/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/201220.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, December 20, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 354

                            Headlines

AGL CLO 9: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $21.70MM Class E Notes
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2018-2: DBRS Confirms BB on Class E Notes
ANGEL OAK 2020-SBC1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
ANGEL OAK 2020-SBC1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2015-UBS7: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on 2 Tranches

BANK 2020-BNK29: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class K Certs
BANK 2020-BNK29: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class K Certificates
BANK 2020-BNK30: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class X-G Certs
BANK OF AMERICA 20170BNK3: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. F Certs
BELLEMEADE RE 2020-4: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on M-2A Notes

BELLEMEADE RE 2020-4: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. M-2A Debt
BENCHMARK 2019-B15: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on G-RR Certs
CARVANA AUTO 2020-P1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on N Notes
CARVANA AUTO 2020-P1: DBRS Finalizes BB (high) Rating on N Notes
CARVANA AUTO 2020-P1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(high) on Class N Notes

CD MORTGAGE 2017-CD6: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class G-RR Debt to Bsf
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2016-C6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. X-F Certs
CFMT 2020-HB4 2020-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class M4 Notes
CIM TRUST 2020-J2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
CIM TRUST 2020-J2: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. B-5 Certs B(EXP)sf

CIM TRUST 2020-J2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
CITIGROUP 2020-420K: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on HRR Certs
CITIGROUP COMM'L 2019-C7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on JRR Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC31: DBRS Confirms B(low) on G Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC33: DBRS Confirms B Rating on F Certs

COMM 2013-CCRE7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
COMM 2014-CCRE21: DBRS Lowers Class X-E Certs Rating to B
COMM 2014-UBS5: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class E Debt to CCC
COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
COMM 2015-CCRE24: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-E Certs

COMM 2015-LC19: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
COMM MORTGAGE 2014-CCRE14: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on F Certs
COMM MORTGAGE 2014-UBS6: DBRS Cuts Rating on X-D Certs to Bsf
CONTINENTAL CREDIT 2017-1: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on C Notes
CSAIL 2015-C1: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to B(low)

CSAIL 2015-C3: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
CSAIL 2016-C5: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
DRYDEN 36: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
ELMWOOD CLO VII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $16MM Class E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2017-2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Notes

FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
GLS AUTO 2020-4: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: DBRS Lowers Class F Certs Rating to C
GS MORTGAGE 2014-GC24: DBRS Lowers Class F Certs Rating to CCC
GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC30: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2018-GS10: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G-RR Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2019-GC40: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-RR Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2020-GSA2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ6: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ6: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. B5 Certs B(EXP)sf
GSAMP TRUST 2006-FM1: Moody's Downgrades Cl. A-1 Debt to Caa2
HOME PARTNERS 2020-2: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Cl. F Certs
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: Moody's Upgrades Class E Certs to Ba1
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on 14 Tranches

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Downgrades Class A-MS Certs to CCCsf
JP MORGAN 2011-C3: DBRS Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to CCC
JP MORGAN 2011-C4: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class H Certs
JP MORGAN 2011-C5: DBRS Cuts Class F Certs Rating to B(low)
JP MORGAN 2013-C16: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certificates

JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C27: DBRS Cuts X-FG Debt Rating to B(low)
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C28: DBRS Lowers Class X-F Debt Rating to Bsf
KAYNE CLO 9: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $11.25MM Class E Notes
LENDMARK FUNDING 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Debt
LSTAR COMMERCIAL 2016-4: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G Certs

METLIFE SECURITIZATION 2020-INV1: DBRS Finalizes BB on B-4 Debt
METLIFE SECURITIZATION 2020-INV1: DBRS Gives BB Rating on B-4 Debt
MF1 2020-FL4: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
MF1 LTD 2019-FL2: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
MFA TRUST 2020-NQM3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Certs

MFA TRUST 2020-NQM3: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
MFA TRUST 2020-NQM3: S&P Gives B Rating on Class B-2 Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class E Debt to B(low)
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C18: DBRS Lowers Class E Certs Rating to B
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C21: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class G Certs to CCC

MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C24: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on F Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-UBS8: DBRS Cuts Class E Debt Rating to BB(low)
MSC MORTGAGE 2011-C3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Cl. G Certs
OCP CLO 2020-20: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on $12MM Class E Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2020-3: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes

PFP LTD 2019-6: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
REGATTA XVII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
SECURITIZED TERM 2019-CRT: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
STACR REMIC 2020-DNA6: DBRS Gives Prov. Bsf Rating on 2 Tranches
STARWOOD MORTGAGE 2020-INV1: S&P Gives (P)B Rating on 11 Classes

UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2012-C2: Moody's Lowers Cl. F Certs to C
WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Downgrades Class F Certs to Csf
WELLS FARGO 2014-NXS1: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-C27: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class F Certs to CCC
WELLS FARGO 2015-C30: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-FG Certs

WELLS FARGO 2015-C31: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-SG1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-C36: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-1 Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS5: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to CCC
WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs

WELLS FARGO 2019-C53: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on K-RR Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C9: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on F Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C23: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
WFRBS COMMERIAL 2014-LC14: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. F Certs
[*] S&P Places Ratings on 87 US RMBS Legacy Deals on Watch Negative


                            *********

AGL CLO 9: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $21.70MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to AGL CLO 9 Ltd./AGL CLO 9
LLC's floating-rate notes and loan.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The legal structure of the transaction, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

Ratings Assigned

AGL CLO 9 Ltd./AGL CLO 9 LLC

Class AS,       $149.90 mil.: AAA (sf)
Class AL loans, $209.70 mil.: AAA (sf)
Class AJ,       $17.40 mil.: NR
Class B,        $63.80 mil.: AA (sf)
Class C (deferrable), $31.90 mil.: A (sf)
Class D (deferrable), $31.90 mil.: BBB- (sf)
Class E (deferrable), $21.70 mil.: BB- (sf)
Subordinated notes,   $54.65 mil.: Not rated



AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2018-2: DBRS Confirms BB on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. discontinued, confirmed or upgraded its ratings on the
following classes of securities included in three AmeriCredit
Automobile Receivables Trust transactions:

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-3
- Class A-3, discontinued due to repayment
- Class B, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class D, confirmed at A (low) (sf)

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-3
- Class A-2-A, discontinued due to repayment
- Class A-2-B, discontinued due to repayment
- Class A-3, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class C, upgraded to AA (sf)
- Class D, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E, confirmed at BB (sf)

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2019-3
- Class A-1, discontinued due to repayment
- Class A-2-A, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class A-2-B, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class A-3, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B, upgraded to AA (high) (sf)
- Class C, upgraded to A (high) (sf)
- Class D, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E, confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update," published on September
10, 2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic
scenarios on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The
scenarios were last updated on September 10, 2020, and are
reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
remains predicated on a more rapid return of confidence and a
steady recovery heading into 2021. Observed performance during the
2008–09 financial crisis and the possible impact from stimulus
were also considered in the assumptions.

-- Transaction's capital structure, and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar-projected remaining cumulative net loss (CNL)
(including an adjustment for the moderate scenario) assumption at a
multiple of coverage commensurate with the ratings above.

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected CNL assumptions consistent with the expected unemployment
levels in the moderate scenario.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


ANGEL OAK 2020-SBC1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized provisional ratings on the following classes
of certificates issued by Angel Oak SB Commercial Mortgage Trust
2020-SBC1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class B-2 at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The initial balances of the Class A-1, A-2, A-3, M-1, B-1, and B-2
are approximate and may be adjusted up to plus or minus 5.0%.

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Overview

With regard to the coronavirus pandemic, the magnitude and extent
of performance stress posed to global structured finance
transactions remain highly uncertain. This considers the fiscal and
monetary policy measures and statutory law changes that have
already been implemented or will be implemented to soften the
impact of the crisis on global economies. Some regions,
jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling more
immediate effects. DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic and its impact on both the commercial
real estate (CRE) sector and the global fixed income markets.
Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply additional short-term
stresses to its rating analysis, for example by front-loading
default expectations and/or assessing the liquidity position of a
structured finance transaction with more stressful operational risk
and/or cash flow timing considerations.

The collateral consists of 236 individual loans secured by 236
commercial, multifamily, and single-family rental (SFR) properties,
as defined by DBRS Morningstar, with an average (unless noted
otherwise, average refers to straight average) loan balance of
$765,050. The transaction is configured with a sequential pay
pass-through structure. DBRS Morningstar applied its "North
American CMBS Multi-Borrower Rating Methodology" (the CMBS
Methodology) for this transaction.

Of the 236 individual loans, three have a fixed interest rate for
the 30-year loan term. The remaining 233 loans structured with
interest rate floors ranging from 5.125% to 10.125% with an
weighted average of 7.436% and interest rate caps ranging from
5.00% to 6.00% with an average of 5.99%. DBRS Morningstar applied a
stress to the index (six-month Libor) that corresponded to the
remaining fully extended term of the loans and added the respective
contractual loan spread to determine a stressed interest rate over
the loan term. DBRS Morningstar looked to the greater of the
interest rate floor or the DBRS Morningstar stressed index rate
when calculating stressed debt service. There are 235 loans that
will amortize on a 360-month basis and one loan that will amortizes
on a 300-month basis, all with term lengths ranging from 10 to 30
years. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants or stressed interest rates, there were 25 loans,
representing 10% of the pool, with term debt service coverage
ratios above 1.80 times (x) a threshold which is indicative of a
lower likelihood of midterm default.

The pool has an average original term length of 337 months or 28.1
years with an average remaining term of 322 months or 26.8 years.
Based on the current loan balance and the appraisal at origination,
the pool had a weighted-average (WA) loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of
61.5%. DBRS Morningstar applied a pool average LTV of 62.7%, which
reflects adjustments made to values based on implied cap rates by
market rank. Furthermore, all but 26 of 236 loans fully amortize
over their respective remaining loan terms, resulting in 90.7%
expected amortization; this does not represent typical CBMS conduit
pools, which have substantial concentrations of interest-only and
balloon loans. DBRS Morningstar research indicates that, for CMBS
conduit transactions securitized between 2000 and 2019, average
amortization by year has ranged from 7.5% to 22.0% with an overall
median of 12.5%.

Of the 236 loans, DBRS Morningstar identified five loans,
representing 1.2% of the trust balance, are secured by an
individual or a portfolio of SFR properties. The CMBS Methodology
does not currently contemplate ratings on SFR properties. To
address this, DBRS Morningstar severely increased the expected loss
on these loans by approximately 3.2x over the average non-SFR
expected loss.

The transaction has several positive attributes. The pool is
relatively diverse based on loan size, with an average balance of
$765,050 and a concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool
of 119 equal-sized loans. Increased pool diversity helps to
insulate the higher-rated classes from event risk. Furthermore, the
loans are secured by traditional property types (i.e., retail,
multifamily, office, and industrial), with no exposure to
higher-volatility property types, such as hotels. The pool
generally represents lower leverage financing as evidenced by the
strong WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of 62.7%. Unlike typical CMBS
conduit pools, all but 26 of the 236 loans fully amortize over
their respective remaining loan terms, resulting in 90.7% expected
amortization. Given the relatively small balance of the loan
amounts, the pool has a relatively high concentration of properties
located in markets DBRS Morningstar considers more urban in nature.
DBRS Morningstar concluded that 22.5% of the pool has a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of 5, 6, or 7. Properties located in urban
markets typically benefit from higher levels of liquidity in times
of stress compared with smaller markets. Furthermore, 25.4% of the
pool is located in metropolitan statistical area (MSA) Group 3,
representing eight of the 25 largest MSAs that historically have
outperformed all other top 25 MSAs.

The pool also has several challenging factors for which DBRS
Morningstar has addressed. Of the 49 loans DBRS Morningstar sampled
(performed an exterior site inspection and/or reviewed third-party
photographs), 24 loans, representing 41.7% of the DBRS Morningstar
sample, were modeled with Average - to Poor property quality. DBRS
Morningstar increased the probability of default (POD) for these
loans to account for the elevated risk. Furthermore, DBRS
Morningstar modeled any uninspected loans as Average -, which has a
slightly increased POD level.

Limited property-level information was available for DBRS
Morningstar to review. The origination policies executed by
Cherrywood Mortgage, LLC do not provide for terrorism insurance or
earthquake insurance, nor do they require that a Property Condition
Report or a Phase I environmental report be prepared by an
accredited engineer. DBRS Morningstar received a long- or
short-form appraisal for loans in its sample, which DBRS
Morningstar used in the NCF analysis process. Phase I environmental
reports were only performed on four loans representing 3.0% of the
pool and desktop environmental radius search reports were conducted
on all assets. DBRS Morningstar applied a penalty to the loss
severity to mitigate any potential future environmental risk.
Engineer-created property condition reports were provided; however,
DBRS Morningstar used capital expense estimates in excess of its
guideline amounts and its assessment of the sampled property
quality to stress the NCF analysis.

The sponsors of small balance loans are generally less
sophisticated operators of CRE with limited real estate portfolios
and experience. DBRS Morningstar was provided limited borrower
information, net worth or liquidity information, and credit
history. Each mortgage loan is full recourse to the related
borrower. Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar modeled loans with Weak
borrower strength, which increases the stress on the default rate.
DBRS Morningstar was provided a 24-month pay history on each loan.
Any loan with more than one late pay within a 12-month period was
modeled with additional stress to the default rate. This assumption
was applied to 59 loans, representing 25.3% of the pool balance.
Two loans, representing 1.1% of the trust balance, listed in the
AMC Guideline review with outstanding judgements were modeled with
increased default rates. Finally, a borrower FICO score as of loan
origination was provided on 233 of the 236 loans with an average
FICO score of 700. While the CMBS Methodology does not contemplate
FICO scores, the "RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and Rating Methodology" does and
would characterize a FICO score of 700 as near-prime, where prime
is considered greater than 750. A borrower with a FICO score of 700
could generally be described as potentially having had previous
credit events (foreclosure, bankruptcy, etc.), but it is likely
that these credit events were cleared about two to five years ago.

DBRS Morningstar was provided limited information regarding the
effects of the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on individual
property occupancy or cash flow. Of the 236 loans, 52 loans (27.4%
of the trust amount) have recently exited forbearance or the
borrowers have inquired about forbearance for coronavirus
pandemic-related reasons. DBRS Morningstar applied a 5.0% stress to
the NCF variance for all loans as a mitigant against reduced income
from the coronavirus. Of these 52 loans, 37 loans (16.8% of the
trust amount) have deferred balances. While, these loans are
current, DBRS Morningstar applied elevated default rates to account
for the increased risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ANGEL OAK 2020-SBC1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
certificates to be issued by Angel Oak SB Commercial Mortgage Trust
2020-SBC1:

-- Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- Class A3 at A (sf)
-- Class M1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- Class B2 at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The initial balances of the Class A1, A2, A3, M1, B1, and B2 are
approximate and may be adjusted up to plus or minus 5.0%.

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Overview

With regard to the coronavirus pandemic, the magnitude and extent
of performance stress posed to global structured finance
transactions remain highly uncertain. This considers the fiscal and
monetary policy measures and statutory law changes that have
already been implemented or will be implemented to soften the
impact of the crisis on global economies. Some regions,
jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling more
immediate effects. DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic and its impact on both the commercial
real estate (CRE) sector and the global fixed income markets.
Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply additional short-term
stresses to its rating analysis, for example by front-loading
default expectations and/or assessing the liquidity position of a
structured finance transaction with more stressful operational risk
and/or cash flow timing considerations.

The collateral consists of 236 individual loans secured by 236
commercial, multifamily, and single-family rental (SFR) properties,
as defined by DBRS Morningstar, with an average (unless noted
otherwise, average refers to straight average) loan balance of
$765,050. The transaction is configured with a sequential pay
pass-through structure. DBRS Morningstar applied its "North
American CMBS Multi-Borrower Rating Methodology" (the CMBS
Methodology) for this transaction.

Of the 236 individual loans, three have a fixed interest rate for
the 30-year loan term. The remaining 233 loans structured with
interest rate floors ranging from 5.125% to 10.125% with an
weighted average of 7.436% and interest rate caps ranging from
5.00% to 6.00% with an average of 5.99%. DBRS Morningstar applied a
stress to the index (six-month Libor) that corresponded to the
remaining fully extended term of the loans and added the respective
contractual loan spread to determine a stressed interest rate over
the loan term. DBRS Morningstar looked to the greater of the
interest rate floor or the DBRS Morningstar stressed index rate
when calculating stressed debt service. There are 235 loans that
will amortize on a 360-month basis and one loan that will amortizes
on a 300-month basis, all with term lengths ranging from 10 to 30
years. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants or stressed interest rates, there were 25 loans,
representing 10% of the pool, with term debt service coverage
ratios above 1.80 times (x) a threshold which is indicative of a
lower likelihood of midterm default.

The pool has an average original term length of 337 months or 28.1
years with an average remaining term of 322 months or 26.8 years.
Based on the current loan balance and the appraisal at origination,
the pool had a weighted-average (WA) loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of
61.5%. DBRS Morningstar applied a pool average LTV of 62.7%, which
reflects adjustments made to values based on implied cap rates by
market rank. Furthermore, all but 26 of 236 loans fully amortize
over their respective remaining loan terms, resulting in 90.7%
expected amortization; this does not represent typical CBMS conduit
pools, which have substantial concentrations of interest-only and
balloon loans. DBRS Morningstar research indicates that, for CMBS
conduit transactions securitized between 2000 and 2019, average
amortization by year has ranged from 7.5% to 22.0% with an overall
median of 12.5%.

Of the 236 loans, DBRS Morningstar identified five loans,
representing 1.2% of the trust balance, are secured by an
individual or a portfolio of SFR properties. The CMBS Methodology
does not currently contemplate ratings on SFR properties. To
address this, DBRS Morningstar severely increased the expected loss
on these loans by approximately 3.2x over the average non-SFR
expected loss.

The transaction has several positive attributes. The pool is
relatively diverse based on loan size, with an average balance of
$765,050 and a concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool
of 119 equal-sized loans. Increased pool diversity helps to
insulate the higher-rated classes from event risk. Furthermore, the
loans are secured by traditional property types (i.e., retail,
multifamily, office, and industrial), with no exposure to
higher-volatility property types, such as hotels. The pool
generally represents lower leverage financing as evidenced by the
strong WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of 62.7%. Unlike typical CMBS
conduit pools, all but 26 of the 236 loans fully amortize over
their respective remaining loan terms, resulting in 90.7% expected
amortization. Given the relatively small balance of the loan
amounts, the pool has a relatively high concentration of properties
located in markets DBRS Morningstar considers more urban in nature.
DBRS Morningstar concluded that 22.5% of the pool has a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of 5, 6, or 7. Properties located in urban
markets typically benefit from higher levels of liquidity in times
of stress compared with smaller markets. Furthermore, 25.4% of the
pool is located in metropolitan statistical area (MSA) Group 3,
representing eight of the 25 largest MSAs that historically have
outperformed all other top 25 MSAs.

The pool also has several challenging factors for which DBRS
Morningstar has addressed. Of the 49 loans DBRS Morningstar sampled
(performed an exterior site inspection and/or reviewed third-party
photographs), 24 loans, representing 41.7% of the DBRS Morningstar
sample, were modeled with Average - to Poor property quality. DBRS
Morningstar increased the probability of default (POD) for these
loans to account for the elevated risk. Furthermore, DBRS
Morningstar modeled any uninspected loans as Average -, which has a
slightly increased POD level.

Limited property-level information was available for DBRS
Morningstar to review. The origination policies executed by
Cherrywood Mortgage, LLC do not provide for terrorism insurance or
earthquake insurance, nor do they require that a Property Condition
Report or a Phase I environmental report be prepared by an
accredited engineer. DBRS Morningstar received a long- or
short-form appraisal for loans in its sample, which DBRS
Morningstar used in the NCF analysis process. Phase I environmental
reports were only performed on four loans representing 3.0% of the
pool and desktop environmental radius search reports were conducted
on all assets. DBRS Morningstar applied a penalty to the loss
severity to mitigate any potential future environmental risk.
Engineer-created property condition reports were provided; however,
DBRS Morningstar used capital expense estimates in excess of its
guideline amounts and its assessment of the sampled property
quality to stress the NCF analysis.

The sponsors of small balance loans are generally less
sophisticated operators of CRE with limited real estate portfolios
and experience. DBRS Morningstar was provided limited borrower
information, net worth or liquidity information, and credit
history. Each mortgage loan is full recourse to the related
borrower. Furthermore, DBRS Morningstar modeled loans with Weak
borrower strength, which increases the stress on the default rate.
DBRS Morningstar was provided a 24-month pay history on each loan.
Any loan with more than one late pay within a 12-month period was
modeled with additional stress to the default rate. This assumption
was applied to 59 loans, representing 25.3% of the pool balance.
Two loans, representing 1.1% of the trust balance, listed in the
AMC Guideline review with outstanding judgments were modeled with
increased default rates. Finally, a borrower FICO score as of loan
origination was provided on 233 of the 236 loans with an average
FICO score of 700. While the CMBS Methodology does not contemplate
FICO scores, the "RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and Rating Methodology" does and
would characterize a FICO score of 700 as near-prime, where prime
is considered greater than 750. A borrower with a FICO score of 700
could generally be described as potentially having had previous
credit events (foreclosure, bankruptcy, etc.), but it is likely
that these credit events were cleared about two to five years ago.

DBRS Morningstar was provided limited information regarding the
effects of the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on individual
property occupancy or cash flow. Of the 236 loans, 52 loans (27.4%
of the trust amount) have recently exited forbearance or the
borrowers have inquired about forbearance for coronavirus
pandemic-related reasons. DBRS Morningstar applied a 5.0% stress to
the NCF variance for all loans as a mitigant against reduced income
from the coronavirus. Of these 52 loans, 37 loans (16.8% of the
trust amount) have deferred balances. While, these loans are
current, DBRS Morningstar applied elevated default rates to account
for the increased risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANC OF AMERICA 2015-UBS7: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-UBS7 issued by Banc of
America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-UBS7 as
follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (sf)
-- Class E at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at B (low) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)
-- Class G at CCC (sf)

Classes F, G, and X-FG were removed from Under Review with Negative
Implications, where they were placed on August 6, 2020. Class X-FG
now has a Negative trend. Classes F and G have ratings that do not
carry trends. DBRS Morningstar changed the trends for Classes D, E,
X-D, and X-E to Negative from Stable. All other trends are Stable.
DBRS Morningstar continues the Interest in Arrears designation for
Class E.

The Negative trends on Classes D, E, X-D, X-E, and X-FG reflect the
continued performance challenges for the underlying collateral,
much of which has been driven by the impacts of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. In addition to the four loans
representing 20.7% of the pool in special servicing as of the
November 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar notes that the pool has
a high concentration of hospitality properties, representing 17.2%
of the pool. Hospitality properties have been the most severely
affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and, as
such, the high concentration suggests increased risks for the pool,
particularly for the lower rating categories, since issuance.

In addition, the transaction has a higher concentration of retail
property types, with 10 loans secured by regional malls and both
anchored and unanchored retail properties, collectively
representing 20.0% of the pool. Office collateral makes up the
largest concentration of one property type, with four loans
comprising 25.2% of the current trust balance.

The four loans in special servicing are West Hotel at the Domain
(Prospectus ID#3; 8.9% of the pool), The Mall of New Hampshire
(Prospectus ID#5; 7.0% of the pool), WPC Department Store Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#12; 2.8% of the pool), and Southeast Retail
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#18; 2.0% of the pool).

The largest loan in special servicing, The Mall of New Hampshire,
is secured by a Class B single-level enclosed regional mall
totalling 811,573 square feet (sf), of which 405,723 sf is part of
the collateral. Simon Property Group owns and operates the
property. At issuance, the largest tenants were the noncollateral
Macy's, Sears, and JCPenney. The Sears was closed in 2018 and later
backfilled by Dick's Sporting Goods and Dave & Buster's. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2020 at the borrower's
request, who cited imminent monetary default because of coronavirus
pandemic-driven difficulties.

The borrower last paid debt service in March 2020. An October 2020
appraisal obtained by the special servicer indicated an as-is value
of $243.5 million, a relatively minor -4.9% variance from the
issuance valuation of $256.0 million, with an implied loan-to-value
ratio of 61.6%. Financial performance had shown signs of declining
prior to the pandemic when cash flows continued to trend downward.
The 2019 year-end net cash flow (NCF) decreased 8.8% compared with
the 2018 NCF and was down 21.6% from the issuer's NCF. Although the
October 2020 appraisal suggests only a small value decline from
issuance, DBRS Morningstar believes that valuation may be
aggressive and notes the significantly increased risks in the
extended delinquency and the collateral mall's exposure to
struggling retailers including JCPenney and Macy's as well as Dave
& Buster's, which has been particularly challenged amid the
social-distancing impacts of the pandemic. Given these factors, as
well as the decline in performance prior to the pandemic, DBRS
Morningstar applied a stressed probability of default for this loan
in the analysis for this review, significantly increasing the
expected loss.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 41 of the original 42 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 5.9%
since issuance. Three loans, representing 1.2% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased. Additionally, there are 10 loans,
representing 27.4% of the current trust balance, on the servicer's
watchlist per the November 2020 remittance. These loans are being
monitored for a variety of reasons including low debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and occupancy issues; however, the primary
reason for the increase of loans on the watchlist is for
hospitality and retail properties with a low DSCR stemming from
disruptions related to the coronavirus pandemic.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK 2020-BNK29: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class K Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized provisional ratings on the following classes
of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-BNK29
issued by BANK 2020-BNK29:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high)
-- Class X-D at A (sf)
-- Class X-F at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-H at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-J at BB (sf)
-- Class X-K at B (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (high (sf)
-- Class G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class J at BB (low)(sf)
-- Class K at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class A-3-1, Class A-3-2, Class A-3-X1, Class A-3-X2, Class
A-4-1, Class A-4-2, Class A-4-X1, Class A-4-X2, Class A-S-1, Class
A-S-2, Class A-S-X1, and Class A-S-X2 certificates are also offered
certificates. Such classes of certificates, together with the Class
A-3, Class A-4 and Class A-S certificates, constitute the
Exchangeable Certificates. The Class A-1, Class A-SB, Class B,
Class C, Class D, Class E, Class F, Class G, Class H, Class J,
Class K, and Class L certificates, together with the RR Interest
and the Exchangeable Certificates with a certificate balance, are
referred to as the Principal Balance Certificates.

The Class X-A, Class X-B, Class X-D, Class X-F, Class X-G, Class
X-H, Class X-J, Class X-K, and Class X-L certificates (collectively
referred to as the Class X Certificates) are notional amount
certificates and will not be entitled to distributions of
principal. The notional amount of the Class X-A certificates will
be equal to the aggregate certificate or principal balance of the
Class A-1 and Class A-SB certificates and the Class A-3 and Class
A-4 trust components. The notional amount of the Class X-B
certificates will be equal to the aggregate certificate or
principal balance of the Class A-S trust component and the Class B
and Class C certificates. The notional amount of the Class X-D
certificates will be equal to the aggregate certificate balance of
the Class D and Class E certificates. The notional amount of each
of the Class X-F, Class X-G, Class X-H, Class X-J, Class X-K, and
Class X-L certificates will be equal to the certificate balance of
the class of principal balance certificates that, with the addition
of "X-", has the same alphabetical designation as the subject class
of Class X certificates.

With regard to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
magnitude and the extent of performance stress posed to global
structured finance transactions remain highly uncertain. This
considers the fiscal and monetary policy measures and statutory law
changes that have already been implemented or will be implemented
to soften the impact of the crisis on global economies. Some
regions, jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling
more immediate effects. DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic and its impact on both the commercial
real estate (CRE) sector and the global fixed-income markets.
Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply additional short-term
stresses to its rating analysis, for example, by front-loading
default expectations and/or assessing the liquidity position of a
structured finance transaction with more stressful operational risk
and/or cash flow timing considerations.

The collateral consists of 41 fixed-rate loans secured by 89
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. DBRS Morningstar analyzed
the conduit pool to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting
the long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. DBRS Morningstar shadow-rated three loans,
representing 17.2% of the pool balance, as investment grade. When
DBRS Morningstar measured the cut-off loan balances against the
DBRS Morningstar Net Cash Flow and their respective actual
constants, the initial DBRS Morningstar Weighted-Average (WA) Debt
Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of the pool was 2.39 times (x). No
loans had a DBRS Morningstar WA DSCR lower than 1.30x, a threshold
indicative of a higher likelihood of midterm default. The DBRS
Morningstar WA Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio of the pool was 58.4% at
issuance and the pool is scheduled to amortize down to a DBRS
Morningstar WA LTV of 54.5% at maturity. These credit metrics are
based on A note balances. Fourteen loans, representing 39.4% of the
pool balance, were originated in connection with the borrower's
acquisition of the related mortgage property. Twenty-six loans,
representing 50.6% of the pool balance, were originated in
connection with the borrower's refinancing of a previous mortgage
loan and one loan, representing 10% of the pool balance, was
originated in connection with a recapitalization. DBRS Morningstar
views acquisition loans as more favorable in the context of
recent-vintage conduit and fusion transactions. Cash-equity
infusions from a sponsor in a transaction typically result in a
greater alignment of interests between the lender and borrower,
especially compared with a refinancing scenario where the sponsor
may be withdrawing equity from the transaction.

The collateral features three loans, representing 17.2% of the pool
balance, that DBRS Morningstar assessed as investment grade: The
Grace Building, Turner Towers, and McDonald's Global HQ. The Grace
Building exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a shadow
rating of "A", McDonald's Global HQ exhibits credit characteristics
consistent with a shadow rating of A (low), and Turner Towers
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a shadow rating of
AAA.

Eight loans, representing 37.7% of the pool balance, are in areas
with DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks of 7 and 8, which benefit from
locations in urban and liquid markets, driven by consistently
strong investor demand, even during times of economic stress. Urban
markets represented in this deal include New York and Chicago. In
addition, 14 loans, representing 26.5% of the pool balance, have
collateral in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Group 3, which
represents the best-performing group in terms of historical
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) default rates among the
top 25 MSAs. MSA Group 3 has a historical default rate of 17.2%,
which is nearly 40.0% lower than the overall CMBS historical
default rate of 28.0%.

Eighteen loans, representing 57.0% of the pool balance, exhibited
DBRS Morningstar LTVs equal to or less than 60.0% at issuance, a
threshold historically indicative of relatively low-leverage
financing and generally associated with below-average default
frequency.

Term default risk is low as indicated by a strong DBRS Morningstar
WA DSCR of 2.39x. Even with the exclusion of the shadow-rated
loans, representing 17.2% of the pool balance, the deal exhibits a
favorable DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 2.70x.

Five loans, representing 40.5% of the pool balance, have sponsors
that DBRS Morningstar deems as Strong. Only four loans,
representing 7.5% of the pool balance, have sponsors and/or loan
collateral associated with a voluntary bankruptcy filing, a prior
discounted payoff, a loan default, limited net worth and/or
liquidity, a historical negative credit event, and/or inadequate
CRE experience.

DBRS Morningstar deemed only one of the sampled loans as Below
Average or Poor property quality. Eleven sampled loans,
representing 69.4% of the pool balance, exhibited Average (+),
Above Average, or Excellent property quality.

Thirteen loans, representing 29.6% of the pool balance, including
four portfolios, are secured by properties that are either fully or
partially leased to a single tenant. Coleman Highline (9.8% of the
pool balance) is an office building that is 100% occupied by Roku.
Exchange Right Net Leased Portfolio #40 (6.2% of the pool balance)
consists of 21 properties across nine states. Of the net rentable
area , 89.1% is occupied by investment-grade tenants, such as
Walgreens Company (Walgreens), CVS Pharmacy, and Kroger. IFA
Rotorion Building (3.9% of the pool balance) is an office building
that is 100% occupied by IFA Rotorion and serves as its North
American headquarters. Triangle 54 (3.7% of the pool balance) is an
office building that is 100% occupied by RHO, Inc.

Exchange Right Net Leased Portfolio #39 (1.4% of the pool balance)
consists of 18 properties with seven different tenant brands, 14 of
which are investment-grade properties, including Walgreens, Dollar
General, Pick N Save, and Dollar Tree. Investment-grade tenants
account for 63.9% of gross potential rent. Other single-tenant
properties include H Mart (0.9% of the pool balance), Dollar
General (0.8% of the pool balance), WAG portfolio of two Walgreens
properties (0.7% of the pool balance), four separate loans with
single-standing Walgreens (1.9% of the pool balance), and Comerica
Bank (0.3% of the pool balance). The DBRS Morningstar WA LTV for
the single-tenant properties is 63.5% at issuance, which DBRS
Morningstar considers to be moderate leverage.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
office properties with eight loans, representing 52.0% of the pool
balance. The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose
challenges globally and the future demand for office space is
uncertain with corporate downsizings and more companies extending
their remote-working strategy. Two of the three shadow-rated loans,
The Grace Building and McDonald's Global HQ, representing 14.3% of
the pool balance, are office properties that DBRS Morningstar
shadow-rates as investment grade. The office properties in the pool
exhibit a favorable DBRS Morningstar WA DSCR of 2.47x and DBRS
Morningstar WA LTV of 54.5%, which mitigate some of DBRS
Morningstar's concerns about this property type. Five of the office
loans, representing 43.3% of the pool balance, are secured by
office properties located in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 7 and 8, which are in desirable primary markets. For the
loans secured by office properties in more suburban areas, the WA
expected loss is more than 2.00x the overall pool's expected loss.
Four of the office loans, representing 37.5% of the pool balance,
are backed by sponsors that DBRS Morningstar deems as Strong
because they meet certain net worth and liquidity multiple
thresholds and have substantial real estate experience with limited
past credit issues.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 74.0% of the pool balance, are
structured with full-term interest-only (IO) periods. An additional
eight loans, representing 9.6% of the pool balance, are structured
with partial-IO terms ranging from 12 months to 60 months.

The pool features a relatively high concentration of loans secured
by properties located in less favorable suburban, tertiary, and
rural market areas. Twenty-six loans, representing 39.8% of the
pool balance, are secured by properties predominately located in
areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 1 through 4. Loans in
markets with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 1 through 4
typically have a higher probability of default and, on average,
produce higher expected losses than similar loans.

Two loans - 2100 River and Turner Towers - with an original loan
amount exceeding $20 million, representing 6.1% of the pool
balance, do not have a nonconsolidation opinion.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK 2020-BNK29: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class K Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-BNK29 to
be issued by BANK 2020-BNK29:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (sf)
-- Class X-F at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-H at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-J at BB (sf)
-- Class X-K at B (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (high (sf)
-- Class G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class J at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class K at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class A-3-1, Class A-3-2, Class A-3-X1, Class A-3-X2, Class
A-4-1, Class A-4-2, Class A-4-X1, Class A-4-X2, Class A-S-1, Class
A-S-2, Class A-S-X1, and Class A-S-X2 Certificates are also offered
certificates. Such classes of certificates, together with the Class
A-3, Class A-4, and Class A-S Certificates, constitute the
Exchangeable Certificates. The Class A-1, Class A-SB, Class B,
Class C, Class D, Class E, Class F, Class G, Class H, Class J,
Class K, and Class L Certificates, together with the RR Interest
and the Exchangeable Certificates with a certificate balance, are
the Principal Balance Certificates.

The Class X-A, Class X-B, Class X-D, Class X-F, Class X-G, Class
X-H, Class X-J, Class X-K, and Class X-L Certificates
(collectively, the Class X Certificates) are notional amount
certificates and will not be entitled to distributions of
principal. The notional amount of the Class X-A Certificates will
be equal to the aggregate certificate or principal balance of the
Class A-1 and Class A-SB Certificates and the Class A-3 and Class
A-4 trust components. The notional amount of the Class X-B
Certificates will be equal to the aggregate certificate or
principal balance of the Class A-S trust component and the Class B
and Class C Certificates. The notional amount of the Class X-D
Certificates will be equal to the aggregate certificate balance of
the Class D and Class E Certificates. The notional amount of each
of the Class X-F, Class X-G, Class X-H, Class X-J, Class X-K, and
Class X-L Certificates will be equal to the certificate balance of
the class of principal balance certificates that, with the addition
of X-, has the same alphabetical designation as the subject class
of Class X Certificates.

With regard to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
magnitude and extent of performance stress posed to global
structured finance transactions remain highly uncertain. This
considers the fiscal and monetary policy measures and statutory law
changes that have already been implemented or will be implemented
to soften the impact of the crisis on global economies. Some
regions, jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling
more immediate effects. DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic and its impact on both the commercial
real estate (CRE) sector and the global fixed-income markets.
Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply additional short-term
stresses to its rating analysis, for example by front-loading
default expectations and/or assessing the liquidity position of a
structured finance transaction with more stressful operational risk
and/or cash flow timing considerations.

The collateral consists of 41 fixed-rate loans secured by 89
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. DBRS Morningstar analyzed
the conduit pool to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting
the long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. DBRS Morningstar shadow rated three loans,
representing 17.2% of the pool balance, as investment grade. When
DBRS Morningstar measured the cut-off loan balances against the
DBRS Morningstar Net Cash Flow and their respective actual
constants, the initial DBRS Morningstar Weighted-Average (WA) Debt
Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of the pool was 2.81 times (x). No
loans had a DBRS Morningstar WA DSCR lower than 1.30x, a threshold
indicative of a higher likelihood of midterm default. The DBRS
Morningstar WA Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio of the pool was 58.4% at
issuance and the pool is scheduled to amortize down to a DBRS
Morningstar WA LTV of 55.1% at maturity. These credit metrics are
based on A note balances. Fourteen loans, representing 39.4% of the
pool balance, were originated in connection with the borrower's
acquisition of the related mortgage property. Twenty-six loans,
representing 50.6% of the pool balance, were originated in
connection with the borrower's refinancing of a previous mortgage
loan and one loan, representing 10% of the pool balance, was
originated in connection with a recapitalization. DBRS Morningstar
views acquisition loans as more favorable in the context of
recent-vintage conduit and fusion transactions. Cash-equity
infusions from a sponsor in a transaction typically result in a
greater alignment of interests between the lender and borrower,
especially compared with a refinancing scenario where the sponsor
may be withdrawing equity from the transaction.

The collateral features three loans, representing 17.2% of the pool
balance that DBRS Morningstar assessed as investment grade: The
Grace Building, Turner Towers, and McDonald's Global HQ. The Grace
Building exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a shadow
rating of "A," McDonald's Global HQ exhibits credit characteristics
consistent with a shadow rating of A (low), and Turner Towers
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a shadow rating of
AAA.

Eight loans, representing 37.7% of the pool balance, are in areas
with DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks of 7 and 8, which benefit from
locations in urban and liquid markets, driven by consistently
strong investor demand, even during times of economic stress. Urban
markets represented in this deal include New York and Chicago. In
addition, 14 loans, representing 26.5% of the pool balance, have
collateral in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Group 3, which
represents the best-performing group in terms of historical
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) default rates among the
top 25 MSAs. MSA Group 3 has a historical default rate of 17.2%,
which is nearly 40.0% lower than the overall CMBS historical
default rate of 28.0%.

Eighteen loans, representing 57.0% of the pool balance, exhibited
DBRS Morningstar LTVs of equal to or less than 60.0% at issuance, a
threshold historically indicative of relatively low-leverage
financing and generally associated with below-average default
frequency.

Term default risk is low as indicated by a strong DBRS Morningstar
WA DSCR of 2.81x. Even with the exclusion of the shadow-rated
loans, representing 17.2% of the pool balance, the deal exhibits a
favorable DBRS Morningstar WA DSCR of 2.70x.

Five loans, representing 40.5% of the pool balance, have sponsors
that DBRS Morningstar deems as Strong. Only four loans,
representing 7.5% of the pool balance, have sponsors and/or loan
collateral associated with a voluntary bankruptcy filing, a prior
discounted payoff, a loan default, limited net worth and/or
liquidity, a historical negative credit event, and/or inadequate
CRE experience.

DBRS Morningstar deemed only one of the sampled loans as Below
Average or Poor property quality. Eleven sampled loans,
representing 69.4% of the pool balance, exhibited Average (+),
Above Average, or Excellent property quality.

Thirteen loans, representing 29.6% of the pool balance, including
four portfolios, are secured by properties that are either fully or
partially leased to a single tenant. Coleman Highline (9.8% of the
pool balance) is an office building that is 100% occupied by Roku.
Exchange Right Net Leased Portfolio #40 (6.2% of the pool balance)
consists of 21 properties across nine states. Of the net rentable
area, 89.1% is occupied by investment-grade tenants, such as
Walgreens Company (Walgreens), CVS Pharmacy, and Kroger. IFA
Rotorion Building (3.9% of the pool balance) is an office building
that is 100% occupied by IFA Rotorion and serves as its North
American headquarters. Triangle 54 (3.7% of the pool balance) is an
office building that is 100% occupied by RHO, Inc.

ExchangeRight Net Leased Portfolio #39 (1.4% of the pool balance)
consists of 18 properties with seven different tenant brands, 14 of
which are investment-grade properties, including Walgreens, Dollar
General, Pick N Save, and Dollar Tree. Investment-grade tenants
account for 63.9% of gross potential rent. Other single-tenant
properties include H Mart (0.9% of the pool balance), Dollar
General (0.8% of the pool balance), WAG portfolio of two Walgreens
properties (0.7% of the pool balance), four separate loans with
single-standing Walgreens (1.9% of the pool balance), and Comerica
Bank (0.3% of the pool balance). The DBRS Morningstar WA LTV for
the single-tenant properties is 63.5% at issuance, which DBRS
Morningstar considers to be moderate leverage.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
office properties with eight loans, representing 52.0% of the pool
balance. The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose
challenges globally and the future demand for office space is
uncertain with corporate downsizings and more companies extending
their remote-working strategy. Two of the three shadow-rated loans,
The Grace Building and McDonald's Global HQ, representing 14.3% of
the pool balance, are office properties that DBRS Morningstar
shadow rates as investment grade. The office properties in the pool
exhibit a favorable DBRS Morningstar WA DSCR of 3.05x and DBRS
Morningstar WA LTV of 54.5%, which mitigate some of DBRS
Morningstar's concerns about this property type. Five of the office
loans, representing 43.3% of the pool balance, are secured by
office properties located in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 7 and 8, which are in desirable primary markets. For the
loans secured by office properties in more suburban areas, the WA
expected loss is more than 2.00x the overall pool's expected loss.
Four of the office loans, representing 37.5% of the pool balance,
are backed by sponsors that DBRS Morningstar deems as Strong
because they meet certain net worth and liquidity multiple
thresholds and have substantial real estate experience with limited
past credit issues.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 74.0% of the pool balance, are
structured with full-term interest-only (IO) periods. An additional
eight loans, representing 9.6% of the pool balance, are structured
with partial-IO terms ranging from 12 months to 60 months.

The pool features a relatively high concentration of loans secured
by properties located in less favorable suburban, tertiary, and
rural market areas. Twenty-six loans, representing 39.8% of the
pool balance, are secured by properties predominately located in
areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 1 through 4. Loans in
markets with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 1 through 4
typically have a higher probability of default, and on average,
produce higher expected losses than similar loans.

Two loans—2100 River and Turner Towers—with an original loan
amount exceeding $20 million, representing 6.1% of the pool
balance, do not have a nonconsolidation opinion.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-F, X-G, X-H, X-J, X-K, and X-H are IO
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK 2020-BNK30: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class X-G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-BNK30 to
be issued by BANK 2020-BNK30:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BB (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes X-D, X-F, X-G, D, E, F, and G will
be privately placed.

Classes A-3-X1, A-3-X2, A-4-X1, A-4-X2, X-A, X-B, A-S-X1, and
A-S-X2 are interest-only (IO) certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The Class A-3-1, A-3-2, A-3-X1, A-3-X2, A-4-1, A-4-2, A-4-X1,
A-4-X2, A-S-1, A-S-2, A-S-X1, and A-S-X2 certificates are also
offered certificates. Such classes of certificates, together with
the Class A-3, A-4, and A-S certificates, constitute the
Exchangeable Certificates. The Class A-1, A-SB, A-2, B, C, D, E, F,
G, and H certificates, together with the RR Interest and the
Exchangeable Certificates with a certificate balance, are referred
to as the principal balance certificates.

With regard to the coronavirus pandemic, the magnitude and extent
of performance stress posed to global structured finance
transactions remain highly uncertain. This considers the fiscal and
monetary policy measures and statutory law changes that have
already been implemented or will be implemented to soften the
impact of the crisis on global economies. Some regions,
jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling more
immediate effects. DBRS Morningstar continues to monitor the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic and its impact on both the commercial
real estate (CRE) sector and the global fixed income markets.
Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply additional short-term
stresses to its rating analysis, for example by front-loading
default expectations and/or assessing the liquidity position of a
structured finance transaction with more stressful operational risk
and/or cash flow timing considerations.

The transaction consists of 40 fixed-rates loans secured by 62
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is of a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. Three loans, representing
25.7% of the pool, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS
Morningstar. Additionally, 14 loans in the pool, representing 5.3%
of the transaction, are backed by residential co-operative loans.
The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the DBRS Morningstar Net Cash Flow and their
respective actual constants, the initial Weighted-average (WA) DBRS
Morningstar Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of the pool was
2.75x. One loan, representing only 0.7% of the pool, has a DBRS
Morningstar DSCR below 1.32x, a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of midterm default. The pool additionally includes five
loans, composing a combined 15.3% of the pool balance, with a DBRS
Morningstar Loant-to-Value (LTV) ratio exceeding 67.1%, a threshold
generally indicative of above-average default frequency. The WA
DBRS Morningstar LTV of the pool at issuance was 52.4%, and the
pool is scheduled to amortize down to a WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of
47.4% at maturity. These credit metrics are based on the A note
balances. Excluding the shadow-rated loans, representing 25.7% of
the pool, the deal still exhibits a favorable DBRS Morningstar
Issuance LTV of 56.4%.

The pool has a top 10 loan concentration of 70.6% and exhibits a
Herfindahl score of 16.7, which is notably lower than previous
transactions rated by DBRS Morningstar including BANK 2020-BNK29,
with a Herfindahl score of 18.4, and BANK 2020-BNK26, with a
Herfindahl score of 32.7. Three of the loans—605 Third Avenue,
McDonald's Global HQ, and Grace Building—exhibit credit
characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings.
Combined, these loans represent 25.7% of the pool. Both 605 Third
Avenue and McDonald's Global HQ have credit characteristics
consistent with an A (low) shadow rating, and Grace Building has
credit characteristics consistent with an A shadow rating.
Additionally, 14 loans in the pool, representing 5.3% of the
transaction, are backed by residential co-operative loans.
Residential co-operatives tend to have minimal risk, given their
low leverage and high risk to residents if the co-operative
associations default on their mortgages. The WA LTV for these loans
is 17.2%.

Twenty-seven loans, representing a combined 62.7% of the pool by
allocated loan balance, exhibit issuance LTVs of less than 59.3%, a
threshold historically indicative of relatively low-leverage
financing and generally associated with below-average default
frequency. Even with the exclusion of the shadow-rated loans,
representing 25.7% of the pool, and 14 loans, representing 5.3% of
the pool, the deal exhibits a favorable DBRS Morningstar Issuance
LTV of 59.4%. Additionally, term default risk is low, as indicated
by a strong DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 2.75x. Even with the exclusion
of the shadow-rated and National Cooperative Bank, N.A. (NCB) loans
the deal exhibits a very favorable DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 2.28x.

While the pool demonstrates favorable loan metrics with WA DBRS
Morningstar Issuance and Balloon LTVs of 52.4% and 47.4%,
respectively, it also exhibits heavy leverage barbelling. There are
three loans, accounting for 25.7% of the pool, with
investment-grade shadow ratings and a WA LTV of 40.8% and 14 loans,
representing 5.3% of the transaction, secured by co-operatives with
a WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of 17.2%. The pool also has 27 loans,
representing a combined 62.7% of the pool by allocated loan
balance, with an issuance LTV lower than 59.3%, a threshold
historically indicative of relatively low-leverage financing. There
are five loans, constituting a combined 15.3% of the pool balance,
with an issuance LTV higher than 67.1%, a threshold historically
indicative of relatively high-leverage financing and generally
associated with above-average default frequency. The WA expected
loss of the pool's investment-grade and NCB co-operative component
was approximately 0.6%, while the WA expected loss of the pool's
conduit component was substantially higher at approximately 2.0%,
further illustrating the barbelled nature of the transaction. The
WA DBRS Morningstar expected loss exhibited by the loans that have
relatively high-leverage financing was 2.1%. This is higher than
the conduit component's WA expected loss of 1.9%, and the pool's
credit enhancement reflects the higher leverage of this five-loan
component with an issuance LTV exceeding 67.1%.

Nine loans, representing 29.1% of the pool, are in areas identified
as DBRS Morningstar Market Ranks of 7 or 8, which are generally
characterized as highly dense urbanized areas that benefit from
increased liquidity driven by consistently strong investor demand,
even during times of economic stress. Markets ranked seven and
eight benefit from lower default frequencies than less dense
suburban, tertiary, and rural markets. Urban markets represented in
the deal include New York and San Francisco. In addition, 22 loans,
representing 42.0% of the pool balance, have collateral in
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Group 3, which is the
best-performing group in terms of historical commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) default rates among the top 25
MSAs. MSA Group 3 has a historical default rate of 17.2%, which is
nearly 10.8 percentage points lower than the overall CMBS
historical default rate of 28.0%.

Ten loans, representing 57.0% of the pool balance, received a
property quality of Average + or better including one loan,
representing 8.6% of the pool, deemed to have Excellent quality and
two loans, representing 16.6% of the pool, to be Above Average. Six
loans, five of which are within the top 10 loans, representing
42.4% of the pool, have Strong sponsorship. Furthermore, DBRS
Morningstar identified only three loans, which, combined, represent
just 6.5% of the pool, that have sponsorship and/or loan collateral
associated with a voluntary bankruptcy filing, a prior discounted
payoff, a loan default, limited net worth and/or liquidity, a
historical negative credit event, and/or inadequate commercial real
estate experience.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
office and retail properties with six loans, representing 42.3% of
the pool balance, secured by office properties and 10 loans,
representing 33.6% of the pool, secured by retail properties. The
ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges globally,
and the future demand for office and retail space is uncertain with
many store closures, companies filing for bankruptcy or downsizing,
and more companies extending their remote-working strategy. Three
of the six office loans, representing 60.8% of the office balance,
are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS Morningstar: 605 Third
Avenue, McDonald's Global HQ, and Grace Building. Furthermore,
62.2% of the office loans are in areas with DBRS Morningstar Market
Ranks of 7 or 8, and no loans are in a market ranked lower than
five. Additionally, two retail loans, representing 38.3% of the
retail concentration, are in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 6. The retail properties in more suburban areas have a WA
expected loss that is more than 50% higher than the overall pool's
expected loss. Of the retail concentration, three loans,
representing 24.4% of the retail loans, are secured by multiple
properties (25 in total), which insulates the loans from issues at
any one property. The office and retail properties exhibit
favorable WA DBRS Morningstar DSCRs of 3.01x and 2.10x,
respectively. Additionally, both property types exhibit favorable
LTVs at 47.3% and 60.7%, respectively. Four of the loans secured by
office properties, representing 74.1% of the concentration, have
sponsors that were deemed to be Strong.

Sixteen loans, representing 67.0% of the pool balance, are
structured with full-term IO periods. An additional three loans,
representing 7.8% of the pool balance, are structured with
partial-IO terms ranging from 36 months to 60 months. Of the 16
loans with full-term IO periods, seven loans, representing 39.0% of
the pool by allocated loan balance, are in areas with a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of 6, 7, or 8. These markets benefit from
increased liquidity even during times of economic stress. Two of
the 16 identified loans, representing 17.2% of the total pool
balance, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS Morningstar: 605
Third Avenue and Grace Building.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK OF AMERICA 20170BNK3: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-BNK3 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK3. In addition, Fitch has
revised the Rating Outlook on two classes to Negative from Stable.

RATING ACTIONS

BACM 2017-BNK3

Class A-1 06427DAN3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-2 06427DAP8; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3 06427DAR4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 06427DAS2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 06427DAV5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 06427DAQ6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 06427DAW3; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 06427DAX1; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 06427DAC7; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E 06427DAE3; LT BB+sf Affirmed; previously BB+sf

Class F 06427DAG8; LT Bsf Affirmed; previously Bsf

Class X-A 06427DAT0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 06427DAU7; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class X-D 06427DAA1; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Despite a majority of the pool
exhibiting relatively stable performance, loss expectations have
increased, driven primarily by a greater number of Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs) that have been impacted by the slowdown in economic
activity related to the coronavirus pandemic. Fitch has designated
16 loans (29.3% of pool) as FLOCs, including two specially serviced
loans (2.1%).

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 3.75%. The
Rating Outlook revisions to Negative from Stable on classes E and F
factor in additional sensitivities that reflect losses, which could
reach 5.90%; these additional sensitivities include additional
stresses related to the coronavirus and potential outsized losses
on three loans, Shoreline Office Center, Potomac Mills and Fremaux
Town Center.

The largest contributor to Fitch's overall loss expectation, and
the largest increase in loss since the prior rating action, is the
largest FLOC, The Summit Birmingham, which is secured by a
681,000-sf regional mall located in Birmingham, AL. YE 2019 NOI
fell 3.5% from 2018. Near-term lease roll includes 5% in 2020 and
11% in 2021. The largest tenants are Belk (23.8% of NRA; lease
expires on Jan. 31, 2023), RSM US (5.2%; Oct. 31, 2021) and Barnes
& Noble (3.7%; Feb. 1, 2023). Belk and Barnes & Noble leases were
extended five years from their original 2018 lease expiration
dates. The property was 94% occupied as of the June 2020 rent
roll.

The two specially serviced loans consist of the Holiday Inn Express
King Of Prussia (1.2%) and Holiday Inn Express - Garland, TX
(0.9%). The Holiday Inn Express King Of Prussia loan, which is
secured by a 155-key limited-service hotel located in King of
Prussia, PA, transferred to special servicing in June 2020 due to
payment default. The borrower has requested coronavirus pandemic
relief. A pre-negotiation letter was executed and potential
forbearance was being negotiated; however, the parties are too far
apart at this time. Foreclosure was filed. TTM September 2020
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 37%, $102 and $38, respectively,
compared to 66%, $116 and $77 for 2019; 67%, $114 and $76 for 2018
and 66%, $117 and $78 at issuance.

The Holiday Inn Express - Garland, TX loan, which is secured by a
98-key limited-service hotel located in Garland, TX, transferred to
special servicing in June 2020 due to performance concerns related
to the coronavirus pandemic. Terms have been approved for a
forbearance agreement and document drafting has been initiated. TTM
September 2020 occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 58%, $105 and $61,
respectively, compared to 70%, $112 and $78 for 2019; 69%, $108 and
$75 for 2018 and 76%, $118 and $91 at issuance.

Coronavirus Exposure: Six loans (11.9%) are secured by hotel
properties, and 20 loans (29.6%) are secured by retail properties.
The non-specially serviced hotel loans have a weighted average (WA)
YE 2019 NOI DSCR of 2.48x and can sustain an average NOI decline of
58.8% before the DSCR would fall below 1.0x. The retail loans have
a WA YE 2019 NOI DSCR of 2.11x and can sustain an average NOI
decline of 47.1% before the DSCR would fall below 1.0x. Fitch
applied additional stresses related to the coronavirus to five
hotel loans and six retail loans to account for potential cash flow
disruptions due to the coronavirus pandemic; these additional
stresses contributed to the Negative Outlook revisions on class E
and F.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch applied an additional
sensitivity scenario on the Shoreline Office Center, Potomac Mills
and Fremaux Town Center loans, which factored in potential outsized
losses of 15%, 15% and 25%, respectively; this scenario contributed
to the Negative Outlook revisions on classes E and F.

The Shoreline Office Center loan, which is secured by an office
property in Mill Valley, CA, faces the significant upcoming
rollover of its largest tenant, Glassdoor, which has previously
announced plans to move its headquarters away from the property and
has laid off its workforce due to the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic. Potomac Mills and Fremaux Town Center are regional
mall/outlet properties in Woodbridge, VA and Slidell, LA; Fitch is
concerned with future performance due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Minimal Change in Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the November 2020
remittance reporting, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been paid down by 2.0% to $957.5 million from $977.1 million at
issuance. The pool is scheduled to amortize by 6.9% of the initial
pool balance prior to maturity. Of the current pool, 55.2% is full
term, IO, and 20.7% have a partial, IO component. Two loans (1.0%)
have been defeased.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes E and F reflect the additional
sensitivity scenario applied to Shoreline Office Center, Potomac
Mills and Fremaux Town Center, as well as performance concerns
stemming from reduced economic activity as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic. The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through D
reflect the generally stable performance of the majority of the
pool and expected continued amortization.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance, particularly on the FLOCs, coupled with
additional paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to classes B, X-B
and C would only occur with significant improvement in CE and/or
defeasance; however, are not likely unless the FLOCs stabilize.
Upgrades to the class D and X-D are also not likely until FLOCs
stabilize, but would be limited based on sensitivity to loan
concentrations. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
interest shortfalls are likely. Upgrades to classes E and F are not
likely until the later years in the transaction and only if the
performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or properties
vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and
there is sufficient CE.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades of the 'Asf'-, 'AAsf'- and 'AAAsf'-rated
categories are not considered likely due to the position in the
capital structure, but may occur at 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf' should
interest shortfalls affect these classes. A downgrade to the
'BBBsf' category is possible should expected losses for the pool
increase significantly and/or performance of the FLOCs fail to
stabilize or decline further. Downgrades of the 'BBsf' and 'Bsf'
categories would occur should loss expectations increase
significantly, performance of the FLOCs fail to stabilize or
decline further and/or the Shoreline Office Center, Potomac Mills
and Fremaux Town Center loans have outsized losses.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
additional negative rating actions, including downgrades of a
category or more and Negative Outlook revisions.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BELLEMEADE RE 2020-4: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on M-2A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series 2020-4 (the Notes) to be
issued by Bellemeade Re 2020-4 Ltd. (BMIR 2020-4 or the Issuer):

-- $142.1 million Class M-2A at BB (sf)
-- $162.4 million Class M-2B at B (low) (sf)

The BB (sf) and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 4.25% and 2.25% of
credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

BMIR 2020-4 is Arch Mortgage Insurance Company's (Arch MI) and
United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company's (UGRIC;
collectively the Ceding Insurer) 12th rated MI-linked note
transaction. The Notes are backed by reinsurance premiums, eligible
investments, and related account investment earnings, in each case
relating to a pool of MI policies linked to residential loans. The
Notes are exposed to the risk arising from losses that the Ceding
Insurer pays to settle claims on the underlying MI policies.

The BMIR 2020-4 Notes are backed by the MI policies that were also
reinsured in the Bellemeade Re 2020-1 Ltd. (BMIR 2020-1)
transaction. The losses arising from any underlying MI policies
reinsured in this transaction will be allocated first to the
various coverage levels, up to the coverage level M-1C, before
being allocated to the coverage level B-1 of the BMIR 2020-1
transaction.

As of the cut-off date, the pool of insured mortgage loans consists
of 131,047 fully amortizing first-lien fixed- and variable-rate
mortgages that are part of BMIR 2020-1 transaction. They all have
been underwritten to a full documentation standard, have original
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) less than or equal to 100%, have never
been reported to the ceding insurer as 60 or more days delinquent,
have never been reported to be modified, and have not been reported
to be in payment forbearance plan. The mortgage loans have MI
policies effective on or after February 2018. On March 1, 2020, a
new master policy was introduced to conform to government-sponsored
enterprises' revised rescission relief principles under the Private
Mortgage Insurer Eligibility Requirements guidelines. All of the
mortgage loans (100.0%) were originated prior to the introduction
of the new master policy.

On the Closing Date, the Issuer will enter into the Reinsurance
Agreement with the Ceding Insurer. As per the agreement, the Ceding
Insurer will receive protection for the funded portion of the MI
losses. In exchange for this protection, the Ceding Insurer will
make premium payments related to the underlying insured mortgage
loans to the Issuer.

The Issuer is expected to use the proceeds from the sale of the
Notes to purchase certain eligible investments that will be held in
the reinsurance trust account. The eligible investments are
restricted to AAA or equivalent rated U.S. Treasury money-market
funds and securities. Unlike other residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) transactions, cash flow from the underlying loans
will not be used to make any payments; rather, in mortgage
insurance-linked Notes (MILN) transactions, a portion of the
eligible investments held in the reinsurance trust account will be
liquidated to make principal payments to the noteholders and to
make loss payments to the Ceding Insurer when claims are settled
with respect to the MI policy.

The Issuer will use the investment earnings on the eligible
investments, together with the Ceding Insurer's premium payments,
to pay interest to the noteholders.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
the reduction in the aggregate exposed principal balance on the
underlying MI policy that is allocated to the Notes. The
subordinate Notes will receive their pro rata share of available
principal funds if the minimum credit enhancement test and the
delinquency test are satisfied. The minimum credit enhancement test
will be satisfied if the subordinate percentage is at least 8.00%.
The delinquency test will be satisfied if the three-month average
of 60+ days delinquency percentage is below 75% of the subordinate
percentage.

Interest payments are funded via (1) premium payments that the
Ceding Insurer must make under the reinsurance agreement and (2)
earnings on eligible investments.

On the closing date, the Ceding Insurer will establish a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account. If the Ceding
Insurer defaults in paying coverage premium payments to the Issuer,
the amount available in this account will cover interest payments
to the noteholders. Unlike a majority of the prior rated MILN
transactions, the premium deposit account will not be funded at
closing. Instead, the Ceding Insurer will make a deposit into this
account up to the applicable target balance only when one of the
premium deposit events occurs. Please refer to the related report
and/or offering circular for more details.

The Notes are scheduled to mature on June 25, 2030, but will be
subject to early redemption at the option of the Ceding Insurer (1)
for a 10% clean-up call or (2) on or following the payment date in
December 2025, among others. The Notes are also subject to
mandatory redemption before the scheduled maturity date upon the
termination of the Reinsurance Agreement.

Arch MI and UGRIC, together, act as the Ceding Insurer. The Bank of
New York Mellon (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as the Indenture Trustee, Paying Agent, Note
Registrar, and Reinsurance Trustee.

Coronavirus Impact – MILN

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many RMBS asset classes, some meaningfully.

Various mortgage insurance (MI) companies have set up programs to
issue MILNs. These programs aim to transfer a portion of the risk
related to MI claims on a reference pool of loans to the investors
of the MILNs. In these transactions, investors' risk increases with
higher MI payouts. The underlying pool of mortgage loans with MI
policies covered by MILN reinsurance agreements is typically
composed of conventional/conforming loans that follow
government-sponsored enterprises' acquisition guidelines and
therefore have LTVs above 80%. However, a portion of each MILN
transaction's covered loans may not be agency eligible.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, DBRS Morningstar expects
increased delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a
potential near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged
properties. Such deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers'
ability to make monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell
properties in an amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance
of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under the moderate
scenario in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios:
December Update" published on December 2, 2020, for the MILN asset
class DBRS Morningstar applies more severe market value decline
(MVD) assumptions across all rating categories than what it
previously used. Such MVD assumptions are derived through a
fundamental home price approach based on the forecast unemployment
rates and GDP growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate
scenario. In addition, DBRS Morningstar may assume a portion of the
pool (randomly selected) to be on forbearance plans in the
immediate future. For these loans, DBRS Morningstar assumes higher
loss expectations above and beyond the coronavirus assumptions.
Such assumptions translate to higher expected losses on the
collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit enhancement.

In the MILN asset class, while the full effect of the pandemic may
not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS Morningstar
generally believes that loans with layered risk (low FICO score
with high LTV/high debt-to-income (DTI) ratio) may be more
sensitive to economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment
rates and lower incomes. Additionally, higher delinquencies might
cause a longer lockout period or a redirection of principal
allocation away from outstanding rated classes because of the
failure of performance triggers.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BELLEMEADE RE 2020-4: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. M-2A Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to one class
of mortgage insurance credit risk transfer notes issued by
Bellemeade Re 2020-4 Ltd.

Bellemeade Re 2020-4 Ltd. is the fourteenth transaction issued
under the Bellemeade Re program since inception and the fourth
transaction issued in 2020, which transfers to the capital markets
the credit risk of private mortgage insurance (MI) policies issued
by Arch Mortgage Insurance Company and United Guaranty Residential
Insurance Company (UGRIC) on a portfolio of residential mortgage
loans. The notes are exposed to the risk of claims payments on the
MI policies, and depending on the notes' priority, may incur
principal and interest losses when the ceding insurer makes claims
payments on the MI policies.

In this transaction, the notes are part of a single series of
mortgage insurance-linked notes designated as "Series 2020-4." The
reference pool is a subset of the Bellemeade Re 2020-1 transaction
and is comprised of all non-canceled and clean pay policies
(131,047 by count). Bellemeade Re 2020-4 is collateralized by a
separate reinsurance trust account and is governed by separate
legal documents. The new issuance will have no impact on the
outstanding Bellemeade 2020-1 transaction.

On the closing date, the issuer and the ceding insurer will enter
into a reinsurance agreement providing excess of loss reinsurance
on mortgage insurance policies issued by the ceding insurer on a
portfolio of residential mortgage loans. Proceeds from the sale of
the notes will be deposited into the reinsurance trust account for
the benefit of the ceding insurer and as security for the issuer's
obligations to the ceding insurer under the reinsurance agreement.
The funds in the reinsurance trust account will also be available
to pay noteholders, following the termination of the trust and
payment of amounts due to the ceding insurer. Funds in the
reinsurance trust account will be used to purchase eligible
investments and will be subject to the terms of the reinsurance
trust agreement.

Following the instruction of the ceding insurer, the trustee will
liquidate assets in the reinsurance trust account to (1) make
principal payments to the notes as the insurance coverage in the
reference pool reduces due to loan amortization or policy
termination, and (2) reimburse the ceding insurer whenever it pays
MI claims after the coverage level B-2 is written off. While income
earned on eligible investments is used to pay interest on the
notes, the ceding insurer is responsible for covering any
difference between the investment income and interest accrued on
the notes' coverage levels.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bellemeade Re 2020-4 Ltd.

Cl. M-2A, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expects this insured pool's aggregate exposed principal
balance (AEPB) to incur 3.16% losses in a base case scenario, and
18.02% losses under an Aaa stress scenario. The AEPB is the portion
of the pool's risk in force that is not covered by existing
third-party reinsurance. The AEPB is the aggregate product of (i)
loan unpaid balance, (ii) the MI coverage percentage of each loan,
and (iii) one minus existing quota share reinsurance percentage.
Approximately 9.9% (by UPB) of the loans have 7.5% existing quota
share reinsurance covered by unaffiliated third parties, hence
92.5% pro rata share of MI losses of such loans will be taken by
this transaction. For the rest of loans having zero existing quota
share reinsurance, the transaction will bear 100% of their MI
losses.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.
Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(mean expected losses by 13.58%) and its Aaa losses by 5% to
reflect the likely performance deterioration resulting from of a
slowdown in US economic activity in 2020 due to the coronavirus
outbreak.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety. Servicing practices, including tracking coronavirus
related loss mitigation activities, may vary among servicers in the
transaction. These inconsistencies could impact reported collateral
performance and affect the timing of any breach of performance
triggers, the timing of policy terminations and the amount of
ultimate net loss.

Moody's may infer and extrapolate from the information provided
based on this or other transactions or industry information, or
make stressed assumptions. Moody's calculated losses on the pool
using its US Moody's Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based
on the loan-level collateral information as of the cut-off date.
Loan-level adjustments to the model results included, but were not
limited to, adjustments for origination quality.

Collateral Description

The reference pool consists of 131,047 primes, fixed- and
adjustable-rate, one- to four-unit, first-lien fully-amortizing
conforming mortgage loans with a total insured loan balance of
approximately $33 billion. Nearly all loans in the reference pool
had a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination that was greater
than 80%, with a weighted average of 91.6%. The borrowers in the
pool have a weighted average FICO score of 747, a weighted average
debt-to-income ratio of 36.0% and a weighted average mortgage rate
of 3.9%. The weighted average risk in force (MI coverage
percentage) is approximately 24.4% of the reference pool total
unpaid principal balance. Approximately 99.8% of the mortgage loans
have a mortgage insurance coverage effective date from July 1, 2019
through December 31, 2019, both days inclusive (by cut-off date
AEPB).

The weighted average LTV of 91.6% is far higher than those of
recent private label prime jumbo deals, which typically have LTVs
in the high 60's range, however, it is in line with those of recent
STACR high LTV CRT transactions and other MI CRT transactions rated
by Moody's. Except for 1 loan, all other insured loans in the
reference pool were originated with LTV ratios greater than 80%.
100% of insured loans were covered by mortgage insurance at
origination with 97.97% covered by BPMI and 2.03% covered by LPMI
(by cut-off date aggregate exposed principal balance).

Underwriting Quality

Moody's took into account the quality of Arch's insurance
underwriting, risk management and claims payment process in its
analysis. Arch's underwriting requirements address credit, capacity
(income), capital (asset/equity) and collateral. It has a licensed
in-house appraiser to review appraisals.

Lenders submit mortgage loans to Arch for insurance either through
delegated underwriting or non-delegated underwriting program. Under
the delegated underwriting program, lenders can submit loans for
insurance without Arch re-underwriting the loan file. Arch issues
an MI commitment based on the lender's representation that the loan
meets the insurer's underwriting requirement. Arch does not allow
exceptions for loans approved through its delegated underwriting
program. Lenders eligible under this program must be pre-approved
by Arch. Under the non-delegated underwriting program, insurance
coverage is approved after full-file underwriting by the insurer's
underwriters. For Arch's overall portfolio, approximately 57.1% of
the loans are insured through delegated underwriting and 42.9%
through non-delegated. Arch follows the GSE underwriting guidelines
via DU/LP but applies additional overlays.

Servicers provide Arch monthly reports of insured loans that are
60-day delinquent prior to any submission of claims. Claims are
typically submitted when servicers have taken possession of the
title to the properties. Claims are submitted by uploading or
entering on Arch's website, electronic transfer or paper.

Arch performs an internal quality assurance review on a sample
basis of delegated and non-delegated underwritten loans to ensure
that (i) the risk exposure of insured mortgage loans is accurately
represented, (ii) lenders submitting loans via delegated
underwriting program are adhering to Arch's guidelines, and (iii)
internal underwriters are following guidelines and maintaining
consistent underwriting standards and processes.

Arch has a solid quality control process to ensure claims are paid
timely and accurately. Similar to the above procedure, Arch's
claims management reviews a sample of paid claims each month.
Findings are used for performance management as well as identified
trends. In addition, there is strong oversight and review from
internal and external parties such as GSE audits, Department of
Insurance audits, audits from an independent account firm, and
Arch's internal audits and compliance. Arch is also SOX compliant.

PwC, an independent account firm, performs a thorough audit of
Arch's claim payment process.

Third-Party Review

The third-party review was originally performed by the third-party
diligence provider in March 2020 in connection with the Bellemeade
Re 2020-1 transaction, prior to the widespread impact of COVID-19
pandemic in the United States. The scope of the third-party review
remains weaker than private label RMBS transactions because it
covers only a limited sample of loans (0.20% by total loan count in
the reference pool) and only includes credit, data and valuation.
No updates have been made to the sampling or results of the
third-party diligence review since it was originally performed in
March 2020.

Reps & Warranties Framework

The ceding insurer does not make any representations and warranties
to the noteholders in this transaction. Since the insured mortgages
are predominantly GSE loans, the individual sellers would provide
exhaustive representations and warranties to the GSEs that are
negotiated and actively monitored. In addition, the ceding insurer
may rescind the MI policy for certain material misrepresentation
and fraud in the origination of a loan, which would benefit the MI
CRT noteholders.

Transaction Structure

The transaction structure is very similar to the Bellemeade Re
2020-1 transaction that Moody's has rated. The ceding insurer will
retain the coverage levels A, M-1C, and B-2. After closing, the
ceding insurer will maintain the 50% minimal retained share of
coverage level B-2 throughout the transaction. The offered notes
benefit from a sequential pay structure. The transaction
incorporates structural features such as a 9.5-year bullet maturity
and a sequential pay structure for the non-senior tranches,
resulting in a shorter expected weighted average life on the
offered notes.

Funds raised through the issuance of the notes are deposited into a
reinsurance trust account and are distributed either to the
noteholders, when insured loans amortize or MI policies terminate,
or to the ceding insurer for reimbursement of claims paid when
loans default. Interest on the notes is paid from income earned on
the eligible investments and the coverage premium from the ceding
insurer. Interest on the notes will accrue based on the outstanding
balance of the notes, but the ceding insurer will only be obligated
to remit coverage premium based on each note's coverage level.

Credit enhancement in this transaction is comprised of
subordination provided by junior notes. The rated M-2A offered note
has a credit enhancement level of 4.25%. The credit risk exposure
of the notes depends on the actual MI losses incurred by the
insured pool. The loss is allocated in a reverse sequential order.
MI loss is allocated starting from coverage level B-2, while
investment losses are allocated starting from class B-1 note.

So long as the senior coverage level is outstanding, and no
performance trigger event occurs, the transaction structure
allocates principal payments on a pro-rata basis between the senior
and non-senior reference tranches. Principal is then allocated
sequentially amongst the non-senior tranches. Principal payments
are all allocated to senior reference tranches when trigger event
occurs.

A trigger event with respect to any payment date will be in effect
if the coverage level amount of coverage level A for such payment
date has not been reduced to zero and either (i) the preceding
three month average of the sixty-plus delinquency amount for that
payment date equals or exceeds 75.00% of coverage level A
subordination amount or (ii) the subordinate percentage (or with
respect to the first payment date, the original subordinate
percentage) for that payment date is less than the target CE
percentage (minimum C/E test: 8.00%).

Premium Deposit Account (PDA)

The premium deposit account will benefit the transaction upon a
mandatory termination event (e.g., the ceding insurer fails to pay
the coverage premium and does not cure, triggering a default under
the reinsurance agreement), by providing interest liquidity to the
noteholders for 70 days while the assets of the reinsurance trust
account are being liquidated to repay the principal of the notes.

On the closing date, the ceding insurer will establish a cash and
securities account (the PDA) but no initial deposit amount will be
made to the account by the ceding insurer unless the premium
deposit event is triggered. The premium deposit event will be
triggered if the rating of the notes exceeds the insurance
financial strength (IFS) rating of the ceding insurer or the ceding
insurer's IFS rating falls below Baa2. If the note ratings exceed
that of the ceding insurer, the insurer will be obligated to
deposit into the premium deposit account the coverage premium only
for the notes that exceeded the ceding insurer's rating. If the
ceding insurer's rating falls below Baa2, it is obligated to
deposit coverage premium for all reinsurance coverage levels.

The required PDA amount for each class of notes and each month is
equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the coupon rate of the note
multiplied by (a) the applicable funded percentage, (b) the
coverage level amount for the coverage level corresponding to such
class of notes and (c) a fraction equal to 70/360, over (ii) two
times the investment income collected on the eligible investments.

Moody's believes the PDA arrangement does not establish a linkage
between the ratings of the notes and the IFS rating of the ceding
insurer because, 1) the required PDA amount is small relative to
the entire deal, 2) the risk of PDA not being funded could
theoretically occur if the ceding insurer suddenly defaults,
causing a rating downgrade from investment grade to default in a
very short period; which is a highly unlikely scenario, and 3) even
if the insurer becomes insolvent, there would be a strong incentive
for the insurer's insolvency regulator to continue to make the
interest payments to avoid losing reinsurance protection provided
by the deal.

Claims Consultant

To mitigate risks associated with the ceding insurer's control of
the trust account and discretion to unilaterally determine the MI
claims amounts (i.e., ultimate net losses), the ceding insurer will
engage Opus Capital Markets, as claims consultant, to verify MI
claims and reimbursement amounts withdrawn from the reinsurance
trust account once the coverage level B-2 has been written down.
The claims consultant will review on a quarterly basis a sample of
claims paid by the ceding insurer covered by the reinsurance
agreement. In verifying the amount, the claims consultant will
apply a permitted variance to the total paid loss for each MI
Policy of +/- 2%. The claims consultant will provide a preliminary
report to the ceding insurer containing results of the
verification. If there are findings that cannot be resolved between
the ceding insurer and the claims consultant, the claims consultant
will increase the sample size. A final report will be delivered by
the claim's consultant to the trustee, the issuer and the ceding
insurer. The issuer will be required to provide a copy of the final
report to the noteholders and the rating agencies.

Unlike RMBS transactions where there is typically some level of
independent third-party oversight by the trustee, the master
servicer and/or the securities administrator, MI CRT transactions
typically do not have such oversight. For example, the ceding
insurer not only has full control of the trust account but can also
determine, at its discretion, the MI claims amount. The ceding
insurer will then direct the trustee to withdraw the funds to
reimburse for the claims paid. Since the trustee is not required to
verify the MI claims amount, there could be a scenario where funds
are withdrawn from the reinsurance trust account in excess of the
amounts necessary to reimburse the ceding insurer. As such, Moody's
believes the claims consultant in this transaction will provide the
oversight to mitigate such risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in April
2020.


BENCHMARK 2019-B15: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on G-RR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-B15 issued by Benchmark
2019-B15 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes E, F, G-RR, X-D, and X-F were removed from Under Review
with Negative Implications where they were placed on August 6,
2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the transaction consisted of
32 fixed-rate loans secured by 87 commercial and multifamily
properties. The initial trust balance of $846.6 million has been
reduced by only a nominal amount as of the November 2020
remittance, as all loans from issuance remain in the pool and there
has been negligible amortization to date. The transaction is
concentrated by property type as eight loans, representing 37.1% of
the current trust balance, are secured by office collateral;
mixed-use properties back the second-largest concentration of
loans, with eight loans representing 29.9% of the current trust
balance. As of the November 2020 remittance, seven loans,
representing 16.8% of the pool, are on the servicer's watchlist,
and there are no loans in special servicing. The watchlisted loans
are being monitored for various reasons, including delinquent
payments, servicing trigger events, low debt service coverage
ratios (DSCRs), and/or Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic-related forbearance requests. Some of these issues have
been resolved and the servicer expects that status will be
reflected in the reporting within the near term.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is Kildeer Village
Square (Prospectus ID#6, 5.7% of pool), which was flagged for
delinquent payments and a servicing trigger event. The loan is
secured by a 199,245-square foot (sf) shopping centre in Kildeer,
Illinois, approximately 40 miles northwest of Chicago. In early
March 2020, the largest tenant, Art Van Furniture (Art Van) (20.4%
of net rentable area (NRA)), went dark following the company's
bankruptcy filing, which ultimately resulted in the company
declaring that all assets would be liquidated and all stores would
be closed. These events triggered a cash sweep and cash trap,
according to the loan documents. The loan was also flagged for
delinquent debt service payments as the loan was more than 30 days
delinquent as of October 2020 before payments were made current
with the November 2020 payment date. As of June 2020, the subject
was 80.0% occupied with a strong tenant mix including Nordstrom
Rack, Sierra Trading Post, Nike, and DSW. At issuance, a Forever 21
Red store was in the process of closing and that space was
eventually backfilled by La-Z-Boy Furniture.

The trailing six months (T-6) ended June 2020 DSCR was reported at
1.41 times (x), below the DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 1.70x, but
indicated that there is extra cash available for trapping. However,
the in-place DSCR will likely decline as the full impact of the
loss of Art Van bears out in the revenues. At issuance, Art Van's
rent represented 14.7% of the DBRS Morningstar base rent figure,
suggesting a decline of 1.13x for the in-place DSCR when deducting
that tenant's rent. The remaining tenant mix is desirable, as is
the subject's location along a heavily travelled thoroughfare for
the northwestern suburbs of Chicago. In addition, the property is a
relatively new, modern, and attractive development that should fare
better than other product in the area trying to backfill vacant
boxes. There are near-term challenges in the state and local
government mandates affecting the several restaurant tenants at the
property, as well as the Orange Theory gym, which could be
affecting rent collections. However, the sponsor, who contributed
$940,000 in additional equity to close the subject loan and
developed the property from the ground up, should be incentivized
to support the property and loan because the medium-term prospects
for stabilization remain healthy.

The second-largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is Legends at
Village West (Prospectus ID#10, 4.1% of the pool). It was flagged
for the sponsor's pandemic relief request, which was ultimately
granted to allow for a three-month deferral of payments that were
paid out of the nontax and insurance reserves. The deferred amounts
will be repaid over a period of time as outlined in the
modification agreement. The loan is secured by a 702,750-sf outlet
mall in Kansas City, Kansas. The property is currently open and
operating and, despite its location a cold Midwestern climate,
benefits amid the pandemic in the outdoor configuration of the
property that allows for more social distancing and less crowding
indoors. The collateral is anchored by AMC Theatres, Dave &
Buster's, and T.J. Maxx. As of the T-6 ended June 2020 reporting,
the loan reported a DSCR of 1.24x, down from the issuer's figure of
1.67x and the DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 1.41x.

Although the concentration of entertainment operators in AMC
Theatres and Dave & Buster's (together comprising 19.4% of the
collateral NRA) is concerning given the widely reported struggles
amid the pandemic for both companies, the overall strength of the
property within the Kansas City metropolitan statistical area is
noteworthy in terms of mitigating factors. The property was
initially developed as a traditional mall and was later converted
to the current outlet format. There is significant development
surrounding the property, including the Kansas Speedway, Great Wolf
Lodge, and the stadium for Kansas City's soccer club, Sporting KC,
that drive both visiting and local traffic to the relatively far
western portion of the area. The sponsor recently announced a Tory
Burch outlet store would be added to the mall, joining relatively
recent additions as of issuance in Michael Kors and Kate Spade as
part of the mall's strategy to offer more upscale retailers. In
addition, Aldi recently announced it would be constructing a
free-standing store in the vicinity, speaking to the continued
desirability of the area for businesses catering to local traffic,
a trend driven by increases in residential development over the
last decade. As such, DBRS Morningstar believes the loan is
generally well positioned but will monitor it closely for tenant
developments.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar shadow-rated Century Plaza Towers
(Prospectus ID#3, 7.4% of pool) at A (sf), The Essex (Prospectus
ID#14, 2.9% of pool) at BBB (high) (sf), and Osborn Triangle
(Prospectus ID#16, 2.4% of pool) at BBB (low) (sf). DBRS
Morningstar confirmed the shadow rating on all three loans given
the continued stable performance since issuance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CARVANA AUTO 2020-P1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on N Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes to be issued by Carvana Auto Receivables Trust
2020-P1, originally assigned on November 30, 2020. The
confirmations are in conjunction with DBRS Morningstar's "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update" published on December 2,
2020:

-- $56,000,000 Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $120,000,000 Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $115,000,000 Class A-3 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $75,930,000 Class A-4 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $13,365,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $17,212,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $7,493,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $15,000,000 Class N Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The transaction's assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2,
2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios
on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The scenarios
were last updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions consider the
moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the commentary, with
the moderate scenario serving as the primary anchor for current
ratings. The moderate scenario factors in increasing success in
containment during the first half of 2021, enabling the continued
relaxation of restrictions.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CARVANA AUTO 2020-P1: DBRS Finalizes BB (high) Rating on N Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by Carvana Auto Receivables Trust 2020-P1
(CRVNA 2020-P1 or the Issuer):

-- $56,000,000 Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $120,000,000 Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $115,000,000 Class A-3 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $75,930,000 Class A-4 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $13,365,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $17,212,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $7,493,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $15,000,000 Class N Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS Morningstar of the
following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, fully funded reserve funds, and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under
various stress scenarios.

(2) The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in which
they have invested. For this transaction, the rating addresses the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

(3) The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar performed an operational review of Carvana,
LLC (Carvana) and Bridgecrest Credit Company, LLC and considers the
entities to be an acceptable originator and servicer, respectively,
of auto loans.

(4) The operational history of Carvana and the strength of the
overall company and its management team.

-- Company management has considerable experience in the consumer
lending business.

-- Carvana's platform is a technology-driven platform that focuses
on providing the customer with high-level experience, selection,
and value. Its website and smartphone app provide the consumer with
vehicle search and discovery (on a selection of more than 30,000
vehicles online); the ability to trade or sell vehicles almost
instantaneously; and real-time, personalized financing. Carvana has
developed underwriting policies and procedures for use across the
lending platform that leverages technology where appropriate to
validate customer identity, income, employment, residency, credit
worthiness, and proper insurance coverage.

-- Carvana has developed multiple proprietary risk models to
support various aspects of its vertically integrated automotive
lending business. All proprietary risk models used in Carvana's
lending business are regularly monitored and tested. The risk
models are updated from time to time to adjust for new performance
data, changes in customer and economic trends, and additional
sources of third-party data.

(5) The credit quality of the collateral, which includes
Carvana-originated loans with CRVNA Deals Scores, of 50 or higher.

-- As of the November 18, 2020, cut-off date, the collateral pool
for the transaction is primarily composed of receivables due from
prime and near-prime obligors with a weighted-average (WA) FICO
score of 710, a WA annual percentage rate of 8.20%, and a WA
loan-to-value ratio of 93.88%. Approximately 48.47%, 40.37%, and
11.16% of the pool include loans with CRVNA Deal Scores greater
than or equal to 80, between 60 and 79, and between 50 and 59,
respectively. Additionally, 13.22% of the pool comprises obligors
with FICO scores greater than 800, 36.35% consists of FICO scores
between 701 to 800, and 1.99% is from obligors with FICO scores
less than or equal to 600 or with no FICO score.

-- DBRS Morningstar analyzed the performance of Carvana's auto
loan and retail installment contract originations and static pool
vintage loss data broken down by Deal Score to determine a
projected CNL expectation for the CRVNA 2020-P1 pool.

(6) DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. While
considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the intensity and
duration of the pandemic's effects, DBRS Morningstar-projected CNL
includes an assessment of the expected impact on consumer behavior.
The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 2.75%, based on the cut-off
date pool composition.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, that have been regularly updated. The scenarios were last
updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions also take into
consideration observed performance during the 2008–09 financial
crisis and the possible impact of stimulus. The assumptions
consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the
commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as the primary
anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario factors in
increasing success in containment during the first half of 2021,
enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

(7) Carvana's financial condition as reported in its annual report
on Form 10-K filed as of February 26, 2020, and 10-Q.

(8) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions, which
addresses the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Carvana, that
the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets, and consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria
for U.S. Structured Finance."

The ratings on the Class A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 Notes reflect 9.90%
of initial hard credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes
in the pool (9.40%) and the reserve account (0.50%). The ratings on
the Class B, C, and D Notes reflect 6.60%, 2.35%, and 0.50% of
initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CARVANA AUTO 2020-P1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(high) on Class N Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Carvana Auto Receivables Trust 2020-P1 (CRVNA
2020-P1 or the Issuer):

-- $56,000,000 Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $120,000,000 Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $115,000,000 Class A-3 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $75,930,000 Class A-4 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $13,365,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $17,212,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $7,493,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $15,000,000 Class N Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS Morningstar
of the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, fully funded reserve funds, and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under
various stress scenarios.

(2) The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in which
they have invested. For this transaction, the rating addresses the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

(3) The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar performed an operational review of Carvana,
LLC (Carvana) and Bridgecrest Credit Company, LLC and considers the
entities to be an acceptable originator and servicer, respectively,
of auto loans.

(4) The operational history of Carvana and the strength of the
overall company and its management team.

-- Company management has considerable experience in the consumer
lending business.

-- Carvana's platform is a technology-driven platform that focuses
on providing the customer with high-level experience, selection,
and value. Its website and smartphone app provide the consumer with
vehicle search and discovery (on a selection of more than 20,000
vehicles online); the ability to trade or sell vehicles almost
instantaneously; and real-time, personalized financing. Carvana has
developed underwriting policies and procedures for use across the
lending platform that leverages technology where appropriate to
validate customer identity, income, employment, residency, credit
worthiness, and proper insurance coverage.

-- Carvana has developed multiple proprietary risk models to
support various aspects of its vertically integrated automotive
lending business. All proprietary risk models used in Carvana's
lending business are regularly monitored and tested. The risk
models are updated from time to time to adjust for new performance
data, changes in customer and economic trends, and additional
sources of third-party data.

(5) The credit quality of the collateral, which includes
Carvana-originated loans with Deals Score, of 50 or higher.

-- As of the November 18, 2020, cut-off date, the collateral pool
for the transaction is primarily composed of receivables due from
prime and near-prime obligors with a weighted-average (WA) FICO
score of 710 and WA annual percentage rate of 8.20% and a WA
loan-to-value ratio of 93.88%. Approximately 48.47%, 40.37%, and
11.16% of the pool include loans with CRVNA Deal Scores greater
than or equal to 80, between 60 and 79, and between 50 and 59,
respectively. Additionally, 13.22% of the pool comprises obligors
with FICO scores greater than 800, 36.35% consists of FICO scores
between 701 to 800, and 1.99% is from obligors with FICO scores
less than or equal to 600 or with no FICO score.

-- DBRS Morningstar analyzed the performance of Carvana's auto
loan and retail installment contract originations and static pool
vintage loss data broken down by Deal Score to determine a
projected CNL expectation for the CRVNA 2020-P1 pool.

(6) DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). While
considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the intensity and
duration of the shock, DBRS Morningstar-projected CNL includes an
assessment of the expected impact on consumer behavior. The DBRS
Morningstar CNL assumption is 2.75% based on the cut-off date pool
composition.

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: September Update," published on September 10, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, that have been regularly updated. The scenarios were last
updated on September 10, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions also take into
consideration observed performance during the 2008–09 financial
crisis and the possible impact of stimulus. The assumptions
consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the
commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as the primary
anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario remains
predicated on a more rapid return of confidence and a steady
recovery heading into 2021.

(7) Carvana's financial condition as reported in its annual report
on Form 10-K filed as of February 26, 2020, and 10-Q.

(8) The legal structure and expected presence of legal opinions,
which will address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Carvana, that
the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria
for U.S. Structured Finance."

The ratings on the Class A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 Notes reflect 9.90%
of initial hard credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes
in the pool (9.40%) and the reserve account (0.50%). The ratings on
the Class B, C, and D Notes reflect 6.60%, 2.35%, and 0.50% of
initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CD MORTGAGE 2017-CD6: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class G-RR Debt to Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded its ratings on the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-CD6 issued by CD
2017-CD6 Mortgage Trust and removed them from Under Review with
Negative Implications, where they were placed on August 6, 2020:

-- Class F-RR to BB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G-RR to B (sf) from BB (low)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the following ratings:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also changed the trend on Class E-RR to Negative
from Stable. The trends on Classes F-RR and G-RR are Negative while
all other trends are Stable. DBRS Morningstar also discontinued the
rating on Class A-1 because the class was fully repaid.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends reflect the continued
performance challenges facing the underlying collateral largely
driven by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. As of
the November 2020 remittance, eight loans are in special servicing,
representing 18.8% of the pool. DBRS Morningstar notes that the
pool also has a higher concentration of hospitality properties,
representing 18.3% of the pool. The initial effects of the
coronavirus pandemic have affected hospitality properties most
severely and, as such, the high concentration in this pool suggests
increased risks since issuance, particularly for the lower rating
categories.

In addition, the transaction has a higher concentration of retail
properties with 16 loans secured by regional malls as well as
anchored and unanchored retail properties, collectively
representing 18.3% of the pool. Of the six loans on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 12.5% of the pool, all but one are secured
by hotel and retail properties. Office collateral makes up the
largest property-type concentration with 15 loans comprising 30.6%
of the pool.

The eight loans in special servicing are Headquarters Plaza
(Prospectus ID#1; 7.4% of the pool), Lightstone Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#6; 6.0% of the pool), Promenade at West End Phase II
(Prospectus ID#21; 2.1% of the pool), Hampton Inn Majestic Chicago
(Prospectus ID#20; 2.0 % of the pool), Gurnee Mills (Prospectus
ID#27; 1.4% of the pool), Hampton Inn Hilton Head (Prospectus
ID#41; 0.9% of the pool), Holiday Inn & Suites Albuquerque Airport
(Prospectus ID#45; 0.7% of the pool), and Lakeridge Commons
(Prospectus ID#48; 0.5% of the pool). All of these loans were
recent transfers to special servicing and the special servicer
obtained updated appraisals for seven of the eight loans. Value
declines in the most recent appraisals for these loans ranged from
-17.7% to -48.8%, increasing the implied loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
for the loans with the sharpest declines.

The largest loan in special servicing, Headquarters Plaza, is
secured by the borrower's fee and leasehold interests in a
mixed-use property in Morristown, New Jersey. The collateral
comprises three office towers totaling 562,242 square feet (sf),
which includes 167,274 sf of ground-floor retail space and a
256-key Hyatt Regency hotel, which are connected via enclosed
corridors. Such improvements sit atop a multistory above- and
below-grade 2,900-space parking garage that does not serve as
collateral for the loan. The loan sponsors are the property's
original developers and, at issuance, DBRS Morningstar noted that
the loan sponsors had invested approximately $45.7 million in
capital improvements for the property since 2005. The property's
retail component features interior and outdoor-facing retail
suites, an AMC theatre, and a fitness facility known as The Club at
Headquarters Plaza. The collateral's hotel portion was added to the
subject complex in 1993 and includes 31,000 sf of meeting and
banquet space; a 4,984-sf conference center; a small indoor pool; a
fitness and business center; and three food and beverage outlets.

Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the hotel was outperforming its
competitive set and was the dominant hotel in the market; however,
the pandemic has caused significant declines in hotel demand at the
property and most others across the United States. As a result, the
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 for
coronavirus-related payment default. The property was appraised in
August 2020 for $158.6 million, a 33.6% decline from the issuance
valuation of $239.0 million, largely because of the sharp decline
in the hospitality portion's assigned value. Using the most recent
value, the current implied LTV is 94.6%, up from 62.8% at issuance.
Given the value decline and ongoing slump in business travel, this
loan was liquidated from the pool in DBRS Morningstar's analysis,
resulting in an implied loss severity of approximately 15.0% based
on a 10% haircut to the appraised value and a stressed advanced
figure to increase the trust exposure. Overall, DBRS Morningstar
believes that the long-term ownership and implied value exceeding
the loan balance should incentivize the sponsor to continue working
with the special servicer to find a resolution, which will likely
include a loan modification. However, the value decline since
issuance is a noteworthy increased risk for the pool from issuance,
justifying the liquidation analysis.

For the remaining loans in special servicing, DBRS Morningstar
applied a probability of default penalty to increase the expected
loss in the analysis. In general, the resulting expected loss
figures were well above the pool average, supported by the value
declines and other increased risks to the pool since issuance for
these loans.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its principal methodology
when determining the rating assigned to Class C. The material
deviation is warranted given the uncertain loan-level event risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2016-C6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. X-F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C6 issued by CFCRE
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C6 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)

With this rating action, DBRS Morningstar removed Classes E, F,
X-E, and X-F from Under Review with Negative Implications, where
they were placed on August 6, 2020, due to DBRS Morningstar's
concerns about the transaction's significant concentration of loans
secured by retail and hotel collateral that collectively represent
greater than 50.0% of the pool's current trust balance. The trends
on these classes are Negative. DBRS Morningstar notes that these
two asset classes remain exposed to the multiple headwinds brought
on by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and believes the
near-term risk for multiple loans in the transaction is heightened.
The trends on all other Classes are Stable.

According to the November 2020 remittance, four loans, representing
9.7% of the current trust balance, are in special servicing,
including two loans secured by hotel assets: Inn at the Colonnade
(Prospectus ID#10; 2.9% of the current trust balance) and Holiday
Inn Express Nashville Downtown (Prospectus ID#11; 2.8% of the
current trust balance). Inn at the Colonnade, secured by a 125-key
full service hotel in Baltimore, was transferred to the special
servicer in March 2020, given the ongoing effects of the pandemic.
DBRS Morningstar notes its concern that a loan modification has not
been agreed upon and that the subject recently received an updated
appraisal reporting a September 2020 value of $25.0 million (-26.0%
variance from issuance value of $33.8 million), which implies a
current loan-to-value ratio of 87.0%. DBRS Morningstar believes
that, while the subject is not immune to the short-term stressors
from the pandemic, the property's long-term outlook is clearer,
given the corporate and leisure demand generated by its proximity
to Johns Hopkins University, which has an enrollment of over 20,000
students and is a renowned research center. Given that short-term
room demand remains suppressed, DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan
with an elevated probability of default (PoD). The Holiday Inn
Express Nashville Downtown, secured by a 287-key hotel in downtown
Nashville, was transferred to the special servicer in June 2020.
The property's proximity to multiple downtown attractions, such as
the entertainment district, Bridgestone Arena (home of the NHL's
Nashville Predators), and Nissan Stadium (home of the NFL's
Tennessee Titans), puts the subject in a vulnerable position in the
short term, given its reliance on entertainment-based traffic to
the area, which has had several restrictions because of the
pandemic. The subject does benefit from moderate leverage and a
well-capitalized sponsor in Highland Capital Management, which
purchased the property in January 2019 for a publicly reported
value of $117.5 million. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan with an
elevated PoD in its analysis for this review.

Additionally, fourteen loans, representing 29.5% of the current
trust balance, are on the servicer's watchlist per the November
2020 remittance. DBRS Morningstar notes its concerns about the
Residence Inn by Marriott Los Angeles LAX/Century Boulevard
(Prospectus ID#7; 3.1% of the current trust balance), which is
secured by a 231-key full service extended stay Residence Inn
located within one mile of Los Angeles International Airport. The
special servicer provided payment relief to the sponsor in the form
of utilizing reserve funds to cover debt service payments and
deferring furniture, fixtures, and equipment reserve deposits for
the period between June and November 2020. DBRS Morningstar
believes the short-term risk is heightened for this loan, given its
reliance on the volume of airline travel and its declining cash
flow performance prior to the pandemic when it reported a YE2019
DSCR of 1.61 times (x), down from 2.15x at YE2017. DBRS Morningstar
notes that, while the property reported a relatively high occupancy
of 87.6% as of Q2 2020, an elevated PoD was applied, given the
property's main demand driver is likely to have a longer return to
normalcy. Additionally, DBRS Morningstar generally applied
increased PoD factors where applicable to other loans on the
servicer's watchlist.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 45 loans at an original
trust balance of $787.5 million. Per the November 2020 remittance,
44 loans remain in the transaction at a current trust balance of
$757.0 million, representing a collateral reduction of 3.9% since
issuance. The transaction is concentrated by property type as 15
loans, representing 38.0% of the current trust balance, are secured
by retail assets while eight loans, representing 14.7% of the
current trust balance, are secured by hotel assets. Office
collateral makes up the second-largest concentration, represented
by nine loans and 26.9% of the current trust balance. One loan,
representing 1.7% of the current trust balance, is fully defeased.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CFMT 2020-HB4 2020-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class M4 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2020-3, to be issued by CFMT 2020-HB4,
LLC:

-- $496.9 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $31.4 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $32.7 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $28.9 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $29.4 million Class M4 at BB (sf)
-- $6.3 million Class M5 at BB (low) (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating reflects 90.3% of credit enhancement. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and BB (low) (sf) ratings reflect
15.55%, 10.33%, 5.71%, 1.01%, and 0.00% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar did not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

Lenders typically offer reverse mortgage loans to people who are at
least 62 years old. Through reverse mortgage loans, borrowers have
access to home equity through a lump sum amount or a stream of
payments without periodically repaying principal or interest,
allowing the loan balance to accumulate over a period of time until
a maturity event occurs. Loan repayment is required (1) if the
borrower dies, (2) if the borrower sells the related residence, (3)
if the borrower no longer occupies the related residence for a
period (usually a year), (4) if it is no longer the borrower's
primary residence, (5) if a tax or insurance default occurs, or (6)
if the borrower fails to properly maintain the related residence.
In addition, borrowers must be current on any homeowner's
association dues if applicable. Reverse mortgages are typically
nonrecourse; borrowers don't have to provide additional assets in
cases where the outstanding loan amount exceeds the property's
value (the crossover point). As a result, liquidation proceeds will
fall below the loan amount in cases where the outstanding balance
reaches the crossover point, contributing to higher loss severities
for these loans.

As of the Cut-Off Date (October 31, 2020), the collateral has
approximately $625.6 million in unpaid principal balance (UPB) from
2,681 nonperforming home equity conversion mortgage (HECM) reverse
mortgage loans secured by first liens typically on single-family
residential properties, condominiums, multifamily (two- to
four-family) properties, manufactured homes, and planned unit
developments. The loans were originated between 1994 and 2016. Of
the total loans, 359 have a fixed interest rate (13.3% of the
balance), with a 5.07% weighted-average coupon (WAC). The remaining
2,322 loans have floating-rate interest (86.7% of the balance) with
a 1.75% WAC, bringing the entire collateral pool to a 2.19% WAC.

All the loans in this transaction are nonperforming (i.e.,
inactive) loans. There are 1,053 loans that are referred for
foreclosure (42.5% of balance), 63 are in bankruptcy (2.3%), 930
are called due (34.4%), 55 are real estate owned (1.6%), and the
remaining 580 (19.1%) are in default. However all these loans are
insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and this insurance acts to mitigate losses
vis-à-vis uninsured loans. See discussion in the Analysis section
below. Because the insurance supplements the home value, the
industry metric for this collateral is not loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) but rather the weighted-average (WA) effective LTV adjusted
for HUD insurance, which is 54.4% for these loans. The WA LTV is
calculated by dividing the UPB by the maximum claim amount (MCA)
plus the asset value.

The transaction uses a sequential structure. No subordinate note
shall receive any principal payments until the senior notes (Class
A notes) have been reduced to zero. This structure provides credit
enhancement in the form of subordinate classes and reduces the
effect of realized losses. These features increase the likelihood
that holders of the most senior class of notes will receive regular
distributions of interest and/or principal. All note classes have
available fund caps.

The Class M notes have principal lockout terms insofar as they are
not entitled to principal payments until after the expected final
payment of the upstream notes. Available cash will be trapped until
these dates at which stage the notes will start to receive
payments. Specifically, Classes M1, M2, M3, M4, and M5 are locked
out until May 2023, July 2023, September 2023, December 2023, and
March 2024, respectively. Note that the DBRS Morningstar cash flow
as pertains to each note models the first payment being received
after these dates for each of the respective notes; hence at the
time of issuance, these rules are not expected to affect the
natural cash flow waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CIM TRUST 2020-J2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-J2 (the
Certificates) to be issued by CIM Trust 2020-J2:

-- $278.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $208.7 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $208.7 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $208.7 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.6 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.6 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $222.6 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $222.6 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $222.6 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.7 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.7 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.7 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.4 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.4 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.4 million Class A-21 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-22 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-23 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-24 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-IO4 at AAA (sf)
-- $208.7 million Class A-IO5 at AAA (sf)
-- $208.7 million Class A-IO6 at AAA (sf)
-- $208.7 million Class A-IO7 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.6 million Class A-IO8 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.6 million Class A-IO9 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.6 million Class A-IO10 at AAA (sf)
-- $222.6 million Class A-IO11 at AAA (sf)
-- $222.6 million Class A-IO12 at AAA (sf)
-- $222.6 million Class A-IO13 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.7 million Class A-IO14 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.7 million Class A-IO15 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.7 million Class A-IO16 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class A-IO17 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class A-IO18 at AAA (sf)
-- $13.9 million Class A-IO19 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.4 million Class A-IO20 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.4 million Class A-IO21 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.4 million Class A-IO22 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-IO23 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-IO24 at AAA (sf)
-- $312.6 million Class A-IO25 at AAA (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-IO1 at AA (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-IO2 at A (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $2.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $982.0 thousand Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $328.0 thousand Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO6, A-IO7, A-IO8,
A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14, A-IO15, A-IO16,
A-IO17, A-IO18, A-IO19, A-IO20, A-IO21, A-IO22, A-IO23, A-IO24,
A-IO25, B-IO1, and B-IO2 are interest-only certificates. The class
balance represents notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12,
A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-22, A-23, A-24, A-IO2, A-IO3,
A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO8, A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14,
A-IO17, A-IO20, A-IO23, A-IO24, A-IO25, B-1, and B-2 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of initial exchangeable certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11,
A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-16, A-17, and A-18 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
senior support certificates (Classes A-19, A-20, and A-21) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 4.50% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 2.80%, 1.60%,
0.80%, 0.50%, and 0.40% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien, fixed-rate, prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 359 loans with a total principal
balance of $327,361,523 as of the Cut-Off Date (December 1, 2020).

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are Guaranteed
Rate, Inc. (31.3%) and Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC (4.0%)
(collectively known as Guaranteed Rate Companies); Fairway
Independent Mortgage Corporation (20.4%); PrimeLending (15.3%); and
various other originators, each comprising no more than 15.0% of
the pool by principal balance. On the Closing Date, the Seller,
Fifth Avenue Trust, will acquire the mortgage loans from Bank of
America, N.A. (BANA; rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar).

Through bulk purchases, BANA generally acquired the mortgage loans
underwritten to

-- Its jumbo whole loan acquisition guidelines (96.0%),
-- Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac's Automated Underwriting System
     (AUS; 2.3%), or
-- The related originator's guidelines (1.7%).

DBRS Morningstar conducted an operational risk assessment on BANA's
aggregator platform, as well as certain originators, and deemed
them acceptable.

NewRez LLC doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will
service 100% of the mortgage loans, directly or through
subservicers. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Negative
trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as Master Servicer, Securities
Administrator, and Custodian. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
will serve as Trustee. Chimera Funding TRS LLC will serve as the
Representations and Warranties (R&W) Provider.

The holder of a majority of the most subordinate class of
subordinate Certificates (other than any interest-only
Certificates) then outstanding (the Controlling Holder) has the
option to engage, at its own expense, an asset manager to review
the Servicer's actions regarding the mortgage loans, which includes
determining whether the Servicer is making modifications or
servicing the loans in accordance with the pooling and servicing
agreement.

For this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March 27, 2020, 13
loans (2.5% of the pool) had been granted forbearance plans because
the borrowers reported financial hardship related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Additionally, two loans
(0.4% of the pool) requested a forbearance plan but later withdrew
the request. These forbearance plans allow temporary payment
holidays, followed by repayment once the forbearance period ends.
As of December 4, 2020 all 13 loans satisfied their forbearance
plans and are current. Furthermore, none of the loans in the pool
are on active coronavirus-related forbearance plans.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Coronavirus Pandemic Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The prime mortgage sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that
consists of securitizations backed by pools of residential home
loans originated to borrowers with prime credit. Generally, these
borrowers have decent FICO scores, reasonable equity, and robust
income and liquid reserves.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update,"
published on December 2, 2020), for the prime asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
DBRS Morningstar derives such MVD assumptions through a fundamental
home price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and
GDP growth outlined in the moderate scenario. In addition, for
pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS Morningstar may assume
higher loss expectations above and beyond the coronavirus
assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher expected losses
on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit
enhancement.

In the prime asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that this sector should have low
intrinsic credit risk. Within the prime asset class, loans
originated to (1) self-employed borrowers or (2) higher
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to
more volatile income sources, which could lead to reduced cash
flows generated from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with
lower equity in their properties, generally have fewer refinance
opportunities and therefore slower prepayments. In addition,
certain pools with elevated geographic concentrations in densely
populated urban metropolitan statistical areas may experience
additional stress from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown
of the economy.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CIM TRUST 2020-J2: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. B-5 Certs B(EXP)sf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by CIM Trust 2020-J2 (CIM 2020-J2).

RATING ACTIONS

CIM Trust 2020-J2

Class A-1; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-2; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-3; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-4; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-5; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-6; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-7; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-8; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-9; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-10; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-11; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-12; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-13; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-14; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-15; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-16; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-17; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-18; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-19; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-20; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-21; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-22; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-23; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-24; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO1; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO2; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO3; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO4; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO5; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO6; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO7; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO8; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO9; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO10; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO11; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO12; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO13; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO14; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO15; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO16; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO17; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO18; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO19; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO20; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO21; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO22; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO23; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO24; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO25; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-1; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-IO1; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-1A; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-2; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-IO2; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-2A; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-3; LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-4; LT BB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-5; LT B(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-6; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A-IO-S; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 359 fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs)
with a total balance of approximately $327.36 million as of the
cutoff date. The loans were originated by various mortgage
originators and the seller, Fifth Avenue Trust, acquired the loans
from Bank of America, National Association. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a
traditional senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Revised GDP Due to Coronavirus (Negative): The ongoing coronavirus
pandemic and resulting containment efforts have resulted in
revisions to Fitch's GDP estimates for 2020. Fitch's current
baseline Global Economic Outlook for U.S. GDP growth is -3.5% for
2020, down from 1.7% for 2019. To account for the baseline
macroeconomic scenario and increase in loss expectations, the
Economic Risk Factor (ERF) default variable for the 'Bsf' and
'BBsf' rating categories has been increased to 2.0 from floors of
1.0 and 1.5, respectively.

Expected Payment Deferrals Related to Coronavirus (Negative): The
outbreak of the coronavirus and widespread containment efforts in
the U.S. will result in increased unemployment and cash flow
disruptions. To account for the cash flow disruptions, Fitch
assumes deferred payments on a minimum of 8.3% of the pool for the
first month at all rating categories with a reversion to its
standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve by January 2021.

Payment Forbearance (Neutral): As of Dec. 4, 2020, none of the
borrowers in the pool are on a coronavirus forbearance plan. For
borrowers who enter a coronavirus forbearance plan after this date,
the principal and interest (P&I) advancing party will advance P&I
during the forbearance period. If at the end of the forbearance
period, the borrower begins making payments, the advancing party
will be reimbursed from any catch-up payment amount.

If the borrower does not resume making payments, the loan will
likely become modified and the advancing party will be reimbursed
from principal collections on the overall pool. This will likely
result in writedowns to the most subordinate class, which will be
written back up as subsequent recoveries are realized. Since there
will be no borrowers on a coronavirus forbearance plan as of the
closing date and forbearance requests have significantly declined,
Fitch did not increase its loss expectation to address the
potential for writedowns due to reimbursement of servicer
advances.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of very
high-quality 30-year fixed-rate fully amortizing Safe Harbor
Qualified Mortgage (SHQM) loans to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, relatively low leverage, and large liquid reserves. Per
Fitch's calculation methodology, the loans are seasoned an average
of four months. The pool has a weighted average (WA) original FICO
score of 782, which is indicative of very high credit-quality
borrowers. Approximately 89% of the loans have a borrower with a
FICO score above 750. In addition, the original WA CLTV ratio of
63.8% represents substantial borrower equity in the property and
reduced default risk.

Low Operational Risk (Negative): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Chimera actively purchases
prime jumbo loans and is assessed as an 'Average' aggregator by
Fitch. Loans were primarily originated by Guaranteed Rate, Inc.
(Guaranteed Rate) and Fairway Independent Mortgage Corporation
(Fairway), which comprise approximately 31% and 20% of the loans in
the transaction pool, respectively. Fitch has reviewed both
Guaranteed Rate and Fairway mortgage origination platforms and has
assessed them both to be 'Average' originators.

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing is the named servicer for the
transaction and is responsible for primary and special servicing
functions. Fitch views Shellpoint as a sound servicer of prime
loans and is rated 'RPS2-'. Overall, Fitch increased its expected
losses at the 'AAAsf' rating stress slightly by 4 bps to reflect
the absence of originator assessments covering a portion of the
transaction coupled with the 'Average' aggregator assessment.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party due
diligence was performed on 100% of the pool by Clayton Services,
Opus CMC, and Consolidated Analytics which are respectively
assessed as Acceptable - Tier 1, Acceptable - Tier 2, and
Acceptable - Tier 3 by Fitch. The due diligence results identified
no material exceptions as 100% of loans were graded 'A' or 'B'.
Credit exceptions were deemed immaterial and supported by
compensating factors, and compliance exceptions were primarily
related to the TRID rule and cured with subsequent documentation.
Fitch applied a credit for loans that received due diligence, which
ultimately reduced the 'AAAsf' loss expectation by 13 bps.

Representation and Warranty Framework Adjustment (Negative): The
loan-level representation and warranty (R&W) framework is
consistent with a Tier 1 framework as it contains the full list of
representations which are outstanding for the life of the mortgage
loans. Despite a strong framework, repurchase obligations are
designated to a separate fund that does not hold an
investment-grade rating. The fund may have issues fulfilling
repurchases in times of economic stress, particularly if the fund
must repurchase on behalf of the underlying originators. Fitch
increased its loss expectations by 11 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
category to account for the non-investment grade counterparty risk
of the R&W provider.

Shifting Interest Structure (Mixed): The mortgage cash flow and
loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

Full Servicer Advancing (Mixed): The servicer will provide full
advancing for the life of the transaction (the servicer is also
expected to advance delinquent P&I on loans that enter a
coronavirus forbearance plan). Although full P&I advancing will
provide liquidity to the certificates, it will also increase the
loan-level loss severity (LS) since the servicer looks to recoup
P&I advances from liquidation proceeds, which results in less
recoveries. Wells Fargo, as master servicer, will advance if the
servicer fails to do so.

CE Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor of 1.35%
has been considered in order to mitigate potential tail end risk
and loss exposure for senior tranches as pool size declines and
performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and
small loan count concentration. Also, a junior subordination floor
of 0.90% will be maintained to mitigate tail risk, which arises as
the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding. Additionally, the
stepdown tests do not allow principal prepayments to subordinate
bondholders in the first five years following deal closing.

Geographic Concentration (Negative): Approximately 49% of the pool
is concentrated in California with relatively low MSA
concentration. The largest MSA concentration is in Los Angeles MSA
(15.6%), followed by the San Francisco MSA (13.3%) and the Chicago
MSA (8.0%). The top three MSAs account for 36.9% of the pool. As a
result, there was a 1.01x adjustment for geographic concentration,
which increased the 'AAAsf' expected loss by 0.02%.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the certificates.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$300,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are only
an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or
that may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Sensitivity analyses was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as
lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model-projected 38.5% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national level, or
in other words positive home price growth with no assumed
overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth of
10%. Excluding the senior class, which is already rated 'AAAsf',
the analysis indicates there is potential positive rating migration
for all of the rated classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home
prices would result in a full category upgrade for the rated class
excluding those being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

Fitch has added a Coronavirus Sensitivity Analysis that that
includes a prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer
demand and a protracted period of below-trend economic activity
that delays any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this
severe scenario, Fitch expects the ratings to be affected by
changes in its sustainable home price model due to updates to the
model's underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term impact
arising from coronavirus disruptions on these economic inputs will
likely affect both investment- and speculative-grade ratings.

CRITERIA VARIATION

The analysis includes one variation to Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating
Criteria." Fitch expects to conduct an originator review every
12-18 months for any underlying originator that contributed 15% or
more to a transaction. The originator review for PrimeLending
(15.3%) is expired. The loans in the pool are of very high quality,
a third-party due diligence review was conducted on 100% of the
loans in the pool (with 100% A and B grades), and the concentration
is just slightly above the concentration noted in Fitch's criteria.
Additionally, Fitch has reviewed both Chimera and BANA as
aggregators. Loans that do not have an originator assessment are
treated as the aggregator in Fitch's analysis and, therefore, a 5%
penalty was applied. This variation did not have a rating impact.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Consolidated Analytics, Clayton Services, and Opus CMC.
The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on
credit, compliance, data integrity and property valuation for each
loan and is consistent with Fitch criteria. The due diligence
companies performed a review on 100% of the loans. The results
indicate sound loan origination practices with no incidence of
material defects that are consistent with non-agency prime RMBS.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result,
Fitch made the following adjustment to its analysis: loans with due
diligence received a credit in the loss model. This adjustment
reduced the 'AAAsf' expected losses by 13 bps.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by clicking the link to the Appendix. The appendix also contains a
comparison of these RW&Es to those Fitch considers typical for the
asset class as detailed in the Special Report titled
'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global
Structured Finance Transactions'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This
means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit
impact on the entity, either due to their nature or the way in
which they are being managed by the entity.


CIM TRUST 2020-J2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to 58
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
CIM Trust 2020-J2. The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Ba3
(sf).

CIM 2020-J2 is a securitization of prime residential mortgages. The
pool comprises primarily 30-year along with three 25-year and one
27-year fixed rate mortgages. This transaction represents the
second prime jumbo issuance by Chimera Investment Corporation (the
sponsor) in 2020. The transaction includes 359 fixed rate, first
lien-mortgages with an unpaid principal balance of $327,361,523.
There are 14, primarily high balance, GSE-eligible (2.29% by
balance) and 345 prime jumbo (97.71% by loan balance) mortgage
loans in the pool. The mortgage loans for this transaction have
been acquired by the affiliate of the sponsor, Fifth Avenue Trust
(the Seller) from Bank of America, National Association (BANA).
BANA acquired the mortgage loans through its whole loan purchase
program from various originators. Approximately, 96.04% of the
loans in the pool and those acquired by BANA are underwritten to
Chimera Investment Corporation's (Chimera) guidelines.

All the loans are designated as qualified mortgages (QM) either
under the QM safe harbor or the GSE temporary exemption under the
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (SMS)
will service the loans and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2, long term
debt) will be the master servicer. SMS will be responsible for
advancing principal and interest and servicing advances, with the
master servicer backing up SMS' advancing obligations if SMS cannot
fulfill them.

Three third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan level information that Moody's received from the Sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data
accuracy and compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage loans in
the collateral pool. The TPR results indicate that there are no
material compliance, credit, or data issues and no appraisal
defects.

Moody's analyzed the underlying mortgage loans using Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. Moody's also compared the
collateral pool to other prime jumbo securitizations. In addition,
Moody's adjusted its expected losses based on qualitative
attributes, including the financial strength of the representation
and warranties (R&W) provider and TPR results.

CIM 2020-J2 has a shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination floor and
a subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow tool. In
its analysis of tail risk, Moody's considered the increased risk
from borrowers with more than one mortgage in the pool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIM Trust 2020-J2

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO21*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO22*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO23*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-IO1*, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-IO2*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.21%
at the mean and 0.09% at the median and reaches 2.47% at a stress
level consistent with its Aaa ratings.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.
Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(approximately 9.1% for the mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to
reflect the likely performance deterioration resulting from a
slowdown in US economic activity in 2020 due to the coronavirus
outbreak.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's bases its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

Moody's assessed the collateral pool as of the cut-off date of
December 1, 2020. CIM 2020-J2 is a securitization of 359 mortgage
loans with an aggregate principal balance of $327,361,523. This
transaction consists of fixed-rate fully amortizing loans, which
will not expose the borrowers to any interest rate shock for the
life of the loan or to refinance risk. All the mortgage loans are
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties, condominiums, and planned unit developments. The loans
have a weighted average seasoning of approximately 1.33 months.

Overall, the credit quality of the mortgage loans backing this
transaction is better than recently issued prime jumbo
transactions. The WA FICO of the aggregate pool is 786 (771 CIM
Trust 2020-J1 and 770 in CIM Trust 2019-J2) with a WA LTV of 63.7%
(66.6% in CIM Trust 2020-J1 and 70.3% in CIM Trust 2019-J2) and WA
CLTV of 63.8% (66.9% in CIM Trust 2020-J1 and 70.3% in CIM Trust
2019-J2). Approximately 21.3% (by loan balance) of the pool has a
LTV ratio greater than 75% compared 30.2% in CIM Trust 2020-J1 and
to 38.4% in CIM Trust 2019-J2.

Exterior-only appraisals: In response to the COVID-19 national
emergency, many originators/aggregators have temporarily
transitioned to allowing exterior-only appraisals, instead of a
full interior and exterior inspection of the subject property, on
many mortgage transactions. There are 5 loans in the pool, 1.6% by
unpaid principal balance, that do not have a full appraisal that
includes an exterior and an interior inspection of the property.
Instead, these loans have an exterior-only appraisal. Moody's did
not make any adjustments to its losses for such loans primarily
because of strong credit characteristics such as high FICO score,
low LTV and DTI ratios, and significant liquid cash reserves. In
addition, none of these borrowers have any prior history of
delinquency.

Loans with delinquency and forbearance history: Although there are
no loans in the pool that are currently delinquent, there are 17
loans in the pool that have some history of delinquency. Of these
17 delinquent loans, 6 delinquencies were COVID-19 related
delinquencies and were under a forbearance plan. Of the remaining
11 loans, 9 loans were delinquent because of servicing transfer and
the other 2 loans were delinquent for non-payment of mortgage
obligation. Of note, there were 7 borrowers that had either
inquired about or had entered into a COVID-19 forbearance plan but
never exercised any forbearance option and were always current.
Moody's increased its model-derived median expected losses by 15%
(9.1% for the mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely
performance deterioration resulting from a slowdown in US economic
activity in 2020 due to the coronavirus outbreak. Moody's regards
the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework,
given the substantial implications for public health and safety.

Origination

There are 12 originators in the transaction, some of which may have
limited history of securitizing prime jumbo mortgages. The largest
originators in the pool with more than 10% by balance are
Guaranteed Rate Inc. and Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC (31.32%+
4.03% = 35.35%), Fairway Independent Mortgage Corporation (20.36%),
PrimeLending (15.28%), and JMAC Lending, Inc. (11.61%).

Underwriting guidelines

Approximately 97.71% of the loans by loan balance are prime jumbo
loans. 96.04% of the loan pool is underwritten to Chimera's
guidelines, with the remaining 1.67% and 2.29% underwritten to
loanDepot.com, LLC's and GSE guidelines, respectively. All the
loans are designated as qualified mortgages (QM) either under the
QM safe harbor or the GSE temporary exemption under the
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules.

Moody's increased its base case and Aaa loss expectations for all
loans underwritten to Chimera's underwriting guidelines, as Moody's
considers the underwriting guidelines to be slightly weaker. For
loans that were not acquired under Chimera's guidelines, Moody's
made adjustments based on the origination quality of such loans.
While Moody's were neutral on all GSE-eligible loans, of note,
regardless of the underwriting channel, Moody's increased its base
case and Aaa loss expectations for conforming loans originated by
Home Point Financial Corporation (0.34% of aggregate collateral
balance).

Third Party Review

Three third-party review (TPR) firms, Clayton Services LLC,
Consolidated Analytics, Inc, and Opus Capital Markets Consultants,
LLC, verified the accuracy of the loan-level information that the
sponsor gave us. These firms conducted detailed credit, property
valuation, data accuracy and compliance reviews on 100% of the
mortgage loans in the collateral pool. The TPR results indicate
that the majority of reviewed loans were in compliance with
respective originators' underwriting guidelines, no material
compliance or data issues, and no appraisal defects.

The overall property valuation review for this transaction is in
line with most prime jumbo transactions Moody's has rated, which
typically had third-party valuation products, such as collateral
desk appraisal (CDA), field review and automated valuation model
(AVM) or a Collateral Underwriter (CU) risk score. For one
conforming loan the transaction is utilizing AVM and CU score of
greater than 2.5 as a comparison to verify the original appraisal
and for another conforming loan the transaction is utilizing just
the AVM and does not have a CU score to verify the original
appraisal. These valuation methods are weaker than either having a
CDA or a CU score less than 2.5. Moody's took this framework into
consideration and did not apply an adjustment to the loss for such
loans since the statistically significant sample size and valuation
results of the loans that were reviewed using a third-party
valuation product such as a CDA, field review, and a CU risk score
of equal to or less than 2.5 (in the case of GSE-eligible loans)
were sufficient.

Of note, for property valuation, of the 359 loans reviewed, the TPR
firms identified all loans as either A or B level grades. There
were 2 loans the appraisal of which was not supported by the desk
review (variance between the appraisal value and the desk review
was greater than -10%). A field review was subsequently ordered,
and this valuation came out in line with the appraisal. Therefore,
Moody's did not make any additional adjustments to its base case
and Aaa loss expectations for TPR.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

All loans were aggregated by Bank of America, National Association
(BANA) through its whole loan aggregation program. Each originator
will provide comprehensive loan level reps and warranties for their
respective loans. BANA will assign each originator's R&W to the
seller, who will in turn assign to the depositor, which will assign
to the trust. To mitigate the potential concerns regarding the
originators' ability to meet their respective R&W obligations, the
R&W provider will backstop the R&Ws for all originator's loans. The
R&W provider's obligation to backstop third party R&Ws will
terminate five years after the closing date, subject to certain
performance conditions. The R&W provider will also provide the gap
reps. Moody's considered the R&W framework in its analysis and
found it to be adequate. Moody's therefore did not make any
adjustments to its losses based on the strength of the R&W
framework.

The R&W framework is adequate in part because the results of the
independent TPRs revealed a high level of compliance with
underwriting guidelines and regulations, as well as overall
adequate appraisal quality. These results give confidence that the
loans do not systemically breach the R&Ws the originators have made
and that the originators are unlikely to face material repurchase
requests in the future. The loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in
general, either meet or exceed the baseline set of credit-neutral
R&Ws Moody's identified for US RMBS. Among other considerations,
the R&Ws address property valuation, underwriting, fraud, data
accuracy, regulatory compliance, the presence of title and hazard
insurance, the absence of material property damage, and the
enforceability of mortgage.

In a continued effort to focus breach reviews on loans that are
more likely to contain origination defects that led to or
contributed to the delinquency of the loan, an additional carve out
has been in recent transactions Moody's has rated from other
issuers relating to the delinquency review trigger. Similarly, in
this transaction, exceptions exist for certain excluded disaster
mortgage loans that trip the delinquency trigger. These excluded
disaster loans include COVID-19 forbearance loans.

Tail Risk and Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.35% of the closing pool balance,
which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time. Additionally, there is a
subordination lock-out amount which is 0.90% of the cut-off pool
balance.

Other Considerations

In CIM 2020-J2, the controlling holder has the option to hire at
its own expense the independent reviewer upon the occurrence of a
review event. If there is no controlling holder (no single entity
holds a majority of the Class Principal Amount of the most
subordinate class of certificates outstanding), the trustee shall,
upon receipt of a direction of the certificate holders of more than
25% of the aggregate voting interest of all certificates and upon
receipt of the deposit, appoint an independent reviewer at a cost
to the trust. However, if the controlling holder does not hire the
independent reviewer, the holders of more than 50% of the aggregate
voting interests of all outstanding certificates may direct (at
their expense) the trustee to appoint an independent reviewer. In
this transaction, the controlling holder can be the depositor or a
seller (or an affiliate of these parties). If the controlling
holder is affiliated with the depositor, seller or Sponsor, then
the controlling holder may not be motivated to discover and enforce
R&W breaches for which its affiliate is responsible.

The servicer will not commence foreclosure proceedings on a
mortgage loan unless the servicer has notified the controlling
holder at least five business days in advance of the foreclosure
and the controlling holder has not objected to such action. If the
controlling holder objects, the servicer has to obtain three
appraisals from the appraisal firms as listed in the pooling and
servicing agreement. The cost of the appraisals is borne by the
controlling holder. The controlling holder will be required to
purchase such mortgage loan at a price equal to the highest of the
three appraisals plus accrued and unpaid interest on such mortgage
loan as of the purchase date. If the servicer cannot obtain three
appraisals there are alternate methods for determining the purchase
price. If the controlling holder fails to purchase the mortgage
loan within the time frame, the controlling holder forfeits any
foreclosure rights thereafter. Moody's considers this credit
neutral because a) the appraiser is chosen by the servicer from the
approved list of appraisers, b) the fair value of the property is
decided by the servicer, based on third party appraisals, and c)
the controlling holder will pay the fair price and accrued
interest.

Servicing Arrangement / COVID-19 Impacted Borrowers

In the event a borrower enters into or requests a COVID-19 related
forbearance plan after December 4, 2020, such mortgage loan will
remain in the mortgage pool and the servicer will be required to
make advances in respect of delinquent interest and principal (as
well as servicing advances) on such mortgage loan during the
forbearance period (to the extent such advances are deemed
recoverable). Forbearances are being offered in accordance with
applicable state and federal regulatory guidelines and the
homeowner's individual circumstances. At the end of the forbearance
period, as with any other modification, to the extent the related
borrower is not able to make a lump sum payment of the forborne
amount, the servicer may, subject to the servicing matrix, offer
the borrower a repayment plan, enter into a modification with the
borrower (including a modification to defer the forborne amounts)
or utilize any other loss mitigation option permitted under the
pooling and servicing agreement.

As with any other modification, it is anticipated that the servicer
will reimburse itself at the end of the forbearance period for any
advances made by it with respect to such mortgage loan, whether
that be from any lump sum payments made by the related borrower,
from any increased payments received with respect to any repayment
plan entered into by the borrower, or, if modified and capitalized
in connection therewith, at the time of such modification as a
reimbursement of such capitalized advances from principal
collections on all of the mortgage loans. The servicer also has the
right to reimburse itself for any advance from all collections on
the mortgage loans it at any time it deems such advance to be
non-recoverable. With respect to a mortgage loan that was the
subject of a servicing modification, the amount of principal of the
mortgage loan, if any, that has been deferred and that does not
accrue interest will be treated as a realized loss and to the
extent any such amount is later recovered, will result in the
allocation of a subsequent recovery.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


CITIGROUP 2020-420K: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on HRR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued by
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2020-420K (CGCMT 2020-420K):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X balance is notional.

The Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2020-420K (CGCMT 2020-420K)
single-asset/single-borrower transaction is collateralized by the
borrower's fee-simple interest in two Class A residential towers on
the waterfront in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.
Despite the uncertainty around short- and medium-term demand for
multifamily rental product in New York, DBRS Morningstar takes a
positive view on the credit characteristics of the collateral,
which has continued to exhibit strong leasing velocity with minimal
concessions. The Kings County submarket where the collateral is
located has exhibited especially favorable growth trends in recent
years, with double-digit inventory growth rates matched by stable
absorption reported over the five-year period ended December 31,
2019, driven by Brooklyn's convenient transit access, comparatively
affordable rents, and continued development and gentrification.

Both the 416 Kent and 420 Kent portions of the development benefit
from significant 421-a tax exemptions during the loan term, and in
return, the developer has designated between 20% and 25% of the
units at each address as affordable (65 units at 416 Kent and 121
units at 420 Kent). The market rate units at 416 Kent generally are
not subject to any restrictions on rental rates, while the market
rate component at 420 Kent is subject to limitations on rental rate
increases set by the NYC Rent Guidelines Board during the exemption
period.

The property is situated in an irreplaceable waterfront location
along the East River in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn. As a
result, many units feature sweeping views of Lower Manhattan, and
the property also benefits from convenient access to the South
Williamsburg Ferry which provides service to Wall Street/Pier 11.
The surrounding neighborhood has undergone vast gentrification in
the past few years, and Williamsburg has become one of the most
desirable areas in Brooklyn, with many popular restaurants and
high-end retail offerings.

The market rate component of 420 Kent, where the majority of the
residential vacancy is concentrated, has continued to lease up at a
significant pace despite the ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic. Additionally, per the arranger, the sponsor has not had
to offer any additional concessions to maintain leasing velocity
throughout the spring and summer months. Furthermore, residential
collections at the property have averaged 94.1% between the months
of March and September 2020, a period during which other high-end
multifamily properties struggled with collections.

The DBRS Morningstar loan-to-value ratio (LTV) on the first
mortgage debt is 85.49%, which is relatively favorable compared
with other recently analyzed single-asset transactions
collateralized by Class A multifamily properties whose DBRS
Morningstar LTV ratios range from to 87.3% to 102.8%.

The borrower is primarily using whole loan proceeds to refinance
existing debt on the property held by KKR and is not returning a
meaningful amount of equity to themselves as a part of the
transaction. DBRS Morningstar views cash-neutral financings more
favorably than when the sponsor is withdrawing significant equity,
which can result in reduced skin in the game.

Both the 416 Kent and 420 Kent portions of the development are
currently operating under temporary certificates of occupancy
(TCOs) pending certain building code approvals. The borrower is
required to maintain the TCOs until a permanent certificate of
occupancy (PCO) is obtained. If the borrower fails to maintain a
TCO or obtain a PCO, the property may not be legally occupied.
However, it is not uncommon for mortgages on new developments in
New York to close with a TCO, the borrower has represented that
costs to obtain a PCO are de minimis, and has represented that PCOs
are expected by December 31, 2020, for 416 Kent and March 31, 2021,
for 420 Kent.

The properties were completed and began leasing up between January
and September 2019, and therefore have limited income and expense
operating history. However, DBRS Morningstar believes there is
upside in the property's concluded net cash flow as the sponsor
leases the remaining units, and DBRS Morningstar's concluded
in-place vacancy figure is approximately 20%.

Class X is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references
multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP COMM'L 2019-C7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on JRR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-C7 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-C7:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-H at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class J-RR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. However, there are continued performance
challenges for the underlying collateral, many of which have been
driven by the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic. As of the November 2020 remittance, loans representing
1.3% of the pool were in special servicing. Additionally, DBRS
Morningstar notes that the pool has a moderate concentration of
hospitality and retail properties, representing 10.0% and 18.8% of
the pool balance, respectively. These property types have been the
most severely affected by the initial impact of the coronavirus
pandemic and, as such, those concentrations are suggestive of
slightly increased risks for the pool, particularly at the lower
rating categories, since issuance.

The transaction is concentrated by property type as 18 loans,
representing 29.8% of the current trust balance, are secured by
multifamily assets. According to the November 2020 remittance,
there are two loans, representing 1.3% of the current trust
balance, in special servicing. Both loans are secured by a hotel
assets: Courtyard by Marriott New Haven/Milford (Prospectus ID#41;
0.8% of the current trust balance) and Hampton Inn
Cleveland-Westlake (Prospectus ID#48; 0.5% of the current trust
balance).

Courtyard by Marriott New Haven/Milford is secured by a 121-key
limited-service hotel in Orange, Connecticut, and was transferred
to the special servicer in July 2020 given the ongoing effects of
the coronavirus pandemic. As of November 2020, the servicer
reported that a modification has been agreed upon and is in the
process of being finalized. The subject recently received an
updated appraisal that reported an August 2020 value of $11.0
million (a -29.0% variance from the issuance value of $15.5
million), implying a current loan-to-value ratio of 87.5%. DBRS
Morningstar believes that while the subject is not immune to the
short-term stressors from the pandemic, the property's long-term
outlook could be hampered by the reduction of corporate demand. At
issuance, the hotel had strong corporate demand driven by its
proximity to Yale West Campus and the offices for both Avangrid
Networks and United Illuminating. Given that short-term demand
remains suppressed, DBRS Morningstar will continue to monitor the
situation for developments.

As of the November 2020 remittance, all 55 original loans remain in
the pool. No loans are defeased. Additionally, there are four
loans, representing 12.0% of the current trust balance, on the
servicer's watchlist. These loans are being monitored for a variety
of reasons including low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
occupancy, and deferred maintenance issues; however, the primary
reason for many of the more recent transfers is for hospitality
properties with a low DSCR stemming from disruptions related to the
coronavirus pandemic. At issuance, the pool reported a
weighted-average DSCR of 2.0 times.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC31: DBRS Confirms B(low) on G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC31 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-GC31 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS Morningstar also removed its rating on
Class G from Under Review with Negative Implications, where it was
placed on August 6, 2020.

The rating confirmation and Stable trends reflect the overall
stable performance of the transaction since issuance. As of
November 2020, the transaction consisted of 49 loans totalling
$685.8 million. One of the original 50 loans has been repaid,
resulting in collateral reduction of 5.2% including loan
amortization. The transaction benefits from a concentration of
office collateral as seven loans, representing 37.6% of the current
pool balance, are secured by office properties, which have shown
greater resilience to cash flow declines during the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. While the ongoing pandemic has
disproportionately affected loans secured by hotel and retail
properties, the pool has a relatively small concentration with a
combined 17 loans, representing 20.2% of the current pool balance,
secured by these property types. Eight loans, representing 11.1% of
the current pool balance, are secured by defeasance collateral.

As of the November 2020 reporting, only one loan is in special
servicing, representing 0.8% of the current pool balance, and eight
loans are on the servicer's watchlist, representing 22.8% of the
current pool balance. The specially serviced loan,
Walgreens-Smithfield (Prospectus ID#34), is secured by a
14,559-square-foot (sf), single-tenant property in Smithfield,
Rhode Island. The property transferred to special servicing for
nonmonetary default in October 2020 as the borrower failed to
follow cash management provisions following the departure of
Walgreens, which went dark in December 2019. Walgreens is on a
lease through 2090 and continues to honor rent obligations. While
the loan is late on payments, it reported an annualized debt
service coverage ratio of 1.84 times as of Q2 2020, in line with
historical reporting.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist and in the pool, 135
South LaSalle (Prospectus ID#1; 14.6% of the current pool balance)
is being monitored because the Bank of America (63.1% of the net
rentable area) has an upcoming lease expiration in July 2021 and it
is unclear if the tenant will renew. The property is secured by a
1.3 million-sf, Class A office property in Chicago. A Crain's
Chicago Business article published in July 2018 indicated that the
company would be looking to vacate its 135 South LaSalle Street
space, while expanding its footprint at 540 West Madison Street
over time to approximately 405,000 sf, and moving into an estimated
500,000 sf space at 110 North Wacker Drive in 2020. The loan was
structured with cash flow sweep provisions, which would be
triggered 12 months prior to lease expiration and would accumulate
to $15.0 million ($18 per sf (psf)). These funds were to be used
for tenant improvement/leasing commission (TI/LCs) costs to
retenant the Bank of America space (if the balance in the TI/LC
account is insufficient) or to be held as additional collateral for
the loan and used to pay down principal after the anticipated
repayment date in 2025. Notwithstanding the cash flow sweep
provisions, the sweep is subject to a debt yield threshold of
10.0%. As the year-end 2019 debt yield was well above this
threshold, it seems unlikely that this sweep will be triggered in
the near term.

There is potential upside at the property. The Bank of America
currently pays a blended rental rate of approximately $34.0 psf,
below the average asking rate of $40.61 psf for comparable Class A
office properties within a 0.5-mile radius of the subject as of Q3
2020. In addition, vacancy is reported at 8.9% for these properties
and the borrower will have the standard TI/LC reserves available,
which are expected to reach approximately $3.3 million ($4 psf) by
lease expiration. While the rollover risk will occur at a
challenging time, with heightened vacancy in the submarket of 15.1%
and companies reevaluating their operational needs amid the ongoing
pandemic, the loan's sponsor, AmTrust Realty Corp., has market
experience and is well capitalized. Based on the issuance appraised
value of $330.0 million, the sponsor had roughly $230.0 million of
implied equity behind the transaction, reflecting a low loan
leverage of $76 psf.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC33: DBRS Confirms B Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC33 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-GC33 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

Classes E, F, and G were removed from Under Review with Negative
Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. The trends
on these classes are Negative. In addition, DBRS Morningstar
changed the trend on classes D and X-D to Negative from Stable. The
trends on all other classes are Stable. The Negative trends reflect
the continuing performance challenges for the underlying
collateral, many of which have been driven by the impact of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. DBRS Morningstar notes
that the pool has a significant concentration of hospitality
properties and retail properties, representing 22.8% and 21.6% of
the pool balance, respectively. These property types have been the
most severely affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus
pandemic and, as such, those concentrations suggest increased risks
for the pool, particularly at the lower rating categories, since
issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 63 of the original 64 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 4.68%
since issuance. Four loans, representing 13.1% of the pool, are in
special servicing, including the second-largest loan in the pool,
Hammons Hotel Portfolio (Prospectus ID#2, 10.1% of the pool
balance). The $100 million trust loan represents a pari passu
interest in a $250.8 million whole loan secured by a portfolio of
seven hotel properties, including five full service, one limited
service, and one extended stay. The portfolio consists of four
Embassy Suites in North Carolina, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Alabama;
a Courtyard by Marriott in Texas; a Renaissance by Marriott in
Arizona; and a Residence Inn by Marriott in Missouri. The
properties have a combined total of 1,869 rooms and all were
developed between 2006 and 2010. Four of the hotels include a
leasehold interest in the adjacent convention centers, which are
included in the collateral. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in July 2020 after the borrower requested
coronavirus-related relief. According to the most recent servicer
commentary, coronavirus relief discussions are ongoing. Prior to
the pandemic, the loan maintained a stable performance as the net
cash flow (NCF) for the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2020,
was up 6% from issuance. In addition, according to the December
2019 Smith Travel Research, the hotels all maintained strong
performances among their respective competitive sets, with each
property reporting penetration rates exceeding 100%. Furthermore,
the Embassy Suites Concord, Embassy Suites Murfreesboro, and
Residence Inn Kansas City ranked first in average daily rate and in
revenue per available room in each of the previous three years.
Despite these strengths, DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan with an
elevated probability of default, given the borrower has requested
coronavirus relief.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, the Houston Hotel
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#15, 1.4% of the pool balance), is secured
by a portfolio of two hotels totaling 159 rooms in the Houston
metropolitan statistical area. The larger of the two hotels,
Hampton Inn & Suites, is located in Port Arthur, Texas, which is 90
miles east of Houston. The second hotel, the Holiday Inn Express &
Suites Houston West Road, is located about 18 miles northwest of
the Houston central business district. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in August 2020 for coronavirus-related relief.
The loan has been delinquent since May 2020. The hotel's
performance was trending downward prior to the pandemic as the
YE2019 NCF was down 49% since issuance. As of YE2019, the debt
service coverage ratio was 0.95 times. In its analysis, DBRS
Morningstar assumed a haircut to the issuance value and liquidated
the loan from the trust, resulting in a hypothetical loss severity
in excess of 30.3%.

Although it is not on the servicer's watchlist, DBRS Morningstar is
monitoring the pool's largest loan, Illinois Center (Prospectus
ID#1, 10.9% of the pool balance) because of rollover concerns. The
loan is secured by two adjoining Class A office towers totaling 2.1
million square feet (sf) in the East Loop submarket of downtown
Chicago. While the YE2019 NCF was up 11% since issuance, occupancy
decreased to 68% as of June 2020 from 74% as of YE2019.
Furthermore, the property's largest tenant, the General Services
Administration (GSA), accounting for 8% of the property's net
rentable area, has a lease expiration of November 2020. According
to its website, the GSA plans to relocate its offices and has
proposed a three-year lease extension to provide sufficient time to
accomplish its relocation plans. The GSA leases 184,042 sf of space
for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S.
Department of Commerce-International Trade Administration, and
Federal Housing Finance Agency .

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2013-CCRE7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE7 issued by COMM
2013-CCRE7 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class G, which has a
Negative trend.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the pool consisted of 59 loans
with an initial balance of $936.2 million. As of the November 2020
remittance, there has been collateral reduction of 49.2%. Twelve
loans repaid in full since issuance and one loan, One West Fourth
Street (Prospectus ID #4), liquidated in August 2019 with a $9.5
million loss that was contained to the unrated Class H
certificates, implying a loan loss severity of approximately 18.4%.
There is also a higher concentration of defeasance, with 10 loans
defeased, representing 22.1% of the remaining pool balance. The
remaining loans have generally performed as expected, with a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.79x
as of the November 2020 reporting period, compared with the
issuer's WA DSCR for the pool as a whole at closing of 1.71x.

The Negative trend for the lowest-rated Class G bond reflects DBRS
Morningstar's concerns with the higher concentration of loans
backed by hotel and retail properties in this pool, which were at
21.6% and 25.8% of the pool, respectively, as of the November 2020
remittance. Hotel and retail property types have been among the
most significantly affected by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic, a dynamic that has contributed to another area of concern
for this pool in the five specially serviced loans representing
9.1% of the pool, all of which are backed by hotel and retail
properties. In addition, there were 12 loans representing 41.8% of
the pool on the servicer's watchlist as of the November 2020
reporting period, with six of the largest 15 loans in the pool on
the watchlist, four of which are secured by hotel and retail
properties.

The largest and most pivotal loan on the servicer's watchlist is
the largest remaining loan in the pool, Lakeland Square Mall
(Prospectus ID #2, 12.6% of the pool). The loan is secured by two
(out of five) anchor spaces and all of the in-line space of a
regional mall in Lakeland, Florida, approximately 35 miles east of
Tampa. The loan sponsor at issuance was Rouse Properties, Inc.,
which was acquired by an affiliate of Brookfield Asset Management,
Inc. (Brookfield) in 2016, with Brookfield assuming the trust loan
as part of the acquisition. The loan was added to the servicer's
watchlist following the sponsor's coronavirus relief request in
June 2020. Although cash flows have been down in recent years as
compared with the issuance figures, the DSCR has remained
relatively healthy and was 1.55x for YE2019 and more recently, at
1.47x at the trailing six months ended June 2020, when occupancy
was 94.0%.

Cash flows began to decline in 2016, followed by noncollateral
anchor closures in Macy's, which closed in 2017, and Sears, which
closed in 2018, with some in-line leases likely containing
provisions allowing for reduced rent if two anchors closed. The
combined square footage (sf) for the closed anchors is quite
substantial, at approximately 257,000 sf. The remaining anchors
include a noncollateral Dillard's, which occupies approximately
90,000 sf, and collateral anchors in JCPenney (19.4% of the
collateral net rentable area (NRA) with a lease running through
November 2025) and Burlington Coat Factory (15.3% of the collateral
NRA on a lease ending January 2023). Other major tenants include
Cinemark, Urban Air Adventure Park, and H&M, which opened at the
subject in 2017.

The mall benefits from its status as the only regional mall within
30 miles, and to date, Brookfield has not expressed an
unwillingness to continue investing in the property or keeping the
trust loan current. However, the two closed anchors, which have
been empty for years, present obvious challenges, particularly
considering the challenges for the remaining anchors in the
bankrupt JCPenney and Dillard's, which reported a net loss of
$138.7 million for the 39 weeks ended October 31, 2020, with the
retailer citing coronavirus-related challenges contributing to
those results. Brookfield was part of the group that acquired
JCPenney out of bankruptcy, however, and the consensus appears to
be that the mall operator should be well incentivized to keep the
JCPenney locations at its malls open. In addition, although down
from issuance, cash flows have remained generally healthy, and the
collateral occupancy rate has held steady through the anchor
closures and into the first few months of the pandemic. Given the
challenges for the loan, particularly amid the coronavirus pandemic
that has driven many retailers into bankruptcy or further toward
trimming store counts, DBRS Morningstar assumed a liquidation
scenario based on a 50.0% haircut to the issuance value as part of
this review, which resulted in a loss severity of just above
20.0%.

The two largest loans in special servicing are both secured by
hotels and include Hampton Inn Jekyll Island, GA (Prospectus ID
#21, 2.7% of the pool) and NCH Portfolio (Prospectus ID #25, 2.1%
of the pool). The larger loan, Hampton Inn Jekyll Island, GA, is
secured by a limited-service hotel in a tourist area off the
southeastern Georgia coastline. The property is the newest of the
competitive set and has historically performed quite well, with the
YE2019 DSCR at 2.22x. The loan transferred to special servicing in
March 2020 following the borrower's coronavirus relief request, but
it has generally been kept current since the transfer. The special
servicer reports a loan modification will be finalized in the near
term, allowing for a forbearance of the DSCR covenants on the loan
through the beginning of 2021. After the finalization, the loan
would return to the master servicer. For this review, DBRS
Morningstar assumed an elevated probability of default (PoD) given
the unknowns regarding hotel performance trends through the near-
to moderate-term, increasing the expected loss in the analysis.

The NCH Portfolio loan is secured by a portfolio of three
limited-service hotels in tertiary markets in North Dakota,
Minnesota, and Illinois. The loan transferred to special servicing
in April 2020 with the borrower's coronavirus relief request, but
the property's cash flows had been well-below issuance figures long
before the onset of the pandemic, with the YE2019 DSCR at 1.04x.
The loan was current as of the November 2020 reporting, and the
special servicer reports a modification is close to being finalized
but has not provided specifics to date. Given the previous cash
flow declines and the tertiary markets for the hotels, suggesting
the effects of the pandemic may linger beyond the period for more
centrally located properties, DBRS Morningstar applied a PoD
penalty, significantly increasing the expected loss in the analysis
for this review.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its North American CMBS
Insight Model when determining the ratings assigned to Classes B
and C as the quantitative results suggested a higher rating for
both classes. The material deviation is warranted, given the
uncertain loan-level event risk with the loans in special servicing
and on the servicer's watchlist.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2014-CCRE21: DBRS Lowers Class X-E Certs Rating to B
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the following ratings on the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-CCRE21 issued by
COMM 2014-CCRE21 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class D to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class X-C to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class X-D to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class X-E to B (sf) from B (high) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes D, E,
F, G, X-C, X-D, and X-E to Negative from Stable and maintained the
Interest in Arrears designation on Class G. The trends for the
remaining eight classes are Stable. DBRS Morningstar notes its
concerns with the significant concentration of retail and
hospitality loans that collectively represent 43.6% of the pool.
Thirteen loans, representing 25.0% of the current pool balance, are
secured by retail collateral, while six loans, representing 18.6%
of the current pool, are secured by hospitality collateral. These
property types have been the most severely affected by the initial
effects of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and, as
such, those concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool,
particularly at the lower rating categories, since issuance.
Additionally, DBRS Morningstar notes its concerns with the large
concentration of specially serviced loans that includes six loans,
representing 21.2% of the current pool balance. Three of the six
loans are in the top 10 largest remaining loans.

The largest loan in special servicing, King Shop's (Prospectus
ID#3; 7.3% of the current pool balance), is secured by a 69,023 sf
retail property in Waikoloa, Hawaii, and in proximity to several of
the area's largest resorts. This loan transferred to the special
servicer in September 2020 due to payment delinquency and the
borrower's request for relief given the coronavirus pandemic. The
subject also lost its former largest tenant, Macy's, in January
2020. Macy's previously occupied 10,008 sf (14.5% of the net
rentable area) and no recent leases being reported to backfill the
space. Additionally, the loan has continued to report declining
cash flow performance as it reported a year-end (YE) 2019 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.38 times (x) that represents a
decrease since issuance. DBRS Morningstar expects a continued
decline given the Macy's departure, continued effects of the
pandemic on current tenants, and near-term rollover of
approximately 28.2% by April 2021. DBRS Morningstar increased the
probability of default (POD) to account for these risks.

The second-largest loan in special servicing is secured by the
Hilton College Station (Prospectus ID#7; 4.9% of the current pool
balance), a 303-key full-service hotel in College Station, Texas,
in proximity to Texas A&M University. Per the June 2020 Asset
Summary Report, the sponsor attributed the decline in the subject's
performance to oversupply in the market as there are more than 11
other hotels within a mile of the subject that all compete for the
same demand from generators such as collegiate sports and
conventions. In addition, the borrower didn't have the funds to
complete the Hilton property improvement plan required upon
acquisition, which resulted in newer properties outperforming the
subject. The property has experienced multiple appraisal reductions
since issuance, most recently reporting a September 2020 value of
$12.8 million ($42,000 per key), representing a 76.6% decline from
the issuance value of $54.8 million ($180.693 per key). DBRS
Morningstar liquidated the loan in its analysis for this review
that resulted in a significant loss estimate.

Per the November 2020 remittance, there are 10 loans, representing
25.5% of the current pool balance, on the servicer's watchlist. The
Loews Miami Beach Hotel (Prospectus ID#32; 9.1% of the current pool
balance), secured by a 790-key full service hotel in Miami Beach,
Florida, was added to the servicer's watchlist given the sponsor's
request for pandemic-related payment relief; it has since been
granted a forbearance. While DBRS Morningstar notes that the
property benefits from the sponsor's long-term ownership by MB
Redevelopment and continued outperformance relative to its
competitive set, the property has seen a drop in occupancy and
RevPAR for the trailing 12 months ending August 2020 and a drop in
cash flow from a YE2019 DSCR of 3.21x to 1.66x in June 2020. DBRS
Morningstar applied a POD increase to account for these short-term
risks. For the remaining loans on the watchlist, DBRS Morningstar
generally applied increased POD factors where applicable.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 59 loans at an original
trust balance of $824.8 million. Per the November 2020 remittance,
51 loans remain in the transaction at a current trust balance of
$657.9 million, representing a collateral reduction of
approximately 20.2%. The transaction's highest property
concentration is multifamily, represented by 13 loans and 26.3% of
the current pool balance. There are three loans, representing 2.4%
of the current pool balance, that are fully defeased.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2014-UBS5: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class E Debt to CCC
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings on the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-UBS5 issued by COMM
2014-UBS5 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class X-B2 to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class D to BB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class E to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the following ratings:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B1 at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)

DBRS Morningstar removed Classes D, E, F, X-B2, and X-C from Under
Review with Negative Implications where they were placed on August
6, 2020. The trends on Classes D, X-B2, and X-C are now Negative
while the ratings on Classes E and F do not carry trends. DBRS
Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes C and PEZ to
Negative from Stable. All other trends are Stable. In addition,
DBRS Morningstar designated Classes E and F as having Interest in
Arrears.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends reflect the continued
performance challenges for the underlying collateral, some of which
presented prior to the onset of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic while others have been largely caused by the impact of the
pandemic, as further described below. As of the November 2020
remittance, 13 loans, representing 24.4% of the pool, were in
special servicing. The pool has a concentration of loans secured by
office, hospitality, and retail properties representing 38.1%,
28.2%, and 16.6% of the outstanding pool balance, respectively, as
of the November 2020 remittance. Hotel properties have been the
most severely affected by the initial effects of the pandemic and,
as such, the relatively high concentration of loans backed by that
property type in this pool suggests increased risks, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 61 of the original 70 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 20.1%
since issuance. Six loans, representing 5.4% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased. Based on the YE2019 financials, the
pool reported a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.84 times (x) compared with the issuer's underwritten DSCR of
1.76x.

The largest three loans in special servicing are 6100 Wilshire
(Prospectus ID#6, 5.1% of the pool), Breakwater Hotel (Prospectus
ID#14, 2.7% of the pool), and Ridgmar Mall (Prospectus ID#13, 2.6%
of the pool), which are secured by a class A office property, a
full-service hotel, and a Class B enclosed regional mall,
respectively.

6100 Wilshire, the largest loan in special servicing, is secured by
a 213,000 square foot (sf) Class A office property located in the
heart of the Miracle Mile District of Los Angeles. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in October 2019 for imminent
nonmonetary default due to the sponsor's noncompliance with cash
management provisions. In April 2019, CBS (20.6% of net rentable
area, lease expiry April 2020) failed to renew its lease 12 months
prior to its lease expiration, which caused a trigger event. The
sponsor did not comply with the terms of the trigger event and
ultimately the servicer determined that the borrower had
misappropriated rents in the amount of $1.07 million and failed to
comply with the lender's request to remit those rents.

Although news outlets have reported that the sponsor has initiated
a lawsuit against the servicer, DBRS Morningstar notes that the
servicer previously granted a forbearance that increased the
rollover reserves, initiated an ongoing cash sweep, and made other
provisions. The loan has been less than 30 days late several times
since the default, but is current as of the November 2020
remittance. Given the increased risks for this loan in the
sponsor's noncompliance with the terms of the loan and the
potential lawsuit that suggests cooperation could be limited
through the workout for this loan, DBRS Morningstar applied a
probability of default (POD) penalty to significantly increase the
expected loss in the analysis for this review

Breakwater Hotel, the second-largest loan in special servicing, is
secured by a boutique hotel in Miami that contains 99 rooms, two
full-service restaurants, and a rooftop lounge. The property cash
flows have consistently been reported well below issuance, with a
YE2019 DSCR of 0.73x. The loan remained current, however, until May
2020 and recently the borrower requested a transfer to special
servicing, citing financial difficulties as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic. As of the November 2020 remittance, the loan
is 90 days delinquent and the servicer reports discussions remain
ongoing with regard to the workout strategy. Given both the
sustained performance declines that have been exacerbated amid the
pandemic and the loan's delinquency, a significantly increased POD
was applied to increase the expected loss in the analysis for this
review.

Based on developments and known information to date, the most
pivotal of the larger specially-serviced loans is the Ridgmar Mall
loan, which is secured by 396,444 sf of a 1.3 million sf Class B
regional mall located in Forth Worth, Texas. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2017 and is also in
maturity default, having past its initial maturity date of November
2018. The special servicer is dual tracking the settlement and
enforcement of the servicer's rights; however, the borrower
continues to cooperate with the special servicer as a loan
modification is being pursued.

At issuance, the property was anchored by noncollateral tenants in
JCPenney, Dillard's, Neiman Marcus, Macy's, and Sears. All but
JCPenney and Dillard's have since closed and the Dillard's space
has been halved and now serves as a clearance outlet for the
retailer. As of March 2020, the collateral portion of the mall was
only 47.3% occupied. The appraised value previously dropped from
$66.5 million at issuance to $13.0 million as of July 2019 and it
has declined even further, to $9.5 million, as of a February 2020
appraisal. Given the impact of the pandemic, DBRS Morningstar
believes the value could have since fallen even further and, as
such, a liquidation scenario was analyzed for this loan that
resulted in a loss severity exceeding 75.0%.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 11 loans are on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 38.3% of the current pool balance. These
loans include the largest loan in the pool, Loews Miami Beach Hotel
(Prospectus ID#1, 10.6% of the pool), which is being monitored for
a coronavirus relief request. The servicer is monitoring the other
10 loans for a variety of reasons, including low DSCR, occupancy,
and deferred maintenance issues; however, many loans have recently
been added to the servicer's watchlist for coronavirus-related
reasons.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its principal methodology
when determining the ratings assigned to Classes AM, B, and D. The
material deviations are warranted given the uncertain loan level
event risk.

Classes X-A, X-B1, X-B2, and X-C are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-CCRE23 issued by COMM
2015-CCRE23 Mortgage Trust (the Trust) as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

The trend for Class B was changed to Stable from Positive, and the
trend for Class F was changed to Negative from Stable. The Negative
trend for Class F reflects the increased loss risk to the Trust
related to Holiday Inn Manhattan View (Prospectus ID#19 – 1.6% of
the trust balance) and DoubleTree Norwalk (Prospectus ID#20 - 1.6%
of the trust balance). All remaining trends are Stable.

At issuance, the Trust consisted of 83 fixed-rate loans secured by
220 commercial and multifamily properties with a total trust
balance of $1.369 billion. Per the November 2020 remittance report,
the Trust had 80 loans secured by 152 properties remaining with a
total trust balance of $1.177 billion, representing a 14.0%
collateral reduction. Over the previous 12 months, the second
largest loan, Courtland by Marriott Portfolio (Prospectus ID#2 -
$100 million in trust), was fully repaid and the related rake bond
ratings were discontinued in February 2020. Three additional loans
totaling $24.8 million fully repaid over the past year as well.

The Trust benefits from 11 loans, comprising 23.6% of the trust
balance, being fully defeased, which includes the second- and
third-largest loans. The pool is also relatively diverse as the
largest 15 loans represent 57.8% of the trust balance, although the
largest loan, 9200 & 9220 Sunset (Prospectus ID#1), comprises 10.2%
of the trust balance. The Trust is primarily secured by office and
multifamily property types, which comprise 33.3% and 25.0% of the
trust balance, respectively. These property types have been more
stable during the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic compared
to other property types. Cash flow growth of the remaining
non-defeased loans exhibited a moderate increase as the most recent
preceding weighted-average (WA) YE debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) totaled 1.78 times (x), up from the Issuer's WA underwriting
DSCR of 1.67x derived at issuance. There are 12 loans, comprising
13.4% of the trust balance, that have sponsors and/or loan
collateral with a negative historical credit event prior to
issuance. DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of default for
the respective loans to reflect the increased sponsor risk.

Six loans, representing 4.6% of the trust balance, are in special
servicing per the November 2020 remittance report. The two largest
specially serviced loans are the Holiday Inn Manhattan View and
DoubleTree Norwalk. The Holiday Inn Manhattan View loan is secured
by the leasehold interest in a 136-key limited-service hotel in
Long Island City, New York. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in February 2020 because of a balloon payment default upon
loan maturity in January 2020. The hotel reported significant cash
flow growth prior to the maturity date, but the borrower was unable
to secure financing prior to the coronavirus pandemic. The hotel
was forced to close in March 2020 and has not yet reopened. The
special servicer is dual tracking foreclosure and a loan
modification; however, the State of New York extended its
moratorium on commercial evictions and foreclosures through January
2021. The hotel was re-appraised in March 2020 (pre-pandemic) for a
$14.0 million value, down from the $29.5 million appraised value
derived at issuance. DBRS Morningstar is closely monitoring the
special servicer actions as the moratorium is scheduled to expire
in the near term. The loan was liquidated from the Trust as part of
the analysis, which resulted in an implied loss severity in excess
of 50.0%.

DoubleTree Norwalk is secured by a 265-key full-service hotel in
Norwalk, Connecticut. The property became real estate owned by the
Trust in September 2018 and the special servicer initially targeted
disposition of the asset in late 2019; however, the hotel attracted
little buyer interest. The property was re-appraised in April 2020
for an as-is value of $11.7 million and the appraisal report
assumed an extensive capital expenditure project to stabilize the
asset. Hotel operations have remained open throughout the
coronavirus pandemic; however, an October 2020 Smith Travel
Research report showed the subject continues to underperform
relative to its competitive set. The collateral is operating with
considerable ongoing losses and servicer advances continue to
accrue. The special servicer is attempting to stabilize the asset
prior to disposition. The loan was liquidated from the Trust as
part of the analysis, which resulted an implied loss severity in
excess of 60.0%.

An additional 20 loans, representing 17.7% of the trust balance,
are on the servicer's watchlist. The probabilities of default were
increased for loans that demonstrated higher default risk since
issuance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2015-CCRE24: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-CCRE24 issued by COMM
2015-CCRE24 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also discontinued its rating on Class A-3 after
the class fully repaid with the March 2020 remittance report.

DBRS Morningstar assigned Negative trends to Classes D, E, F, G,
X-C, X-D, and X-E because of the increased risk from various loans
secured by hospitality and retail properties. In addition, the
Palazzo Verdi loan (Prospectus ID#4 – 5.7% of Pool Balance)
exhibited increased risk since issuance after losing a primary
tenant in October 2020. All other classes have Stable trends.

At issuance, the trust consisted of 81 fixed-rate loans secured by
128 commercial and multifamily properties with a total trust
balance of $1.39 billion. Per the October 2020 remittance report,
there were 78 loans secured by 125 commercial and multifamily
properties remaining in the trust with a total trust balance of
$1.28 billion, representing a 7.9% collateral reduction since
issuance. Four loans, representing 1.5% of the pool balance, are
defeased. The pool composition is relatively granular as the 10
largest loans represent only 51.8% of the trust balance. The
remaining collateral has outperformed issuer underwritten cash
flows as the most recently reported preceding year weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.84 times (x), up from
the issuer's WA DSCR of 1.74x derived at issuance. The trust's loan
maturity risk is low in the near term as there are only two loans,
representing 1.4% of the pool balance, that have loan maturity
dates prior to December 2024.

The pool is geographically concentrated as 13 loans, representing
26.2% of the pool balance, are secured by properties in California.
The pool is also concentrated by property type as there are 23
loans, representing 22.5% of the pool, secured by retail properties
and 10 loans, representing 20.5% of the pool, secured by
hospitality properties. Retail and hospitality properties have been
particularly affected by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic as these property types have experienced acute
interruptions to operations resulting from mandated restrictions
and lockdowns. Approximately 46.8% of the loans secured by retail
and hospitality properties by loan balance are performing and are
not on the servicer's watchlist.

Per the October 2020 remittance, there are three loans, consisting
of 5.0% of the pool balance, that are in special servicing. The
Westin Portland loan (Prospectus ID#8 – 4.2% of the pool balance)
is secured by a 19-story, full-service, luxury, 205-key hotel in
the central business district of Portland, Oregon. The hotel has
been closed since March 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic as
travel restrictions were implemented by various governments. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in June 2020 as a result
of payment default as the last loan payment occurred in March 2020.
Because of the Oregon Moratorium, the special servicer has been
limited with enforcement options at this time. Counsel has been
engaged and negotiations with the borrower continue. It should be
noted the hotel's performance has been subpar since 2016 as there
has been a significant number of new hospitality properties
delivered to the submarket since issuance and the sponsor converted
the hotel into the Dossier boutique brand from the Westin flag in
2018. The loan's probability of default was significantly increased
for the subject review as the collateral has not performed since
2016 and there is no indication when the hotel will be able to
reopen to full capacity.

An additional 15 loans, consisting of 26.8% of the pool balance,
are on the servicer's watchlist, which are primarily due to cash
flow declines or coronavirus-related relief. The watchlist loan of
most concern is the Palazzo Verdi (Prospectus ID#4 – 5.7% of the
pool balance), which is a 15-story, Class A office property in
Greenwood Village, Colorado. The loan was added to the servicer's
watchlist in November 2017 because the primary tenant, Newmont
Mining (59.8% of net rentable area), provided notice to vacate upon
its lease expiration in October 2020. The property's occupancy rate
is projected to decrease to 36.9% following the loss of Newmont
Mining. An August 2020 Reis report showed the submarket's average
vacancy rate is high at 18.1% and there will be a considerable
amount of new supply delivered in the near term with 1.4 million sf
by 2022. The high vacancy rate and new competitive stock create
headwinds for the collateral, especially during the coronavirus
pandemic when office users are reconsidering office demand. The
probability of default was also appropriately enhanced for the
subject review.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its principal methodology
when determining the rating assigned to Class B as the quantitative
results suggested a lower rating. The material deviations is
warranted given the uncertain loan level event risk with the Westin
Portland loan. The increased expected loss for the loan increased
the model credit enhancement results for the transaction, which
resulted the material deviation. DBRS Morningstar is monitoring the
workout process of the loan as the special servicer continues to
evaluate remedies.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, X-D, and X-E are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2015-LC19: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-LC19 issued by COMM
2015-LC19 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes E, F, and G were removed from Under
Review with Negative Implications where they were placed on August
6, 2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the collateral consisted of 59
fixed-rate loans secured by 139 commercial and multifamily
properties with a trust balance of $1.4 billion. According to the
November 2020 remittance, 55 of the original 59 loans remain in the
pool, with a collateral reduction of 7.3% since issuance. The
transaction is concentrated by property type as nine loans,
representing 28.3% of the current trust balance, are secured by
office properties; the second-largest concentration comprises 18
loans, representing 25.7% of the current trust balance, which are
secured by retail collateral. In addition, loans secured by lodging
properties represent 16.7% of the current trust balance. There are
four loans, representing 4.7% of the pool, in special servicing and
nine loans, representing 17.7% of the pool, on the servicer's
watchlist. The watchlisted loans are being monitored for various
reasons, including low debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) or
occupancy, deferred maintenance, tenant rollover risk, and/or
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic-related forbearance
requests.

Although there are four loans in special servicing along with a
concentration of loans secured by retail collateral in the
transaction, the larger retail loans in the pool are reporting
stable cash flows as they are generally located in stronger
markets. Overall, approximately 29.8% of the pool is located in
primary urban markets, including the two largest office loans in
the transaction which have historically exhibited stable credit
metrics. For loans that are reporting quarterly 2020 cash flows,
the weighted-average DSCR was 2.59 times (x) compared with 2.25x at
YE2019. In addition, there are six loans, representing 4.6% of the
current trust balance, that are fully defeased.

The largest loan in special servicing, DoubleTree Arctic Club
(Prospectus ID#16, 1.8% of the pool), secured by a 120-room
full-service hotel in downtown Seattle, transferred to the special
servicer in June 2020 for imminent default when the borrower
requested coronavirus-related relief. According to the servicer,
the hotel temporarily closed in March 2020, shortly after the
pandemic was declared, and remains closed to date. However, based
on its website as of December 2020, the hotel appears to be
accepting reservations for January 2021. The loan was more than 60
days delinquent as of November 2020 and the borrower requested debt
service relief pending the reopening of the hotel, with the
servicer reviewing strategies to cure the default. According to the
August 2020 appraisal, the property value was reported at $24.1
million, a 47.1% decline compared with the issuance value of $45.6
million. Given the increased risks in the extended closure and the
value decline from issuance, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan
with an elevated probability of default to significantly increase
the expected loss for this review. However, the sponsor had
historically kept the loan current and the loan had exhibited
stable performance trends prior to the transfer with the DSCR
ranging from 1.28x to 1.46x.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Enclave West
(Prospectus ID#21, 1.5% of the pool) is secured by a 552-bed
student housing property located in Edwardsville, Illinois, serving
the students of Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2019 after the servicer
reported issues with both the borrower and the property management.
A receiver was appointed in August 2019 and the servicer was
reportedly working on a strategy to improve leasing traction for
the school year, as the property had experienced pandemic-driven
challenges with the university. According to the November 2019
appraisal, the property value was reported at $27.5 million, a
15.1% decline compared with the issuance value of $32.4 million.
The as-is value may have fallen since that time given the impact of
the pandemic. Given these challenges, DBRS Morningstar analyzed
this loan with an increased probability of default to significantly
increase the expected loss for this review.

The other two loans in special servicing are relatively small,
including Hampden Villa (Prospectus ID#33, 0.7% of the pool) and
56-15 Northern Boulevard (Prospectus ID#34, 0.6% of the pool),
which transferred to special servicing in October 2019 and January
2020, respectively. DBRS Morningstar analyzed both loans with a
stressed expected loss figure to reflect the current risk level to
the trust.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM MORTGAGE 2014-CCRE14: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-CCRE14 issued by COMM
2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at B (low) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Class F, which does not
carry a trend.

The rating confirmations and Stable trends reflect the overall
stable performance of the transaction. As of November 2020, the
transaction consisted of 45 loans totaling $1.03 billion, down from
60 loans at issuance, resulting in collateral reduction of 25.2%
including loan amortization. The transaction benefits from a
concentration of office collateral, as 11 loans, representing 45.9%
of the pool, are secured by office properties, which have shown
greater resiliency to cash flow declines during the pandemic. This
office concentration includes the pool's three-largest loans
comprising a telecommunications data center in lower Manhattan (60
Hudson Street; Prospectus ID#2, 15.0% of the pool), Google and
Amazon Office Portfolio (Prospectus ID#1, 14.5% of the pool
balance), and the fee interest in the land underneath 625 Madison
Avenue (Prospectus ID#3, 10.7% of the pool balance). Additionally,
eight loans, representing 10.6% of the pool, are defeased.

There are three loans, representing 3.9% of the pool, in special
servicing, including the tenth-largest loan in the pool, McKinley
Mall (Prospectus ID#13, 2.4% of the pool balance). The $24.2
million trust loan represents a pari passu interest in a $38
million whole loan secured by a 728,133-sf regional mall in
Buffalo, New York. The loan collateral includes all inline space
and three of the property's four anchor spaces (excluding the
former Macy's space). The loan transferred to the special servicer
in 2018 for payment default . The mall's performance has been
trending downward in recent years as the most recent year-end net
cash flow was 58% below issuance. The decline in performance can be
attributed to the loss of three of the mall's four anchor tenants
including Neiman Marcus, Macy's, and Sears as well as the
subsequent departure of several in-line tenants. The most recent
financials reported were as of June 2020 and show occupancy at 54%.
According to the servicer, the borrower is cooperating in turning
over the title to the lender via a deed-in-lieu. In its analysis,
DBRS Morningstar assumed a haircut to the October 2020 appraisal
and liquidated the loan from the trust, resulting in a loss
severity in excess of 85.0%.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is the 175 West
Jackson (Prospectus ID#8, 3.7% of the pool balance). The loan is
secured by a 22-story, 1.5 million sf office tower in the Chicago
CBD. The loan has severely underperformed since issuance and
transferred to the special servicer in 2018 because of a below
break-even DSCR. The loan transferred back to the master servicer
in September 2018 after Brookfield Asset Management acquired the
property for $305 million ($218/sf) in 2018. Since Brookfield's
acquisition, occupancy has marginally improved from 61% as of
year-end 2018 to 67% as of June 2020. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the
loan with an elevated probability of default given the borrower has
requested Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) relief.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM MORTGAGE 2014-UBS6: DBRS Cuts Rating on X-D Certs to Bsf
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded five classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-UBS6 issued by COMM
2014-UBS6 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class D to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E to BB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F to B (low) (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C to BBB (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes as
follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class G at C (sf)

Classes D, E, F, G, X-C, and X-D were removed from Under Review
with Negative Implications, where they were placed on August 6,
2020. The trends for these classes are Negative. All other trends
are Stable. The Negative trends and rating downgrades reflect the
continued performance challenges for the underlying collateral,
much of which has been driven by the impact of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. In addition to loans
representing 9.9% of the pool in special servicing as of the
November 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes the pool has
a high concentration of retail and hospitality properties,
representing 32.4% and 18.1% of the pool balance, respectively.
These property types have been the most severely affected by the
initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and as such, those
concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 79 of the original 89 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 14.0%
since issuance. There are seven loans, representing 9.9% of the
pool, in special servicing, including the fifth-largest loan,
University Village (Prospectus ID# 5; 3.6% of the pool), which is
90-plus days delinquent. The $39 million loan is secured by a
456-unit (1,164-bed) student housing complex in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama. The property, which is two miles from the University of
Alabama, was built in 2009. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in July 2019. The property's net cash flow (NCF) has
remained low for several years, with the 2018 NCF down 25% from
issuance. The performance decline is due to a combination of
factors including additions to supply, the subject being of an
older vintage, and declining enrollment at the university. These
trends are expected to continue as the property was 23% occupied as
of August 2020 and was only 33% preleased for the 2020-21 school
year according to the special servicer. In its analysis, DBRS
Morningstar assumed a haircut to the March 2020 appraised value and
liquidated the loan from the trust, resulting in a hypothetical
loss severity in excess of 62.0%.

According to the November 2020 remittance, 21 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 40.1% of the current pool
balance. These loans are being monitored for various reasons
including low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) or occupancy
decreases, delinquency, tenant rollover risk, and/or
pandemic-related forbearance requests. Four loans, representing
10.3% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased.

The W Scottsdale (Prospectus ID #2; 5.1% of the pool) is the only
master-serviced loan that is delinquent. The loan is secured by a
seven-story, 236-room, full-service boutique hotel in Scottsdale,
Arizona. The loan was added to the servicer's watchlist for
delinquency concerns after the loan fell 60 days delinquent as of
November 2020. The loan is expected to transfer to the special
servicer in December with the borrower likely to request
coronavirus-related relief. Despite its recent delinquency, the
hotel has historically maintained strong performance as the YE2019
NCF was up 25% since issuance. The loan had a DSCR of 2.34x during
that period. Given the loan's recent delinquency, this loan was
analyzed with an elevated probability of default for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CONTINENTAL CREDIT 2017-1: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the following classes of
securities in two Continental Credit Card ABS transactions:

Continental Credit Card ABS 2017-1, LLC

-- Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Class C Notes at B (high) (sf)

Continental Credit Card ABS 2019-1, LLC

-- Class A Notes at A (sf)
-- Class B Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class C Notes at BB (low) (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update," published on September
10, 2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic
scenarios on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The
scenarios were last updated on September 10, 2020, and are
reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
remains predicated on a more rapid return of confidence and a
steady recovery heading into 2021. Observed performance during the
2008–09 financial crisis and the possible impact from stimulus
were also incorporated into the analysis.

-- The level of hard credit enhancement in the form of
overcollateralization, subordination, and amounts held in reserve
fund available in the transaction. Hard credit enhancement and
estimated excess spread are sufficient to support the DBRS
Morningstar current rating levels listed above.

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected charge off assumptions consistent with the expected
unemployment levels in the moderate scenario.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


CSAIL 2015-C1: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to B(low)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded the ratings on four classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C1 issued by CSAIL
2015-C1 Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class X-E to BB (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E to BB (low) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class X-F to B (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class F to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

Additionally, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the ratings on the
following classes:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes X-B, B, C, X-D,
D, X-E, E, X-F, and F to Negative from Stable while the trends on
all other classes are Stable. DBRS Morningstar also discontinued
the rating on Class A-2 because the class has been paid in full.

The rating downgrades and trend changes reflect ongoing performance
issues with select loans, specifically those secured by hotel and
retail properties, which the ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has disproportionately affected. In total, 30 loans in the
transaction are secured by hotel and retail properties,
representing 50.4% of the current pool balance. As of the November
2020 reporting, there are five loans in special servicing,
representing 7.8% of the current pool balance, and 20 loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 32.0% of the current pool
balance.

Four of the five loans in special servicing are at least 90 days
delinquent with all five loans secured by either hotel or retail
properties. Additionally, three of the four largest loans in the
transaction are on the servicer's watchlist. The largest loan,
Soho-Tribeca Grand Hotel Portfolio (Prospectus ID#1; 10.0% of the
current pool balance), is secured by two hotel properties in New
York City's SoHo and Tribeca neighborhoods and the third-largest
loan, Courtyard Midtown East (Prospectus ID#3; 7.3% of the current
pool balance), is secured by a hotel in New York City's Midtown
neighborhood. The fourth-largest loan, Westfield Trumbull (7.0% of
the current pool balance), is secured by a portion of a regional
mall in Trumbull, Connecticut. DBRS Morningstar has flagged these
three loans for performance issues with the Courtyard Midtown East
and Westfield Trumbull loans currently on the DBRS Morningstar
Hotlist for increased credit risk prior to the onset of the
pandemic.

As of November 2020, the transaction comprises 74 loans totaling
$715.0 million. Eight of the original 82 loans have been repaid or
liquidated from the trust, resulting in collateral reduction of
10.4% including payoffs, loan amortization, and $4.1 million of
realized losses. The transaction benefits from a minor
concentration of office collateral as six loans, representing 12.6%
of the current pool balance, are secured by office properties,
which have shown greater resilience to cash flow declines during
the pandemic. This includes the second-largest loan in the
transaction, 500 Fifth Avenue (9.1% of the current pool balance),
which is secured by an office tower in Manhattan. The transaction
also includes 15 loans secured by multifamily and manufactured
housing community properties, representing 10.9% of the current
pool balance. Additionally, 14 loans, representing 9.9% of the
current pool balance, have been defeased.

The largest loan in special servicing, 777 East 10th Street
(Prospectus ID#8; 2.6% of the current pool balance), is secured by
a mixed-use building located in downtown Los Angeles' Fashion
District. The property serves as wholesale retail, office, storage,
and production space for its tenants, which operate in the fashion
and textile industries. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in May 2020 because of cash flow issues that the
coronavirus pandemic exacerbated; however, the property reported
figures that underperformed issuance expectations prior to the
pandemic. The borrower last made its debt service payment in
February 2020, and the YE2019 and YE2018 debt service coverage
ratios (DSCRs) were 1.11 times (x) and 1.31x, respectively. The
property was appraised for $47.7 million at issuance, equating to a
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 60.4% based on the current pool
balance; however, given the performance decline and the outstanding
delinquency, the property's value has likely decreased. According
to the servicer, it has submitted a proposal for forbearance terms
to the borrower that is currently under review. In its analysis,
DBRS Morningstar assumed a haircut to the issuance value and
liquidated this loan from the trust, resulting in a hypothetical
loss severity exceeding 15.0%.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, Bayshore Mall
(Prospectus ID#14; 2.0% of the current pool balance), is secured by
a regional mall in Eureka, California. The loan transferred to the
special servicer in October 2020; however, the loan has been
delinquent since August 2020. Property performance began to suffer
at YE2019 when Sears vacated its anchor pad and, as of June 2020,
the property was 68.0% occupied. Remaining anchor tenants include
Walmart, Kohl's, Sportsman's Warehouse, Bed Bath & Beyond, and Ross
Dress for Less. Sales figures have also been weak in recent years
as, according to the March 2020 sales report, trailing 12-month
(T-12) sales for in-line tenants occupying less than 10,000 square
feet (sf) were $326 per sf (psf) and T-12 sales for tenants
occupying more than 10,000 sf were $234 psf. The property was
appraised for $69.0 million at issuance, equating to an LTV ratio
of 65.0% based on the current pool balance; however, given the
performance decline, outstanding delinquency, and headwinds facing
retail and specifically nontrophy regional malls, the property's
value has likely decreased. According to the servicer, the
borrower—Brookfield Properties Retail Inc.—may be interested in
transitioning the property back to the lender. As such, a new
appraisal has been ordered and counsel has been hired because the
loan is early in the resolution process. In its analysis, DBRS
Morningstar assumed a haircut to the issuance value and liquidated
this loan from the trust, resulting in a hypothetical loss severity
exceeding 20.0%.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its quantitative model
when determining the rating assigned to Class B by assigning a
rating higher than the lower rating implied by the quantitative
model. The material deviation is warranted given uncertain
loan-level event risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CSAIL 2015-C3: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C3 issued by CSAIL 2015-C3
Commercial Mortgage Trust (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed Classes X-E, E, X-F, and
F from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were
placed on August 6, 2020. The trends on these classes are Negative.
In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on Classes X-D and
D to Negative from Stable. All other trends remain Stable.

The Negative trends are reflective of DBRS Morningstar's concerns
as a result of ongoing performance issues with select loans,
specifically those in special servicing and those secured by hotel
and retail properties, which have been disproportionately affected
by the ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In total,
there are 39 loans in the transaction that are secured by hotel and
retail properties, representing 54.8% of the outstanding
transaction balance. As of the November 2020 reporting, there are
ten loans in special servicing, representing 17.9% of the current
pool balance, and 18 loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 17.2% of the current pool balance.

Nine of the ten loans in special servicing are secured by either
hotel and retail properties, including the second-largest loan in
the transaction (The Mall of New Hampshire; 8.2% of the pool),
which is currently on the DBRS Morningstar Hotlist. There are two
additional loans secured by regional malls in the transaction,
including Westfield Wheaton (8.0% of the pool) and Westfield
Trumbull (3.4% of the pool), with Westfield Trumbull also currently
on the DBRS Morningstar Hotlist as the loan was identified as
having increased credit risk in advance of the onset of the
pandemic.

As of November 2020, the transaction comprises 84 loans totaling
$1.2 billion, as five of the original 89 loans have been repaid
from the trust, resulting in collateral reduction of 14.4%
inclusive of payoffs and loan amortization. The transaction
benefits from a concentration of office collateral, as nine loans,
representing 19.0% of the pool, are secured by office properties,
which have shown greater resiliency to cash flow declines thus far
amid the pandemic. This includes the largest loan in the
transaction, secured by an office property in Boston, Massachusetts
(Charles River Plaza North; 9.4% of the pool). The transaction also
includes 13 loans secured by multifamily and MHC properties,
representing 12.4% of the pool balance. Additionally, nine loans,
representing 5.9% of the pool, have been defeased.

The largest loan in special servicing, The Mall of New Hampshire
(Prospectus ID#3; 8.2% of the pool balance), is secured by a Class
B, single-level enclosed regional mall totalling 811,573 square
feet (sf), 405,723 sf of which is part of the collateral. Simon
Property Group (Simon) owns and operates the property. At issuance,
the largest tenants were the noncollateral Macy's, Sears, and
JCPenney. Sears was closed in 2018 and later backfilled by Dick's
Sporting Goods and Dave & Buster's. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2020 at Simon's request, who cited imminent
monetary default because of coronavirus pandemic-driven
difficulties.

According to the November 2020 remittance report, the borrower last
paid debt service in March 2020. An October 2020 appraisal obtained
by the special servicer indicated an as-is value of $243.5 million,
a relatively minor -4.9% variance from the issuance valuation of
$256.0 million, with an implied loan-to-value ratio of 61.6%.
Financial performance had declined prior to the pandemic. The
year-end 2019 net cash flow (NCF) decreased 8.8% compared with the
2018 NCF and was down 21.6% from the Issuer's NCF. Although the
October 2020 appraisal suggests only a small value decline from
issuance, DBRS Morningstar believes that valuation may be
aggressive and notes the significantly increased risks in the
extended delinquency and the exposure to struggling retailers,
including JCPenney and Macy's as well as Dave & Buster's, which has
been particularly challenged amid the social-distancing impacts of
the pandemic. Given these factors, as well as the decline in
performance prior to the pandemic, DBRS Morningstar applied a
stressed probability of default (POD) for this loan in the analysis
for this review, increasing the expected loss.

The bulk of the other nine loans in special servicing have not
reported an updated appraisal since issuance, with those files
expected to be forthcoming over the near to moderate term for those
loans past the 60 days delinquent mark. For those loans that have
been in special servicing for longer periods of time, such as the
WPC Department Store Portfolio loan (which is backed by a portfolio
of six department stores formerly occupied by affiliates of The Bon
Ton companies, which liquidated in 2018) DBRS Morningstar assumed a
liquidation scenario in the analysis for this review. For newer
transfers without updated appraisals and/or much new information
available, a stressed POD was assumed to increase the expected loss
in the analysis.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist is 21 Astor Pace
(Prospectus ID#10; 2.2% of the pool balance). The collateral is a
retail property that spans the ground floor and a basement level
condominium unit of an 11-story multifamily property located in
lower Manhattan's NoHo neighborhood. The loan is being monitored
for the March 2021 lease expiry for the largest tenant, FedEx,
which represents 61.0% of the net rentable area. The servicer
commentary suggests a lease renewal is in process. In general, the
watchlisted loans are concentrated in those secured by retail and
hospitality property types, with many loans being monitored for
coronavirus-driven performance declines. Where merited, these loans
were analyzed with an increased POD to increase the expected loss
for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CSAIL 2016-C5: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C5 issued by CSAIL 2016-C5
Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar discontinued the ratings on Classes A-2 and A-3 as
both were repaid in full with the November 2020 remittance.

DBRS Morningstar removed the ratings on Classes E, F, X-E, and X-F
from Under Review with Negative Implications, where it placed them
on August 6, 2020. The trends on these classes are Negative. DBRS
Morningstar changed the trends on Classes D and X-D to Negative
from Stable. All other trends are Stable.

The Negative trends reflect the continued performance challenges
for the underlying collateral, mainly driven by the impacts of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. As of the November
2020 remittance, there were eight loans in special servicing,
representing 13.3% of the pool. The concentration of loans in
special servicing fell significantly with the successful repayment
of the Starwood Capital Extended Stay Portfolio loan, which
previously represented 9.0% of the pool balance. The pool continues
to have a moderate concentration of loans secured by hospitality
properties, representing 16.4% of the outstanding pool balance as
of the November 2020 remittance. Hotel properties have been the
most severely affected by the initial effects of the pandemic and,
as such, the relatively high concentration of loans backed by that
property type in this pool suggests increased risks, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 54 of the original 59 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 23.4%
since issuance. Three loans, representing 3.8% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased. Based on the YE2019 financials, the
pool reported a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.81x, compared with the issuer's underwritten DSCR of 1.80x.

There are eight loans, representing 13.3% of the pool, in special
servicing; however, since the October remittance, the
second-largest loan, Starwood Capital Extended Stay Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#3, 9.0% of the pool), has successfully been repaid.
The second- and third-largest loans remaining in special servicing
are Embassy Suites and Claypool Court (Embassy Suites; Prospectus
ID#7, 4.0% of the pool) and University Plains (Prospectus ID#17,
2.3% of the pool), which are secured by a full-service hotel and a
student housing property, respectively.

The Embassy Suites loan is secured by a 360-key full-service hotel
with an attached 77,121-sf office and retail portion, located in
the central business district of Indianapolis. The loan transferred
to special servicing in September 2020 following the borrower's
coronavirus relief request. As of the October 2020 remittance, the
loan was 30 to 59 days delinquent, and the special servicer most
recently calculated a DSCR of 1.81x as of the trailing 12 months
ended March 2020, down from 2.28x at YE2019. As of the October 2020
remittance, the loan was 30 days delinquent, and the servicer
commentary indicated the workout negotiations are in the initial
stages for this loan. Given the sharp performance decline since
issuance, DBRS Morningstar applied a probability of default penalty
to increase the expected loss in the analysis for this review.

The University Plains loan is secured by a 540-unit student housing
property in Ames, Iowa, approximately three miles from Iowa State
University. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2018 and is real estate owned. Performance declined
shortly after issuance, with the borrower citing increased supply
and declining enrollment as contributing factors. A new appraisal
from February 2020 valued the collateral at $13.9 million, down
from the issuance appraised value of $22.9 million. Given the
increased stress in recent months on student housing properties,
particularly those struggling prior to the pandemic, DBRS
Morningstar believes the value for this property could have fallen
even further since the February 2020 appraisal date. For this
review, DBRS Morningstar liquidated the loan from the pool with a
30% haircut to the February 2020 value, for a loss severity
exceeding 55.0%.

According to the November 2020 remittance, there are 12 loans on
the servicer's watchlist, representing 16.5% of the current pool
balance. The servicer is monitoring these loans for a variety of
reasons including low DSCR, occupancy, and deferred maintenance
issues; however, many loans have recently been added to the
servicer's watchlist for coronavirus related reasons.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DRYDEN 36: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings on the class A-R3, B-R3,
C-R3, and D-R3 replacement notes from Dryden 36 Senior Loan Fund, a
CLO originally issued in 2014 managed by PGIM Inc. S&P withdrew its
ratings on the class A-R2, B-R2, C-R2, and D-R2 notes following
payment in full on the Dec. 11, 2020, refinancing date. At the same
time, S&P affirmed our ratings on the class E-R2, and X-R2 notes.

On the Dec. 11, 2020, refinancing date, proceeds from the class
A-R3, B-R3, C-R3, and D-R3 note issuances were used to redeem the
class A-R2, B-R2, C-R2, and D-R2 notes as outlined in the
transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P withdrew its rating
on the refinanced notes in line with their full redemption and
assigned a rating to the replacement notes. The replacement notes
are being issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

S&P said, "In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios
applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and
pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated
tranches.

"The ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support available
is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings on
the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and we will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

Rating Assigned

Dryden 36 Senior Loan Fund

-- Replacement class A-R3, $434.00 million: AAA (sf)

-- Replacement class B-R3, $85.40 million: AA (sf)

-- Replacement class C-R3, $60.20 million: A (sf)

-- Replacement class D-R3, $36.40 million: BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Dryden 36 Senior Loan Fund

-- Class E-R2: B+ (sf)

-- Class x-R2: AAA (sf)

Rating Withdrawn

Dryden 36 Senior Loan Fund

-- Class A-R2 to 'NR' from 'AAA (sf)'

-- Class B-R2 to 'NR' from 'AA (sf)'

-- Class C-R2 to 'NR' from 'A (sf)'

-- Class D-R2 to 'NR' from 'BBB- (sf)'


ELMWOOD CLO VII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $16MM Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Elmwood CLO
VII Ltd./Elmwood CLO VII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Elmwood CLO VII Ltd./Elmwood CLO VII LLC

-- Class A, $300.00 million: AAA (sf)

-- Class B, $80.00 million: AA (sf)

-- Class C (deferrable), $30.00 million: A (sf)

-- Class D (deferrable), $28.75 million: BBB- (sf)

-- Class E (deferrable), $16.25 million: BB- (sf)

-- Class F (deferrable), $7.50 million: B- (sf)

-- Subordinated notes, $39.00 million: Not rated


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2017-2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed, upgraded, or discontinued its ratings on the
following classes of securities included in eight Exeter Automobile
Receivables Trust transactions:

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-2,
- Class C Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class D Notes, upgraded to AA (high) (sf)

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-3
- Class B Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to A (sf)

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-1
- Class B Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to BBB (sf)

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-2
- Class B Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-3
- Class A Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AA (high) (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1
- Class B Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to A (high) (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2019-1
- Class A Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class B Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AA (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update," published on September
10, 2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic
scenarios on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The
scenarios were last updated on September 10, 2020, and are
reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
remains predicated on a more rapid return of confidence and a
steady recovery heading into 2021. Observed performance during the
2008–09 financial crisis and the possible impact from stimulus
were also considered in the assumptions.

-- Transaction's capital structure, and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar-projected remaining cumulative net loss (CNL)
(including an adjustment for the moderate scenario) assumption at a
multiple of coverage commensurate with the ratings above.

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected CNL assumptions consistent with the expected unemployment
levels in the moderate scenario.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed, upgraded, or discontinued its ratings on the
following classes of securities included in 16 Flagship Credit Auto
Trust transactions:

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2016-2, Series 2016-2
- Class B, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D, upgraded to AAA (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2016-4, Series 2016-4
- Class B, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class E, upgraded to A (low) (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-1, Series 2017-1
- Class B, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class E, upgraded to BBB (high) (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-2, Series 2017-2
- Class B, discontinued due to repayment
- Class C, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class E, upgraded to A (low) (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-3, Series 2017-3
- Class A, discontinued due to repayment
- Class B, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D, upgraded to AA (high) (sf)
- Class E, upgraded to A (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-4, Series 2017-4
- Class A, discontinued due to repayment
- Class B, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D, upgraded to AA (sf)
- Class E, upgraded to BBB (high) (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-1
- Class A Notes, discontinued due to repayment
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to AA (low) (sf)
- Class E Notes, upgraded to BBB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-2
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to A (high) (sf)
- Class E Notes, upgraded to BBB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-3
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to A (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-4
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to BBB (high) (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2019-1
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, upgraded to AA (sf)
- Class D Notes, upgraded to BBB (high) (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2019-2
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, upgraded to AAA (sf)
- Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2019-3
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AA (sf)
- Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2019-4
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AA (sf)
- Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2020-1
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AA (sf)
- Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2020-2
- Class A Notes, confirmed at AAA (sf)
- Class B Notes, confirmed at AA (sf)
- Class C Notes, confirmed at A (sf)
- Class D Notes, confirmed at BBB (sf)
- Class E Notes, confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update," published on September
10, 2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic
scenarios on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The
scenarios were last updated on September 10, 2020, and are
reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
remains predicated on a more rapid return of confidence and a
steady recovery heading into 2021. Observed performance during the
2008–09 financial crisis and the possible impact from stimulus
were also considered in the assumptions.

-- Transaction's capital structure, and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement. The current level of hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar-projected remaining cumulative net loss (CNL)
(including an adjustment for the moderate scenario) assumption at a
multiple of coverage commensurate with the ratings above.

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected CNL assumptions consistent with the expected unemployment
levels in the moderate scenario.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.


GLS AUTO 2020-4: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust 2020-4 (the
Issuer):

-- $155,400,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $42,170,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $51,630,000 Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- $32,050,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $29,220,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization
(OC), subordination, amounts held in the reserve account, and
excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption
under various stress scenarios.

(2) DBRS Morningstar's projected losses include the assessment of
the impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

-- While considerable uncertainty remains with respect to the
intensity and duration of the shock, the DBRS Morningstar-projected
CNL includes an assessment of the expected impact on consumer
behavior. The DBRS Morningstar CNL assumption is 21.50% based on
the expected Cut-Off Date pool composition.

(3) The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its commentary Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: December Update, published on December 2, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020, that have been regularly updated. The scenarios were last
updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions also take into
consideration observed performance during the 2008–09 financial
crisis and the possible impact of stimulus. The assumptions
consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario outlined in the
commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as the primary
anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario factors in
increasing success in containment during the first half of 2021,
enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

(4) The consistent operational history of Global Lending Services
LLC (GLS or the Company) and the strength of the overall Company
and its management team.

-- The GLS senior management team has considerable experience and
a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

(5) The capabilities of GLS with regard to originations,
underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar performed an operational review of GLS and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
servicer.

(6) DBRS Morningstar exclusively used the static pool approach
because GLS has enough data to generate a sufficient amount of
static pool projected losses.

-- DBRS Morningstar was conservative in the loss forecast analysis
performed on the static pool data.

(7) The Company indicated that it may be subject to various
consumer claims and litigation seeking damages and statutory
penalties. Some litigation against GLS could take the form of
class-action complaints by consumers; however, the Company
indicated that there is no material pending or threatened
litigation.

(8) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with GLS, that the
trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the assets,
and the consistency with the DBRS Morningstar "Legal Criteria for
U.S. Structured Finance."

GLS is an independent full-service automotive financing and
servicing company that provides (1) financing to borrowers who do
not typically have access to prime credit-lending terms for the
purchase of late-model vehicles and (2) refinancing of existing
automotive financing.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 54.20% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool
(46.70%), the reserve account (1.00%), and OC (6.50%). The ratings
on the Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E Notes reflect 41.50%,
25.95%, 16.30%, and 7.50% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: DBRS Lowers Class F Certs Rating to C
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2011-GC5 as follows:

-- Class B to AA (high) (sf) from AAA (sf)
-- Class C to A (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BB (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E to CCC (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to C (sf) from B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the following ratings:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed Classes D, E, and F from
Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on
August 6, 2020.

DBRS Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes B, C, and D to
Negative from Stable. All other trends are Stable, with the
exception of Classes E and F, which have ratings that do not carry
trends. In addition, DBRS Morningstar added an Interest in Arrears
designation for Class F and discontinued the rating for the
notional Class X-B with this review.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends reflect the continued
performance challenges for the underlying collateral, with previous
cash flow declines for several large loans secured by regional
malls, including the second-largest loan in the pool, which is in
special servicing. Previous performance declines and the generally
challenging landscape for regional malls have both been compounded
by the effects of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global
pandemic. In addition to the two loans representing 16.3% of the
pool in special servicing as of the November 2020 remittance, there
are 11 loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 20.2% of the
pool. DBRS Morningstar notes that retail collateral makes up the
largest concentration by property type overall, with 22 loans
comprising 65.2% of the current trust balance. The pool also
features loans backed by four hospitality properties, representing
5.2% of the pool. Both hospitality and retail properties have been
the most severely affected by the initial effects of the
coronavirus pandemic, exacerbating the concentration of loans
backed by retail properties and suggestive of significantly
increased risks for the pool since issuance.

In addition to the pool's second-largest remaining loan, Park Place
Mall (Prospectus ID#1, 15.3% of the pool), which is in special
servicing, there are two additional top 15 loans backed by regional
malls in Parkdale Mall & Crossing (Prospectus ID#5, 6.8% of the
pool) and Champlain Centre (Prospectus ID#13, 2.7% of the pool).
All three of the collateral malls—located in Tucson, Arizona;
Beaumont, Texas; and Plattsburg, New York—are located in
secondary markets and have shown signs of increased risks from
issuance including anchor closures for some, cash flow declines for
others, and sponsorship issues in either a reduced commitment from
a strong sponsor or a weak sponsor that has recently filed for
bankruptcy amid the pandemic. Although all three loans had issuance
values that suggested going-in loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) ranging
from 57.0% to 64.0%, the as-is values for all three have likely
fallen significantly since issuance, combining with the other
increased risks for these loans to suggest significantly increased
risks to the trust since issuance, a primary driver for the ratings
downgrades taken by DBRS Morningstar.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 49 of the original 74 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 37.0%
since issuance. Eighteen loans, representing 25.6% of the current
pool balance, are fully defeased. Additionally, there are 11 loans,
representing 20.2% of the current trust balance, on the servicer's
watchlist per the November 2020 remittance. These loans are being
monitored for a variety of reasons including low debt service
coverage ratios (DSCR), upcoming tenant rollover risk, occupancy
issues, and deferred maintenance; however, the primary reason for
the increase of loans on the watchlist is for hospitality and
retail properties with a low DSCR stemming from disruptions related
to the coronavirus pandemic.

The two loans in special servicing are Park Place Mall and Holiday
Inn Express Anchorage (Prospectus ID#33, 1.0% of the pool), both of
which are highlighted below.

The Park Place Mall loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2020 because of imminent monetary default. The loan is
secured by a 1.1 million-square foot (sf) regional mall, of which
478,333 sf is part of the collateral. The property is located in
Tucson. At issuance, the mall was anchored by Sears (which vacated
in July 2018 and later backfilled with Round 1 Bowling &
Amusement), Macy's (which permanently closed in Q2 2020), and
Dillard's, all of which own their improvements and are not part of
the collateral. Major collateral tenants include Century Theatres
(15.3% of the net rentable area (NRA) through August 2021), Total
Wine & More (5.6% of the NRA through August 2027), and H&M (3.9% of
the NRA through April 2022). The sponsor of the loan at issuance
was General Growth Properties, which Brookfield Properties acquired
in 2018.

According to the servicer's commentary, the sponsor is no longer
supporting the asset with additional equity infusions. The loan was
more than 30 days delinquent as of November 2020. The special
servicer reported that a workout strategy is being determined, with
the special servicer continuing discussions with the sponsor while
dual tracking foreclosure. The loan's scheduled maturity date is in
May 2021. As of June 2020, the collateral occupancy was 96.0%,
which remains relatively unchanged from issuance. The going-in LTV
was moderate at 63.1%. As such, a 55% haircut to the issuance
appraisal value of $313.0 million and a stressed advancing figure
implies a relatively moderate loss severity of 30.4%. That said,
there is the possibility that the sponsor will be turning the
property over to the trust, and the servicer will be faced with
disposing the asset in a very challenging time for regional mall
properties, particularly those in secondary markets such as the
subject. Therefore, DBRS Morningstar notes the loss severity could
be much higher at resolution, supporting the Negative trends on
certain classes.

The smaller loan in special servicing, Holiday Inn Express
Anchorage, secured by a 129-key limited-service hotel in Anchorage,
Alaska, transferred to the special servicer in August 2020 for
imminent default because of challenges driven by coronavirus. As of
November 2020, the loan was more than 90 days delinquent and the
special servicer reported that the asset manager is dual tracking
foreclosure while continuing discussions regarding a loan
modification with the borrower. As of June 2020, the property
reported an occupancy rate of 61% and DSCR of 0.98x compared with a
YE2019 occupancy rate of 81% and DSCR of 1.84x. Given the
outstanding delinquency and the significant challenges for the
underlying collateral amid the pandemic that will make repayment at
the scheduled July 2021 maturity unlikely, DBRS Morningstar
analyzed this loan with an elevated probability of default to
significantly increase the expected loss for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2014-GC24: DBRS Lowers Class F Certs Rating to CCC
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC24 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-GC24 as follows:

-- Class D to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class E to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

The trends on these classes are Negative except for Class F, which
does not carry a trend. DBRS Morningstar also removed these classes
from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were
placed on August 6, 2020.

In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trends on the following
classes to Negative from Stable:

-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

The trends on these classes remain Stable.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends reflect the continued
performance challenges facing the underlying collateral, primarily
driven by the impacts of the global Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic. In addition to the six loans, representing 15.1% of the
pool, that are in special servicing as of the November 2020
remittance, DBRS Morningstar notes that the pool has a high
concentration of retail properties, representing 34.7% of the pool.
The largest specially serviced loan is backed by an anchored retail
property, representing 9.1% of the pool. In general, the initial
effects of the coronavirus pandemic have severely affected retail
properties and, as such, the high concentration of loans backed by
retail property types suggests increased risks for the pool since
issuance, particularly for the lower rating categories. The
pandemic has also significantly affected hotel properties, which
has also affected the subject pool as four loans that are secured
by hotel properties are in special servicing, representing 5.3% of
the pool.

The six loans in special servicing are Beverly Connection
(Prospectus ID #3; 9.1% of the pool), Hampton Inn & Suites –
Yonkers (Prospectus ID #8; 2.4% of the pool), MHG Hotel Portfolio
(Prospectus ID #23; 1.0% of the pool); Holiday Inn Express
Corvallis (Prospectus ID #27; 1.0% of the pool), Hampton Inn &
Suites Fargo (Prospectus ID #26; 0.9% of the pool), and Westwind
Marketplace (Prospectus ID #57; 0.5% of the pool).

The largest loan in special servicing, Beverly Connection
(Prospectus ID #3; 9.1% of the pool), is secured by a two-story
334,566-square-foot (sf) anchored retail center and parking
structure in the West Los Angeles submarket of Los Angeles. As of
the March 31, 2020, rent roll, the property was 95.0% leased and
the largest tenants included City Target, Marshalls, Nordstrom
Rack, and Ross Dress for Less. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2020 for delinquent payments resulting from the
coronavirus pandemic. As of the November 2020 reporting, the loan
was listed as 90+ days delinquent and was last paid in May 2020.
The servicer is currently evaluating a borrower request for relief
but notes that, to date, the borrower has not provided an
acceptable workout proposal. Given the strong tenancy and the
healthy historical cash flow trends, the borrower's need for
coronavirus relief may be overstated and the servicer's suggestion
that proposed modifications terms have been unacceptable could
indicate the loan will ultimately return to the master servicer in
the near to moderate term.

All of the loans in special servicing are secured by retail and
hospitality property types and all but one transferred to special
servicing after the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic. Two of
the seven specially serviced loans have reported updated property
values since their transfer to special servicing—the real estate
owned Hampton Inn & Suites – Yonkers (Prospectus ID #26; 2.4% of
the pool) and Holiday Inn Express Corvallis (Prospectus ID #27;
1.0% of the pool). In both cases, the updated property values
showed declines from issuance that would result in losses to the
trust.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 66 of the original 75 loans
remain in the pool with a collateral reduction of 11.0% since
issuance. Seven loans, representing 11.7% of the pool, are fully
defeased. Additionally, 13 loans, representing 33.7% of the pool,
are on the servicer's watchlist for a variety of reasons, including
low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and occupancy issues. The
primary reason for the increased loans on the servicer's watchlist,
however, is for hospitality and retail properties with a low DSCR
stemming from disruptions related to the coronavirus. Where
merited, DBRS Morningstar analyzed these, and any other loans in
the pool showing signs of increased stress since issuance, with an
elevated probability of default and expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC30: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC30 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2015-GC30 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Classes E and F. DBRS
Morningstar changed the trend on Class E to Negative from Stable.
The trend on Class F is also Negative, and DBRS Morningstar removed
the class from Under Review with Negative Implications, where it
was placed on August 6, 2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has generally performed in line with
expectations at issuance. However, there are challenges with the
concentration of larger loans in special servicing, including three
of the largest 15 loans in the pool, as well as the concentration
of larger loans on the servicer's watchlist, which also includes
three of the top 15 loans. All of the larger loans in special
servicing or on the servicer's watchlist are backed by hotel or
retail properties, which the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has disproportionately affected. The generally increased
risks for these loans were primary drivers for the Negative trends
on Classes E and F.

As of the November 2020 remittance, there were 82 of the original
90 loans remaining in the pool with a collateral reduction of 16.4%
since issuance because of amortization and loan payoffs. There were
also 10 defeased loans, representing 5.5% of the pool. The
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the
pool was 2.41 times (x) as of the servicer's November 2020
reporting, up from the Issuer's WA DSCR of 2.19x at transaction
closing. There have been no losses in the pool to date. As of the
November 2020 remittance, five loans were in special servicing,
representing 6.7% of the pool, and 20 loans were on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 22.1% of the pool.

The pool benefits from a relatively diverse property-type
concentration with loans backed by multifamily properties
representing the largest percentage of the pool at 22.0%. The
second-largest concentration is in retail properties (21.9%),
followed by office properties (19.4%) and hospitality properties
(15.1%). The retail concentration is noteworthy, given the
significant stress that retail properties have faced amid the
coronavirus pandemic, which has significantly disrupted consumer
traffic with the enforcement of social distancing guidelines. Four
of the top 15 loans in the pool are backed by retail properties.
Hotel properties have also been among the hardest hit by the
effects of the pandemic and, although the hotel concentration in
the pool is smaller, four of the largest 15 loans are backed by
hotels.

The largest loan in special servicing, Hilton Scotts Valley
(Prospectus ID#8; 2.4% of the pool), is secured by a full-service
resort hotel known as the Hilton Santa Cruz Scotts Valley. The
hotel is approximately 30 miles southwest of San Jose, California,
and was sold to an affiliate of Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc.
(Ashford) for $50.0 million in February 2019, well above the $39.0
million property value at issuance. This indicates that Ashford,
which assumed the subject loan at transaction closing, infused new
equity of $25.0 million into the property. The loan transferred to
special servicing in April 2020 for imminent monetary default
following the sponsor's coronavirus relief request. The loan was
reportedly current as of the November 2020 remittance, however, and
the servicer reports that a proposed loan modification is under
evaluation.

The property has historically performed well with previous years
showing a DSCR well above 2.00x; however, the year-end (YE) 2019
DSCR was much lower at 1.14x than the historical figures.
Acquisition costs or a partial-year financial statement could
explain the significant year-over-year variance, but the low
DSCR—particularly combined with the loan's transfer to special
servicing in April 2020—indicates increased risks since issuance.
Notable mitigating factors include the recent sale and equity
infusion as well as the hotel's status as one of the only resort
hotels in the area and its historically strong performance that
demonstrates its appeal within the market. To capture the increased
risks since issuance, DBRS Morningstar analyzed the loan with an
increased probability of default (POD) to increase the expected
loss for this review.

The second-largest loan in special servicing, 170 Broadway
(Prospectus ID#12; 1.9% of the pool), is secured by the
ground-floor retail component of a property at 170 Broadway in New
York's Financial District. The collateral sits below a Residence
Inn hotel and is leased to a single tenant, the Gap, whose lease
expires in February 2030. The Gap closed in March 2020 at the onset
of the coronavirus pandemic and has remained closed since that
time. According to news articles, the tenant is suing the loan
sponsors for the right to cancel the lease, arguing that the
changes in consumer traffic resulting from the pandemic mean that
the retailer cannot operate as planned at the subject property. The
loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020 and is over 121
days delinquent as of the November 2020 remittance. The litigation
remains ongoing and the special servicer has advised that
discussions between the sponsor and the servicer are on hold, given
the moratorium on lender remedies that the State of New York
implemented through January 2021.

The pandemic and the measures taken by local and state governments
to curb public gatherings and limit close-contact opportunities
have caused considerable stress on New York City retail, which is a
primary driver for the loan's default. Prior to the pandemic,
however, the Gap was already reporting significant difficulty at
the corporate level and some news articles suggested that the
retailer, and others in similar situations, could be taking
advantage of the pandemic to renegotiate lease terms or close
locations as part of an effort to consolidate operations and
conserve cash. The unique challenges for New York City retail and
the extended loan delinquency indicate significantly increased
risks since issuance and, as a result, DBRS Morningstar applied a
POD penalty to increase the expected loss for this review.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Worthington
Renaissance Fort Worth (Prospectus ID#3; 1.7% of the pool), is
secured by a 504-key full-service hotel in Downtown Fort Worth,
Texas. The loan is on the watchlist because of the borrower's
coronavirus relief request and the servicer recently confirmed that
the discussions with the borrower remain ongoing. Although the
pandemic's impacts on this hotel, and most others across the U.S.,
indicate increased risks since issuance, DBRS Morningstar notes
that mitigating factors include the high DSCR of 2.93x at YE2019
prior to the pandemic; the sponsor's recent $8.0 million investment
in upgrades for the common areas and lobby; and the conversion of
the hotel's dining component to a Toro restaurant, a Latin
steakhouse concept by celebrity chef Richard Sandoval.

The property's significant decline in occupancy and room rates,
reflected in the revenue per available room figure of $64.00 for
the trailing six-month period ended June 30, 2020 (according to the
property's June 2020 Smith Travel Research report), suggest
increased stress for the loan. DBRS Morningstar believes that the
near- to medium-term risk for the loan remains relatively moderate,
however, and expects a loan modification to be finalized in the
near term. Given the low in-place revenues, DBRS Morningstar
analyzed the loan with a POD penalty to increase the expected loss
for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-GS5 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2017-GS5 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. In addition, DBRS Morningstar discontinued
its rating on Class A-1 as the class repaid in full with the
November 2020 remittance.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
pool, which has had a collateral reduction of 3.1% since issuance
as of November 2020. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 32
fixed-rate loans secured by 72 commercial and multifamily
properties. As of the November 2020 remittance, 31 loans remained
in the pool, with a relatively low concentration of loans secured
by retail (19.8% of the pool) and lodging (2.5% of the pool)
properties. Six loans are on the servicer's watchlist, representing
31.5% of the pool, and two loans are in special servicing,
representing 5.7% of the pool. One loan, representing 2.1% of the
pool, is fully defeased. Based on the YE2019 financials, the pool
reported a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
2.10 times (x) compared with the Issuer's underwritten DSCR of
2.39x.

The largest loan in special servicing, Simon Premium Outlets
(Prospectus ID#12; 3.1% of the pool) is secured by two retail
properties totalling 436,987 square feet (sf), with Simon Property
Group, Inc. (Simon) as the loan sponsor. The larger property by
allocated loan balance (ALB), Queenstown Premium Outlets (63.7% of
the ALB) is in Queenstown, Maryland, and the second collateral
property, Pismo Beach Premium Outlets (36.3% of the ALB) is in
Pismo Beach, California. The loan transferred to special servicing
in July 2020 for payment default when Simon requested Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19)-related relief. According to the servicer,
negotiations are ongoing regarding a potential loan modification as
well as the pursuit of lender remedies. The sponsor is also
reportedly complying with the installation of a lockbox.

Property performance for both malls has been generally stable since
issuance as the most recently reported cash flows have a DSCR of
2.06x for the trailing 12-month (T-12) period ended August 31,
2020, which is in line with the YE2019 figure, but below the
Issuer's DSCR of 2.36x. As of October 2020, portfolio occupancy was
reported at 81.0%, down from 90.0% at YE2018. The major tenant
rosters primarily consist of a mix of the standard Premium Outlets
tenants, including VF Outlet, Nike Factory Store, and Polo Ralph
Lauren. Given the pandemic-driven issues and current delinquency
status, there are increased risks for this loan since issuance and,
as such, DBRS Morningstar applied an increased probability of
default (POD) penalty to increase the expected loss in its analysis
for this review.

The smaller specially serviced loan, 20 West 37th Street
(Prospectus ID#16; 2.7% of the pool) is secured by a 77,100-sf
mixed-use property in New York. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2020 for monetary default. According to the
servicer, a loan modification as well as a receiver are under
consideration. Prior to the loan's transfer to special servicing,
the loan was added to the servicer's watchlist in May 2020
following the borrower's coronavirus-related relief request. The
loan was also being monitored for an active cash trap event and
outstanding servicer advances.

Prior to the loan's transfer to special servicing, performance had
been quite stable with the T-12 period ended June 30, 2020, DSCR of
1.30x compared with YE2019 and YE2018 DSCRs of 1.38x and 1.52x,
respectively. As of June 2020, however, occupancy was reported at
68.0% compared with 100.0% at issuance as tenants representing
32.0% of the net rentable area (NRA) vacated the subject from
September 2019 to February 2020, suggesting that the YE2020 DSCR
will show a significant decline in performance. The remaining three
largest tenants collectively represent 26.0% of the NRA with leases
expiring between December 2020 and September 2027. Given the
pandemic-driven issues and elevated vacancy rate, DBRS Morningstar
also applied an increased POD penalty for this loan to increase the
expected loss in its analysis for this review.

According to the November 2020 remittance, six loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 31.5% of the pool. Four loans,
representing 9.1% of the pool, were flagged for performance
declines. Although only one loan was added for an official
coronavirus-related relief request, most of the loans are being
monitored for cash flow and occupancy declines based on the
quarterly 2020 reporting. One loan, representing 7.2% of the pool,
was flagged for deferred maintenance. One loan, 350 Park Avenue
(Prospectus ID#1; 9.7% of the pool), is being monitored following
the announcement that the property's largest tenant, Ziff Brothers
Investments, LLC (50.3% of NRA; expiring in April 2021), would be
vacating upon lease expiration. The tenant had been downsizing for
years, however, with a substantial portion of its space subleased
to other tenants, which partially mitigates the risks associated
with its lease expiry next year. Generally, and where merited, for
loans on the servicer's watchlist, DBRS Morningstar applied a POD
penalty to increase the expected loss in its analysis for this
review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2018-GS10: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G-RR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-GS10 issued by GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2018-GS10 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Class G-RR was removed from Under Review with Negative Implications
where it was placed on August 6, 2020.

With this review, DBRS Morningstar confirmed that the overall
performance of the transaction remains in line with expectations at
issuance. At issuance, the trust consisted of 33 fixed-rate loans
secured by 57 commercial and multifamily properties. As of the
November 2020 remittance, all loans remained in the pool with a
collateral reduction of 0.6% caused by scheduled amortization. The
transaction is backed by a relatively diverse set of collateral,
with loans backed by office, retail, and industrial properties
representing 34.4%, 24.1%, and 16.7% of the pool, respectively.
There is only a small concentration of loans backed by hospitality
properties, which represent less than 3.0% of the pool. Given the
unique stresses for hotel properties amid the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic, this is considered a strength for the
transaction. In addition, there are three loans, collectively
representing 19.3% of the pool, that are shadow-rated investment
grade by DBRS Morningstar, including 1000 Wilshire (Prospectus
ID#2, 8.1% of the pool), Aliso Creek Apartments (Prospectus ID#3,
7.8% of the pool), and Marina Heights State Farm (Prospectus ID#11,
3.4% of the pool). With this review, DBRS Morningstar confirmed
that the loans continue to perform in line with the
investment-grade shadow ratings.

As of the November 2020 remittance, there were eight loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 17.3% of the pool, and no
delinquent or specially serviced loans. The watchlisted loans are
being monitored for various reasons, including delinquent taxes,
upcoming rollover risk, low debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) or
occupancy rates, and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests.
Based on the YE2019 financials, the pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) DSCR of 2.53 times (x) compared with the
YE2018 WA DSCR of 2.43x and DBRS Morningstar DSCR at issuance of
2.10x.

The 3300 East 1st Avenue loan (Prospectus ID#15, 3.0% of the pool
balance) is on the servicer's watchlist because of its delinquent
payments between May and September 2020. However, as of the October
2020 remittance, the loan was marked current by the servicer, with
the loan listed as current in the November 2020 reporting as well.
The servicer also notes that a coronavirus relief request has been
made, which is under review. The loan collateral is a mixed-use
property located in Denver. The property reported a September 2020
occupancy rate of 81.2%. The largest tenant, Zone Athletic Club,
occupies 27.2% of the net rentable area on a lease through March
2033. Cash flows have been reported in line since issuance, with
1.66x as the most recent DSCR reported for the trailing six months
ended June 30, 2020.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2019-GC40: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-RR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-GC40 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Corporation Trust 2019-GC40 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (sf))

Additionally, DBRS Morningstar confirmed its ratings to the
following rake bonds (the Rake Bonds), which are secured by the
beneficial interest in the subordinate debt placed on the
Diamondback Industrial Portfolio 1 (Prospectus ID#14) and
Diamondback Industrial Portfolio 2 (Prospectus ID#1) loans:

-- Class DB-A at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class DB-X at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class DB-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class DB-C at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class DB-D at BB (sf)
-- Class DB-E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class DB-F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. At issuance, the transaction
consisted of 35 fixed-rate loans secured by 44 commercial and
multifamily properties with a trust balance of $1.03 billion.
According to the November 2020 remittance, all loans from issuance
remain in the pool with minimal amortization to date. The
transaction is concentrated by property type as 15 loans,
representing 53.4% of the current trust balance, are secured by
office and industrial properties while the third-largest
concentration comprises five loans, representing 20.0% of the
current trust balance, are secured by mixed-use assets.

As of the November 2020 remittance, there were no loans in special
servicing. There are ten loans, representing 22.9% of the pool, on
the servicer's watchlist. These loans are being monitored for
various reasons, including low debt service coverage ratios or
occupancy, tenant rollover risk, and/or pandemic-related
forbearance requests. The loan for 59 Maiden Lane (Prospectus ID#6;
4.9% of the current pool balance) represents the only watchlisted
loan in the top 10. The pari passu loan is secured by fee-simple
interest in a 43-story Class A office property just north of the
downtown financial district in New York. The loan is on the
watchlist because of the upcoming lease expiration of the
property's largest tenant, Department of Citywide Administrative
Services. The tenant, which represents 69% of the building's net
rentable area, has a lease expiration in August 2021; however,
according to DBRS Morningstar's research, the tenant has renewed
beyond its current lease expiration.

The pool's largest loan, Diamondback Industrial Portfolio - 2
(Prospectus ID#1; 8.2% of pool), has a whole loan balance of $139
million, of which $78 million senior debt is included in the pooled
classes while the subordinate $61 million component is tied to the
raked classes. The loan is secured by the fee-simple interest in a
portfolio of three single-tenant industrial properties totaling
more than 2.5 million square feet located in Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Virginia. The portfolio is 100% leased to
investment-grade single tenants: Nestlé S.A. (Nestlé; rated AA
(low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar); The Home Depot,
Inc. (The Home Depot; rated "A" with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar); and Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon; not currently rated by
DBRS Morningstar). All of the properties were build-to-suit
projects and have been the only occupants at their respective
buildings. Nestlé has occupied the property since 1994, while The
Home Depot and Amazon have occupied their spaces since 2008 and
2011, respectively. All three tenants have leases extending beyond
the loan term.

The second loan that is tied to the raked classes is associated
with the Diamondback Industrial Portfolio - 1 (Prospectus ID#14;
7.8% of pool). The loan has a whole loan balance of $130.3 million,
of which $20 million senior debt is included in the pool classes.
There are also pari passu notes totaling $50 million that are split
between trust debt and raked classes. The subordinate $60.3 million
note is tied to the raked classes. The loan is secured by the
fee-simple interest in a portfolio of three single-tenant
industrial properties totaling more than 2.2 million square feet
located in South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The
portfolio is 100% leased to investment-grade single tenants:
Amazon, T.J.Maxx, and FedEx. All three tenants are leased beyond
the loan term.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-GSA2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings and Rating Outlooks to
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2020-GSA2 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2020-GSA2 as follows:

RATING ACTIONS

GSMS 2020-GSA2

  -- $17,052,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,429,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,754,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $100,000,000a class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $381,296,000a class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,358,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $612,360,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $73,324,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57,471,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35,671,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,653,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46,571,000bc class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,754,000c class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,817,000c class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,818,000c class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7,927,000cd class G-RR 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $32,699,123cd class H-RR;

  -- $22,622,314e class RR Interest;

  -- $11,009,350e class RR Certificates.

(a) The initial certificate balances of classes A-4 and A-5 are
unknown and expected to be $481,346,000 in aggregate, subject to a
5% variance. The certificate balances will be determined based on
the final pricing of those classes of certificates. The expected
class A-4 balance range is $0 to $200,000,000, and the expected
class A-5 balance range is $281,296,000 to $481,296,000. Fitch's
certificate balances for classes A-4 and A-5 are assumed at the
midpoint of the range for each class.

(b) Notional amount and interest only (IO).

(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

(e) Non-offered vertical credit risk retention interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Dec. 10, 2020.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, the primary assets of which are 46 fixed-rate loans secured
by 89 commercial properties with an aggregate principal balance of
$826,330,787 as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citi Real Estate Funding Inc., Goldman Sachs Mortgage
Company, Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC, Argentic Real Estate
Finance, and Societe Generale Financial Corporation. The master
servicer is expected to be Midland Loan Services, Inc. and the
special servicer are expected to be LNR Partners, LLC.

The ongoing containment efforts related to the coronavirus pandemic
may have an adverse impact on near-term revenue (i.e. bad debt
expense and rent relief) and operating expenses (i.e. sanitation
costs) for some properties in the pool. Delinquencies may occur in
the coming months as forbearance programs are put in place,
although the ultimate impact on credit losses will depend heavily
on the severity and duration of the negative economic impact of the
pandemic and to what degree fiscal interventions by the U.S.
government can mitigate the impact on consumers. Per the offering
documents, all loans are current and none are subject to any
forbearance requests; however, the sponsors for four loans, JW
Marriott Nashville (4.2% of the pool), Hotel Zaza Houston Museum
District (2.4% of the pool), Paramount Town Center loan (1.3% of
the pool) and 1404 West University loan (0.5% of the pool) have
negotiated loan amendments/modifications.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool has
slightly higher than average leverage relative to other recent
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch loan to
value (LTV) of 103.8% is higher than YTD 2020 average of 99.4%, but
only slightly greater than the 2019 average of 103.0%. The pool's
Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.33x is slightly
higher than the YTD 2020 average of 1.31x and higher than the 2019
average of 1.26x. Excluding credit opinion loans, the pool's
weighted average (WA) DSCR and LTV are 1.27x and 109.6%,
respectively.

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans representing 10.9% of the pool by
balance have credit characteristics consistent with
investment-grade obligations on a stand-alone basis. MGM Grand &
Mandalay Bay (7.9% of the pool) is secured by a hotel and casino
and received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB+sf', while Grand
Canal Shoppes (3.0% of the pool) is secured by an upscale retail
property located within the Venetian Hotel & Casino and received a
stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf'.

Property Type Representation: Loans secured by office properties
account for 47.4% of the pool, which is higher than the YTD 2020
and 2019 averages of 41.1% and 34.2%, respectively. While the pool
is highly exposed to the office sector, several of these properties
are generally better-quality assets located in core markets. Loans
secured by hotel properties account for 16.3% of the pool, which is
higher than the YTD 2020 and 2019 averages of 8.9% and 12.0%,
respectively. Fitch consider the hotel asset type to have the
greatest downside risk among all of the commercial asset types and
loans secured by hotel properties are assigned an above-average
probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This section provides insight into the sensitivity of ratings when
one assumption is modified, while holding others equal. For U.S.
CMBS, the sensitivity reflects the impact of changes to property
net cash flow (NCF) in up- and down-environments. The result should
only be considered as one potential outcome, as the transaction is
exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as
an indicator of possible future performance.

Declining cash flow decreases property value and capacity to meet
its debt service obligations. The table indicates the model implied
rating sensitivity to changes in one variable, Fitch NCF:

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Improvement in cash flow increases property value and capacity to
meet its debt service obligations. The table indicates the model
implied rating sensitivity to changes in one variable, Fitch NCF:

Original Rating: 'AAAsf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-sf'
/'BB-sf' / 'Bsf'.

20% NCF Increase: 'AAAsf' / 'AAAsf' / 'AA+sf' / 'A+sf' / 'A-sf' /
'BBBsf' / 'BBBsf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Similarly, declining cash flow decreases property value and
capacity to meet its debt service obligations. The table indicates
the model implied rating sensitivity to changes to the same one
variable, Fitch NCF:

Original Rating: 'AAAsf' / 'AA-sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBBsf' / 'BBB-sf' /
'BBsf' / 'Bsf'.

10% NCF Decline: 'A+sf' / 'A-sf' / 'BBB-sf' / 'BB+sf' / 'BB-sf' /
'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

20% NCF Decline: 'BBB+sf' / 'BBB-sf' / 'BB+sf' / 'B+sf' / 'CCCsf '
/ 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

30% NCF Decline: 'BBB-sf' / 'BB+sf' / 'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'/ 'CCCsf' /
'CCCsf' / 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E ("Form 15E") as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and it did not have an effect on Fitch's analysis or
conclusions.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by clicking the link to the Appendix. The appendix also contains a
comparison of these RW&Es to those Fitch considers typical for the
asset class as detailed in the Special Report titled
'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global
Structured Finance Transactions'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ6: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-PJ6 (the
Certificates) to be issued by GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust
2020-PJ6 (GSMBS 2020-PJ6):

-- $432.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $432.2 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.7 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $324.2 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $324.2 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $108.1 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $108.1 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.8 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.8 million Class A-9-X at AAA (sf)
-- $28.8 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.8 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.8 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $53.7 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $514.7 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $432.2 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.7 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.7 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $324.2 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $108.1 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $21.4 million Class B at BBB (sf)
-- $8.1 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $8.1 million Class B-1-A at AA (sf)
-- $8.1 million Class B-1-X at AA (sf)
-- $7.3 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $7.3 million Class B-2-A at A (sf)
-- $7.3 million Class B-2-X at A (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-3-X at BBB (sf)
-- $1.9 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.6 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-9-X, A-11-X, A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, A-X-5, A-X-7,
B-1-X, B-2-X, B-3-X, and B-X are interest-only certificates. The
class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6, A-8, A-10, A-11, A-11-X, A-12, A-X-2,
B, B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-X are exchangeable certificates. These
classes can be exchanged for combinations of exchange certificates
as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, and A-11 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from the senior support certificates (Classes A-3, A-4,
and A-12) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 5.10 % of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 3.60%, 2.25%,
1.15%, 0.8%, and 0.50% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien fixed-rate prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 562 loans with a total principal
balance of $542,397,085 as of the Cut-Off Date (December 1, 2020).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years and a
weighted-average loan age of two months. Approximately 1.9% of the
pool are conforming, high-balance mortgage loans that were
underwritten using an automated underwriting system designated by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and were eligible for purchase by such
agencies. The remaining 98.1% of the pool are traditional,
nonagency, prime jumbo mortgage loans. Details on the underwriting
of conforming loans can be found in the Key Probability of Default
Drivers section.

The originators for the mortgage pool are CrossCountry Mortgage LLC
( 47.1%), Movement Mortgage, LLC ( 19.0%), and various other
originators, each comprising less than 15.0% of the mortgage loans.
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company is the Sponsor and the Mortgage Loan
Seller of the transaction. For certain originators, the related
loans were sold to MAXEX Clearing LLC ( 6.4%) and were subsequently
acquired by the Mortgage Loan Seller.

NewRez LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, will
service the mortgage loans within the pool. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
( rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as
the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator, and Custodian. U.S.
Bank Trust National Association will serve as Delaware Trustee.
Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will serve as the representations and
warranties (R&W) File Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a precrisis structure.

GSMBS 2020-PJ6 is the first prime residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) transaction issued from the GSMBS shelf PJ series
where the coupon rates for certain floating-rate and inverse
floating-rate certificates are based on the Secured Overnight
Financing Rate. Prior to this deal, GSMBS PJ certificate coupons
were either fixed-capped, LIBOR-based floating-rate, or Net WAC.

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may arise in the coming
months for many RMBS asset classes, some meaningfully.

The prime mortgage sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that
consists of securitizations backed by pools of residential home
loans originated to borrowers with prime credit. Generally, these
borrowers have decent FICO scores, reasonable equity, and robust
income and liquid reserves.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, DBRS Morningstar expects
increased delinquencies and loans on forbearance plans, slower
voluntary prepayment rates, and a potential near-term decline in
the values of the mortgaged properties. Such deteriorations may
adversely affect borrowers' ability to make monthly payments,
refinance their loans, or sell properties in an amount sufficient
to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update,"
published on December 2, 2020), for the prime asset class, DBRS
Morningstar assumes a combination of higher unemployment rates and
more conservative home price assumptions than what DBRS Morningstar
previously used. Such assumptions translate to higher expected
losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit
enhancement.

In the prime asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
pandemic may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that this sector should have low
intrinsic credit risk. Within the prime asset class, loans
originated to (1) self-employed borrowers or (2) higher
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to
more volatile income sources, which could lead to reduced cash
flows generated from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with
lower equity in their properties, generally have fewer refinance
opportunities and therefore slower prepayments. In addition,
certain pools with elevated geographic concentrations in densely
populated urban metropolitan statistical areas may experience
additional stress from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown
of the economy.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality credit attributes, well-qualified borrowers,
satisfactory third-party due-diligence review, structural
enhancements, and 100% current loans.

The ratings reflect transactional weaknesses that include their R&W
framework, borrowers on forbearance plans, entities lacking
financial strength or securitization history, servicer's financial
capability, and no operational risk review on certain large
originators.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ6: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. B5 Certs B(EXP)sf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust
2020-PJ6.

RATING ACTIONS

GSMBS 2020-PJ6

Class A1; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A10; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A11; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A11X; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A12; LT AA+(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A2; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A3; LT AA+(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A4; LT AA+(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A5; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A6; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A7; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A8; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A9; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A9X; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AIOS; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AR; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AX1; LT AA+(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AX2; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AX3; LT AA+(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AX4; LT AA+(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AX5; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class AX7; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B; LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B1; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B1A; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B1X; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B2; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B2A; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B2X; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B3; LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating


Class B3A; LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B3X; LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B4; LT BB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B5; LT B(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B6; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class BX; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is expected to close on Dec. 29, 2020. The
certificates are supported by 562 conforming and nonconforming
loans with a total balance of approximately $542.4 million as of
the cutoff date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists
primarily of 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) fully amortizing
loans seasoned approximately four months in aggregate. The
borrowers in this pool have strong credit profiles (773 model FICO)
and relatively low leverage (a 75.8% sustainable loan-to-value
ratio [sLTV]). The 100% full documentation collateral is mostly
nonconforming prime-jumbo loans (98%), with a small mix of
conforming agency eligible loans (2%), while 100% of the loans are
Safe Harbor QM. The pool consists of 98% of loans where the
borrower maintains a primary residence, while 2% are second homes.
Additionally, over 90% of the loans were originated through a
retail channel.

Shifting-Interest Deal Structure (Mixed): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure whereby the subordinate classes receive
only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. While there is
only minimal leakage to the subordinate bonds early in the life of
the transaction, the structure is more vulnerable to defaults
occurring at a later stage compared to a sequential or modified
sequential structure.

To help mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and
fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 1.0% of the
original balance will be maintained for the senior certificates,
and a subordination floor of 0.7% of the original balance will be
maintained for the subordinate certificates.

Shellpoint Servicing will provide full advancing for the life of
the transaction. While this helps the liquidity of the structure,
it also increases the expected loss due to unpaid servicer
advances.

Prior Delinquencies (Negative): 1.9% of the loans have had
delinquencies over the last 12 months; however, all loans are
current and none are in forbearance. The servicer/issuer provided
prior delinquency details on all loans with a prior delinquency,
including whether the loans were a credit-related delinquency, or
delinquency related to a coronavirus-hardship. Only credit-related
delinquencies were treated as dirty current in Fitch's analysis,
and they were treated with a higher probability of default (PD).
These prior delinquencies resulted in an increased 'AAAsf' rating
category loss of 30 bps.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is well controlled
for in this transaction. Goldman Sachs is assessed as an 'Above
Average' aggregator by Fitch due to its robust sourcing strategy
and seller oversight, experienced senior management and staff and
strong risk management and corporate governance controls. Primary
servicing responsibilities are performed by Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (Shellpoint), rated 'RPS2-' by Fitch.

Representation Framework (Negative): The loan-level representation,
warranty and enforcement (RW&E) framework is consistent with Tier 2
quality. Fitch increased its loss expectations by 34 bps at the
'AAAsf' rating category as a result of the Tier 2 framework and the
underlying sellers supporting the repurchase obligations of the
RW&E providers.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party due
diligence was performed on 100% of the loans in the transaction.
Due diligence was performed by AMC, Opus, Digital Risk,
Consolidated Analytics and Clayton, which Fitch assesses as
'Acceptable - Tier 1', 'Acceptable - Tier 2', 'Acceptable - Tier
2', 'Acceptable - Tier 3', 'Acceptable - Tier 1' and 'Acceptable -
Tier 2', respectively. The review scope is consistent with Fitch
criteria, and the results are generally similar to prior prime RMBS
transactions. Credit exceptions were supported by strong mitigating
factors, and compliance exceptions were primarily cured with
subsequent documentation. Fitch applied a credit for the high
percentage of loan-level due diligence, which reduced the 'AAAsf'
loss expectation by 21 bps.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are only
an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to, or
that may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool, and lower
MVDs illustrated by a gain in home prices.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national level, or
positive home price growth with no assumed overvaluation. The
analysis assumes positive home price growth of 10%. Excluding the
senior class, which is already 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates
there is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a
full category upgrade for the rated class excluding those assigned
'AAAsf' ratings.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30% in addition to the
model-projected 4.4%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated classes,
compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10% additional
decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by one full
category.

Fitch has added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that includes a
prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer demand and
a protracted period of below-trend economic activity that delays
any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this severe scenario,
Fitch expects the ratings to be affected by changes in its
sustainable home price model due to updates to the model's
underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term effects arising from
coronavirus-related disruptions on these economic inputs will
likely affect both investment and speculative-grade ratings.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch did not review Movement Mortgage, LLC (19%) prior to
assigning expected ratings. Per criteria, Fitch expects to have an
outstanding operational assessment on originators contributing over
15% of an RMBS transaction pool. Fitch has not conducted a full
review of Movement Mortgage, and one is expected to be scheduled in
the near future. Movement Mortgage provided data and material
related to their origination process, as well as underwriting
guidelines. Ultimately, Fitch is relying on Goldman Sachs' review
framework as Goldman Sachs is assessed as an 'Above Average'
aggregator by Fitch for its robust loan sourcing strategy and
strong internal risk management framework. The aggregator also
manages an internal due diligence team that reviews acquired loans
in addition to leveraging independent TPR firms. In addition to
strong aggregation processes by Goldman Sachs, 100% of the
transaction pool received loan level due diligence from independent
TPR firms that are assessed by Fitch.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form "ABS Due Diligence 15E" was reviewed and used as part of the
rating for this transaction.

Third-party due diligence was performed on 100% of the loans in the
transaction. Due diligence was performed by AMC, Opus, Digital
Risk, Consolidated Analytics and Clayton, which Fitch assesses as
'Acceptable - Tier 1', 'Acceptable - Tier 2', 'Acceptable - Tier
2', 'Acceptable - Tier 3', 'Acceptable - Tier 1' and 'Acceptable -
Tier 2', respectively. The review scope is consistent with Fitch
criteria, and the results are generally similar to prior prime RMBS
transactions. Credit exceptions were supported by strong mitigating
factors, and compliance exceptions were primarily cured with
subsequent documentation.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied in its analysis on an independent third-party due
diligence review performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due
diligence was consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
Clayton, SitusAMC, Opus, Digital Risk and Consolidate Analytics
were engaged to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this
engagement were given compliance, credit and valuation grades and
assigned initial grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions
and waivers were noted in the due diligence reports. Refer to the
Third-Party Due Diligence section of this report for further
details.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5-designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others, to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by clicking the link to the Appendix. The appendix also contains a
comparison of these RW&Es to those Fitch considers typical for the
asset class as detailed in the Special Report titled
'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global
Structured Finance Transactions'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


GSAMP TRUST 2006-FM1: Moody's Downgrades Cl. A-1 Debt to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of Class A-1 issued
by GSAMP Trust 2006-FM1, backed by subprime mortgages loans.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-FM1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2019
Upgraded to B3 (sf)
losses.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects an adjustment to its cash flow analysis
based on the trustee's updated interpretation of the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement (PSA) for the transaction. Moody's had
originally modeled this transaction to reflect its interpretation
that the PSA calls for pro rata allocation of aggregate principal
distributions among all Class A certificates based upon each of
their principal balances. In January 2019, however, Moody's
upgraded the rating of this tranche because trustee Deutsche Bank
was allocating payment to the Class A certificates based on the
Class A Principal Allocation Percentage.

Since the September 2020 distributions, the trustee has begun
adjusting the Class A principal allocations and balances, noting
that it is now implementing a pro rata principal distribution to
the Class A certificates.[1] Moody's has thus updated its cash flow
analysis to reflect the updated distributions, and the downgrade
action reflects this change.

The rating action also reflects the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. In light
of the current macroeconomic environment, Moody's revised loss
expectations based on the extent of performance deterioration of
the underlying mortgage loans, resulting from a slowdown in
economic activity and increased unemployment due to the coronavirus
outbreak. Specifically, Moody's has observed an increase in
delinquencies, payment forbearance, and payment deferrals since the
start of pandemic, which could result in higher realized losses.

Its analysis considers the current proportion of loans granted
payment relief in each individual transaction. Moody's identified
these loans based on a review of loan level cashflows over the last
few months. Based on its analysis, the proportion of borrowers that
are currently enrolled in payment relief plans varied greatly,
ranging between approximately 2% and 19% among RMBS transactions
issued before 2009. In its analysis, Moody's assumes these loans to
experience lifetime default rates that are 50% higher than default
rates on the performing loans.

In addition, for borrowers unable to make up missed payments
through a short-term repayment plan, servicers will generally defer
the forborne amount as a non-interest-bearing balance, due at
maturity of the loan as a balloon payment. Its analysis considered
the impact of six months of scheduled principal payments on the
loans enrolled in payment relief programs being passed to the trust
as a loss. The magnitude of this loss will depend on the proportion
of the borrowers in the pool subject to principal deferral and the
number of months of such deferral. The treatment of deferred
principal as a loss is credit negative, which could incur
write-downs on bonds when missed payments are deferred.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


HOME PARTNERS 2020-2: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Single-Family
Rental Pass-Through Certificates (the Certificates) issued by Home
Partners of America 2020-2 Trust (HPA 2020-2 or the Issuer):

-- $108.3 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $31.3 million Class B at AA (sf)
-- $12.1 million Class C at A (sf)
-- $22.8 million Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- $10.7 million Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $27.6 million Class F at BB (low) (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating reflects 54.04% of credit enhancement provided
by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (high)
(sf), BBB (low) (sf), and BB (low) (sf) ratings reflect 40.73%,
35.59%, 25.92%, 21.38%, and 9.68% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The HPA 2020-2 Certificates are supported by the income streams and
values from 838 rental properties. The properties are distributed
across 18 states and 38 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in
the United States. DBRS Morningstar maps an MSA based on the ZIP
code provided in the data tape, which may result in different MSA
stratifications than those provided in offering documents. As
measured by value, 49.7% of the portfolio is concentrated in three
states: Colorado (23.9%), Washington (14.3%), and Minnesota
(11.6%). The average purchase price per property is $338,277, and
the average value is $339,962. The average age of the properties is
roughly 27 years. The majority of the properties have three or more
bedrooms. The Certificates represent a beneficial ownership in an
eight-year, fixed-rate, interest-only loan with an initial
aggregate principal balance of approximately $235.5 million.

As in typical single-borrower, single-family rental transactions,
the waterfall has straight sequential payments with reverse
sequential losses.

DBRS Morningstar estimated the base-case net cash flow (NCF) by
evaluating the gross rent, concession, vacancy, operating expenses,
and capital expenditure data. DBRS Morningstar's base-case
underwriting yielded an aggregate annualized NCF of approximately
$8.9 million. Based on DBRS Morningstar's NCF assumptions outlined
in the presale report, the DBRS Morningstar NCF analysis resulted
in a minimum debt service coverage ratio of greater than 1.0x.

Vacancy data in the single-family rental space is relatively
limited. In general, based on performance data in existing
securitizations as well as information gathered in annual
property-manager reviews, vacancy is considered low in the
single-family rental market. However, because of the lease
expiration profile, DBRS Morningstar applied a base vacancy rate of
9%, an additional base vacancy adjustment related to the impact of
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, plus a qualitative
adjustment that brought the vacancy rate to 12.5% of the gross
income, which is more conservative than the underwritten economic
vacancy rate of 4.1% of the Issuer's gross income. As noted in DBRS
Morningstar's monthly Single-Family Rental Performance summary
(under the Research tab at www.dbrsmorningstar.com), the vacancy
rate across issuers is heavily influenced by the number of lease
expirations in each month. Generally, the more leases expiring in a
given month, the higher the vacancy rate will be. With 70.2% of the
properties by count expiring from July 2021 to September 2021, DBRS
Morningstar expects vacancy levels to increase around this
three-month period.

Additionally, DBRS Morningstar applied a stress to the broker price
opinions (BPOs) because, in general, a valuation based on a BPO may
be less comprehensive than a valuation based on a full appraisal.
Independent Settlement Services (ISS) provided full appraisals for
60 properties in the pool, and DBRS Morningstar adjusted its
valuation stresses to account for full appraisals. In addition to
the BPO stress mentioned above, DBRS Morningstar recently adjusted
that stress upward because of the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic.

The transaction allows for discretionary substitutions of up to
5.0% of the number of properties as of the closing date, as long as
certain restrictions are met.

The Sponsor intends to satisfy its risk retention obligations under
the U.S. Risk Retention Rules by holding the Class G Certificates,
either directly or through a majority-owned affiliate.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: Moody's Upgrades Class E Certs to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-CIBC10 as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2019 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2019 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X-1*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2019 Affirmed C
(sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class, Cl. E, was upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 1.7% since Moody's last review
and 98.9% since securitization.

The rating on the one P&I class was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 0.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.7% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities"
published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 10, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by almost 99% to $22.1
million from $1.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 27.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting over 97.0% of the pool. Three loans,
constituting 14.3% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 7 at Moody's last review.

As of the November 2020 remittance report, loans representing 98.0%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments.

Two loans, constituting 26.2% of the pool, that currently are on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $150.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 42%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's makes various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjusts the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between its sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also uses an adjusted loan balance that reflects
each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this
publication reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in
the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results, and partial year
2020 operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 28.0%, compared to 60.0% at the last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
27.3% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.15X and 3.60X,
respectively, compared to 1.16X and 2.17X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 67.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Universal Technical Institute Loan ($6.0
million -- 27.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 282,000 square
feet (SF) warehouse/distribution building located in Avondale,
Arizona, which is approximately 14 miles east of downtown Phoenix.
As of December 2020, the property was 100% leased to Universal
Technical Institute of Arizona, with a lease expiration date in
July 2024. The loan is fully amortizing, has amortized 68% since
securitization and matures in December 2024. Due to the single
tenancy, Moody's analysis incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 25% and 3.83X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Foss Manufacturing Loan ($5.3
million -- 24.3% of the pool), which is secured by three buildings
(industrial, mixed use, and office) that total 528,000 SF. The
properties are located in Hampton, New Hampshire. As of December
2020, the properties were fully leased to Foss Performance
Materials, with a lease expiration in August 2035. The loan is
fully amortizing, has amortized 68% since securitization and
matures in July 2024. Due to the single tenancy, Moody's analysis
incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
28% and 3.53X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Southern View Apartments Loan ($3.5
million -- 16.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 26 building,
300-unit garden-style apartment complex located in Fayetteville,
Arkansas. As of June 2020, the property was 100% occupied. The loan
is fully amortizing, has amortized 69% since securitization and
matures in October 2024. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 27% and
3.59X, respectively.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on 14 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2006-CIBC15.

RATING ACTIONS

J. P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
2006-CIBC15

Class A-J 46627QBD9; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class A-M 46627QBC1; LT CCCsf Affirmed; previously CCCsf

Class B 46627QBG2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class C 46627QBH0; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class D 46627QBJ6; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class E 46627QAA6; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class F 46627QAC2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class G 46627QAE8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class H 46627QAG3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class J 46627QAJ7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class K 46627QAL2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class L 46627QAN8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class M 46627QAQ1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class N 46627QAS7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class P 46627QAU2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pool Concentration and Adverse Selection: Eight loans/assets
remain. The affirmation of class A-M reflects the high
concentration of REO assets (five assets; 68.9% of pool) and the
binary risk associated with the three performing loans, which are
all secured by single-tenanted properties. Loss expectations on the
REO assets have increased since Fitch's last rating action. Per the
servicer, none of the REO assets are currently being marketed for
sale. The three single tenant properties are all currently occupied
by non-credit worthy tenants.

The largest REO asset in the pool, FPG Portfolio I (32.7%), was
previously bifurcated into a $16.0 million A-note and an $8.3
million hope note. Three industrial warehouse/distribution
properties remain out of the original 12 industrial/office
properties; the remaining properties are located in South Carolina,
North Carolina, and Texas. These assets became REO in June 2016.
The largest property, 130 Commerce, is vacant; the second property,
880 Technology Drive, is 100% leased to FedEx Group through October
2024; and the third property, 2000-2020 Westridge Drive, was 46%
occupied. A significant loss was modeled on the A-note and a full
loss was modeled on the B-note.

The Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc. loan (19% of pool), which is
secured by a 1,010,859-sf industrial property
(warehouse/distribution) located in Dillon, SC, is fully leased to
Harbor Freight Tools USA through March 2039, which is after the
loan's maturity date in February 2022.

The 70 Jewett City Road loan (9%), which is secured by a 638,000-sf
industrial property (warehouse/distribution) located in Norwich,
CT, is fully leased to Bob's Discount Furniture through September
2027, which is after the loan's maturity date in June 2026.

The Eckerd - Voorhees loan (2%), which is secured by a 13,813-sf
single-tenant retail property located in Voorhees, NJ, is fully
leased to Rite Aid through January 2026, which is after the loan's
maturity date in November 2025. Rite Aid subleases the space in its
entirety to Cheers Wine & Spirits.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement increased since
Fitch's prior rating action from one loan payoff, two REO
liquidations and continued scheduled amortization. As of the
November 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has
been reduced by 96.5% to $74.2 million from $2.12 billion at
issuance. There has been $364.6 million (17.2% of original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Interest shortfalls are
currently impacting class A-J and classes E through the non-rated
class and total $33 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

An upgrade to class A-M is unlikely due to the significant
concentration, adverse selection and binary risks associated with
the remaining pool. Classes A-J through P will remain at 'Dsf' due
to these classes already realizing losses.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

A downgrade to class A-M would occur should performance on the
performing loans decline significantly or with a greater certainty
of loss.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Downgrades Class A-MS Certs to CCCsf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 22 already distressed
classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2006-LDP9.
The downgrade is to correct an error initially made during a rating
action on Feb. 14, 2019 as well as a significantly higher modeled
loss for the Discover Mills loan.

At the 2019 action as well as subsequent actions, the analysis
relied upon the paydown for the largest loan (131 S. Dearborn)
paying off the class A-MS, which was a misinterpretation of the
deal structure. The proceeds from the Discover Mills loan, not 131
S. Dearborn, was the loan with principal payments allocated to this
class. 131 S. Dearborn repaid in November 2020 and the proceeds
from that repayment went to classes A-J, which was rated 'Dsf' due
to a prior loss. A full loss was realized on the 131 S. Dearborn
B-Note, which had a balance of $36 million and was applied to class
A-JS, also rated 'Dsf'.

RATING ACTIONS

J. P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2006-LDP9

Class A-J 46629PAF5; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class A-JS 46629PAR9; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class A-MS 46629PAQ1; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at Asf

Class B 46629PAG3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class B-S 46629PAS7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class C 46629PAH1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class C-S 46629PAT5; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class D 46629PAJ7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class D-S 46629PAU2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class E 46630AAA6; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class E-S 46630AAC2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class F 46630AAE8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class F-S 46630AAG3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class G 46630AAJ7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class G-S 46630AAL2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class H 46630AAN8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class H-S 46630AAQ1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class J 46630AAS7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class K 46630AAU2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class L 46630AAW8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class M 46630AAY4; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class N 46630ABA5; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class P 46630ABC1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentrated Pool; High Loss Expectations: Repayment of the A-MS
class is reliant on the largest loan, Discover Mills (94% of the
pool), which has been designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC).
The collateral is a 1.2 million sf superregional mall located in
the greater Atlanta area constructed in 2001 and renovated in 2006.
Occupancy has declined slightly to 85% as of June 2020 from 87% at
YE 2019 and NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) has declined to
2.85x compared to 2.90x at YE 2019. The loan, which is sponsored by
Simon Property Group and Farallon Capital, is current but has been
delinquent three times in the past 12 months and the loan has
already been modified three times, most recently in December 2018,
with an extension of the maturity date to December 2021. Fitch
expects the loan would have difficulty refinancing at maturity and
considers a loss likely.

Decreased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) has decreased
significantly since the last rating action primarily due to the
disposition of 131 South Dearborn B note. The deal has been reduced
98.00% since issuance to $97.9 million from $4.85 billion at
issuance, realized losses total 15.7%. All of the remaining loans
are scheduled to mature in 2021.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

An upgrade to class A-MS is not likely as the remaining five loans
all mature at the end of 2021. Upgrades to the 'Dsf' rated classes
are not possible as these classes have previously incurred
principal losses.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming loans. A downgrade to class
A-MS would occur if losses are incurred.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


JP MORGAN 2011-C3: DBRS Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded five classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C3 issued by JP Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C3 as follows:

-- Class E to BBB (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class F to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G to B (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class H to CCC (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class J to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes as
follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed Classes C, D, E, F, G,
H, and J from Under Review with Negative Implications, where it
placed them on August 6, 2020. The trends on Classes E, F, and G
are Negative. Classes H and J have ratings that do not carry
trends. All other trends remain Stable.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends reflect DBRS
Morningstar's concerns with the ongoing performance challenges for
the underlying collateral, particularly the largest loans in
special servicing, much of which has been affected by the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. In addition to
loans representing 51.0% of the pool being in special servicing as
of the November 2020 remittance, the pool has a high concentration
of retail and hospitality properties, representing 56.1% and 4.1%
of the pool balance, respectively. These property types have been
the most severely affected by the initial impact of the coronavirus
pandemic and, as such, those concentrations suggest slightly
increased risks for the pool.

The transaction is concentrated by property type as four loans,
representing 56.1% of the current trust balance, are secured by
retail assets, whereas two loans, representing 36.1% of the current
trust balance, are secured by office assets. Lodging collateral
makes up the third-largest concentration, representing one loan and
4.1% of the current trust balance.

According to the November 2020 remittance, there are two loans,
representing 51.0% of the current trust balance, in special
servicing. Both loans are secured by regional mall assets: Holyoke
Mall (Prospectus ID#1; 39.3% of the current trust balance) and
Sangertown Square (Prospectus ID#6; 11.5% of the current trust
balance). Both properties are owned and operated by affiliates of
the Pyramid Companies. According to the servicer's commentary, both
loans have reached successful modification agreements. The general
terms of the modification include: deferral of debt service
payments for four months commencing in May 2020, converting the
loans to interest-only (IO) payments for six months commencing
September through the end of February 2021, all deferred amounts of
debt service to be repaid over a 12-month period commencing January
2021, and a three-year loan extension.

Holyoke Mall is secured by a 1.56 million-sf regional mall in
Holyoke, Massachusetts, and was transferred to the special servicer
in May 2020 given the ongoing effects of the coronavirus pandemic.
The loan is more than 90 days delinquent according to the November
2020 remittance report. The property reported a June 2020 occupancy
rate of 77.1%, in line with the YE2019 and YE2018 occupancy rates
of 74.5% and 73.5%, respectively. The largest collateral tenants
include JCPenney (expires October 2025), Target (expires January
2025), Burlington Coat Factory (expires February 2022), Forever 21,
Best Buy, and Hobby Lobby (all expire February 2023). Before the
coronavirus pandemic, the net cash flow (NCF) has dropped each year
since 2014, and in November 2018, the Sears closed as part of the
retailer's bankruptcy filing. The subject reported a YE2019 and
YE2018 NCF debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12 times (x) and
1.26x, respectively. In addition to the declining cash flows in
recent years, there are additional challenges surrounding the
redevelopment of Sears' previous space and the potential risk of
JCPenney vacating prior to lease expiry. There has been no updated
appraisal to date, but the as-is value has likely declined
significantly from the issuance figure of $400.0 million. Given
these increased risks from issuance, the loan's delinquency status,
concerns with existing tenants such as JCPenney, DBRS Morningstar
liquidated the loan in the analysis for this review, with an
implied loss severity of 18.7%.

Sangertown Square is secured by a 894,127-sf regional mall in New
Hartford, New York, and was also transferred to the special
servicer in May 2020 given the ongoing effects of the coronavirus
pandemic. The loan is more than 90 days delinquent according to the
November 2020 remittance report. The property reported a June 2020
occupancy rate of 93.47%, in line with the YE2019 and YE2018
occupancy rates of 95.48% and 94.43%, respectively. The largest
collateral tenants include Macy's (expires January 2021), Target
(expires January 2023), and Boscov's (expires January 2037), which
took over Sears' space in October 2016. JCPenney closed its store
in October 2020, three years prior to its October 2023 lease
expiration as part of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. The October
departure of JCPenney's reduced occupancy to roughly 76%. Before
the coronavirus pandemic, the property had maintained strong
occupancy but the DSCR has remained near breakeven. The subject
reported a YE2019 and YE2018 NCF DSCR of 1.09x and 1.09x,
respectively. With JCPenney vacating prior to lease expiry, there
are additional challenges surrounding the redevelopment of
JCPenney's previous space and the potential risk of Macy's vacating
at lease expiry. There has been no updated appraisal to date, but
the as-is value has likely declined significantly from the issuance
figure of $107.0 million. Given these increased risks from
issuance, the loan's delinquency status, concerns with existing
tenants such as Macy's, DBRS Morningstar liquidated the loan in the
analysis for this review, with an implied loss severity of 19.7%.

As of the November 2020 remittance, only eight of the original 45
loans remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of
69.2% since issuance. One loan, representing 3.8% of the current
pool balance, is fully defeased. Additionally, there are four
loans, representing 33.8% of the current trust balance, on the
servicer's watchlist. The servicer is monitoring these loans for a
variety of reasons, including low DSCR, occupancy, and deferred
maintenance issues; however, the primary reason for many of the
more recent transfers is for hospitality properties with a low DSCR
stemming from disruptions related to the coronavirus pandemic.
Based on the November 2020 remittance, the pool reported a
weighted-average DSCR of 0.95x, compared with the issuer's issuance
DSCR of 1.63x.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2011-C4: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class H Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C4 issued by JP Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C4 as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (sf)

DBRS Morningstar changed the trend on Class H to Negative from
Stable. This trend change is reflective of the increased risk to
the lowest-rated class because the largest loan in the pool has
been transferred to special servicing, as detailed below. The trend
on all other classes is Stable. In addition, DBRS Morningstar
removed the Interest in Arrears designation from Classes F, G, and
H.

In general, the pool has performed as expected at issuance, despite
the high concentration of loans secured by retail properties
(73.6%) in the remaining pool as of the November 2020 remittance.
Thirteen of the original 42 loans remain in the pool, representing
a collateral reduction of 76.9% since issuance. Two loans,
representing 1.8% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased.
Based on the YE2019 financials, the pool reported a
weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.26 times
(x), compared with the issuer's DSCR of 1.60x.

One loan is in special servicing: The Newport Centre loan
(Prospectus ID#1, representing 51.0% of the pool) is secured by a
regional mall in Jersey City, New Jersey. The collateral for the
loan is a 782,000 square foot (sf) portion of the 1.15 million sf
regional mall, owned by a joint venture between Melvin Simon &
Associates and the LeFrak family, who also developed the Newport
Master Planned Community where the property is located. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in July 2020 when a
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) relief request was made by the
borrower. A loan modification was granted in September 2020 that
allowed for the deferral of principal, replacement, and Tenant
Improvement/Leasing Commission reserve payments from May 2020
through to July 2020. Repayment of the deferred amounts is to be
made between August 2020 and the loan's maturity date in May 2021.

Prior to the transfer to special servicing, performance had been
quite stable, with the trailing twelve months as of March 2020 DSCR
of 2.03x, in line with the YE2019 and YE2018 DSCRs of 2.08x and
2.05x, respectively. Although the strong DSCR figures are
encouraging, DBRS Morningstar does note risks in the anchor mix,
which includes Macy's (23.6% of total net rentable area (NRA),
expiring January 2028), Sears (19.8% of total NRA, expiring October
2027 and which is subject to a ground lease), JCPenney (18.5% of
total NRA, expiring January 2050), Kohl's (14.9% of total NRA,
expiring January 2028), and an 11-screen AMC Theatres (4.9% of
total NRA, expiring January 2026). All of these tenants have
reported difficulties both before and during the pandemic,
including JCPenney's bankruptcy filing and Macy's announcement that
125 stores would be closed in the next few years. The loan remains
current and the borrower appears to be proactively working with the
servicer to resolve the pandemic-driven issues, but the factors
outlined above suggest there are increased risks for this loan from
issuance and, as such, DBRS Morningstar applied an increased
probability of default penalty to increase the expected loss in the
analysis for this review.

According to the November 2020 remittance, two loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 6.9% of the current pool
balance. Cooper Tire (Prospectus ID#18, 4.2% of the pool) is being
monitored for the single tenant's nonrenewal and Enterprise Place
(Prospectus ID#26, 2.8% of the pool) is being monitored for
persistent occupancy issues and a low DSCR. In both cases, DBRS
Morningstar applied a probability of default penalty to increase
the expected loss in the analysis for this review.

Class X-A is interest-only (IO) certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2011-C5: DBRS Cuts Class F Certs Rating to B(low)
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings on three classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C5 issued by JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C5 as
follows:

-- Class D to BB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to B (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class F to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the ratings on the
remaining classes as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at CCC (sf)

The trends on Classes D, E, F, and X-B are Negative while Class G
does not carry a trend. All other trends are Stable. DBRS
Morningstar also removed the ratings on Classes D, E, F, G, and X-B
from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were
placed on August 6, 2020.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends reflect DBRS
Morningstar's concerns about the ongoing performance challenges
facing the underlying collateral caused by the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) global pandemic, particularly the largest loans in
special servicing. In addition to the loans in special servicing as
of the November 2020 remittance, representing 24.0% of the pool
balance, DBRS Morningstar also notes the pool's concentration in
retail and hospitality properties, representing 53.4% and 34.8% of
the pool balance, respectively. Because the coronavirus pandemic
has affected both property types most severely, these
concentrations indicate increased risks for the pool.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 14 of the original 44 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 63.9%
since issuance. Two loans, representing 24.0% of the pool balance,
are in special servicing, both of which are in the top 10. The
largest specially serviced loan, Asheville Mall (Prospectus ID#3;
16.7% of the pool balance), is secured by a regional mall in
Asheville, North Carolina. CBL Properties (CBL) owns the property,
which is the only regional mall within a 60-mile radius of
Asheville; the property's main competition stems from two power
centers and a lifestyle center. The loan transferred to special
servicing at CBL's request, citing coronavirus-driven performance
declines as the reason for the requested relief. The loan is more
than 60 days delinquent with the November 2020 remittance report,
but the servicer reports that discussions with CBL are ongoing.

The subject property reported a March 2020 occupancy rate of 96.3%,
in line with the YE2019 and YE2018 occupancy rates of 96.0% and
97.0%, respectively. At issuance, the mall was anchored by
non-collateral tenants in Belk, Dillard's, Sears, and JCPenney;
however, Sears vacated in 2018. The largest collateral tenants
include Barnes & Noble, Old Navy, and Gap. Prior to the coronavirus
pandemic, the subject reported YE2019 and YE2018 debt service
coverage ratios (DSCR) of 1.30 times (x) and 1.52x, respectively.
In addition to the declining cash flows in recent years, there are
additional challenges surrounding the redevelopment of Sears'
previous space and the sponsor's recent filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. DBRS Morningstar has not received an updated
appraisal to date, but the property's as-is value has likely
declined significantly from the issuance figure of $123.0 million.
Given these increased risks since issuance, the loan's delinquency
status, and concerns with existing tenants such as JCPenney, the
loan was liquidated in DBRS Morningstar's analysis for this loan
with an implied loss severity exceeding 35.0%.

The second-largest specially serviced loan, LaSalle Select
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#9; 7.4% of the pool balance), was
originally secured by a portfolio of four suburban office buildings
in the Norcross/Peachtree Corners submarket northeast of Atlanta.
The loan transferred to special servicing in December 2017 for
imminent default and has been real estate owned since August 2018.
The special servicer liquidated one of the four properties in
August 2019. As of December 2019 appraisals, the combined value for
the remaining properties in the portfolio was $31.4 million, a
21.7% decline from the issuance appraised value of approximately
$40.1 million and below the trust exposure of approximately $27.3
million. In addition, DBRS Morningstar believes it is likely that
the properties' as-is values have declined since the 2019 appraisal
date, given the increased economic stress driven by the coronavirus
pandemic in 2020. Based on these factors, DBRS Morningstar assumed
a significant haircut to the 2019 appraisal values in its analysis
for this loan with a liquidation scenario implying a loss severity
exceeding 65.0%.

According to the November 2020 remittance, three loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 38.3% of the pool balance. The
largest loan in the pool, InterContinental Hotel Chicago
(Prospectus ID#1; 34.8% of the pool balance), has been on and off
the watchlist several times since issuance because of cash flow
declines and an in-place DSCR of less than 1.20x. Most recently,
the loan reported a YE2019 DSCR of 1.17x and a trailing 12-month
period ended June 30, 2020, DSCR of -0.12x. The servicer also
reported that the borrower submitted, but later withdrew, a
coronavirus relief request. Given the increased risks since
issuance and cash flows that were below issuance expectations for
much of the loan's life—a situation that the pandemic's effects
have severely exacerbated—DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan
with a liquidation scenario that assumed a significant haircut to
the issuance value, resulting in a loss severity exceeding 18.0%.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its North American CMBS
Insight Model when determining the ratings assigned to Classes C
and D as the quantitative results suggested a higher rating on
Class C and a lower rating on Class D. The material deviations are
warranted given the uncertain loan-level event risk with the loans
in special servicing and on the servicer's watchlist, in addition
to the increased concentration of the pool in terms of the number
of loans remaining.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2013-C16: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C16, issued by JP Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C16 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes E, X-C, and F were removed from Under Review with Negative
Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. The rating
confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction since issuance. At issuance, the transaction consisted
of 60 fixed-rate loans secured by 113 commercial and multifamily
properties with a trust balance of $1.1 billion. According to the
November 2020 remittance, 51 of the original 60 loans remain in the
pool, representing a collateral reduction of 28.8% since issuance.
The transaction is concentrated by property type as nine loans,
representing 31.9% of the current trust balance, are secured by
office properties while the second-largest concentration comprises
seven loans, representing 24.1% of the current trust balance, are
secured by multifamily collateral. The transaction benefits from
its low exposure to both retail and lodging properties, comprising
just 15.1% and 8.2% of the pool, respectively, and its significant
amount of defeased loans totaling 17.7% of the current pool. There
are three loans, representing 7.7% of the pool, in special
servicing and 12 loans, representing 35.0% of the pool on the
servicer's watchlist including the largest loan in the pool, The
Aire (Prospectus ID#1, 15.4% of pool). These loans are being
monitored for various reasons, including low debt service coverage
ratios (DSCR) or occupancy, tenant rollover risk, and/or
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic-related forbearance
requests.

The largest loan in special servicing, Hilton Richmond Hotel & Spa
(Prospectus ID#7, 4.9% of the pool), secured by a 254-room
full-service hotel in Richmond, Virginia, transferred to the
special servicer in April 2020 for imminent monetary default
shortly after the borrower notified the master servicer of an
anticipated drop in performance as a result of the coronavirus
pandemic. The property has historically benefited from its
proximity to several major corporate headquarters and its 21,700 sf
of meeting space but has been severely negatively affected by the
pandemic. The loan is over 121 days delinquent as of November 2020
and the special servicer's current course of action is to dual
track foreclosure or a loan modification with the borrower. An
updated appraisal has been ordered and is currently in process.
Given the risks surrounding the collateral property, this loan was
analyzed with an elevated probability of default for this review.

The Aire, secured by a luxury apartment on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan, has been monitored on the servicer's watchlist since
February 2017 because of a DSCR below 1.0 times (x). The property
has seen its real estate taxes steadily increase as a 10-year tax
abatement is gradually expiring resulting in the taxes increasing
20% every two years since 2014. This tax increase, in conjunction
with increases in other expense items such as repairs and
maintenance and payroll, has contributed to the loan's poor
performance. Revenue has increased 12% since issuance and the
property most recently reported an occupancy rate of 96% as of May
2020. Although the DSCR has remained below 1.0x since 2017, the
sponsor has kept the loan current with no missed payments reported
to-date. Because of the consistent performance struggles, DBRS
Morningstar analyzed this loan with an increased probability of
default for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C27: DBRS Cuts X-FG Debt Rating to B(low)
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited removed the Under Review with Negative Implications
statuses and downgraded the following ratings on the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C27 issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-C27:

-- Class E to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class X-FG to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class A-3A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trend of Class D to
Negative from Stable. The trends for Classes E, F, X-E, and X-FG
are Negative, while the trends for the 12 remaining Classes are
Stable. DBRS Morningstar notes its concerns with the second-largest
remaining loan in the pool, Branson at Fifth (Prospectus ID#3;
11.4% of the current trust balance), which has shown a steady
decline in performance since its transfer to the special servicer
in July 2019. Secured by a mixed-use property that contains 31
multifamily units and 14,881 square feet of retail space in Midtown
Manhattan, the loan was transferred to the special servicer when
the sponsor failed to remit $2.0 million into the rollover reserve
account given the termination of the lease of the sole retail
tenant, Domenico Vacca, without lender consent. Following
delinquent rent payments from the tenant in February 2019 and a
countersuit from the tenant claiming that the sponsor inflated
rents to obtain financing for the collateral, the tenant vacated
the property in mid-2019. According to the Asset Summary Report
from January 2020, the proposed loan modification terms included
the interest-only (IO) period for the loan to be extended until
maturity, the borrower to make a payment guaranty of $20.0 million
over five years, and the borrower to fund the rollover reserve
totalling $2.0 million. Per a recent servicer update from November
2020, the loan modification has yet to be finalized. The sponsor
for this loan is Assa Properties and Black Bear Asset Management,
and the chief executive officer of Assa Properties, Salim Assa, and
two other individuals serve as guarantors for the loan. DBRS
Morningstar liquidated the loan in its analysis for this review,
which resulted in a high expected loss scenario. DBRS Morningstar
also liquidated the other loan in special servicing, Hampton Inn &
Suites – Union Center (Prospectus ID#25; 1.6% of the current
trust balance), in its analysis given the lender's intent to pursue
foreclosure and receivership.

According to the November 2020 remittance, there are 13 loans,
representing 29.0% of the current trust balance, on the servicer's
watchlist, including four loans in the Top 15. Shaner Hotels
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#5; 5.1% of the current trust balance),
secured by four hotels across four different states, totalling 605
keys, was added to the servicer's watchlist in April 2020 given the
borrower's request for payment relief due to Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19). The portfolio reported year-to-date occupancy of 41.4%,
representing a significant decrease from the 2019 figure of 81.6%,
while revenue per available room declined to $67 from $151 for the
same period. DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with an inflated
probability of default (POD) factor to reflect the short-term
increased risk with this loan and generally increased POD factors
for loans on the watchlist.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 44 loans at an original
trust balance of $836.5 million. According to the November 2020
remittance, 37 loans remain in the transaction at a current trust
balance of $636.2 million. The transaction is concentrated by
property type as eight loans, representing 36.4% of the pool
balance, are secured by office collateral while the next largest
property concentration is lodging, represented by eight loans and
17.5% of the current trust balance. Thirteen loans, representing
52.2% of the current trust balance, have a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 5 or greater, and there is one loan, representing 1.1% of
the current pool balance, that is fully defeased.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, X-D, X-E, and X-FG are IO certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C28: DBRS Lowers Class X-F Debt Rating to Bsf
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded two classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C28 issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-C28 as follows:

-- Class X-F at B (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes as
follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

Classes D, E, F, X-D, X-E, and X-F were removed from Under Review
with Negative Implications, where they were placed on August 6,
2020. The trends for these classes are Negative. All other trends
are Stable. The Negative trends and rating downgrades reflect the
continued performance challenges for the underlying collateral,
much of which has been driven by the impacts of the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. In addition to loans
representing 12.3% of the pool in special servicing as of the
October 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes the pool has a
high concentration of retail and hospitality properties,
representing 49.3% and 13.5% of the pool balance, respectively.
These property types have been the most severely affected by the
initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and as such, those
concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the October 2020 remittance, 60 of the original 68 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 19.4%
since issuance. There are four loans, representing 12.3% of the
pool, in special servicing, including the second-largest loan, The
Shops at Waldorf Center, which is 30 to 59 days delinquent and is
secured by a 497,000-square-foot anchored retail property in
Waldorf, Maryland. The collateral property's occupancy rate has
fallen precipitously over the last few years but cash flows have
remained relatively healthy, with a YE2019 debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.59 times (x) reported by the servicer. The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2020 for imminent default
related to the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to the trust loan,
there is a $10 million mezzanine loan. Discussions regarding the
workout strategy between the special servicer, borrower, and the
mezzanine holder are ongoing. For more information on this loan,
please visit www.viewpoint.dbrsmorningstar.com. Given the
performance declines for the collateral property and uncertainty
surrounding the resolution of the outstanding defaults, DBRS
Morningstar analyzed this loan with an elevated probability of
default for this review.

The other three loans in special servicing are notably backed by
anchored retail, full-service hotel, and unanchored retail property
types. The second-largest loan in special servicing is the Horizon
Outlet Shoppes Portfolio (Prospectus ID#12, 2.9% of the pool), a
pari passu loan which transferred to special servicing in March
2020, prior to the onset of the pandemic. According to a March 2020
appraisal obtained by the special servicer, the collateral
portfolio of three outlet malls located in Wisconsin, Washington,
and Indiana was valued at $39.1 million, down from the issuance
value of $87.4 million and well below the total senior loan balance
of $51.5 million. As of the October 2020 remittance, the loan is
more than 121 days delinquent and a receiver was appointed at all
three properties by August 2020. The special servicer reports
discussions regarding a potential deed-in-lieu have been held, with
a foreclosure strategy also being dual-tracked. The collateral
properties are located in tertiary and rural markets, and the
servicer reported a YE2019 DSCR of 0.91x. Given the sharp value
decline from issuance and the likelihood that the trust will
eventually own the collateral properties, this loan was analyzed
with a liquidation scenario that implied a loss severity in excess
of 50.0%.

According to the October 2020 remittance, 10 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 13.4% of the current pool
balance. These loans are being monitored for various reasons
including low DSCR or occupancy, tenant rollover risk, and/or
pandemic-related forbearance requests. Four loans, representing
2.6% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased. Based on the
YE2019 financials, the pool reported a weighted-average DSCR of
2.34x, compared with the issuer's DSCR of 1.97x.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, X-D, X-E, and X-F are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


KAYNE CLO 9: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $11.25MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Kayne CLO 9 Ltd./Kayne
CLO 9 LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and over-collateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Kayne CLO 9 Ltd./Kayne CLO 9 LLC

  Class A-1, $279.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $9.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B-1, $49.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $5.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.75 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $27.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $11.25 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $44.00 million: Not rated


LENDMARK FUNDING 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the following classes of
securities issued by four Lendmark Funding Trust transactions as
follows:

-- Series 2018-1, Class A, at AA (sf)
-- Series 2018-1, Class B, at A (sf)
-- Series 2018-1, Class C, at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2018-1, Class D, at BB (sf)

-- Series 2018-2, Class A, at AA (sf)
-- Series 2018-2, Class B, at A (sf)
-- Series 2018-2, Class C, at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2018-2, Class D, at BB (sf)

-- Series 2019-1, Class A, at AA (sf)
-- Series 2019-1, Class B, at A (sf)
-- Series 2019-1, Class C, at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Series 2019-1, Class D, at BB (sf)

-- Series 2019-2, Class A, at AA (sf)
-- Series 2019-2, Class B, at A (sf)
-- Series 2019-2, Class C, at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Series 2019-2, Class D, at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update," published on December 2,
2020. DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios
on April 16, 2020, which have been regularly updated. The scenarios
were last updated on December 2, 2020, and are reflected in DBRS
Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary, with the moderate scenario serving as
the primary anchor for current ratings. The moderate scenario
factors in increasing success in containment during the first half
of 2021, enabling the continued relaxation of restrictions.

-- The level of hard credit enhancement in the form of
overcollateralization, subordination, and amounts held in the
reserve funds available in the transactions. Hard credit
enhancement and estimated excess spread are sufficient to support
the DBRS Morningstar current rating levels listed above.

-- The collateral performance to date and DBRS Morningstar's
assessment of future performance, including upward revisions to the
expected charge-off assumptions consistent with the expected
unemployment levels in the moderate scenario.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

Notes: The principal methodology is the DBRS Morningstar Master
U.S. ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


LSTAR COMMERCIAL 2016-4: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-4 issued by LSTAR Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-4 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar discontinued its rating on Class A-1 because it
was repaid in full.

Classes F and G were removed from Under Review with Negative
Implications, where they were placed on August 6, 2020. All trends
are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the generally stable performance
of the transaction since issuance; however, DBRS Morningstar
continues to monitor performance challenges for the underlying
collateral, much of which has been driven by the impact of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. This transaction
does benefit from a lower concentration of anchored and unanchored
retail properties, collectively representing 6.5% of the current
trust balance. The pool has a high concentration of hospitality
properties, however, representing 28.3% of the pool. These property
types have been the most severely affected by the initial effects
of the coronavirus pandemic and, as such, the high concentration is
of note. It is noteworthy that none of the five hotel loans in the
pool are on the servicer's watchlist for a coronavirus relief
request and none are in special servicing. In general, the
collateral hotels were performing well prior to the pandemic and
the loans benefit from generally low LTVs as based on the issuance
valuations. Also offsetting some of the increased risks to the pool
resulting from the coronavirus is the concentration of loans
secured by multifamily properties, representing 32.3% of the
current pool balance, which have continued to show overall stable
performance throughout the global pandemic.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 17 of the original 22 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 15.2%
since issuance. One loan, representing 3.0% of the current pool
balance, is fully defeased. Additionally, there are four loans,
representing 33.7% of the current trust balance. These loans are
being monitored for a low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and/or
occupancy issues primarily driven from disruptions related to the
coronavirus pandemic. There is only one loan in special servicing,
310 Superior Street (Prospectus ID#22), representing 1.2% of the
pool. This loan is secured by an unanchored retail property in
Chicago and was transferred to special servicing in October 2017
after the former largest tenant closed in January 2017. The loan
remained current through the stint in special servicing, until May
2020 when it was first flagged as delinquent. The November 2020
reporting showed the loan was 121-plus days delinquent and a new
value is pending. The loan was analyzed with a probability of
default (PoD) penalty to increase the expected loss in the analysis
for this review.

The largest loan in the pool, Charlotte Plaza (Prospectus ID#1,
11.7% of the pool), was analyzed also with an elevated PoD given
the ongoing occupancy issues for the underlying property, a
632,171-sf, Class A office building in downtown Charlotte, North
Carolina. The loan was initially added to the servicer's watchlist
in late 2017 because the largest tenant, Charlotte School of Law,
LLC (CSL), which previously occupied 39.5% of the NRA, was being
reviewed by the American Bar Association (ABA). The for-profit
school was placed on probation by the ABA in November 2016 and
ultimately lost its operating license.

The tenant vacated the property and ceased rental payments with
that development and according to the September 2020 rent roll, the
property was 81.4% occupied. The sponsor was able to back-fill most
of the CSL space in August 2019 with Lowe's Home Improvement, which
took roughly 31.8% of NRA on a lease through July 2024. This space
is serving as an interim office space while the tenant waits for a
permanent location to be completed. Other major tenants at the
property include Grant Thornton (8.8% of the NRA through December
2023) and Tryon Medical Partners (4.0% of NRA through February
2029). Given the concentration of lease rollover around the January
2023 loan maturity date, as well as the relatively low in-place
occupancy rate that will compound the challenge of leasing up space
in the current economy, the elevated PoD and resulting increased
expected loss were justified.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


METLIFE SECURITIZATION 2020-INV1: DBRS Finalizes BB on B-4 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2020-INV1 (the
Securities) issued by MetLife Securitization Trust 2020-INV1:

-- $273.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.5 million Class A-1-A at AAA (sf)
-- $273.5 million Class A-1-X at AAA (sf)
-- $255.5 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $255.5 million Class A-2-A at AAA (sf)
-- $255.5 million Class A-2-X at AAA (sf)
-- $166.1 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $166.1 million Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $166.1 million Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $89.4 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $89.4 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $89.4 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $18.0 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.0 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $18.0 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $8.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $5.9 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $6.3 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.5 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.7 million Class B-5 at B (low) (sf)

Classes A-1-X, A-2-X, A-3-X, A-4-X, and A-5-X are interest-only
notes. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-1-A, A-1-X, A-2, A-2-A, A-2-X, A-3, A-4, and A-5 are
exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations
of initial exchangeable notes as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-2, A-2-A, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, and A-4-A are super senior
notes. These classes benefit from additional protection from the
senior support notes (Classes A-5 and A-5-A) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Notes reflects 9.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes. The AA (sf), A (sf),
BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 6.25%, 4.30%,
2.20%, 1.05%, and 0.50% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien, fixed-rate
investment-property residential mortgages funded by the issuance of
the Securities. The Securities are backed by 994 loans with a total
principal balance of $300,568,294 as of the Cut-Off Date (November
1, 2020).

This securitization is Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's (MLIC)
first 100% prime investor transaction. Since 2017, MLIC has issued
three DBRS Morningstar-rated seasoned reperforming
securitizations.

The entire pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages
(FRMs) with original terms to maturity of 30 years. The loans were
made to investors primarily for business purposes; however, 26.4%
of the loans were subject to a cash-out refinancing and may have
been used by the borrower for personal use. Based on third party
due diligence designations, 90.7% of the pool was not subject to
the Qualified Mortgage (QM) and Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules
(together, the Rules). The rest of the pool (9.3%) was categorized
as Safe Harbor which mitigates future litigation risk and provides
a level of assurance that these loans are better insulated from
claims and defenses by borrowers. In addition, 18 borrowers have
multiple mortgages (41 loans in total, 4.0% of the pool) included
in the securitized portfolio. Most of the mortgage loans (98.1% of
the pool) in the portfolio were eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae
or Freddie Mac (conforming mortgages).

Prior to the Closing Date, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(MLIC), as Sponsor and Seller, acquired the loans from Bayview
Dispositions V, LLC; Oceanview Dispositions, LLC; and Lakeview Loan
Servicing, LLC, each of which acquired the loans from various
unaffiliated third-party originators.

Community Loan Servicing, LLC f/k/a Bayview Loan Servicing (CLS)
will act as the Servicer. Citibank, N.A. (rated AA (low) with a
Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as Trust Administrator.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will act as Delaware Trustee
and Indenture Trustee. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated
AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as
Custodian.

MLIC, as Sponsor, intends to retain (directly or through a
majority-owned affiliate) a vertical interest in 5% of each class
of Securities (other than the Class R Certificates) to satisfy the
credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

Unlike other prime securitizations rated by DBRS Morningstar, the
Servicer will not advance delinquent principal and interest (P&I)
on any mortgage; however, the Servicer is obligated to make certain
advances in respect of homeowner association fees, taxes, and
insurance; and reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course
of servicing and disposing of properties.

This transaction also incorporates a unique feature for the
treatment of delinquent interest and the calculation of interest
entitlements of the securities. Delinquent interest will first
reduce the interest entitlement to the Class X Notes. Then, the
interest entitlements to the securities, through the application of
a capped coupon rate, are reduced by the delinquent interest that
would have accrued on the related loans, reverse sequentially. In
other words, investors are not entitled to any interest on such
delinquent mortgages, unless such interest amounts are recovered.
The delinquent interest recovery amounts, if any, will be
distributed sequentially to the P&I securities.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

As of the Cut-Off Date, no borrower within the pool has entered
into a Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)-related forbearance plan with
a servicer. In the event that a borrower requests or enters into a
coronavirus-related forbearance plan after the Cut-Off Date but
prior to the Closing Date, the Seller will remove such loan from
the mortgage pool. Loans that enter a coronavirus-related
forbearance plan after the Closing Date will remain in the pool.

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The prime mortgage sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that
consists of securitizations backed by pools of residential home
loans originated to borrowers with prime credit. Generally, these
borrowers have decent FICO scores, reasonable equity, and robust
income and liquid reserves.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update,"
published on September 10, 2020), for the prime asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
DBRS Morningstar derived such MVD assumptions through a fundamental
home price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and
GDP growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the prime asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that this sector should have low
intrinsic credit risk. Within the prime asset class, loans
originated to (1) self-employed borrowers or (2) higher
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to
more volatile income sources, which could lead to reduced cash
flows generated from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with
lower equity in their properties, generally have fewer refinance
opportunities and therefore slower prepayments. In addition,
certain pools with elevated geographic concentrations in densely
populated urban metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) may
experience additional stress from extended lockdown periods and the
slowdown of the economy.

Although no loan in the pool has been on a forbearance plan because
of financial hardship related to the coronavirus, for this deal,
DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to evaluate the
impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated tranches,
stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) no servicing
advances on delinquent P&I.

These assumptions include:

Increasing delinquencies for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating
levels for the first 12 months;

Increasing delinquencies for the A (sf) and below rating levels
for the first nine months;

Applying no voluntary prepayments for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf)
rating levels for the first 12 months; and

Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds for the AAA (sf) and
AA (sf) rating levels for the first 12 months.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality credit attributes, well-qualified borrowers, a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review, structural
enhancements, and 100% current loans.

The ratings reflect transactional challenges that include no
servicer advances of delinquent P&I, 100% investor properties,
multiple loans from the same borrowers in the securitized pool, and
a R&W framework that incorporates sunset provisions that allow for
certain R&Ws to expire within three to six years after the Closing
Date.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


METLIFE SECURITIZATION 2020-INV1: DBRS Gives BB Rating on B-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2020-INV1 (the
Securities) to be issued by MetLife Securitization Trust
2020-INV1:

-- $273.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.5 million Class A-1-A at AAA (sf)
-- $273.5 million Class A-1-X at AAA (sf)
-- $255.5 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $255.5 million Class A-2-A at AAA (sf)
-- $255.5 million Class A-2-X at AAA (sf)
-- $166.1 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $166.1 million Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $166.1 million Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $89.4 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $89.4 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $89.4 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $18.0 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.0 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $18.0 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $8.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $5.9 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $6.3 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.5 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.7 million Class B-5 at B (low) (sf)

Classes A-1-X, A-2-X, A-3-X, A-4-X, and A-5-X are interest-only
notes. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-1-A, A-1-X, A-2, A-2-A, A-2-X, A-3, A-4, and A-5 are
exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations
of initial exchangeable notes as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-2, A-2-A, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, and A-4-A are super senior
notes. These classes benefit from additional protection from the
senior support notes (Classes A-5 and A-5-A) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Notes reflects 9.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect
6.25%, 4.30%, 2.20%, 1.05%, and 0.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien, fixed-rate
investment-property residential mortgages funded by the issuance of
the Securities. The Securities are backed by 994 loans with a total
principal balance of $300,568,294 as of the Cut-Off Date (November
1, 2020).

This securitization is Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's (MLIC)
first 100% prime investor transaction. Since 2017, MLIC has issued
three DBRS Morningstar-rated seasoned reperforming
securitizations.

The entire pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages
(FRMs) with original terms to maturity of 30 years. The loans were
made to investors primarily for business purposes; however, 26.4%
of the loans were subject to a cash-out refinancing and may have
been used by the borrower for personal use. Based on third party
due diligence designations, 90.7% of the pool was not subject to
the Qualified Mortgage (QM) and Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules
(together, the Rules). The rest of the pool (9.3%) was categorized
as Safe Harbor which mitigates future litigation risk and provides
a level of assurance that these loans are better insulated from
claims and defenses by borrowers. In addition, 18 borrowers have
multiple mortgages (41 loans in total, 4.0% of the pool) included
in the securitized portfolio. Most of the mortgage loans (98.1% of
the pool) in the portfolio were eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae
or Freddie Mac (conforming mortgages).

Prior to the Closing Date, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(MLIC), as Sponsor and Seller, acquired the loans from Bayview
Dispositions V, LLC; Oceanview Dispositions, LLC; and Lakeview Loan
Servicing, LLC, each of which acquired the loans from various
unaffiliated third-party originators.

Community Loan Servicing, LLC f/k/a Bayview Loan Servicing (CLS)
will act as the Servicer. Citibank, N.A. (rated AA (low) with a
Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as Trust Administrator.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will act as Delaware Trustee
and Indenture Trustee. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as
Custodian.

MLIC, as Sponsor, intends to retain (directly or through a
majority-owned affiliate) a vertical interest in 5% of each class
of Securities (other than the Class R Certificates) to satisfy the
credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

Unlike other prime securitizations rated by DBRS Morningstar, the
Servicer will not advance delinquent principal and interest (P&I)
on any mortgage; however, the Servicer is obligated to make certain
advances in respect of homeowner association fees, taxes, and
insurance; and reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course
of servicing and disposing of properties.

This transaction also incorporates a unique feature for the
treatment of delinquent interest and the calculation of interest
entitlements of the Securities. Delinquent interest will first
reduce the interest entitlement to the Class X Notes. Then, the
interest entitlements to the Securities, through the application of
a capped coupon rate, are reduced by the delinquent interest that
would have accrued on the related loans, reverse sequentially. In
other words, investors are not entitled to any interest on such
delinquent mortgages, unless such interest amounts are recovered.
The delinquent interest recovery amounts, if any, will be
distributed sequentially to the P&I securities.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a precrisis structure.

As of the Cut-Off Date, no borrower within the pool has entered
into a Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) related forbearance plan with
a servicer. In the event that a borrower requests or enters into a
coronavirus-related forbearance plan after the Cut-Off Date but
prior to the Closing Date, the Seller will remove such loan from
the mortgage pool. Loans that enter a coronavirus-related
forbearance plan after the Closing Date will remain in the pool.

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The prime mortgage sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that
consists of securitizations backed by pools of residential home
loans originated to borrowers with prime credit. Generally, these
borrowers have decent FICO scores, reasonable equity, and robust
income and liquid reserves.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update,"
published on September 10, 2020), for the prime asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
DBRS Morningstar derived such MVD assumptions through a fundamental
home price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and
GDP growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the prime asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that this sector should have low
intrinsic credit risk. Within the prime asset class, loans
originated to (1) self-employed borrowers or (2) higher
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to
more volatile income sources, which could lead to reduced cash
flows generated from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with
lower equity in their properties, generally have fewer refinance
opportunities and therefore slower prepayments. In addition,
certain pools with elevated geographic concentrations in densely
populated urban metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) may
experience additional stress from extended lockdown periods and the
slowdown of the economy.

Although no loan in the pool has been on a forbearance plan because
of financial hardship related to the coronavirus, for this deal,
DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to evaluate the
impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated tranches,
stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) no servicing
advances on delinquent P&I. These assumptions include:

  Increasing delinquencies for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating
levels for the first 12 months;

  Increasing delinquencies for the A (sf) and below rating levels
for the first nine months;

  Applying no voluntary prepayments for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf)
rating levels for the first 12 months; and

  Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds for the AAA (sf) and
AA (sf) rating levels for the first 12 months.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality credit attributes, well-qualified borrowers, a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review, structural
enhancements, and 100% current loans.

The ratings reflect transactional challenges that include no
servicer advances of delinquent P&I, 100% investor properties,
multiple loans from the same borrowers in the securitized pool, and
a R&W framework that incorporates sunset provisions that allow for
certain R&Ws to expire within three to six years after the Closing
Date.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MF1 2020-FL4: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized provisional ratings on the following classes
of notes issued by MF1 2020-FL4, Ltd. (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes F and G will be privately placed.

With regard to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the
magnitude and extent of performance stress posed to global
structured finance transactions remain highly uncertain. This
considers the fiscal and monetary policy measures and statutory law
changes that have already been implemented or will be implemented
to soften the impact of the crisis on global economies. Some
regions, jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, feeling
more immediate effects. Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply
additional short-term stresses to its rating analysis. For example,
DBRS Morningstar may front-load default expectations and/or assess
the liquidity position of a structured finance transaction with
more stressful operational risk and/or cash flow timing
considerations.

MF1 2020-FL4, Ltd. provided coronavirus and business plan updates
for all loans in the pool, confirming that all debt service
payments have been received in full for closed loans. Furthermore,
no loans are in forbearance or other debt service relief and no
loan modifications were requested, except for The Edison (#7; 4.3%
of the initial pool balance) and 144 West Street (#21; 1.2% of the
initial pool balance). However, these modifications were in
response to the loans' approaching maturity.

The initial collateral consists of 22 floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 29 transitional multifamily properties totaling $783.3
million (67.8% of the total fully funded balance), excluding $203.7
million of remaining future funding commitments and $168.0 million
of pari passu debt. Of the 22 loans, there are three unclosed,
delayed-close loans as of October 27, 2020, representing 10.7% of
the initial pool balance: Grande at Metro Park (#6), Avilla Paseo
(#15), and LA Multifamily Portfolio II (#22). Additionally, the SF
Multifamily Portfolio II (#13) and LA Multifamily Portfolio II
(#22) loans have delayed-close mortgage assets, which are
identified in the data tape and included in the DBRS Morningstar
analysis. The Issuer has 45 days after closing to acquire the
delayed-close assets.

Additionally, the transaction is structured with a 90-day ramp-up
acquisition period, whereby the Issuer plans to acquire up to
$166.7 million of additional collateral, and an 18-month
reinvestment period. After the 45-day delayed-close asset
acquisition period and 90-day ramp-up acquisition period, the
Issuer projects a target pool balance of $950.0 million. DBRS
Morningstar assessed the ramp loans using a conservative pool
construct and, as a result, the ramp loans have expected losses
above the pool weighted-average loan expected losses. Reinvestment
of principal proceeds during the reinvestment period is subject to
Eligibility Criteria, which, among other criteria, includes a
rating agency no-downgrade confirmation by DBRS Morningstar for all
new mortgage assets and funded companion participations exceeding
$1.0 million. On the first payment date after the ramp-up
completion date, any amounts remaining in the unused proceeds
account up to $5.0 million will be deposited into the reinvestment
account. Any funds exceeding $5.0 million will be transferred to
the payment account and applied as principal proceeds in accordance
with the priority of payments.

The loans are mostly secured by currently cash flowing assets, many
of which are in a period of transition with plans to stabilize and
improve the asset value. Of these loans, 11 have remaining future
funding participations totaling $41.8 million, which the Issuer may
acquire during the reinvestment period. Please see the chart below
for participations that the Issuer will be allowed to acquire.

Given the floating-rate nature of the loans, the index DBRS
Morningstar used (one-month Libor) was the lower of (1) DBRS
Morningstar's stressed rate that corresponded with the remaining
fully extended term of the loans and (2) the strike price of the
interest rate cap with the respective contractual loan spread added
to determine a stressed interest rate of the loan term. When
measuring the cut-off date balances against the DBRS Morningstar
As-Is Net Cash Flow, 19 loans, representing 90.9% of the cut-off
date pool balance, had a DBRS Morningstar As-Is Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of 1.00x or below, a threshold indicative of
default risk. Additionally, the DBRS Morningstar Stabilized DSCR
for six loans, representing 33.0% of the initial pool balance, is
1.00x or below, which indicates elevated refinance risk. The
properties are often transitioning with potential upside in cash
flow; however, DBRS Morningstar does not give full credit to the
stabilization if there are no holdbacks or if the other loan
structural features are insufficient to support such treatment.
Furthermore, even if the structure is acceptable, DBRS Morningstar
generally does not assume the assets will stabilize above market
levels. The transaction will have a sequential-pay structure.

The loans were all sourced by an affiliate of the Issuer, which has
strong origination practices and substantial experience in the
multifamily industry. Classes F and G and the Preferred Shares
(collectively, the Retained Securities; representing 14.9% of the
initial pool balance) will be purchased by a wholly owned
subsidiary of MF1 REIT II LLC.

All loans in the pool are secured by multifamily properties located
across 10 states including California, New York, New Jersey, and
Arizona. Multifamily properties benefit from staggered lease
rollover and generally low expense ratios compared with other
property types. While revenue is quick to decline in a downturn
because of the short-term nature of the leases, it is also quick to
respond when the market improves. Additionally, most loans are
secured by traditional multifamily properties, such as garden-style
communities or mid-rise/high-rise buildings, with only one loan
secured by an independent living/assisted-living/memory care
facility (#3, Crestavilla).

The loan collateral was generally in very good physical condition
as evidenced by the six loans, representing 45.0% of the initial
pool balance, secured by properties that DBRS Morningstar deemed to
be Above Average in quality. An additional four loans, representing
16.8% of the initial pool balance, are secured by properties with
Average + quality. Furthermore, only one loan is backed by a
property that DBRS Morningstar considered to be Average - quality,
representing just 2.0% of the initial pool balance.

DBRS Morningstar analyzed 18 of the 22 loans in the transaction,
representing 94.5% of the pool by allocated cut-off date loan
balance. This sample size is substantially larger than other
commercial real estate collateralized loan obligation (CRE CLO)
deals recently rated by DBRS Morningstar.

The pool is moderately diverse by CRE CLO standards with a
Herfindahl score of 13.89, but it cannot drop below 14.00 after the
ramp-up acquisition period is complete, as detailed in the
Eligibility Criteria.

The transaction will likely be subject to a benchmark rate
replacement, which will depend on the availability of various
alternative benchmarks. The current selected benchmark is the
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). Term SOFR, which is
expected to be a similar forward-looking term rate compared with
Libor, is the first alternative benchmark replacement rate but is
currently being developed. There is no assurance Term SOFR
development will be completed or that it will be widely endorsed
and adopted. This could lead to volatility in the interest rate on
the mortgage assets and floating-rate notes. The transaction could
be exposed to a timing mismatch between the notes and the
underlying mortgage assets as a result of the mortgage benchmark
rates adjusting on different dates than the benchmark on the notes,
or a mismatch between the benchmark and/or the benchmark
replacement adjustment on the notes and the benchmark and/or the
benchmark replacement adjustment (if any) applicable to the
mortgage loans. In order to compensate for differences between the
successor benchmark rate and the then-current benchmark rate, a
benchmark replacement adjustment has been contemplated in the
indenture as a way compensate for the rate change. Currently, Wells
Fargo, National Association in its capacity as the Designated
Transaction Representative will generally be responsible for
handling any benchmark rate change, and it will only be held to a
gross negligence standard with regard any liability for its
actions.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges and
risks to the CRE sector and, while DBRS Morningstar expects
multifamily to fare better than most other property types, the
long-term effects on the general economy and consumer sentiment are
still unclear.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the in-place cash flow. It is
possible that the sponsors will not successfully execute their
business plans and that the higher stabilized cash flow will not
materialize during the loan term, particularly with the ongoing
coronavirus pandemic and its impact on the overall economy. A
sponsor's failure to execute the business plan could result in a
term default or the inability to refinance the fully funded loan
balance.

The loan agreements for SF Multifamily Portfolio II (#13) and LA
Multifamily Portfolio II (#22) allow the related borrower to
acquire additional properties as collateral for the mortgage loan.

Three loans, representing 17.1% of the initial cut-off date pool
balance, have a sponsor with negative credit history and/or limited
financial wherewithal, including The Core at Sycamore Highlands
(#4), The Edison (#7), and Mark at Midlothian (#11).

All loans have floating interest rates and are interest-only during
the initial loan term, which ranges from 24 months to 36 months,
creating interest rate risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MF1 LTD 2019-FL2: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Notes issued by MF1 2019-FL2, Ltd. (the
Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. At issuance, the pool comprised 38
floating-rate mortgage loans secured by 39 transitional multifamily
properties totaling $654.6 million (67.4% of the total fully funded
balance), excluding $68.4 million of remaining future funding
commitments and $248.2 million of pari passu debt. At issuance, 32
loans had remaining future funding participations, which the Issuer
may acquire in the future. The loans are mostly secured by cash
flow producing assets, most of which are in a period of transition
with plans to stabilize and improve asset values. Per the November
2020 remittance, 34 loans remain in the transaction at a current
ending scheduled balance of $660.0 million. At issuance, the pool
reported a weighted-average (WA) As-Is Issuance Loan-to-Value (LTV)
of 82.9% and an expected WA Stabilized Balloon LTV of 67.7%.

The transaction benefits from property type concentration and
geographic diversification given that all loans in the pool are
secured by multifamily properties across more than 14 states. The
largest geographic concentrations are in Texas (25.0%), Arizona
(18.9%), and Georgia (14.9%). Additionally, 69.9% of the pool
represents acquisition financing wherein sponsors contributed
material cash equity as a source of funding in conjunction with the
mortgage loan, resulting in a moderately high sponsor cost basis in
the underlying collateral. The loans were all sourced by an
affiliate of the Issuer, which has strong origination practices and
substantial experience in the multifamily industry. A wholly owned
subsidiary of the originator purchased Classes F and G and the
Preferred Shares (collectively, the retained securities;
representing 14.0% of the initial pool balance).

Per the November 2020 remittance, there are four loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 5.7% of the current pool
balance. The largest loan on the watchlist is the Bayou Park
Apartments (Prospectus ID#6; 5.2% of the current pool balance) that
is secured by a 689-unit property in Houston. The servicer added
this loan to its watchlist in September 2020 given the loan's
pending initial maturity in December 2020. Additionally, the
borrower requested a budget modification that the servicer is
reviewing as the borrower is not experiencing the expected demand
for renovated units. Per a recent servicer update from November
2020, the borrower has completed approximately 50% to 60% of the
renovation work; however, the borrower needs to complete 80% of the
work to qualify for the extension. Freddie Mac is currently
reviewing the borrower's requested one-year loan extension given
that the subject loan has a pari passu component securitized in
FREMF 2019-Q009. DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of
default in its analysis for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MFA TRUST 2020-NQM3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-NQM3 (the
Certificates) issued by MFA 2020-NQM3 Trust (MFA 2020-NQM3):

-- $264.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $23.8 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $35.5 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $20.8 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $14.7 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $10.1 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects 30.65%
of credit enhancement provided by subordinate certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 24.40%,
15.10%, 9.65%, 5.80%, and 3.15% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate nonprime first-lien residential mortgages funded by
the issuance of the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by
1,048 mortgage loans with a total principal balance of $381,464,962
as of the Cut-Off Date (October 31, 2020).

Citadel Servicing Corporation (CSC) is the Originator and Servicer
for all loans in this pool.

CSC has three programs under which it originates loans. The
Non-Prime and Maggi Plus (Maggi+) products are CSC's core mortgage
programs, with Maggi+ aimed at higher credit profiles. CSC's
Outside Dodd-Frank products include loans exempt from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) rules.

Although the applicable mortgage loans were originated to satisfy
the CFPB Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers
who generally do not qualify for agency, government, or
private-label nonagency prime jumbo products for various reasons.
In accordance with the QM (Qualified Mortgage)/ATR rules, 67.5% of
the loans are designated as non-QM. Approximately 32.5% of the
loans are made to investors for business purposes or foreign
nationals, which are not subject to the QM/ATR rules.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible horizontal interest consisting
of the Class B-3 and XS Certificates representing at least 5% of
the aggregate fair value of the Certificates to satisfy the credit
risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the distribution date in November
2023 or (2) the date when the aggregate unpaid principal balance of
the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date balance,
the Depositor, at its option, may redeem all of the outstanding
Certificates at a price equal to the class balances of the related
Certificates plus accrued and unpaid interest, including any Cap
Carryover Amounts and any preclosing deferred amounts due to the
Class XS Certificates (optional redemption). After such purchase,
the Depositor must complete a qualified liquidation, which requires
(1) a complete liquidation of assets within the trust and (2)
proceeds to be distributed to the appropriate holders of regular or
residual interests.

On any date following the date on which the aggregate unpaid
principal balance of the mortgage loans is less than or equal to
10% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the Servicing Administrator will
have the option to terminate the transaction by purchasing all of
the mortgage loans and any real-estate owned (REO) property from
the issuer at a price equal to the sum of the aggregate unpaid
principal balance of the mortgage loans (other than any REO
property) plus accrued interest thereon, the lesser of the fair
market value of any REO property and the stated principal balance
of the related loan, and any outstanding and unreimbursed servicing
advances, accrued and unpaid fees, and expenses that are payable or
reimbursable to the transaction parties (optional termination). An
optional termination is conducted as a qualified liquidation.

For this transaction, the Servicer will not fund advances of
delinquent principal and interest (P&I) on any mortgage. However,
the Servicer is obligated to make advances in respect of taxes,
insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing of properties (servicing advances).

Of note, if the Servicer defers or capitalizes the repayment of any
amounts owed by a borrower in connection with the borrower's loan
modification, the Servicer is entitled to reimburse itself from the
excess servicing fee, first, and from principal collections,
second, for any previously made and unreimbursed servicing advances
related to the capitalized amount at the time of such
modification.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches subject
to certain performance triggers related to cumulative losses or
delinquencies exceeding a specified threshold (Trigger Event).
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 Certificates (IIPP) before being applied
sequentially to amortize the balances of the senior and
subordinated certificates. For more subordinate Certificates,
including Class A-3 Certificates after a Trigger Event, principal
proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls as the more
senior Certificates are paid in full. Also, the excess spread can
be used to cover realized losses first before being allocated to
unpaid Cap Carryover Amounts due to Class A-1 down to Class B-2.
Notably, in the prior two recent transactions by the Sponsor rated
by DBRS Morningstar (MFA 2020-NQM1 and MFA 2020-NQM2), the
principal was used to cover interest shortfalls on the Class A-2
Certificates after Class A-1 Certificates were paid off (IPIP).

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside of the CFPB's ATR rules, which became effective on
January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans encompass the entire credit
spectrum. They range from high-FICO, high-income borrowers who opt
for interest-only (IO) or higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratio
mortgages, to near-prime debtors who have had certain derogatory
pay histories but were cured more than two years ago, to nonprime
borrowers whose credit events were only recently cleared, among
others. In addition, some originators offer alternative
documentation or bank statement underwriting to self-employed
borrowers in lieu of verifying income with W-2s or tax returns.
Finally, foreign nationals and real estate investor programs, while
not necessarily non-QM in nature, are often included in non-QM
pools.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, DBRS Morningstar expects
increased delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a
potential near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged
properties. Such deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers'
ability to make monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell
properties in an amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance
of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update,"
dated December 2, 2020), for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home-price
approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and GDP growth
outlined in the moderate scenario. In addition, for pools with
loans on forbearance plans, DBRS Morningstar may assume higher loss
expectations above and beyond the coronavirus assumptions. Such
assumptions translate to higher expected losses on the collateral
pool and correspondingly higher credit enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
pandemic may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes loans originated to (1) borrowers
with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers, or (3)
higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have exhibited
difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the past and may
revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term. Self-employed
borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile income sources,
which could lead to reduced cash flows generated from their
businesses. Higher LTV borrowers with lower equity in their
properties generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March
27, 2020, 29.3% of the borrowers have been granted forbearance
and/or deferral plans because of financial hardship related to
coronavirus pandemic. Approximately 3.0% of the pool satisfied
their forbearance or deferral plans and are current. In June 2020,
the Servicer developed a hardship review process for borrowers
requesting relief on their Mortgage Loans as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic. The Servicer will require each borrower to
complete a hardship package of employment, financial, and credit
information. As a result, the Servicer, in conjunction with or at
the direction of the Sponsor, may offer a repayment plan or other
forms of payment relief, such as a loan modification, in addition
to pursuing other loss mitigation options.

For this deal, DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to
evaluate the impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated
tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) no
servicing advances on delinquent P&I. These assumptions include:

(1) Increasing delinquencies for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating
levels for the first 12 months;

(2) Increasing delinquencies for the A (sf) and below rating levels
for the first nine months;

(3) Applying no voluntary prepayments for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf)
rating levels for the first 12 months; and

(4) Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds for the AAA (sf)
and AA (sf) rating levels for the first 12 months.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MFA TRUST 2020-NQM3: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-NQM3 (the Certificates) to
be issued by MFA 2020-NQM3 Trust (MFA 2020-NQM3):

-- $264.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $23.8 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $35.5 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $20.8 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $14.7 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $10.1 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects 30.65%
of credit enhancement provided by subordinate certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 24.40%,
15.10%, 9.65%, 5.80%, and 3.15% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate nonprime first-lien residential mortgages funded by
the issuance of the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by
1,048 mortgage loans with a total principal balance of $381,464,962
as of the Cut-Off Date (October 31, 2020).

Citadel Servicing Corporation (CSC) is the Originator and Servicer
for all loans in this pool.

CSC has three programs under which it originates loans. The
Non-Prime and Maggi Plus (Maggi+) products are CSC's core mortgage
programs, with Maggi+ aimed at higher credit profiles. CSC's
Outside Dodd-Frank products include loans exempt from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) rules.

Although the applicable mortgage loans were originated to satisfy
the CFPB Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers
who generally do not qualify for agency, government, or
private-label nonagency prime jumbo products for various reasons.
In accordance with the QM (Qualified Mortgage)/ATR rules, 67.5% of
the loans are designated as non-QM. Approximately 32.5% of the
loans are made to investors for business purposes or foreign
nationals, which are not subject to the QM/ATR rules.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible horizontal interest consisting
of the Class B-3 and XS Certificates representing at least 5% of
the aggregate fair value of the Certificates to satisfy the credit
risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the distribution date in November
2023 or (2) the date when the aggregate unpaid principal balance of
the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date balance,
the Depositor, at its option, may redeem all of the outstanding
Certificates at a price equal to the class balances of the related
Certificates plus accrued and unpaid interest, including any Cap
Carryover Amounts and any preclosing deferred amounts due to the
Class XS Certificates (optional redemption). After such purchase,
the Depositor must complete a qualified liquidation, which requires
(1) a complete liquidation of assets within the trust and (2)
proceeds to be distributed to the appropriate holders of regular or
residual interests.

On any date following the date on which the aggregate unpaid
principal balance of the mortgage loans is less than or equal to
10% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the Servicing Administrator will
have the option to terminate the transaction by purchasing all of
the mortgage loans and any real-estate owned (REO) property from
the issuer at a price equal to the sum of the aggregate unpaid
principal balance of the mortgage loans (other than any REO
property) plus accrued interest thereon, the lesser of the fair
market value of any REO property and the stated principal balance
of the related loan, and any outstanding and unreimbursed servicing
advances, accrued and unpaid fees, and expenses that are payable or
reimbursable to the transaction parties (optional termination). An
optional termination is conducted as a qualified liquidation.

For this transaction, the Servicer will not fund advances of
delinquent principal and interest (P&I) on any mortgage. However,
the Servicer is obligated to make advances in respect of taxes,
insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing of properties (servicing advances).

Of note, if the Servicer defers or capitalizes the repayment of any
amounts owed by a borrower in connection with the borrower's loan
modification, the Servicer is entitled to reimburse itself from the
excess servicing fee, first, and from principal collections,
second, for any previously made and unreimbursed servicing advances
related to the capitalized amount at the time of such
modification.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches subject
to certain performance triggers related to cumulative losses or
delinquencies exceeding a specified threshold (Trigger Event).
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 Certificates (IIPP) before being applied
sequentially to amortize the balances of the senior and
subordinated certificates. For more subordinate Certificates,
including Class A-3 Certificates after a Trigger Event, principal
proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls as the more
senior Certificates are paid in full. Also, the excess spread can
be used to cover realized losses first before being allocated to
unpaid Cap Carryover Amounts due to Class A-1 down to Class B-2.
Notably, in the prior two recent transactions by the Sponsor rated
by DBRS Morningstar (MFA 2020-NQM1 and MFA 2020-NQM2), the
principal was used to cover interest shortfalls on the Class A-2
Certificates after Class A-1 Certificates were paid off (IPIP).

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Impact The coronavirus pandemic and
the resulting isolation measures have caused an economic
contraction, leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and
income reductions for many consumers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates
that delinquencies may continue to rise in the coming months for
many residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) asset classes,
some meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside of the CFPB's ATR rules, which became effective on
January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans encompass the entire credit
spectrum. They range from high-FICO, high-income borrowers who opt
for interest-only (IO) or higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratio
mortgages, to near-prime debtors who have had certain derogatory
pay histories but were cured more than two years ago, to nonprime
borrowers whose credit events were only recently cleared, among
others. In addition, some originators offer alternative
documentation or bank statement underwriting to self-employed
borrowers in lieu of verifying income with W-2s or tax returns.
Finally, foreign nationals and real estate investor programs, while
not necessarily non-QM in nature, are often included in non-QM
pools.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, DBRS Morningstar expects
increased delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a
potential near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged
properties. Such deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers'
ability to make monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell
properties in an amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance
of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: December Update,"
dated December 2, 2020), for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home-price
approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and GDP growth
outlined in the moderate scenario. In addition, for pools with
loans on forbearance plans, DBRS Morningstar may assume higher loss
expectations above and beyond the coronavirus assumptions. Such
assumptions translate to higher expected losses on the collateral
pool and correspondingly higher credit enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
pandemic may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes loans originated to (1) borrowers
with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers, or (3)
higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have exhibited
difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the past and may
revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term. Self-employed
borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile income sources,
which could lead to reduced cash flows generated from their
businesses. Higher LTV borrowers with lower equity in their
properties generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March
27, 2020, 29.3% of the borrowers have been granted forbearance
and/or deferral plans because of financial hardship related to
coronavirus pandemic. Approximately 3.0% of the pool satisfied
their forbearance or deferral plans and are current. In June 2020,
the Servicer developed a hardship review process for borrowers
requesting relief on their Mortgage Loans as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic. The Servicer will require each borrower to
complete a hardship package of employment, financial, and credit
information. As a result, the Servicer, in conjunction with or at
the direction of the Sponsor, may offer a repayment plan or other
forms of payment relief, such as a loan modification, in addition
to pursuing other loss mitigation options.

For this deal, DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to
evaluate the impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated
tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) no
servicing advances on delinquent P&I. These assumptions include:

  Increasing delinquencies for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating
levels for the first 12 months;

  Increasing delinquencies for the A (sf) and below rating levels
for the first nine months;

  Applying no voluntary prepayments for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf)
rating levels for the first 12 months; and

  Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds for the AAA (sf) and
AA (sf) rating levels for the first 12 months.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MFA TRUST 2020-NQM3: S&P Gives B Rating on Class B-2 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings today assigned its ratings to MFA 2020-NQM3
Trust's mortgage pass-through certificates series 2020-NQM3.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by
first-lien fixed- and adjustable-rate fully amortizing and
interest-only residential mortgage loans primarily secured by
single-family residences, planned unit developments, condominiums,
condotels, two to four-family homes, mixed-use, 5-10 unit, 11-20
unit, and manufactured housing to both prime and nonprime
borrowers. The pool has 1,048 loans, which are primarily
nonqualified mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S$P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, geographic concentration, and representation and
warranty framework;

-- The mortgage aggregator and mortgage originator; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.
Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective
and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are
promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to
social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread
availability of effective immunization, which could come by the
middle of next year. S&P uses this assumption in assessing the
economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.

Ratings Assigned(i)

MFA 2020-NQM3 Trust

-- Class A-1, $264,545,000: AAA (sf)

-- Class A-2, $23,842,000: AA (sf)

-- Class A-3, $35,476,000: A (sf)

-- Class M-1, $20,790,000: BBB (sf)

-- Class B-1, $14,686,000: BB (sf)

-- Class B-2, $10,109,000: B (sf)

-- Class B-3, $12,016,961: NR

-- Class XS, notional(ii): NR

-- Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): NR

-- Class R, N/A: NR


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class E Debt to B(low)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded its ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C11
issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust:

-- Class D to B (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class E to B (low) (sf) from B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the following ratings:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class PST at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed Classes E and F from
Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on
August 6, 2020.

DBRS Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes C, D, E, and
PST to Negative from Stable. All other trends are Stable, with the
exception of Class F, which has a rating that does not carry a
trend. In addition, DBRS Morningstar added an Interest in Arrears
designation for Class F.

The rating downgrades and Negative trends are reflective of the
continued performance challenges for the underlying collateral,
with previous cash flow declines for several large loans, including
the three largest in special servicing, severely compounded by the
effects of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. In
addition to the four loans representing 39.8% of the pool in
special servicing as of the November 2020 remittance, DBRS
Morningstar notes that retail collateral makes up the largest
concentration of one property type, with six loans comprising 42.6%
of the current trust balance. The pool also features loans backed
by eight hospitality properties, representing 22.0% of the pool.
Both hospitality and retail properties have been the most severely
affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and, as
such, the high concentration suggests increased risks for the pool,
particularly for the lower rating categories, since issuance.

The four loans in special servicing are Westfield Countryside
(Prospectus ID#1; 16.5% of the pool), The Mall at Tuttle Crossing
(Prospectus ID#2; 15.0% of the pool), Marriott Chicago River North
Hotel (Prospectus ID#5; 7.9% of the pool), and Hampton Inn –
Katy, TX (Prospectus ID#36; 0.4% of the pool). Two of the four
loans in special servicing are secured by regional malls located in
suburban markets, while the remaining two are secured by
hospitality properties.

The largest loan in the pool, Westfield Countryside, transferred to
the special servicer in June 2020 for imminent default, after being
closed for over two months as a result of coronavirus restrictions.
The loan is secured by a 464,398-sf portion of a 1.3 million sf
super regional mall in Clearwater, Florida. The mall was initially
anchored by Sears (which vacated in July 2018), Macy's, Dillard's,
and JCPenney, all of which own their improvements and are not part
of the collateral. Major collateral tenants include Cobb Theatre
(11.6% of the NRA through December 2026), Game Time (5.7% of the
NRA through September 2034), and Forever 21 (4.3% of the NRA
through January 2023). The loan is sponsored by Westfield Group
(Westfield) and O'Connor Capital Partners (O'Connor).

According to servicer commentary, Westfield will no longer be
supporting the asset going forward but is cooperating in a friendly
foreclosure process. Westfield will continue managing the mall
while receiver and sales proposals are being evaluated. The mall is
expected to be listed for sale by YE2020 as O'Connor is also not
interested in further investment into the partnership or property.
An updated appraisal is currently being reviewed but has not been
finalized as of the November 2020 reporting period. According to
the June 2020 rent roll, the property was 88.8% occupied, compared
with 92.0% at issuance. In addition to the decline in occupancy,
operating expenses have been steadily increasing YOY. The going-in
LTV (loan-to-value) was relatively low at 57.4%. As such, a 50%
haircut to the issuance appraisal value of $270.0 million and a
stressed advancing figure implies a relatively moderate loss
severity of 20.4%. However, given the fact that the sponsor is
expected to give the property over to the trust and there are
significant unknowns with regard to the ultimate liquidation
scenario given the current retail environment, DBRS Morningstar
notes the loss severity could be much higher at resolution,
supporting the Negative trend assignments as previously outlined.

The second-largest loan in the pool, The Mall at Tuttle Crossing,
transferred to the special servicer in July 2020 for imminent
default. The loan is secured by a 385,057-sf portion of a 1.1
million sf super regional mall in Dublin, Ohio, a suburb of
Columbus. The property, owned and operated by Simon Property Group
(Simon), was built in 1997 and originally had three anchors:
JCPenney, Sears, and Macy's. The noncollateral Macy's downsized in
2017, closing one of its two anchor spaces, and the noncollateral
Sears vacated the property in 2018. Dayton-based fun center Scene75
purchased the former Macy's store and opened in mid-2019. The
largest collateral tenants are Finish Line (5.4% of the NRA through
February 2025) and Show Depot (3.5% of the NRA through June 2023).
It should be noted that relatively new competition for the subject
was noted at issuance in the Polaris Fashion Place, which was
constructed in 2000. As a result, the collateral property has
transitioned from being one of the best-performing malls in
Columbus to a more modest player.

According to servicer commentary, the borrower has agreed to a
friendly foreclosure. Simon classifies this property in its "Other
Properties" category, which designates the REIT's noncore assets
within its portfolio. As of the June 2020 rent roll, the property
was 69.0% occupied, compared with 87.0% at issuance. The going-in
LTV was relatively low at 52.1%. As such, a 50% haircut to the
issuance appraisal value of $240.0 million implies a relatively low
loss severity of 5.6%. However, while this figure is a reference
point, much like the Westfield Countryside loan, DBRS Morningstar
acknowledges the loss at resolution could tick higher, supporting
the Negative trends assigned to the lowest rated bonds.

DBRS Morningstar is also monitoring the third-largest loan in the
pool, Southdale Center (Prospectus ID#4, 8.5% of the pool), which
was most recently added to the servicer's watchlist in November
2020. The loan is secured by a 634,880-sf portion of a 1.3 million
sf Simon-owned shopping mall in Edina, Minnesota. At issuance, the
two spaces that served as collateral anchors were leased to
Herberger's and Marshalls, while the two noncollateral anchors were
occupied by Macy's and JCPenney. Throughout the years, the
collateral Herberger's and Marshalls and noncollateral JCPenney
anchors vacated the subject. The former JCPenney space was razed
and rebuilt as a 120,000-sf Life Time Fitness & Life Time Work
(35,000 sf of office space) in December 2019, and there are plans
for the former collateral Herberger's space to be back-filled with
another less traditional tenant in Hennepin County's Southdale
Library. Although there has been positive leasing activity,
according to the June rent roll, the overall occupancy rate for the
property was 67.0%, while the collateral portion was 54.0%
occupied. Given the current stressed retail environment and low
occupancy, DBRS Morningstar applied a stressed probability of
default for this loan in the analysis for this review,
significantly increasing the expected loss.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 30 of the original 38 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 32.4%
since issuance. Five loans, representing 12.1% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased. Additionally, there are nine loans,
representing 24.6% of the current trust balance, on the servicer's
watchlist per the November 2020 remittance. These loans are being
monitored for a variety of reasons including low debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and occupancy issues; however, the primary
reason for the increase of loans on the watchlist is for
hospitality and retail properties with a low DSCR stemming from
disruptions related to the coronavirus pandemic.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C18: DBRS Lowers Class E Certs Rating to B
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded three ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C18 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C18 (the Issuer):

-- Class D to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to B (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the following ratings of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C18:

-- Class A-SB at AAA(sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F at CCC (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the following
nonpooled rake bonds of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-C18, which are backed by the $244.4
million subordinate B note of the 300 North LaSalle loan:

-- Class 300-A at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class 300-B at A (sf)
-- Class 300-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class 300-D at BB (sf)
-- Class 300-E at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable except for Classes D, E, X-B, and X-C, which
now carry Negative trends, and except for Class F, which does not
carry a trend. DBRS Morningstar also applied an Interest in Arrears
Designation to Class E. DBRS Morningstar removed the Under Review
with Negative Implications designation on Classes E, F, and X-C,
which they were assigned on August 6, 2020.

DBRS Morningstar's rating actions reflect its concerns with the
trust's significant concentration of retail and hospitality loans,
which collectively represent 48.2% of the pool. Sixteen loans,
representing 27.7% of the current pooled balance (excluding
defeased loans), are secured by retail collateral, while eight
loans, representing 19.6% of the current pool, are secured by
hospitality collateral. These property types have been the most
severely affected by the coronavirus pandemic and, as such, those
concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance. Additionally, DBRS
Morningstar notes its concerns with the large concentration of
specially serviced loans that includes eight loans, representing
20.8% of the current pooled balance. Four of the eight loans are
among the 15 largest remaining loans.

The largest loan in special servicing, Ashford Hospitality
Portfolio C1 (Prospectus ID#1; 8.0% of the pool), is secured by a
portfolio of three hotels totaling 534 keys in Orlando, Florida;
Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Louisville, Kentucky. This loan
transferred to the special servicer in April 2020 when the sponsor
requested relief as a result of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
pandemic. The mezzanine lender has completed a Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) foreclosure in September 2020 and has taken ownership of
the properties. Prior to the pandemic, the loan's net cash flow
declined to $6.3 million in 2019 from $8.0 million in 2017. The
primary drivers of this decline can be attributed to declines in
occupancy and revenue per available room (RevPAR) for the Residence
Inn Orlando Lake Buena Vista and Courtyard Louisville Airport
properties between 2017 and 2019. DBRS Morningstar increased the
probability of default (PoD) to account for the increased risk
profile of this loan.

Per the November 2020 remittance, there are six loans, representing
13.0% of the current pool, on the servicer's watchlist, including
the second-largest loan remaining in the pool, Huntington Oaks
Shopping Center (Prospectus ID#3, 8.7% of the pool). Secured by an
anchored retail center in Monrovia, California, the loan was added
to the watchlist in April 2018 when Toys R Us filed for bankruptcy
and later vacated its space, which represented 13.0% of the NRA.
DBRS Morningstar increased the PoD to reflect the short-term risks
with this loan that include the concern with the prolonged vacancy
of Toys R Us' space and drop off in cash flow to 1.06x as of Q2
2020.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 65 loans at an original
trust balance of $1.03 billion. Per the November 2020 remittance,
there are 52 loans remaining at a pooled trust balance of $692.1
million, representing a collateral reduction of 33.0%. The trust's
largest property concentration is represented by office collateral
that consists of 11 loans and 34.2% of the pool balance.
Additionally, there are five loans, representing 7.1% of the
current pool, that are fully defeased.

DBRS Morningstar's rating actions of the nonpooled rake
certificates reflect the stable performance of the underlying
collateral 300 North LaSalle, a 1.3 million sf Class A office
building in Chicago's River North submarket, since issuance.
Originally constructed in 2009, 300 North LaSalle is a 60-story
riverfront building with an extensive amenities package that
includes an outdoor public plaza, conference center, onsite bank,
cafe, fitness center, steakhouse restaurant, and subterranean valet
parking garage. The property has won several awards, including a
National Association of Industrial and Office Properties (Chicago)
Award (2010), Architectural Record Good Design is Good Business
Awards (2011), and Urban Land Institute Award (2011). The property
is LEED Platinum certified and has received an EnergyStar
certificate as well as the Chicago Building Owners and Managers
Association Earth Award (2014). The sponsor used loan proceeds,
consisting of a $475.0 million mortgage loan along with $381.6
million of borrower equity, to finance the Irvine Company LLC's
(Irvine) $850.0 million acquisition of the property. As of January
2020, the building was 95.8% leased with the largest tenants at the
property including Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Kirkland) and the Boston
Consulting Group (BCG).

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C21: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class G Certs to CCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded six classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C21 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2015-C21 as follows:

-- Class D at BB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class E at B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class G at CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes as
follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class 555A at A (sf)
-- Class 555B at BBB (sf)

Classes D, E, F, G, X-E, and X-FG were removed from Under Review
with Negative Implications, where they were placed on August 6,
2020. All trends are Stable, with the exception of Classes D, E, F,
X-E, and X-FG, which have Negative trends. Class G has a rating
that does not carry a trend, and DBRS Morningstar placed Interest
in Arrears designations on Classes E, F, and G. The ratings
downgrade and negative trends are due to the elevated risk profile
of two of the largest loans in the pool that have been negatively
affected by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, as well as
the concentration of loans in special servicing, which represent
24.1% of the pool as of the November 2020 remittance. The pool has
a high concentration of loans backed by retail properties,
representing 32.8% of the pool balance. As retail properties have
been severely affected by the coronavirus pandemic, this
concentration indicates increased risks for the pool.

The Class 555A and Class 555B certificates are rake bonds backed by
the 555 11th Street NW subordinate B note, which is a $57.0 million
loan that composes a portion of the $177.0 million whole loan
secured by the collateral property, a Class A office building in
Washington, D.C. The whole loan comprises a $90.0 million pari
passu A note ($60.0 million of which is held in the subject trust
and backs the pooled bonds), a $30.0 million senior B note (not
held in any commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions),
and a $57.0 million subordinate B note, of which a $30.0 million
pari passu portion was contributed to the subject transaction. The
subordinate B note is below the senior B note in payment priority.
The performance of the underlying collateral has been strong since
issuance. As of June 2020, the servicer reported a 99.0% occupancy
rate and a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.39 times (x) and
1.37x on the A note and whole loan balances, respectively. The
largest tenants are Latham & Watkins (58.1% of the net rentable
area (NRA), expiring January 2031), Silver Cinemas (9.7% of the
NRA, expiring March 2032), and the American Cancer Society (5.9% of
the NRA, expiring October 2021). Given the strength in tenancy with
minimal rollover in the near to moderate term, DBRS Morningstar
considers the risks with this loan to be generally unchanged from
issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 62 of the original 64 loans
remain in the pool, with scheduled amortization resulting in 8.9%
of collateral reduction since issuance. Three loans, representing
3.8% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased. There are six
loans in special servicing, including the largest loan in the pool,
Westfield Palm Desert Mall (Prospectus ID#1, 7.9% of the pool
balance), which is 90 to 120 days delinquent and is secured by a
572,724-sf portion of a 977,888-sf regional mall in Palm Desert,
California. In addition, the loan reported approximately $612,434
in outstanding principal and interest advances. The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2020 for delinquent
payments, with the servicer reporting they are dual tracking
foreclosure while also negotiating with the borrower for a
potential loan modification.

The mall anchors are Macy's, JCPenney, with a former Sears that was
closed in early 2020. The largest collateral tenants include Dick's
Sporting Goods, Tristone Cinemas, and Barnes & Noble. As of March
2020, the subject reported a DSCR of 1.58x, a decline compared with
the YE2019 and YE2018 DSCR figures of 1.97x and 2.26x,
respectively. Given the cash flow declines from issuance, as well
as the dark anchor in Sears and the bankruptcy filing for JCPenney,
the risks for this loan are significantly increased since issuance,
particularly when considering the extended delinquency and
possibility of foreclosure. As such, DBRS Morningstar liquidated
the loan in the analysis for this review, with a loss severity in
excess of 50.0%.

The second-largest loan in special servicing is Ashford Hotel
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#4, 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by
a portfolio of two extended-stay hotels and one limited-service
hotel, located throughout Florida, Kansas, and Utah. The subject
was transferred to special servicing in June 2020 for delinquent
payments, and the servicer noted a loan modification is under
review. The terms of the modification could include provisions
allowing the borrower to pay 50.0% of debt service from April 2020
through April 2021. By May 2021, regular payments would continue
and deferred amounts would be repaid over an 18-month period
beginning January 2022. As of the August 2020 appraisal, the
portfolio reported a value of $69.8 million, a relatively minor
5.6% decline compared with the issuance appraised value of $73.2
million. Given the delinquency and the challenges facing hotels
amid the pandemic, DBRS Morningstar applied a probability of
default penalty for this loan to increase the expected loss in the
analysis for this review.

According to the November 2020 remittance, 15 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 17.7% of the current pool
balance. The servicer is monitoring these loans for various
reasons, including a low DSCR or occupancy figure, tenant rollover
risk, and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its North American CMBS
Insight Model when determining the ratings on Classes B, C, D, and
PST as the quantitative results suggested a lower rating. The
material deviations are warranted given the uncertain loan level
event risk with the loans in special servicing and on the
servicer's watchlist.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C24: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C24 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2015-C24 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar discontinued its rating on Class A-1 because it
was repaid in full.

DBRS Morningstar removed Classes D, X-D, E, and F from Under Review
with Negative Implications, where it placed them on August 6, 2020.
The trends for Classes E and F are Negative. All other trends are
Stable.

The Negative trends on the two lowest-rated classes reflect the
continued performance challenges for the underlying collateral,
mainly driven by the impacts of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
global pandemic. In addition to the six loans in special servicing
as of the November 2020 remittance, representing 5.2% of the pool,
the transaction has a moderate concentration of hospitality
properties, representing 15.6% of the pool. In addition, all but
one of the loans in special servicing are secured by hotels.
Hospitality properties have been the most severely affected by the
initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and, as such, this
concentration, while relatively moderate, suggests increased risks
for the pool since issuance, particularly for the lower rating
categories.

In addition, the transaction has a high concentration of retail
property types, with 23 loans secured by regional malls and both
anchored and unanchored retail properties, collectively
representing 26.1% of the pool. Multifamily collateral makes up the
largest concentration of one property type, with 23 loans
representing 26.1% of the current trust balance. Loans secured by
multifamily properties have remained among the least volatile asset
types throughout the pandemic.

The six loans in special servicing are Hampton Inn Wyomissing
(Prospectus ID#13; 1.6% of the pool), Aloft – Green Bay, WI
(Prospectus ID#27; 0.9% of the pool), Homewood Suites – Andover,
MA (Prospectus ID#28; 0.9% of the pool), Holiday Inn Express West
Chester (Prospectus ID#42; 0.7% of the pool), Haggen Food &
Pharmacy – West Linn (Prospectus ID#43; 0.7% of the pool), and
Holiday Inn Express – Medford, OR (Prospectus ID#57; 0.5% of the
pool). Four of the six loans are recent transfers to special
servicing after experiencing steep cash flow declines caused by the
coronavirus pandemic.

In the analysis for this review, DBRS Morningstar assumed
liquidation scenarios for two loans, Haggen Food & Pharmacy –
West Linn (Haggen) and Holiday Inn Express – Medford, OR
(Medford). Both loans have been in special servicing for several
years. The Medford property received an updated appraisal in April
2020, citing a value of $4.8 million, a 32.4% decline from the
issuance valuation of $7.1 million. With our analysis, we applied
haircuts to the most recent appraisal values, resulting in loss
severities of approximately 73.5% and 11.6% for the Haggen and
Medford loans, respectively. For the other four loans in special
servicing, where applicable, DBRS Morningstar applied a probability
of default penalty to increase the expected loss for each in the
analysis.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 73 of the original 74 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 5.3%
since issuance. Four loans, representing 3.6% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased. Additionally, there are 20 loans,
representing 39.6% of the current trust balance, on the servicer's
watchlist as of the November 2020 remittance. The servicer is
monitoring them for a variety of reasons, including low debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and occupancy issues; however, the
primary reason for the increase of loans on the watchlist is the
coronavirus-driven stress for hospitality and retail properties,
with watchlisted loans backed by those property types generally
reporting a low DSCR.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-UBS8: DBRS Cuts Class E Debt Rating to BB(low)
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded three classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-UBS8 issued by Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2015-UBS8 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class D to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class X-D to BB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the remaining classes as
follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-H at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at CCC (sf)
-- Class H at CCC (sf)

With this review, DBRS Morningstar removed Classes D, E, F, G, H,
X-D, X-F, X-G, and X-H from Under Review with Negative
Implications, where they were placed on August 6, 2020. The trends
on these classes are Negative, with the exception of Classes G and
H, which have ratings that do not carry trends. All other trends
are Stable. In addition, DBRS Morningstar also designated Classes G
and H as having Interest in Arrears.

The Negative trends and rating downgrades reflect the continued
performance challenges for the underlying collateral, much of which
has been driven by the impacts of the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) global pandemic. In addition to loans representing 16.0%
of the pool in special servicing as of the November 2020
remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes the pool has a high
concentration of retail and hospitality properties, representing
44.4% and 15.9% of the pool balance, respectively. These property
types have been the most severely affected by the initial effects
of the coronavirus pandemic and, as such, those concentrations
suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly at the lower
rating categories, since issuance. Based on the year-end (YE) 2019
financials, the pool reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.84 times (x) compared with the YE2018 WA
DSCR of 1.91x with the Issuer's WA DSCR of 1.85x.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 56 of the original 57 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 4.9%
since issuance. One loan, representing 0.9% of the pool, is fully
defeased. There are 10 loans, representing 16.0% of the pool, in
special servicing, four of which are in the top 15. The largest
specially serviced loan, Mall de las Aguilas (Prospectus ID#6, 3.1%
of the pool balance), is secured by a 350,000 square foot (sf)
portion of a 450,000 sf regional mall located in Eagle Pass, Texas,
which is located on the United States and Mexico border; the city
is heavily influenced by border traffic. The loan transferred to
special servicing at the request of the borrower due to challenges
resulting from the coronavirus-driven border closure. The loan is
over 60 days delinquent with the most recent remittance report and
the servicer is working towards a transition of title of the
property to the trust.

The property reported a September 2020 occupancy rate of 74.6%,
which is a drop over the YE2019 occupancy rate of 90%. The
occupancy decline is primarily the result of the Beall's closure,
which formerly occupied 17.5% of the net rentable area (NRA) and
vacated the property following the bankruptcy filing and ultimate
liquidation of the parent company, Stage Stores. In addition to the
declining occupancy rate, there are additional challenges in the
exposure to JCPenney, which represents 22.5% of the NRA, and
Cinemark, which occupies 6.5% of the NRA. Given these increased
risks from issuance, the loan's delinquency status, and the
likelihood the trust will take title at some point, this loan was
analyzed with an increased probability of default to significantly
increase the expected loss for this review.

The second-largest specially serviced loan is WPC Department Store
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#10, 2.6% of the current pool balance),
which is a pari passu loan spread across the subject and two other
transactions in BACM 2015-UBS7 and CSAIL 2015-C3, both of which are
also rated by DBRS Morningstar. The loan is secured by a portfolio
of six department stores located across Wisconsin, Illinois, and
North Dakota, all of which were formerly occupied by department
store brands owned by Bon-Ton, which liquidated and closed all
locations in 2018. The collateral locations have been vacant since
that time and the loan has been real-estate owned since October
2019. The loan reported an October 2019 value of $24.1 million,
which is an 11.1% decline from the October 2018 appraisal of $27.1
million and a 73.1% decrease from the issuance appraisal of $89.5
million. In addition, the most recent value is well below the
whole-loan balance of $57.0 million and DBRS Morningstar believes
the value could have fallen even further since that time given the
impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and the secondary market
locations. Given these factors, this loan was analyzed with a
liquidation scenario that implied a loss severity in excess of
80.0%.

According to the November 2020 remittance, 14 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 24.2% of the current pool
balance. These loans are being monitored for various reasons,
including a low DSCR or occupancy figure and/or pandemic-related
forbearance requests.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its North American CMBS
Insight Model when determining the rating to Class B as the
quantitative results suggested a lower rating. The material
deviation is warranted given the uncertain loan level event risk
with the loans in special servicing and on the servicer's
watchlist.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MSC MORTGAGE 2011-C3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C3 issued by MSC 2011-C3
Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)

The trends on Classes F, X-B, and G are Negative while the trends
on all other classes are Stable. DBRS Morningstar also removed its
ratings on Classes F, X-B and G from Under Review with Negative
Implications, where they were placed on August 6, 2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. The Negative trends on Classes F, X-B, and G
reflect the continued performance issues facing loans secured by
retail and hotel properties, which the ongoing Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic has disproportionately affected. These loans
represent 50.7% of the current pool balance. As of November 2020
reporting, two loans are in special servicing, representing 18.2%
of the current pool balance, and nine loans are on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 20.9% of the current pool balance.

The transaction currently consists of 82 loans totalling $637.8
million as 24 of the original 63 loans have been repaid, resulting
in collateral reduction of 38.1%, including loan amortization.
Eleven loans, representing 18.4% of the current pool balance, are
fully defeased. The pool benefits from healthy leverage metrics
with a weighted-average (WA) loan-to-value ratio of 55.9% as of
November 2020 compared with 61.6% at issuance. In addition, there
is a concentration of office collateral as 12 loans, representing
34.6% of the current pool balance, are secured by office
properties, which have shown greater resilience to cash flow
declines during the pandemic.

The largest loan in special servicing and in the pool, Westfield
Belden Village (Prospectus ID#2; 14.6% of the current pool balance)
transferred to special servicing for imminent monetary default in
May 2020 and is now 121+ days delinquent with modification listed
as the workout strategy. The loan is secured by a portion of a
single-level regional mall in Canton, Ohio, which originally served
to refinance existing debt for the Westfield Group (Westfield);
however, Starwood Capital Group (Starwood) assumed the loan in 2013
as part of its acquisition of seven malls from Westfield. To
refinance the portfolio, Starwood raised a significant amount of
capital through Israeli-backed bonds that have defaulted,
triggering an accelerated payment clause enabling the bondholders
to seize control of the assets. According to a The Real Deal
article published on September 29, 2020, the joint venture between
Pacific Retail Capital Partners and Golden East Investors has won
the bid to take over the malls. While the transition to new
ownership and restructuring of senior debt will likely take some
time, there have been some positive developments in recent months.
The loan had historically been monitored for the departure of the
noncollateral Sears, which originally downsized to 73,000 square
feet (sf) in 2018 from 196,000 sf and then subsequently vacated.
While there was a period of increased vacancy, Seritage Growth
Properties has since redeveloped and backfilled most of the space
with three tenants—Dave & Buster's (opened in November 2019),
Dick's Sporting Goods (opened in October 2020), and Golf Galaxy
(opened in October 2020). Despite some issues with rent collections
and struggling retailers amid the ongoing pandemic, collateral
occupancy was reported at 96.2% per the September 30, 2020, rent
roll.

The second loan in special servicing, Park Place Power (Prospectus
ID#16; 3.6% of the current pool balance) transferred in June 2020
for imminent default at the borrower's request for coronavirus
relief. As of November 2020 reporting, the loan was current and
listed with a workout strategy of discounted payoff. Collateral is
secured by a Class A office property in the central business
district of Birmingham, Alabama, which has been 67.0% occupied
since Hand Ardenall Harrison Sale LLC's departure (10.3% of the net
rentable area (NRA)) in January 2017. As of November 2020,
occupancy has further declined to 57.5% as a result of a number of
departures and downsizing. The loan reported an annualized coverage
of 1.09 times (x) as of Q2 2020; however, there is some near-term
rollover in the next six months that could further stress in-place
coverage, most notably Frost Cummings Tidwell Group, LLC (7.1% of
the NRA; expiring February 2021). The property has been listed for
sale since July 2020 and it appears that the servicer's primary
strategy is to work with the borrower to sell the property in line
with market value. The secondary strategy is foreclosure. Given
performance to date, DBRS Morningstar expects the value of the
property has dropped precipitously from the issuance level, and
with the noted workout strategy being a discounted payoff, the loan
is expected to take a loss

Of the nine loans on the servicer's watchlist, six loans (19.2% of
the current pool balance) were added for performance-related
declines, primarily attributed to increased vacancy as a result of
the coronavirus. Based on Q2 2020 reporting, these loans had a WA
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12x compared with 1.83x as
of year-end 2019, reflecting a 39.3% decline. Despite the
performance declines, all six loans remain current as of the
November 2020 remittance. The remaining three loans (1.7% of the
current pool balance) were watchlisted as a result of ongoing
renovations and deferred maintenance.

While neither specially serviced nor on the watchlist, the Oxmoor
Center (Prospectus ID#3; 12.6% of the current pool balance) in
Louisville, Kentucky, poses some concern following Sears'
departure. While there have been ongoing legal challenges from
residents in the surrounding area, Topgolf has signed a lease
through May 2040 for 65,000 sf of the 139,000 sf space that Sears
vacated. The tenant's lease is not scheduled to commence until
November 2022, but this reflects its extensive redevelopment plans.
While the loan reported an annualized DSCR of 1.01x as of Q2 2020
reporting, the figure is artificially low as the annual ground-rent
expense has been charged. Adjusting the figure to account for this
results in an annualized DSCR of 1.18x, in line with the Q2 2019
annualized DSCR of 1.14x. The Brookfield Property Partners L.P.
property is anchored by Macy's, Von Maur, and Dick's Sporting
Goods. As of the most recent tenant sales report for the trailing
12-month period ended December 2018, reported in-line sales for
tenants that occupy less than 10,000 sf is $481 per sf.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


OCP CLO 2020-20: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on $12MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OCP CLO 2020-20 Ltd./OCP
CLO 2020-20 LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured term loans
that are governed by collateral quality tests. The notes are
managed by Onex Credit Partners LLC.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and over-collateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  OCP CLO 2020-20 Ltd./OCP CLO 2020-20 LLC

  Class A-1, $240.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $16.00 million: Not rated
  Class B-1, $39.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $9.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D-1 (deferrable), $16.00 million: BBB (sf)
  Class D-2 (deferrable), $8.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $12.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $35.95 million: Not rated


PALMER SQUARE 2020-3: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Palmer Square CLO 2020-3
Ltd.'s floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and over-collateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Palmer Square CLO 2020-3 Ltd.

  $248.00 mil. class A-1a: AAA (sf)
  $8.00 mil. class A-1b: AAA (sf)
  $48.00 mil. class A-2: AA (sf)
  $24.00 mil. class B: A (sf)
  $20.00 mil. class C: BBB- (sf)
  $16.00 mil. class D: BB- (sf)
  $6.00 mil. class E: B- (sf)
  $31.10 mil. subordinated notes: Not rated


PFP LTD 2019-6: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
notes (the Notes) issued by PFP 2019-6, Ltd. (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the collateral since issuance. The transaction benefits from its
pool composition as only one loan, representing 2.3% of the current
pool balance, is backed by a hospitality property, and five loans,
representing 8.1% of the current pool balance, are backed by retail
properties, which are vulnerable to prolonged depressed cash flows
amid the current economic environment stemming from the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic restrictions. In addition, 15 loans,
representing 44.0% of the current pool balance, are secured by
properties in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 5, 6, 7,
or 8, which are characterized as core market locations and are more
urbanized or densely suburban in nature. These markets have
historically benefitted from greater demand drivers and available
liquidity.

In its analysis of the transaction, DBRS Morningstar applied
probability of default adjustments to loans with confirmed issues
related to the stressed commercial real estate environment caused
by the coronavirus pandemic. Because of the transitional nature of
the underlying collateral, proposed business plans that are
necessary to bring the assets to stabilization may be delayed and,
in some cases, borrowers have requested relief from the Issuer.

The initial collateral consisted of 36 floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 37 mostly transitional properties with a cut-off balance
totalling $760.1 million, excluding approximately $80.7 million of
future funding commitments. Most loans are in a period of
transition with plans to stabilize and improve the asset value.
During the Permitted Funded Companion Participation Acquisition
Period, the Issuer may acquire future funding commitments without
being subject to rating agency confirmation. As of the November
2020 remittance, the trust consists of 34 loans with a current
principal balance of $760.1 million with approximately $65.9
million of future funding commitments outstanding.

As of the November 2020 remittance, five loans, representing 11.1%
of the pool, are on the servicer's watchlist with no loans in
special servicing. Two of the five loans on the servicer's
watchlist were flagged for deferred maintenance. The other three
loans on the servicer's watchlist were added after coronavirus
relief was requested and loan modifications were executed. In
total, there are five loans, representing 18.0% of the pool, that
have had loan modifications executed in 2020. The modifications
include the use of reserves to pay debt service, deference and
accrual of any interest shortfalls, and waiver of reserve deposits
and replenishment obligations.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


REGATTA XVII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Regatta XVII
Funding Ltd./Regatta XVII Funding LLC's fixed- and floating-rate
notes (see list).

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed primarily by
broadly syndicated, speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower),
senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality
tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 8,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and over-collateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Regatta XVII Funding Ltd./Regatta XVII Funding LLC

  $192.00 mil. class A-1-A: AAA (sf)
  $25.00 mil. class A-1-B: AAA (sf)
  $7.00 mil. class A-2: AAA (sf)
  $42.00 mil. class B: AA (sf)
  $21.00 mil. class C: A (sf)
  $17.50 mil. class D: BBB- (sf)
  $14.88 mil. class E: BB- (sf)
  $32.73 mil. subordinated notes: Not rated


SECURITIZED TERM 2019-CRT: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the Auto Loan Receivables
Backed Notes, Classes B, C, and D (collectively, the Subordinated
Notes) issued by Securitized Term Auto Receivables Trust 2019-CRT
(the Trust). The confirmation is part of DBRS Morningstar's
continued effort to provide timely credit rating opinions and
increased transparency to market participants.

The Trust also issued Auto Loan Receivables Backed Notes, Class A
(the Class A Notes; collectively with the Subordinated Notes, the
Notes), which are not rated. The Notes are supported by a portfolio
of prime retail auto loan contracts originated by The Bank of Nova
Scotia (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) and
secured by new and used light trucks (including sport-utility
vehicles, crossover utility vehicles, and minivans) and passenger
cars (the Portfolio of Assets).

Securitized Term Loan Auto Receivables Trust 2019-CRT

Class B     Confirmed    AA(low)(sf)
Class C     Confirmed    A(low)(sf)
Class D     Confirmed    BB(sf)

Repayment of the Notes will be made from collections from the
Portfolio of Assets, which generally include scheduled monthly loan
payments, prepayments, and proceeds from vehicle sales in the case
of defaults. Principal repayment on the Notes will be made pro-rata
until the occurrence of a Sequential Principal Payment Trigger
Event, after which the Notes will be paid sequentially in the order
of the Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, and Class D
Notes. The ratings on the Subordinated Notes are based on their
full repayment by the Final Scheduled Payment Date.

DBRS Morningstar initially published its outlook on the Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) pandemic's impact on key economic indicators for
the 2020–22 time frame in April 2020. DBRS Morningstar last
updated the macroeconomic scenarios on September 10, 2020, in its
"Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: September Update" at
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/366543/dbrs-morningstar-global-macroeconomic-scenarios-september-update.
For the Subordinated Notes, DBRS Morningstar considered impacts
consistent with the moderate scenario in the referenced commentary
in its analysis. The rating confirmations are based on the
following factors, each of which includes additional analysis and,
where appropriate, additional stresses to expected performance as a
result of global efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus
pandemic:

-- Credit protection is provided by a nonamortizing cash reserve
account funded at closing representing approximately 0.42% of the
outstanding Note balance as of October 2020 as well as
subordination of 6.50% and 2.75% (as a percentage of the Note
balance) to the Class B Notes and Class C Notes, respectively.

-- Excess spread net of cost of funds and replacement servicer
fees is available to offset collection shortfalls on a monthly
basis. As of October 2020, excess spread was equal to approximately
4.55% (annualized).

-- To date, cumulative losses amount to 6 basis points and remain
well below DBRS Morningstar's expectations set at the time of the
initial rating.

-- The Bank of Nova Scotia has a strong and well-diversified
banking franchise with a long history in banking and consumer
lending across multiple product lines.

DBRS Morningstar monitors the performance of each transaction to
identify any deviation from its expectations at issuance and to
ensure that the ratings remain appropriate. The review is
predicated upon the timely receipt of performance information from
the related providers. The performance and characteristics of each
publicly rated auto loan portfolio and the Notes are available and
updated each month in the Monthly Canadian ABS Report available at
www.dbrsmorningstar.com.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


STACR REMIC 2020-DNA6: DBRS Gives Prov. Bsf Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) REMIC 2020-DNA6 Notes (the
Notes) issued by Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2020-DNA6 (STACR
2020-DNA6):

-- $279.0 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2A at BB (high) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2B at BB (sf)
-- $69.5 million Class B-1A at BB (low) (sf)
-- $69.5 million Class B-1B at B (sf)
-- $208.0 million Class M-2 at BB (sf)
-- $208.0 million Class M-2R at BB (sf)
-- $208.0 million Class M-2S at BB (sf)
-- $208.0 million Class M-2T at BB (sf)
-- $208.0 million Class M-2U at BB (sf)
-- $208.0 million Class M-2I at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2AR at BB (high) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2AS at BB (high) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2AT at BB (high) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2AU at BB (high) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2AI at BB (high) (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2BR at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2BS at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2BT at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2BU at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2BI at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2RB at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2SB at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2TB at BB (sf)
-- $104.0 million Class M-2UB at BB (sf)
-- $139.0 million Class B-1 at B (sf)
-- $69.5 million Class B-1AR at BB (low) (sf)
-- $69.5 million Class B-1AI at BB (low) (sf)

Classes M-2, M-2R, M-2S, M-2T, M-2U, M-2I, M-2AR, M-2AS, M-2AT,
M-2AU, M-2AI, M-2BR, M-2BS, M-2BT, M-2BU, M-2BI, M-2RB, M-2SB,
M-2TB, M-2UB, B-1, B-1AR, and B-1AI are Modifiable and Combinable
STACR Notes (MAC Notes). Classes M-2I, M-2AI, M-2BI, and B-1AI are
interest-only MAC Notes.

The BBB (low) (sf), BB (high) (sf), BB (sf), BB (low) (sf), and B
(sf) ratings reflect 2.000%, 1.625%, 1.250%, 1.000%, and 0.750% of
credit enhancement, respectively. Other than the specified classes
above, DBRS Morningstar does not rate any other classes in this
transaction.

STACR 2020-DNA6 is the 23nd transaction in the STACR DNA series.
The Notes are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a
certain reference pool (the Reference Pool) of residential mortgage
loans held in various Freddie Mac-guaranteed mortgage-backed
securities.

As of the Cut-Off Date, the Reference Pool consists of 129,438
greater-than-20-year fully amortizing first-lien fixed-rate
mortgage loans underwritten to a full documentation standard, with
original loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 60% and less than
or equal to 80%. The mortgage loans were estimated to be originated
on or after January 2015 (99.95% after June 2019) and were
securitized by Freddie Mac between April 1, 2020, and June 30,
2020.

On the Closing Date, the trust will enter into a Collateral
Administration Agreement (CAA) with Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac, as
the credit protection buyer, will be required to make transfer
amount payments. The trust is expected to use the aggregate
proceeds realized from the sale of the Notes to purchase certain
eligible investments to be held in a custodian account. The
eligible investments are restricted to highly rated, short-term
investments. Cash flow from the Reference Pool will not be used to
make any payments; instead, a portion of the eligible investments
held in the custodian account will be liquidated to make principal
payments to the Noteholders and return amount, if any, to Freddie
Mac upon the occurrence of certain specified credit events and
modification events.

STACR 2020-DNA6 is the second credit risk transfer (CRT)
transaction where the coupon rates for the various notes are based
on the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) whereas the coupon
rates for prior transactions were based on LIBOR. There are
replacement provisions in place in the event that SOFR is no longer
available, please see the Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) for
more details. DBRS Morningstar did not run interest rate stresses
for this transaction, as the interest is not linked to the
performance of the reference obligations. Instead, the trust will
use the net investment earnings on the eligible investments
together with Freddie Mac's transfer amount payments to pay
interest to the Noteholders.

In this transaction, approximately 46.0% of the loans were
originated using property values determined by using Freddie Mac's
automated collateral evaluation (ACE) assessment rather than a
traditional full appraisal. Loans where the property values were
determined by using ACE assessments generally have better credit
attributes, as shown in the table below. Please see the PPM for
more details about the ACE assessment.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
actual principal collected on the Reference Pool. For STACR DNA
transactions, beginning with the STACR 2018-DNA2 transaction, there
has been a revision to principal allocation. The scheduled
principal in prior transactions was allocated pro rata between the
senior and nonsenior (mezzanine and subordinate) tranches,
regardless of deal performance, while the unscheduled principal was
allocated pro rata subject to certain performance tests being met.
For the more recent transactions, the scheduled and unscheduled
principal will be combined and only be allocated pro rata between
the senior and nonsenior tranches if the performance tests are
satisfied. For the STACR 2020-DNA6 transaction, the minimum credit
enhancement test—one of the three performance tests—has been
set to fail at the Closing Date thus locking out the rated classes
from initially receiving any principal payments until the
subordination percentage grows from 3.00% to 3.25%. Additionally,
the nonsenior tranches will also be entitled to supplemental
subordinate reduction amount if the offered reference tranche
percentage increases above 6.15%. The interest payments for these
transactions are not linked to the performance of the reference
obligations except to the extent that modification losses have
occurred.

The Notes will be scheduled to mature on the payment date in
December 2050, but will be subject to mandatory redemption prior to
the scheduled maturity date upon the termination of the CAA.

The sponsor of the transaction will be Freddie Mac. Citibank, N.A.
(rated AA (low) with a Stable trend and R-1 (middle) with a Stable
trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Indenture Trustee and
Exchange Administrator. The Bank of New York Mellon (rated AA
(high) with a Stable trend and R-1 (high) with a Stable trend by
DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Custodian. Wilmington Trust,
National Association (rated AA (low) with a Negative trend and R-1
(middle) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the
Owner Trustee.

The Reference Pool consists of approximately 0.6% of loans
originated under the Home Possible program. Home Possible is
Freddie Mac's affordable mortgage product designed to expand the
availability of mortgage financing to creditworthy low- to
moderate-income borrowers.

If a reference obligation is refinanced under the Enhanced Relief
Refinance Program, then the resulting refinanced reference
obligation may be included in the Reference Pool as a replacement
of the original reference obligation. The Enhanced Relief Refinance
Program provides refinance opportunities to borrowers with existing
Freddie Mac mortgages who are current in their mortgage payments
but whose LTV ratios exceed the maximum permitted for standard
refinance products. The refinancing and replacement of a reference
obligation under this program will not constitute a credit event.

For this transaction, if a loan becomes delinquent and the related
servicer reports that such loan is in disaster forbearance before
or in the reporting period related to the payment date in March
2021 or April 2021, Freddie Mac will remove the loan from the pool
to the extent the related mortgaged property is located in a FEMA
major disaster area and in which FEMA had authorized individual
assistance to homeowners in such area as a result of Hurricane
Laura, or any other hurricane that impacts such related mortgaged
property prior to the Closing Date.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an economic contraction, leading to
sharp increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for
many consumers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may
continue to rise in the coming months for many residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) asset classes, some
meaningfully.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under the moderate
scenario in its commentary, see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios:
December Update," published on December 2, 2020, for the
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE CRT) asset class DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than what it previously
used. DBRS Morningstar derives such MVD assumptions through a
fundamental home price approach based on the forecast unemployment
rates and GDP growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate
scenario. In addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans,
DBRS Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and
beyond the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to
higher expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly
higher credit enhancement.

In the GSE CRT asset class, while the full effect of the
coronavirus may not occur until a few performance cycles later,
DBRS Morningstar generally believes that loans with layered risk
(low FICO score with high LTV/high debt-to-income ratio) may be
more sensitive to economic hardships resulting from higher
unemployment rates and lower incomes. Additionally, higher
delinquencies might cause a longer lockout period or a redirection
of principal allocation away from outstanding rated classes because
performance triggers failed.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


STARWOOD MORTGAGE 2020-INV1: S&P Gives (P)B Rating on 11 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Starwood
Mortgage Residential Trust 2020-INV1's mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by an
aggregate pool comprised of 984 investor occupancy debt service
coverage ratio mortgage loans, which are fixed- and adjustable-rate
residential mortgage loans (some with interest-only features)
secured by first liens on single-family residences, planned unit
developments, condominiums, and two-four family residential
properties. All are exempted from the qualified
mortgage/ability-to-repay rules.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;

-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;

-- The representation and warranty framework for this
transaction;

-- The geographic concentration; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Starwood Mortgage Residential Trust 2020-INV1

Class      Rating(i)           Amount ($)
A-1        AAA (sf)           225,343,000
A-2        AA (sf)             18,466,000
A-3        A (sf)              31,701,000
M-1        BBB (sf)            15,688,000
B-1        BB (sf)             14,707,000
B-2        B (sf)              10,131,000
B-2-A      B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)
B-2-AX     B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)(iii)
B-2-B      B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)
B-2-BX     B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)(iii)
B-2-C      B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)
B-2-CX     B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)(iii)
B-2-D      B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)
B-2-DX     B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)(iii)
B-2-E      B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)
B-2-EX     B (sf)              10,131,000 (ii)(iii)
B-3-1      NR                   7,011,000
B-3-1-A    NR                   7,011,000 (iv)
B-3-1-AX   NR                   7,011,000 (iv)(iii)
B-3-1-B    NR                   7,011,000 (iv)
B-3-1-BX   NR                   7,011,000 (iv)(iii)
B-3-1-C    NR                   7,011,000 (iv)
B-3-1-CX   NR                   7,011,000 (iv)(iii)
B-3-1-D    NR                   7,011,000 (iv)
B-3-1-DX   NR                   7,011,000 (iv)(iii)
B-3-1-E    NR                   7,011,000 (iv)
B-3-1-EX   NR                   7,011,000 (iv)(iii)
B-3-2      NR                   3,774,945
B-3-2-A    NR                   3,774,945 (v)
B-3-2-AX   NR                   3,774,945 (v)(iii)
B-3-2-B    NR                   3,774,945 (v)
B-3-2-BX   NR                   3,774,945 (v)(iii)
B-3-2-C    NR                   3,774,945 (v)
B-3-2-CX   NR                   3,774,945 (v)(iii)
B-3-2-D    NR                   3,774,945 (v)
B-3-2-DX   NR                   3,774,945 (v)(iii)
B-3-2-E    NR                   3,774,945 (v)
B-3-2-EX   NR                   3,774,945 (v)(iii)
A-IO-S     NR                    Notional (vi)
XS         NR                    Notional (vi)
A-R        NR                         N/A



UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2012-C2: Moody's Lowers Cl. F Certs to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on three classes and
downgraded the ratings on nine classes in UBS-Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-C2.

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S-EC, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-EC, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C-EC, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Affirmed A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. EC**, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2020
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

** Reflects exchangeable classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two principal and interest (P&I) classes, Cl. A-3
and Cl. A-4, were affirmed due to their significant credit support
and because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The rating on Cl. G was affirmed due to
the anticipated losses to the pool.

The ratings on six P&I classes were downgraded due to higher
anticipated losses and increased interest shortfall risks driven by
the significant exposure to specially serviced loans primarily
secured by regional malls. Specially serviced loans represent
nearly 25% of the pool, of which the three largest (representing
24% of the pool) are secured by regional malls. The three specially
serviced mall loans include Louis Joliet Mall (9.7% of the pool),
Crystal Mall (9.6% of the pool) and Pierre Bossier Mall (4.7% of
the pool), all of which had already experienced declines in
performance prior to 2020. Furthermore, for each loan foreclosure
is being considered, or the borrower has already indicated plans to
transfer the loan to the trust. Appraisal reductions have not yet
been recognized on any of the specially serviced malls loans,
therefore Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls may increase
materially. In aggregate five loans, representing a combined 35% of
the pooled balance, are secured by regional malls, including
Westgate Mall (3.6% of the pool) in which the sponsor, CBL &
Associates Properties, Inc. ("CBL"), has recently declared Chapter
11 bankruptcy.

The rating on two interest-only (IO) classes were downgraded due to
decline in the credit quality of their referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class was downgraded due to decline
in the credit quality of the referenced exchangeable classes.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 18.0% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 11.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 8.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in September 2020, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020. The principal
methodology used in rating exchangeable classes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2020.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in September 2020, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 13, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27.6% to $880.4
million from $1.22 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by fifty-two mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to just under 9.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
(excluding defeasance) constituting 62.1% of the pool. One loan,
constituting 4.4% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured
credit assessment. Seventeen loans, constituting 19.2% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

The transaction has a significant concentration to five Class B
regional malls, representing approximately 35% of the pool balance.
Class B malls in secondary and tertiary locations have historically
exhibited higher cash flow volatility, loss severity and may face
higher refinancing risk compared to other major property types.
Three of these regional malls (23% of the pool) have already been
transferred to special servicing and the mall loans all have loan
maturity dates in less than two years.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

As of the November 13, 2020 remittance report, loans representing
75.3% were current or within their grace period on their debt
service payments and 24.7% were greater than 90 days delinquent, in
foreclosure or REO.

Five loans, constituting 6.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization.
There are currently five loans in special servicing, secured by
four properties and constituting 24.7% of the balance, of which the
three loans secured by regional malls, 23.9% of the pool,
transferred since May 2020. The three specially serviced mall loan
were already experiencing material declines in performance prior to
2020 and the impact of the coronavirus pandemic has accelerated
this trend.

The largest specially serviced exposure is the Louis Joliet Mall
Loan ($85.0 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
359,000 square foot (SF) portion of a 975,000 SF regional mall
located in Joliet, Illinois. At securitization the mall was
anchored by Macy's, Sears, JC Penney and Carson Pirie Scott & Co
(all non-collateral). However, both Sears and Carson Pirie Scott &
Co. closed their stores at this location in 2018. Two major
collateral tenants, MC Sport and Toys R Us, also closed their
stores in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Based on September 2020 rent
roll, the mall's total and inline occupancy declined to
approximately 63% and 89%, respectively, compared to 73% and 96%,
respectively, in December 2019. The property's performance had
already exhibited significant declines in performance in recent
years due to lower revenues. The 2019 NOI declined 24% year over
year and was 31% lower than in 2012. The reported comparable
in-line tenant sales for the trailing twelve-month period (TTM)
ending March 2020 were $415 per square foot (PSF), compared to $488
PSF for the TTM June 2019. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2020 due to imminent monetary default and as of
the November 2020 remittance statement is last paid through its
March 2020 payment date. The mall re-opened in June 2020 after
being temporary closed as a result of the coronavirus. The loan is
interest-only for the entire term and has maturity in July 2022.
The borrower has recently indicated it will not contribute
additional capital towards the property and the special servicer
indicated negotiations for a deed-in-lieu or stipulated foreclosure
are in process.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Crystal Mall Loan
($84.2 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 518,500
SF portion of a 783,300 SF super-regional mall located in
Waterford, Connecticut. At securitization the mall contained three
anchors: Macy's, Sears, and JC Penney (Macy's and Sears were
non-collateral anchors). Sears, owned by Seritage Growth
Properties, closed its store at this location in 2018 and the space
remains vacant. The subject is the only regional mall within a
50-mile radius, but it faces significant competition from other
retail centers including Waterford Commons and Tanger Outlets.
Property performance has declined in recent years due to lower
rental revenue. The 2019 NOI declined over 15% year over year and
was over 40% below the NOI in 2012. Furthermore, mall stores less
than 10,000 SF reported sales of less than $300 PSF in both 2019
and 2018. As of June 2020, the collateral occupancy was 82%
occupied, compared to 78% in December 2019 and 87% in December
2018. The property's reported June 2020 NOI DSCR was 0.83X,
compared to 1.16X in December 2019 and 1.37X in December 2018. The
loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020 due to imminent
default and as of November 2020 remittance statement was last paid
through its May 2020 payment date. The special servicer indicated
they are working with the borrower to transfer the property to
REO.

The third specially serviced loan is the Pierre Bossier Mall Loan
($41.4 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 265,400
SF portion of a 612,300 SF regional mall located in Bossier City,
Louisiana. At securitization the mall contained four non-collateral
anchors: Dillard's, Sears, JC Penney, and Virginia College. Both
Sears and Virginia College closed at their locations in 2018. The
property performance has declined annually since 2015 as a result
of continued declines in rental revenues. The NOI DSCR has been
below 1.00X since 2019 and the 2019 NOI was down 4% year over year
and was 42% lower than in 2012. Furthermore, the comparable inline
stores less than 10,000 SF reported sales of approximately $305 PSF
in 2019, compared to $324 PSF in 2018. As of September 2020, rent
roll, the total and inline occupancy were 82% and 64%,
respectively, compared to 81% and 62% in December 2019 and 86% and
72% in December 2018. The mall also faces competition from several
other retail centers within a 10-mile trade area, including a
regional mall (Mall St. Vincent), an outdoor mall (Louisiana
Boardwalk), a lifestyle center (Stirling Bossier Shopping Center),
and two power centers (Regal Court and Shoppes at Bellemead). The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 due to imminent
default and as of the November 2020 remittance date is last paid
through its October 2020 payment date. The mall is sponsored by
Brookfield Properties, and the special servicer commentary
indicates legal remedies are being pursued as they continue to
review the asset.

The remaining specially serviced loan is the Behringer Harvard
Portfolio Loan ($7.2 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which originally
consisted of two office properties located in Houston and Irving,
TX. The office property in Irving was released in February 2016,
leaving the 180,000 SF Houston property as the sole remaining
collateral. The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2017
as a result of imminent default and the asset became REO in July
2017. The remaining property was only 38% occupied in October
2020.

Moody's has identified one additional troubled loan secured by a
regional mall. The troubled loan is the Westgate Mall ($31.7
million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 453,544 SF
portion of a regional mall. The mall anchors include Dillard's;
Belk (both non-collateral) and JC Penney. A former anchor, Sears
(193,000 SF), vacated in September 2018 and the space remains
vacant. Major collateral tenants include an 8-screen Regal Cinema
(23,000 SF; lease expiration in October 2021), Bed Bath & Beyond
(36,000 SF; lease expiration in January 2026) and Dick's Sporting
Goods (lease expiration January 2030; lease expiration January
2030). However, the Regal Cinema is temporarily closed as a result
of the pandemic. As of September 2020, total occupancy was 93%,
compared to 90% at year-end 2019, and 83% at year-end 2018. The
property's performance increased from securitization through 2015,
however, the malls NOI has since declined annually due to declines
rental revenue and the 2019 NOI was 19% lower than in 2012. The
June 2020 NOI DSCR was 1.64X, compared to 1.71X in 2019. CBL &
Associates Properties, Inc. ("CBL"), which is the sponsor and
manages the property, declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November
2020. The loan has amortized nearly 21% since securitization and is
last paid through its October 2020 payment date, which was still
within its grace period for the November 2020 payment date. Due to
the recent declines in performance, the current retail environment
and the recent bankruptcy of the sponsor, Moody's has identified
this as a troubled loan.

Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $142 million (57%
expected loss on average) from the specially serviced and troubled
loans.

As of the November 2020 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $1.2 million and only impacted the non-rated Cl. H.
However, Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls are expected to
increase as updated appraisals or loan modifications are executed
on the specially serviced regional malls loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan
modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's makes various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjusts the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between its sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also uses an adjusted loan balance that reflects
each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this
publication reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in
the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 99% of the
pool and partial year 2020 operating results for 88% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 101% at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 27% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 909 Third
Avenue Net Lease Loan ($38.6 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is
secured by the fee interest in a parcel of land located beneath a
1.3 million SF office property located in Manhattan, New York. The
collateral is leased to an affiliate of Vornado Realty Trust and
the annual ground lease payments are $1.6 million. The loan is
interest-only throughout the term prior to the anticipated
repayment date (ARD) in May 2022. Moody's structured credit
assessment is a1 (sca.pd).

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22.3% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Southland Center Mall Loan ($67.8
million -- 7.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 611,000 SF
portion of a 903,500 SF super-regional mall located in Taylor,
Michigan. The mall is currently anchored by Macy's (non-collateral)
and JC Penney. Other major tenants include Best Buy and a
12-screen, Cinemark multiplex theater. As of September 2020, the
total mall and the inline space were 94% and 81% occupied,
respectively, compared to 97% and 93% in March 2019. Per the
September 2020 tenant sales report, comparable inline sales for
tenants under 10,000 SF were $374 PSF, compared to $439 PSF at
year-end 2019 and $430 in 2018. The property's performance had
significantly improved through 2019 as a result of higher rental
revenues and the 2019 NOI was 32% higher than in 2012. The loan
remains current as of the November 2020 remittance statement
payment date and has amortized 14% since securitization. The loan
sponsor is Brookfield Properties. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
101% and 1.13X.

The second largest conduit loan is the Two MetroTech Loan ($65.4
million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 10-story,
Class-A office building containing 511,920 SF of net rentable area
located in Brooklyn, New York. The property is well located
approximately five minutes from downtown Manhattan and is
accessible via 12 subway lines and the Long Island Railroad. The
improvements are situated in New York City-owned land. The ground
lease expires in 2087, and beginning in 2025, the ground rent will
be adjusted to be 10% of the fair market value of the land,
considered as unimproved and unencumbered by the ground lease. As
of June 2020, the building was approximately 100% leased, unchanged
since 2013. The five largest tenants represent 94% of the
property's square footage and all have leases expirations in
December 2022 or later. The loan has amortized 14% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and
1.07X.

The third largest conduit loan is the Trenton Office Portfolio Loan
($63.0 million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by two
Class-A mid-rise office buildings containing 473,658 SF in
aggregate and located in downtown Trenton, New Jersey. As of June
2020, the buildings were approximately 96% leased, unchanged since
2013. The largest tenant is the State of New Jersey, which leases
approximately 86% of the aggregate square footage on leases through
December 2022. The loan has also amortized 14% since securitization
and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.25X.


WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Downgrades Class F Certs to Csf
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six and affirmed eight classes of
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2013-LC12 (WFCM 2013-LC12). In
addition, Fitch has placed four classes on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN).

RATING ACTIONS

WFCM 2013-LC12

Class A-1 94988QAA9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-2 94988QAC5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3 94988QAE1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3FL 94988QBG5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3FX 94988QBQ3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 94988QAG6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 94988QAN1; LT AAAsf Rating Watch On; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 94988QAL5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 94988QAQ4; LT BBBsf Downgrade; previously AA-sf

Class C 94988QAS0; LT BBsf Downgrade; previously A-sf

Class D 94988QAU5; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously BBB-sf

Class E 94988QAW1; LT CCsf Downgrade; previously Bsf

Class F 94988QAY7; LT Csf Downgrade; previously CCCsf

Class PEX 94988QBJ9; LT BBsf Downgrade; previously A-sf

Class X-A 94988QBC4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades and RWN reflect
increased loss expectations on the three underperforming regional
mall loans (19.5% of pool); Carolina Place (6.8%), White Marsh Mall
(6.6%) and Rimrock Mall (6.1%). Fitch's current ratings incorporate
a base case loss of 17.40%, which includes additional stresses on
the three underperforming malls due to deteriorating performance
and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the secular shift
away from regional malls.

Fitch previously modeled no loss on Carolina Place at the prior
rating action; however, this increased to approximately 64% in the
base case scenario due to declining occupancy and sales since
issuance, significant lease rollover prior to maturity, limited
leasing progress on the vacant anchor space and significant market
competition. Fitch expects this loan has a high probability of
default in the near term.

Fitch previously applied an outsized loss of 25% to White Marsh
Mall at the prior rating action; however, this increased to
approximately 71% in the base case scenario. Fitch previously
applied a 40% outsized loss to Rimrock Mall at the prior rating
action; however, this increased to approximately 87% in the base
case scenario. The White Marsh Mall and the Rimrock Mall are both
over 90 days delinquent and in special servicing.

The classes placed on RWN reflect the potential for further
downgrades due to uncertainty regarding the ultimate disposition of
the three regional malls mentioned. The classes on RWN are expected
to be resolved once updated appraisals are received and/or there is
more clarity regarding the workout strategy or sponsor commitment
for these malls.

The 17 non-mall Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) (10.0%), which each
comprise less than 1.0% of the pool individually, include two real
estate owned (REO) hotel assets (1.3%), one hotel loan in
foreclosure (0.4%) and 14 loans (8.3%) designated as FLOCs,
primarily due to the expected effects from the coronavirus
pandemic.

Regional Mall FLOCs: The largest contributor to Fitch's overall
loss expectations, Rimrock Mall (6.1%), is secured by 428,661-sf of
a 586,446-sf regional mall in Billings, MT. The loan, which is
sponsored by Starwood Retail Partners, transferred to special
servicing for Imminent Monetary Default in May 2020 at the
borrower's request as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.

The loan is over 90 days delinquent, and negotiations for a
deed-in-lieu (DIL) or stipulated foreclosure are in process.
Collateral anchor, Herberger's, previously 14% net rentable area
(NRA), vacated in August 2018. The space remains vacant. As of the
YTD June 2020, collateral occupancy was 83%, and servicer reported
net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
0.85x based on fully amortizing principal and interest payments as
the initial five-year interest-only period expired in July 2018. As
of the TTM ended April 2020, in-line tenant sales were $325-psf. In
November 2020, the mall received an appraisal reduction, which
indicates a significant decline in the property value.

The second-largest contributor to Fitch's overall loss
expectations, White Marsh Mall (6.6%), is secured by 702,317-sf of
a 1.2 million-sf regional mall in Baltimore, MD. The loan, which
matures in May 2021, transferred to special servicing in August
2020 for Imminent Monetary Default at the borrower's request and is
over 90 days delinquent.

A pre-negotiation letter was executed and discussions are ongoing.
After non-collateral Sears closed in April 2020, the remaining
non-collateral anchors are Macy's and JCPenney. The collateral
anchors are Boscov's, Macy's Home Store and Dave & Buster's.

The property is located adjacent to an IKEA and AMC Theatres, which
are not part of the loan collateral. As of the YTD June 2020,
collateral occupancy and servicer-reported NOI DSCR were 95% and
2.26x, respectively for this full-term, interest-only loan. At YE
2019, in-line tenant sales were $361-psf. Brookfield Properties
Retail Group is the sponsor.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's loss, Carolina Place
(6.8%), is secured by 693,196-sf of a 1.2 million-sf regional mall
in Pineville, NC, approximately 10 miles southwest of the Charlotte
CBD. The loan, which is sponsored by a joint venture between
Brookfield Properties Retail Group and the New York State Common
Retirement Fund, was designated a FLOC due to near term rollover
concerns, collateral anchor Sears (23% NRA) vacating in January
2019, and significant market competition.

The remaining collateral anchor is JCPenney, which leases
approximately 17% NRA through May 2023, after it renewed its lease
for an additional two years. The non-collateral anchors are
Dillard's and Belk. A non-collateral box formerly occupied by
Macy's through March 2017 was backfilled by Dick's Sporting Goods
/Golf Galaxy in 2019.

As of the YTD June 2020, collateral occupancy and servicer-reported
NOI DSCR were 75% and 1.76x, respectively. The loan began
amortizing in July 2016 after the initial three-year interest-only
period expired. As of the TTM ended August 2020, in-line sales were
$319-psf. Fitch expects the loan will have difficulty refinancing,
given the low occupancy and sales, substantial lease rollover
concerns and stronger nearby competition.

Increase in Credit Enhancement: As of the November 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 13.8% to $1.215 billion from $1.409 billion at issuance.
Realized losses to date total $10.9 million, or 0.8% of the
original pool balance, following the disposition of The Crowne
Plaza Madison, which was disposed in February 2020, with a $10.4
million loss to the trust. Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.3 million are currently affecting classes E, F and the non-rated
class G. The majority of the pool (83.2%) is currently amortizing.
Fourteen loans (8.6%) are fully defeased.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 58.3% of the pool.
Loan maturities are concentrated in 2023 (92.9%). One loan (6.6%)
matures in 2021 and one loan (0.5%) in 2022. The largest
concentrations by property type are retail at 42.3%, office at
22.0% and manufactured housing at 13.7%.

The largest loan, Cumberland Mall (7.4%), is secured by 541,527-sf
of a 1.0 million-sf regional mall located in Atlanta, GA. The
collateral includes a 147,409-sf portion that is ground leased to
Costco. Macy's is a non-collateral anchor. Sears, a former
non-collateral anchor, vacated in November 2018.

Per servicer updates, the former Sears box, owned by a 50/50 joint
venture between Brookfield and Seritage Growth Properties, was
re-tenanted with Dick's Sporting Goods, Planet Fitness and Round 1.
Dick's Sporting Goods and Planet Fitness are open and operating.
Per media reports, and as of September 2020, Cobb County approved
rezoning the property as Regional Retail Commercial from three
separate zones.

The proposed redevelopment would add two office towers totaling
445,000-sf, 312 apartment homes and new restaurants and stores on
17.29 acres. As of the YTD June 2020, collateral occupancy and
servicer-reported NOI DSCR were 97% and 3.28x, respectively for
this full-term interest-only loan. As of the TTM ended August 2020,
in-line sales were $571-psf ($415-psf excluding Apple). The loan is
sponsored by Brookfield Retail Properties Group and CBRE Group.

Exposure to Coronavirus Pandemic: Fitch expects significant
economic effects to certain hotels, retail and multifamily
properties from the coronavirus pandemic due to the sudden
reductions in travel and tourism, temporary property closures and
lack of clarity at this time on the potential duration of the
coronavirus-related effects. The pandemic prompted the closure of
several hotel properties in gateway cities, malls, entertainment
venues and individual stores.

Fourteen loans (8.3%) are secured by hotel properties. The weighted
average NOI DSCR for all hotel loans is 1.82x. These hotel loans
could sustain a weighted average decline in NOI of 46% before DSCR
falls below 1.00x. Thirty-four loans (42.3%) are secured by retail
properties. The weighted average NOI DSCR for all non-defeased
retail loans is 2.16x. These retail loans could sustain a weighted
average decline in NOI of 54% before DSCR falls below 1.00x.
Additional coronavirus specific base case stresses were applied to
11 hotel loans (6.6%) and three non-defeased retail loans (1.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The RWN on classes A-S, B, C and PEX reflect the potential for
further downgrades and concerns with the FLOCs, primarily Carolina
Place, White Marsh Mall and Rimrock Mall. The Stable Rating
Outlooks on classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3FL, A-3FX, A-4, A-SB and X-A
reflect the defeasance, the expectation of continued amortization
and the anticipated payoff of performing non-FLOCs.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Factors resulting in upgrades include stable to improved asset
performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades are
not likely due to performance/refinance concerns with the FLOCs,
primarily the regional mall FLOCs, but could occur if performance
of the FLOCs improves significantly and/or any of the mall's
payoff.

The classes currently on RWN are not expected to be upgraded unless
the classes senior to them payoff. Classes would not be upgraded
above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls. The
distressed classes are not likely to be upgraded unless one or more
of the three FLOC malls payoff or performance improves
considerably.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

Factors resulting in downgrades include an increase in pool level
expected losses due to valuations on the specially serviced malls
that are less than Fitch's current assumed value, further clarity
on the workout strategy of the specially serviced malls or the
transfer of additional loans to special servicing.

Downgrades of classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3FL, A-3FX, A-4, A-SB and
X-A would occur should overall loss expectations increase but the
payment priority of the classes would be taken into account. Should
interest shortfalls occur or expected to be incurred classes would
be capped at 'Asf'. Classes A-S, B, C and PEX would be downgraded
further if performance of the FLOCs, primarily Carolina Place,
White Marsh Mall and Rimrock Mall, continues to decline and or loss
expectations increase significantly. Classes D, E and F would be
downgraded further with increased certainty of losses or as losses
are realized.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021. Should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
downgrades could be multiple categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

WFCM 2013-LC12 has an Environmental, Social and Corporate
Governance (ESG) Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to Social
Impacts due to malls that are underperforming as a result of
changing consumer preference to shopping, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the
ratings.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG Credit Relevance is a Score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


WELLS FARGO 2014-NXS1: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-NXS1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

RATING ACTIONS

WFCM 2015-NXS1

Class A-2 94989HAF7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 94989HAJ9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 94989HAM2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 94989HAQ3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 94989HAW0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 94989HAT7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B 94989HBF6; LT AAsf Affirmed; previously at AAsf

Class C 94989HBJ8; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class D 94989HBM1; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 94989HBR0; LT BB-sf Affirmed; previously at BB-sf

Class F 94989HBU3; LT B-sf Affirmed; previously at B-sf

Class PEX 94989HBQ2; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class X-A 94989HAZ3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class X-E 94989HCA6; LT BB-sf Affirmed; previously at BB-sf

Class X-F 94989HCD0; LT B-sf Affirmed; previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relatively Stable Performance: The majority of the pool has
exhibited generally stable performance since issuance. Loss
expectations have increased slightly due to performance
deterioration of the Fitch Loans of Concerns (FLOCs) and cash flow
disruptions to hotel and retail properties as a result of the
coronavirus pandemic. Fitch designated eight loans (16.2% of pool)
as FLOCs, including four loans (12.4%) in the Top 15 and two
specially serviced loans/assets (3.8%). Fitch's current ratings
incorporate a base case loss of 6.5%. The Negative Outlooks factor
in additional stresses related to the coronavirus pandemic, which
reflect losses could reach 7.4%.

FLOC: The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC), is the Best Western
Premier Herald Square (3.4%), a 94-room hotel renovated in 2013
located in New York, NY. Occupancy has dropped from 99% at YE 2019
to 92% as of June 2020 TTM and RevPAR has dropped from $216 at YE
2019 to $163 as of June 2020 TTM due to negative impacts from the
coronavirus pandemic. The servicer reported NOI debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for June 2020 TTM was only 0.85x compared to
1.51x at YE 2019. While the hotel is in a strong location, Fitch
applied a coronavirus-related stress to the 2019 NOI given the
ongoing effects from the coronavirus pandemic. The loan remains
current.

The second biggest FLOC is Hotel Valencia (3.3%), a 213-room,
full-service hotel located in San Antonio, TX. The hotel is located
on the San Antonio River with access to the San Antonio River Walk,
a main entertainment district and tourist attraction. Occupancy has
dropped to 31% as of September 2020 YTD from 74% at YE 2019 and
RevPAR has dropped to $52 as of September 2020 YTD from $129 at YE
2019. As of the YTD September 2020 STR report, the property
reported occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR penetration rates of 97%, 107%
and 104%, respectively. The servicer reported NOI DSCR for
September 2020 TTM was only 0.25x compared to 1.51x at YE 2019. The
loan remains current. Fitch applied a coronavirus-related stress to
the 2019 NOI given the ongoing effects from the coronavirus
pandemic.

The third biggest FLOC and also the biggest specially-serviced loan
in the pool is Hotel Andra (3.0%), which is secured by a a
119-room, full-service unflagged boutique hotel located in Seattle,
WA. The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2020 due to
payment default; the loan is 90+ days delinquent as of November
2020. The special servicer is currently engaged in negotiations
with the borrower for a DIL or stipulated foreclosure. As of the
YTD September 2020 STR report, occupancy, ADR, RevPAR decreased to
84%, $180 and $108, respectively, from 91%, $252 and $229 at
September 2019 TTM. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 2.01x as of
September 2019 TTM. The hotel is currently closed. Based on
subject's relative performance in its competitive set and an
updated appraisal value, Fitch is assuming conservative loss
severity of 29% on the loan; however, actual losses may be lower
given good asset quality and location.

The fourth biggest FLOC, 9990 Richmond Avenue (2.5%), is secured by
a 188,439-sf office building located in Houston, TX. The subject's
occupancy dipped below 80% in 2019 when a previous tenant; Tranzap,
Inc. (10,531 sf/5.63% NRA) rolled over. Per the servicer, the
borrower has a prospect that will occupy this space for a 79-month
term from May 2021; although nothing has been signed yet. The
servicer-reported occupancy and NOI DSCR as of June 2020 YTD was
66.7% and was 1.28x, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.48x at YE
2019. With respect to Selene Finance, the largest tenant at the
property (14.7%, May 2021), the borrower believes the tenant will
renew at the end of its term given that it has occupied the
property since 2007. The loan is currently cash managed with a cash
trap in place.

FLOCs outside the Top 15 include Braun Pointe Shopping Center
(1.1%), a 54,327 sf multi-tenant retail center, built in 2008 and
located in San Antonio, TX. As of March 2020 YTD, the servicer
reported NOI DSCR was 1.31x, a decline from 1.33x at YE 2019 due to
small tenants that rolled over in early 2020. As of October 2020,
the property was occupied by 18 tenants and was 89.6% occupied
compared to 95.8% at YE 2019. Homewood Suites Woodlands (1.1%) is a
91-room, extended stay hotel located in Shenandoah, TX and has been
experiencing performance declines since issuance. Per the borrower,
performance declined due to major renovations which began at the
property in 2016 and also by supply cuts to the oil and gas
industry which affected its corporate accounts. Performance has
further declined in 2020 due to the negative impact from the
coronavirus pandemic. As of June 2020 YTD, the subject reported an
NOI DSCR of 0.54x with 62.32% occupancy and ADR of $109.85 and
RevPAR of $68.46. This compares to the YE 2019 DSCR of 0.82x with
occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR of 73.72%, $119.58, and $88.15,
respectively. The loan is currently cash managed with a cash trap
in place. No other FLOC comprises more than 1% of the pool.

Exposure to Coronavirus: There are five loans (11.7% of pool),
which have a weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR of 1.91x, that are
secured by hotel properties. These hotel loans could sustain a WA
decline in NOI of 43.5% before DSCR falls below 1.00x. Twenty-seven
loans (25.4%), which have a WA NOI DSCR of 1.88x, are secured by
retail properties. These retail loans could sustain a WA decline in
NOI of 42.7% before DSCR falls below 1.00x. Fitch's base case
analysis applied additional stresses to three hotel loans, and six
retail loans given the significant declines in property-level cash
flow expected in the short term as a result of the decrease in
consumer spending and property closures from the coronavirus
pandemic; these additional stresses contributed to the downgrade
and Negative Outlook on classes F and X-F.

Increase in Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the November 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance was
reduced by 19.3% to $770.7 million from $955.2 million at issuance
and 6.7% since Fitch's last rating action. Since issuance, five
loans (4.6% of the issuance pool) have paid off and one loan (9.9%
of the issuance pool) disposed with a loss totaling $953,216. Five
loans (9.7% of pool) are fully defeased. One loan, Quadrangle
Corporate Park (1.2%), is in the process of being fully defeased.
Within the non-defeased loans, four loans (12.7%) are full-term, IO
and 27 loans (54.5%) are partial-IO loans. All partial-IO loans are
currently amortizing. Loan maturities and anticipated repayment
dates (ARDs) are concentrated in in 2020 (5.0%), 2024 (16.8%) and
2025 (77.3%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through E reflect the
overall stable performance of the majority of the pool and expected
continued amortization. The Negative Rating Outlook on classes F
reflects the potential for downgrade due to concerns surrounding
the ultimate impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the performance
concerns associated with the FLOCs, which include two specially
serviced loans.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades would include
stable to improved asset performance, coupled with additional
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the 'A-sf'- and
'AA-sf'-rated classes are not expected but would likely occur with
significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance and/or the
stabilization to the properties impacted from the coronavirus
pandemic. Upgrade of the 'BBB-sf' class is considered unlikely and
would be limited based on the sensitivity to concentrations or the
potential for future concentrations. Classes would not be upgraded
above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. An
upgrade to the 'Bsf'-rated class is not likely unless the
performance of the remaining pool stabilizes and the senior classes
pay off.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades to classes A-1 through A-S and the IO
class X-A are not likely due to the position in the capital
structure, but may occur should interest shortfalls occur.
Downgrades to classes B, and C are possible should performance of
the FLOCs continue to decline; should loans susceptible to the
coronavirus pandemic not stabilize; and/or should further loans
transfer to special servicing. Classes D, E, F, X-D and X-F could
be downgraded should the specially-serviced loan not return to the
master servicer and/or as there is more certainty of loss
expectations. The Rating Outlooks on these classes may be revised
back to Stable if performance of the FLOCs improves and/or
properties vulnerable to the coronavirus stabilize once the
pandemic is over.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, classes with Negative Rating
Outlooks will be downgraded one or more categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C27: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class F Certs to CCC
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C27 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C27 as follows:

-- Class X-B to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class D to BB (high) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class E to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class F to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the ratings on the
remaining classes as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar removed Classes F and X-F from Under Review with
Negative Implications, where it placed them on August 6, 2020. The
trend on Class X-F is Negative. DBRS Morningstar changed the trends
on Classes D, E, X-B, and X-E to Negative from Stable, and all
remaining trends are Stable. DBRS Morningstar assigned the Interest
in Arrears designation for Class F. The Negative trends and rating
downgrades reflect the continued performance challenges for the
underlying collateral, mainly driven by the impacts of the global
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Per the November 2020
remittance report, there are five loans representing 10.2% of the
pool in special servicing, including the largest loan, Westfield
Palm Desert (Prospectus ID#1 – 6.9% of the trust balance). The
pool has a significant concentration of retail and hospitality
properties, representing 24.6% and 21.3% of the pool balance,
respectively. These property types have been the most severely
affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and, as
such, those concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool,
particularly at the lower rating categories.

At issuance, the trust consisted of 95 loans secured by 124
commercial and multifamily properties with a total trust balance of
$1.047 billion. Per the November 2020 remittance report, there were
84 loans secured by 112 commercial and multifamily properties
remaining in the trust with a total trust balance of $903.9
million, representing a 13.7% collateral reduction since issuance.
The trust realized a $949,467 loss in June 2019 following the
liquidation of the Country Club Apartments loan (Prospectus ID#53),
and the losses have been accruing because of the reimbursement of
nonrecoverable advances related to the Peoria Multifamily Portfolio
loan (Prospectus ID#78 – 0.3% of the trust balance).

Per the November 2020 remittance report, nine loans, representing
9.3% of the trust balance, were fully defeased. The pool is
relatively granular, as the 15 largest loans represent 51.4% of the
trust balance. Near-term loan maturity risk is minimal, as there is
only one loan (Watson & Taylor Self Storage – Prospectus ID#71)
that has a loan maturity date prior to December 2024. As previously
mentioned, the pool is concentrated by property type, with retail
and hospitality properties representing 45.9% of the trust balance.
The properties displayed sufficient preceding year-end debt service
coverage ratios (DSCRs), with the retail properties exhibiting a
weighted-average (WA) DSCR of 2.31 times (x) and hospitality
properties exhibiting a WA DSCR of 1.49x. These reported DSCRs
reflect operations prior to the coronavirus pandemic. Six loans,
representing 8.9% of the trust balance, have sponsorship with
negative credit events prior to issuance. DBRS Morningstar
increased the probability of default for the loans with sponsorship
concerns.

There are five loans in special servicing, including Westfield Palm
Desert, which is 90 to 120 days delinquent and is secured by a
572,724-sf portion of a 977,888-sf regional mall in Palm Desert,
California. The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020
for delinquent payments, with the servicer reporting it is
proceeding with foreclosure while also negotiating with the
borrower for a potential loan modification. The mall anchors
include Macy's, JCPenney, and a former Sears space. The largest
collateral tenants include Dick's Sporting Goods, Tristone Cinemas,
and Barnes & Noble. As of March 2020, the subject reported a DSCR
of 1.58x, a decline compared with the YE2019 and YE2018 DSCR
figures of 1.97x and 2.26x, respectively. Given the cash flow
declines from issuance, as well as the dark anchor in Sears and the
bankruptcy filing for JCPenney, the risks for this loan
significantly increased since issuance, particularly when
considering the extended delinquency and possibility of
foreclosure. As such, DBRS Morningstar liquidated the loan in the
analysis for this review, with a loss severity exceeding 50.0%.

An additional 26 loans, totaling 28.2% of the trust balance, are on
the servicer's watchlist. DBRS Morningstar is closely monitoring
the 312 Elm (Prospectus ID#3 – 4.9% of the trust balance) and 312
Plum (Prospectus ID#17 – 1.9% of the trust balance) loans because
they are secured by Class A office buildings in downtown Cincinnati
that had significant occupancy rate declines since issuance. The
sponsor simultaneously acquired the two similar properties in 2015,
and both properties have lost their primary tenants since issuance.
The sponsor has been unable to improve the occupancy rates for the
312 Elm property and 312 Plum property, which totaled 64.0% and
60.9%, respectively, as of June 2020. Both properties had a below
breakeven DSCR for YE2019, but the borrower has been keeping loan
payments current. Reis data has indicated that office demand for
the Cincinnati central business district will weaken in the near
term, primarily as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The
properties could be vulnerable to the sponsor's adverse selection,
and the stabilization process is likely to be lengthy. DBRS
Morningstar is also monitoring the upcoming December 2022 lease
expiration of Gannett Satellite at the 312 Elm property because The
Enquirer, the major local newspaper and part of Gannett Satellite's
portfolio of national news organizations, occupies 28.9% of the net
rentable area. When reviewing both loans, DBRS Morningstar enhanced
its probability of default assumptions.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C30: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-FG Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C30 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C30 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar discontinued the rating on Class A-2
as it was paid out as of the November 2020 remittance.

Classes E, F, G, X-E, and X-FG were removed from Under Review with
Negative Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020. The
trends on these classes are Negative. All other trends are Stable.
The Negative trends reflect the continued performance challenges
for the underlying collateral, much of which has been driven by the
impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In addition
to loans representing 3.3% of the pool being in special servicing
as of the November 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes
that the pool has a significant concentration in retail and
hospitality properties, representing 22.5% and 12.4% of the pool
balance, respectively. These property types have been the most
severely affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus
pandemic and, as such, those concentrations suggest increased risks
for the pool, particularly at the lower rating categories, since
issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 95 of the original 101 loans
remain in the pool, representing a 7.9% reduction of collateral.
There are three loans, representing 3.3% of the pool, with the
special servicer, the largest of which, Sheraton Crescent Phoenix
(Prospectus ID#16, 1.3% of the pool), is secured by a 342-room
full-service hotel in Phoenix. The loan had performed well,
reporting a 2018 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.02 times
(x), but experienced a sharp decline in 2019, prior to the
coronavirus pandemic, when it reported a DSCR of 0.92x. While the
franchise agreement with Sheraton Crescent Phoenix runs through
2032 and the hotel was last renovated in 2014, the 2019 operating
statement reported a 17.9% increase in general expenses when
compared with the issuer's underwritten level. Of specific concern,
the franchise fee increased by 58.9% since issuance and 45.3% over
the prior year. Additionally, repair and maintenance items
increased by 26.8% since issuance and 5.7% over the prior year. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in March 2020 and the
servicer has not provided any additional information regarding the
increase in franchise fees. However, a May 2020 inspection noted
roof repairs as well as some room repairs were ongoing. The hotel
was re-appraised in October 2020 at $11 million ($32,164 per room),
which is encouraging as it remains above the $9.1 million loan
balance. The servicer comments indicate they are working toward an
agreement for temporary debt relief. DBRS Morningstar expects the
loan will return to the master servicer once a modification is in
place.

There are 29 loans, representing 27.6% of the pool, on the
servicer's watchlist. These loans are being monitored for various
reasons including low DSCR or occupancy, tenant rollover risk,
and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests. Three of the
watchlisted loans, collectively representing 7.0% of the pool
balance, have received temporary debt relief. The largest of these
three is the Hilton Garden Inn – Downtown Denver loan (Prospectus
ID#4, 4.5% of the pool balance), followed by the Best Western
Brooklyn loan (Prospectus ID#17, 1.4% of the pool balance) and the
Holiday Inn Winter Haven loan (Prospectus ID#21, 1.2% of the pool
balance). The servicer noted the Hilton Garden Inn – Downtown
Denver and the Holiday Inn Winter Haven have each begun repayment
of past due debt service as of the November 2020 remittance. Also
of concern is the Plaza Diamond Bar loan (Prospectus ID#13, 1.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a 61,857-square-foot office/retail
property that is about 30 miles east of Los Angeles. The largest
tenant is Horizon University, a Christian educational institution
accounting for 10% of the property's gross leasable area, which has
a lease expiration in August 2021. It is unclear at this time if
the tenant will renew or vacate. Although historical performance
has been strong with a 2019 DSCR of 1.51x and 87% occupancy, the
borrower notified the master servicer of coronavirus-related
hardship and the loan is now delinquent. DBRS Morningstar expects
an imminent transfer to the special servicer.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C31: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Limited. confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C31 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C31 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

Classes D, E, F, and X-D were removed from Under Review with
Negative Implications where they were placed on August 6, 2020.
With this review, the trends Classes E and F are Negative, while
the trends on the remaining classes remain Stable.

In general, the pool has performed as expected at issuance, despite
the high concentration of loans secured by retail properties
(25.9%) and lodging properties (21.1%) in the remaining pool as of
the November 2020 remittance. Of the original 102 loans, 94 loans
remain, representing a collateral reduction of 7.3% since issuance.
Five loans, representing 3.3% of the current pool balance, are
fully defeased. Based on the YE2019 financials, the pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.69
times (x), compared with the Issuer's DSCR of 1.63x. As of the
November 2020 remittance, 21 loans, representing 31.5% of the pool,
are on the servicer's watchlist, and four loans are in special
servicing representing 2.5% of the pool. The watchlisted loans are
being monitored for various reasons, including delinquent payments,
servicing trigger events, low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs),
and/or Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic-related forbearance
requests.

The largest loan in special servicing is Holiday Inn Lafayette
(Prospectus ID#23, 1.2% of the pool), which was liquidated from the
pool for this analysis. The loan is secured by a 147-key
full-service hotel located in Lafayette, Indiana. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2019 for delinquent
payments. As of the November 2020 remittance, the loan was over 120
days delinquent and the servicer has reported a July 2020 appraised
value of $13.0 million, well below the issuance value of $17.2
million and the first appraisal obtained by the special servicer,
dated October 2019, that showed an as-is value of $18.8 million. As
of November 2020, the trust exposure to the loan was just shy of
$11.8 million, with the July 2020 suggesting value outside the
trust; however, DBRS Morningstar believes the value could further
deteriorate as the effects of the pandemic bear out, and, as such,
a 20.0% haircut to the July 2020 valuation was assumed in the
analysis for this review, resulting in a loss severity in excess of
20.0% in the DBRS Morningstar liquidation scenario.

According to the November 2020 remittance, 21 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 31.5% of the current pool
balance. The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, Sheraton
Lincoln Harbor Hotel (Prospecus ID#2, 6.5% of the pool), is being
monitored for a low DSCR. The servicer reported a T-12 ended June
2020 DSCR of 0.35x, down from the YE2019 DSCR of 1.53x. The decline
in DSCR is directly attributable to disruptions to the lodging
industry as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The loan first
went late with the November 2020 reporting, where the loan showed
late but less than 30 days delinquent. The loan was analyzed with a
probability of default penalty to increase the expected loss in the
analysis for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2015-SG1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-SG1 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-SG1 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

With this rating action, Classes D, E, F, X-E, and X-F were removed
from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were
placed on August 6, 2020. The trends on these classes are Negative.
DBRS Morningstar also changed the trends on Classes B, C, and PEX
to Negative from Stable. All other trends are Stable.

The Negative trends reflect the continued performance challenges
for the underlying collateral, much of which has been driven by the
impacts of the global Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In
addition to loans representing 16.7% of the pool in special
servicing and 43.3% of the pool on the servicer's watchlist as of
the November 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes the pool
has a high concentration of retail and hospitality properties,
representing 35.0% and 22.3% of the pool balance, respectively.
These property types have been the most severely affected by the
initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic and as such, those
concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance. Based on the
year-end (YE) 2019 financials, the pool reported a weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.76 times (x), compared
to the YE2018 WA DSCR of 1.78x with the Issuer's WA DSCR of 1.66x.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 69 of the original 72 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 9.1%
since issuance. One loan, representing 0.5% of the pool is fully
defeased. There are eight loans, representing 16.7% of the pool, in
special servicing, including the second-largest loan in the pool,
Boca Park Marketplace (Prospectus ID#2, 6.8% of the current pool
balance). This loan is secured by an anchored retail property
located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and was transferred to special
servicing at the borrower's request due to the impact of the
coronavirus pandemic. As of the November 2020 remittance, the loan
is over 90 days delinquent and a resolution strategy has not yet
been determined. The property reported a healthy occupancy rate of
99.0% as of the servicer's July 2020 site inspection, with the
largest tenant in Ross Dress for Less, which represents 20.7% of
the net rentable area (NRA) and is on a lease extending until
January 2022. The immediate vicinity includes national tenants such
as Whole Foods, Barnes & Noble, Target, Walgreens, and Kohl's.
Considering the loan's delinquency status and uncertainty
surrounding the workout plan, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan
with an elevated probability of default (PoD) to increase the
expected loss for this review.

According to the November 2020 remittance, 20 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 43.3% of the current pool
balance. These loans are being monitored for various reasons,
including a low DSCR or occupancy figure, deferred maintenance,
and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests. The largest loan in
the pool, Patrick Henry Mall (Prospectus ID#1, 9.7% of the current
pool balance), was recently placed on the servicer's watchlist in
September 2020 as the Q2 2020 DSCR was below threshold at 1.18x,
compared with the YE2019 DSCR of 1.53x. The loan is secured by a
430,000 square foot (sf) portion of a 717,000 sf regional mall
located in Newport News, Virginia. The mall is owned and operated
by Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust (PREIT), which filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in early November 2020 with the company
citing the impact of the coronavirus pandemic as a driver for the
filing. A prepackaged financial restructuring plan was recently
confirmed by the bankruptcy court and PREIT is expected to emerge
from bankruptcy before the end of the year or in early 2021.

The subject mall is anchored by a noncollateral Macy's and
Dillard's, as well as a collateral JCPenney and DICK'S Sporting
Goods. Although JCPenney remains open as of November 2020, it is
noteworthy that the retailer, which occupies 19.7% of the NRA, had
a lease expiration of October 2020 and the renewal status is
unknown, with a leasing update pending from the servicer as of the
date of this press release. Given the increased risks from
issuance, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan with an elevated PoD
to increase the expected loss for this review.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C36: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G-1 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C36 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C36 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E-2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class F-2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class EF at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-1 at B (sf)
-- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)

Classes F-2, EF, F, G-1, G-2, G, and EFG were removed from Under
Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on August
6, 2020. With this review, the trends for those classes are
Negative. In addition, DBRS Morningstar changed the trend for Class
F-1 to Negative from Stable; all other trends remain Stable. DBRS
Morningstar assigned the Interest in Arrears designation to Classes
G-2, G, and EFG.

The Negative trends reflect the continued performance challenges
for the underlying collateral, much of which has been driven by the
impact of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. In
addition to the seven loans representing 27.5% of the pool in
special servicing as of the November 2020 remittance, DBRS
Morningstar notes that the pool has a high concentration of retail
properties, representing 30.6% of the pool. Three of the four
largest specially serviced loans are backed by regional mall
properties, collectively representing 17.9% of the pool; all have
shown performance declines since issuance that were in place prior
to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic that are expected to be
exacerbated over the near term. In general, retail properties have
been severely affected by the initial effects of the coronavirus
pandemic and, as such, the high concentration of loans backed by
retail property types suggests increased risks for the pool since
issuance, particularly for the lower rating categories.

The seven loans in special servicing are Gurnee Mills (Prospectus
ID#1; 9.0% of the pool), Easton Town Center (Prospectus ID#5; 5.5%
of the pool), Conrad Indianapolis (Prospectus ID#6; 3.6% of the
pool), Mall at Turtle Creek (Prospectus ID#7; 3.4% of the pool),
Home2 Suites – Long Island City (Prospectus ID#8; 2.9% of the
pool), DoubleTree Dallas Near the Galleria (Prospectus ID#14; 2.2%
of the pool), and Holiday Inn Express & Suites Cooperstown
(Prospectus ID#25; 0.9% of the pool).

The largest loan in special servicing, Gurnee Mills, is secured by
a single-level enclosed regional mall totalling 1.9 million square
feet (sf), of which 1.7 million sf is part of the collateral. Simon
Property Group (Simon) owns and operates the collateral portion of
the property. At issuance, the largest tenants were Sears, Bass Pro
Shops, and Macy's. The Sears was closed in 2018 and the sponsor has
yet to back-fill the space. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in June 2020 as a result of monetary default related to
the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. The loan was last paid in
April 2020, according to the November 2020 remittance. Simon has
submitted a coronavirus-related relief request, which is still
being evaluated by the special servicer.

Performance for the subject property was on the decline prior to
the coronavirus pandemic, with cash flow trending downward for the
past three consecutive years. The 2019 year-end net cash flow (NCF)
decreased 11.1% compared with year-end 2018 and declined 17.5%
compared with the issuer's NCF. DBRS Morningstar notes the
increased risks for the loan from issuance given the extended
delinquency, difficulty in back-filling the former Sears space, and
the property's exposure to struggling retailers including Macy's.
Given these factors, as well as the decline in performance prior to
the pandemic, DBRS Morningstar applied a stressed probability of
default (PoD) for this loan in the analysis for this review,
increasing the expected loss.

All of the loans in special servicing are secured by retail and
hospitality property types and all transferred to the special
servicer after the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic. Two of
the seven specially serviced loans, Conrad Indianapolis and
DoubleTree Dallas Near the Galleria, have reported updated values
since the transfer. In both cases, the June 2020 values showed
declines from issuance, but still implied value just above the
trust and/or pari passu A note balances. In instances where the
specially serviced loans were exhibiting signs of increased credit
risk since issuance, a stressed PoD was applied to increase the
expected loss in the analysis for this review.

As of the November 2020 remittance, all 73 of the original loans
remain in the pool with a collateral reduction of 11.1% since
issuance. Three loans, representing 1.44% of the pool, are fully
defeased. Additionally, there are 19 loans, representing 19.7% of
the current trust balance, being monitored on the servicer's
watchlist. These loans are being monitored for a variety of
reasons, including low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
occupancy issues; however, the primary reason for the increase of
loans on the servicer's watchlist is for hospitality and retail
properties with a low DSCR stemming from disruptions related to
coronavirus. Where merited, these and any other loans in the pool
showing signs of increased stress from issuance were analyzed with
an elevated PoD and expected loss.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS5: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to CCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the ratings on nine classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C28 issued by Wells
Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-NXS5 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class X-B to AA (low) (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class B to A (high) (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C to BBB (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E to BB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F to B (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class F to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class X-G to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class G to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

The trends on these classes are Negative, excluding Class G, which
carries no trend. DBRS Morningstar also removed Classes D, E, F, G,
X-F, and X-G from Under Review with Negative Implications, where
they were placed on August 6, 2020.

In addition, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the ratings on the
remaining classes as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-6FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-6FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

The trends on these classes are Stable.

The Negative trends and rating downgrades reflect the continued
performance challenges facing the underlying collateral, much of
which has been driven by the impacts of the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) global pandemic. In addition to the seven loans in
special servicing, representing 9.5% of the current pool balance,
as of the November 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes
that the pool has a high concentration of retail and hospitality
properties, representing 29.6% and 17.5% of the pool balance,
respectively. The initial effects of the coronavirus pandemic have
affected these property types most severely and, as such, those
concentrations suggest increased risks for the pool, particularly
at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 61 of the original 64 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 16.4%
since issuance. Seven loans, representing 9.5% of the current pool
balance, are in special servicing. Five of these loans,
representing 5.7% of the current pool balance, were in special
servicing prior to the coronavirus outbreak and are either real
estate owned or in various stages of foreclosure. DBRS Morningstar
expects all of these loans to take losses upon their final
resolution, with loss severities ranging from 40% to 80%. The
remaining two loans in special servicing, representing 3.8% of the
current pool balance, are recent transfers to special servicing as
a result of coronavirus impacts.

The Shoppes at Zion (Prospectus ID#11; 3.0% of the pool), which is
60 days to 89 days delinquent, is secured by a 118,433 square foot
(sf) retail plaza in St. George, Utah. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2020 for imminent monetary default as a
result of tenant hardship. While the loan reported an annualized
debt service coverage ratio of 1.13 times (x) as of Q2 2020, the
borrower has been uncooperative since requesting and being denied a
forbearance. The property has a mixture of local and national
retailers and restaurants, and generally drives a portion of demand
from tourists exploring the nearby national parks, including the
Grand Canyon. Given the collateral's performance decline, paired
with the borrower's unresponsiveness, DBRS Morningstar analyzed
this loan with an elevated probability of default. Comfort Inn York
(Prospectus ID#42; 0.8% of the pool), which is 30 days to 59 days
delinquent, is secured by 129-key, limited-service hotel in York,
Pennsylvania. The loan transferred to special servicing for
monetary default in June 2020 and, at this point, the workout
strategy is still being assessed. Prior to the coronavirus
outbreak, the loan had performed well, most recently reporting a
year-end (YE) 2018 DSCR of 1.42x.

According to the November 2020 remittance, 18 loans are on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 18.9% of the current pool
balance. These loans are being monitored for various reasons,
including low DSCR or occupancy, tenant rollover risk, and/or
pandemic-related forbearance requests. Two loans, representing 2.1%
of the current pool balance, are fully defeased. Based on the most
recent YE financials, the pool had a weighted-average DSCR of
1.65x, relatively in line with the Issuer's figures, demonstrating
the lack of overall cash flow growth and the performance challenges
facing the underlying collateral.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-NXS6 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-NXS6 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

DBRS Morningstar removed Classes F, G, and X-FG from Under Review
with Negative Implications, where it placed them on August 6, 2020.
All trends are Stable, with the exception of Classes F, G and X-FG,
which have Negative trends. In addition, DBRS Morningstar placed
the Interest in Arrears designation on Class G. The Negative trends
reflect the elevated risk profile of two loans in the top 10, which
have been adversely affected by the ongoing Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic, as well as the concentration of loans in
special servicing, which represent 15.2% of the pool. The pool has
a high concentration of loans backed by retail properties in the
transaction, representing 26.7% of the pool balance. As retail
properties have been particularly hard hit amid the coronavirus
pandemic, this concentration is noteworthy.

As of the November 2020 remittance, all 50 loans remain in the
pool, with scheduled amortization resulting in 3.0% of collateral
reduction since issuance. Three loans, representing 1.9% of the
current pool balance, are fully defeased. There are six loans in
special servicing, including the sixth-largest loan in the pool,
Cassa Times Square Mixed-Use (Prospectus ID #6, 4.7% of the pool
balance), which is more than 121 days delinquent and is secured by
a mixed-use property in New York City. Before the pandemic, the
collateral achieved occupancy rates above 90.0%, with a YE2019 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.98 times (x), according to the
servicer. The loan was transferred to special servicing in May
2020, with the servicer reporting it's pursuing foreclosure. The
June 2020 appraisal obtained by the special servicer estimated an
as-is value of $32.1 million, a 53.4% decline compared with the
issuance appraisal value of $68.9 million and just below the
outstanding trust balance of $34.2 million. Given the sharp value
decline and the challenges facing the property amid the pandemic,
DBRS Morningstar applied an elevated probability of default in the
analysis for this loan to significantly increase the expected
loss.

The second-largest loan in special servicing is Sixty Soho
(Prospectus ID#10, 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 97-key
full-service hotel in New York City. The loan first went delinquent
in May 2020 and has hovered between 30 days and 90+ days delinquent
since. The loan was transferred to special servicing in October
2020. Prior to the loan's transfer to special servicing, the
servicer approved a coronavirus relief request with a modification
that allowed for reserve funds to be applied to the outstanding
debt service payments due for April, May, and June 2020. However,
as of the November 2020 remittance, the loan is listed as 90 to 120
days delinquent, and the servicer is still determining a workout
strategy. An updated appraisal has not been finalized yet, but
given the difficulties for the property and the hospitality sector
overall, the as-is value has likely declined significantly from
issuance. Given these factors, DBRS Morningstar analyzed this loan
with a higher probability of default to significantly increase the
expected loss. According to the November 2020 remittance, 14 loans
are on the servicer's watchlist, representing 24.2% of the current
pool balance. The servicer is monitoring these loans for various
reasons, including a low DSCR or occupancy figure, tenant rollover
risk, and/or pandemic-related forbearance requests.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2019-C53: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on K-RR Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-C53 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2019-C53:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class H-RR at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class J-RR at B (high) (sf)
-- Class K-RR at B (low) (sf)

Classes H-RR, J-RR, and K-RR were removed from Under Review with
Negative Implications, where they were placed on August 20, 2020.
All trends are Stable. Although all classes have a Stable trend,
there are continued performance challenges for the underlying
collateral, many of which have been driven by the impact of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In addition to loans
representing 0.8% of the pool being in special servicing as of the
October 2020 remittance, DBRS Morningstar also notes that the pool
has a moderate concentration of hospitality and retail properties,
representing 10.9% and 19.9% of the pool balance, respectively.
These property types have been the most severely affected by the
initial impact of the coronavirus pandemic and, as such, those
concentrations are suggestive of slightly increased risks for the
pool, particularly at the lower rating categories, since issuance.

The transaction is concentrated by property type as seven loans,
representing 25.3% of the current trust balance, are secured by
office assets, whereas 14 loans, representing 19.9% of the current
trust balance, are secured by retail assets. Self storage
collateral makes up the third-largest concentration, representing
eight loans and 11.6% of the current trust balance. According to
the October 2020 remittance, there is one loan, representing 0.8%
of the current trust balance, in special servicing. The loan is
secured by a retail asset: 101 NE 40th Street - FL (Prospectus
ID#32; 0.8% of the current trust balance).

101 NE 40th Street - FL is secured by a single-tenant, 5,000-sf
retail property in Miami, Florida, and was transferred to the
special servicer in September 2020 given the ongoing effects of the
coronavirus pandemic. The property's single tenant, Theory (with a
lease that expires in March 2022), stopped paying rent when forced
to close as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. As of October,
the tenant has resumed paying rent and is in negotiations with the
borrower on a possible lease modification to have some of the past
due rent abated and the rest paid back over several months. The
loan advanced to 121-plus days past due in October. As of October
2020, the servicer reported the workout strategy as dual-tracking
foreclosure as it negotiates a possible loan modification with the
borrower. At issuance, the collateral for the loan had an appraisal
value of $10.5 million, equating to an LTV of 51.4%. DBRS
Morningstar believes that while the subject is not immune to the
short-term stressors from the pandemic, the property's long-term
outlook could be hampered by the headwinds in the luxury retail
industry and declining tourism volume. Given that short-term demand
remains suppressed, DBRS Morningstar will continue to monitor the
situation for developments.

As of the October 2020 remittance, all 58 original loans remain in
the pool. No loans are defeased. Additionally, there are eight
loans, representing 10.2% of the current trust balance, on the
servicer's watchlist. These loans are being monitored for a variety
of reasons including low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
occupancy, and deferred maintenance issues; however, the primary
reason for many of the more recent transfers is for hospitality
properties with a low DSCR stemming from disruptions related to the
coronavirus pandemic. At issuance, the pool reported a
weighted-average DSCR of 1.97 times (x).

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C9: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed its ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C9 issued by WFRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C9 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

Class F was removed from Under Review with Negative Implications,
where it was placed on August 6, 2020. All trends are Stable.
Although all classes have a Stable trend, there are continued
performance challenges for the underlying collateral, many of which
have been driven by the impact of the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. In addition to loans representing 4.5% of the
pool being in special servicing as of the November 2020 remittance,
DBRS Morningstar also notes that the pool has a high concentration
of hospitality and retail properties, representing 18.1% and 39.6%
of the pool balance, respectively. These property types have been
the most severely affected by the initial impact of the coronavirus
pandemic and, as such, those concentrations are suggestive of
slightly increased risks for the pool, particularly at the lower
rating categories, since issuance.

The transaction is concentrated by property type as 17 loans,
representing 39.6% of the current trust balance, are secured by
retail assets whereas 12 loans, representing 21.0% of the current
trust balance, are secured by office assets. Lodging collateral
makes up the third-largest concentration, representing 12 loans and
18.1% of the current trust balance. According to the November 2020
remittance, there are three loans, representing 4.5% of the current
trust balance, in special servicing, both loans are secured by
hotel assets: Hilton Garden Troy (Prospectus ID#18; 1.9% of the
current trust balance), Homewood Suites Houston (Prospectus ID#27;
1.5% of the current trust balance) and Hilton Garden Inn Columbia
(Prospectus ID#37; 1.1% of the current trust balance).

The Hilton Garden Troy is secured by a 127-room, full-service hotel
property in Troy, New York, and was transferred to the special
servicer in August 2020 given the ongoing effects of the
coronavirus pandemic. The loan was already under some stress prior
to 2020, as ongoing renovations impaired net cash flow in 2019,
contributing to a reduction in NCF of 21% from 2018. As of October
2020, the servicer reported a modification has been completed and
the loan is in process of being returned to the master servicer. At
issuance, the collateral for the loan had an appraisal value of
$27.0 million, equating to an LTV of 65%. DBRS Morningstar believes
that while the subject is not immune to the short-term stressors
from the pandemic, the property's long-term outlook could be more
positive than other tertiary lodging properties given the subject's
proximity to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, which has an
enrollment of around 7,500 students, and Samaritan Hospital. Given
that short-term demand remains suppressed, DBRS Morningstar will
continue to monitor the situation for developments.

As of the November 2020 remittance, 64 of the original 73 loans
remain in the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 29.6%
since issuance. Nineteen loans, representing 33.0% of the current
pool balance, are fully defeased. Additionally, there are 11 loans,
representing 14.3% of the current trust balance, on the servicer's
watchlist per the November 2020 remittance. These loans are being
monitored for a variety of reasons including low debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR), occupancy, and deferred maintenance issues;
however, the primary reason for many of the more recent transfers
is for hospitality properties with a low DSCR stemming from
disruptions related to the coronavirus pandemic. Based on the
October 2020 remittance, the pool reported a weighted-average DSCR
of 1.60 times (x) compared with the issuer's issuance DSCR of
1.57x.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C23: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C23 issued by WFRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C23 as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-Y at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

The trends on Classes X-C, E, X-D, and F are Negative while the
trends on all other classes are Stable. DBRS Morningstar also
removed the ratings on Classes X-B, D, X-C, E, X-D, and F from
Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on
August 6, 2020.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. The Negative trends on Classes X-C, E, X-D, and F
reflect continued performance issues with loans secured by retail
and hotel properties, which the ongoing Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic has disproportionately affected; these loans
represent 31.0% of the current pool balance. As of November 2020
reporting, two loans are in special servicing, representing 4.0% of
the current pool balance, and 25 loans are on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 24.5% of the current pool balance.

As of November 2020, the transaction consisted of 82 loans
totalling $827.4 million. Ten of the original 92 loans have been
repaid, resulting in collateral reduction of 12.1% including loan
amortization. The transaction benefits from a concentration of
office collateral as eight loans, representing 29.2% of the current
pool balance, are secured by office properties, which have shown
greater resilience to cash flow declines during the pandemic. This
includes the largest loan in the transaction, Bank of America Plaza
(14.1% of the current pool balance), which is secured by an office
tower in downtown Los Angeles. Additionally, 11 loans, representing
5.1% of the current pool balance, are secured by defeasance
collateral.

The largest loan in special servicing, 677 Broadway (Prospectus
ID#6, 3.1% of the current pool balance), was brought current with
the November 2020 remittance. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2020 for imminent default following the loss of
two major tenants—McNamee, Lochner, Titus & Williams, P.C. (12.9%
of the net rentable area (NRA)) and Fuller O'Brien Gallagher (8.9%
of the NRA)—bringing occupancy down to its current rate of 67.0%.
In addition, Jackson Lewis P.C. (14.5% of the NRA) announced that
it would reduce its footprint by 9,900 square feet (sf; 5.6% of the
NRA) in February 2021, maintaining its status as the largest tenant
with 15,731 sf (8.9% of the NRA). According to the initial asset
summary report from July 2020, the borrower submitted a loan
modification proposal while the mezzanine lender was pursuing
foreclosure pursuant to the intercreditor agreement. As of November
2020 reporting, the loan was listed with foreclosure as the workout
strategy. The sponsor used loan proceeds of $28.9 million, along
with $6.6 million in borrower equity and $3.4 million in mezzanine
debt, to fund the acquisition of the collateral, a Class A office
property totalling 177,039 sf on the outskirts of the central
business district of Albany, New York. Per the July 2020 appraisal,
the property had an as-is value of $16.0 million ($90 per sf
(psf)), well below the appraised value of $39.0 million ($220 psf)
at issuance, reflecting a value reduction of 59.0%. While DBRS
Morningstar views the value decline as a major credit risk, DBRS
Morningstar is awaiting an update on the special servicer's workout
strategy and, if the mezzanine lender forecloses on the borrower,
its plan to stabilize the property.

The second loan in special servicing, Hampton Inn & Suites Lenox
(Prospectus ID#21, 0.9% of the current pool balance), is currently
121+ days delinquent; however, a modification was reportedly
executed in October 2020, which would result in the loan's
correction and return to the master servicer in Q1 2021. The terms
of the relief package include a nine-month forbearance followed by
interest-only (IO) payments for the following 15 months. The loan
is secured by a 79-key, limited-service hotel in Lenox,
Massachusetts.

Of the 25 loans on the servicer's watchlist, seven loans (17.4% of
the current pool balance) were added for performance-related
declines, three loans (3.9% of the current pool balance) were added
for increased vacancy (3.9% of the current pool balance), four
loans (1.1% of the current pool balance) were added as a result of
deferred maintenance discovered in the properties' most recent
inspection, and one loan (0.1% of the current pool balance) was
added for delayed financial reporting. The remaining 10 loans (2.0%
of the current pool balance) are secured by cooperative housing
properties and, despite their inclusion on the servicer's
watchlist, benefit from extremely low leverage as exhibited by
their weighted-average loan-to-value ratio of 14.5% at issuance.

Crossings at Corona (Prospectus ID#2, 8.6% of the current pool
balance) was added to the watchlist in April 2018 following Toys
"R" Us (7.6% of the NRA) vacating its space as part of its
corporate liquidation. Occupancy trended downward to 79% as of June
2020 and financial performance followed suit, most recently
reflected in the annualized debt service coverage ratio of 0.99
times. However, the loan remains current as of November 2020 with
approximately $11.0 million in reserves, most of which the earnout
reserve of $6.5 million (which has not yet been released based on
the criteria) funded. The loan is secured by an 834,075-sf power
center in Corona, California, approximately 50 miles southeast of
Los Angeles. Developed in four phases between 2004 and 2007, Target
shadow anchors the property alongside collateral anchor tenants,
including Kohl's (10.4% of the NRA; expiring January 2024), Regal
Cinemas (9.6% of the NRA; expiring November 2024), and Best Buy
(5.4% of the NRA; expiring March 2024).

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WFRBS COMMERIAL 2014-LC14: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2014-LC14 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

RATING ACTIONS

WFRBS 2014-LC14

Class A-3FL 96221TBC0; LT PIFsf Paid In Full; previously AAAsf

Class A-3FX 96221TBE6; LT PIFsf Paid In Full; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 96221TAD9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-5 96221TAE7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 96221TAG2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 96221TAF4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 96221TAK3; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 96221TAL1; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 96221TAQ0; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E 96221TAS6; LT BBsf Affirmed; previously BBsf

Class F 96221TAU1; LT CCCsf Affirmed; previously CCCsf

Class PEX 96221TAM9; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class X-A 96221TAH0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 96221TAJ6; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC), Slight Decrease in Loss
Expectations: Fitch has designated 20 FLOC (46.9% of the pool)
including four specially serviced loans (8.2%); eight (35.4%) FLOC
are within the top 15. Loss expectations have declined since the
last review due to a combination of paydowns (30.5% since
Issuance), including The Outlets at Jersey Gardens ($80 million),
which paid off in November 2020; the sale of two REO properties and
one negotiated payoff in the last year for a combined recognized
loss of $9.2 million; defeased loan increases to 14.8% of the pool;
and the improvement in performance of select properties. These
improvements were largely offset by property performance
deterioration related to the coronavirus pandemic Four loans,
including Williams Center Towers (4.9%), West Side Mall (2.8%),
H.H. Gregg - Boca Raton (0.7%) and Hampton Inn Austin (1.2%) are
the largest contributors to current modeled losses. Fitch's current
ratings incorporate a base case loss of 5.0%; however, losses could
reach 6.4% after additional stresses related to the pandemic are
applied to the pool.

The largest FLOC is the AmericasMart (13.6% of pool), which is
secured by a wholesale trade market that consists of four
interconnected buildings totaling approximately 4.6 million
rentable sf. The property, with more than 10,000 hotel rooms within
a 1/2-mile radius, is located in the Atlanta CBD within 20 minutes
of Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. The property,
which caters to a variety of retailers, wholesalers and
manufacturers that engage in wholesale trading, consists of
approximately 3.5 million sf leased to over 1,500 permanent tenants
and 1.1 million sf of temporary exhibition space that can be leased
during trade shows held throughout the year. According to the
sponsor's website, AmericasMart is open, however, no trade shows
are scheduled until at least January 2021. Historically,
approximately 20%-25% of property revenue has been generated
through these trade shows. Per the June 2020 rent roll, occupancy
for nontrade show space was approximately 79.5% compared to 91% in
2019.

The second largest FLOC and largest Specially Serviced Loan,
Williams Center Towers (4.9%), is secured by two office towers
totaling 765,809 sf located within the CBD of Tulsa, OK. Occupancy
as of July 2020 was 66.6%, down from 91.6% at issuance and 79% as
of September 2019. The largest tenant at issuance, Samson Energy,
first downsized and then completely left the building in 2017 after
filing bankruptcy. The property suffered a further drop in December
2019 when the Bank of Oklahoma terminated its lease. Current
largest tenants include Community Care HMO (17.5% NRA, LXD 2033),
Southwest Power Administration (5.4%, 2033 LXD), Doerner, Saunders,
Daniel and Anderson, LLP (5.2%, 2022 LXD) and McAfee and Taft, PC
(5.0%, 2027 LXD). The loan transferred to Special Servicing in
April 2018 due to a low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) but
remains current with cash management in place.

The third largest FLOC is Canadian Pacific Plaza (4.3%), designated
a FLOC due to its decline in occupancy. The property is a
393,902-sf office building located at 120 South 6th Street in the
CBD of Minneapolis, MN. A large lease Nilan Johnson Lewis PA (19.6%
of NRA) expired in February 2020 and the tenant vacated. The only
remaining large tenant is Soo Line (23.4%, Aug. 2027 LXD) with no
other tenant occupying more than 3% of NRA. Occupancy as of
November 2020 was 65%, down from 87% as of September 2019 and 93%
for YE 2018. DSCR has dropped from 1.92x in 2019 to 1.52x as of
June 2020 YTD.

West Side Mall (2.8%) is a FLOC due to its continued low occupancy
rate. The property is a 420,434-sf retail power center anchored by
Lowe's and Price Chopper located in Edwardsville, PA. The property
was originally constructed in 1960 as an enclosed mall and has
undergone significant renovation in the decades since, converting
to an open-air shopping center. The largest tenants include Lowe's
(32.8%, January 2027 LXD), Price Chopper (16.6%, August 2024 LXD),
and Jo-Ann Stores (5.7%, January 2023 LXD). Other tenants at the
property include Petco, Rite Aid and Dollar Tree. While upcoming
rollover is low and the majority of the tenancy represents
essential retail, occupancy has remained low (71% currently vs. 85%
at Issuance). 2019 DSCR of 1.12x is up slightly from 0.98x (2018)
due to a combination of amortization and increased recoveries.

H. H. Gregg Boca Raton (0.7%), is a FLOC due to its ongoing
vacancy. The loan is secured by a 100% vacant 41,520 sf single
tenant retail property, located in Boca Raton, FL. At Issuance, the
property was 100% occupied by H. H. Gregg with a NCF DSCR of 1.39x.
As a result of H. H. Gregg's bankruptcy filing, the location has
been vacant since 2016. As of November 2020, the property is still
not occupied and had an NOI DSCR of -0.45x as of June 2020 YTD. The
loan remains current.

Hampton Inn Austin (1.2%), transferred to Special Servicing in July
2020 for imminent monetary default due to issues related to the
coronavirus pandemic. The colllateral is a limited service 123-room
hotel in Austin, TX built in 1997. The property suffered from a
continued decline in performance prior to the pandemic with DSCR
decreasing to 0.92x in March 2020 TTM from 1.90x in 2017, 1.70x in
2018 and 1.32x in 2019. June 2020 YTD occupancy dropped to 44.0%
from 80.6% in 2019. The Special Servicer is reviewing the
borrower's request for relief, and the loan is paid through June
2020.

Credit Enhancement (CE) Improvement/Amortization: As of the
November 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been paid down by 30.5% to $872.3 million from $1,255.6
million at issuance. Since the last annual review, the second
largest loan, The Outlets at Jersey Gardens ($80 million), has paid
off and three loans were disposed for a combined recognized loss of
$9.2 million. In addition, 13 loans (14.8%) have been defeased. The
pool is scheduled to amortize by 16.2% of the initial pool balance
through maturity with no IO loans.

Coronavirus Exposure: Fitch expects significant economic impact to
certain hotels, retail and multifamily properties from the
coronavirus pandemic, due to the sudden reductions in travel and
tourism, temporary property closures and lack of clarity on the
potential duration of the impact. The pandemic has prompted the
closure of several hotel properties in gateway cities as well as
malls, entertainment venues and individual stores. The hotel sector
as a whole is expected to experience significant declines in RevPar
in the near term due to a significant slow-down in travel.
Additionally, retail properties are expected to face hardship as
tenants may not be able to pay rent or as leases with upcoming
expiration dates are not renewed given that many retailers are
closed for business or have drastically reduced store hours.

Seventeen of the non-defeased loans are backed by retail properties
(18.5% of the pool), including three (8.4%) in the top 15. Hotel
properties account for 10 loans (10.4% of the pool), including two
crossed loans (2.0%) in the top 15. Four loans (8.1%) are secured
by multifamily properties, including one (4.1%) in the top 15.
Fitch's analysis applied additional stresses to five hotel loans,
nine retail loans and one multifamily (student housing) loans due
to their vulnerability to the coronavirus pandemic. The further
stresses did not result in any further downgrades to the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 through D reflect
expected continued increase in CE from amortization and future
dispositions. The Negative Rating Outlook on class E reflects the
potential for downgrades due to concerns surrounding the ultimate
impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the performance concerns
associated with the FLOC, which include four specially serviced
loans.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades would include
stable to improved asset performance, coupled with additional
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the 'A-sf'- and
'AA-sf'-rated classes are not expected but would likely occur with
significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance and/or the
stabilization to the properties impacted from the coronavirus
pandemic. Upgrades of the 'BBB-sf' and below-rated classes are
considered unlikely and would be limited based on the sensitivity
to concentrations or the potential for future concentrations.
Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood
of interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'CCCsf'-rated class is
not likely unless the performance of the remaining pool stabilizes
and the senior classes pay off.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades to the 'AAA' through 'A-' classes are not
currently considered likely due to the expectation of continued
increase in CE from amortization and future dispositions, but may
occur with continued performance declines should the impact of the
pandemic be prolonged. In addition, classes rated 'AAA' or 'AA-'
would be downgraded should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to
classes 'BBB-' and 'BB' classes are possible should performance of
the FLOC continue to decline, should loans susceptible to the
coronavirus pandemic not stabilize and/or should further loans
transfer to special servicing. The Rating Outlooks on these classes
may be revised back to Stable if performance of the FLOC improves
and/or properties vulnerable to the coronavirus stabilize once the
pandemic is over.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, classes with Negative Rating
Outlooks will be downgraded one or more categories.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction, and also serves
as the backup advancing agent. Fitch's Issuer Default Rating for
Deutsche Bank is currently 'BBB'/'F2'/Outlook Negative. Fitch
relies on the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., a division
of Wells Fargo & Company (A+/F1/Negative), which is currently the
primary advancing agent, as counterparty. Fitch provided ratings
confirmation on April 22, 2020.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or approved.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


[*] S&P Places Ratings on 87 US RMBS Legacy Deals on Watch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on 128 classes from 80 U.S.
RMBS transactions, including 21 U.S. RMBS re-real estate mortgage
investment conduit (re-REMIC) transactions, issued between 2002 and
2010 on CreditWatch with negative implication. At the same time,
S&P placed its ratings on 17 classes from eight transactions,
including two re-REMIC transactions, on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow the update to our criteria
guidance article regarding how we analyze the impact of reductions
in interest payments to security holders due to loan rate
modifications and other credit-related events.

"While the notion of limiting ratings based on existing/projected
interest reductions due to loan modifications and other
credit-related events remain, we have updated how we apply our
analytical judgment to determine and assess the impact of interest
reduction amounts." More specifically:

-- A monthly calculation has been introduced that considers (a)the
portion of the pool reported as modified; (b) S&P's assumption as
to what percentage of the modified portion has experienced an
interest rate adjustment; and (c)an assumed amount of interest rate
reduction.

-- S&P's calculation that captures expected cumulative interest
reduction amount (CIRA) for the remaining life of the security from
existing modifications has been updated;

-- S&P clarified that the projected interest reduction amount is
not applicable for pre-2009 transactions given significant
seasoning;

-- The maximum potential rating thresholds was updated; and

-- More clarity regarding other considerations that may be used
and applied in the analysis has been provided.

Creditwatch Placements

The updated guidance described above led to the following rating
actions.

S&P said, "We placed 128 classes from 80 U.S. RMBS transactions on
CreditWatch negative, including 49 classes from 21 U.S. RMBS
re-REMIC transactions, in cases where our preliminary analysis
indicates that there is at least a one-in-two likelihood that we
will lower the affected ratings.

"We further placed 17 classes from eight U.S. RMBS transactions,
including 11 classes from two U.S. RMBS re-REMIC transactions, on
CreditWatch positive, where our preliminary analysis indicates that
there is at least a one-in-two likelihood that we will raise the
affected ratings.

"We typically resolve CreditWatch placements within three months of
initial placement."

Other Considerations

Given the various asset, structural, and transactional features
that exist across the U.S. RMBS landscape, under S&P updated
guidance the following may also be relevant to its analysis:

-- S&P may use transaction-specific considerations when
determining the ultimate impact of exposure to loan modifications
or other credit-related events (e.g., more tailored interest rate
modification assumptions based on the subject transaction).

-- S&P's forward-looking assessment of a particular transaction.
To account for securities that could be subject to a step-up in
interest rate that has not yet occurred, it considers both the time
frame until such step-up and the amount of step-up.

-- S&P's evaluation of the interest reduction for the re-REMIC
considers the differences between re-REMIC issue dates and the
issue dates corresponding to the underlying securities.
Furthermore, realized and expected CIRA amounts could vary for the
re-REMIC compared to the underlying security, given the different
issuance periods and structural provisions of the re-REMIC and the
underlying security.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.
Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective
and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are
promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to
social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread
availability of effective immunization, which could come by the
middle of next year. S&P said, "We use this assumption in assessing
the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.
As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and
estimates accordingly."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

             https://bit.ly/33Z4VJn


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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