class B has a remaining balance
of $23.3 million as of the January 2020 remittance, representative
of an exposure of just under $39,000 per key on the collateral.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CD 2016-CD1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-CD1 issued by CD 2016-CD1
Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. With this rating action, Classes X-E and F
were removed from the Under Review with Negative Implications,
where they were placed on August 6, 2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction over the last 12 months. At issuance, the trust
consisted of 32 fixed-rate loans secured by 58 commercial
properties with a total trust balance of $703.2 million. Per the
December 2020 remittance report, all loans and properties remained
in the trust with a total balance of $678.2 million, representing a
3.6% collateral reduction since issuance. DBRS Morningstar is
monitoring the anticipated payoff of the Gas Company Tower & World
Trade Centre Parking Garage loan (Prospectus ID#8; 5.9% of the
trust balance) as the loan maturity date is scheduled for August
2021. DBRS Morningstar forecasts full loan repayment as the loan
continues to exhibit strong credit metrics.

The pool is concentrated as the largest 15 loans represent 80.9% of
the trust balance. Additionally, five loans, representing 35.2% of
the trust balance, are full-term interest-only (IO) loans; however,
four of those loans were shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS
Morningstar at issuance. The trust is relatively concentrated by
property type as loans secured by office properties represent 41.7%
of the trust balance. The concentration risk is mitigated by office
properties generally being more resilient throughout the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the subject office
properties exhibiting a strong weighted-average year-end 2019 debt
service coverage ratio of 2.61 times.

Per the December 2020 remittance report, there were five loans,
representing 11.3% of the trust balance, that have transferred to
the special servicer. All of these loans transferred to the special
servicer during the coronavirus pandemic and vary by property type
and geographic location. The largest specially serviced loan, 60
East 55th Street (Prospectus ID#10; 3.4% of the trust balance), is
secured by the fee-interest in a 36,928 square foot (sf) mixed-use
property in the Plaza District of Midtown Manhattan. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in July 2020 for monetary
default because of the coronavirus pandemic. The property is
primarily occupied by the Core Club, an exclusive members-only
organization that caters to affluent members of society. Loan
payments were last made in August 2020 and the special servicer
continues to evaluate all options as the borrower has been
unresponsive. The special servicer has been unable to commence the
foreclosure process as New York State extended its moratorium on
commercial evictions and foreclosures through January 31, 2021. The
probability of default and the loss given default for the subject
loan were increased for the subject review to reflect the increased
risk since issuance.

The second-largest specially serviced loan, Embassy Suites Columbus
(Prospectus ID#11; 3.3% of the trust balance), is secured by a
seven-story, 198-key, full-service hotel near the Port Columbus
International Airport in Columbus, Ohio. The loan transferred to
the special servicer in June 2020 for imminent monetary default as
a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Loan payments were last
remitted in July 2020 and the borrower has rejected all debt-relief
proposals. The special servicer is pursuing all legal remedies,
including the appointment of a receiver and foreclosure actions.
The September 2020 Smith Travel Research report indicates hotel
operations have continued throughout the coronavirus pandemic,
although the main demand driver for lodging in the area is the
airport. The August 2020 site inspection report performed for the
special servicer reported a major $2.5 million brand renovation was
completed in 2018, which included upgrades to the guestrooms and
common areas. The collateral was later acquired by United Capital
Corporation in November 2019 for $31.9 million and the subject loan
was assumed by the new sponsor. The loss given default was
increased for the subject review to reflect the collateral value
decline driven by the coronavirus pandemic.

The third-largest specially serviced loan, 401 South State Street
(Prospectus ID#15; 2.2% of the trust balance), is secured by a
historic 479,522 sf office building and a 7,500 sf commercial
building located in the South Loop of Chicago. The loan transferred
to the special servicer in June 2020 for payment default as the
single-tenant, Robert Morris University (lease expiration of June
2024), unexpectedly vacated and stopped paying rent in April 2020.
Loan payments were last made in March 2020 and a receiver was
appointed in September 2020. The controlling $32.0 million
pari-passu note was securitized in the CGCMT 2016-P4 transaction
(not rated by DBRS Morningstar). A "Crain's Chicago Business"
article dated August 2020 noted the borrower acknowledged the loan
default and planned to hand the keys over to the property as soon
as possible. The article also noted a lawsuit filed by the borrower
against Robert Morris University is pending. The property was
listed for sale and marketed by Jones Lang LaSalle with one offer
received. The loan was liquidated from the trust as part of the
subject review given the borrower's intention to transfer title to
the trust and the vacant status of the collateral. At issuance, the
appraisal report provided an as-dark value of $46.5 million, well
below the as-is value of $76.5 million. The loan was liquidated
based on the as-dark value, resulting in an implied loss severity
in excess of 15% to the trust.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar shadow rated the following loans as
investment grade: 10 Hudson Yards (Prospectus ID#1; 9.6% of the
pool balance), Westfield San Francisco Centre (Prospectus ID#3;
8.9% of the pool balance), Gas Company Tower & World Trade Center
Parking Garage (Prospectus ID#8; 5.9% of the pool balance) and
Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ (Prospectus ID#9; 4.4% of the pool
balance). DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the performance of these
loans remains consistent with investment-grade characteristics.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C3 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C3 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

Classes E, F, X-E, and X-F were removed from Under Review with
Negative Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. All
trends are Stable; however, the underlying collateral continues to
face performance challenges, many of which have been driven by the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In addition to the loans
representing 1.8% of the pool that are in special servicing as of
the December 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes that the
pool has a moderate concentration of hospitality and retail
properties, representing 20.1% and 23.2% of the pool balance,
respectively. The initial impact of the coronavirus pandemic has
affected these property types most severely and, as such, those
concentrations suggest slightly increased risks for the pool,
particularly at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

The transaction is concentrated by property type as 11 loans,
representing 36.8% of the current trust balance, are secured by
office assets, whereas 10 loans, representing 23.2% of the current
trust balance, are secured by retail assets. Lodging collateral
makes up the third-largest concentration, representing 10 loans and
20.1% of the current trust balance. According to the December 2020
remittance, two loans, representing 1.8% of the current trust
balance, were in special servicing. The two loans—Homewood Suites
Overland Park (Prospectus ID#26; 0.9% of the current trust balance)
and Marriott Saddle Brook (Prospectus ID#28; 0.9% of the current
trust balance)—are both secured by lodging properties.

The Homewood Suites Overland Park is secured by a 92-key
extended-stay hotel property in Overland Park, Kansas, and was
transferred to the special servicer in July 2020, given the ongoing
effects of the coronavirus pandemic. The loan is now 121-plus days
delinquent. The loan was already under some stress prior to 2020 as
net cash flow (NCF) was 18% below the issuer's NCF. As of December
2020, the servicer reported working on a loan modification with the
borrower. The subject recently received an updated appraisal that
reported a September 2020 value of $9.5 million (a -24.0% variance
from the issuance value of $12.5 million), implying a current
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 72.7%. Given that short-term demand
remains suppressed, DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan with an
elevated probability of default.

The Marriott Saddle Brook is secured a 241-key full-service hotel
property in Saddle Brook, New Jersey, and was transferred to the
special servicer in November 2020, also because of the effects of
the coronavirus pandemic. As of December 2020, the servicer
reported the workout strategy to be foreclosure and the loan
remains delinquent. At issuance, the collateral for the loan had an
appraisal value of $43.0 million, equating to an LTV of 70.0%.
Given these increased risks from issuance, the loan's delinquency
status, and concerns with borrower's commitment to the property,
DBRS Morningstar liquidated the loan in the analysis for this
review. In this scenario, the loan incurred an implied loss
severity of 45.7%.

All 44 original loans remain in the pool, with a collateral
reduction of 3.4% since issuance as a result of loan amortization.
One loan, representing 1.5% of the current trust balance, has been
defeased. Additionally, 11 loans, representing 30.9% of the current
trust balance, are on the servicer's watchlist. These loans are
being monitored for a variety of reasons, including low debt
service coverage ratio, occupancy, and deferred maintenance
issues.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar assigned an investment-grade shadow
rating to two loans: Potomac Mills (Prospectus ID#6, 4.8% of the
current trust balance) and Quantum Park (Prospectus ID#8, 4.1% of
the current trust balance). DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the
performance of these loans remains consistent with the
investment-grade loan characteristics.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-P8: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on X-F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-P8 issued by Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-P8 as listed below.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class V-2A at AAA (sf)
-- Class V-2B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class V-2C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class V-3AC at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class V-2D at BBB (sf)
-- Class V-3D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

Classes E, X-E, F, and X-F were removed from Under Review with
Negative Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. The
trends on Classes E, X-E, F, and X-F are Negative, reflecting the
continuing performance challenges to the underlying collateral,
many of which have been driven by the impact of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The trends on all other classes are
Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations since issuance. The pool is unchanged since issuance,
still consisting of 53 loans secured by 167 commercial and
multifamily properties. As of the December 2020 remittance, the
pool had an aggregate principal balance of $1.07 billion,
representing a collateral reduction of 1.5% since issuance.
Seventeen loans, representing 30.2% of the current trust balance,
are on the servicer's watchlist. These loans are generally being
monitored for lease rollover concerns and/or low debt service
coverage ratios (DSCR), factors that have generally been driven by
disruptions related to the pandemic. Among the watchlisted loans,
DBRS Morningstar's primary concern is with the Starwood Capital
Group Hotel Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#8, 3.9% of the pool
balance), which is secured by the borrower's fee and leasehold
interests in a portfolio comprising 65 select-service and
extended-stay hotels across 21 states. The loan received
coronavirus relief to allow the borrower the ability to draw upon
existing furniture, fixtures, and equipment (FF&E) reserves to
cover debt service shortfalls as well as to defer the collection of
FF&E reserves for a period of three months. The repayment will
occur over 12 months, commencing in February 2021. DBRS
Morningstar's concerns are also heightened because the performance
across the portfolio had been trending downward prior to the
pandemic as the year-end 2019 net cash flow (NCF) was 11% below
issuance.

While it is not on the servicer's watchlist, DBRS Morningstar
maintains a cautious view on the Mall at Louisiana (Prospectus
ID#6; 4.4% of the pool). The pari passu loan is secured by the fee
interest in a 776,917-square-foot (sf) portion of a 1.6 million-sf
regional mall in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Non-collateral anchors
include Dillard's, Dillard's Men's & Home, JCPenney, Macy's, and
Sears. Despite maintaining a stable occupancy of 89% along with a
strong DSCR of 1.94 times (x) as of September 2020, the year-end
2019 NCF was down 13.6% since issuance because of a small decline
in occupancy as well as increased operating expenses. Further,
according to a March 2020 sales report, comparable in-line sales
for tenants of less than 10,000 sf, excluding Apple, were $414 per
sf (psf) compared with $461 psf in 2018 and $496 psf at issuance.

The Canyon Portal (Prospectus ID#20; 2.0% of the pool) is the only
loan in special servicing. The loan is secured by the leasehold
interest in a 47,511-sf mixed-use retail center in Sedona, Arizona,
specifically by a retail component consisting of local shops
catering to the tourist market. The property also includes a
portion of the land underneath the Orchards Inn Sedona, a 70-room
full-service hotel. The land parcel, which is known as Orchards
Annex, represents 44.9% of the property's net rentable area under a
gross lease through 2040. The second-largest tenant, representing
13.7% of the property, is a local restaurant leased through 2072.
The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2020 after the
borrower requested coronavirus relief. It is unclear if the special
servicer is willing to grant relief as the loan has maintained
stable performance to date. As of September 2020, the property was
100% occupied while covering a DSCR of 1.19x.

At issuance, four loans, representing 17.9% of the current pool
balance, were shadow-rated investment grade. These loans include
225 & 233 Park Avenue South (Prospectus ID #1; 5.6% of the pool);
General Motors Building (Prospectus ID#2; 5.2% of the pool); The
Grove at Shrewsbury (Prospectus ID# 7; 4.1% of the pool) and
Lakeside Shopping Center (Prospectus ID #13; 3.1% of the pool).
With this review, DBRS Morningstar confirms that the performance of
these loans remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

Although the overall performance of the pool has remained generally
stable from issuance, DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the
impact of the pandemic on the underlying collateral. DBRS
Morningstar notes that the subject pool has a relatively moderate
concentration (9.9%) of loans backed by hospitality properties. The
pool has a higher concentration of loans secured by retail
properties, which represent 30.5% of the current balance. Both
hotel and retail property types have been among the hardest hit by
the effects of the pandemic and, as such, these loans will be
monitored closely for developments

DBRS Morningstar did not perform an updated model run as
performance was deemed to be generally in line with expectations at
the last review. As of the previous actions published on January
31, 2020, the material deviation(s) from the North American CMBS
Insight Model was reported on Classes B, C, V-2B, V-2C, and V-3AC,
ranging between three and four notices that were lower than the
implied results. These material deviations are warranted, given
that the sustainability of loan performance trends has not yet been
demonstrated.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE13 Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates. In addition, Fitch has revised the
Rating Outlook for one class to Negative from Stable.

     DEBT              RATING              PRIOR
     ----              ------              -----
COMM 2013-CCRE13

A-3 12630BAZ1    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed       AAAsf
A-4 12630BBA5    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed       AAAsf
A-M 12630BBC1    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed       AAAsf
A-SB 12630BAY4   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed       AAAsf
B 12630BBD9      LT  AAsf   Affirmed       AAsf
C 12630BBF4      LT  Asf    Affirmed       Asf
D 12630BAE8      LT  BBB-sf Affirmed       BBB-sf
E 12630BAG3      LT  BBsf   Affirmed       BBsf
F 12630BAJ7      LT  Bsf    Affirmed       Bsf
PEZ 12630BBE7    LT  Asf    Affirmed       Asf
X-A 12630BBB3    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed       AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Loss expectations for the pool have
increased since Fitch's last rating action, due to performance
concerns on the nine Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 37.4% of pool),
including one specially serviced loan (0.8%). Fitch's current
ratings incorporate a base case loss of 2.6%. Losses could reach
5.0% when factoring in additional stresses related to the
coronavirus pandemic and a potential outsized loss of 20% on the
Kalahari Resort and Convention Center loan.

The largest contributor to loss, and the largest change in loss
since the prior rating action, is the 525 West 22nd Street loan
(1.7%), which is secured by a 16,225-sf retail property located in
the Chelsea neighborhood of Manhattan. Occupancy fell to 41.5% from
100% after two tenants vacated. Danese Gallery LLC (26.5% of NRA)
vacated upon their June 2020 lease expiration, and 23rd and 11th
Office (32%) vacated in July 2020, ahead of their May 2021 lease
expiration.

The servicer is negotiating an expansion of an existing tenant's
space into the former Danese Gallery space, which is expected to be
finalized by the end of January 2021. A leasing broker has been
engaged for the former 23rd and 11th Office space. The loan is
currently cash managed; however, per the servicer, after accounting
for the increased vacancy, the current cash flow is insufficient to
cover the combined annual debt service, real estate tax and
insurance expenses.

The next largest contributor to loss, and second largest change in
loss since the prior rating action, is the 175 West Jackson loan
(10.4%), which is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in a
22-story, 1.45 million-sf office building built in 1912, located in
downtown Chicago, IL. The loan was returned to the master servicer
in August 2018 after being assumed by a Brookfield-related entity.

Property occupancy had declined substantially since issuance after
multiple tenants vacated. The prior borrower was also unwilling to
contribute additional capital toward re-leasing and renovating the
property. With the new ownership, occupancy has since increased
slightly to 68.6% as of the September 2020 rent roll, from 67% at
YE 2019 and 60.9% at YE 2018, but still remains significantly below
the 92% reported at issuance. Brookfield is expected to continue
investing additional capital towards stabilizing the asset. The
servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 0.82x as of YE 2019.

The next largest contributor to loss, and third largest change in
loss since the prior rating action, is the specially serviced 6th
and Rio Retail loan (0.8%), which is secured by a 19,259-sf retail
property located in downtown Austin, TX. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2020 due to imminent default caused by the
pandemic and has been delinquent since March 2020. The property is
occupied by two bar tenants, Rio (69% of NRA; through December
2025) and Pop (29%; January 2024).

In March 2020, both tenants were ordered to close as a result of
the coronavirus pandemic. The bar shutdown was lifted in May 2020,
reinstated in June 2020 and most recently lifted again in October
2020. Both bars are currently open as of January 2021. Per the
servicer, foreclosure has not been scheduled yet and there has been
limited progress with a potential workout solution. The
servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 1.73x as of YE 2019.

The largest FLOC, Kalahari Resort and Convention Center (10.4%), is
secured by a 491-key resort hotel and water park located in
Sandusky, OH. The property has experienced significant performance
decline caused by the pandemic. As of YTD June 2020, the
servicer-reported occupancy, ADR and RevPAR fell to 35.8%, $204 and
$73, respectively, from 73.9%, $204 and $151 at YE 2019 and 70.7%
and $201 and $142 at YE 2018.

In July 2020, the borrower was granted relief which allowed them to
use reserve funds to make debt service payments. The loan remains
current, but was previously 30 days delinquent in June 2020. The
loan had a balance of $249,660 in repair reserves and no FF&E
reserves remaining as of December 2020. The hotel and water park
remain open as of January 2021. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR fell
to 0.87x as of TTM June 2020 from 2.89x at YE 2019.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the December 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
26.4% to $813.9 million from $1.125 billion at issuance and 1.5%
since Fitch's last rating action. Fifteen loans totaling 23.2% of
the pool are defeased, up from 12 loans (20.2%) at the last rating
action. Two loans (17.1%) are full-term interest-only and the
remainder of the pool is currently amortizing. All of the remaining
loans in the pool mature in 2023. The non-rated class G has been
impacted by $6.5 million in realized losses to date (0.6% of
original pool balance).

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario which assumed a potential outsized loss of 20%
on the current balance of the Kalahari Resort and Convention Center
loan to reflect refinance concerns and the high vulnerability of
the property to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, while also
factoring in the expected paydown of the transaction from defeased
loans. This analysis contributed to the Negative Rating Outlook
revision on class F.

Coronavirus Exposure: Five loans (23.7%) are secured by hotel
properties. The weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR for the hotel loans
is 2.72x; these hotel loans could sustain a NOI decline of 62.4%
before DSCR falls below 1.0x. Nine loans (10.0%) are secured by
retail properties. The WA NOI DSCR for the retail loans is 1.68x;
these retail loans could sustain a NOI decline of 37.3% before DSCR
falls below 1.0x. Three loans (6.6%) are secured by multifamily
properties, including one student housing property (0.4%). The WA
NOI DSCR for the multifamily loans is 1.45x; these multifamily
loans could sustain a NOI decline of 30.2% before DSCR falls below
1.0x.

Fitch applied additional coronavirus-related stresses to three
hotel loans, four retail loans and one student housing loan to
account for potential cash flow disruptions due to the pandemic;
this analysis contributed to the Negative Outlook revision on class
F.

Increasing Pool Concentration: Forty-three of the original 57 loans
remain. The top five non-defeased loans account for 50.6% of the
pool and the top 10 non-defeased loans account for 62.3% of the
pool.

Credit Opinion Loan: Fitch assigned an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'AAsf*' on a stand-alone basis to the largest loan in
the pool, 60 Hudson Street (15.4%), at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlook on class F reflects the potential for
downgrade due to concerns surrounding the ultimate impact of the
coronavirus pandemic and the performance concerns associated with
the FLOCs. The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB through E
reflect the increasing credit enhancement, continued expected
amortization and relatively stable performance of the majority of
the pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include:

-- Stable to improved asset performance coupled with pay down
    and/or defeasance.

-- Upgrades of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur
    with significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or
    defeasance; however, adverse selection, increased
    concentrations and further underperformance of the FLOCs or
    loans expected to be negatively affected by the coronavirus
    pandemic could cause this trend to reverse.

-- Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' category would be limited based on
    sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
    concentration.

-- Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is
    likelihood for interest shortfalls.

-- Upgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories are not likely
    until the later years in a transaction and only if the
    performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or properties
    vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels,
    and there is sufficient credit enhancement to the classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include:

-- An increase in pool level losses from underperforming or
    specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf'
    categories are not likely due to the position in the capital
    structure, but may occur should interest shortfalls impact the
    classes.

-- Downgrades to the 'BBBsf' and Asf' category would occur should
    overall pool losses increase significantly and/or one or more
    large loans have an outsized loss, which would erode credit
    enhancement.

-- Downgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories would occur
    should loss expectations increase and if performance of the
    FLOCs or loans vulnerable to the coronavirus pandemic fail to
    stabilize or additional loans default and/or transfer to the
    special servicer.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
negative rating actions, including downgrades and/or further
Negative Rating Outlook revisions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


COMM 2016-CCRE28: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-E Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-CCRE28 issued by COMM
2016-CCRE28 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-HR at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-HR at AAA (sf)
-- Class XP-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (sf)
-- Class H at B (low) (sf)

Classes G, X-E, and H were removed from Under Review with Negative
Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. The trends
on these classes are Negative. Additionally, the trends on Classes
F and X-D are Negative. All other trends are Stable. The Negative
trends reflect the continued performance challenges for the
underlying collateral, much of which has been driven by the impact
of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In addition to
loans representing 11.1% of the pool being in special servicing as
of the December 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes that
the pool has a significant concentration in retail and hospitality
properties, representing 23.7% and 16.5% of the pool balance,
respectively. These property types have been the most severely
affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and, as
such, those concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool,
particularly at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the December 2020 remittance, 48 of the original 49 loans
remain in the pool, representing a 5.7% reduction of collateral.
There are six loans, representing 11.1% of the pool, with the
special servicer, the largest of which is the Equitable City Center
loan (Prospectus ID#6, 5.7% of the pool). This loan is secured by a
165,257-sf retail center in the Koreatown section of Los Angeles.
Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the loan had stable performance,
reporting a healthy 2019 net cash flow (NCF) of $4.3 million and a
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.75 times (x). As of August
2020, occupancy was 70%, which is a 12% decline when compared with
the issuance level. It appears that the second-largest tenant at
issuance, Crystal Spa, which occupied 9% of the GLA, has vacated
ahead of its scheduled lease expiration in 2029. The two largest
tenants remaining are H-Mart, which occupies 18% of the GLA on a
lease through 2030, and Seung Ae, which occupies 6% of the GLA on a
lease through 2025. Overall, the rent roll is fairly granular as no
other tenant represents more than 5% of the GLA. The servicer is
reviewing the borrower's request for a long-term forbearance as the
coronavirus pandemic damped rent collections. However, the LTV
based on the September 2020 appraisal is reasonable at 73% and the
loan does have strong sponsorship with David Lee, an experienced
landlord in Koreatown, which mitigates some of the concern.

The Holiday Inn Fort Worth North Fossil Creek loan (Prospectus
ID#28, 1.2% of the pool) is secured by a 126-room full-service
hotel, which has been with the special servicer since 2018 when the
borrower notified of its inability to cover shortfalls and
inability to complete the property improvement project (PIP), which
was due in 2018. An attempted property sale was unsuccessful in
August 2020 and the plan continues to be to stabilize the asset's
performance and place it back on the market when the timing is more
advantageous. A May 2020 appraisal valued the property at $8.7
million, which is below the $11.7 million loan balance.

There are eight loans, representing 16.9% of the pool, on the
servicer's watchlist. These loans are being monitored for various
reasons including low DSCR or occupancy, tenant rollover risk,
and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests. Three of the
watchlist loans, collectively representing 10.5% of the pool
balance, have been modified with either a maturity extension or
temporary debt relief. The largest of these three is the Hyatt
Regency St. Louis at The Arch loan (Prospectus ID#5, 5.3% of the
pool balance), which had stable performance prior to the pandemic
but struggled to keep up with its competition as reported by the
STR reports. The loan received a temporary three-month suspension
of reserve payments that will be repaid over a 12-month period. The
Equity Inns Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#10, 4.1% of the pool
balance) received a two-year maturity extension, which pushed
maturity to October 2022, and the loan will also be paid down by $3
million from October 2021 through October 2022. Lastly, the
Springhill Suites - Huntsville loan (Prospectus ID#30, 1.1% of the
pool balance) was also granted a temporary three-month suspension
of reserve payments to be repaid over a 12-month period.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2001-CMLB1: Moody's Affirms B3 on X Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the
interest-only class (IO) in Commercial Mortgage Leased-Backed
Certificates 2000-CMLB1 (CMLBC 2001-CMLB1), as follows:

Cl. X*, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2019 Affirmed B3
(sf)

* Reflects interest-only class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the interest only (IO) class was affirmed based on
the credit quality of its referenced classes. The IO class
references all P&I classes which are not rated by Moody's

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around Moody's forecasts is unusually high. Stress
on commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

An IO class may be subject to ratings upgrades if there is an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes,
subject to the limits and provisions of the updated IO
methodology.

An IO class may be subject to ratings downgrades if there is (i) a
decline in the credit quality of the reference classes and/or (ii)
paydowns of higher quality reference classes, subject to the limits
and provisions of the updated IO methodology.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease Financings"
published in June 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $59.1 million
from $476.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 41 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
2% to 14% of the pool. Twenty-eight of the loans are CTL loans
secured by properties leased to nine corporate credit tenants.
Thirteen loans, representing 27% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

The CTL pool, excluding defeasance, consists of 28 loans secured by
properties leased to 9 tenants. The largest exposure is AutoZone,
Inc. ($15.1 million -- 26% of the pool; senior unsecured rating:
Baa1 -- stable outlook). Seven of the tenants (67% of the pool
excluding defeasance) have a Moody's investment grade ratings. The
bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool
(including defeasance) is 1377, compared to 1838 at the last
review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.


CPS AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Class A Notes issued by CPS Auto
Securitization Trust 2018-1 at BB (low) (sf). The rating was
removed from Under Review with Negative Implications, where it was
placed on July 14, 2020, and maintained on October 16, 2020.

The rating action is based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The Notes are secured by the right to receive certain residual
cash flows resulting from the following 17 securitization
transactions sponsored by CPS: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-B,
2015-C, 2016-A, 2016-B, 2016-C, 2016-D, 2017-A, 2017-B, 2017-C and
2017-D (together, the Underlying Securitization Transactions). The
transaction was also secured by residuals from 2013-C, 2013-D,
2014-A, 2014-B, 2014-C, 2014-D, 2015-A which have been paid in
full.

-- The performance of the DBRS rated Underlying Securitization
Transactions and the stability and migration of outstanding
ratings. This includes DBRS Morningstar's assessment of future
performance, including upward revisions to the expected CNL
assumptions consistent with the expected unemployment levels in the
moderate scenario.

-- The transaction assumptions for the Underlying Securitization
Transactions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of macroeconomic
scenarios for select economies related to the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The scenarios were
last updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions for the Underlying Securitization Transactions
consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the
commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as the primary
anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario factors in
increasing success in containment during the first half of 2021,
enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

-- Pursuant to the DBRS Internal Assessment Global Policy, DBRS
has relied on public ratings issued by other credit rating agencies
for the assessment of certain tranches of Underlying Securitization
Transactions not rated by DBRS. Pursuant to the DBRS methodology
Rating U.S. Structured Finance Transactions, generally, the highest
rating assigned in a residual re-securitization may not exceed the
lowest outstanding rating in the pool of primary transactions. DBRS
Morningstar has excluded CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-C from the
rating analysis as the most subordinated class of notes was
determined to be below the CPS 2018-1 rating level. In addition
DBRS Morningstar has excluded CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-A
from the current rating analysis as the Class F Notes are currently
Under Review with Negative Implications. DBRS Morningstar performed
the analysis on CPS Auto Securitization Trust 2018-1 without credit
to any cash allocation from CPS Auto Receivables Trust Series
2016-A and 2016-C.

-- The transaction's capital structure, and form and sufficiency
of available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are commensurate with the
ratings.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


CPS AUTO 2021-A: DBRS Gives Provisional BB Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2021-A:

-- $105,228,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $43,855,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $36,137,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $26,705,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $18,620,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of over-collateralization
(OC), subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund, and excess
spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption
under various stress scenarios.

-- DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). While
considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the intensity and
duration of the shock, the DBRS Morningstar-projected CNL includes
an assessment of the expected impact on consumer behavior. The DBRS
Morningstar CNL assumption is 17.00%, based on the expected cut-off
date pool composition.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, that have been regularly updated. The scenarios were last
updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions also take into
consideration observed performance during the 2008–09 financial
crisis and the possible impact of stimulus. The assumptions
consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the
commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as the primary
anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario factors in
increasing success in containment during the first half of 2021,
enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

(2) The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

(3) The consistent operational history of Consumer Portfolio
Services, Inc. and the strength of the overall Company and its
management team.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and
a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

(4) The capabilities of CPS with regard to originations,
underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar performed an operational review of CPS and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
servicer.

(5) DBRS Morningstar exclusively used the static pool approach
because CPS has enough data to generate a sufficient amount of
static pool projected losses.

-- DBRS Morningstar was conservative in the loss forecast analysis
performed on the static pool data.

(6) The Company indicated that it may be subject to various
consumer claims and litigation seeking damages and statutory
penalties. Some litigation against CPS could take the form of
class-action complaints by consumers; however, the Company
indicated that there is no material pending or threatened
litigation.

(7) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the nonconsolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that the trust has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets, and the consistency
with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured
Finance."

CPS is an independent full-service automotive financing and
servicing company that provides (1) financing to borrowers who do
not typically have access to prime credit-lending terms for the
purchase of late-model vehicles and (2) refinancing of existing
automotive financing.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 58.05% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool
(51.15%), the reserve account (1.00%), and OC (5.90%). The ratings
on the Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E Notes reflect 40.15%,
25.40%, 14.50%, and 6.90% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DT AUTO 2021-1: DBRS Assigns Provisional BB Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2021-1:

-- $186,000,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $38,000,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $60,000,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $42,000,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $20,000,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of the following
analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of over-collateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund, and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under
various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

(2) DTAOT 2021-1 provides for Classes A, B, C, D, and E coverage
multiples that are slightly below the DBRS Morningstar range of
multiples set forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS
Morningstar believes that this is warranted, given the magnitude of
expected loss, company history, and structural features of the
transaction.

(3) DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include an assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). While
considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the intensity and
duration of the pandemic, the DBRS Morningstar-projected CNL
includes an assessment of the expected impact on consumer behavior.
The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 30.00% based on the expected
Cut-Off Date pool composition.

(4) The assessment was guided by DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios:
December Update" commentary published on December 2, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, and they have been regularly updated. The scenarios were
updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions consider the
moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the commentary, with
the moderate scenario serving as the primary anchor for current
ratings. The moderate scenario factors in increasing success in
containment during the first half of 2021, enabling the continued
relaxation of restrictions.

(5) The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

(6) The quality and consistency of historical static pool data for
DriveTime originations and performance of the DriveTime auto loan
portfolio.

(7) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions, which
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with DriveTime,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets, and the consistency with DBRS Morningstar's Legal Criteria
for U.S. Structured Finance methodology.

The transaction represents a securitization of a portfolio of motor
vehicle retail installment sales contracts originated by DriveTime
Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator). The Originator is a
direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of DriveTime. DriveTime is a
leading used-vehicle retailer in the United States that focuses
primarily on the sale and financing of vehicles to the subprime
market.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 55.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated Notes in the pool,
the reserve account (1.50%), and over-collateralization (13.50%).
The ratings on the Class B, C, D, and E Notes reflect 45.50%,
30.50%, 20.00%, and 15.00% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GE COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: DBRS Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to D
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings of the following two remaining
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-C1 issued by GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Series
2007-C1, as follows:

-- Class A-M to D (sf) from C (sf)
-- Class A-MFX to D (sf) from C (sf)

DBRS Morningstar has also removed the Interest in Arrears
designation on Classes A-M and A-MFX.

The rating downgrades are the result of the most recent realized
losses to the Trust, which occurred after the Wellpoint Office
Tower (Prospectus ID#10) and JP Morgan Portfolio (Prospectus ID#7)
loans were liquidated from the Trust at a loss of $66.4 million and
$127.8 million, respectively, with the December 2020 remittance.
The loss eroded the remaining balance on Classes A-M and A-MFX.
Since issuance, the transaction has experienced a cumulative loss
of $736.9 million with the December 2020 remittance.

The Wellpoint Office Tower loan, which was secured by a 450,000-sf
office building in Woodland Hills, California, had been in special
servicing since November 2019 for maturity default. In June 2020,
an updated appraisal had been provided, with the property's value
reported at $39.1 million ($87 psf), compared with an issuance
value of $150 million ($335 psf). This loan ultimately liquidated
from the trust with the December 2020 remittance, incurring a
realized trust loss of $66.4 million, resulting in a realized loss
severity of 59.2%.

The JP Morgan Portfolio loan was originally secured by a 40-story,
Class A office tower and accompanying parking garage in the
Phoenix, Arizona, CBD, and a 17-story Class B office tower in
downtown Houston, Texas. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in March 2017 for imminent balloon default and the
servicer proceeded with foreclosure. In February 2018 the Phoenix
collateral was sold, with a $62.1 million paydown applied in April
2018. The remaining Houston property was most recently valued in
March 2019, when an appraised value of $42.0 million was reported,
down from $52.0 million in the previous year and $63.2 million at
issuance. This remaining loan balance was liquidated from the trust
with the December 2020 remittance, incurring a realized trust loss
of $127.8 million, resulting in a realized loss severity of 95.0%.

There are no outstanding ratings remaining following the
above-referenced rating action. As such, this concludes DBRS
Morningstar's surveillance of this transaction.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-GC45: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-RR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-GC45 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2020-GC45 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (sf)

In addition, Classes F-RR and G-RR were removed from Under Review
with Negative Implications, where they were placed on August 6,
2020. All trends are Stable.

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the loan-specific certificates as
follows:

-- Class SW-A at A (low) (sf)
-- Class SW-B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class SW-C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class SW-D at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The ratings confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the underlying loans in the transaction. At issuance, the trust
consisted of 52 fixed-rate loans secured by 152 commercial,
hospitality, and multifamily properties with an original balance of
$1.39 billion. As of the December 2020 remittance report, all of
the original loans remain in the pool and there has been nominal
collateral reduction of 0.08% since issuance. Amortization has
generally been limited as 29 of the loans representing 68.2% of the
current pool balance are structured as interest-only (IO) and 17
loans representing another 26.5% are structured as partial-IO and
remain in their IO periods. The collateral pool's property type
concentration is relatively diverse, with the greatest property
type concentration by loan balance consisting of mixed-use assets
(eight loans accounting for 23.2% of the current pool balance).
Retail assets account for the second greatest property type
concentration, with 15 loans that represent 21.7% of the current
pool balance. There are four loans secured by lodging properties,
which have been particularly hard-hit by the global Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic; however, the concentration is
relatively small as these loans make up only 9.3% of the current
pool balance.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar assigned an investment-grade shadow
rating to eight loans (seven of which were included in the 15
largest loans): Prospectus ID#1 – 1633 Broadway (4.5% of current
pool); Prospectus ID#2 – 560 Mission 1 (4.5% of current pool);
Prospectus ID#3 – Starwood Class A Industrial Portfolio 1 (4.5%
of current pool); Prospectus ID#4 – Bellagio Hotel and Casino
(4.5% of current pool); Prospectus ID#5 – Southcenter Mall (4.5%
of current pool); Prospectus ID#8 – 650 Madison Avenue (3.8% of
current pool); Prospectus ID#14 – Parkmerced (2.8% of current
pool); and Prospectus ID#17 – 510 East 14th Street (2.6% of
current pool). With this review, DBRS Morningstar confirmed that
the respective performance of each of these loans remains
consistent with the characteristics of an investment-grade loan.

As of the December 2020 remittance period, there were five loans
representing 9.3% of the current pool balance on the servicer's
watchlist, including two loans representing 7.8% of the pool in the
15 largest loans. These five loans are being monitored for a
variety of reasons including a low debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and/or requests from the respective borrowers for
coronavirus relief. There were no loans in special servicing and no
delinquent loans as of the December 2020 remittance. The two
largest loans on the servicer's watchlist were Prospectus ID#7 –
Van Aken District (4.0% of current pool) and Prospectus ID#11 –
Crystal Springs Resort (3.8% of current pool).

The largest watchlisted loan, Prospectus ID#7 – Van Aken
District, is secured by a 237,574 square-foot (sf) mixed-use
development in Shaker Heights, Ohio. The loan was added to the
servicer's watchlist in November 2020 after the DSCR fell below 75%
of the issuer's DSCR due to the ongoing effects of the coronavirus.
The subject consists of 80,118 sf of retail space, 62,961 sf of
office space, and 103 multifamily units, and was built in phases
during 2005 and from 2018 to 2019. Tenancy is granular, as no
tenant makes up more than 8.0% of the net rentable area (NRA), and
primarily consists of local retailers and some regional and
national office tenants. The September 2020 rent roll for the
commercial portion of the property shows that the property was
84.8% leased, including the fourth-largest tenant, Beauty Shoppe
(3.4% of NRA), which operates as a co-working space. According to
the borrower, the pandemic meant a delay in the tenant's opening at
the property and as a result, most of the rent due for 2020 was
forgiven, contributing to the cash flow declines for the property.
Meanwhile, the multifamily portion of the property reported a June
2020 rent roll with an occupancy rate of 95.1%. The servicer
reported a trailing six months ended June 2020 DSCR of 1.25 times
(x), compared to the issuer's DSCR of 2.36x.

The second-largest watchlisted loan, Prospectus ID#11 – Crystal
Springs Resort, is a five-year loan secured by the rental interests
in the privately-owned condominium hotel units in two full-service
hotel properties, both of which are located in Hamburg, New Jersey
(50 miles west of Manhattan). Together, the two properties offer a
total of 457 keys, and at issuance, 419 were participating in the
property's rental management program, whereby the property
management team rents the participating units as if they were
typical hotel units. The collateral also includes the borrower's
fee interest in six golf courses with five clubhouses and the
ownership interest in 12 food and beverage outlets, all situated on
a total of 232 acres.

The loan was added to the servicer's watchlist in August 2020 after
the DSCR fell below the 75% of the issuer's DSCR. The servicer
reported a trailing 12 months ended September 2020 DSCR of 1.34x,
which was a sharp decrease from the issuer's DSCR of 3.93x and
suggested a full year's cash flows with the impact of the
coronavirus realized would show a coverage ratio well below
breakeven. The watchlist commentary notes that the hotel portion of
the property was closed for April and May 2020. DBRS Morningstar
has requested further information from the servicer.

The loan-specific certificates represented by Classes SW-A, SW-B,
SW-C, and SW-D are backed by the $65.5 million subordinate
companion loan of the $210 million Starwood Industrial Portfolio
whole loan, which is secured by a portfolio of 33 industrial
properties (including 24 warehouses, three distribution centers,
two manufacturing facilities, two cold storage facilities, and two
flex spaces) totaling 4.1 million sf across four states (Indiana,
Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin). The loan-specific certificates are
not pooled with the remainder of the trust loans. With this review,
DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the performance of the underlying
loan remains in line with the expectations at issuance, supporting
the rating confirmations for those classes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2021-PJ1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating to Class B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-PJ1 to be issued by
GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2021-PJ1 (GSMBS 2021-PJ1):

-- $353.4 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $353.4 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.9 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.9 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $265.0 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $265.0 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $88.3 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $88.3 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $394.3 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $394.3 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $394.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $353.4 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.9 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $265.0 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $88.3 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $15.8 million Class B at BBB (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-1-A at AA (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-1-X at AA (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-2-A at A (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-2-X at A (sf)
-- $4.2 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $4.2 million Class B-3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $4.2 million Class B-3-X at BBB (sf)
-- $2.5 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.0 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-5, A-X-7, B-1-X, B-2-X, B-3-X, and
B-X are interest-only certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6, A-8, A-9, A 10, A-X-2, B, B-1, B-2,
B-3, and B-X are exchangeable certificates. These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of exchange certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7, and A-8 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
the senior support certificates (Classes A-3 and A-4) with respect
to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 5.15% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 3.70%, 2.35%,
1.35%, 0.75%, and 0.50% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien fixed-rate prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 423 loans with a total principal
balance of $415,719,429 as of the Cut-Off Date (January 1, 2021).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of 30 years and a weighted-average loan
age of two months. Approximately 99.3% of the pool are traditional,
nonagency, prime jumbo mortgage loans. The remaining 0.7% of the
pool are conforming, high-balance mortgage loans that were
underwritten using an automated underwriting system designated by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and were eligible for purchase by such
agencies. Details on the underwriting of conforming loans can be
found in the Key Probability of Default Drivers section in the
related presale report.

The originators for the mortgage pool are CrossCountry Mortgage LLC
(41.4%), Guaranteed Rate, Inc (20.4%), and various other
originators, each comprising less than 15.0% of the mortgage loans.
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company is the Sponsor and the Mortgage Loan
Seller of the transaction. For certain originators, the related
loans were sold to MAXEX Clearing LLC (4.6%) and were subsequently
acquired by the Mortgage Loan Seller.

NewRez LLC doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will
service the mortgage loans within the pool. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as
the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator, and Custodian. U.S.
Bank Trust National Association will serve as Delaware Trustee.
Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will serve as the representations and
warranties (R&W) File Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a precrisis structure.

For this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March 27, 2020, seven
loans (1.1% of the pool) had been granted forbearance plans because
the borrowers reported financial hardship related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. These forbearance plans
allow temporary payment holidays, followed by repayment once the
forbearance period ends. As of the Cut-Off Date, all seven loans
satisfied their forbearance plans and are current. Furthermore,
none of the loans in the pool are on active coronavirus forbearance
plans.

Coronavirus Pandemic Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may arise in the coming
months for many RMBS asset classes, some meaningfully.

The prime mortgage sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that
consists of securitizations backed by pools of residential home
loans originated to borrowers with prime credit. Generally, these
borrowers have decent FICO scores, reasonable equity, and robust
income and liquid reserves.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies and loans on forbearance plans, slower voluntary
prepayment rates, and a potential near-term decline in the values
of the mortgaged properties. Such deteriorations may adversely
affect borrowers' ability to make monthly payments, refinance their
loans, or sell properties in an amount sufficient to repay the
outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update,"
published on December 2, 2020), for the prime asset class DBRS
Morningstar assumes a combination of higher unemployment rates and
more conservative home price assumptions than what DBRS Morningstar
previously used. Such assumptions translate to higher expected
losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit
enhancement.

In the prime asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that this sector should have low
intrinsic credit risk. Within the prime asset class, loans
originated to (1) self-employed borrowers or (2) higher
loan-to-value ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to economic
hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and lower
incomes. Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to more
volatile income sources, which could lead to reduced cash flows
generated from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with lower
equity in their properties, generally have fewer refinance
opportunities and therefore slower prepayments. In addition,
certain pools with elevated geographic concentrations in densely
populated urban metropolitan statistical areas may experience
additional stress from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown
of the economy.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality credit attributes, well-qualified borrowers,
satisfactory third-party due-diligence review, structural
enhancements, and 100% current loans.

The ratings reflect transactional weaknesses that include their R&W
framework, entities lacking financial strength or securitization
history, servicer's financial capabilities, and borrowers on
forbearance plans.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2021-1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 51
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) 2021-1. The ratings range from
(P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 1,121 fully-amortizing fixed-rate
mortgage loans with a total balance of $1,033,923,807 as of the
December 31, 2020 cut-off date. The loans have original terms to
maturity of up to 30 years. Similar to prior JPMMT transactions,
JPMMT 2021-1 includes agency-eligible mortgage loans (approximately
3.7% by loan balance) underwritten to the government sponsored
enterprises guidelines, in addition to prime jumbo non-agency
eligible mortgages purchased by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition
Corp. (JPMMAC), the sponsor and mortgage loan seller, from various
originators and aggregators. The characteristics of the mortgage
loans underlying the pool are generally comparable to those of
other JPMMT transactions backed by prime mortgage loans that
Moody's have rated. As of the cut-off date, no borrower under any
mortgage loan has entered into a COVID-19 related forbearance plan
with the servicer.

Guaranteed Rate, Inc originated approximately 12.2% of the mortgage
loans (by balance) in the pool. All other originators accounted for
less than 10% of the pool by balance. With respect to the mortgage
loans, each originator made a representation and warranty (that the
mortgage loan constitutes a qualified mortgage under the QM rule.

NewRez LLC f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing ("Shellpoint") will interim service approximately about
91.01% (subserviced by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association ),
loanDepot.com, LLC (loanDepot) will service about 4.4% (subserviced
by Cenlar, FSB), United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC will service about
3.6% of the mortgage loans ( also subserviced by Cenlar, FSB),
Johnson Bank will service about 0.9% and USAA Federal Savings Bank
(USAA) will service about 0.1% (subserviced by Nationstar).
Shellpoint will act as interim servicer for the JPMCB mortgage
loans from the closing date until the servicing transfer date,
which is expected to occur on or about April 1, 2021 (but which may
occur after such date). After the servicing transfer date, these
mortgage loans will be serviced by JPMCB.

The servicing fee for loans serviced by JPMCB (Shellpoint, until
the servicing transfer date),loanDepot and United Wholesale
Mortgage, LLC will be based on a step-up incentive fee structure
and additional fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans.
Johnson Bank and USAA Federal Savings Bank ("USAA") have a fixed
fee servicing framework. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will
be the master servicer and Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) will be the
securities administrator and Delaware trustee. Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC will be the representations and warranties breach
reviewer.

Four third-party review firms verified the accuracy of the loan
level information. These firms conducted detailed credit, property
valuation, data accuracy and compliance reviews on 100% of the
mortgage loans in the collateral pool.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a typical shifting interest structure that benefits from
senior and subordination floors. Moody's coded the cash flow to
each of the certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow
tool. In coding the cash flow, Moody's took into account the
step-up incentive servicing fee structure.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2021-1

Cl. A-1, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-AI*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-B, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-BI*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Rating Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Rating Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Rating Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Rating Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
0.36%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.19%, and reaches 3.82% at
a stress level consistent with our Aaa ratings.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around our forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's increased our model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(10.2% for the mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely
performance deterioration resulting from of a slowdown in US
economic activity due to the coronavirus outbreak.

Moody's regards the COVID-19 outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's base its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the TPR and the R&W framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2021-1 is a securitization of a pool of 1,121
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$1,033,923,807 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted average (WA)
remaining term to maturity of 357 months, and a WA seasoning of 3
months. The WA current FICO score is 776 and the WA original
combined loan-to-value ratio is 69.7%. About 78.36% of the mortgage
loans (by balance) were originated through correspondent (3.73%)
and broker (74.64%) channels.

The borrowers have high monthly income (about $27,424 on WA.
average), and significant liquid cash reserve (about $362,792 on
average), all of which have been verified as part of the
underwriting process and reviewed by the third-party review firms.
The GSE-eligible loans have an average balance of $683,273 compared
to the average GSE balance of approximately $230,000. The higher
conforming loan balance is attributable to the greater amount of
properties located in high-cost areas, such as the metro areas of
Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York City. The GSE-eligible
loans, which make up about 3.7% of the JPMMT 2021-1 pool by loan
balance, were underwritten pursuant to GSE guidelines and were
approved by DU/LP. All the loans are subject to the QM and
Ability-to-Repay rules.

Overall, the characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to those of other JPMMT transactions backed by
prime mortgage loans that we have rated.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's consider JPMMAC's aggregation platform to be adequate and
we did not apply a separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation
quality. In addition to reviewing JPMMAC as an aggregator, Moody's
have also reviewed the originator(s) contributing a significant
percentage of the collateral pool (above 10%). Additionally,
Moody's did not make an adjustment for GSE-eligible loans, since
those loans were underwritten in accordance with GSE guidelines.
Moody's increased our base case and Aaa loss expectations for
certain originators of non-conforming loans where Moody's do not
have clear insight into the underwriting practices, quality control
and credit risk management. In addition, Moody's reviewed the loan
performance for some of these originators. Moody's viewed the loan
performance as comparable to the GSE loans due to consistently low
delinquencies, early payment defaults and repurchase requests.

United Shore (originator): Loans originated by United Shore have
been included in several prime jumbo securitizations that Moody's
have rated. United Shore originated approximately 73.28% of the
mortgage loans by pool balance (69.31% for non-conforming loans and
3.97% for conforming loans). The majority of these loans were
originated under United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program
which are processed using the Desktop Underwriter automated
underwriting system, and are therefore underwritten to Fannie Mae
guidelines. The loans receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due
to the loan amount only. Moody's made a negative origination
adjustment (i.e. Moody's increased our loss expectations) for
United Shore's loans due mostly to 1) the lack of statistically
significant program specific loan performance data and 2) the fact
that United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program is unique and
fairly new and no performance history has been provided to Moody's
on these loans. Under this program, the origination criteria rely
on the use of GSE tools (DU/LP) for prime-jumbo non-conforming
loans, subject to Qualified Mortgage overlays. More time is needed
to assess United Shore's ability to consistently produce
high-quality prime jumbo residential mortgage loans under this
program.

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to
be adequate given the strong servicing arrangement of the
servicers, as well as the presence of a strong master servicer to
oversee the servicers. The servicers are contractually obligated to
the issuing entity to service the related mortgage loans. However,
the servicers may perform their servicing obligations through
sub-servicers. In this transaction, Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc. corporate family rating B2) will
act as the master servicer. The servicers are required to advance
P&I on the mortgage loans. To the extent that the servicers are
unable to do so, the master servicer will be obligated to make such
advances. In the event that the master servicer, Nationstar, is
unable to make such advances, the securities administrator,
Citibank (rated Aa3) will be obligated to do so to the extent such
advance is determined by the securities administrator to be
recoverable.

COVID-19 Impacted Borrowers

As of the cut-off date, 1.55% of the borrowers have entered into a
COVID-19 related forbearance plan with the servicer but none of
them are active. JPMMAC will be removing any mortgage loan with
respect to which the related borrower requests or enters into a
COVID-19 related forbearance plan after the cut-off date but on or
prior to the closing date, which would be a closing date
substitution amount treated like a prepayment at month one. In the
event that after the closing date a borrower enters into or
requests a COVID-19 related forbearance plan, such mortgage loan
(and the risks associated with it) will remain in the mortgage
pool.

Typically, the borrower must contact the servicer and attest they
have been impacted by a COVID-19 hardship and that they require
payment assistance. The servicer will offer an initial forbearance
period to the borrower, which can be extended if the borrower
attests that they require additional payment assistance.

At the end of the forbearance period, if the borrower is unable to
make the forborne payments on such mortgage loan as a lump sum
payment or does not enter into a repayment plan, the servicer may
defer the missed payments, which could be added as a
non-interest-bearing payment due at the end of the loan term. If
the borrower can no longer afford to make payments in line with the
original loan terms, the servicer would typically work with the
borrower to modify the loan (although the servicer may utilize any
other loss mitigation option permitted under the pooling and
servicing agreement with respect to such mortgage loan at such time
or any time thereafter).

However, it should be noted that servicing practices, including
tracking COVID-19-related loss mitigation activities, may vary
among servicers in this particular transaction. These
inconsistencies could impact reported collateral performance and
affect the timing of any breach of performance triggers, servicer
advance recoupment, the extent of servicer fees, and additional
expenses for R&W breach reviews when loans become seriously
delinquent.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for all loans will be based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $40 per loan and
additional fees for delinquent or defaulted loans.

By establishing a base servicing fee for performing loans that
increases when loans become delinquent, the fee-for-service
structure aligns monetary incentives to the servicer with the costs
of servicing. The servicer receives higher fees for labor-intensive
activities that are associated with servicing delinquent loans,
including loss mitigation, than they receive for servicing a
performing loan, which is less costly and labor-intensive. The
fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and adequate for this
transaction because it better aligns the servicer's costs with the
deal's performance. Furthermore, higher fees for the more
labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these loans to another
servicer easier, should that become necessary.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $40 for all performing loans and increases according to a
pre-determined delinquent and incentive servicing fee schedule. The
delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from the
available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-Party Review

Four TPR firms, AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), Clayton Services LLC
(Clayton), Opus Capital Markets Consultants, LLC (Opus), and Inglet
Blair (IB) (collectively, TPR firms) reviewed 100% of the loans in
this transaction for credit, regulatory compliance, property
valuation, and data accuracy. Each mortgage loan was reviewed by
only one of the TPR firms and each TPR firm produced one or more
reports detailing its review procedures and the related results.
The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for majority of loans, no material
compliance issues and no material appraisal defects. Overall, the
loans that had exceptions to the originators' underwriting
guidelines had strong documented compensating factors such as low
DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment
histories. The TPR firms also identified minor compliance
exceptions for reasons such as inadequate RESPA disclosures (which
do not have assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) violations related to fees that were out of
variance but then were cured and disclosed.

In addition, there are nine loans (0.76% of the pool) that have
exterior only appraisal due to COVID-19, instead of full appraisal.
Three out of such nine loans are for purchase and have a sales
price. These exterior-only loans are all non-conforming loans,
underwritten through Guaranteed Rate's guidelines. Since the
exterior-only appraisal only covers the outside of the property
there is a risk that the property condition cannot be verified to
the same extent had the appraiser been provided access to the
interior of the home. Moody's did not make any specific adjustment
for exterior-only appraisal loans since they make a de minimis
portion of the pool.

While the transaction benefits from strong TPR results for credit
and compliance, the overall property valuation review for this
transaction is weaker than in most prime jumbo transactions Moody's
have rated, which typically had third-party valuation products,
such as desktop appraisals or field reviews, ordered for the vast
majority of the collateral pool. In this transaction, most of the
non-conforming loans originated under United Shore's High Balance
Nationwide program had a property valuation review only consisting
of Fannie Mae Collateral Underwriter risk scores (in some
instances, combined with an automated valuation model) and no other
third-party valuation product such as a collateral desk appraisal
and field review. Moody's considers the use of CU risk scores for
non-conforming loans to be credit negative due to (1) the lack of
human intervention which increases the likelihood of missing
emerging risk trends, (2) the limited track record of the software
and limited transparency into the model and (3) GSE focus on
non-jumbo loans which may lower reliability on jumbo loan
appraisals. Moody's applied an adjustment to the loss for such
loans since the statistically significant sample size and valuation
results of the loans that were reviewed using a third-party
valuation product such as a CDA and field review were
insufficient.

R&W Framework

JPMMT 2021-1's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework considers the financial
strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers
and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms. The creditworthiness of
the R&W provider determines the probability that the R&W provider
will be available and have the financial strength to repurchase
defective loans upon identifying a breach. An investment grade
rated R&W provider lends substantial strength to its R&Ws. Moody's
analyze the impact of less creditworthy R&W providers case by case,
in conjunction with other aspects of the transaction.

Moody's made no adjustments to the loans for which JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (rated Aa1) provided R&Ws since it is a high-rated and
financially stable entity. Furthermore, the R&W provider, Quicken
Loans, LLC (rated Ba1) has a strong credit profile and is a
financially stable entity. However, Moody's applied an adjustment
to Moody's expected losses to account for the risk that Quicken
Loans may be unable to repurchase defective loans in a stressed
economic environment in which a substantial portion of the loans
breach the R&Ws, given that it is a non-bank entity with a monoline
business (mortgage origination and servicing) that is highly
correlated with the economy. Moody's tempered this adjustment by
taking into account Quicken Loans' relative financial strength
relative to other originators in this pool.

Moody's applied an adjustment to all other R&W providers that are
unrated and/or financially weaker entities. For loans that JPMMAC
acquired via the MaxEx (MaxEx Clearing LLC) platform, MaxEx under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MaxEx to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in other
JPMMT transactions.

No other party will backstop or be responsible for backstopping any
R&W providers who may become financially incapable of repurchasing
mortgage loans. With respect to the mortgage loan R&Ws made by such
originators or the aggregator, as applicable, as of a date prior to
the closing date, JPMMAC will make a "gap" representation covering
the period from the date as of which such R&W is made by such
originator or the aggregator, as applicable, to the cut-off date or
closing date, as applicable. Additionally, no party will be
required to repurchase or substitute any mortgage loan until such
loan has gone through the review process.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction Delaware trustee is Citibank. The custodian's
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by Citibank.
Nationstar, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, servicer termination and for the appointment of any
successor servicer. In addition, Nationstar is committed to act as
successor if no other successor servicer can be found. The master
servicer is required to advance P&I if the servicer fails to do so.
If the master servicer fails to make the required advance, the
securities administrator is obligated to make such advance.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.7% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. The
subordinate bonds benefit from a floor as well. When the total
current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus the aggregate
balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior to it amount to
less than 0.5% of the original pool balance, those tranches that
are junior to it do not receive principal distributions. The
principal those tranches would have received is directed to pay
more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

In addition, until the aggregate class principal amount of the
senior certificates (other than the interest only certificates) is
reduced to zero, if on any distribution date, the aggregate
subordinate percentage for such distribution date drops below 6.00%
of current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will
include all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero.

Moody's calculate the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in our principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor is equal to an amount which is the sum of the
balance of the six largest loans at closing multiplied by the
higher of their corresponding MILAN Aaa severity or a 35% severity.
The credit neutral floor for Aaa rating is $7,237,467. The senior
subordination floor of 0.7% and subordinate floor of 0.5% are
consistent with the credit neutral floors for the assigned
ratings.

Transaction Structure

The transaction has a shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds (other than the
Class A-R Certificates) is based on the net WAC as reduced by the
sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and (ii) the capped trust
expense rate. In the event that there is a small number of loans
remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate can be reduced to
zero.

The Class A-11, Class A-11-A, Class A-11-B Certificates will have a
pass-through rate that will vary directly with the rate of
one-month LIBOR and the Class A-11-X Certificates will have a
pass-through rate that will vary inversely with the rate of
one-month LIBOR. If the securities administrator notifies the
depositor that it cannot determine one-month LIBOR in accordance
with the methods prescribed in the sale and servicing agreement and
a benchmark transition event has not yet occurred, one-month LIBOR
for such accrual period will be one-month LIBOR as calculated for
the immediately preceding accrual period. Following the occurrence
of a benchmark transition event, a benchmark other than one-month
LIBOR will be selected for purposes of calculating the pass-through
rate on the Class A-11, Class A-11-A, Class A-11-B certificates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2020.


JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2017-JP6: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on F-RR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-JP6 issued by JPMCC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-JP6 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also removed the ratings on Classes F-RR and G-RR
from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were
placed on August 6, 2020. The trends on Classes F-RR and G-RR are
Negative, reflecting the continued performance challenges to the
underlying collateral, many of which the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic has driven. The trends on all other classes are
Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS Morningstar's
expectations since issuance. At issuance, the transaction consisted
of 48 loans with an original trust balance of $786.2 million. As of
the December 2020 remittance report, 38 loans remain in the
transaction with a current trust balance of $675.0 million,
representing a collateral reduction of approximately 14.2% since
issuance. Two loans, representing 4.96% of the pool, are in special
servicing. One of these loans is the eighth-largest loan, Marriott
Colorado Springs (Prospectus ID#8; 3.6% of the pool), which
transferred to special servicing in February 2020 because of
nonpermitted equity transfers. The loan is backed by the borrower's
fee interest in a 309-key full-service hotel in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. The loan received coronavirus relief in August 2020,
allowing the borrower to draw upon existing furniture, fixtures,
and equipment (FF&E) reserves to cover debt service shortfalls as
well as to defer the collection of monthly FF&E reserves. DBRS
Morningstar's concerns are also heightened because the
transaction's performance had been trending downward prior to the
coronavirus pandemic with the year-end 2019 net cash flow 19% below
the issuance figure following an $8 million property improvement
plan completed in 2018. Furthermore, based on the most recent Smith
Travel Research report for the 12-month period ended December 31,
2019, the property underperformed its competitors, with occupancy,
average daily rate, and revenue per available room penetration
rates of less than 100% for each of the previous three years. The
other specially serviced loan, the 106th South Office Building
(Prospectus ID#30; 1.4% of the pool), transferred to special
servicing for nonmonetary default. According to the servicer, the
loan should return to the master servicer after the defaults are
cured.

Eleven loans, representing 21.9% of the pool, are on the servicer's
watchlist as of the December 2020 remittance. The largest loan on
the servicer's watchlist is 740 Madison Ave (Prospectus ID#4; 5.93%
of the pool), which is backed by the borrower's fee interest in a
33,176-square-foot (sf) single-tenant retail property in
Manhattan's Upper East Side neighborhood. The property is 100.0%
leased to Bottega Veneta through September 2038. The loan continues
to be monitored on the watchlist after the tenant received a 50%
rent abatement between May 2020 and August 2020.

While not on the servicer's watchlist, DBRS Morningstar remains
concerned about the pool's largest loan, 245 Park Avenue
(Prospectus ID#1; 14.5% of the pool). The loan, which is backed by
a 1.8 million-sf Class A office property in Midtown Manhattan's
Grand Central submarket, will face rollover concerns in 2022 when
the lease of the second-largest tenant, Major League Baseball
(MLB), expires in October 2022. As noted at issuance, MLB, which
represents 12.7% of the building's net rentable area (NRA), will
vacate the property upon its lease expiration. MLB vacated the
property in January 2020 and has subleased a majority of its space.
In addition, MLB is paying well above market rents at $124.75 per
square foot (psf), which will likely have an adverse effect on cash
flow as effective rents within the Grand Central submarket were
$65.00 psf as of Q3 2020, according to Reis. The property's largest
tenant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable
trend by DBRS Morningstar), which represents 45.7% of the NRA, also
has a lease expiration in October 2022 and has subleased the
majority of its space to Société Générale and Houlihan Lokey,
Inc. Société Générale has executed a direct 10-year lease
totaling 560,000 sf that will commence in 2022. The property will
likely face heightened risk in 2022 because of the MLB's
above-market rent coupled with softened office demand in a
post-coronavirus environment.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


KKR INDUSTRIAL 2021-KDIP: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating to G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2021-KDIP to
be issued by KKR Industrial Portfolio Trust 2021-KDIP:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AA (sf)
-- Class X-FP at AA (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X-CP, X-FP, and X-EXT certficates are interest-only (IO)
classes whose balances are notional.

KKR Industrial Portfolio Trust 2021-KDIP is a
single-asset/single-borrower transaction that is collateralized by
the borrower's fee-simple interest in 96 industrial properties
totaling approximately 10.9 million square feet. DBRS Morningstar
continues to take a favorable view on the long-term growth and
stability of the warehouse and logistics sector, despite the
uncertainty and risk that the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has created across all commercial real estate asset
classes. The reliance on e-commerce and home delivery during the
pandemic has only accelerated pre-pandemic consumer trends, and
DBRS Morningstar believes that retail's loss continues to be
industrial's gain. The portfolio benefits from both tenant
granularity and largely last-mile urban infill property locations,
both of which contribute to potential cash flow stability over
time.

The portfolio has a property Herfindahl score of 50.9 by allocated
loan amount (ALA), which is in line with other single-borrower
industrial portfolios. The properties are located across nine U.S.
states in multiple regions, and the portfolio also exhibits both
tenant diversity and granularity. No tenant currently accounts for
more than 3.3% of in-place base rent and no property accounts for
more than 5.3% of net operating income. Additionally, the portfolio
benefits from its position in several strong-performing industrial
markets, including Chicago, Dallas/Fort Worth, and Atlanta. While
these markets demonstrate slightly elevated average vacancy rates
of 9%, 8.9%, and 12.5%, respectively, they are forecast to decline
by 8.3%, 4.8%, and 10.5%, according to Reis.

The portfolio primarily consists of last-mile logistics properties
in infill locations within their respective markets. Infill markets
generally benefit from less new supply because of a scarcity of
developable land, and zoning ordinances that restrict industrial
development in suburban areas to business parks and away from
residential and other commercial use. Because required delivery
times have shortened for many online retailers and e-commerce
companies, they have begun leasing smaller warehouse and
distribution spaces closer to dense consumer bases. Furthermore,
the portfolio exhibits a moderate WA DBRS Morningstar Market Rank
of 3.3. The portfolio comprises 19.3% of ALA in MSA 0, 66.2% of ALA
in MSA 1, 6.7% of ALA in MSA 2, and 7.8% of ALA in MSA 3.

The portfolio has been largely unaffected by the immediate-term
disruptions from the coronavirus pandemic, with collections of
98.9% as of November 2020. Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar believes
that industrial properties are among the best positioned to weather
any short-and medium-term market dislocations related to the
pandemic. The portfolio demonstrates strong occupancy of 96.6% as
of the November 2020 rent roll and has an average occupancy of 94%
since 2018. The subject portfolio exhibits stronger occupancy
relative to comparable industrial portfolios analyzed by DBRS
Morningstar.

The borrower contributed approximately $300.4 million of fresh
equity into the transaction, representing 33.4% of the $989.5
million acquisition price. Acquisition financing involving a
significant amount of equity provides a buffer against potential
losses to the trust and is viewed as credit positive.

The sponsor for this transaction is KKR Real Estate Partners
Americas II L.P., an affiliate KKR & Co. Inc. (KKR), a global
investment firm with more than $233.8 billion in AUM as of
September 2020. In 2018, KKR founded Alpha Industrial Properties
(AIP), which is an operator of industrial logistics and
distribution properties across the U.S.

Leases representing 61.4% of DBRS Morningstar's gross rent are
scheduled to roll through the fully extended loan term. The
rollover is especially concentrated in 2022 and 2024, when 15.7%
and 16.6% of the gross rent is scheduled to expire, respectively.
Significant portfolio rollover typically indicates the potential
for future cash flow volatility, particularly if market rents or
occupancy rates have become less favorable.

The portfolio will be encumbered by $45 million in mezzanine debt,
which represents approximately 4.3% of the total financing package.
While the mezzanine loan is not collateralized directly by any
trust assets (but is collateralized by a pledge of 100% of the
indirect equity interest in the mortgage loan borrowers) and there
is an intercreditor agreement, it is still a form of subordinate
debt that the sponsor must service.

The loan allows for pro rata paydowns for the first 25% of the
original principal balance. The loan has a partial pro
rata/sequential-pay structure. We consider this structure to be
credit negative, particularly at the top of the capital stack.
Under a partial pro rata structure, deleveraging of the senior
notes through the release of individual properties occurs at a
slower pace as compared with a sequential-pay structure and DBRS
Morningstar applied a penalty to the transaction's capital
structure.

The borrower/sponsor/arranger can release individual properties
with customary debt yield and LTV tests. The prepayment premium for
the release of individual assets is 105% of the ALA (aggregate
prior releases must not exceed 15.0% of the original principal
balance) and 110% of the ALA for the release of individual assets
thereafter. As these release premiums are designed to reduce the
risk of adverse selection over time, DBRS Morningstar considers the
release premium to be weaker than a generally credit-neutral
standard of 115%. Additionally, the borrower may release one or
more pre-approved release parcels at a release price equal to
100.0% of the applicable allocated loan amount, provided the
release of the properties does not exceed 10% of the original
principal balance. DBRS Morningstar applied a penalty to the
transaction's capital structure to account for the weak
deleveraging premium.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-C33 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2017-C33 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed the ratings on Classes E
and F from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were
placed on August 6, 2020. The trends on these classes are Negative.
In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes B, C,
D, X-B, and X-D to Negative from Stable. All other trends remain
Stable.

The Negative trends reflect the continued performance challenges
facing the underlying collateral, much of which has been driven by
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic.
In addition to the four loans in special servicing, representing
17.3% of the current pool balance, as of the December 2020
remittance, DBRS Morningstar notes that the pool has a high
concentration of retail and hospitality properties, representing
29.6% and 12.8% of the pool balance, respectively. The coronavirus
pandemic has affected these property types most severely and, as
such, those concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool,
particularly at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the December 2020 remittance, all 44 of the original loans
remain in the pool, with a collateral reduction of 2.9% since
issuance as result of loan amortization. All four loans in special
servicing transferred as a result of ongoing difficulties caused by
the coronavirus pandemic. Two of these loans, Hyatt Regency Austin
(Prospectus ID#1, 8.8% of the current pool balance) and Holiday Inn
Express Quakertown (Prospectus ID#33, 0.9% of the current pool
balance) were 121+ days delinquent, while the remaining two loans,
Key Center Cleveland (Prospectus ID#5, 5.7% of the current pool
balance) and Gateway Crossing (Prospectus ID#13, 2.0% of the
current pool balance) were current. The servicer commentary
indicates that the Gateway Crossing loan was returned to the master
servicer in early December 2020.

Hyatt Regency Austin is secured by a 448-key full-service hotel in
Austin, Texas. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
August 2020 for imminent default following notice that the property
would no longer be able to support operations going forward.
According to the December 2020 reporting, forbearance terms have
been approved and an agreement is currently pending the borrower's
execution. Performance at the property had been strong prior to the
pandemic, yielding a year-end 2019 net cash flow (NCF) of $17.3
million, representing a 41.8% increase when compared with the DBRS
Morningstar NCF derived at issuance of $12.2 million and a 26.2%
increase over the issuer's NCF. However, performance dropped
precipitously during the first half of 2020 and led to the
borrower's request for relief. While the borrower has historically
shown a strong commitment to the property, DBRS Morningstar
highlighted concerns relating to the guarantor's limited financial
wherewithal and relatively small hotel real estate portfolio at
issuance. Given the recent developments, DBRS Morningstar increased
the probability of default for this loan to capture the increased
credit risk to the trust.

Key Center Cleveland is secured by a mixed-use property in downtown
Cleveland, comprising two interconnected office buildings, a
400-key Marriott hotel, and a 985-space underground parking garage.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in November 2020 for
imminent default at the borrower's request. As noted above, the
loan was current as of December 2020 reporting, and negotiations
for temporary relief are underway. As of June 2020, the loan
reported an annualized NCF of $17.8 million, representing a 38.5%
decline when compared with the year-end 2019 figure of $28.9
million. While cash flow had been trending positive since issuance
prior to the most recent reporting, the decline comes primarily as
a result of lost revenue from the hotel and parking portions of the
collateral amid the pandemic, which is likely to remain depressed
during the short term. Additionally, the property's largest tenant,
KeyBank (31.8% of the net rentable area (NRA), expiring June 2030),
downsized by 44,000 square feet (3.2% of the NRA) in July 2020
after giving the required 12 months' notice; a $2.1 million fee was
collected upon notice in 2019. While there is a three-year lockout
before the tenant can contract its footprint further, KeyBank
retains two more identical options, allowing the tenant to downsize
by 103,000 square feet total. While it appears likely that a
coronavirus-related forbearance may be granted, the uncertainty
caused by the pandemic and the additional contraction options for
the largest tenant increase the loan's risk profile.

There are also seven loans, representing 11.5% of the current pool
balance, on the servicer watchlist which were generally added for
performance declines related to increased vacancy or rent
collection issues as a result of the impact of the coronavirus. The
largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Centre at Westbank
(Prospectus ID#11, 3.0% of the current pool balance), was most
recently flagged following the borrower's request for relief as a
result of the effect of the coronavirus on loan performance and
debt service obligations. Per the December 2020 reporting, the
borrower has withdrawn their request for relief and the loan is
expected to be removed from the servicer's watchlist in the near
term.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2018-H3: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on H-RR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-H3 issued by Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2018-H3 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)
-- Class H-RR at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also removed the ratings on Classes E-RR, F-RR,
G-RR, and H-RR from Under Review with Negative Implications, where
they were placed on August 6, 2020. The trends on Classes G-RR and
H-RR are Negative while all other trends are Stable. The Negative
trends reflect the continued performance challenges facing the
underlying collateral, many of which the impacts of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic have driven. In addition to one
loan in special servicing as of the December 2020 remittance,
representing 3.9% of the pool, DBRS Morningstar also notes that the
pool has a moderate concentration of hospitality and retail
properties, representing 13.6% and 15.6% of the pool balance,
respectively. The initial impact of the coronavirus pandemic has
affected these property types most severely affected. As such,
those concentrations suggest slightly increased risks for the pool,
particularly at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

The transaction is concentrated by property type as 15 loans,
representing 34.8% of the current trust balance, are secured by
office assets while eight loans, representing 15.7% of the current
trust balance, are secured by mixed-use assets. Lodging collateral
makes up the third-largest concentration with 13 loans,
representing 13.6% of the current trust balance.

According to the December 2020 remittance, there is one loan in
special servicing, Shoppes at Chino Hills (Prospectus ID#6; 3.9% of
the current trust balance), that is secured by a retail asset.
Shoppes at Chino Hills is secured by a 378,676-square-foot (sf)
retail property in Chino Hills, California, and transferred to the
special servicer in July 2020, given the ongoing effects of the
coronavirus pandemic. The subject is a mixed-use lifestyle retail
(315,519 sf) and office (63,157 sf) complex constructed in 2008.
The subject benefits from a diverse tenant roster that includes
national and local businesses. Tenancy is granular as no tenant
makes up more than 9.0% of the net rentable area (NRA). The
property has exposure to Forever 21 (6.0% of the NRA), with a lease
expiration in December 2023. Forever 21 filed for bankruptcy in
2019 and, although Authentic Brands Group LLC subsequently
purchased the company in 2020, it remains a risk. In addition,
there is upcoming rollover risk with the July 31, 2020, rent roll
reporting that the property was 91.0% occupied. Twenty-one tenants,
representing a combined 100,320 sf and 26.7% of the NRA, have
leases that are scheduled to expire in 2021, including Jacuzzi
Brands LLC (32,458 sf), Old Navy (14,534 sf), and Banana Republic
(8,652 sf). The loan advanced to 121+ days past due in December
2020 and the servicer reported that the lender had conditionally
approved a loan modification, which will bring the loan current
with funds from the reserve as well as new borrower equity. The
modification closed in October 2020 and the loan is in the process
of returning to the master servicer. At issuance, the collateral
for the loan had an appraisal value of $176.0 million, equating to
a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 62.5%. DBRS Morningstar believes
that, while the subject is not immune to short-term stresses from
the pandemic, the headwinds in the brick-and-mortar retail industry
and the declining tourism volume could hamper the property's
long-term outlook. Given that short-term demand remains suppressed,
DBRS Morningstar will continue to monitor the situation for
developments.

As of the December 2020 remittance, all 66 original loans remain in
the pool with a collateral reduction of only 0.9% since issuance as
a result of loan amortization. No loans are defeased. Additionally,
14 loans, representing 18.4% of the current trust balance, are on
the servicer's watchlist. These loans are being monitored for a
variety of reasons, including low debt service coverage ratio and
occupancy as well as deferred maintenance issues.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


PALMER SQUARE 2015-1: S&P Affirms BB-(sf) Rating on D-R2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R3,
A-2-R3, and B-R3 replacement notes from Palmer Square CLO 2015-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2015 that is managed by Palmer Square Capital Management LLC. The
replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture. S&P withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1-R2,
A-2-R2, and B-R2 notes following payment in full on the Jan. 15,
2021, refinancing date. S&P also affirmed its ratings on the class
C-R2 and D-R2 notes.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis. In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios
applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and
pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated
tranches. The ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels."

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

  Ratings Assigned

  Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 Ltd/ Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 LLC

  Replacement class A-1-R3, $457.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Replacement class A-2-R3, $84.20 million: AA (sf)
  Replacement class B-R3, $56.50 million: A (sf)

  Ratings Affirmed

  Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 Ltd/ Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 LLC
  Class C-R2: BBB (sf)
  Class D-R2: BB- (sf)

  Ratings Withdrawn

  Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 Ltd/ Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 LLC

  Original class A-1-R2, To: NR; From: AAA (sf)
  Original class A-2-R2, To: NR; From: AA (sf)
  Original class B-R2, To: NR; From: A (sf)
  NR--Not rated.


PALMER SQUARE 2021-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Palmer Square Loan Funding 2021-1,
Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Palmer Square 2021-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$264,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on our methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Palmer Square 2021-1 is a static CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be 100% ramped as
of the closing date.

Palmer Square Capital Management LLC (the "Servicer") may engage in
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer during the life
of the transaction. Reinvestment is not permitted and all sale and
unscheduled principal proceeds received will be used to amortize
the notes in sequential order.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 72

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2660

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50% (actual spread vector of the
portfolio)

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.3%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.07 years (actual amortization vector
of the portfolio)

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak U.S. economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around our forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.


PIKES PEAK 7: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on $16MM Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Pikes Peak CLO 7 (the "Issuer" or
"Pikes Peak 7").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2034
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$56,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2034
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2034 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Pikes Peak 7 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans, provided that upon satisfaction of the permitted securities
condition, up to 5% of the portfolio may consist of senior secured
bonds, senior unsecured bonds and senior secured notes. Moody's
expects the portfolio to be approximately 80% ramped as of the
closing date.

Partners Group US Management CLO LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 67

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak U.S. economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around our forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


REAL ESTATE 2018-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-1 issued by Real Estate
Asset Liquidity Trust, Series 2018-1 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D-1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class D-2 at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. As of the December 2020 remittance,
59 of the original 70 loans remain in the pool, with an aggregate
trust balance of $309.2 million, representing a collateral
reduction of approximately 12.1% since issuance. The transaction is
concentrated by property type, as nine loans, representing 33.7% of
the current trust balance, are secured by retail assets, while 18
loans, representing 20.5% of the current trust balance, are secured
by industrial properties. In addition, there are three loans
secured by healthcare facilities, representing 12.9% of the current
trust balance. All loans remaining in the pool amortize through
their respective loan terms, while more than half of the loans
remaining in the pool benefit from some level of meaningful
recourse to the loan's sponsor.

According to the December 2020 remittance report, there are eight
loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 17.8% of the
current trust balance. Two of these loans, Gateway Boulevard Retail
Edmonton (Prospectus ID#3, 7.5% of the current trust balance) and
Quality Hotel Dorval (Prospectus ID#9, 3.4% of the current trust
balance) received short-term forbearances that ended in July 2020
and December 2020, respectively. Both loans are current as of the
December 2020 reporting and have made their recent principal and
interest payments in accordance with the modified terms. Of the
remaining six loans on the servicer's watchlist, two loans (1.5% of
the current trust balance) were added for near-term maturities, but
they are likely to repay in full, while the other four loans (5.4%
of the current trust balance) were flagged for either performance
declines or tenant rollover; however, all loans remain current as
of the December 2020 reporting.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


SKOPOS AUTO 2019-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the B (sf) rating on the Class E Notes issued
by Skopos Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1. Additionally, DBRS
Morningstar removed the Class E Notes from Under Review with
Negative Implications.

The confirmation and the removal of the rating from Under Review
with Negative Implications is based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumptions consistent with the
unemployment levels in the moderate macroeconomic scenario (please
refer to next bullet). After a spike in extensions and
delinquencies, which peaked in April 2020 as a result of the rise
in unemployment from the shutdown of non-essential businesses and
stay in place orders, performance has since improved and
stabilized. DBRS Morningstar believes obligors benefited from past
U.S. stimulus measures. Although, DBRS continues to monitor and
assess the impact of the recently passed U.S. stimulus package,
announced in December 2020, which is also expected to aid obligors
and bolster collateral performance; uncertainty remains with
respect to the overall effect on obligors' ability to pay and the
impact on losses.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2,
2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios
on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The scenarios
were last updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis (refer to next bullet).

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
factors in increasing success in containment during the first half
of 2021, enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

-- The transactions' capital structure, and form and sufficiency
of available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
DBRS Morningstar's remaining projected cumulative net loss
assumption (including an adjustment for the moderate macroeconomic
scenario) at a multiple of coverage commensurate with the ratings.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


VERUS 2021-R1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B (low) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following Mortgage
Pass Through Notes, Series 2021-R1 to be issued by Verus
Securitization Trust 2021-R1:

-- $465.6 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $38.5 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $58.5 million Class A-3 at A (low) (sf)
-- $31.5 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $18.8 million Class B-1 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $13.3 million Class B-2 at B (low) (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 26.75% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinate notes. The AA (sf), A
(low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (low) (sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings
reflect 20.70%, 11.50%, 6.55%, 3.60%, and 1.50% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

This securitization is a portfolio of fixed- and adjustable-rate,
expanded prime and nonprime, first-lien residential mortgages
funded by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 1,664
mortgage loans with a total principal balance of $635,640,108 as of
the Cut-Off Date (January 1, 2021).

The mortgage pool consists primarily of loans from the following
five collapsed previously issued Verus transactions.

The loans are on average more seasoned than a typical new
origination non-Qualified Mortgage (non-QM) securitization. The
DBRS Morningstar calculated weighted-average (WA) loan age is 34
months, and 99.1% of the loans are seasoned 24 months or more.
Within the pool, 96.6% of the loans are current, 2.5% are 30 days
delinquent, and 0.9% are 60 days or more delinquent. All but two
loans that are 60 days or more delinquent are part of an active
forbearance or deferral plan. The Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19)-affected loans account for 32.5% of the pool and are
described in further detail below.

The originators for the mortgage pool are Sprout Mortgage (29.5%)
and other originators, each comprising less than 10.0% of the
mortgage loans. The Servicers of the loans are Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (79.4%) and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS; 20.6%).

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules,
they were made to borrowers who generally do not qualify for
agency, government, or private-label nonagency prime jumbo products
for various reasons. In accordance with the Qualified Mortgage
(QM)/ATR rules, 45.7% of the loans are designated as non-QM, 0.1%
are designated as QM safe harbor, and 0.9% are designated as QM
rebuttable presumption. Approximately 53.3% of the loans are made
to investors for business purposes and, hence, are not subject to
the QM/ATR rules.

The sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible vertical residual interest
consisting of not less than 5% of each Note, to satisfy the credit
risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the Distribution Date occurring in
January 2023 or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Paying Agent, at the Controlling Holder's option, may
redeem all of the outstanding Notes at a price equal to the greater
of (a) the class balances of the related Notes plus accrued and
unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts and (b) the
class balances of the related Notes less than 90 days delinquent
with accrued unpaid interest plus fair market value of the loans 90
days or more delinquent and real estate-owned properties (Optional
Redemption Price). After such purchase, the Paying Agent must
complete a qualified liquidation, which requires (1) a complete
liquidation of assets within the Trust and (2) proceeds to be
distributed to the appropriate holders of regular or residual
interests.

If the Sponsor (or an affiliate) is not the Controlling Holder and
there is more than one Class XS Noteholder, a Third-Party Auction
may be requested. The Third Party Auction Bid must equal or exceed
the Optional Redemption Price for the qualified liquidation to take
place.

The P&I Advancing Party or servicer in the case of loans serviced
by SLS will fund advances of delinquent principal and interest
(P&I) on any mortgage until such loan becomes 90 days delinquent.
The P&I Advancing Party or servicer has no obligation to advance
P&I on a mortgage approved for a forbearance plan during its
related forbearance period. The Servicers, however, are obligated
to make advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and
reasonable costs incurred in the course of servicing and disposing
properties. The three-month advancing mechanism may increase the
probability of periodic interest shortfalls in the current economic
environment affected by the coronavirus pandemic. As borrowers may
seek forbearance on their mortgages in the coming months, P&I
collections may be reduced meaningfully.

This transaction incorporates a sequential-pay cash flow structure
with a pro rata feature among the senior tranches. Principal
proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the Class A-1
and A-2 Notes sequentially after a Trigger Event. For more
subordinated Notes, principal proceeds can be used to cover
interest shortfalls as the more senior Notes are paid in full.
Furthermore, excess spread can be used to cover realized losses and
prior period bond writedown amounts first before being allocated to
unpaid cap carryover amounts to Class A-1 down to Class B-3.

CORONAVIRUS IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside of the CFPB's ATR rules, which became effective on
January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans encompass the entire credit
spectrum. They range from high-FICO, high-income borrowers who opt
for interest-only (IO) or higher debt-to-income ratio mortgages, to
near-prime debtors who have had certain derogatory pay histories
but were cured more than two years ago, to nonprime borrowers whose
credit events were only recently cleared, among others. In
addition, some originators offer alternative documentation or bank
statement underwriting to self-employed borrowers in lieu of
verifying income with W-2s or tax returns. Finally, foreign
nationals and real estate investor programs, while not necessarily
non-QM in nature, are often included in non-QM pools.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, DBRS Morningstar expects
increased delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a
potential near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged
properties. Such deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers'
ability to make monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell
properties in an amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance
of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update,"
published on December 2, 2020), for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than what it previously
used. Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home
price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and GDP
growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
pandemic may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes loans originated to (1) borrowers
with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers, or (3)
higher loan-to-value ratio (LTV) borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have exhibited
difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the past and may
revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term. Self-employed
borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile income sources,
which could lead to reduced cash flows generated from their
businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with lower equity in their
properties, generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, signed into law on
March 27, 32.5% (as of January 1, 2021) of the borrowers had been
granted forbearance or deferral plans because of financial hardship
related to the coronavirus pandemic. These forbearance plans allow
temporary payment holidays, followed by repayment once the
forbearance period ends. The Servicers, in collaboration with the
Servicing Administrator, is generally offering borrowers a
three-month payment forbearance plan. Beginning in month four, the
borrower can repay all of the missed mortgage payments at once or
opt for other loss mitigation options. Prior to the end of the
applicable forbearance period, the Servicers will contact each
related borrower to identify the options available to address
related forborne payment amounts. As a result, the Servicers, in
conjunction with or at the direction of the Servicing
Administrator, may offer a repayment plan or other forms of payment
relief, such as deferral of the unpaid P&I amounts or a loan
modification, in addition to pursuing other loss mitigation
options.

For these loans, DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to
evaluate the impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated
tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) limited
servicing advances on delinquent P&I. These assumptions include the
following:

Increasing delinquencies on the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating levels
for the first 12 months.

Increasing delinquencies on the A (sf) and below rating levels for
the first nine months.

No voluntary prepayments for the first 12 months for the AAA (sf)
and AA (sf) rating levels.

No liquidation recovery for the first 12 months for the AAA (sf)
and AA (sf) rating levels.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C33 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates. Additionally, Fitch has revised the Rating Outlook
for three classes to Negative from Stable.

     DEBT                RATING             PRIOR
     ----                ------             -----
WFCM 2016-C33

A-2 95000LAX1      LT  AAAsf  Affirmed      AAAsf
A-3 95000LAY9      LT  AAAsf  Affirmed      AAAsf
A-4 95000LAZ6      LT  AAAsf  Affirmed      AAAsf
A-S 95000LBB8      LT  AAAsf  Affirmed      AAAsf
A-SB 95000LBA0     LT  AAAsf  Affirmed      AAAsf
B 95000LBE2        LT  AA-sf  Affirmed      AA-sf
C 95000LBF9        LT  A-sf   Affirmed      A-sf
D 95000LAJ2        LT  BBB-sf Affirmed      BBB-sf
E 95000LAL7        LT  BB-sf  Affirmed      BB-sf
F 95000LAN3        LT  B-sf   Affirmed      B-sf
X-A 95000LBC6      LT  AAAsf  Affirmed      AAAsf
X-B 95000LBD4      LT  A-sf   Affirmed      A-sf
X-D 95000LAA1      LT  BBB-sf Affirmed      BBB-sf
X-E 95000LAC7      LT  BB-sf  Affirmed      BB-sf
X-F 95000LAE3      LT  B-sf   Affirmed      B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increase in Loss Expectations: While the majority of the pool
maintains stable performance, loss expectations on the pool have
increased over the last year primarily due to 10 Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs; 17.7% of the pool), including five specially
serviced loans (7.7%), as well as concerns over the overall impact
of the coronavirus pandemic on the pool. Fitch's current ratings
incorporate a base case loss of 5.5%. Losses could reach 8.2% when
factoring in additional stresses related to the coronavirus
pandemic, including an additional scenario that assumed outsized
losses on two loans secured by office properties with significant
occupancy concerns. The Negative Outlooks reflect these additional
stresses.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Ten loans (17.7%) have been designated as
FLOCs, including five specially serviced loans secured by hotel
properties (7.7%). The largest specially serviced loan and one of
the largest contributors to loss is the Doubletree Seattle Airport
Southcenter (4.5%) loan, which is secured by a 219-key hotel
located in Seattle, WA, near the Westfield Southcenter Mall. The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 due to a
monetary default as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The
special servicer and borrower are currently in discussions
regarding a potential forbearance.

The servicer reported TTM March 2020 NOI debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was 1.54x compared with 1.86x at YE 2019 and 2.34x at
YE 2018. Per the TTM September 2020 STR report, the hotel
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR was 50.3%, $124.77 and $62.80,
respectively, with yoy RevPAR down 52%.

The largest non-specially serviced contributor to loss is the Brier
Creek Corporate Center I & II loan (3.6%), which is secured by two
four-story office buildings totaling 180,955 sf located in Raleigh,
NC. The two largest tenants (approximately 75% of the NRA) vacated
at their 2020 lease expirations. The YE 2019 servicer reported NOI
DSCR was 1.55x, from 1.52x at YE 2018. Fitch accounted for lost
income in its base case analysis and performed an additional
sensitivity on the loan that assumed a potential outsize loss of
50% should the sponsor not successfully re-tenant the space.

Another large contributor to loss is the Omni Officecentre (2.6%)
loan, which is secured by a 294,090 sf office building located in
Southfield, MI. The loan began amortizing in January 2019, the
servicer reported NOI DSCR was 1.90x at YE 2019. According to the
September 2020 rent roll, occupancy had improved to 65% from 45% at
YE 2019. The property is located in the South Southfield, MI
submarket which has a high vacancy rate of 31% per Reis (3Q20).

The largest tenant, Blue Cross Blue Shield (40% of the NRA), has a
lease maturity in 2022. Per local news reports, over the last few
years, the tenant has been consolidating office space at another
property in the submarket, and concern exists over whether they
will renew at the subject. To account for this possible tenancy
loss, Fitch performed an additional sensitivity on the loan that
assumed a potential outsize loss of 25% on the current loan
balance.

The remaining FLOCs include six hotel properties (6.6%), four of
which are specially serviced loans (3.1%), and all have suffered
negative impact from the ongoing pandemic, and one loan (0.4%)
secured by a retail property located in Jasper, AL that has
occupancy issues.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity, which assumed a potential outsized loss of 50% on the
current balance of the Brier Creek Corporate Center I &II loan.
Fitch also assumed a 25% loss on the current balance of the Omni
Officentre loan. This scenario contributes to the Negative Outlooks
on classes E, F, X-E and X-F.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the December 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance was reduced by 17.6%
to $586.7 million from $712.2 million at issuance. Six loans (3.5%
of the pool balance) are fully defeased. There have been no
realized losses to date and interest shortfalls are currently
affecting the non-rated class. The increase in credit enhancement
(CE) is primarily due to the largest loan in the pool at issuance
(9.4%) paying off in October 2020.

The majority of the pool is amortizing. However, 12 loans (23.6%)
are full-term interest only (IO), Three loans (4.9%) remain in IO
periods and are scheduled to begin to amortize by April 2021.
Upcoming loan maturities consist of three loans (2.5%) scheduled to
mature in February and March 2021, including two defeased loans
(1%). The remainder of the pool matures between August 2025 and
March 2026.

Coronavirus Exposure: Fitch expects significant continued economic
impacts to certain properties from the coronavirus pandemic due to
the related reductions in travel and tourism, temporary property
closures, reduced operational capacities, and lack of clarity at
this time on the potential duration of the impacts. Twenty loans
are collateralized by retail properties (21.4% of pool), 10 by
hotel (14.6%), and four (7.4%) by multifamily properties. Fitch's
base case analysis applied additional stresses to 14 retail and
five hotel loans due to their vulnerability to the coronavirus
pandemic; this contributed to the Negative Outlooks.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 14 loans (5.3% of the pool)
secured by multifamily co-ops; all are located in large metro area
including New York City (12); Washington, D.C. (one); and Atlanta,
GA (one).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks reflect the class' sufficient CE relative to
expected losses as well as the stable performance of the majority
of the pool and expected continued amortization. The Negative
Outlook on class E, F, X-E and X-F reflect concerns over the FLOCs
as well as the unknown impact of the pandemic on the overall pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Upgrades to classes B and C would likely occur with
    significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance; however,
    adverse selection and increased concentrations, or the
    underperformance of the FLOCs, could reverse this trend.

-- An upgrade to class D is considered unlikely and would be
    limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or further
    adverse selection.

-- Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were
    likelihood for interest shortfalls.

-- An upgrade to classes E, F and G are not likely until the
    later years in a transaction and only if the performance of
    the remaining pool is stable and/or properties vulnerable to
    the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and there is
    sufficient credit enhancement to the classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Downgrades to classes A-3 through A-S are not likely due to
    their position in the capital structure and the high CE;
    however, downgrades to these classes may occur should interest
    shortfalls occur.

-- Downgrades to class B through D would occur if loss
    expectations increase significantly and/or CE be eroded.

-- Downgrades to the classes E and F would occur if the
    performance of the FLOC continues to decline and/or fail to
    stabilize, or should losses from specially serviced
    loans/assets be larger than expected.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch envisions a downside
scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021; should
this scenario play out, Fitch expects that classes assigned a
Negative Outlook will be downgraded one or more categories and
additional classes may be downgraded or have their Outlooks revised
to Negative.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class H Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C37 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C37 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-EF at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-H at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar discontinued the rating on Class A-1
as it was paid out as of the December 2020 remittance.

Classes H and X-H were removed from Under Review with Negative
Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. All trends
are Stable except for Classes H and X-H, which carry Negative
trends. The Negative trends reflect the continued performance
challenges for the underlying collateral, much of which has been
driven by the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic. In addition to one loan representing 1.0% of the pool in
special servicing as of the December 2020 remittance, DBRS
Morningstar also notes that the pool has a significant
concentration of retail and hospitality properties, representing
29.7% and 19.4% of the pool balance, respectively. These property
types have been the most severely affected by the initial effects
of the coronavirus pandemic and, as such, those concentrations
suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly at the lower
rating categories, since issuance.

As of the December 2020 remittance, 62 of the original 63 loans
remain in the pool, with a collateral reduction of 5.0% as a result
of loan paydown and scheduled amortization. There is one loan,
Holiday Inn Express Cheektowaga North East (Prospectus ID#34, 1.0%
of the pool), that is specially serviced and 16 loans, representing
35.5% of the pool, that are being monitored on the servicer's
watchlist. These loans are being monitored for various reasons,
including low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) or occupancy,
tenant rollover risk, and/or pandemic-related forbearance
requests.

Two of the largest watchlisted loans, Hilton Hawaiian Village
(Prospectus ID#1, 7.4% of the pool) and Franklin Square III
(Prospectus ID#5, 4.2% of the pool), are both being monitored for
cash flow declines amid the pandemic. Hilton Hawaiian Village,
secured by a 22-acre beachfront resort, has seen its DSCR fall to
0.63 times (x) from 2.70x at YE2019 as of the trailing 12 months
ended Q3 2020 financials. Although there are concerns about the
current reported cash flow, DBRS Morningstar believes the property
is well-positioned in the long term because of its desirable
beachfront location on Waikiki beach in Hawaii and its historic
strong credit metrics. Franklin Square III, secured by an anchored
retail property in Gastonia, North Carolina, continues to be
monitored for a low DSCR as well as a major tenant departure as
Gander Mountain (formerly 15.8% of the net rentable area) vacated
in 2018 when its parent company filed for bankruptcy. Camping World
Inc., which acquired Gander Mountain out of bankruptcy, continues
to pay the agreed-upon rent despite the space remaining vacant,
resulting in a physical occupancy rate of approximately 77.0% as of
June 2020. Given the risks surrounding the collateral property,
DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with an elevated probability of
default for this review.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar shadow-rated three loans, Hilton
Hawaiian Village, Quantum Park (Prospectus ID#2, 7.3% of the pool),
and Potomac Mills (Prospectus ID#4, 5.1% of the pool), as
investment grade. This assessment was supported by the loans'
strong credit metrics, strong sponsorship strength, and
historically stable collateral performance. With this review, DBRS
Morningstar confirms that the characteristics of these loans remain
consistent with the investment-grade shadow rating.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


[*] Moody's Lowers Ratings on $173MM of US RMBS Issued 1999-2006
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 27 bonds
from 11 US residential mortgage backed transactions, backed by
subprime and Alt-A mortgages issued by multiple issuers. The
ratings of the affected tranches are sensitive to loan performance
deterioration due to the pandemic.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1999-HE1

A6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2018 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

A7, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2018 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-8

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-AM, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2018
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2018
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2018
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2003-BC2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2018
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-8

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2017
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-1

A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-6

Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3

Cl. A-1F, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2018
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2018
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation to (Affirmed at
Caa1, Negative Outlook on Dec 17, 2020.)

Cl. A-2F, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2018
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2018
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation to (Affirmed at
Caa1, Negative Outlook on Dec 17, 2020.)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-A4

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-14*, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2015
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2018
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2003-4HE

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2018
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2018
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2018
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. In light
of the current macroeconomic environment, Moody's revised loss
expectations based on the extent of performance deterioration of
the underlying mortgage loans, resulting from a slowdown in
economic activity and increased unemployment due to the coronavirus
outbreak. Specifically, Moody's have observed an increase in
delinquencies, payment forbearance, and payment deferrals since the
start of pandemic, which could result in higher realized losses.

Moody's analysis considers the current proportion of loans granted
payment relief in each individual transaction. Moody's identified
these loans based on a review of loan level cashflows over the last
few months. Based on Moody's analysis, the proportion of borrowers
that are currently enrolled in payment relief plans varied greatly,
ranging between approximately 2% and 19% among RMBS transactions
issued before 2009. In Moody's analysis, Moody's assume these loans
to experience lifetime default rates that are 50% higher than
default rates on the performing loans.

In addition, for borrowers unable to make up missed payments
through a short-term repayment plan, servicers will generally defer
the forborne amount as a non-interest-bearing balance, due at
maturity of the loan as a balloon payment. Moody's analysis
considered the impact of six months of scheduled principal payments
on the loans enrolled in payment relief programs being passed to
the trust as a loss. The magnitude of this loss will depend on the
proportion of the borrowers in the pool subject to principal
deferral and the number of months of such deferral. The treatment
of deferred principal as a loss is credit negative, which could
incur write-downs on bonds when missed payments are deferred.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Moody's analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around our forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating all deals except
interest-only classes was US RMBS Surveillance Methodology
published in July 2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds.



[*]DBRS Confirms 23 Ratings on 13 CPS Auto Receivables Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed 23 ratings, upgraded 18 ratings, discontinued
10 ratings across 13 CPS Auto Receivables Trust transactions,
removed ratings on Class E from series 2016-D, 2017-A and 2018-C
from Under Review with Negative Implications and maintained the
rating of Class F from series 2016-A Under Review with Negative
Implications.

The Affected Ratings are available at https://bit.ly/3qzTCQK

The upgraded and confirmed rating actions, including the removal of
three ratings from Under Review with Negative Implications, are
based on the following analytical considerations:

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumptions consistent with the
unemployment levels in the moderate macroeconomic scenario (please
refer to next bullet). After a spike in extensions and
delinquencies, which peaked in April 2020 as a result of the rise
in unemployment from the shutdown of non-essential businesses and
stay in place orders, performance has since improved and
stabilized. DBRS Morningstar believes obligors benefited from past
U.S. stimulus measures. Although, DBRS continues to monitor and
assess the impact of the recently passed U.S. stimulus package,
announced in December 2020, which is also expected to aid obligors
and bolster collateral performance; uncertainty remains with
respect to the overall effect on obligors' ability to pay and the
impact on losses.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2,
2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios
on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The scenarios
were last updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis (refer to next bullet).

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
factors in increasing success in containment during the first half
of 2021, enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

-- The transactions' capital structures, and form and sufficiency
of available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
DBRS Morningstar's remaining projected cumulative net loss
assumption (including an adjustment for the moderate macroeconomic
scenario) at a multiple of coverage commensurate with the ratings.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

For 2016-A class F, DBRS Morningstar is maintaining the class Under
Review with Negative Implications. The transactions'
overcollateralization has been fully eroded and the reserve account
is below the required level as set forth in the transaction's legal
documents. Currently available credit enhancement including excess
spread may be insufficient to support the DBRS Morningstar
remaining projected cumulative net loss assumption (including an
adjustment for the moderate scenario) at a multiple of coverage
commensurate with the current rating on the Class F notes. The
increase in cumulative net losses has flattened and delinquencies
have been relatively stable, other than seasonal increases
currently being experienced and the transaction has amortized to a
pool factor of 10.93%. Given recent improvements in performance and
low pool factor, DBRS Morningstar will continue to monitor this
Class and remove the rating from the Under Review status as soon as
appropriate.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


                            *********

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