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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, December 13, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 347

                            Headlines

AB BSL 1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to $16MM Class E Notes
BANK 2020-BNK30: Fitch to Rate 3 Certificate Classes 'B-sf'
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on 6 Tranches
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO XXX: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
CD 2017-CD3: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Certs to BBsf

COMM 2015-CCRE22: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class E Certs
COMM 2015-DC1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class E Debt
CPS AUTO 2018-D: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2018-CX11: Fitch Lowers Rating G-RR Certs to CCC
FREDDIE MAC 2020-DNA6: S&P Assigns Prelim B+ Rating to B-1B Notes

JP MORGAN 2013-C10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to CCCsf
L STREET 2020-PMT1: S&P Assigns B- Rating on Class B-1X Notes
MELLO WAREHOUSE 2020-2: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating on 2 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-WMC3: Moody's Lowers Class S Debt to Caa3
MFA 2020-NQM3: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating on Cl. B-2 Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C5: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to B3
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C12: Moody's Lowers Rating on F Debt to Ca
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C23: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2020-1: Fitch Gives B(EXP)sf Rating on Cl. B5 Debt
SUMMIT ISSUER 2020-1: Fitch to Rate Class C Notes 'BB-'

TRINITAS CLO XIV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 47 Classes From 28 U.S. CMBS Deals

                            *********

AB BSL 1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to $16MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to AB BSL CLO 1 Ltd./AB BSL
CLO 1 LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  AB BSL CLO 1 Ltd./AB BSL CLO 1 LLC

  Class A-1a, $246.000 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-1b, $2.000 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $4.000 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $52.000 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.000 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $18.000 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $16.000 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $43.425 million: Not rated


BANK 2020-BNK30: Fitch to Rate 3 Certificate Classes 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on BANK 2020-BNK30,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, Series 2020-BNK30.

RATING ACTIONS

BANK 2020-BNK30

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $33,289,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,146,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,929,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150,000,000ab class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0b class A-3-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0b class A-3-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0bc class A-3-X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0bc class A-3-X2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $319,260,000ab class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0b class A-4-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0b class A-4-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0bc class A-4-X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0bc class A-4-X2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $541,624,000c class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $51,130,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0b class A-S-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0b class A-S-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0bc class A-S-X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0bc class A-S-X2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56,097,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,950,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $142,177,000c class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,278,000d class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,475,000d class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,753,000cd class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,442,000d class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,442,000cd class X-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7,738,000d class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7,738,000cd class X-G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,975,000dg class MCD-D 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,750,000dg class MCD-E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33,725,000cdg class MCD-X 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,765,000dg class MCD-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,010,000dg class MCD-G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $29,015,771d class H;

  -- $29,015,771cd class X-H;

  -- $40,723,673de RR Interest;

  -- $5,500,000deg class McRR Interest.

(a) The initial certificate balances of A-3 and A-4 are unknown and
expected to be $469,260,000 in the aggregate, subject to a 5%
variance. The certificate balances will be determined based on the
final pricing of those classes of certificates. The expected class
A-3 balance range is $0 to $300,000,000, and the expected class A-4
balance range is $169,260,000 to $469,260,000. The balance of class
A-3 is the hypothetical midpoint of the class range, and the
balance of A-4 is the midpoint of its class range.

(b) Exchangeable Certificates. The class A-3, class A-4 and class
A-S are exchangeable certificates. Each class of exchangeable
certificates may be exchanged for the corresponding classes of
exchangeable certificates, and vice versa. The dollar denomination
of each of the received classes of certificates must be equal to
the dollar denomination of each of the surrendered classes of
certificates. The class A-3 may be surrendered (or received) for
the received (or surrendered) classes A-3-1, A-3-2, A-3-X1 and
A-3-X2. The class A-4 may be surrendered (or received) for the
received (or surrendered) class A-4-1, A-4-2, A-4-X1 and A-4-X2.
The class A-S may be surrendered (or received) for the received (or
surrendered) class A-S-1, A-S-2, A-S-X1 and A-S-X2. The ratings of
the exchangeable classes would reference the ratings on the
associated referenced or original classes.

(c) Notional amount and interest only.

(d) Privately-placed and pursuant to Rule 144a.

(e) Non-offered vertical credit risk retention interest

(g) The transaction includes six classes of non-offered,
loan-specific certificates (non-pooled rake classes) related to the
companion loan of the McDonald's Global HQ.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Dec. 8, 2020.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 loans secured by 62
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$814,473,444 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Bank of
America, National Association, Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association and National Cooperative Bank, N.A.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 46.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analyses of 95.5% of the pool, and asset
summary reviews on 100% of the pool.

Coronavirus Impact: The ongoing containment effort related to the
coronavirus pandemic may have an adverse impact on near-term
revenue (i.e., bad debt expense, rent relief) and operating
expenses (i.e. sanitation costs) for some properties in the pool.
Delinquencies may occur in the coming months as forbearance
programs are put in place, although the ultimate impact on credit
losses will depend heavily on the severity and duration of the
negative economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic and to what
degree fiscal interventions by the U.S. federal government can
mitigate the impact on consumers.

Per the offering documents, all the loans are current and are not
subject to any ongoing forbearance requests. The 14th largest loan
in the pool, 1890 Ranch (2.2% of the cutoff) was granted three
months of forbearance during the months of June, July and August
2020 as a result of the coronavirus deferred payments made up.
Additionally, all deferred interest has been repaid, reserve
accounts were replenished and a three-month debt service reserve
established. Two other loans (3.4% of the cutoff), Hilton Garden
Inn Salt Lake City Airport and Comfort Suites - Moab, UT, received
loan modifications regarding FF&E reserves and lockbox management,
respectively. Both of these loans are current on their debt service
and have an upfront debt service reserve.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Highly Concentrated Pool: The pool's 10 largest loans represent
70.6% of the pool's cutoff balance, which is greater than the YTD
2020 and 2019 averages of 56.4 and 51.0%, respectively. The pool's
LCI of 599 is considerably greater than the YTD 2020 and 2019
averages of 434 and 379, respectively. For this transaction, the
losses estimated by Fitch's deterministic test at 'AAAsf' exceeded
the base model loss estimate.

Better Than Average Fitch Leverage: Overall, the pool's Fitch DSCR
of 1.45x is higher than average when compared to the YTD 2020 and
2019 averages of 1.32x and 1.26x, respectively. The pool's Fitch
LTV of 95.5% is below the YTD 2020 and 2019 averages of 99.4% and
103.0%, respectively.

Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans representing 25.8% of the pool by
balance have credit characteristics consistent with
investment-grade obligations on a stand-alone basis. 605 Third
Avenue (9.8% of the pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of
'BBB-sf', McDonald's Global HQ (8.6% of the pool) received a
stand-alone credit opinion of 'Asf*', and Grace Building (7.4% of
the pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'A-sf*'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This section provides insight into the sensitivity of ratings when
one assumption is modified, while holding others equal. For U.S.
CMBS, the sensitivity reflects the impact of changes to property
net cash flow (NCF) in up- and down-environments. The results
should only be considered as one potential outcome, as the
transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors. It should
not be used as an indicator of possible future performance.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

Declining cash flow decreases property value and capacity to meet
its debt service obligations. The table indicates the model implied
rating sensitivity to changes in one variable, Fitch NCF:

Original Rating: AAAsf / AA-sf / A-sf / BBBsf / BBB-sf / BB-sf /
B-sf

10% NCF Decline: AA+sf / BBB+sf / BBB-sf / BB+sf / B+sf / CCCsf /
CCCsf

20% NCF Decline: Asf / BBB-sf / BBsf / B-sf / CCCsf / CCCsf /
CCCsf

30% NCF Decline: BBB+sf / BB+sf / CCCsf / CCCsf / CCCsf / CCCsf /
CCCsf

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

Improvement in cash flow increases property value and capacity to
meet its debt service obligations. The table indicates the model
implied rating sensitivity to changes to the same one variable,
Fitch NCF:

Original Rating: AAAsf / AA-sf / A-sf / BBBsf / BBB-sf/ BB-sf /
B-sf

20% NCF Increase: AAAsf / AAAsf / AA+sf / A+sf / A-sf / BBBsf /
BBB-sf

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Deloitte & Touche LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis, and the findings
did not have an impact on its analysis or conclusions. A copy of
the ABS Due Diligence Form 15-E received by Fitch in connection
with this transaction may be obtained via the link at the bottom of
the related rating action commentary.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by clicking the link to the Appendix. The appendix also contains a
comparison of these RW&Es to those Fitch considers typical for the
asset class as detailed in the Special Report titled
'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global
Structured Finance Transactions'.
A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under "Related Research". The
appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to those Fitch
considers typical for the asset class as detailed in the Special
Report titled 'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement
Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions,' dated May
31, 2016.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on 6 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed seven classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series 2006-TOP22
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

RATING ACTIONS

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-TOP22

Class G 07387BGB3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class H 07387BGC1; LT AAAsf Upgrade; previously BBsf

Class J 07387BGD9; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class K 07387BGE7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class L 07387BGF4; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class M 07387BGG2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class N 07387BGH0; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

Class O 07387BGJ6; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increasing Credit Enhancement from Loans Paying in Full: The
upgrade to class H is due to a significant increase in credit
enhancement (CE) from six loans (53.0% of the prior pool balance)
paying in full since the prior rating action. The pool consists of
71.7% defeased loans that are due to mature by April 2021 and which
cover 100% of classes G and H, driving the upgrade to class H.

Concentrated Pool: Due to the highly concentrated nature of the
pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity and liquidation analysis, which
grouped the remaining loans based on their current status and
collateral quality and ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment and/or loss expectations. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

Only six of the original 224 loans remain, four (71.7%) of which
have been defeased. As of the November 2020 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 98.3%, to
$29.8 million from $1.7 billion at issuance. There have been $31.7
million (1.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes J, L, O and P.

Maturity Profile: One loan (1.3%) matures in December 2020, four
loans (96.3%) mature in 2021 and the remaining loan (2.4%) matures
in 2029.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes G and H reflect the overall
stable performance of the remainder of the pool and the reliance of
these classes on defeased collateral to pay in full.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  -- Classes G and H are already rated 'AAAsf' and cannot be
upgraded. Classes J, K, L, M, N and O have all realized losses and
cannot be upgraded above 'Dsf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  -- Downgrades to classes G and H are extremely unlikely due to
the classes being 100% covered by defeasance, high CE and near-term
maturities that will result in these classes paying in full.
Classes J, K, L, M, N and O are all rated 'Dsf' and cannot be
downgraded further.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch envisions a downside
scenario where the coronavirus crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook, or
those already with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded by
one or more categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO XXX: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BlueMountain
CLO XXX Ltd./BlueMountain CLO XXX LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 4,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  BlueMountain CLO XXX Ltd./BlueMountain CLO XXX LLC

  Class A, $240.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $64.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $23.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $23.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $13.25 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $39.19 million: Not rated


CD 2017-CD3: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Certs to BBsf
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed 13 classes of CD
2017-CD3 Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-CD3. Fitch has also removed seven classes
from Rating Watch Negative.

RATING ACTIONS

CD 2017-CD3 Mortgage Trust Series 2017-CD3

Class A-1 12515GAA5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-2 12515GAB3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3 12515GAC1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 12515GAD9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-AB 12515GAE7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 12515GAF4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 12515GAG2; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 12515GAH0; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 12515GAM9; LT BBsf Downgrade; previously BBB-sf

Class E 12515GAP2; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously BB-sf

Class F 12515GAR8; LT CCsf Downgrade; previously B-sf

Class V-A 12515GAX5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class V-B 12515GAZ0; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class V-C 12515GBB2; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class V-D 12515GBD8; LT BBsf Downgrade; previously BBB-sf

Class X-A 12515GAJ6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 12515GAK3; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class X-D 12515GAV9; LT BBsf Downgrade; previously BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades are driven by increased
loss expectations for the pool, primarily on the largest loan, 229
West 43rd Street Retail Condo, as well as a greater number of Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs) that have been impacted by the slowdown in
economic activity related to the coronavirus pandemic. Fitch has
designated 18 loans (34.9%) as FLOCs, including two specially
serviced loans (8.4%).

Fitch had previously placed classes C, V-C, D, V-D, X-D, E and F on
Rating Watch Negative on Oct. 1, 2020 due to increased loss
expectations on the 229 West 43rd Street Retail Condo loan (7.7% of
pool). While the loan had been previously identified as a FLOC,
loss expectations have increased significantly to approximately 70%
based on a recently publicized August 2020 valuation of the
property, which indicates a value considerably below the
outstanding debt amount.

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 8.10%. The
Negative Outlooks factor in additional sensitivities which reflect
losses could reach 10%; these additional sensitivities include
additional coronavirus-related stresses as well as a potential
outsized loss on the 681 Fifth Avenue loan.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest contributor to Fitch's overall
loss expectation and the largest increase in loss since the prior
rating action is the 229 West 43rd Street Retail Condo loan, which
is secured by a 245,132-sf retail condominium located in
Manhattan's Time Square district. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2019 for imminent monetary default. Multiple
lease sweep periods have occurred related to the majority of the
tenants, including National Geographic, Gulliver's Gate and OHM
tenants, which have triggered a cash flow sweep since December
2017. Two of these tenants, National Geographic and Gulliver's Gate
(combined, 43% of NRA), have recently vacated, dropping occupancy
to 52% as of October 2020. The OHM food hall concept contemplated
at issuance failed to open at the property. The property had been
benefiting from an Industrial Commercial Incentive Program (ICIP)
tax abatement, which began to burn off in the 2017- 2018 tax year
by 20% per year. The property has also been impacted by the
coronavirus pandemic as it caters to entertainment and tourism.

The next largest increase in losses is the Silverado Ranch loan
(3.1%), which is secured by a 234,306-sf retail property located in
Las Vegas, NV. The borrower has requested coronavirus relief. Per
the servicer, the annualized year-to-date June 2020 rental income
declined by approximately 20% from YE 2019 due to the loss of
rental income as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Fitch has
inquired the servicer for details on which tenants are paying
reduced rent but has not received a response. The collateral is
shadow-anchored by a 133,700-sf Target store. Major collateral
anchors include Marshall's (12.8% of NRA, lease renewed for
additional five years through January 2026), Michael's (10.2%,
lease renewed for additional five years through April 2026),
PetSmart (8.2%, March 2026), CVS (7.5%, February 2026; space has
been subleased to Office Depot since 2001) and Downeast Outfitters
(6.6%, July 2021). Occupancy has remained stable at 94.9% as of
June 2020, compared to 94.9% at YE 2019 and 93.9% at YE 2018.

The next largest increase in losses is the AHIP FLTN 3-Pack loan
(2%), which is secured by three hotel properties totaling 285
rooms. Two of are located in Chattanooga, TN and one in
Jacksonville, FL. Performance of the underlying hotel properties
has been negatively impacted by the coronavirus pandemic. The
borrower was granted coronavirus relief in June 2020. As of TTM
August 2020, occupancy, ADR and RevPAR for the Residence Inn -
Chattanooga property were 65.4%, $113 and $74, respectively,
compared to 74.6%, $115 and $86 at YE 2019. As of TTM August 2020,
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR for the TownPlace Suites - Chattanooga
property were 63.3%, $86 and $55, respectively, compared to 80.5%,
$95 and $77 at YE 2019. As of TTM July 2020, occupancy, ADR and
RevPAR for the Fairfield Inn & Suites - Jacksonville West/Chaffee
Point property were 58.6%, $114 and $67, respectively, compared to
76%, $115 and $87 at YE 2019.

In addition to 229 West 43rd Street, the other specially serviced
loan is Comfort Inn & Suites Pittsburgh loan (0.7%), which is
secured by a 223-room hotel located in Pittsburgh, PA. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2020 following a borrower
request for coronavirus-related relief. The hotel includes an
86-seat restaurant/bar and 7,700 sf of meeting space. The hotel has
remained open during the pandemic at reduced occupancy. The
servicer is dual- tracking the loan and reviewing the borrower's
relief request and property financials.

Additional Coronavirus Stresses: Nine loans (15.2%) are secured by
hotel properties, which have a weighted- average YE 2019 NOI DSCR
of 2.29x. Fourteen loans (20.2%) are secured by retail properties,
which have a weighted- average YE 2019 NOI DSCR of 1.50x. To
account for cash flow disruptions due to the coronavirus pandemic,
Fitch's analysis applied additional stresses to six hotel loans
(9.5%) and five retail loans (7.9%). These additional stresses
contributed to the Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-S, X-A,
V-A, B, X-B, V-B, C, V-C, D, X-D, V-D, E, F and G.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch applied an additional
sensitivity analysis that factored in potential outsized losses of
20% on the 681 Fifth Avenue loan; this sensitivity analysis also
contributed to the Negative Rating Outlooks. The 681 Fifth Avenue
loan (2.2%) is secured by an 82,573-sf mixed-use property located
on the east side of Fifth Avenue between 54th and 53rd Streets in
Manhattan. The property was 65.7% occupied as of June 2020,
compared to 59% at YE 2019 and 91% at YE 2017. Tommy Hilfiger (27%
of NRA, 80% of base rent) vacated in April 2019, prior to its May
2023 lease expiration, but continues to pay rent; the tenant has
also provided a $6.7 million Letter of Credit. The sponsor,
Metropole Realty Advisors, occupies the top two penthouse office
floors (9.2% of NRA, 3% of base rent) on a lease through March
2029. Proper Cloth (7.1% of NRA) executed a new lease in November
2019, with rent that commenced in June 2020.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the November 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has paid down by
1.7% to $1.30 billion from $1.33 billion at issuance. Sixteen loans
(52% of pool) are full-term, interest-only; five loans (13%) remain
in their partial interest-only period; and the remaining 31 loans
(35%) are currently amortizing. The pool is scheduled to amortize
by 6.9% of the initial pool balance by maturity. Interest
shortfalls totaling $722,748 are currently impacting classes F, G
and V-E.

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans (10.3%) had investment-grade credit
opinions at issuance: 85 Tenth Avenue (5.6%) received an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone basis
and Hilton Hawaiian Village Waikiki Beach Resort (4.6%) received an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone
basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes A-S, X-A, V-A, B, X-B, V-B, C,
V-C, D, X-D, V-D, E, F and G reflect the potential for downgrade
due to concerns surrounding the ultimate impact of the coronavirus
pandemic, the additional sensitivity applied to the 681 Fifth
Avenue loan, as well as performance concerns associated with the
FLOCs. The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-AB
reflect overall stable performance for the majority of the pool and
expected continued paydowns.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that could lead to upgrades include stable to improved
asset performance, coupled with additional paydown and/or
defeasance.

  -- An upgrade to the 'AA-sf' rated classes would likely occur
with significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance but would be
limited unless the FLOCs and the properties impacted from the
coronavirus pandemic stabilize.

  -- An upgrade to the 'A-sf' rated classes would also account for
these factors, but would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if interest shortfalls are
likely.

  -- An upgrade to the 'BBsf' rated classes is not likely until the
later years in a transaction and only if the performance of the
remaining pool is stable and/or properties vulnerable to the
coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and there is sufficient
credit enhancement to the classes.

  -- Upgrades to the 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' categories are not likely
absent significant performance improvement on the FLOCs and
substantially higher recoveries than expected on the specially
serviced loans.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that could lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets.

  -- Downgrades to the super senior classes A-1, A-2, A- 3, A-4 and
A-AB are not likely due to the position in the capital structure
but may occur should interest shortfalls affect these classes.

  -- Downgrades to the classes A-S, V-A, X-A, B, V-B and X-B are
possible should expected losses for the pool increase significantly
and/or should all of the loans susceptible to the coronavirus
pandemic suffer losses.

  -- Downgrades to the 'BBsf' rated classes are possible if
performance of the FLOCs continues to decline, should the 681 Fifth
Avenue loan experience an outsized loss, should additionally loans
transfer to special servicing and/or loans susceptible to the
coronavirus pandemic not stabilize.

  -- Downgrades to the 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' categories would occur as
losses are realized or with a greater certainty of loss.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021.
Should this scenario play out, downgrades to the senior classes
could occur, and classes with Negative Outlooks could be downgraded
one or more categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


COMM 2015-CCRE22: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of COMM 2015-CCRE22 Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2015-CCRE22.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2015-CCRE22

Class A-2 12592XAZ9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3 12592XBA3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 12592XBC9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-5 12592XBD7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-M 12592XBF2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 12592XBB1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 12592XBG0; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 12592XBJ4; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 12592XAG1; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E 12592XAJ5; LT BB-sf Affirmed; previously BB-sf

Class PEZ 12592XBH8; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class X-A 12592XBE5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 12592XAA4; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Loss Expectations Driving Affirmations: The
affirmations are based on the overall stable performance of the
underlying collateral. Two loans (4.0% of the current pool balance)
have transferred to special servicing since June 2020. Fourteen
loans (18.7%) have been designated as Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOC). Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of
5.1%. The Stable Rating Outlooks on all classes also factor
additional stresses related to the coronavirus pandemic, reflecting
losses that could reach 6.4%.

Improving Credit Enhancement: As of the November 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by
14.2% to $1.11 billion from $1.30 billion at issuance. Since
Fitch's prior rating action three loans have paid in full, and
total defeasance has increased to 9.3% of the current pool balance
compared to 8.2% as of the prior rating action. The pool has
realized $38,053 in losses, which are impacting the nonrated class
H. Interest shortfalls are also impacting class H. Seven loans,
representing 32.8% of the pool, are full-term interest-only, and 24
loans, representing 39.7% of the pool, are partial interest-only.
The remainder of the pool consists of 27 balloon loans representing
27.6% by balance. Two loans (9.8%) mature in 2022, nine loans
(14.1%) mature in 2024, 46 loans (70.7%) mature in 2025 and one
anticipated repayment date (ARD) loan (5.4%) has a final maturity
date in 2035.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC and largest driver to
losses is the Wonder Bread loan (2.7%). The loan is secured by an
office building in Washington D.C. where media reports indicate the
largest tenant, WeWork (40.8% of NRA), plans to vacate prior to
their September 2026 lease expiration. Fitch's analysis included an
overall 40% stress to YE19 NOI to address expected declines in
performance due to WeWork's departure.

TPI Hospitality Pool A (2.4%) is a two-property hotel portfolio
located in the Minneapolis metro area. While occupancy has remained
stable, cashflow for the portfolio has declined due to increasing
expenses. As of the 2Q20 financials, the portfolio is performing at
a 0.90x NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR). Fitch's analysis
included an overall 26% stress to YE19 NOI to address expected
declines in performance due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Other FLOCs include 1424 K Street Northwest and 3300-3340 New York
Avenue (1.9%), two cross-collateralized office and industrial
properties in Washington D.C. with declining occupancy and
cashflow; 205 West Randolph (1.6%), an office property in Chicago
with low DSCR; Mayfair Plaza (0.8%), a retail property on the north
side of Chicago where a major tenant (Mattress Firm, 18.5% NRA) has
vacated, resulting in a decline in occupancy; and seven other loans
where an additional NOI stress was applied due to expected declines
in performance due to the pandemic.

Specially Serviced Loans: Hotel Giraffe (3.0%), a 72-unit
full-service hotel in New York City, transferred to special
servicing in June 2020 due to payment default. The borrower and
special servicer are in the process of negotiating a loan
modification. Fitch modeled an approximate 15% loss in the base
case analysis due to the asset's specially serviced status.

The New Mexico Portfolio (0.9%), a five-property retail portfolio
leased to restaurants, art galleries and breweries, transferred to
special servicing in July 2020 due to payment default. The special
servicer is dual-tracking negotiations with the borrower and
foreclosure proceedings. Fitch modeled an approximate 20% loss in
the base case analysis due to the asset's specially serviced
status.

Coronavirus Exposure: The pool contains eight loans (11.2%) secured
by hotels with a weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR of 1.87x. Retail
properties account for 16.9% of the pool balance and have a WA NOI
DSCR of 1.78x. Cashflow disruptions continue as a result of
property and consumer restrictions due to the spread of the
coronavirus. Fitch's base case analysis applied an additional NOI
stress to six hotel loans and eight retail loans due to their
vulnerability to the pandemic.

New York City and Leased Fee Concentration: Six loans (31.7%) are
secured by properties located in New York City, including the
largest loan in the pool. In addition, three loans in the pool
(11.7%) are secured by leased fee properties located in New York
City and Portland, OR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on all classes reflect the overall
stable performance of the pool, continued amortization, loan
paydowns and defeasance.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to classes B, C, X-B and PEZ would only occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement (CE) and/or
defeasance but would be unlikely unless the FLOCs stabilize. An
upgrade to class D would also consider these factors but would be
limited due to its junior position. Classes would not be upgraded
above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. An
upgrade to class E is unlikely until the later years of the
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and there is sufficient CE, which would likely occur when
the senior classes payoff and if the nonrated classes are not
eroded. Additionally, as long as uncertainty surrounding the
pandemic continues, upgrades are not likely.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the senior classes, A-2, A-3, A-SB, A-4, A-5, A-M,
X-A, B, PEZ and C, are less likely due to the high CE but may occur
at 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades
to class D would occur should overall pool losses increase and/or
one or more large loans have an outsized loss, which would erode
CE. Downgrades to class E would occur should loss expectations
increase due to an increase in specially serviced loans.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook or
those with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded by one or
more categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


COMM 2015-DC1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of COMM 2015-DC1 Mortgage
Trust.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2015-DC1

Class A-2 12629NAB1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3 12629NAC9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 12629NAE5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-5 12629NAF2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-M 12629NAH8; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 12629NAD7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 12629NAJ4; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 12629NAL9; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 12629NAX3; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E 12629NAZ8; LT Bsf Affirmed; previously Bsf

Class PEZ 12629NAK1; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class X-A 12629NAG0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 12629NAM7; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class X-D 12629NAR6; LT Bsf Affirmed; previously Bsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Loss expectations have increased due
to an increase in the number of Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) and
specially serviced loans. Fitch's base case loss is 8.4%. The
Negative Outlooks reflect additional sensitivities which reflect
losses could reach 10.4%. These additional sensitivities include
additional stresses applied to loans expected to be impacted by the
coronavirus pandemic as well as potential outsized losses on
Pinnacle Hills Promenade. Both of the losses assume a conservative
loss assumption on the specially serviced 115 Mercer loan. The
affirmations of the junior classes considered that losses may be
lower based on the asset quality and location.

Sixteen loans (29.6% of pool), including seven loans (9.7%) in
special servicing, were designated FLOCs. As of the November 2020
distribution period, there were 17 loans (39.7%) on the servicer's
watchlist for high vacancy, low debt service coverage ratios
(DSCR), requesting COVID relief, deferred maintenance and rolling
tenants. Additionally, loss expectations have increased due to the
additional stresses Fitch applied in its analysis to reflect the
coronavirus pandemic's effect on property-level performance.

Specially Serviced Loans: 115 Mercer (3.1%) is securitized by an
unanchored retail condominium space located in the in the Soho
neighborhood of New York, NY. Loan Transferred to special servicing
in March 2019 for term default. The loan was originally put on the
servicer's watchlist in January 2018 as Kooples Bloom, Inc. (NRA
54.7%) intended to terminate its lease in May 2018 prior to its
lease expiration in October 2024. This event activated the loan's
lease sweep period. According to the servicer, in mid-2018 the
borrower and Kooples reached a new agreement whereby the tenant
would continue its lease at a reduced rate. Kooples paid $1.4
million in annual base rent at issuance compared to $1.0 million
($250 psf total or $445 on the ground floor retail portion) per the
January 2020 rent roll. In early 2019, Derek Lam (NRA 45.3%)
vacated the property. The special servicer has engaged counsel and
is currently pursuing a foreclosure while dual tracking litigation
and settlement discussions once courts reopen. Based on lower
market rates, low physical occupancy and an updated appraisal
value, Fitch is assuming conservative loss severity of 58% on the
loan; however, actual losses may be lower given good asset quality
and location. Fitch recognized that the applied losses are
potentially mitigated and considered this when affirming the junior
classes in the transaction. The loss contributed to the Negative
Outlooks on classes D and E.

200 West Second Street (2.2%) is secured by the leased fee interest
in a parcel of land in downtown Winston-Salem, NC encumbered by a
suburban office property known as the BB&T Financial Center. The
loan transferred to special in January, 2018 due to imminent
default. The borrower's clearing house, Wells Fargo, exercised its
right to terminate its agreement after learning that the guarantor
is under investigation for money laundering and wire fraud. Lender
is currently working with borrower to find a replacement clearing
account and the special servicer continues to follow litigation.
Loan is current. The property is still occupied by BB&T and
exhibits stable performance. Litigation is still ongoing.

Aloft Hotel Chicago O Hare (1.6%) is collateralized by a limited
service hotel located in Rosemont, IL near the O'Hare International
Airport. Aloft Hotel Chicago O Hare transferred to special
servicing in July 2020 due to imminent monetary default at
borrower's request as a result of coronavirus pandemic related
hardship. The loan was classified as 90+ days delinquent as of the
October 2020 payment date and has since been brought current. Per
the most recent servicer watchlist comments, the borrower and
special servicer are assessing potential resolutions.

The five remaining specially serviced loans individually account
for less than 1.0% of aggregate pool balance. Kyrene Village (.9%)
is a retail property, and this loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2019 after Walmart (NRA 28%) vacated the
subject. Staybridge - Austin (.7%), Holiday Inn Express Baytown
(.7%) and Mainstay Suites (.4%) are all hotel properties that
transferred to special servicing due to imminent monetary default
as a result of coronavirus related hardship.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Class credit enhancement (CE) has
increased compared to issuance due to amortization, prepayments and
defeasance. As of the November 2020 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced 15.2% to $1.200
billion from $1.416 billion at issuance with 59 loans remaining. Of
the remaining pool balance, 32.4% of the pool is classified as full
interest-only through the term of the loan. Seven loans, comprising
8.5% of the pool have been defeased. Since Fitch's prior rating
action in 2019, Shook Retail Portfolio, Hampton Inn UN & HIX Herald
Square, Storage Pros Portfolio and Real Plaza & Santa Rosa
Warehouse either prepaid or matured for a total of $112.1 million
in principal paydown.

Exposure to Coronavirus: There are nine loans (10.6% of pool),
which have a weighted average NOI DSCR of 3.21x, are secured by
hotel properties. Twelve loans (19.3%), which have a weighted
average (WA) NOI DSCR of 1.51x, are secured by retail properties.
Six loans (4.9%), which have a WA NOI DSCR of 1.64x, are secured by
multifamily properties. Fitch's base case analysis applied
additional stresses to three hotel loans, five retail loans and one
multifamily loan given the significant declines in property-level
cash flow expected in the short term as a result of the decrease in
consumer spending and property closures from the coronavirus
pandemic.

Fitch ran an additional sensitivity scenario which assumed a 25%
loss on the Pinnacle Hills Promenade given concerns with future
performance due to the coronavirus pandemic. The additional stress
did not impact the ratings.

Fitch Loans of Concern:

Pinnacle Hills Promenade (8.1%) is collateralized by a
superregional mall located in Rogers, AR. This loan is currently
cashed managed due to JCPenney filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in May
2020. At time of Fitch's rating action, the subject's JCPenney was
not on the list for closure according to the JCPenney website. As
of March 2020, TTM in-line sales at the property were $331 psf,
compared with $337 psf at YE 2019, $309 psf at YE 2018 and $302
reported at issuance as of YE 2014.

Sylvan Corporate Center (4.9%) is collateralized by two
cross-collateralized, cross defaulted office properties located in
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. One of the property's major tenants, Unilever
(32% of portfolio NRA), has vacated the property. Additionally, LG
Chem Sciences America (NRA 4.3%) and LG Electronics (NRA 4.9%) both
vacated at lease expiration in August and February 2020,
respectively. The space vacated by Unilever has been partially
refilled by OwnBackup for 22% of subject NRA. Subject October 2020
occupancy has fallen to 70.9% from 82% at YE 2019 and 98%
underwritten occupancy at issuance. As of the November 2020 payment
date, $907,175.06 is held in the Excess Cashflow account due to the
loan being cash managed. According to the most recent watchlist
comments, the borrower has engaged a JLL broker to market the
vacant space; however, the borrower notes that leasing interest has
decreased due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Trintri Mountain View (1.8%) is collateralized by an Office/R&D
office property located in Mountain View, CA within Silicon Valley.
The subject's sole tenant, Tintri INC (NRA 100%), vacated in
October 2018 ahead of its lease expiration in August 2022 due to
the company filing for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. According to the
subject's OSAR YTD June 2020 NOI DSCR and occupancy were -0.38x and
0%, respectively, compared to underwritten NOI DSCR and occupancy
of 2.45x and 100%. According to the most recent watchlist
commentary, the borrower is currently advertising for the subject
and has given a number of tours.

TPI Hospitality Pool C (1.6%) is collateralized by a hotel
portfolio, the portfolio is comprised of 235 keys and two hotels
located in Bloomington, MN. Subject TTM June 2020 NOI DSCR was .87x
compared to 1.58x at YE 2019 and underwritten NOI DSCR at issuance
of 2.22x. Watchlist commentary indicates the decline in performance
is due to economic hardship as a result of the coronavirus
pandemic. It is unclear whether the borrower has requested relief
or a modification.

1045 Bryant Street (1.1%) is collateralized by an office property
located in the Design District of San Francisco, CA. This loan
entered cash management in November 2020 due to Infatics, Inc. (NRA
86%) failing to renew it its lease, scheduled to expire in November
2020. As of the November 2020 payment date, the servicer was
holding $756,336.09 within the Special Rollover Reserve account.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through C reflect the
overall stable performance of the majority of the pool and expected
continued amortization. The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D
and E reflect the potential for downgrade due to concerns
surrounding the ultimate impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the
performance concerns associated with the FLOCs, which include seven
specially serviced loans.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades would include
stable to improved asset performance, coupled with additional
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' rated
classes are not expected but would likely occur with significant
improvement in CE and/or defeasance and/or the stabilization to the
properties impacted from the coronavirus pandemic. Upgrade of the
'BBB-sf' class is considered unlikely and would be limited based on
the sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentrations. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'Bsf'
rated class is not likely unless the performance of the remaining
pool stabilizes and the senior classes pay off.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades to classes A-1 through A-M and the
interest-only classes X-A are not likely due to the position in the
capital structure, but may occur should interest shortfalls occur.
Downgrades to classes B, C, and X-B are possible should performance
of the FLOCs continue to decline; should loans susceptible to the
coronavirus pandemic not stabilize; and/or should further loans
transfer to special servicing. Classes E, D and X-D could be
downgraded should the specially serviced loan not return to the
master servicer and/or as there is more certainty of loss
expectations. The Rating Outlooks on these classes may be revised
back to Stable if performance of the FLOCs improves and/or
properties vulnerable to the coronavirus stabilize once the
pandemic is over.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, classes with Negative Rating
Outlooks will be downgraded one or more categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CPS AUTO 2018-D: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on eight classes from CPS
Auto Receivables Trust's series 2017-B, 2017-C, 2017-D, 2018-C, and
2018-D transactions. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
six classes from the transactions.

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect the transactions' collateral
performance to date; our expectations regarding their future
collateral performance, including an upward adjustment in remaining
cumulative net losses (CNLs) to account for the COVID-19-induced
recession; and our view of each transaction's structure and the
respective credit enhancement levels. Additionally, we incorporated
secondary credit factors, including credit stability, payment
priorities under various scenarios, and sector- and issuer-specific
analyses. Considering these factors, we believe the notes'
creditworthiness is consistent with the raised and affirmed
ratings.

"The series under review are generally performing slightly better
or better than our prior revised loss expectation (pre-COVID-19).
However, we factored in an upward adjustment to remaining losses
that could result from elevated unemployment levels due to the
current COVID-19-induced recession. As such, our forward-looking
expectations for the series 2017-B, 2017-C, 2017-D, and 2018-C
transactions are for slightly higher losses, as reflected in our
adjusted expected CNLs. We maintained our loss expectations on
series 2018-D, which is performing better than our prior revised
loss expectations, factoring in the upward adjustment we made to
remaining losses for all series. Extensions peaked in April due to
the COVID-19 pandemic but have since returned to pre-COVID-19
levels."
  
  Table 1
  Collateral Performance (%)(i)

                       Pool   Current    60+ day
  Series      Mo.    factor       CNL    delinq.    Extensions
  2017-B       43     25.44      14.41      5.61          4.79
  2017-C       40     26.48      12.12      5.37          4.73
  2017-D       37     31.38      11.36      5.89          4.07
  2018-C       28     39.44       8.23      4.67          4.80
  2018-D       25     45.85       7.35      4.44          4.86

(i)As of the November 2020 distribution date.
Mo.--Month.
CNL--cumulative net loss.
Delinq.--Delinquencies

  Table 2
  CNL Expectations (%)

                 Original           Prior         Current
                 lifetime        lifetime        lifetime
  Series         CNL exp.     CNL exp.(i)    CNL exp.(ii)
  2017-B      18.00-19.00     19.00-19.50     19.50-20.00
  2017-C      18.00-19.00     16.25-16.75     16.75-17.25
  2017-D      18.00-19.00     17.00-18.00     17.25-18.25
  2018-C      17.00-18.00     16.50-17.50     16.75-17.75
  2018-D      17.75-18.75     17.50-18.50     17.50-18.50

(i)Revised in December 2019.
(ii)As of December 2020.
CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations.

Each transaction has a sequential principal payment structure that
is expected to increase the credit enhancement for the senior notes
as the pool amortizes. Each transaction also has credit enhancement
consisting of overcollateralization, subordination, if applicable,
a nonamortizing reserve account, and excess spread. The hard credit
enhancement for each transaction except series 2017-B is at its
respective specified target. Series 2017-B's overcollateralization
percentage is only slightly below its specified target. Since
closing, the credit support for each series has increased as a
percentage of the amortizing pool balance.

S&P said, "We analyzed the current hard credit enhancement versus
the remaining expected CNL for the classes where hard credit
enhancement alone--without credit to the expected excess
spread--was sufficient, in our view, to upgrade or affirm the
ratings. For the other classes, we incorporated a cash flow
analysis to assess the loss coverage levels, giving credit to
stressed excess spread. Our various cash flow scenarios included
forward-looking assumptions on recoveries, the timing of losses,
and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that we believe are
appropriate, given each transaction's performance to date. The
credit support, as a percentage of the current amortizing pool
balance compared with our revised remaining loss expectations, is
commensurate with the raised and affirmed ratings."

  Table 3
  Hard Credit Support (%)(i)

                         Total hard    Current total hard
                     credit support        credit support
  Series     Class  at issuance(ii)    (% of current)(ii)
  2017-B     D                12.95                 71.86
  2017-B     E                 3.10                 33.14
  2017-C     D                14.25                 63.82
  2017-C     E                 3.25                 22.28
  2017-D     C                25.10                 92.59
  2017-D     D                13.20                 54.67
  2017-D     E                 2.85                 21.69
  2018-C     C                25.60                 69.76
  2018-C     D                14.30                 41.11
  2018-C     E                 5.00                 17.54
  2018-D     B                40.65                 97.16
  2018-D     C                27.65                 68.81
  2018-D     D                16.30                 44.06
  2018-D     E                 5.60                 20.72

(i) As of the November 2020 distribution date.
(ii) Calculated as a percentage of the total gross receivable pool
balance, consisting of a reserve account, overcollateralization,
and, if applicable, subordination. Excess spread is excluded from
the hard credit support and can also provide additional
enhancement.

S&P said, "We also conducted sensitivity analyses to determine the
impact that a moderate ('BBB') stress level scenario would have on
our ratings if losses trended higher than our revised base-case
loss expectations. In our view, the results demonstrated that all
of the classes' ratings meet our credit stability limits at their
respective raised and affirmed rating levels.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of all the outstanding
transactions to ensure credit enhancement remains sufficient to
cover our CNL expectations under our stress scenarios for each of
the rated classes."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.
Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective
and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are
promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to
social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread
availability of effective immunization, which could come by the
middle of next year. S&P said, "We use this assumption in assessing
the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.
As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and
estimates accordingly."

  RATINGS RAISED
  CPS Auto Receivables Trust

                    Rating         Rating
  Series   Class    To             From
  2017-B   D        AAA (sf)       AA- (sf)
  2017-B   E        BBB+(sf)       BBB- (sf)
  2017-C   D        AAA (sf)       AA- (sf)
  2017-D   D        AA (sf)        A (sf)
  2018-C   C        AAA (sf)       AA- (sf)
  2018-C   D        A (sf)         BBB+ (sf)
  2018-D   C        AAA( sf)       AA- (sf)
  2018-D   D        A (sf)         BBB+ (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED
  CPS Auto Receivables Trust

  Series   Class    Rating
  2017-C   E        BB+ (sf)
  2017-D   C        AAA (sf)
  2017-D   E        BB (sf)
  2018-C   E        BB- (sf)
  2018-D   B        AAA (sf)
  2018-D   E        BB (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE 2018-CX11: Fitch Lowers Rating G-RR Certs to CCC
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 15 classes of
Credit Suisse CSAIL 2018-CX11 Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2018-CX11. Fitch has also
revised the Rating Outlook on class E-RR to Negative from Stable.

RATING ACTIONS

CSAIL 2018-CX11

Class A-1 12652UAQ2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-2 12652UAR0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-3 12652UAS8; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 12652UAT6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-5 12652UAU3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 12652UAY5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 12652UAV1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 12652UAZ2; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 12652UBA6; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 12652UAC3; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E-RR 12652UAE9; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class F-RR 12652UAG4; LT BB-sf Affirmed; previously BB-sf

Class G-RR 12652UAJ8; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously B-sf

Class X-A 12652UAW9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 12652UAX7; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class X-D 12652UAA7; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations; High Concentration of Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOC): The downgrade and Negative Outlook revision reflect
an increase in Fitch's loss expectations since the last rating
action, largely attributable to loans with continued deteriorating
performance and concerns related to the coronavirus pandemic.
Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 6.1%. The
Negative Outlooks reflect additional sensitivities which reflect
that losses could reach 7.2%. These additional sensitivities
include additional stresses due to expected potential in
performance declines from the coronavirus pandemic as well as
potential outsized loss on the Lehigh Valley Mall. There are 14
FLOCs (24.5% of the pool), including eight loans (13.6%) that
transferred to special servicing between June and September 2020.

FLOC/Specially Serviced Loans: The largest contributor to modeled
losses is the third largest specially serviced loan, Ohio
Limited-Service Hotel Portfolio (1.7%). The loan is secured by two
limited-service hotels located in Beavercreek, OH (94 key Courtyard
by Marriott Dayton Beavercreek and 100 key Residence Inn by
Marriott Dayton Beavercreek). The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2020 for payment default due to the coronavirus
pandemic. The loan is over 90 days delinquent. Per the servicer, an
agreement in principle in connection with a modification to the
loan that would result in a deferral of payments through March
2021. Documentation is in process. Fitch assumed a loss severity of
64% which was based on a discount to an updated appraisal value.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the seventh
largest loan, Soho House Chicago (4.3%), which is secured by a
115,000-sf mixed-use building located in Chicago, Illinois. The
property offers amenities such as multiple restaurants, a spa (the
Cowshed Spa), a barbershop (the Neville Barbershop), 40 hotel
rooms, a gymnasium that features a professional boxing ring, a
30-seat cinema, a rooftop pool and a music room. The sole tenant,
Soho House Chicago, LLC signed a 20-year NNN lease in June 2014
that expires in June 2034. Due to the property being a lifestyle
and entertainment venue, the loan is considered a FLOC. Fitch
expects a negative impact on the property's performance due to the
coronavirus, as well as the above market rent payment. Fitch's
analysis included a 20% stress to YE 2019 NOI which resulted in an
approximately 19% loss; however, given the property quality and
location, losses may ultimately be minimal.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses, Hyatt House
Broomfield Hotel (1.4%), is secured by a 123 key extended stay
hotel located in Broomfield, CO. Due to the property's declining
performance, it was flagged as a FLOC. As of YE 2019 servicer
reported occupancy and DSCR were 71% and 1.03x respectively,
compared to 78% and 1.73x at YE 2018. Fitch's base case analysis
assumed a 26% haircut (HC) to YE 2019 to account for declining
performance to the coronavirus pandemic.

The largest specially serviced loan, Throggs Neck Shopping Center
(4.8%) is secured by a 119,161-sf retail strip center, located in
Bronx, New York. The largest tenant at the property is TJ Maxx
(23.8% NRA; leases expires in August 2024). The second and third
largest tenants are Party City (9.0% NRA; lease expires in Jan.
2028) and Petco Animal Supplies (8.7% NRA; lease expires Jan.
2025), respectively. The subject has a diverse tenant mix of retail
tenants, food service/restaurant tenants and medical/salon/service
tenants. The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2020 due
to payment delinquency/coronavirus pandemic relief. The loan is now
current. As of March 2020, the property was 93% occupied. Fitch's
loss expectation of 10% was based on a discount to the updated
appraisal value.

The second largest specially serviced loan, 6-8 West 28th Street
(2.8%), is secured by a 26,600 SF mixed use property consisting of
14,000 SF of retail and 12,600 SF of office space, located in New
York, New York. Top three tenants include: JTRE, LLC (23.7% NRA;
expires Oct. 31, 2029), Lansco N.Y. (23.7% NRA; expires October 31,
2027) and W.J. Enterprise, Inc. (18.8% NRA; November 30, 2028). The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 for payment
default due to the coronavirus pandemic. The loan is over 90 days
delinquent. As of Sept. 2019, servicer reported occupancy and DSCR
were 100% and 1.75x respectively. The borrower has made a request
for relief and negotiations remain ongoing. The five remaining
loans in special servicing consist of four hotels (2.8%) and one
retail property (1.6%) anchored by a fitness tenant. Fitch's loss
expectation of approximately 14% were based on a discount to the
updated appraisal value.

The second largest non-specially FLOC and 11th largest loan, Lehigh
Valley Mall (2.8%) is secured by a 545,223-sf regional mall located
in Whitehall, PA outside of Allentown, PA. The property is anchored
by JCPenney, Macy's and Boscov's, all of which are non-collateral.
The collateral is anchored by a Bob's Discount Furniture, Barnes &
Noble and Modell's Sporting Goods. The Modell's closed in March
2020 after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Additionally, 6.1% NRA
and 10.9% NRA expire in 2020 and 2021, respectively. While property
performance remains relatively stable overall, the loan is
considered a FLOC due to its tertiary location, weak anchors and
sponsor-related concerns. Comparable tenant sales for tenants under
10 thousand sf, excluding Apple, were $460 psf at YE 2018 compared
to $457 psf at Issuance. Fitch's base case expected loss assumed a
loss of 3.6% based on a 20% stress to YE 2019 NOI due to the
closure of Modell's, upcoming tenant roll, and concerns about the
long-term viability of the mall's anchors. In addition, Fitch
applied a loss of 15% in a sensitivity scenario which contributed
to the Negative Outlooks on classes E-RR and F-RR.

The remaining three FLOCs (2.5%) are outside the Top 15: two (2%)
are secured by hotels and one (0.5%) is secured by a 40,511-sf,
mixed-use center located in Chicago, IL. Fitch applied between a
20% and 26% haircut to YE 2019 NOI on these loans to reflect the
impact of the coronavirus and loss of large tenants.

Minimal Change in Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the November 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 1.6% to $937.6 million from $952.9 million at issuance.
Twenty loans (45.1% of pool) are full-term, IO and 14 loans (22.7%)
are partial IO (of which 10 loans representing 14.7% have begun
amortizing. The pool is scheduled to amortize 8.5% prior to
maturity.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario that assumed potential outsized losses of 15%
on the maturity balance of Lehigh Valley Mall to reflect the
potential for outsized losses due to upcoming rollover risk and
uncertainty of the sponsor's long-term commitment. This scenario
contributed to the Downgrade and Negative Outlook revision.

Coronavirus Impact: Fitch expects significant economic impacts to
certain hotels, retail and multifamily properties from the
coronavirus pandemic due to the related reductions in travel and
tourism, temporary property closures and lack of clarity at this
time on the potential duration of the impacts. Loans collateralized
by retail properties and mixed-use properties with a retail
component account for 12 loans (27.3% of pool). Loans secured by
hotel properties account for 15 loans (20.6%), while nine loans
(11.8%) are secured by a multifamily property. Fitch's base case
analysis applied additional stresses to nine hotel loans and one
retail loan due to their vulnerability to the coronavirus pandemic;
this analysis contributed to the Downgrades and Negative Outlooks.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: There are four loans (12.1%)
that received investment-grade credit opinions at issuance. These
loans include One State Street Plaza (BBB+sf*; 5.3% of the pool),
Moffett Towers II - Building 2 (BBB-sf*; 3.5% of the pool),
Yorkshire & Lexington Towers (BBBsf*; 2.1% of the pool) and 111
West Jackson (BBB+sf*, 1.2% of the pool).

High Hotel Exposure: Loans secured by hotel properties represent
20.6% of the pool by balance. Two of the top 10 loans are backed by
hotel properties. At issuance it was noted total hotel
concentration exceeded the 2017 average of 15.8% and 2016 average
of 16.0%.

Pari Passu Loans: 13 loans (47.9%) of the pool including 10 loans
(43.9%) in the top 15 have pari passu loan pieces.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes E-RR and F-RR reflect concerns
over the FLOC, primarily the specially serviced loans, Soho House
Chicago and Lehigh Valley Mall. The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1,
A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-SB, A-S, B, C and D reflect sufficient CE and
expected continued amortization.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades could be triggered by significantly improved performance
coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. An upgrade to classes B and
C could occur with stabilization of the FLOCs, but would be limited
as concentrations increase. Classes would not be upgraded above
'Asf' if there is likelihood of interest shortfalls. Upgrades of
classes D and E-RR would only occur with significant improvement in
CE and stabilization of the FLOC. An upgrade to classes F-RR and
G-RR is not likely unless performance of the FLOC improves and if
performance of the remaining pool is Stable.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to Negative
rating action/Downgrade:

Downgrades could be triggered by an increase in pool-level losses
from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the
senior A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 A-SB and A-S classes, along with
class B, are not expected given their sufficient CE and expected
increase in CE from amortization, but may occur if interest
shortfalls occur or losses increase considerably. Downgrades to
classes C and D may occur if overall pool performance declines or
loss expectations increase. Downgrades to class E-RR and F-RR may
occur if loans in special servicing remain unresolved, or if
performance of the FLOC fails to stabilize. Further downgrades to
class G-RR may occur if additional loans default or transfer to the
special servicer.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch envisions a downside
scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021; should
this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater percentage of
classes may be given a Negative Outlook, or those with Negative
Outlooks will be downgraded one or more categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


FREDDIE MAC 2020-DNA6: S&P Assigns Prelim B+ Rating to B-1B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Freddie Mac
STACR REMIC Trust 2020-DNA6's notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by 100% conforming
residential mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 9,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The credit enhancement provided by the subordinated reference
tranches, as well as the associated structural deal mechanics;

-- A REMIC structure that reduces the counterparty exposure to
Freddie Mac for periodic principal and interest payments, but, at
the same time, pledges the support of Freddie Mac (a highly rated
counterparty) to cover shortfalls, if any, on interest payments and
to make up for any investment losses;

-- The issuer's aggregation experience and the alignment of
interests between the issuer and noteholders in the deal's
performance, which, in S&P's view, enhances the notes' strength;

-- The enhanced credit risk management and quality control
processes Freddie Mac uses in conjunction with the underlying
representations and warranties framework; and

-- The impact that COVID-19 is likely to have on the U.S. economy
and the U.S. housing market and the additional structural
provisions included to address corresponding forbearance and
subsequent defaults.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2020-DNA6

  $37,650,083,275 class A-H(i): NR

  $279,000,000 class M-1: BBB+ (sf)

  $109,145,188 class: M-1H(i): NR

  $208,000,000 class M-2: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2A: BBB (sf)
  
  $41,554,445 M-2AH(i): NR

  $104,000,000 class M-2B: BB+ (sf)

  $41,554,445 M-2BH(i): NR

  $208,000,000 M-2R: BB+ (sf)

  $208,000,000 M-2S: BB+ (sf)

  $208,000,000 M-2U: BB+ (sf)

  $208,000,000 M-2I: BB+ (sf)

  $208,000,000 M-2T: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2AR: BBB (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2AS: BBB (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2AT: BBB (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2AU: BBB (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2AI: BBB (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2BR: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2BS: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2BT: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2BU: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2BI: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2RB: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2SB: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2TB: BB+ (sf)

  $104,000,000 M-2UB: BB+ (sf)

  $139,000,000 B-1: B+ (sf)

  $69,500,000 B-1A: BB (sf)

  $69,500,000 B-1AR: BB (sf)

  $69,500,000 B-1AI: BB (sf)

  $27,536,297 B-1AH(i): NR

  $69,500,000 B-1B: B+ (sf)

  $27,536,297 B-1BH(i): NR

  $164,000,000 B-2: NR

  $82,000,000 B-2A: NR

  $82,000,000 B-2AR: NR

  $82,000,000 B-2AI: NR

  $15,036,297 B-2AH(i): NR

  $82,000,000 B-2B: NR

  $15,036,297 B-2BH(i): NR

  $97,036,299 B-3H(i): NR

(i)Reference tranche only and will not have corresponding notes.
Freddie Mac retains the risk of each of these tranches.
NR--Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2013-C10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to CCCsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed eight classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2013-C10.

RATING ACTIONS

JPMCC 2013-C10

Class A-5 46639JAE0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 46639JAH3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 46639JAF7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 46639JAJ9; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 46639JAK6; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 46639JAL4; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E 46639JAP5; LT BBsf Affirmed; previously BBsf

Class F 46639JAR1; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously Bsf

Class X-A 46639JAG5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Despite a majority of the pool
exhibiting relatively stable performance, loss expectations have
increased. This is primarily attributable to continued performance
declines for the loans in special servicing, including Fashion
Outlets of Santa Fe (1.12% of the pool) and three additional loans
that have transferred since Fitch's last rating action: West County
Center (6.30% of the pool); 663, 665 & 667 Lincoln Road (0.85% of
the pool); and Kleban Portfolio I (0.67% of the pool). The
performance declines for these loans have been exacerbated by the
social and market disruption caused by the effects of the
coronavirus pandemic and related containment measures. Fitch has
designated nine loans (22.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs),
including the four specially serviced loans. Three of the top 15
loans are designated as FLOCs (17.5% of the pool). For each loan
flagged as a FLOC, Fitch applied either an additional haircut to
NOI or a stress to the most recent appraisal value.

Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 7.10%,
which includes coronavirus-related stresses. The Negative Outlook
factors in additional sensitivities which reflect losses could
reach 8.70%; these additional sensitivities include potential
additional outsized losses up to 75% on the West County Center
loan.

Fitch Loans of Concern: West County Center (6.3% of the pool) is
the largest contributor to Fitch's projected losses, the fourth
largest loan in the pool and the largest FLOC. The collateral is a
1.2 million sf regional mall located in St. Louis. The loan, which
is sponsored by struggling mall owner CBL, transferred to special
servicing in April 2020 due to imminent monetary default related to
hardship stemming from the pandemic. Although the loan remains
current and the transfer was initiated at the borrower's request,
there is increased concern of term default following the sponsor's
November 2020 bankruptcy filing. As a result, loss expectations
have increased significantly to approximately 50%. Fitch had
previously considered the loan to be at risk of maturity default
given the subject's declining sales trends and the volume of nearby
competition with heavy tenant overlap. The loan is scheduled to
mature in December 2022. As previously discussed, Fitch applied an
additional sensitivity analysis that factored in potential outsized
losses of 75% on this loan; this sensitivity also contributed to
the Negative Rating Outlook.

Fashion Outlets of Santa Fe (1.1% of the pool balance), the second
largest contributor to Fitch's projected losses, is a 124,504 sf
outlet mall located 10 miles southwest of downtown Santa Fe, NM.
The asset transferred to special servicing in April 2017, and a
foreclosure sale was completed in May 2018. Occupancy at the
property has declined to 30% as of November 2020, from 49.6% as of
October 2019, after multiple entities closed due to financial
difficulties compounded by reduced foot traffic related to the
pandemic. Fitch expects losses from the disposition of this asset
to be significant.

EIP Industrial Portfolio (9.3% of the pool), the third largest loan
in the pool, and College Grove (1.9% of the pool), the 14th largest
loan in the pool, have been flagged as FLOCs given significant
upcoming tenant rollover; however, the loans are not large
contributors to Fitch's projected losses. The remaining FLOCs are
outside of the top 15 and represent 4.2% of the pool combined.

Coronavirus Exposure: Loans secured by retail properties comprise
48.01% of the pool, including seven in the top 15 (37.1%). The
pool's retail component has a weighted average debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.32x. Loans secured by hotel properties
comprise 2.34% of the pool, none of which are in the top 15. The
pool's hotel component has a weighted average DSCR of 2.44x. The
majority of the pool exhibited stable performance prior to the
pandemic. Additional pandemic-related stresses were applied to two
hotel loans (1.3%) and two retail loans (2.2%).

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the November 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
approximately 32.9% to $858 million from $1.3 billion at issuance.
There have been no realized losses since issuance. Five loans (10%
of the current pool) are defeased. The majority of the pool (25
loans, 76.7% of the pool) is currently amortizing. Three loans
(19.8% of the pool) are full-term interest only.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-5 through D and X-A remain
Stable.

The Rating Outlook on class E was revised to Negative from Stable.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  -- Upgrades could be triggered by significantly improved
performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to
classes B and C could occur with stabilization of the FLOCs but
would be limited as concentrations increase. Classes would not be
upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood of interest
shortfalls. Upgrades to classes D and E would only occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement and stabilization of
the FLOCs. An upgrade to class F is not likely unless performance
of the FLOCs improves, losses on specially serviced loans are lower
than expected and performance of the remaining pool is stable.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  -- Downgrades could be triggered by an increase in pool-level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to classes rated 'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to their
position in the capital structure, but they may occur at 'AAAsf' or
'AA-sf' should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to classes B
and C may occur if overall pool performance declines or loss
expectations increase. Downgrades to classes D and E may occur if
loans in special servicing remain unresolved or if performance of
the FLOCs fails to stabilize. Downgrades to class F may occur if
additional loans default or transfer to the special servicer.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook or
those with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded one or more
categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

JPMCC 2013-C10 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to retail exposure, including an REO outlet mall
and a specially serviced regional mall in the top 15 that are
underperforming as a result of changing consumer preferences to
shopping, which has a negative impact on the credit profile and is
relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors. This has
contributed to the downgrade of class F and the Negative Rating
Outlook on class E.

Except for the matters discussed, the highest level of ESG credit
relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


L STREET 2020-PMT1: S&P Assigns B- Rating on Class B-1X Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to L Street Securities
Trust 2020-PMT1's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is a real estate mortgage investment conduit
(REMIC) transaction in which the payments are determined by a
reference pool of residential mortgage loans, deeds of trust, or
similar security instruments encumbering mortgaged properties
acquired by Fannie Mae.

The ratings reflect:

-- The credit enhancement provided by the subordinated reference
tranches and the associated structural deal mechanics;

-- The credit quality of the collateral included in the reference
pool--a substantial portion of such collateral is covered by
mortgage insurance backstopped by Fannie Mae;

-- A REMIC structure that reduces the counterparty exposure to
Fannie Mae for periodic principal and interest payments, but, at
the same time, pledges the support of Fannie Mae (a highly rated
counterparty) to cover shortfalls, if any, on interest payments and
to make up for any investment losses;

-- The issuer's aggregation experience and the alignment of
interests between the issuer and the noteholders in the deal's
performance, which, in our view, enhances the notes' strength;

-- The enhanced credit risk management and quality control
processes Fannie Mae uses in conjunction with the underlying
representations and warranties framework; and

-- The impact that the economic stress brought on by the COVID-19
pandemic will likely have on the performance of the mortgage
borrowers in the pool and liquidity available in the transaction.

  Ratings Assigned

  L Street Securities Trust 2020-PMT1

  Class A-H(i), $41,879,700,431: Not rated

  Class M-1(ii), $719,457,000: BBB- (sf)

  Class M-2(ii), $305,057,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2A, $130,739,000: BB+ (sf)

  Class M-2B, $87,159,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2C, $87,159,000: BB (sf)

  Class B-1(ii), $392,217,000: B- (sf)
  
  Class B-2(ii), $283,269,000: Not rated

  Class M-1Y, $719,457,000: BBB- (sf)

  Class M-1X, $719,457,000: BBB- (sf)

  Class M-2Y, $305,057,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2X, $305,057,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2AY, $130,739,000: BB+ (sf)

  Class M-2AX, $130,739,000: BB+ (sf)

  Class M-2BY, $87,159,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2BX, $87,159,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2CY, $87,159,000: BB (sf)

  Class M-2CX, $87,159,000: BB (sf)

  Class B-1Y, $392,217,000: B- (sf)

  Class B-1X, $392,217,000: B- (sf)

  Class B-2Y, $283,269,000: Not rated

  Class B-2X, $283,269,000: Not rated

(i) Reference tranche only and will not have corresponding notes.
Fannie Mae retains the risk of this tranche.
(ii)Classes M-1, M-2, B-1, and B-2 are offered at closing and may
be exchanged for other RCR notes or exchangeable notes.


MELLO WAREHOUSE 2020-2: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to seven
classes of notes issued by Mello Warehouse Securitization Trust
2020-2 (the transaction). The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to
(P)B2 (sf). The securities in this transaction are backed by a
revolving pool of newly originated first-lien, fixed rate and
adjustable rate, residential mortgage loans which are eligible for
purchase by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or in accordance with the
criteria of Ginnie Mae for the guarantee of securities backed by
mortgage loans to be pooled in connection with the issuance of
Ginnie Mae securities. The pool may also include FHA Streamline
mortgage loans or VA-IRRR mortgage Loans, which may have limited
valuation and documentation. The revolving pool has a total size of
$300,000,000.

The complete rating action are as follows.

Issuer: Mello Warehouse Securitization Trust 2020-2

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is based on a repurchase agreement between
loanDepot.com, LLC, as repo seller, and Mello Warehouse
Securitization Trust 2020-2 as buyer. LD Holdings Group, LLC ("LD
Holdings", senior unsecured rating B2) guarantees loanDepot's
payment obligations under the securitization's repurchase
agreement.

Moody's bases its Aaa expected losses of 29.12% and base case
expected losses of 4.69% on a scenario in which loanDepot and the
guarantor LD Holdings does not pay the aggregate repurchase price
to pay off the notes at the end of the facility's three-year
revolving term, and the repayment of the notes will depend on the
credit performance of the remaining static pool of mortgage loans.
To assess the credit quality of the static pool, Moody's created a
hypothetical adverse pool based on the facility's eligibility
criteria, which includes no more than 5% (by unpaid balance)
adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) loans. Loans which are subject to
payment forbearance, a trial modification, or delinquency are
ineligible to enter the facility. Moody's analyzed the pool using
its US MILAN model and made additional pool level adjustments to
account for risks related to (i) a weak representation and warranty
enforcement framework (ii) existence of compliance findings related
to the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) Rule in third-party
diligence reports from prior Mello Warehouse Securitization Trust
transactions, which have raised concerns about potential losses
owing to TRID for the loans in this transaction. The final rating
levels are based on its evaluation of the credit quality of the
collateral as well as the transaction's structural and legal
framework. The ratings on the notes during the revolving period
will be the higher of (i) the repo guarantor's (LD Holdings Group
LLC) rating and (ii) the rating of the notes based on the credit
quality of the mortgage loans backing the notes (i.e., absent
consideration of the repo guarantor). If the repo guarantor does
not satisfy its obligations under the guaranty, then the ratings on
the notes will only reflect the credit quality of the mortgage
loans backing the notes. Of note, this is the first warehouse
securitization transaction sponsored by loanDepot where the repo
agreement has a three-year term.

Collateral Description:

The mortgage loans will be newly originated, first-lien, fixed-rate
and adjustable-rate mortgage loans that also comply with the
eligibility criteria set forth in the master repurchase agreement.
The aggregate principal balance of the purchased loans at closing
will be $300,000,000. Per the transaction documents, the mortgage
pool will have a minimum weighted average FICO of 725 and a maximum
weighted average LTV of 82%.

The ultimate composition of the pool of mortgage loans remaining in
the facility at the end of the three-year term upon default of
loanDepot is unknown. Moody's modeled this risk through evaluating
the credit risk of an adverse pool constructed using the
eligibility criteria. In generating the adverse pool: 1) Moody's
assumed the worst numerical value from the criteria range for each
loan characteristic. For example, the credit score of the loans is
not less than 640 and the weighted average credit score of the
purchased mortgage loans is not less than 725; the maximum
debt-to-income ratio is 50% in the adverse pool (per eligibility
criteria); 2) Moody's assumed risk layering for the loans in the
pool within the eligibility criteria. For example, loans with the
highest LTV also had the lowest FICO to the extent permitted by the
eligibility criteria; 3) Moody's took into account the specified
restrictions in the eligibility criteria such as the weighted
average LTV and FICO; 4) Since these loans are eligible for
purchase by the agencies, Moody's also took into account the
specified restrictions in the underwriting criteria. For example,
no more than 97% LTV for fixed rate purchased loans and 95% for
adjustable-rate purchase loans.

The transaction allows the warehouse facility to include up to 50%
(consistent with the prior deal) of mortgage loans (by outstanding
principal balance) whose collateral documents have not yet been
delivered to the custodian (wet loans). This transaction is more
vulnerable to the risk of losses owing to fraud from wet loans
during the time it does not hold the collateral documents. There
are risks that a settlement agent will fail to deliver the mortgage
loan files after receipt of funds, or the sponsor of the
securitization, either by committing fraud or by mistake, will
pledge the same mortgage loan to multiple warehouse lenders.
However, its analysis has considered several operational mitigants
to reduce such risks, including (i) collateral documents must be
delivered to the custodian within 10 business days following a wet
loan's funding or it becomes ineligible, (ii) the transaction will
only fund a wet loan if the closing of the mortgage loan is handled
by a settlement agent (covered by errors and omissions insurance
policy) who will provide a closing protection letter to the repo
seller (except for attorney closings in the State of New York),
(iii) the repo seller maintains a fidelity bond in place, naming
the issuer as an additional insured party, in the event of fraud in
connection with the closing of the wet loans, (iv) the repo seller
has acquired services of an independent third party fraud detection
and verification vendor, PitchPoint Solutions Inc. (settlement
agent vendor), to verify credentials of settlement agents and the
bank accounts for wires in connection with the funding of such wet
loans, and (v) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Baa1), a
highly rated independent counterparty, act as the mortgage loan
custodian. Moody's views these mitigants as adequate measures to
prevent the likelihood of fraud by the settlement agent or the
sponsor.

The loans will be originated and serviced by loanDepot.com, LLC
(loanDepot). U.S. Bank National Association will be the standby
servicer. Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for
this pool to be adequate. At the transaction closing date, the
servicer acknowledges that it is servicing the purchased loans for
the joint benefit of the issuer and the indenture trustee.

Transaction Structure:

Its analysis of the securitization structure includes reviewing
bankruptcy remoteness, assessing the ability of the indenture
trustee to take possession of the collateral in an event of
default, conformity of the collateral with the eligibility criteria
as well as allocation of funds to the notes.

The transaction is structured as a master repurchase agreement
between loanDepot (the repo seller) and the Mello Warehouse
Securitization Trust 2020-2 (the trust or issuer). The U.S.
Bankruptcy Code provides repurchase agreements, security contracts
and master netting agreements a "safe harbor" from the Bankruptcy
Code automatic stay. Due to this safe harbor, in the event of a
bankruptcy of loanDepot or the guarantor, the issuer will be exempt
from the automatic stay and thus, the issuer will be able to
exercise remedies under the master repurchase agreement, which
includes seizing the collateral.

During the revolving period, the repo seller's obligations will
include making timely payments of interest accrued on the notes as
well as the aggregate monthly fees. Failure to make such payments
will constitute a repo trigger event whereby the indenture trustee
will seize the collateral and terminate the repo agreement. It is
expected that the notes will not receive payments of principal
until the expected maturity date or after the occurrence and
continuance of an event of default under the indenture unless the
repo seller makes an optional prepayment. In an event of default,
principal will be distributed sequentially amongst the classes.
Realized losses will be allocated in a reverse sequential order.

In addition, since the pool may consist of both fixed rate and
adjustable-rate mortgages, the transaction may be exposed to
potential risk from interest rate mismatch. To account for the
mismatch, Moody's assumed a stressed LIBOR curve by increasing the
one-month LIBOR rate incrementally for a certain period until it
reaches the maximum allowable interest rate as described in the
transaction documents.

Ongoing Due Diligence

During the revolving period, Clayton Services LLC (or a qualified
successor diligence provider appointed by the repo seller) will
conduct ongoing due diligence every 90 days on 100 randomly
selected loans (other than wet loans). The first review will be
performed 30 days following the closing date. In previous
transactions, three diligence reviews were conducted over the life
of the transaction. Moody's did not make any adjustments for the
reduction in the diligence frequency because the diligence results
for prior transactions have been stable and in-line with
expectation since the program's inception in 2016. The scope of the
review will include credit underwriting, regulatory compliance,
valuation and data integrity.

Because Moody's analysis is based on a scenario in which the
facility terms out, due diligence reviews provide some control on
the credit quality of the collateral. The due diligence framework
in this transaction combined with the collateral eligibility
controls help mitigate the risks of adverse selection in this
transaction.

While the due diligence review will provide some validation on the
quality of the loans, it may not be fully representative of the
collateral quality of the facility at all times. This is mainly due
to the frequency of the due diligence review, the revolving nature
of the collateral pool, and that the review will be conducted on a
sample basis. Also, by the time the due diligence review is
completed, some of the sampled loans may no longer be in the pool.

Representation and Warranties

For a mortgage loan to qualify as an eligible mortgage loan, the
loan must meet representations and warranties described in the
repurchase agreement. The substance of the representations and
warranties are consistent with those in its published criteria for
representations and warranties for U.S. RMBS transactions. After a
repo event of default, which includes the repo seller or buyer's
failure to purchase or repurchase mortgage loans from the facility,
the repo seller or buyer's failure to perform its obligations or
comply with stipulations in the master repurchase agreement,
bankruptcy or insolvency of the buyer or the repo seller, any
breach of covenant or agreement that is not cured within the
required period of time, as well as the repo seller's failure to
pay price differential when due and payable pursuant to the master
repurchase agreement, a delinquent loan reviewer will conduct a
review of loans that are more than 120 days delinquent to identify
any breaches of the representations and warranties provided by the
underlying sellers. Loans that breach the representations and
warranties will be put back to the repo seller for repurchase.

While the transaction has the representation and warranties
enforcement mechanism, in the amortization period, after an event
of default where the repo seller did not pay the notes in full, it
is unlikely that the repo seller will repurchase the loans. In
addition, the noteholders (holding 100% of the aggregate principal
amount of all notes) may waive the requirement to appoint such
delinquent loan reviewer.

Elevated social risks associated with the coronavirus

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.
Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's has not made any adjustments related to coronavirus for
this transaction because (i) loans that are subject to payment
forbearance or a trial modification are ineligible to enter the
facility, and the repo seller must repurchase loans in the facility
that become subject to forbearance, (ii) delinquent loans are
ineligible to enter the facility, and (iii) loans are unlikely to
be modified while in the facility due to the seasoning constraint
specified in the eligibility criteria. The repo seller will be
required to repurchase any loans that do not meet the "eligible
loan" criteria.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and the state of the housing
market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above its original expectations as
a result of a weaker collateral composition than that in the
adverse pool, financial distress of any of the counterparties.
Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US macro
economy and housing market.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in April 2020.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-WMC3: Moody's Lowers Class S Debt to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class S
issued by Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3, backed
by subprime mortgage loans as follows:

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2019 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATING RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on Class S from Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3, reflects the updated performance on the
underlying linked bonds. The rating action also reflects the recent
performance as well as Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying pools. In light of the current macroeconomic
environment, Moody's revised loss expectations based on the extent
of performance deterioration of the underlying mortgage loans,
resulting from a slowdown in economic activity and increased
unemployment due to the coronavirus outbreak. Specifically, Moody's
has observed an increase in delinquencies, payment forbearance, and
payment deferrals since the start of pandemic, which could result
in higher realized losses.

Its analysis considers the current proportion of loans granted
payment relief in each individual transaction. Moody's identified
these loans based on a review of loan level cashflows over the last
few months. Based on its analysis, the proportion of borrowers that
are currently enrolled in payment relief plans varied greatly,
ranging between approximately 4% and 25% among RMBS transactions
issued before 2009. In its analysis, Moody's assumes these loans to
experience lifetime default rates that are 50% higher than default
rates on the performing loans.

In addition, for borrowers unable to make up missed payments
through a short-term repayment plan, servicers will generally defer
the forborne amount as a non-interest-bearing balance, due at
maturity of the loan as a balloon payment. Its analysis considered
the impact of six months of scheduled principal payments on the
loans enrolled in payment relief programs being passed to the trust
as a loss. The magnitude of this loss will depend on the proportion
of the borrowers in the pool subject to principal deferral and the
number of months of such deferral. The treatment of deferred
principal as a loss is credit negative, which could incur
write-downs on bonds when missed payments are deferred.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
residential mortgage loans from the current weak US economic
activity and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an
economic recovery is underway, it is tenuous, and its continuation
will be closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in July 2020.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds.


MFA 2020-NQM3: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating on Cl. B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to MFA
2020-NQM3 Trust's mortgage pass-through certificates series
2020-NQM3.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by
first-lien fixed- and adjustable-rate fully amortizing and
interest-only residential mortgage loans primarily secured by
single-family residences, planned unit developments, condominiums,
condotels, two to four-family homes, mixed-use, 5-10 unit, 11-20
unit, and manufactured housing to both prime and nonprime
borrowers. The pool has 1,048 loans, which are primarily
nonqualified mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 7,
2020.

Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, geographic concentration, and representation and
warranty framework;

-- The mortgage aggregator and mortgage originator; and

-- The impact the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have on the
performance of the mortgage borrowers in the pool and liquidity
available in the transaction.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.
Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective
and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are
promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to
social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread
availability of effective immunization, which could come by the
middle of next year. S&P said, "We use this assumption in assessing
the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.
As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and
estimates accordingly."

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned(i)
  
  MFA 2020-NQM3 Trust
  Class A-1, $264,545,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $23,842,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $35,476,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $20,790,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $14,686,000: BB (sf)
  Class B-2, $10,109,000: B (sf)
  Class B-3, $12,016,961: NR
  Class XS, notional(ii): NR
  Class A-IO-S, notional(ii): NR
  Class R: NR

(i) The collateral and structural information in this report
reflects the preliminary private placement memorandum dated Dec. 3,
2020.
(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated
principal balance.
NR--Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C5: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on twelve and
downgraded the ratings on two classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. PST**, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. X-C*, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2019 Affirmed B2
(sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

**Reflects Exchangeable Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eight principal and interest (P&I) classes were
affirmed due to the credit support and because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes were downgraded due to a decline in
pool performance and higher expected losses driven primarily by
specially serviced loans and the deal's exposure to hotel and
retail properties. Special servicing loans currently represent 9.3%
of the pool and primarily secured by hotel and retail properties
that were experienced flat or declining net operating income (NOI)
prior to 2020. In aggregate retail and hotel loans represent 37%
and 14% of the pool, respectively. Furthermore, the pool faces
upcoming refinance risk with nearly all loans maturing is less than
two years.

The ratings on three IO classes, X-A, X-B and X-C, were affirmed
based on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on class PST was affirmed due to the credit quality of
the referenced exchangeable classes.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.0% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.6% at the last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in September 2020, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020. The principal
methodology used in rating exchangeable classes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2020.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in September, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to $944.8
million from $1.35 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 63 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 52.5% of the pool. One loan, constituting
10.6% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Eleven loans, constituting 17.7% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 16 at Moody's last review.

As of the November 2020 remittance report, loans representing 94%
were current, 1% were beyond their grace period but less than 30
days late, 1% were 30 days delinquent and 4% were in foreclosure.

Eleven loans, constituting 12.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. Seven loans,
constituting 9.3% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
All of the specially serviced loans transferred to special
servicing in 2020, of which six of them, representing 8.3% of the
pool, have transferred since April 2020 due to the coronavirus
outbreak.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Distrikt Loan ($34.3
million -- 3.6% of the pooled balance), which is secured by the
leasehold interest on a 32 story, full-service hotel located in the
Times Square neighborhood of New York City, New York. The property
operates under a Hilton flag as part of their "Tapestry
Collection." The collateral is subject to a ground lease with an
expiration in April 2111 with a current ground lease payment of
$825,000, increasing to 907,500 in years 11 through 15 with
subsequent increases thereafter. Property performance has generally
declined since 2012, due to lower room revenue. The March 2020
trailing twelve-month (TTM) occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 93.9%,
$192.85 and $181.03, respectively, compared to 95.6%, $190.38 and
$181.98 for full year 2019, and 89.4%, $199.33 and $178.23,
respectively, in 2018. The loan transferred to special servicing
due to imminent monetary default in relation to the coronavirus
outbreak. As of the November 2020 remittance statement the loan was
last paid through its April 2020 payment date. According to the
special servicer, the borrower is no longer willing to contribute
additional capital to the property and the special servicer is
currently pursuing legal remedies. The property was re-appraised in
October 2020 at $37.6 million (43% lower than its securitization
value) and as a result the master servicer has recognized a $1.3
million appraisal reduction. The loan has amortized 14.2% from
securitization, however, the property's cash flow erosion since
securitization makes this loan more vulnerable to the significant
performance declines due to coronavirus outbreak induced property
closures and travel restrictions.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Nightingale
Retail Portfolio - Banks Crossing Shopping Center Loan ($12.3
million -- 1.3% of the pooled balance), which is secured by a
256,671 SF neighborhood shopping center located in Fayetteville,
Georgia about 32 miles south of Atlanta. The property is anchored
by JC Penney, Kroger and Planet Fitness and was over 90% leased to
nineteen tenants in June 2020. Higher operating expenses have led
the property performance to decline slightly from securitization,
however, the 2019 NOI DSCR was 1.42X. The loan transferred to
special servicing in July 2020 due to imminent monetary default
stemming from the impact of the coronavirus outbreak. The loan was
current as of the November 2020 remittance statement and the
special servicer is preparing to return loan to master servicer.
The loan has amortized 13.5% since securitization and due the
performing nature and historical performance the loan was included
in the conduit statistics.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Ocean East Mall
Loan ($9.5 million -- 1.0% of the pooled balance), which is secured
by a 112,260 SF grocery store anchored strip retail property
located in Stuart, Florida, approximately 12 miles southeast of
Port St. Lucie. The property was only 44% leased as of February
2020, down from 80% leased in September 2019 and 91% at
securitization. The loan has been cash managed since November 2018
after the largest tenant, representing 37% of the NRA, vacated at
lease expiration. The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2020 due to imminent default. The borrower has made
payments through September 2020 and has expressed their commitment
to remain current on their debt service payment.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by two
hotel properties, one retail property and retail/office mixed use
property. Two of the remaining specially serviced loans are
current, one is 30 -- 59 days delinquent and one is REO. Of the
remaining specially serviced loans 929-933 Broadway (0.9% of the
pool) and 338 North Cannon Drive (0.6%) were included in the
conduit statistics due to their historical performance.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans, constituting approximately 2% of the pool. The
loan is secured by a retail property in Los Angeles, California
which has exhibited declining performance through year-end 2019.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $33.4 million loss for four
specially serviced and one troubled loan (a 43.5% expected loss on
average).

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's makes various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjusts the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between its sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also uses an adjusted loan balance that reflects
each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this
publication reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in
the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and partial year 2020 operating results for 76% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 88% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 27% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 1.52X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Silver Sands
Factory Stores Loan ($100 million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 442,000 square foot retail outlet center located in
Miramar, Florida. The center is currently known as "Silver Sands
Premium Outlets". As of June 2020, the property was 90% leased,
compared to 89% as of December 2018. Major national tenants at the
property include Saks Off Fifth, Polo Ralph Lauren, Nike Factory,
Old Navy and Columbia Sportswear. Property performance has improved
since securitization due to increased rental revenue. The year-end
2019 NOI was 35% higher than in 2012 and the 2019 NOI DSCR was
4.62X. The loan is interest-only for the full loan term and Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and
1.48X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 27.1% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Legg Mason Tower Loan ($148.8 million --
15.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 24-story, 612,613 SF,
Class A multi-tenant office building located in the Harbor East
waterfront area of Baltimore, Maryland. The property is part of a
three-unit condominium structure that includes the office space,
18,988 SF of ground and second floor retail space, and a
1,145-space subterranean parking garage shared with the adjacent
Four Seasons Hotel Baltimore. The property was 100% leased as of
September 2020 up from 85% at securitization. The largest tenant at
securitization, Legg Mason, has downsized its space from 374,598 SF
at to 323,804 SF (currently 53% of RNA), of which they currently
occupy 173,353 SF and sublease 150,451 SF, under a lease set to
expire in August 2024. Legg Mason began subletting their space in
2009 to various tenants such as Johns Hopkins University and One
Main Financial. The loan benefits from amortization and has
amortized nearly 16% since securitization. The loan matures in
September 2022 and may face increased refinance risk as a result of
the significant tenant rollover within two years of the maturity
date. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.10X,
respectively

The second largest loan is the Hamilton Town Center Loan ($76.4
million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 494,000 square
foot collateral portion of a retail lifestyle center located in
Noblesville, Indiana, a suburb of Indianapolis. Tenants at the
property include Dick's Sporting Goods, Stein Mart, and Bed Bath
and Beyond, all of which have recently signed five-year extension
options. However, Stein Mart filed for bankruptcy in August 2020
and announced plans to close a significant portion of its
brick-and-mortar stores. Non-collateral anchors include JC Penney
and an IMAX movie theater. The total mall was 86% leased as of June
2020, compared to 92% in March 2019 and 95% in 2017. In-line
occupancy was 84.9% as of June 2020. The loan benefits from
amortization and has amortized over 9% and property performance has
generally improved since securitization due to higher revenues.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 1.18X, respectively,
compared to 79% and 1.33X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Galleria Park Hotel Loan ($30.7
million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 177-room,
nine-story, un-flagged boutique full-service hotel located in San
Francisco, California. The property is located two blocks east of
Union Square and sits at the western edge of the Financial
District. Property performance had improved significantly through
year-end 2019 and the 2019 NOI was 87% higher than in 2012. The
2019 NOI DSCR was 3.70X, which declined to 2.24X for the trailing
twelve-month (TTM) period ending June 2020. The April 2020 TTM
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 79.5%, $275.56 and $219.15,
respectively, compared to 85.8%, $275.96 and $236.86 for full year
2019. The loan benefits from amortization and has amortized about
15% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and
1.25X, respectively.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C12: Moody's Lowers Rating on F Debt to Ca
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on seven classes and
downgraded the ratings on four classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C12, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 10, 2020
Affirmed A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 10, 2020
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 10, 2020
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 10, 2020
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. PST**, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on June 10, 2020 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

** Reflects exchangeable classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the
significant credit support and transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index
(Herf), being within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on four P&I classes were downgraded due to a decline in
pool performance and higher anticipated losses driven primarily
from specially serviced and troubled loans. The five specially
serviced loans now represent 17% of the pool and are secured by
hotel and retail properties. The two largest specially serviced
loans represent nearly 12% of the outstanding pooled balance and
are secured by a regional mall and hotel property that were each
already experiencing declining net operating income (NOI) prior to
the coronavirus pandemic. The largest specially serviced loans
include Marriott Chicago River North Hotel (6.0%) and the Westfield
Countryside (5.8% of pool) both of which are more than 90 days
delinquent as of the November remittance date.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

The rating on class PST was affirmed due to the credit quality of
the referenced exchangeable classes.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
commercial real estate from the current weak US economic activity
and a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 6.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 4.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in September 2020, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020. The principal
methodology used in rating exchangeable classes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities". The methodologies used
in rating interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in September 2020, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in September 2020, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities"
published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to $908.7
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 55 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 58% of the pool. Ten loans, constituting
11% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same as at Moody's last review.

As of the November 2020 remittance report, loans representing 83%
were current on their debt service payments and 16% were more than
90 days delinquent.

Four loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. Five loans,
constituting 17% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Four of the specially serviced loans, representing 14% of the pool,
have transferred to special servicing since March 2020.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Marriott Chicago River
North Hotel ($54.2 million -- 6.0% of the pool) , which represents
a pari-passu portion of a $100.1 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a full-service hotel property in downtown Chicago, IL.
The hotel is dual flagged under Marriott's Residence Inn and
Springhill Suites brands and operates subject to Franchise
agreements that are scheduled to expire in 2033. The property's
2019 NOI declined nearly 20% year over year as a result of lower
room revenue and increased operating expenses, particularly
advertising & marketing. The loan transferred to special servicing
in July 2020 due to payment default and is past due for debt
service payments since May 2020. As of September 2020, the trailing
12-month occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 44.1%, $160.17 and $70.57,
respectively, compared to 83.7%, $195.18 and $163.31 a year prior.
The loan has amortized 16.3% since securitization, however, the
loan was experiencing declining performance through year-end 2019
and the coronavirus pandemic has caused significant stress on its
operations. The borrower has proposed an initial modification and
the special servicer indicated they are dual tracking ongoing
negotiations with foreclosure proceedings. The master servicer has
recognized a 25% appraisal reduction as an updated appraisal has
not yet been received.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Westfield
Countryside Loan ($52.6 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which
represents a pari-passu portion of a $148.4 million mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by a 465,000 square foot (SF) component of an
approximately 1.26 million square foot (SF) super-regional mall
located in Clearwater, Florida approximately 20 miles west of
Tampa. The mall is anchored by Dillard's, Macy's and JC Penney, all
of which are non-collateral. Sears (non-collateral) initially
downsized its location in 2014 and closed the remainder of its
space in 2018. The former Sears space was partially backfilled by a
Whole Food's and Nordstrom Rack. The largest collateral tenant
includes a 12-screen Cobb Theaters (lease expiration in December
2026), which re-opened recently after being closed due to the
coronavirus pandemic. Cobb Theaters' parent company CMX Cinemas
field for chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 2020. The loan transferred
to special servicing in June 2020 due to imminent default and the
loan is past due for debt service payments since May 2020. As of
the September 2020 rent roll, inline occupancy was 88%, the same as
in March 2020. The property's 2019 NOI improved slightly year over
year however, it was 12% below securitization levels due to lower
rental reviews. The loan sponsor is Westfield and O'Connor Capital
Partners. The loan as amortized 4.3% since securitization, however,
the special servicer indicated, Westfield, does not plan to support
the asset going forward, and is cooperating in a friendly
foreclosure process. Furthermore, the special servicer commentary
indicates the likely disposition strategy is to market for sale by
year-end 2020. The master servicer has recognized a 25% appraisal
reduction as an updated appraisal has not yet been received. Due to
the declining performance and current market environment, Moody's
anticipates a significant loss on this loan.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Deer Springs Town
Center ($26.8 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
185,000 square foot (SF) anchored retail center located in North
Las Vegas, Nevada. The loan became delinquent and transferred to
special servicing in October 2018 following the closure of the
former largest tenant, Toys R Us (65,705 SF, 34% of the NRA). A
Receiver was appointed in July 2019 and is working with the
property manager to renew upcoming lease expirations and lease up
vacant spaces. The special servicer indicated that renewals for
PetSmart, Staples and Ross Dress for Less have been executed and an
LOI was received from 24 Hour Fitness expressing interest in
approximately 32,000 SF of the former Toys R Us space. As of June
2020, rent roll, the property was 66% leased, compared to 64% in
January 2020, 63% in December 2018 and 91% at securitization. As of
the November remittance data the loan was last paid through its
December 2019 payment date. The special servicer commentary
indicates the property will be marketed for sale through
receivership once lease amendments have been executed and an
undeveloped pad site is sold.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by an
anchored retail center, located in Winter Haven, FL and a
full-service hotel located in Katy, TX.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 2.3% of the pool, that have all
experienced declines in performance based on their 2019 financial
reporting. The loans are secured by multifamily properties located
in Grand Forks, ND.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this transaction,
Moody's makes various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's adjusts the
MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects capitalization (cap)
rates that are between its sustainable cap rates and market cap
rates. Moody's also uses an adjusted loan balance that reflects
each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV reported in this
publication reflects the MLTV before the adjustments described in
the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2020 operating results for 94% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 96%, compared to 102% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Merrimack Premium Outlets Loan ($116.6 million
-- 12.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 409,000 SF outlet
center located in Merrimack, NH, approximately ten miles north of
the Massachusetts/ New Hampshire border. The property was developed
in 2012 by Simon Property Group. As of June 2020, the property was
95% leased, compared to 96% in December 2019 and 100% at
securitization. The property benefits from limited competition and
is considered to be the dominant shopping center in its trade area.
Through year-end 2019 the property's NOI was nearly 28% above
securitization levels and the 2019 NOI DSCR was 2.24X. The loan
remains current and has amortized 10% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to
96% and 1.04X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 15 MetroTech Center Loan ($75.7
million -- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 19-story, Class
A office building containing approximately 650,000 square feet (SF)
of net rentable area located in Brooklyn, New York. The loan
represents a pari-passu portion of a $143.0 million mortgage loan.
It is one of seven Class A buildings situated within the MetroTech
Center, all of which are owned by the sponsor. The property was
built in 2003 and contains a two-level below-grade parking garage
offering 113 spaces. As of the September 2020 rent roll, the
property was 65% leased, compared to 98% in December 2019. The
decrease in leased space is due to one of the tenants, WellPoint
Inc. vacating the property at lease expiration in June 2020. Three
new leases have been signed by the NYS Department of Taxation and
Finance, Magellan Health and Slate. The loan also benefits from
amortization and has paid down 16% since securitization. Moody's
analysis takes into account the recent leasing activity and Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to
90% and 1.08X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the City Creek Center Loan ($73.7 million
-- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 348,537 SF portion of a
628,934 SF regional mall located in Salt Lake City, Utah. City
Creek Center opened in March 2012 and is part of a $1.5 billion
mixed-used redevelopment of downtown Salt Lake City. In addition to
the subject property, the development contains 2.1 million SF of
office space, 800 multi-family units and a 4,000-space subterranean
garage (not part of the collateral). The property's non-collateral
anchors include Macy's and Nordstrom. The borrower owns a leasehold
interest in the majority of the collateral and a fee interest in
three restaurants. The ground-lease is with the Church of
Latter-day Saints with an initial term of 30 years through March
21, 2042 and four additional 10-year options. As of June 2020, the
in-line occupancy was 98%, compared to 99% as of February 2020. As
part of its bankruptcy filing in September 2019, Forever 21 (38,225
SF, 11% of the NRA), included this location as one of its
underperforming stores will close. The Forever 21 location remains
open but has a lease expiration in January 2022.The property's 2019
NOI was 19% lower than securitization levels primarily due to
higher expenses. The property represents the dominant regional mall
within the trade area and is centrally located in the Salt Lake
City CBD. The loan sponsor is Taubman Realty Group LP and Simon
Property Group has recently executed a merger agreement to acquire
an 80% stake in Taubman Centers. The loan has amortized 13% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.00X,
respectively, compared to 96% and 0.99X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C23: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust (MSBAM) Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C23.

RATING ACTIONS

MSBAM 2015-C23

Class A-3 61690QAD1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-4 61690QAE9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-S 61690QAG4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class A-SB 61690QAC3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class B 61690QAH2; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously AA-sf

Class C 61690QAK5; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class D 61690QAS8; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously BBB-sf

Class E 61690QAU3; LT BB-sf Affirmed; previously BB-sf

Class F 61690QAW9; LT B-sf Affirmed; previously B-sf

Class PST 61690QAJ8; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously A-sf

Class X-A 61690QAF6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Class X-B 61690QAL3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Although overall pool performance
remains generally stable, loss expectations have increased
primarily due to the declining performance of the 14 Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCS; 34.7%), which include two specially serviced loans
(4.9%). Fitch's current ratings incorporate a base case loss of
5.2%. The Negative Outlooks factor in additional stresses related
to the coronavirus pandemic, which reflect losses could reach
7.8%.

The largest FLOC and the largest increase in loss since the prior
rating action is the Fairfax Corner loan (6.3%), which is secured
by fee and leasehold interests in a 182,331-sf mixed-use
retail/office property located in Fairfax, VA. The property is part
of the 900,000-sf Fairfax Corner mixed-use development, which
contains a 16-screen Raven Cinemas, two class A multifamily
buildings totaling 1,100 units, 220,000-sf of retail space,
137,000-sf of office space and 1,903 parking spaces.

Property performance declined due to the coronavirus pandemic. As
of the September 2020 rent roll, occupancy fell to 89.2% from 94.4%
at YE 2019. The servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) fell to 0.98x, as of YTD June 2020, from 1.52x at YE 2019
and 1.75x at YE 2018. The loan began amortizing in May 2018.

The second largest increase in loss since the prior rating action
is the 599 Broadway loan (2.3%), which is secured by the 44,000-sf
office portion of a property located on the southwest corner of
Broadway and Houston Street in the SoHo neighborhood of Manhattan.

Occupancy fell to 75%, as of the October 2020 rent roll, from 91.7%
at YE 2019 after Houston Media Group (16.7% of net rentable area
[NRA]) vacated in 3Q20 ahead of its August 2027 lease expiration.
Indomitable Entertainment, LLC (8.3%) also vacated shortly after
issuance. The largest remaining tenant is WeWork (25.0% of NRA;
36.1% of gross rent; through March 2029). The servicer-reported NOI
DSCR fell to 1.41x, as of YTD June 2020, from 2.40x at YE 2019 for
this interest-only loan.

The third largest increase in loss since the prior rating action is
The Quarters loan (2.3%), which is secured by a 575-unit student
housing property serving the University of Louisiana at Lafayette
(ULL) located half a mile southwest. Per the servicer, occupancy
fell to 77.6%, as of the June 2020, from 90.1% at YE 2017 due to
declining enrollment at ULL and the Louisiana state legislature
slashing funding for the Taylor Opportunity Program for Students
(TOPS) scholarship in 2017 and 2018.

While the borrower's leasing team was able to attain a high renewal
rate of 49.7% for the fall 2020 semester, the cuts to TOPS and
increasing number of students choosing to live with their parents
and commuting to school has negatively affected the subject. The
servicer-reported NOI DSCR fell to 0.76x, as of YTD June 2020, from
1.11x at YE 2019 and 1.40x at YE 2018.

The fourth largest increase in loss since the prior rating action
is the Sawgrass Landing Shopping Center loan (2.3%), which is
secured by a 64,500-sf anchored retail property located in Sunrise,
FL.

While the property continues to be fully occupied, the
servicer-reported NOI DSCR fell to 1.36x, as of YTD March 2020,
from 1.54x at YE 2019 and 1.88x at YE 2018 primarily, due to the
end of the partial-interest-only period in June 2019. The largest
tenant LA Fitness (54.3% of NRA; 39.0% of gross rent; renewed
through December 2036) continues to face significant headwinds due
to mandatory closures and decreased gym attendance from the
coronavirus pandemic.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement increased since
issuance due to loan payoffs, scheduled amortization and
defeasance. As of the November 2020 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance was reduced by 16.8% to $892.7 million
from $1.073 billion at issuance and 12.9% since Fitch's last rating
action. Since issuance, seven loans (10.9% of the issuance pool)
have paid off and one loan (1.3% of the issuance pool) disposed
with minimal losses (totaling $9,413). Five loans (2.9%) are fully
defeased. Six loans (25.0%) are full-term interest-only and all
other loans are currently amortizing. Loan maturities and
anticipated repayment dates (ARDs) are concentrated in 2025
(96.4%), with limited maturities in 2024 (3.7%).

Coronavirus Exposure: Eight loans (16.4%) are secured by hotel
properties. The weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR for the hotel loans
is 2.52x. These hotel loans could sustain a decline in NOI of 59.2%
before NOI DSCR falls below 1.0x. Twenty-three loans (29.1%) are
secured by retail properties. The WA NOI DSCR for the retail loans
is 2.02x. These retail loans could sustain a decline in NOI of
48.6% before DSCR falls below 1.0x. Eleven loans (17.4%) are
secured by multifamily properties, including one loan (2.3%)
secured by a student housing property. The WA NOI DSCR for the
multifamily loans is 1.69x. These multifamily loans could sustain a
decline in NOI of 38.8% before DSCR falls below 1.0x.

Fitch applied additional stresses to five hotel loans, five retail
loans, one mixed-use loan, one traditional multifamily loan and one
student housing loan to account for potential cash flow disruptions
due to the coronavirus pandemic. These additional stresses
contributed to the Negative Rating Outlooks on Classes E and F.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on Classes E and F reflect the
potential for downgrades due to concerns surrounding the ultimate
effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the performance concerns
associated with the FLOCs and specially serviced loans. The Stable
Rating Outlooks on Classes A-SB through D reflect the increasing
credit enhancement, continued expected amortization and relatively
stable performance of the majority of the pool.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Positive Rating Action/Upgrade

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
Upgrades of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance;
however, adverse selection, increased concentrations and further
underperformance of the FLOCs or loans expected to be negatively
affected by the coronavirus pandemic could cause this trend to
reverse.

Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' category would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
is likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the 'Bsf' and
'BBsf' categories are not likely until the later years in a
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and/or properties vulnerable to the coronavirus return to
pre-pandemic levels, and there is sufficient credit enhancement to
the classes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Negative Rating Action/Downgrade

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf' categories are not likely due
to the position in the capital structure but may occur should
interest shortfalls affect the Classes.

Downgrades to the 'BBBsf' and 'Asf' categories would occur should
overall pool losses increase significantly and/or one or more large
loans have an outsized loss, which would erode credit enhancement.

Downgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories would occur should
loss expectations increase due to an increase in specially serviced
loans and/or the loans vulnerable to the coronavirus pandemic not
stabilize.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021. Should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
negative rating actions, including downgrades and/or further
Negative Rating Outlook revisions.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) Credit
Relevance is a Score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MORGAN STANLEY 2020-1: Fitch Gives B(EXP)sf Rating on Cl. B5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to Morgan Stanley
Residential Mortgage Loans Trust 2020-1.

RATING ACTIONS; previously
MSRM 2020-1

Class A1; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A1AIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A1IO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A2; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A2A; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A2AIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A2B; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A2BIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A3; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A3A; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A3AIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A3B; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A3BIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A4; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A4A; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A4AIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A4B; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A4BIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A5; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A5A; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A5AIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A5B; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class A5BIO; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B1; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B2; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B3; LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B4; LT BB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B5; LT B(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B6; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed
certificates issued by Morgan Stanley Residential Mortgage Loan
Trust 2020-1 (MSRM 2020-1) as indicated.

This is the third post-crisis transaction off the Morgan Stanley
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust shelf, with the first transaction
issued in 2014. It is also the first MSRM transaction that is
composed of loans from various sellers and acquired by Morgan
Stanley in their prime jumbo aggregation process.

The certificates are supported by 345 prime quality loans with a
total balance of approximately $308.49 million as of the cutoff
date. The pool consists of 100% fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) from
various mortgage originators. The servicer in this transaction is
Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS). Nationstar Mortgage LLC will
be the master servicer.

All of the loans qualify as Safe Harbor Qualified Mortgage (SHQM)
or agency eligible temporary Qualified Mortgage loans.

There is no exposure to LIBOR in this transaction. The collateral
is 100% fixed rate loans, and the certificates are fixed rate and
capped at the net weighted average coupon (WAC) or based on the net
WAC.

Like other prime transactions, the transaction uses a senior
subordinate shifting interest structure with subordination floors
to protect against tail risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Coronavirus Impact Addressed (Negative): The coronavirus and the
resulting containment efforts have resulted in revisions to Fitch's
GDP estimates for 2020. Fitch's current baseline outlook for U.S.
GDP growth is -3.7% for 2020, down from 1.7% for 2019. To account
for declining macroeconomic conditions, the Economic Risk Factor
(ERF) default variable for the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' rating categories
was increased from a floor of 1.0 and 1.5, respectively, to 2.0.
The ERF floor of 2.0 best approximates Fitch's baseline GDP for
2020 and a recovery of 4.3% in 2021. If conditions deteriorate
further and recovery is longer or less than current projections,
the ERF floors may be further revised higher.

Expected Payment Deferrals Related to Coronavirus (Negative): The
outbreak of the coronavirus and widespread containment efforts in
the U.S. will result in increased unemployment and cash flow
disruptions. To account for the cash flow disruptions, Fitch
assumes deferred payments on a minimum of 16.67% of the pool for
the first month at all rating categories with a reversion to its
standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve by January 2021.
This assumption is based on observations of legacy Alt-A
delinquencies and past due payments following Hurricane Maria in
Puerto Rico and a haircut by 40%.

Payment Forbearance (Neutral): As of the cutoff date, none of the
borrowers in the pool are on a coronavirus forbearance plan or
other pandemic relief plan. Since there are no loans currently
delinquent or under a forbearance plan, Fitch did not make any
additional adjustments to account for increase servicing advance
recoupment, and relied on the pre-pandemic advancing and
liquidation stresses outlined in Fitch's criteria. If a borrower
were to request pandemic relief, the servicer is offering borrowers
a three-month forbearance plan with the option to extend for
another three months if it is still impacted. The forbearance plan
will be followed by a repayment plan. The servicer will follow
standard servicing practices when assessing the need for pandemic
relief and other loss mitigation options. The servicer plans to
advance delinquent P&I while the borrower is on a forbearance
plan.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists of
25- and 30-year fixed rate fully amortizing loans, seasoned
approximately a month in aggregate. Most of the loans were
originated through the sellers' retail channels. The borrowers in
this pool have strong credit profiles (776 FICO) and relatively low
leverage (77.2% sLTV as determined by Fitch). In addition, the pool
contains no loans of particularly large size. Only 83 loans are
over $1 million and the largest is $2.86 million. Fitch considered
100% of the loans in the pool to be fully documented loans.

The pool contains one loan made to a nonpermanent resident, which
makes up 0.3% of the pool. The borrower has a prime credit profile
(742), LTV of 80.0%, and $144,000 of liquid reserves. This loan was
treated by Fitch as investor occupied to capture the risk of the
borrower being a non-permanent resident.

Geographic Concentration (Neutral): Approximately 27% of the pool
is concentrated in California with relatively low MSA
concentration. The largest MSA concentration is in Los Angeles MSA
(11.9%) followed by the San Francisco MSA (7.3%) and the Miami MSA
(6.5%). The top three MSAs account for 25.7% of the pool. As a
result, there was no adjustment for geographic concentration.

Shifting Interest Structure (Mixed): The mortgage cash flow and
loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

CE Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor of 1.6% has
been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and loss
exposure for senior tranches as pool size declines and performance
volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and small loan
count concentration. A junior subordination floor of 1.4% has been
considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and loss exposure
for subordinate tranches as pool size declines and performance
volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and small loan
count concentration.

Full Servicer Advancing (Mixed): The servicers will provide full
advancing for the life of the transaction (the servicer is expected
to advance delinquent P&I on loans that enter a coronavirus
forbearance plan). Although full P&I advancing will provide
liquidity to the certificates, it will also increase the loan-level
loss severity (LS) since the servicer looks to recoup P&I advances
from liquidation proceeds, which results in less recoveries.
Nationstar is the master servicer and will advance if the servicer
is not able to. If the master servicer is not able to advance, then
the securities administrator (Citibank) will advance.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the certificates.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$425,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is
well-controlled for in this transaction. Morgan Stanley has an
extensive operating history in mortgage aggregations and is
assessed by Fitch as an 'Above Average' aggregator. Morgan Stanley
has a developed sourcing strategy and maintains strong internal
controls that leverage the company's enterprise wide risk
management framework. All of the loans are serviced by Specialized
Loan Servicing (SLS), rated 'RPS2' by Fitch. SLS will be the
advancing party, but in the event that neither SLS nor Nationstar
are able to advance, Citibank will be the ultimate advancing
party.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): The loan-level
representations and warranties (R&Ws) are mostly consistent with a
higher tier framework but have a prescriptive testing construct and
materiality factor with no parameters that are restricting them to
a Tier 2. Although some of the loan level representations have
knowledge qualifiers, there is a knowledge qualifier clawback
provision for the sellers/originators, which Fitch views as a
positive aspect of the framework. Morgan Stanley is not providing
the R&Ws for this transaction. The underlying originators/sellers
will be the R&W provider, Morgan Stanley will be providing gap reps
if the originators/sellers are not providing the rep up until the
closing date. The following reps will sunset after 36 months:
fraud, underwriting, income/employment/ assets and property
valuation. Fitch increased its loss expectations 24bps at the
'AAAsf' rating category to mitigate the limitations of the
framework and the noninvestment-grade counterparty risk of the
providers.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party due
diligence was performed on 100% of loans in the transaction by four
different third-party review firms; two firms are assessed by Fitch
as 'Acceptable - Tier 1', and the other firms are assessed as
'Acceptable - Tier 3'. The review confirmed strong origination
practices; no material exceptions were listed and loans that
received a final 'B' grades were due to nonmaterial exceptions that
were mitigated with strong compensating factors. Fitch applied a
credit for the high percentage of loan level due diligence, which
reduced the 'AAAsf' loss expectation by 22bps.

No Exposure to Hurricane Laura, Hurricane Sally or Hurricane Delta:
There are no loans located in the FEMA individual assistance area
for these hurricanes in the pool.

Fitch increased its 'BBsf'-expected loss by rounding the raw model
loss up to the nearest 0.25% rather than to the nearest 0.25% to
prevent compression and to prevent the 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' rating
stresses from having the same given expected loss. For all other
rating stresses, Fitch rounded the raw model loss to the nearest
0.25%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool, and lower
MVDs illustrated by a gain in home prices.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national level, or
positive home price growth with no assumed overvaluation. The
analysis assumes positive home price growth of 10%. Excluding the
senior class, which is already 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates
there is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines at the
national level. The analysis assumes market value declines of 10%,
20% and 30%, in addition to the model projected 6.2% in the base
case. The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the
model projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home
prices would lower all rated classes by two or more full
categories.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

Fitch has added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that includes a
prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer demand and
a protracted period of below-trend economic activity that delays
any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this severe scenario,
Fitch expects the ratings to be affected by changes in its
sustainable home price model due to updates to the model's
underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term effects arising from
disruptions related to the coronavirus on these economic inputs
will likely affect both investment- and speculative-grade ratings.

CRITERIA VARIATION

There was one criteria variation to the "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria"
that was applied in the analysis of this transaction. The variation
reflected the Quicken originator assessment being out dated. Per
criteria, Fitch expects to have an outstanding operational
assessment conducted within 12-18 months of securitization date on
originators contributing over 15% of an RMBS transaction pool.
Fitch has reviewed Quicken Loans in the past and was comfortable
with their origination platform.

Fitch was comfortable with Quicken Loans contributing over 15% of
the loans in this transaction primarily because Morgan Stanley is
the aggregator and is assessed by Fitch as 'Above Average'. Morgan
Stanley has an established loan sourcing strategy and strong
internal controls that leverage its enterprise wide risk management
framework. In addition, 100% of the transaction pool received loan
level due diligence from independent TPR firms that are assessed by
Fitch as 'Acceptable - Tier 1' and 'Acceptable - Tier 3'. The
results of the due diligence review confirmed sound origination
processes with no indication of material defects.

Quicken Loans is a large contributor to non-agency PLS RMBS with
over $1.5 billion of production included in non-agency
securitization since 2016. Performance of this production has been
strong with minimal defaults, and the credit characteristics are
similar to other prime loans included in non-agency PLS. Lastly,
all loans in this transaction sourced from Quicken Loans have been
current since origination and have not exhibited any early payment
defaults. There was no rating impact due to this variation.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by SitusAMC, Clayton, Consolidated Analytics, and
Infinity. The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E
focused on four areas: compliance review, credit review, valuation
review and data integrity. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and, as a result, Fitch did not make any adjustment(s) to
its analysis.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, Clayton, Infinity, and Consolidated Analytics were
engaged to perform the review. Loans reviewed under this engagement
were given compliance, credit and valuation grades and assigned
initial grades for each subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers
were noted in the due diligence reports.

Fitch also used data files that were made available by the issuer
on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received loan-level
information based on the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) data
layout format, and the data are considered to be comprehensive. The
ASF data tape layout was established with input from various
industry participants, including rating agencies, issuers,
originators, investors and others to produce an industry standard
for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS securitization
market. The data contained in the ASF layout data tape were
reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by clicking the link to the Appendix. The appendix also contains a
comparison of these RW&Es to those Fitch considers typical for the
asset class as detailed in the Special Report titled
'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global
Structured Finance Transactions'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


SUMMIT ISSUER 2020-1: Fitch to Rate Class C Notes 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Summit Issuer LLC's revenue notes
class A-1, A-2, B, and C, series 2020-1 as follows:

  -- $50 million 2020-1 class A-1-VFN 'A-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $122.7 million 2020-1 class A-2 'A-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.9 million 2020-1 class B 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33.6 million 2020-1 class C 'BB-'; Outlook Stable.

RATING RATIONALE

The transaction is a securitization of SummitIG's high capacity
network of fiber optic cable assets. These assets include conduits,
cable, permits, rights and contracts, which support SummitIG's dark
fiber network, the collateral consists of mission-critical assets
which support one of the largest data center hubs in the U.S. The
Northern Virginia hub interconnects high quality clients including
cloud providers, telecom companies, data center operators and large
enterprise customers.

The expected ratings are based on the cash flows of the
transaction, as supported by a mission critical asset, which in
turn supports an essential service. The dark fiber network
represents a differentiated deployment of a product that is crucial
to support the internet. Given the operational nature of the asset,
future capex is expected to be limited.

SummitIG is the dominant market participant in the Northern
Virginia market and benefits from high barriers to entry including
that the collateral assets and corresponding cash flows are
protected by first-mover advantage, which precludes another
provider from replicating its service offerings. This is further
bolstered by sustained growth in the usage of the internet and the
supporting data center infrastructure, for which this asset is a
necessity and the sponsor has deployed capacity to support, in
anticipation of further growth.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Dominant Market Position; High Barriers to Entry (Revenue Risk:
Stronger):

SummitIG has established a unique, single-focus dark fiber network
platform, catering to users through a high capacity system in
Northern Virginia. SummitIG's dark fiber infrastructure has high
capacity conduit and fiber-optic cables that provide customized
connectivity solutions to its customers. More than two thirds of
SummitIG's network is on unique or differentiated routes and the
network has sufficient capacity to continue to add customers at
minimal cost. Further, the network benefits from considerable
barriers to entry from competing providers and technology types.
The ability for a competitor to build a platform capable of
providing a comparable level of service is limited. This is a
result of extensive capital requirements, SummitIG's established
network within the geography, and existing long-term agreements,
which grant SummitIG limited access rights of way (interstate
highway systems) with a term option.

Anticipated Repayment Date and Prefunding Debt Structure (Debt
Structure: Midrange):

SummitIG's current issuance of three tranches of debt is secured by
a first priority perfected security interest in the company's dark
fiber network and benefits from its related cash flow. The tranches
contemplate an Anticipated Repayment Date (ARD) in 2025 (2023 with
two one-year extensions for the class A-1 VFN), prior to which each
tranche will only receive interest unless cash sweep conditions
related to the DSCR (1.50x) are breached, with cash beginning to be
trapped at DSCR of 1.70x. The tranches pay sequentially with the A
and B notes being senior to the C notes. Post-ARD, 100% of cash
flow will be trapped to pay down each series sequentially in
alphabetical order. The structure includes reserves accounts for
fixed expenses, insurance, collateral enhancement and advance
fees.

At issuance, $25 million of the proceeds will be used fund the
prefunding account which can be drawn upon if DSCR (1.85x) and
total leverage (9.5x) metrics and certain conditions related to
remaining contract term and investment-grade ratings of the
customers are met. The weighted-average contract term must be at
least 4.0 years, and investment-grade contract counterparties must
account for over 45.0% of revenue. The prefunding period will last
for one year, after which any remaining funds will be used to pay
down principal. Prefunding amounts will be held back at issuance.

Following the termination of the prefunding period, the A-1 VFN
notes can be drawn upon subject to certain conditions related to
DSCR, class A leverage, contract length conditions, and tenant
creditworthiness considerations. This includes DSCR of greater than
1.85x, class A debt/NCF is less than 6.65x, a weighted average
contract term of at least 4.0 years, and investment-grade contract
counterparties accounting for over than 45.0% of revenue.

Limited Capital Requirements (Infrastructure Development/Renewal:
Stronger):

Limited lifecycle and infrastructure investment is necessary given
fiber optic cables have an anticipated useful life of over 30
years. The average age of the fiber throughout SummitIG's network
is approximately three years. Continued improvements in fiber optic
technology are expected to drive a longer useful life of the
conduit and fiber lines. Given current capacity on the network, the
addition of new customers requires minimal infrastructure
investment, with a significant portion of connectivity costs borne
by the customer. The majority of future infrastructure related
costs are expected to be periodic maintenance and routine repairs.

PEER GROUP

The closest Global Infrastructure peers for SummitIG are Kentucky
Wired Infrastructure Company (BBB+/Stable), Inc. and Arqiva
Financing plc (BBB/Stable). Kentucky Wired, an Availability Pay
transaction, is a 3,400-mile high capacity fiber network serving
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Arqiva Financing, a Whole Business
Securitisation, is the sole UK national provider of network access
and managed transmission services for terrestrial television and
radio broadcasting. DSCRs for Kentucky Wired are considerably
weaker than SummitIG as a result of the stability afforded by an
Availability Payment structure with revenues appropriated from a
'AA' category counterparty. Arqiva maintains considerably stronger
DSCRs than SummitIG, but is largely driven by its debt
structuring.

Outside of the digital infrastructure space, several large and
mature toll road networks, were viewed as peers given the fact that
many of these assets share characteristics consistent with SummitIG
operating profile. These include stability in operations, a strong
competitive position, and economic resiliency. DSCR for these
assets range from 1.5x to 3.5x, yet leverage is typically
consistent with that of the SummitIG transaction.

The transaction shares many similarities with wireless tower
securitizations. These transactions are backed by portfolios of
wireless tower assets supported by leases. The transactions have
sponsors that are the dominant market players, have built out
significant networks that would be costly to replicate and provide
an essential service. The transmission of signal from these assets
is ultimately reliant upon fiber-optic cables, the assets which
back the SummitIG transaction. Cash flow is predominantly generated
from a small number of investment-grade or near-investment-grade
counterparties and operating expenses are largely borne by the
tenants, resulting in lower operating expenses. The liability
structures share substantial similarities with the SummitIG
transaction.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  -- Increasing cash flow without an increase in corresponding
debt, from structural contract escalators or new contracts could
lead to upgrades. Actual upgrades are unlikely as the structure
allows for an increase in leverage based on a corresponding
increase in cash flow, resulting in stable leverage levels.
However, the transaction is capped at 'A', given the risk of
technological obsolescence.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  -- Declining cash flow as a result of higher site expenses or
lease churn, and the development of an alternative technology for
the transmission of data or the creation of a competing network
with similar capacity and breadth of coverage could lead to
downgrades.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is a securitization of the contract payments
generated from SummitIG's dense dark fiber infrastructure.
SummitIG's assets include conduits, cable, permits, rights and
contracts. Debt is secured by the net revenue of operations and
benefits from a perfected security interest in the securitized
assets.

CREDIT UPDATE

SummitIG deploys, owns and leases its dark fiber network which is
essential for customers in Northern Virginia's data infrastructure
market. SummitIG has an extensive footprint supporting data center
customers and operators. Northern Virginia's data center market is
uniquely concentrated with existing and fast-growing cloud
providers which drive growth for SummitIG. The company benefits as
more infrastructure is deployed and indirectly as enterprise and
content providers contract cloud providers with high
investment-grade ratings to manage their data.

Robust market demand, first-mover advantage, and limited
competition has resulted in considerable growth in SummitIG's key
operating metrics. Last Quarter Annualized monthly recurring
revenue has grown at a compound annual rate of 32% since 2018.
Credit quality of customers is healthy as approximately 66% of
SummitIG's MRR comes from customers rated investment grade.
SummitIG's top 10 clients account for 63% of MRR. Further, MRR has
a weighted average remaining contracted term of 61 months, with a
weighted average original contracted term of 82 months.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Fitch Cases

The base case was provided by the sponsor. The revenue was based on
in-place contracts. The estimates for operational expenses were
derived from historical data and forward-looking cost estimates
provided by the sponsor, based on its operations.

Fitch's Rating Case Summary

Fitch's rating case assumptions were derived from information
provided by the sponsor. Revenue assumptions were based on Fitch's
analysis of in-place contracts and by applying a haircut to revenue
based on technology type, tenant creditworthiness, and contract
length. Estimates for operational expenses were based on Fitch's
analysis of the historical data and estimates provided by the
sponsor. Under the Fitch Rating Case, the transaction reflects
adequate debt service coverage levels, averaging 2.40x which
demonstrates the ability to withstand potential decreases in
monthly recurring revenue. The Fitch Rating Case cash flow does not
factor the potential for future customer growth which would
facilitate a more rapid retirement of debt service obligations.
Leverage levels considering Fitch's net cash flow for the classes
A-2, B and C are 7.20x, 8.31x and 10.29x, respectively, in Fitch's
rating case scenario.

Fitch ran a variety of sensitivities which reflect stresses on
monthly recurring revenue. These include (1) A 10% per year
reduction in MRR, years five through 15, where MRR will begin to
reduce immediately after the ARD; (2) A 10% per year reduction in
MRR in years 10 through 20; and (3) an exponential decline in
revenue beginning in year seven capped at a 64% reduction.

Coronavirus: Fitch believes the risk of the coronavirus negatively
affecting the data network infrastructure's operational
performance, including that of data center and fiber line
operators, is relatively low. The low risk is due to the integral
nature of data services to consumers' day-to-day lives and given
enhanced business and consumer reliance on this infrastructure as a
direct result of COVID-19. As such, these services have been deemed
essential and have continued uninhibited by the coronavirus
outbreak.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


TRINITAS CLO XIV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Trinitas CLO
XIV Ltd./Trinitas CLO XIV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured term loans
that are governed by collateral quality tests. The notes are
managed by Trinitas Capital Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 4,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Trinitas CLO XIV Ltd./Trinitas CLO XIV LLC

  Class A-1, $300.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $25.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $55.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $30.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $25.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E, $17.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $48.50 million: Not rated


[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 47 Classes From 28 U.S. CMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on 47 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from 28 U.S. CMBS transactions.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 141 classes from
these transactions.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/33M9EOz

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the rating actions by rating
category. In general, the downgrades were between one and three
notches from the previous rating levels, with the exception of
three classes, in which we lowered a 'AA (sf)' rating by six
notches on a single borrower transaction and two 'A (sf)' ratings
on another single-borrower transaction by five notches.

  Table 1
  Breakdown Of Rating Actions

  Rating     Count        Ratings affirmed  Ratings lowered
  Category   (by rating)  (by count)        from (by count)
   
  AAA         106           102                4
  AA           28            22                6
  A            19            11                8
  BBB           9             3                6
  BB           12             2               10
  B            14             1               13
  Total       188           141               47

S&P said, "The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow our revised retail mall capitalization rate
assumptions detailed in the CMBS Global Property Evaluation
Methodology guidance article, published Dec. 4, 2020. In addition,
the downgrade of nine classes from five of these transactions to
the 'CCC' category reflect our view that, based on an S&P Global
Ratings loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of over 100%, these classes are
more susceptible to reduced liquidity support, and the risk of
default and losses on these classes has increased due to uncertain
market conditions.

"As noted in the guidance article, we revised our mall base case
capitalization rate assumptions to generally between 6.00% and at
or greater than 12.75%, from between 6.00% and 8.25%, generally, in
the now retired commentary article. In determining our revised
capitalization rates, we considered cash flow volatility due to
declining and weakening trends within the retail mall sector, the
overall perceived increase in the market risk premium for this
property type, tenant mix, competitors, and the property's presence
in its trade area. While we have increased the capitalization rates
on various retail mall-backed loans (where applicable) in U.S. CMBS
transactions that we recently reviewed, we have identified 33 loans
in 28 U.S. CMBS transactions necessitating capitalization rate
adjustments. For the mall properties securing these loans, we have
generally increased the capitalization rates between 25 basis
points and 150 basis points from their prior levels.

"For certain classes, the model-indicated ratings were lower than
the classes' affirmed or lowered rating levels. This is because we
qualitatively considered the respective property's dominance in its
trade area prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the classes' positions
in the capital structure, and liquidity support. However, if there
are any reported negative changes in the property or transaction's
performance beyond what we have already considered, we may revisit
our analysis and adjust our ratings as necessary.

"For class A-MS in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-LDP9, a U.S. conduit transaction, the model-indicated
rating was higher than the class's affirmed rating level. This is
because we qualitatively considered the significant exposure to a
retail mall-backed loan that was previously with the special
servicer, principal and liquidity supports, as well as the
transaction's low pool factor.    

"The ratings on the interest-only (IO) certificates are based on
our criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.
Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective
and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are
promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to
social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread
availability of effective immunization, which could come by the
middle of next year. S&P uses this assumption in assessing the
economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.

As the situation evolves, S&P will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

SINGLE-ASSET SINGLE BORROWER (SASB) AND LARGE-LOAN TRANSACTIONS

Table 2 provides a breakdown of the rating actions by rating
category for the 12 U.S. CMBS SASB and large-loan transactions.

  Table 2
  Breakdown Of SASB And Large Loan Rating Actions

  Rating     Count        Ratings affirmed  Ratings lowered
  Category   (by rating)  (by count)        from (by count)

  AAA          16           12                4
  AA           11            5                6
  A            12            4                8
  BBB           9            3                6
  BB           12            2               10
  B            13            0               13
  Total        73           26               47

  SASB--Single-asset single-borrower.

Table 3 provides the loan-level metrics for the 13 loans with
revised capitalization rates secured by 15 retail mall properties
in these 12 transactions.

Details on the two U.S. CMBS SASB transactions with material rating
movements are below.

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-DSTY

This transaction is backed by two fixed-rate IO mortgage loans,
each secured by a different phase of the Destiny USA Mall in
Syracuse, N.Y. The two loans totaled $430.0 million (as of the Nov.
13, 2020, trustee remittance report) and are not
cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted because the
payment-in-lieu-of-tax (PILOT) bond financing the underlying Phase
I of the mall restricts the loans from being crossed. The sponsor
is The Pyramid Co. Both loans pay an annual fixed interest rate of
3.814% and originally matured on June 6, 2019.

The loans, which have reported current payment statuses, were
initially transferred to the special servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (Wells Fargo), on March 14, 2019, due to imminent monetary
default because the borrowers requested to modify and extend the
maturity dates of the two loans. The borrowers indicated that they
would not be able to obtain refinancing proceeds by the maturity
dates due to declining property performance coupled with more
conservative underwriting standards for mall loans in today's
lending environment. The loans were modified effective May 31,
2019, and the modification terms included, among other items, an
extension of the loans' maturity dates to June 6, 2020, with two
additional extension options (final maturity dates in June 2022)
that are exercisable upon meeting certain debt yield tests and
depositing $6.0 million upfront into the excess cash flow reserve
account. Both loans transferred back to the special servicer on
April 10, 2020, due to imminent default. The borrowers requested,
among other items, deferring debt service payments for six months
and extending the loans' maturity dates. According to Wells Fargo,
a standstill agreement was executed on June 9, 2020. The terms
included a moratorium of six debt service payments from April
through September 2020, extending the loans' maturity dates to Nov.
6, 2021, and the borrowers paying the deferred amounts and special
servicing and modification fees in 12 monthly installments.
According to Wells Fargo, the borrowers were granted a second
one-month extension of the moratorium period to November 2020.
Wells Fargo stated that due to the ongoing negative impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the underlying properties' performance, the
borrowers are expected to submit a proposal for a longer term
modification of the loans. Wells Fargo indicated that updated
appraisal values are in progress. To date, the trust has not
incurred any principal losses.

Details on the two loans are as follows:

The Phase I mortgage loan has a $300.0 million trust and whole-loan
balance and is secured by 1.24 million sq. ft. of a 1.51
million-sq.-ft. super regional shopping mall, known as Destiny USA
Phase I, in Syracuse. The Phase I borrower is party to a PILOT
agreement under which the borrower makes PILOT payments that
increase each year through the agreement's 2035 expiration in lieu
of paying real estate tax. S&P's property-level analysis considered
the year-over-year decline in servicer-reported net operating
income (NOI) in 2016 (-6.9%), 2017 (-7.9%), 2018 (-13.9%), and 2019
(-6.4%), due primarily to lower occupancy and revenues, flat
expenses, and flat in-line sales ($433 per sq. ft. based on the
year-end 2019 tenant sales report, as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings). According to the Dec. 31, 2019, rent roll, the occupancy
for the collateral was 73.4% and the five largest collateral
tenants, including the anchor, J.C. Penney (12.8% of net rentable
area [NRA]) comprise 35.0% of the collateral's total NRA. In
addition, the NRA reflects leases that expire in 2020 (3.9%), 2021
(9.8%), 2022 (10.5%), and 2023 (9.9%). However, the reported
trailing-12-month (TTM) period ended June 30, 2020, NOI was down
further from 2019 (-42.3%). Wells Fargo reported a debt service
coverage (DSC) of 0.89x for the TTM period ended June 30, 2020. S&P
said, "We derived our sustainable NCF of 11.3 million (unchanged
from our last review in March 2020), which considered the reported
declining NOI and occupancy, and the contractual PILOT payment
increases, by estimating a forward-looking PILOT payment of $29.4
million, unchanged from our last review and at issuance. However,
we increased our capitalization rate to 8.50%, up from 7.75% in our
last review, and added to value $31.0 million for the present value
of the PILOT benefit over a nine year period to arrive at our
expected-case value of $164.2 million, down 7.5% since our last
review. Our expected case value yielded an S&P Global Ratings' LTV
ratio of 182.7%."

The Phase II mortgage loan has a $130.0 million trust and
whole-loan balance, and it is secured by an 874,200-sq.-ft.
regional shopping mall, known as Destiny USA Phase II, in Syracuse.
S&P's property-level analysis considered the fluctuating
servicer-reported occupancy and NOI: 78.9% and $12.8 million,
respectively, in 2016; 82.9% and $12.2 million, respectively, in
2017; 69.6% and $11.1 million, respectively, in 2018; and 72.4% and
$11.7 million, respectively, in 2019. The reported in-line sales
were $323 per sq. ft. (based on the year-end 2019 tenant sales
report, as calculated by S&P Global Ratings). According to the Dec.
31, 2019, rent roll, the collateral's occupancy was 72.4% and the
five largest tenants, including the anchor, Dick's Sporting Goods
(10.4% of NRA), comprise 29.4% of the collateral's total NRA. In
addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (2.5%),
2021 (1.1%), 2022 (12.2%), and 2023 (23.8%). The reported TTM
period ended June 30, 2020, NOI increased from 2019 to $12.3
million. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 2.28x for the TTM period
ended June 30, 2020. S&P said, "We derived our sustainable NCF of
$10.7 million, the same as the last review. Using an S&P Global
Ratings' capitalization rate of 8.50% (the same as the last
review), we arrived at our expected-case value of $126.5 million
and an S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio of 102.8%."

Palisades Center Trust 2016-PLSD

This transaction is backed by a portion ($388.5 million) of a
$418.5 million, fixed-rate, IO whole loan (as of the Nov. 16, 2020,
trustee remittance report) secured by the borrower's fee and
leasehold interests in a portion (1.9 million sq. ft.) of a 2.2
million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall and entertainment center known
as Palisades Center in West Nyack, N.Y. The whole loan consists of
the $229.1 million senior A trust notes, a $30.0 million senior A
nontrust note, and junior trust notes B, C, and D, totaling $159.4
million. The $30.0 million nontrust companion note is pari passu in
right of payment to the $229.1 million senior trust notes, and they
are senior in right of payment to the $159.4 million junior trust
notes. The whole loan is IO and pays an annual weighted-average
fixed rate of 4.19%. In addition, there is $141.5 million in
mezzanine debt. The loan sponsor is also The Pyramid Co.

The loan transferred to the special servicer on April 10, 2020, due
to imminent default. The borrower requested, among other items,
deferring debt service payments for six months, extending the
loan's maturity date, and modifying the cash waterfall. According
to the special servicer, Wells Fargo, a standstill agreement was
executed on June 19, 2020. The terms included a moratorium of six
debt service payments from April through September 2020, extending
the loan's original April 9, 2021, maturity date to the earlier of
Oct. 9, 2021, or such date on which final payment of the loan
becomes due, and the borrower paying the deferred amounts and
special servicing and modification fees in 12 monthly installments.
According to Wells Fargo, the borrower was granted a second 30-day
extension of the moratorium period to November 2020. Wells Fargo
stated that due to the ongoing COVID-19 impact, it expects the
borrower to submit a proposal for a longer term modification of the
loan. Wells Fargo indicated that an updated appraisal value is in
progress and may be released as early as in the December 2020
reporting period. The trust balance has not incurred any principal
losses to date.

S&P's property-level analysis considered the declining
servicer-reported NOI: 2017 (-2.5%), 2018 (-6.9%), and 2019
(-8.5%); the relatively flat in-line sales ($454 per sq. ft. using
the year-end 2019 tenant sales report, as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings); the vacancy of the noncollateral anchor tenant, Lord &
Taylor (120,000 sq. ft.) in January 2020; as well as the numerous
competitors near the mall's trade area. According to the Dec. 31,
2019, rent roll, the collateral property was 79.3% occupied,
excluding Bed, Bath & Beyond (45,000 sq. ft.; vacated in June
2020), and the five-largest tenants, including anchors, Home Depot
(7.0% of NRA), Target (6.9%), and BJ's Wholesale Club (6.2%), made
up 29.0% of the collateral's NRA. In addition, the NRA include
leases that expire in 2020 (2.8%), 2021 (12.6%), 2022 (4.8%), and
2023 (13.9%). For the reported TTM period ended June 30, 2020, NOI
dropped 29.3% from 2019. The master servicer, also Wells Fargo,
reported a DSC of 1.43x for the TTM period ended June 30, 2020. S&P
said, "We derived our sustainable NCF on the whole loan of $34.1
million, unchanged from the last review in March 2020. Using an S&P
Global Ratings' capitalization rate of 8.50% (up from 7.75% since
the last review), we arrived at our expected-case value on the
whole loan of $401.7 million, down 8.8% since our last review and
yielding an S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio of 104.2% on the whole
loan."

CONDUIT TRANSACTIONS

Table 4 provides a breakdown of the rating actions by rating
category for the 16 conduit transactions.

  Table 4
  Breakdown Of Conduit Rating Actions

  Rating     Count        Ratings affirmed  Ratings lowered
  Category   (by rating)  (by count)        from (by count)

  AAA          90            90                0
  AA           17            17                0
  A             7             7                0
  BBB           0             0                0
  BB            0             0                0
  B             1             1                0
  Total       115           115                0

Table 5 provides the loan-level metrics for the 20 loans with
capitalization rate adjustments secured by nine malls in these 16
conduit transactions.

Table 6 provides the transaction-level metrics for the 16
transactions, including the S&P Global Ratings' DSC and LTV ratio
based on adjusted servicer-reported numbers. The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the defeased loans,
ground-lease loans, and specially serviced loans that we believe
will be liquidated from the respective trusts in the near term.

S&P said, "For the specially serviced loans, we reviewed the
circumstances that led each loan to transfer to special servicing.
Based on the respective servicer's comments, updated resolution
information, and historical performance of the underlying property,
we assessed whether a loan will return back to the master servicer
as a corrected mortgage loan. For defaulted loans that we deem
unlikely to return back to the master servicer, we estimate losses
based on, among other factors, updated appraisal values, revised
market- or property-level information, third-party market reports,
and/or comparable sales."

Table 7 provides details on the specially serviced loans in these
conduit transactions.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

-- Health and safety.


                            *********

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