---

         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 19, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 200

                            Headlines

AMMC CLO 15: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. FRR Notes to Caa1
ANGEL OAK 2020-3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
ANGEL OAK 2020-4: Fitch Rates Class B-2 Certs 'B(EXP)sf'
AVIS BUDGET 2020-1: Moody's Lowers Class C Notes to Ba2
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2017-SCH: S&P Cuts Rating on Class D-L Certs to BB

BENEFIT STREET XXI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to E Notes
BUNKER HILL 2020-1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Notes
CAMB COMMERCIAL 2019-LIFE: DBRS Gives B(low) Rating on Cl. G Certs
CAPITAL TRUST 2019A: S&P Cuts Rating to 'D' on Custodial Receipts
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2012-4: Moody's Lowers Rating on E-RR Notes to B1

CARLYLE US 2017-1: Moody's Cuts Class D Notes to B1
CCRESG COMMERCIAL 2016-HEAT: S&P Cuts E Certs Rating to B+ (sf)
CFK TRUST 2019-FAX: DBRS Assigns BB(low) Rating on Class E Certs
CIM TRUST 2020-R5: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class B2 Debt
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2013-GC15: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Debt

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-C4: Fitch Affirms Cl. H-RR Certs at B-sf
COLONNADE GLOBAL 2018-5: DBRS Puts 11 Tranches Under Review
COLUMBIA CENT 29: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to E Notes
COMM 201-LC6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class X-C Debt to Caa2

COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to Csf
COMM 2013-CCRE10: Moody's Lowers Class F Debt to Caa1
COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to B3(sf)
COMM 2013-GAM: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class F Debt
CSAIL 2018-C12: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs

CSMC 2019-ICE4: DBRS Assigns B(High) Rating on Class HRR Certs
DBGS 2018-BIOD: DBRS Assigns B (low) Rating on Class HRR Certs
DBGS MORTGAGE 2019-1735: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Class F Certs
DBUBS 2011-LC2: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa1
DBUBS 2017-BRBK: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating on Class HRR Certs

ELMWOOD CLO V: S&P Rates Class E Notes 'BB- (sf)'
FREDDIE MAC 2020-2: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on Cl. M Certs
FREDDIE MAC 2020-HQA3: Moody's Gives (P)Ba1 Rating on M-2UB Notes
HILDENE TRUPS 2020-3: Moody's Rates Class B Notes 'Ba3'
HOMEWARD OPPORTUNITIES 2020-2: DBRS Gives B Rating on B-2 Certs

HOMEWARD OPPORTUNITIES 2020-2: S&P Rates Class B-2 Certs 'B (sf)'
IMT TRUST 2017-APTS: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Class F-FX Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on 5 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2020-4: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
JP MORGAN 2020-5: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on Class B-5-Y Debt

LEHMAN ABS 2001-B: S&P Affirms B- (sf) Rating on Class M-1 Notes
MADISON PARK XVII: Moody's Cuts Class F-R Notes to Caa2
MARATHON CLO VIII: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D-R Notes to B2
MOFT TRUST 2020-ABC: DBRS Gives B(low) Rating on Class D Certs
MONROE CAPITAL 2015-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class F Notes to Caa3

N-STAR REL VI: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class J Debt to Csf
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-ALXA: DBRS Hikes Cl. E Rating to BB(High)
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-TECH: DBRS Confirms B Rating on G Certs
OBX TRUST 2020-EXP2: Fitch to Rate Class B-5 Debt 'B(EXP)sf'
OCEAN TRAILS 8: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes

PRIMA CAPITAL 2019-RK1: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on C-D Certs
PRIMA CAPITAL 2020-VIII: Moody's Rates Class C Notes 'Ba3'
READY CAPITAL 2020-FL4: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on G Notes
RESIDENTIAL MORTAGAGE 2020-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on B1 Notes
SARANAC CLO VII: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E-R Notes to Caa1

SCF EQUIPMENT 2017-1: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
SG COMMERCIAL 2019-787E: DBRS Assigns BB(low) Rating on F Certs
SILVER CREEK: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to B1
SOUND POINT VIII: Moody's Lowers Class F Notes Rating to Caa2
TOWD POINT 2018-SL1: DBRS Puts BB(low) Rating on Class D-2 Notes

TOWD POINT 2020-3: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Notes
TRINITAS CLO III: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to Ca
UBS COMMERCIAL 2017-C3: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class G-RR Certs
UNITED AUTO 2020-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
VENTURE LTD XIX: Moody's Confirms B3 Rating on Class F-RR Notes

WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Class K Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C10: Moody's Cuts Class F Certs to 'C'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C7: Moody's Cuts Class G Debt to 'C'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C8: Moody's Cuts Class G Certs to Caa1
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at Bsf

WORLDWIDE PLAZA 2017-WWP: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class F Certs
[*] S&P Takes Actions on 49 Classes From 36 U.S. Housing ABS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 101 Classes From 26 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

AMMC CLO 15: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. FRR Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by AMMC CLO 15, Limited:

US$5,140,000 Class FRR Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2032 (the "Class FRR Notes"), Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);
previously on April 17, 2020 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Moody's also confirmed the ratings on the following notes:

U.S. $26,500,000 Class DRR Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2032 (the "Class DRR Notes"), Confirmed at Baa3 (sf);
previously on April 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$22,800,000 Class ERR Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2032 (the "Class ERR Notes"), Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);
previously on April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class DRR Notes, the Class ERR Notes and the Class
FRR Notes. The CLO, originally issued classes of secured notes in
December 2014, partially refinanced some classes of secured notes
in December 2016, and further refinanced all classes of secured
notes in December 2018, is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes are
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in December 2023.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades on the Class FRR Notes reflects the risks posed by
credit deterioration and loss of collateral coverage observed in
the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily prompted by
economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. Since the
outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate credit has
resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other negative
rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing the CLO.
Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has increased
substantially, and the credit enhancement available to the CLO
notes has eroded and exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased
significantly.

Despite the credit quality deterioration stemming from the
coronavirus outbreak, Moody's concluded that the expected losses on
the Class DRR Notes and the Class ERR Notes continue to be
consistent with the current ratings after taking into account the
CLO's latest portfolio, its relevant structural features and its
actual over-collateralization (OC) levels. Consequently, Moody's
has confirmed the ratings on the Classes DRR Notes and Class ERR
Notes.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) was 3306 of June 2020, or 17.0% worse compared to 2830
reported in the June 2019 trustee report [1]. Moody's calculation
also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 2931 reported in
the June 2020 trustee report [2] by 375 points. Moody's noted that
approximately 35% of the CLO's par was from obligors assigned a
negative outlook and 3% from obligors whose ratings are on review
for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on Moody's calculation,
the proportion of obligors in the portfolio with Moody's corporate
family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1 or lower (adjusted for
negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade) was approximately
20.0% as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's calculated the total
collateral par balance, including recoveries from defaulted
securities, at $432.1 million, or $7.6 million less than the deal's
ramp-up target par balance, and Moody's calculated the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios (excluding haircuts) for the
Class CRR, Class DRR and Class ERR notes as of June 2020 at
121.68%, 113.23% and 106.85%, respectively.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $432.1 million, defaulted par of
$14.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 26.1%
(implying a WARF of 3306, a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.80%, a diversity score of 87 and a weighted average
spread of 3.44%. Moody's also analyzed the CLO by incorporating an
approximately $10.4 million par haircut in calculating the OC and
interest diversion test ratios.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


ANGEL OAK 2020-3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2020-3 (the Certificates) to
be issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust 2020-3 (the Trust):

-- $368.6 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $39.5 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $38.5 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $30.2 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $10.6 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $11.9 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects 30.50%
of credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 23.05%,
15.80%, 10.10%, 8.10%, and 5.85% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of primarily first-lien fixed-
and adjustable-rate nonprime and expanded prime residential
mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates. The
Certificates are backed by 1,356 loans with a total principal
balance of $530,343,036 as of the Cut-Off Date (June 1, 2020).

Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (79.4%), Angel Oak Home Loans LLC
(AOHL; 8.4%), and Angel Oak Prime Bridge, LLC (0.04%)
(collectively, Angel Oak) originated approximately 87.9% of the
pool while third-party originators (TPO) contributed the remaining
12.1% of the pool. Angel Oak originated the first-lien mortgages
primarily under the following nine programs: Bank Statement,
Platinum, Portfolio Select, Investor Cash Flow, Non-Prime General,
Non-Prime Recent Housing, Non-Prime Foreign National, Non-Prime
Investment Property, and Asset Qualifier. For more information
regarding these programs, see the related rating report.

In addition, second-lien mortgage loans make up 1.8% of the pool.
The TPO originated all but four of the second-lien loans. Angel Oak
originated the remaining four loans under the guidelines
established by Fannie Mae and overlaid by Angel Oak.

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) is the Servicer for all
loans. AOHL will act as Servicing Administrator and Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar)
will act as the Master Servicer. U.S. Bank National Association
(rated AA (high) with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will
serve as Trustee, Paying Agent, and Custodian.

Although the applicable mortgage loans were originated to satisfy
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Ability-to-Repay
(ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers who generally do not
qualify for agency, government, or private-label nonagency prime
products for various reasons. In accordance with the CFPB Qualified
Mortgage (QM)/ATR rules, 1.7% of the loans are designated as QM
Safe Harbor, 0.8% are designated as QM Rebuttable Presumption, and
80.7% are designated as non-QM. Approximately 16.8% of the loans
are made to investors for business purposes and are thus not
subject to the QM/ATR rules.

The Servicer will generally fund advances of delinquent principal
and interest (P&I) on any mortgage until such loan becomes 180 days
delinquent. The Servicer is also obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred
in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The Seller will have the option, but not the obligation, to
repurchase any nonliquidated mortgage loan that is 90 or more days
delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association method at the
Repurchase Price, provided that such repurchases in aggregate do
not exceed 10% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off
Date.

On or after the three-year anniversary of the Closing Date, Angel
Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC (the Depositor) has the option to
purchase all outstanding certificates (Optional Redemption) at a
price equal to the outstanding class balance plus accrued and
unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts and any
outstanding Pre-Closing Deferred Amounts. After such purchase, the
Depositor then has the option to complete a qualified liquidation,
which requires a complete liquidation of assets within the Trust
and the distribution of proceeds to the appropriate holders of
regular or residual interests.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A-1 and A-2 Certificates sequentially (IIPP). For more
subordinate Certificates, principal proceeds can be used to cover
interest shortfalls as the more senior Certificates are paid in
full. Furthermore, excess spread can be used to cover realized
losses and prior period bond writedown amounts first before being
allocated to unpaid cap carryover amounts to Class A-1 down to
Class M-1.

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to raise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside of the CFPB's ATR rules, which became effective on
January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans encompass the entire credit
spectrum. They range from high-FICO, high-income borrowers who opt
for interest-only or higher debt-to-income ratio mortgages, to
near-prime debtors who have had certain derogatory pay histories
but were cured more than two years ago, to nonprime borrowers whose
credit events were only recently cleared, among others. In
addition, some originators offer alternative documentation or bank
statement underwriting to self-employed borrowers in lieu of
verifying income with Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, or tax
returns. Finally, foreign nationals and real estate investor
programs, while not necessarily non-QM in nature, are often
included in non-QM pools.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario, (see Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update,
published on June 1, 2020), for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than what it previously
used. Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home
price approach based on the forecasted unemployment rates and GDP
growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that loans originated to (1)
borrowers with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers,
or (3) higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more
sensitive to economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment
rates and lower incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have
exhibited difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the
past and may revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term.
Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile
income sources, which could lead to reduced cash flows generated
from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers with lower equity in
their properties generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March
27, 2020, 18.2% of the borrowers are on forbearance plans because
the borrowers reported financial hardship related to coronavirus.
These forbearance plans allow temporary payment holidays, followed
by repayment once the forbearance period ends. SPS, in
collaboration with Angel Oak, is generally offering borrowers a
three-month payment forbearance plan. Beginning in month four, the
borrower can repay all of the missed mortgage payments at once or
opt to go on a repayment plan to catch up on missed payments for a
maximum generally of six months. During the repayment period, the
borrower needs to make regular payments and additional amounts to
catch up on the missed payments. For Angel Oak's approach to
forbearance loans, SPS would attempt to contact the borrowers
before the expiration of the forbearance period and evaluate the
borrowers' capacity to repay the missed amounts. As a result, SPS,
in collaboration with Angel Oak, may offer a repayment plan or
other forms of payment relief, such as deferrals of the unpaid P&I
amounts or a loan modification, in addition to pursuing other loss
mitigation options.

For this deal, DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to
evaluate the impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated
tranches, stemming from (1) lower principal and interest
collections and (2) limited servicing advances on delinquent P&I.
These assumptions include:

Increasing delinquencies for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating levels
for the first 12 months,
Increasing delinquencies for the A (sf) and below rating levels for
the first nine months,
Applying no voluntary prepayments for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf)
rating levels for the first 12 months,
Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds for the AAA (sf) and
AA (sf) rating levels for the first 12 months.
For more information regarding rating methodologies and the
coronavirus, please see the following DBRS Morningstar press
releases and commentary: "DBRS Morningstar Provides Update on
Rating Methodologies in Light of Measures to Contain Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19)," dated March 12, 2020; "DBRS Morningstar Global
Structured Finance Rating Methodologies and Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19)," dated March 20, 2020; and Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: June Update, dated June 1, 2020.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

-- Improved underwriting standards;
-- Robust loan attributes and pool composition;
-- Satisfactory third-party due diligence review;
-- Faster prepayments across non-QM;
-- Compliance with ATR rules; and
-- A strong servicer.

The transaction also includes the following challenges:

-- Borrowers on forbearance plans;
-- Representations and warranties framework and provider;
-- Nonprime, QM Rebuttable Presumption, or non-QM loans; and
-- Servicer advances of delinquent P&I.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ANGEL OAK 2020-4: Fitch Rates Class B-2 Certs 'B(EXP)sf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust
2020-4.

AOMT 2020-4

  - Class A-1; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class A-2; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class A-3; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class B-1; LT BB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class B-2; LT B(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class B-3; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class M-1; LT BBB-(EXP)sf Expected Rating

  - Class XS; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 734 loans with a balance of
$300.39 million as of the cutoff date. This will be the tenth
Fitch-rated transaction consisting of loans originated by several
Angel Oak-affiliated entities (collectively, Angel Oak).

The certificates are secured mainly by nonqualified mortgages
(Non-QM) as defined by the Ability to Repay rule. All of the loans
were originated by several Angel Oak entities, which include Angel
Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (95.2%), Angel Oak Home Loans LLC (4.6%)
and Angel Oak Prime Bridge LLC (0.2%). Of the pool, 80.4% comprises
loans designated as Non-QM, and the remaining 19.6% is not subject
to ATR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Revised GDP Due to the Coronavirus: The coronavirus pandemic and
the resulting containment efforts have resulted in revisions to
Fitch's GDP estimates for 2020. Its baseline global economic
outlook for U.S. GDP growth is currently a 5.6% decline for 2020,
down from 1.7% for 2019. Fitch's downside scenario would see an
even larger decline in output in 2020 and a weaker recovery in
2021. To account for declining macroeconomic conditions resulting
from the coronavirus pandemic, an Economic Risk Factor floor of 2.0
(the ERF is a default variable in the U.S. RMBS loan loss model)
was applied to 'BBBsf' ratings and below.

Liquidity Stress for Payment Forbearance (Negative): The outbreak
of the coronavirus pandemic and widespread containment efforts in
the U.S. will result in increased unemployment and cash flow
disruptions. To account for the cash flow disruptions, Fitch
assumed deferred payments on a minimum of 40% of the pool for the
first six months of the transaction at all rating categories with a
reversion to its standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve
by month 10. This assumption is based on observations of legacy
Alt-A delinquencies and past due payments following Hurricane Maria
in Puerto Rico. The cash flows on the certificates will not be
disrupted for the first six months due to principal and interest
advancing on delinquent loans by the servicer; however, after month
six, the lowest ranked classes may be vulnerable to temporary
interest shortfalls to the extent there is not enough funds
available once the more senior bonds are paid.

Stop Advance Structure (Mixed): The transaction has a stop advance
feature where the servicer will advance delinquent P&I up to 180
days. While the limited advancing of delinquent P&I benefits the
pool's projected loss severity, it reduces liquidity. To account
for the reduced liquidity of a limited advancing structure,
principal collections are available to pay timely interest to the
'AAAsf', 'AAsf' and 'Asf' rated bonds. Fitch expects 'AAAsf' and
'AAsf' rated bonds to receive timely payments of interest and all
other bonds to receive ultimate interest. Additionally, as of the
closing date, the deal benefits from approximately 278 bps of
excess spread, which will be available to cover shortfalls prior to
any writedowns.

The servicer Select Portfolio Servicing will provide P&I advancing
on delinquent loans (even the loans on a coronavirus forbearance
plan). If SPS is not able to advance, the master servicer (Wells
Fargo Bank) will advance P&I on the certificates.

Payment Forbearance (Mixed): As of the cut-off date, 22.0% of the
pool (130 loans) opted into a coronavirus relief plan; however,
only 15.31% are currently on a coronavirus relief plan. The
remaining 6.65% of borrowers who opted-in for relief are no longer
on a forbearance plan as the term of their coronavirus relief plan
has expired and the borrowers are contractually current. Of the
borrowers who are still on a coronavirus relief plan, 14.9% are on
a coronavirus forbearance plan, while 0.4% are solely having their
payment deferred. As of the cut-off date, 0.50% (six loans) of the
borrowers on a coronavirus forbearance relief plan have been making
their payments and are contractually current while the remaining
borrowers (14.3%) have not been making their payments and are
delinquent. Fitch considered borrowers who are on coronavirus
relief plan that are cash flowing as current while the borrowers
who are not cash flowing were treated as delinquent.

Angel Oak is offering borrowers a three-month payment forbearance
plan. Beginning in month three, the borrower can opt to reinstate
(i.e. repay the three missed mortgage payments in a lump sum) or
repay the missed amounts with a repayment plan. If reinstatement or
a repayment plan is not affordable, the missed payments will be
added to the end of the loan term due at payoff or maturity as a
deferred principal. If the borrower does not become current under a
repayment plan or is not able to make payments after a deferral
plan was granted, other loss mitigation options will be pursued
(including extending the forbearance term).

There are 69 loans in the pool where their forbearance plan has
been extended until Aug. 1, 2020. These loans have an average FICO
of 712, average original CLTV of 76.6%, and average liquid cash
reserves of $100,854.

The servicer will continue to advance during the forbearance
period. Recoveries of advances will be repaid either from
reinstated or repaid amounts from loans where borrowers are on a
repayment plan. For loans with deferrals of missed payments, the
servicer can recover advances from the principal portion of
collections, which may result in a mismatch between the loan
balance and certificate balance. While this may increase realized
losses, the 278 bps of excess spread as of the closing date should
be available to absorb these amounts and reduce the potential for
writedowns.

If the borrower doesn't resume making payments, the loan will
likely become modified and the advancing party will be reimbursed
from available funds. Fitch increased its loss expectations by 25
bps-50 bps at 'AAA', 'A', 'BBB-', 'BB' and 'B' rating categories to
address the potential for write-downs due to reimbursements of
servicer advances. This increase is based on Fitch's 40%
delinquency coronavirus stress assumption that is in place for the
first six months.

Expanded Prime Credit Quality (Mixed): The collateral consists of
20-year, 30-year and 40-year mainly fixed-rate loans (1.4% of the
loans are adjustable rate); 4.1% of the loans are interest-only
(IO) loans, and the remaining 95.9% are fully amortizing loans. The
pool is seasoned approximately seven months in aggregate (as
determined by Fitch). The borrowers in this pool have strong credit
profiles with a 720 weighted-average FICO and moderate leverage
(80.9% sLTV). In addition, the pool contains 51 loans over $1
million and the largest is $2.9 million. Self-employed borrowers
make up 69.7% of the pool, 19.7% of the pool are salaried
employees, and 10.6% of the pool comprises investor cash flow
loans. There is one loan that is a second lien and represents 0.3%
of the pool balance.

Fitch considered 7.7% of borrowers as having a prior credit event
in the past seven years, and 0.8% of the pool was underwritten to
nonpermanent residents. The pool characteristics resemble recent
nonprime collateral, and therefore, the pool was analyzed using
Fitch's non-prime model.

Bank Statement Loans Included (Negative): Approximately 60% (380
loans) were made to self-employed borrowers underwritten to a bank
statement program (26.7% to a 24-month bank statement program and
33.5% to a 12-month bank statement program) for verifying income in
accordance with either AOHL's or AOMS's guidelines, which is not
consistent with Appendix Q standards or Fitch's view of a full
documentation program. To reflect the additional risk, Fitch
increases the probability of default by 1.5x on the bank statement
loans.

High Investor Property Concentration (Negative): Of the pool, 19.6%
comprises investment properties, and 9.0% of loans were
underwritten using the borrower's credit profile, while the
remaining 10.6% were originated through the originators' investor
cash flow program that targets real estate investors qualified on a
debt service coverage ratio basis. The borrowers of the non-DSCR
investor properties in the pool have strong credit profiles, with a
WA FICO of 717 (as calculated by Fitch) and an original CLTV of
76.7% (as calculated by Fitch), and DSCR loans have a WA FICO of
739 (as calculated by Fitch) and an original CLTV of 63.4%. Fitch
increased the PD by approximately 2.0x for the cash flow ratio
loans (relative to a traditional income documentation investor
loan) to account for the increased risk.

Geographic Concentration (Neutral): Approximately 31% of the pool
is concentrated in California with relatively low MSA
concentration. The largest MSA concentration is in the Miami-Fort
Lauderdale MSA (14.0%) followed by the Los Angeles MSA (11.2%) and
the San Diego MSA (4.7%). The top three MSAs account for 29.9% of
the pool. As a result, there was no adjustment to the 'AAA'
expected loss to account for geographic concentration.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Neutral): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A
certificates while shutting out the subordinate bonds from
principal until all three classes have been reduced to zero. To the
extent that either the cumulative loss trigger event or the
delinquency trigger event occurs in a given period, principal will
be distributed sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds
until they are reduced to zero.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Angel Oak employs sound
sourcing and underwriting processes and is assessed by Fitch as an
'Average' originator. Primary and master servicing responsibilities
will be performed by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and Wells
Fargo Bank, NA, rated by Fitch at 'RPS1-' and 'RMS1-',
respectively. Fitch adjusted its expected loss at the 'AAAsf'
rating stress by 252 bps to reflect strong counterparties with
established servicing platforms and operating experience in
non-agency PLS. The sponsor's retention of an eligible horizontal
residual interest of at least 5% helps ensure an alignment of
interest between the issuer and investors.

R&W Framework (Negative): AOHL will be providing loan-level
representations and warranties to the loans in the trust. If the
entity is no longer an ongoing business concern, it will assign to
the trust its rights under the mortgage loan purchase agreements
with the originators, which include repurchase remedies for R&W
breaches. While the loan-level reps for this transaction are
substantially consistent with a Tier I framework, the lack of an
automatic review for loans other than those with ATR realized loss
and the nature of the prescriptive breach tests, which limit the
breach reviewers' ability to identify or respond to issues not
fully anticipated at closing, resulted in a Tier 2 framework. Fitch
increased its loss expectations (96 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
category) to mitigate the limitations of the framework and the
non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the providers.

Due Diligence Review Results (Positive): Third-party due diligence
was performed on 100% of loans in the transaction pool. The reviews
were conducted by SitusAMC and Clayton Services, both assessed by
Fitch as 'Acceptable - Tier 1' TPR firms, and Digital Risk,
assessed as 'Acceptable - Tier 2'. The results of the review
confirm effective origination practices with minimal incidence of
material exceptions. Loans that received a final grade of 'B' had
immaterial exceptions and either had strong compensating factors or
were captured in Fitch's loan loss model. Fitch applied a credit
for the high percentage of loan-level due diligence which reduced
the 'AAAsf' loss expectation by 39 bps.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
The implied rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of
the potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that
the transaction may become exposed to or that may be considered in
the surveillance of the transaction. Sensitivity analyses was
conducted at the state and national levels to assess the effect of
higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated
by a gain in home prices.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

This defined negative stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected 8.3% at the base case. This analysis indicates that
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs compared
with the model projection.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national level, or
in other words positive home price growth with no assumed
overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth of
10.0%. Excluding the senior classes, which are already rated
'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential positive rating
migration for all of the rated classes.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance. For enhanced disclosure of on Fitch's
stresses and sensitivities, please refer to the transaction's
presale report.

Fitch has also added a Coronavirus Sensitivity Analysis that
contemplates a more severe and prolonged economic stress caused by
a re-emergence of infections in the major economies, before a slow
recovery begins in 2Q21. Under this severe scenario, Fitch expects
the ratings to be impacted by changes in its sustainable home price
model due to updates to the model's underlying economic data
inputs. Any long-term impact arising from coronavirus disruptions
on these economic inputs will likely affect both investment and
speculative grade ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Third-party loan-level results were reviewed by Fitch for this
transaction. Where applicable, the due diligence firms SitusAMC,
Clayton, and Digital Risk examined 100% of the loan files in three
areas: compliance review, credit review and valuation review. AMC
and Clayton are assessed by Fitch as Tier 1 TPR firms, and Digital
Risk is assessed by Fitch as a Tier 2 firm. The results of the
reviews indicated an overall loan quality that is in line with
other prior transactions from the issuer and other Fitch-rated
nonprime transactions. Fitch assigned approximately 35% of the
loans (by loan count) a final credit grade of 'B'. The credit
exceptions graded 'B' were approved by the originator or waived by
Angel Oak due to the presence of compensating factors. Fitch graded
roughly 27% of the loans (by loan count) 'B' for compliance
exceptions. The majority of these exceptions are either
TRID-related issues that were corrected with subsequent
documentation; Fitch did not apply any adjustments for the 'B'
graded loans. Fitch adjusted three loans that received a final
grade of 'C'. One of the loans received a compliance grade of 'C'
due to a material exception to the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure
rule, which is a standard $15,500 to the LS to account for the
increased risk of statutory damages (this increase to the LS was
immaterial and did not affect the expected losses). The remaining
two loans received a property valuation grade of 'C' due to the
secondary desk review having a negative variance greater than 10%
from the original appraised value or the secondary desk review came
back as indeterminate. The lower property value was substituted
into the LTV as part of the loan loss analysis. Form "ABS Due
Diligence 15E" was reviewed and used as a part of the rating for
this transaction.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." AMC,
Clatyon, and Digital Risk were engaged to perform the review. Loans
reviewed under this engagement were given compliance, credit and
valuation grades, and assigned initial grades for each subcategory.
Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due diligence
reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section for more
detail.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
data layout format, and the data are considered to be
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


AVIS BUDGET 2020-1: Moody's Lowers Class C Notes to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 32 tranches
of rental car asset-backed securities issued by Avis Budget Rental
Car Funding, LLC. The issuer is an indirect subsidiary of the
transaction sponsor and single lessee, Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC
(ABCR, B2 negative). ABCR, a subsidiary of Avis Budget Group, Inc.,
is the owner and operator of Avis Rent A Car System, LLC (Avis),
Budget Rent A Car System, Inc. (Budget), Zipcar, Inc. and Payless
Car Rental, Inc. (Payless). AESOP is ABCR's rental car
securitization platform in the U.S. The collateral backing the
notes is a fleet of vehicles and a single lease of the fleet to
ABCR for use in its rental car business.

Moody's actions on the rental car ABS are prompted by (1) the
challenging market conditions in the rental car market, including
the severe drop in demand and the heightened uncertainty around
ABCR's ability to honor its full lease payment obligation, (2)
uncertainty around the value of used vehicles owing to a resurgence
of COVID-19, the volume of sales from all US rental car companies'
in their efforts to de-fleet, among other factors, and (3) the
continued decrease in program vehicles in the securitized fleet.
Moody's downgraded these ratings and placed them under review for
further downgrade on 27 April 2020. The actions conclude the
review.

COMPLETE RATING ACTIONS

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2015-1

Series 2015-1 Class A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Series 2015-1 Class B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2015-2

Series 2015-2 Class A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Series 2015-2 Class B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2016-1

Series 2016-1 Class A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Series 2016-1 Class B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2016-2

Series 2016-2 Class A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Series 2016-2 Class B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr
27, 2020 Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2017-1

Series 2017-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A,
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2017-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B,
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
A2 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2017-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C,
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2017-2

Series 2017-2 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A,
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2017-2 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B,
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
A3 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2017-2 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C,
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2018-1

Series 2018-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A,
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2018-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B,
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
A3 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2018-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C,
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2018-2

Series 2018-2 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A,
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2018-2 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B,
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
A3 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2018-2 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C,
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2019-1

Series 2019-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A,
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2019-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B,
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
A3 (sf) and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2019-1 Fixed Rate Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C,
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2019-2

Series 2019-2 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A, Downgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2019-2 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B, Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and
Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2019-2 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C, Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2019-3

Series 2019-3 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A, Downgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2019-3 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B, Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and
Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2019-3 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C, Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC, Series 2020-1

Series 2020-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A, Downgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2020-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B, Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and
Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 2020-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class C, Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2020 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's actions on the rental car ABS are prompted by (1) the
challenging market conditions in the rental car market, including
the severe drop in demand and the heightened uncertainty around
ABCR's ability to honor its full lease payment obligation, (2)
uncertainty around the value of used vehicles owing to a resurgence
of COVID-19, the volume of sales from all US rental car companies'
in their efforts to de-fleet, among other factors, and (3) the
continued decrease in program vehicles in the securitized fleet.
The car rental sector has been one of the sectors most
significantly affected by the coronavirus-driven credit shock given
its heavy dependence on air travel and on the sale of used
vehicles. While conditions in the used car market are presently
constructive, air travel has fallen precipitously. As a result,
Moody's believes that (1) the likelihood of ABCR affirming its
lease payment obligation in its entirety in the event of a Chapter
11 bankruptcy has decreased, (2) the uncertainty in the values of
used vehicles and therefore its value haircut being applied to
non-program vehicles upon ABCR's default has increased, and (3) the
percentage of program vehicles in the underlying fleet collateral
will likely decrease further owing to ABCR's efforts to continue
de-fleeting.

If ABCR were to file for bankruptcy, Moody's continues to assume
that the company would be more likely to reorganize under a Chapter
11 filing, as a reorganization would likely realize significantly
more value as an ongoing business concern than a liquidation of its
assets under a Chapter 7 filing. Moody's view considers the
strength of the ABCR brand (one of the three major car rental
companies in North America) and the expected eventual recovery of
the rental car industry.

Moody's now believes that there is a lower likelihood that ABCR
will accept its lease payment terms in its entirety in the event of
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. While Moody's recognizes the strategic
importance of the ABS financing platform to ABCR's operation, the
company's lease payment obligations to the trust are high,
considering the relatively low utilization of the fleet and ABCR's
need to continue to de-fleet in the second half of 2020. ABCR has
historically operated at utilization rates near the 70%-80% range,
with current utilization considerably below historical levels,
although improving from its low in April.

Moody's expects ABCR to continue executing on its plan to reduce
the size of its rental fleet in response to the pandemic, notably
the continued severe downturn in global air travel, while
increasing fleet utilization to turn cash flow positive in the
second half of the year. The severe drop in air travel will
contribute to a sizable cash outflow as ABCR contends with the
unprecedented sharp drop in rental demand, and the need to rapidly
reduce the size of its car rental fleet.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of ABCR's rentals depend
on travel, both business and leisure at on-airport and off-airport
retail locations. Global air passenger demand will likely remain
severely depressed in 2021 and a substantial recovery before 2023
appears unlikely. Moody's expects global air travel to contract by
approximately 70% during 2020, and 2021 passenger travel to fall
35% to 55% below those of 2019. In the meantime, ABCR has begun to
de-fleet in a measured manner and continues to execute on its
de-fleeting strategy. In the second quarter of 2020, ABCR reduced
its fleet size by 8% from the first quarter.

On July 2, 2020, Moody's confirmed ABCR's CFR at B2 with a negative
outlook, prompted by the better-than-expected pricing and volume
environment in the US used car market over the May/June time
period, the related progress ABCR is making in reducing the size of
its rental fleet in response to the coronavirus outbreak, and a
liquidity position that is adequate in advance of the severe
downturn that Moody's anticipates in air travel during 2020 and
2021. The ratings reflect Moody's view that although ABCR is one of
the three leading players in the US car rental sector, it faces
considerable competitive challenges within the current
environment.

The downgrades of the ABS are also driven by an increase in Moody's
assumed mean haircut to the values of non-program vehicles upon
sponsor default. The increase reflects the decline in used car
prices during the pandemic, and the continued uncertainty around
used car prices due to the potential negative impact of a prolonged
resurgence or a second wave of COVID-19. The increase also reflects
the negative effect on used vehicle prices of a potential
oversupply stemming from several rental car companies continuing to
de-fleet in the coming months, including the distressed condition
and evolving fleet disposition strategy of another large market
player in the sector which could be disruptive to the pricing in
the used car market.

Moody's also notes that ABCR has been able to de-fleet at a more
controlled pace so far, and in recent weeks, the market for used
cars has gradually recovered from the severe contraction in late
March through May. According to J.D. Power, wholesale auction sales
volumes reached around 108% of the company's pre-COVID-19
expectations and prices reached around 107% of the company's
pre-COVID-19 expectations as of the week ending 28 June 2020.[1]
During late March and into April and May, the normally quite liquid
and large used car market contracted at an unprecedented pace given
the closure of most auctions and other sales channels.

The downgrades also reflect Moody's expectation for a lower
percentage of program vehicles in the securitized fleet. The fleet
composition has shifted to a lower portion of program vehicles at
13.3% as of 30 May 2020, down from 29.1% a year earlier. In recent
months, ABCR has breached a concentration limit pursuant to the ABS
master trust governing document requiring at least 85% of
non-program vehicles. The net book value of the excess non-program
vehicles is not included in the asset base. Moody's believes ABCR
may choose to continue putting program vehicles back to
manufacturers at pre-determined prices in an effort to de-fleet,
which would further decrease the percentage of program vehicles in
the fleet and result in the net book value of more non-program
vehicles being excluded from the asset base

The ratings on the notes are supported by:

(1) available credit enhancement, which consists of subordination
and over-collateralization, to protect investors against a
meaningful decline in the value of the underlying vehicles (46%-51%
credit enhancement behind the Class A notes, 31%-32% enhancement
behind the Class B notes and 20%-21% enhancement behind the Class C
notes as of 30 May 2020) ,

(2) the credit quality of the collateral in the form of rental
fleet vehicles, which ABCR uses in its rental car business under
brand names Avis, Budget and Payless,

(3) the credit quality of ABCR as lessee and payment guarantor and
of the OEMs that guarantee the prices of program vehicles,

(4) the low likelihood of a Chapter 7 liquidation, along with the
still high likelihood of lease acceptance in the event of a Chapter
11 reorganization, in addition to the progress ABCR has already
made on de-fleeting in a controlled manner,

(5) the amount of required liquidity in the form of cash and/or a
letter of credit sized at roughly six months of interest due on the
notes, plus trust expenses,

(6) the track-record, experience and expertise of ABCR as the
servicer of the rental fleet and the administrator for the issuer,
and

(7) the transaction structure, and other qualitative
considerations.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

Here are the assumptions Moody's applied in the analysis of this
transaction:

Risk of sponsor default: Moody's assumed a 60% decrease in the
probability of default (from Moody's idealized default probability
tables) implied by the B2 rating of the sponsor. This decrease
reflects Moody's view that, in the event of a bankruptcy, ABCR
would be more likely to reorganize under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing, as it would likely realize more value as an ongoing
business concern than it would if it were to liquidate its assets
under a Chapter 7 filing. Furthermore, given the sponsor's
competitive position within the industry and the size of its
securitized fleet relative to its overall fleet, the sponsor is
still likely to affirm its lease payment obligations in order to
retain the use of the fleet and stay in business. Moody's arrives
at the 60% decrease assuming an 80% probability that ABCR would
reorganize under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and a 75% probability (90%
assumed previously) that ABCR would affirm its lease payment
obligations in the event of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Disposal value of the fleet: Moody's assumed the following haircuts
to the net book value (NBV) of the vehicle fleet:

Non-Program Haircut upon Sponsor Default -- Mean: 19% - 25%

Non-Program Haircut upon Sponsor Default -- Standard Deviation: 6%

Fixed Program Haircut upon Sponsor Default: 10%

Additional Fixed Non-Program Haircut upon Manufacturer Default:
20%

Fleet composition -- Moody's assumed the following fleet
composition (based on NBV of vehicle fleet):

Non-program Vehicles: 90%

Program Vehicles: 10%

Non-program Manufacturer Concentration (percentage, number of
manufacturers, assumed rating):

Aa/A Profile: 20%, 2, A3

Baa Profile: 60%, 3, Baa3

Ba/B Profile: 20%, 1, B1

Program Manufacturer Concentration (percentage, number of
manufacturers, assumed rating):

Aa/A Profile: 0%, 0, A3

Baa Profile: 80%, 2, Baa3

Ba/B Profile: 20%, 1, B1

Manufacturer Receivables: 0%; receivables distributed in the same
proportion as the program fleet (Program Manufacturer Concentration
and Manufacturer Receivables together should add up to 100%)

Correlation: Moody's applied the following correlation
assumptions:

Correlation among the sponsor and the vehicle manufacturers: 10%

Correlation among all vehicle manufacturers: 25%

Default risk horizon -- Moody's assumed the following default risk
horizon:

Sponsor: 5 years

Manufacturers: 1 year

A fixed set of time horizon assumptions, regardless of the
remaining term of the transaction, is used when considering sponsor
and manufacturer default probabilities and the expected loss of the
related liabilities, which simplifies Moody's modeling approach
using a standard set of benchmark horizons.

Detailed application of the assumptions is provided in the
methodology.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Rental Fleet Securitizations" published in July
2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings of the notes as applicable if,
among other things, (1) the credit quality of the lessee improves,
(2) the credit quality of the pool of vehicles collateralizing the
transaction strengthens, as reflected by a stronger mix of program
and non-program vehicles and stronger credit quality of vehicle
manufacturers, and (3) sustained improvement in the prices and
sales of non-program vehicles owing to higher demand and successful
containment of the spread of COVID-19.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if, among other
things, (1) the credit quality of the lessee weakens, (2) an
increase in the likelihood of a sudden disposition of the
underlying vehicles in another depressed used-vehicle market due to
a continued resurgence or a second wave of COVID-19, (3) the credit
quality of the pool of vehicles collateralizing the transaction
weakens, as reflected by a weaker mix of program and non-program
vehicles and weaker credit quality of vehicle manufacturers, (4)
sharper than expected declines in vehicle prices of non-program
vehicles owing to sustained weakness in the demand for used
vehicles and prolonged disruptions to used-car sales channels, or
(5) the tail periods, particularly for the 2015-2 notes (2015-1
notes have amortized considerably) that mature in 2021, become
insufficient because US sales channels shut down again for a
prolonged period and therefore vehicle disposition proceeds may be
insufficient to repay the notes.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2017-SCH: S&P Cuts Rating on Class D-L Certs to BB
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class D-L commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from BAMLL Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2017-SCH, a U.S. CMBS transaction. The rating was
removed from CreditWatch, where it was placed with negative
implications on May 6, 2020. At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on four other classes from the same transaction.

On May 6, 2020, S&P had placed its class D-L rating on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to its view of COVID-19's impact on
the performance of the collateral property and the lodging sector
overall, along with the related uncertainty about the duration of
the demand interruption. The downgrade reflects S&P's reevaluation
of the Sheraton Grand Chicago hotel securing the loan in the
single-asset transaction. Its expected-case value has declined
13.8% since issuance, driven by the application of a higher S&P
Global Ratings' capitalization rate that better captures the
increased susceptibility to net cash flow and liquidity disruption
stemming from the pandemic. Using the S&P Global Ratings
sustainable net cash flow of $15.7 million (same as at issuance)
and applying a 10.25% capitalization rate (up from 9.00% at
issuance), the rating agency arrived at an S&P Global Ratings
loan-to-value ratio of 73.4%, versus 63.3% at issuance. The
Sheraton Grand Chicago property closed in March 2020 and has
remained closed as of the date of this publication.

S&P affirmed its ratings on classes A-L, B-L, and C-L even though
the model-indicated ratings were lower than the classes' current
rating levels. This is because S&P qualitatively considered the
underlying collateral quality, the significant market value decline
that would be needed before these classes experience losses,
liquidity support provided in the form of servicer advancing, and
positions of the classes in the waterfall. In addition, S&P
considered that the borrower is current through its June 2020 debt
service payment and has not reached out for COVID-19 forbearance
relief.

S&P affirmed the rating on the X-LEX interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than that
of the lowest-rated reference class. The notional balance on class
X-LEX references the class A-L certificates.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution
of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is
that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions,
but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is
widely available, which may not occur until the second half of
2021. S&P is using this assumption in assessing the economic and
credit implications associated with the pandemic. As the situation
evolves, the rating agency will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
floating-rate IO mortgage loan secured by the borrower's leasehold
interest in the Sheraton Grand Chicago, a 1,218 guestroom
full-service convention hotel located in the Streeterville
neighborhood of Chicago. The property offers over 125,000 sq. ft.
of meeting space, including a 40,000 sq. ft. ballroom--the largest
in the Midwest. Hotel amenities include six food and beverage
outlets, a business center, a fitness center, an indoor pool, a sun
deck, and spa services. The property is subject to a 99-year ground
lease, which commenced in 2017, with a contractual ground rent
payment of $9.0 million annually, increasing 10.5% every five
years, with the next increase scheduled to take place in 2022. The
fee owner and the leasehold owner are both 100% owned by affiliates
of the sponsor, Tishman Hotel & Realty LP.

S&P's property-level analysis considered that the pandemic has
brought about unprecedented social distancing and curtailment
measures, which are resulting in a significant decline in demand in
corporate, leisure, and group travelers. Since the outbreak, there
has been a dramatic decline in airline passenger miles stemming
from governmental restrictions on international travel and a major
drop in domestic travel. In an effort to curtail the spread of the
virus, most group meetings, both corporate and social, have been
cancelled, corporate transient travel has been restricted, and
leisure travel has slowed due to fear of travel and the closure of
demand generators, such as amusement parks and casinos, and the
cancellation of concerts and sporting events.

The Sheraton Chicago generates approximately 61% of its demand from
the meeting and group sector and 26% from the corporate transient
sector. Demand from both of these sources has dropped due to
corporate restrictions on travel, as well as the need for social
distancing. The hotel also derives 13% of its demand from the
leisure segment. While leisure travel has slowly increased since
April, leisure travelers have thus far favored hotels in smaller
markets and more remote locations in an effort to socially
distance. It is S&P's expectation that large conventions and
meetings, on which the hotel relies heavily for both room revenue
and food and beverage revenue, will be significantly curtailed
until there is a COVID-19 treatment or vaccine.

S&P's review considered not only the impact of COVID-19 on the
collateral property, but also the high cost to operate in Chicago,
particularly labor and tax expenses, as well as the recent lodging
supply increase in the Chicago market, which was 2.2% in 2016, 2.4%
in 2017, 2.1% in 2018, and 1.6% in 2019. The property's reported
net cash flow declined by 50.4% to $14.6 million in 2019 from $29.4
million in 2016. During the same time period, the property's
revenue per available room (RevPAR) declined 8.3% to $150.00 in
2019 from $163.70 in 2016. While S&P did not receive an updated
booking pace report, the rating agency reviewed the March 2020
Smith Travel (STR) report for the property. On a trailing-12-month
basis as of February 2020, the property had a RevPAR penetration
rate--which measures the RevPAR of the hotel relative to its
competitors, with 100% indicating parity with
competitors--exceeding 100% each year since 2018. Despite the
property's RevPAR decline, the hotel's penetration rate above 100%
indicates an even broader decline among competitive properties.

In S&P's current analysis, instead of adjusting its sustainable net
cash flow assumption (being that the property is currently closed),
the rating agency increased its capitalization rate by 125 basis
points from issuance to account for the adverse impact of COVID-19
and the responses to it. The pandemic's negative effects on lodging
properties have been particularly severe for those in urban
markets, like the Sheraton Grand Chicago, that are highly reliant
on corporate and group demand, which will be tempered for the next
several quarters. S&P also considered that the property's timing
for reopening remains unknown. There is significant uncertainty
regarding not only the duration of the pandemic, but also the time
needed for lodging demand to return to normalized levels once
travel restrictions are lifted."

According to the June 15, 2020, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $115.0 million,
the same as at issuance. The IO loan pays a per annum floating
interest rate of LIBOR plus a weighted average spread of 1.25%. The
three-year floating-rate loan is scheduled to mature in November
2020, with four one-year extension options remaining.  

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

--Health and safety.

  RATING LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

  BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-SCH
  Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

                 Rating
  Class    To               From
  D-L      BB               BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-SCH
  Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

  Class      Rating
  A-L        AAA (sf)
  B-L        AA- (sf)
  C-L        A- (sf)
  X-LEX      AAA (sf)


BENEFIT STREET XXI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Benefit
Street Partners CLO XXI Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO XXI LLC's
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a diversified
collateral pool, which consists primarily of broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured term loans
that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 10,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The legal structure of the transaction, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Benefit Street Partners CLO XXI Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO

  XXI LLC

  Class                 Rating        Amount
                                    (mil. $)
  A-1                   AAA (sf)      240.00
  A-2                   NR              8.00
  B                     AA (sf)        52.00
  C (deferrable)        A (sf)         24.00
  D (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)      24.00
  E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)       14.00
  Subordinated notes    NR             35.00

  NR--Not rated.


BUNKER HILL 2020-1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2020-1 (the Notes) to be issued by
Bunker Hill Loan Depositary Trust 2020-1 (BHLD 2020-1):

-- $135.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.3 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $12.5 million Class A-3 at A (low) (sf)
-- $10.5 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 28.25% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated notes. The AA (sf), A
(low) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 23.30%,
16.65%, 11.10%, 7.30%, and 4.10% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime and nonprime first-lien residential mortgages
funded by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 560
loans with a total principal balance of $188,494,662 as of the
Cut-Off Date (June 1, 2020).

Compared with BHLD 2019-3, the overall collateral characteristics
of the pool backing BHLD 2020-1 is stronger, and the transaction
structure has been modified into a simple sequential structure, in
contrast to the pro rata senior structure in the prior transaction.
The Representations and Warranties (R&W) framework and enforcement
mechanism of BHLD 2020-1 are similar to that of BHLD 2019-3.

In accordance with U.S. credit risk-retention requirements, Grand
Avenue Acquisition Company, LLC (the Sponsor), either directly or
through a Majority-Owned Affiliate, will retain an eligible
horizontal residual interest consisting of the Class B-3 and XS
Notes representing not less than 5% economic interest in the
transaction, to satisfy the requirements under Section 15G of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. Such retention aligns sponsor and investor interest in
the capital structure.

The Sellers are investment funds advised by Oaktree Capital
Management, L.P. (Oaktree or the Aggregator) under an
indemnification agreement between the funds and the Sponsor.
Oaktree has invested more than $4.0 billion of capital since 2008
as an aggregator of performing and nonperforming mortgage loans as
well as an equity investor in Selene Finance LP, as residential
mortgage servicer, and in Genesis Capital LLC, an originator of fix
and flip loans. Since launching its non-Qualified Mortgage (non-QM)
platform in 2018, Oaktree has acquired more than $1.0 billion of
residential mortgage loans and issued three non-QM residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) deals in 2019. The Aggregator's
platform includes several investment funds and separate accounts
that make investments in the residential assets, including non-QM
loans. The funds include real estate debt (inception in 2010; $3.2
billion in assets under management (AUM)), real estate income
(inception in 2016; $1.2 billion in AUM), and real estate
opportunities (inception in 1994; $5.2 billion in AUM). The
Aggregator does not use its own underwriting guidelines and
generally acquires loans from various approved mortgage originators
based on an investment criterion that, among other factors,
includes lower borrower loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) and higher
credit scores.

Through bulk purchases, Oaktree acquired the mortgage loans from
Metro City Bank (Metro City; 47.6%), A&D Mortgage LLC (A&D; 33.8%),
Citadel Servicing Corporation (Citadel or CSC; 18.1%), and other
originators (0.5%).

Citadel will service approximately 18.1% of the mortgage loans by
balance directly or through subservicers. A&D will be the Servicer
of record for approximately 33.8% of the loans and will use
Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS), a Delaware limited-liability
company, as subservicer to service the loans. SLS will also service
approximately 0.5% of the loans, and Metro City will service the
remaining 47.6%.

DBRS Morningstar conducted an aggregator review of Oaktree, an
originator and servicer review of CSC and Metro City, a servicer
review of SLS, and an originator review of A&D and deems them to be
acceptable.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as Master Servicer, Paying Agent, Certificate
Registrar, Note Registrar, REMIC Administrator, and Custodian. The
Bank of New York Mellon (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by
DBRS Morningstar) will serve as an Indenture Trustee.

Grand Avenue Acquisition Company, LLC will serve as the R&W
Provider for approximately 52.4% of the loans by balance. Metro
City will serve as the R&W Provider for the remaining 47.6% of the
loan balance. The Sponsor's repurchases are subject to the $25
million cap; however, the cap does not apply to Metro City's
repurchases.

Although 55.0% of the mortgage loans by balance were originated to
satisfy the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB's)
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers who
generally do not qualify for agency, government, or private-label
nonagency prime jumbo products for various reasons, including but
not limited to income documentation requirements, limited credit
history, loan size and debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, a prior housing
or credit event, or prior mortgage delinquency. Approximately 45.0%
of the loans were originated under programs that are exempt from
the ATR rules.

The Servicers will fund advances of delinquent principal and
interest (P&I) on any respective mortgage until such loan becomes
180 days delinquent, and they are obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred
in the course of servicing and disposing properties. The loans
Citadel originated will not be subject to any P&I Advances, and the
Master Servicer will have no obligation to make any P&I Advances
for any such loans. However, all Servicers will be required to pay
customary, reasonable, and/or necessary expenses (servicing
advances) incurred in the performance of the servicing obligations,
including the mortgagor's escrow payments (escrow advances).

On or after the earlier of (1) the three-year anniversary of the
Closing Date or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Depositor may, at the direction of the Class XS
Noteholders, purchase all outstanding Notes (call the deal) at a
price equal to the greater of the sum of (1) the outstanding class
balance plus accrued and unpaid interest, including any cap
carryover amounts; unreimbursed advances; any fees, expenses, and
indemnification amounts of the transaction parties; and (2) the sum
of balance of the mortgage loans plus accrued and unpaid interest
thereon and the fair market value of each real estate owned
property, excluding estimated liquidation expenses; unreimbursed
advances and fees; expenses; and indemnification amounts of the
transaction parties. The Depositor may also purchase all of the
Notes from the Noteholders (call the deal) at a price equal to the
aggregate outstanding Notes' balance of all classes, accrued and
unpaid interest thereon (including any cap carryover amounts and
step-up interest payment amounts).

Unlike the prior BHLD securitizations, which incorporate a pro-rata
feature among the senior tranches, this transaction employs a
sequential-pay cash flow structure across the entire capital stack.
Also, principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls
on the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes before paying principal to the
outstanding senior Notes sequentially.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting
isolation measures have caused an economic contraction, leading to
sharp increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for
many consumers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may
continue to rise in the coming months for many RMBS asset classes,
some meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside of the CFPB's ATR rules, which became effective on
January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans encompass the entire credit spectrum
and range from high-FICO, high-income borrowers who opt for
interest-only or higher DTI ratio mortgages, to near-prime debtors
who have had certain derogatory pay histories but were cured more
than two years ago, to nonprime borrowers whose credit events were
only recently cleared, among others. In addition, some originators
offer alternative documentation or bank statement underwriting to
self-employed borrowers in lieu of verifying income with W-2s or
tax returns. Finally, foreign nationals and real estate investor
programs, while not necessarily non-QM in nature, are often
included in non-QM pools.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies and loans on forbearance plans as well as a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under the moderate
scenario in its commentary, Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June
Update, published on June 1, 2020, for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than what was previously
used. Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home
price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and GDP
growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes loans originated to (1) borrowers
with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers, or (3)
higher LTV ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to economic
hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and lower
incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have exhibited
difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the past and may
revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term. Self-employed
borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile income sources,
which could lead to reduced cash flows generated from their
businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with lower equity in their
properties, generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March
27, 2020, 36 mortgage borrowers (7.5% of the aggregate pool
balance, as of June 1, 2020) are on forbearance plans because of
financial hardship related to the coronavirus. The forbearance plan
allows temporary payment holidays followed by repayment once the
forbearance period ends. The Servicer, in collaboration with the
Sponsor, is generally offering borrowers a three-month payment
forbearance plan. Beginning in month four, the borrower can repay
all of the missed mortgage payments at once or opt for other loss
mitigation options. Prior to the end of the applicable forbearance
period, the Servicer will contact each related borrower to identify
the options available to address related forborne payment amounts.
As a result, the Servicer, in conjunction with or at the direction
of the Sponsor, may offer a repayment plan or other forms of
payment relief, such as deferral of the unpaid P&I amounts or a
loan modification, in addition to pursuing other loss mitigation
options.

For these loans, DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to
evaluate the impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated
tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) limited
servicing advances on delinquent P&I. These assumptions include:

Increasing delinquencies on the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating levels
for the first 12 months and on the A (sf) and below rating levels
for the first nine months.
Assuming no voluntary prepayments for the first 12 months for AAA
(sf) and AA (sf) rating levels.

Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds during the first 12
months for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating levels.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

-- Substantial borrower equity, robust loan attributes,
    and pool composition.
-- Compliance with ATR rules.
-- Satisfactory third-party due-diligence review.
-- Current loans.
-- Satisfactory loan performance to date.

The transaction also includes the following challenges:

-- Foreign borrowers with no FICO score.
-- R&W framework and provider.
-- Nonprime, non-QM, and investor loans.
-- Servicers' advance of delinquent P&I.
-- Servicers' financial capability.
-- Borrowers on forbearance plans.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CAMB COMMERCIAL 2019-LIFE: DBRS Gives B(low) Rating on Cl. G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-LIFE issued by CAMB Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2019-LIFE (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 24, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The $1.17 billion ($890 per square foot (psf)) trust mortgage loan
is secured by the sponsor's leasehold interest in eight life
sciences office and laboratory buildings, totaling approximately
1.3 million square feet and located in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The senior mortgage loan has an initial two-year term with five
one-year extensions options, resulting in a fully extended maturity
date of December 9, 2025. The loan pays floating-rate interest of
Libor plus 2.0444% on an interest-only (IO) basis throughout the
term. Additionally, the capital stack includes mezzanine debt of
$130.0 million ($99 psf) subordinate to and held outside of the
trust. The mezzanine note pays an interest rate of Libor plus 4.1%
on a full-term IO basis and is secured by the interest in the
equity of the borrowing entities. Loan proceeds, along with $448.7
million ($341 psf) of borrower cash equity, facilitated the
acquisition of the portfolio properties by the sponsorship group,
Brookfield Asset Management (Brookfield). On December 7, 2018,
Brookfield completed the acquisition of Forest City Realty Trust,
Inc., whereby Brookfield Strategic Real Estate Partners III
indirectly acquired the leasehold interest in the portfolio as part
of the merger. The portfolio's allocated purchase price was $1.6
billion ($1,233 psf).

All eight subject properties are located on the campus of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) within the Cambridge
submarket, which has limited available land for development and
high barriers to entry. Cambridge has the largest concentration of
life science researchers in the U.S. and strong historical
occupancy driven by the high demand for specialized laboratory
space by institutional tenants. The portfolio properties are leased
to 15 individual tenants, with seven of the eight buildings fully
occupied (four single-tenant properties), resulting in a physical
occupancy of 99.0% and an economic occupancy of 97.0%. The subject
properties have reported an average physical occupancy of 97.8%
since 2008, which is indicative of a long-term, "sticky" tenant
roster. The weighted-average remaining lease term of 8.7 years is
1.7 years beyond the fully extended loan term. Only 34.2% of the
DBRS Morningstar base rent expires during the fully extended loan
term, with no more than 12.8% expiring in any single year.

The portfolio benefits from a high concentration of
institutional-quality tenants, with approximately 90.7% of the DBRS
Morningstar base rent derived from public companies or major
research institutions. Furthermore, 44.8% of the DBRS Morningstar
base rent is tied to investment-grade tenants. The largest tenant,
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., occupies 31.7% of the net
rentable area (NRA) and plans to spend $11 million of its own funds
to improve its space at the 40 Landsdowne property as part of its
early renewal for its leases. Other large tenants include Blueprint
Medicines Corporation (13.6% of NRA), Agios Pharmaceuticals (14.3%
of NRA), and Brigham And Women's Hospital (9.3% of NRA). Other
investment-grade tenants include Takeda Vaccines, Inc. (6.0% of
NRA) and Sanofi Pasteur Biologics Co. (4.1% of NRA). Most of the
in-place tenants have invested a considerable amount of their own
capital into their space build-outs.

Each property operates subject to a ground lease from MIT with
maturity dates ranging from 2061 to 2076 and structured with base
rent and percentage rent components. The base rent for each of the
properties is fixed for the entire term of the ground lease while
the percentage rent components are calculated based on the product
of 15% and the gross revenues from the given property over a
specified threshold. The threshold for each is subject to increases
or decreases based on changes (on a dollar-for-dollar basis) in the
deemed debt service due under the loan secured by the applicable
property. The deemed debt service is calculated based on a maximum
75.0% LTV (i.e., no debt service in excess of 75.0% LTV is to be
considered) and an assumed fixed debt service equivalent stipulated
in accordance with the lease documents. Additionally, the ground
lessor has a right of first refusal with respect to a sale of the
properties by the borrower and/or future proposed mortgage or
mezzanine refinancing.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
re-analyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its
consistency with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial
Real Estate Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure
was $88.8 million and a cap rate of 7.14% was applied, resulting in
a DBRS Morningstar Value of $1.2 billion, a variance of -25.7% from
the appraised value at issuance of $1.7 billion. The DBRS
Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 104.5%, based on the total
financing, as compared with the LTV on the issuance appraised value
of 77.7%. The NCF figure applied as part of the analysis represents
a -6.4% variance from the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven by tenant
improvements and leasing commissions, vacancy, and replacement
reserves.

The cap rate applied is at the lower end of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflecting the
ground lease, strong market, investment-grade tenancy, and
above-average property quality. In addition, the 7.14% cap rate
applied is above the implied cap rate of 5.67% based on the
Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 7.0%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Individual properties are permitted to be released with customary
requirements; however, the loan's stipulated release structure
(105.0% release premium for the first 25.0% of the original loan
amount and 110.0% release premium thereafter) is considered weaker
than those in other rated single-borrower, multiproperty deals.
Furthermore, the loan allows for pro rata paydowns for the first
20.0% of the unpaid principal balance for which DBRS Morningstar
applied negative LTV adjustments through the "A" rating category.

Classes X-CP and X-NCP are IO certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CAPITAL TRUST 2019A: S&P Cuts Rating to 'D' on Custodial Receipts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on series 2019A
agency-related custodial receipts for Capital Trust Agency, Fla.'s
series 2018A-1 senior-living revenue bonds, due July 1, 2054,
issued for American Eagle's portfolio project, to 'D' from 'CC' and
subsequently removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where the rating agency placed it on April 7, 2020.

This rating action follows S&P's lowering the rating on the
underlying securities and subsequent removal from CreditWatch,
where S&P Global Ratings placed it with negative implications on
April 7, 2020.

The rating on the custodial receipts reflects the rating on the
underlying securities and S&P Global Ratings' expectation of the
likelihood of certificate holders receiving interest-and-principal
payments when due on the certificates.

As noted in S&P's analysis on Capital Trust Agency, "The project
has been affected significantly by the COVID-19 crisis, which led
the borrower to prioritize operations compared with the payment of
its debt service obligations. As a result, the borrower
discontinued making monthly interest and principal payments on the
bonds as of April 15, 2020, and requested that the trustee enter
into a six-month forbearance agreement on debt service. This
agreement was executed on July 1, 2020. According to its criteria,
S&P views the forbearance agreement as a distressed exchange or
restructuring, which would also warrant a rating of 'D'.

Changes to the rating on these securities could result from, among
other things, changes to the ratings on the underlying securities.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2012-4: Moody's Lowers Rating on E-RR Notes to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies 2012-4,
Ltd.:

US$27,000,000 Class E-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due April 22, 2032, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

This action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class E-RR Notes. The CLO, originally issued on
December 12, 2012, previously refinanced on October 20, 2016 (the
first refinancing date) and April 22, 2019 (the second refinancing
date) is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
April 2024.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade on the Class E-RR Notes reflects the risks posed by
credit deterioration and loss of collateral coverage observed in
the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily prompted by
economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. Since the
outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate credit has
resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other negative
rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing the CLO.
Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has increased
substantially, the credit enhancement available to the CLO notes
has eroded, exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased
significantly, and expected losses (ELs) on certain notes have
increased materially.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) was 3469 as of June 2020, or 17% worse compared to 2962
reported in the March 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's calculation
also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 3063 reported in
the June 2020 trustee report [2] by 406 points. Moody's noted that
approximately 35% of the CLO's portfolio par was from obligors
assigned a negative outlook and 5% from obligors whose ratings are
on review for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on Moody's
calculation, the proportion of obligors in the portfolio with
Moody's corporate family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1 or
lower (adjusted for negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade)
was approximately 22% as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's
calculated the total collateral par balance, including recoveries
from defaulted securities, at $589.0 million, and Moody's
calculated the over-collateralization (OC) ratios (excluding
haircuts) for the Class E notes as of June 2020 at 107.9%. Moody's
noted that the OC test for the Class E notes and the interest
diversion test were recently reported [2] as failing, and as a
result, $2.0 million of interest collections was applied to repay
the Class A-1-RR notes. If these failures were to continue on the
next payment date, they would result in a portion of excess
interest collections being diverted towards further note repayment
or reinvestment in collateral.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $582.9 million, defaulted par of
$12.1 million, a weighted average default probability of 28.75%
(implying a WARF of 3469), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.89%, a diversity score of 85 and a weighted average
spread of 3.46%. Moody's also analyzed the CLO by incorporating an
approximately $15 million par haircut in calculating the OC and
interest diversion test ratios. Finally, Moody's also considered in
its analysis the CLO manager's recent investment decisions and
trading strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


CARLYLE US 2017-1: Moody's Cuts Class D Notes to B1
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Carlyle US CLO 2017-1 Ltd.:

US$38,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 17,
2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$24,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's also confirmed the rating on the following notes:

US$32,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on June 3, 2020 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class C notes and Class D notes and on June 3, 2020
on the Class B notes issued by the CLO. Carlyle US CLO 2017-1 Ltd.,
issued in April 2017, is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes are
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in April 2023.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade on the Class C and Class D notes reflects the risks
posed by credit deterioration and loss of collateral coverage
observed in the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily
prompted by economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic.
Since the outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate
credit has resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other
negative rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing
the CLO. Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has
increased, the credit enhancement available to the CLO notes has
eroded, exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased significantly,
and expected losses on certain notes have increased materially.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) was 3493 as of June 2020, or 19.5% worse compared to a WARF
of 2922 reported in the March 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's
calculation also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 2903
reported in the June 2020 trustee report [2] by 590 points. Moody's
noted that approximately 37% of the CLO's par was from obligors
assigned a negative outlook and 2% from obligors whose ratings are
on review for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on Moody's
calculation, the proportion of obligors in the portfolio with
Moody's corporate family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1 or
lower (adjusted for negative outlook and watchlist for downgrade)
was approximately 23% of the CLO par as of June 2020. Furthermore,
Moody's calculated the total collateral par balance, including
recoveries from defaulted securities, at $585.9 million, or $14.1
million less than the deal's ramp-up target par balance, and
Moody's calculated the over-collateralization ratios (excluding
haircuts) for the Class C and Class D notes as of June 2020 at
111.01% and 106.18%, respectively.

The rating confirmation on the Class B notes reflects the notes'
priority position in the CLO's capital structure and the level of
credit enhancement available to it from both over-collateralization
and cash flows that would be diverted as a result of coverage test
failures. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratio (excluding
haircuts) for the Class B notes is currently 119.75%, compared to
its trigger level of 114.60%. Moody's also noted that according to
the trustee's April 2020 distribution report[3], the OC test for
the Class D notes and the interest diversion test were failing, and
as a result, $254,456 of interest collections was diverted to repay
the Class A-1 notes and $873,661 of interest collections was
applied towards the purchase of additional collateral obligations.
If these failures were to occur on the next payment date, they
would result in a portion of excess interest collections being
diverted towards further note repayment or reinvestment in
collateral.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $581.1 million, defaulted par of $9.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 28.90% (implying
a WARF of 3493), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.92%, a diversity score of 82 and a weighted average spread of
3.45%. Moody's also analyzed the CLO by incorporating an
approximately $11.8 million par haircut in calculating the OC and
interest diversion test ratios. Finally, Moody's also considered in
its analysis the CLO manager's recent investment decisions and
trading strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


CCRESG COMMERCIAL 2016-HEAT: S&P Cuts E Certs Rating to B+ (sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from CCRESG Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2016-HEAT, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on five
other classes from the same transaction. The ratings on classes D,
E, F, and X were removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on May 6, 2020.

S&P had placed these ratings on Watch because of its concerns
regarding COVID-19's potential impact on the performance of the
collateral property and the lodging sector overall, along with the
related ambiguity concerning the duration of the demand
disruption.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution
of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is
that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions,
but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is
widely available, which may not occur until the second half of
2021. S&P is using this assumption in assessing the economic and
credit implications associated with the pandemic. As the situation
evolves, the rating agency will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

"The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect our reevaluation of the Ritz-Carlton South Beach hotel,
which secures the loan in this single-asset transaction.
Specifically, the downgrades on classes E and F reflect the S&P
expected-case value, which is 8.1% down from our last review and at
issuance. The lower expected-case value is due to the application
of a higher S&P capitalization rate, which we believe better
captures the increased susceptibility to net cash flow and
liquidity disruption stemming from the pandemic," S&P said.

Using the S&P sustainable net cash flow of $14.5 million (same as
at issuance and the last review) and applying a 9.25%
capitalization rate (up from 8.50% at issuance and the last
review), the rating agency arrived at an S&P value of $156.5
million ($417,426 per guestroom) and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
102.2%, versus 93.9% at issuance and the last review. Compounding
this, the Ritz-Carlton South Beach closed on Oct. 4, 2017, because
of significant damage sustained from Hurricane Irma." After
substantial repairs and a full guestroom renovation was completed,
the hotel reopened on Jan. 27, 2020, but then closed again in March
2020 due to the pandemic. The hotel reopened on July 1, 2020.

S&P lowered its rating on class F to 'CCC (sf)' because, based on
its revised S&P LTV ratio over 100%, it believes that the class is
more susceptible to reduced liquidity support and that the risk of
default and losses has increased. While the loan has a reported
current payment status as of the July 2020 trustee remittance
report, the master servicer advanced the full debt service amounts
in April and May 2020. Moreover, the loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to the borrower's COVID-19 forbearance
relief request and matures on April 6, 2021. According to the
master servicer, Midland Loan Services, the borrower is working
toward a potential relief strategy. Midland, as the master servicer
and special servicer, is reviewing the matter as a potential
non-monetary imminent default transfer. Midland indicated that the
imminent default status will be determined based on the servicing
agreement guidelines. Class F has $30,036 in accumulated interest
shortfalls, mainly due to non-loan-related legal expenses incurred
by the trustee in connection with the resignation of special
servicer Talmage LLC and its replacement by Midland. S&P will
continue to monitor the situation and may take further rating
action as deemed appropriate.

S&P affirmed its ratings on classes A, B, C, and D even though the
model-indicated ratings were lower than the classes' current rating
levels. This is based on qualitative considerations, such as the
underlying collateral quality, prime beachfront location, the
significant market value decline that would be needed before these
classes experience losses, liquidity support provided in the form
of servicer advancing, and positions in the waterfall. In addition,
S&P considered the substantial renovation work that was recently
completed, as well as the sponsors' long-term commitment to the
property.

The affirmation of the rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificates is based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities,
in which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class. The notional amount of
class X references classes A, B, C, and D.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
$160.0 million fixed-rate IO mortgage loan secured by the
borrower's leasehold interest in the Ritz-Carlton South Beach, a
375-guestroom full-service oceanfront luxury resort located along
the Art Deco district of Miami Beach, Fla. The hotel includes four
food and beverage outlets, 18,500 sq. ft. of meeting/function
space, a 16,000-sq.-ft. spa, 644 sq. ft. of retail space, and two
swimming pools. The property is subject to a ground lease which
commenced on Sept. 10, 1999, and ends on Sept. 9, 2128. The ground
rent through the ground lease term is $2.0 million, adjusted
annually for changes in the Consumer Price Index. The leased fee
owner is controlled by one of the sponsors, Mr. Alfredo Lowenstein.


S&P's property-level analysis considered that the pandemic has
brought about unprecedented social distancing and curtailment
measures, which are resulting in a significant decline in demand in
corporate, leisure, and group travelers. Since the outbreak, there
has been a dramatic decline in airline passenger miles stemming
from governmental restrictions on international travel and a major
drop in domestic travel. In an effort to curtail the spread of the
virus, most group meetings (both corporate and social) have been
cancelled, corporate transient travel has been restricted, and
leisure travel has slowed due to fear of travel and the closure of
demand generators, such as amusement parks and casinos, and the
cancellation of concerts and sporting events.

Prior to the hotel's closure in October 2017, it generated
approximately 70% of its demand from the leisure transient sector
and the remainder from the meeting and group sector. Demand from
both of these sources has dropped due to consumers' fears of
traveling and corporate restrictions on travel, as well as the need
for social distancing. While leisure travel has slowly increased
since April, leisure travelers have thus far favored hotels in
smaller markets and more remote locations in an effort to socially
distance. Revenue per available room (RevPAR) for the Miami lodging
market declined by 58.9% in March 2020, 87.8% in April 2020, and
81.7% in May 2020 versus the same prior-year periods. Given the
recent spike in COVID-19 cases in Florida, S&P's expect leisure
travel, on which the hotel relies heavily for both room revenue and
food and beverage revenue, will be curtailed until there is a
COVID-19 treatment or vaccine.

S&P's review considered not only the impact of COVID-19 on the
collateral property, but also that it was closed for approximately
two and a half years after sustaining significant damage to the
roof, wallboard, electrical systems, and mechanical systems due to
Hurricane Irma on Oct. 4, 2017. The property, including the
guestrooms, was subsequently completely renovated for approximately
$92.1 million, or $245,539 per guestroom. The borrower also
collected approximately $90.9 million in business interruption
insurance proceeds during this period. The renovation work was
substantially completed and the hotel reopened on Jan. 27, 2020,
before closing again in mid-March 2020 due to COVID-19 containment
efforts. The hotel has reopened as of July 1, 2020.

There is no operating performance data for 2018 and 2019 due to the
hotel's closure, and projected occupancy figures following its July
2020 reopening are not available at this time. The Ritz-Carlton
South Beach's performance improved significantly between 2011 and
2014 due to the overall economic recovery after the 2009 recession.
However, the property's net cash flow and RevPAR declined in 2015
and 2016 due to the construction of the Walgreens ground level
retail space and also because of new luxury hotel supply entering
the market, including the Marriott Edition, 1 Hotel & Residences,
and Ritz-Carlton Bal Harbour. Miami's lodging market had supply
growth that was above 3% per year in each of 2015, 2016, 2017, and
2019--significantly above the U.S. average, which was 2.0% or below
in each of those years. Favorably, the hotel had a strong RevPAR
penetration rate--which measures the RevPAR of the hotel relative
to its competitors, with 100% indicating parity with
competitors--exceeding 100% for the trailing-12-months (TTM) ended
February 2014, 2015, and 2016, based on the Smith Travel Research
(STR) report. In addition, while the hotel's competitive set
reported a 3.8% decline in RevPAR for the TTM ended March 2020,
RevPAR was reportedly 7.0% higher for the TTM ended March 2019
versus the same reporting period in 2018.

In S&P's current analysis, instead of adjusting its sustainable net
cash flow assumption (since the property was entirely closed in
2018 and 2019 and just reopened in early July 2020), the rating
agency increased its capitalization rate by 75 basis points from
issuance and the last review to account for the adverse impact of
COVID-19 and the responses to it. The pandemic's negative effect on
lodging properties has been particularly severe for those in urban
markets, like the Ritz-Carlton South Beach, that are highly reliant
on international demand, as well as leisure and corporate demand,
which will be tempered for the next several quarters. There is
significant uncertainty regarding not only the duration of the
pandemic, but also the time needed for lodging demand to return to
normalized levels after lifting travel restrictions.

According to the July 10, 2020, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $160.0 million,
the same as at issuance and S&P's last review. The IO loan pays a
per annum fixed interest rate of 5.509% and matures on April 6,
2021. In addition, there is a $50.0 million mezzanine loan. To
date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

-- Health and safety.

  RATINGS LOWERED AND OFF WATCH

  CCRESG Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-HEAT
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
  Class       To           From

  E           B+ (sf)      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  F           CCC (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Neg

  RATINGS AFFIRMED AND OFF WATCH

  CCRESG Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-HEAT
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                     Rating
  Class       To           From

  D           BBB- (sf)    BBB-/Watch Neg
  X           BBB- (sf)    BBB-/Watch Neg
  
  RATINGS AFFIRMED (NOT PREVIOUSLY ON WATCH)

  CCRESG Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-HEAT
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

  Class       Rating

  A           AAA (sf)
  B           AA- (sf)
  C           A- (sf)


CFK TRUST 2019-FAX: DBRS Assigns BB(low) Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-FAX issued by CFK Trust
2019-FAX (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-A at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 16, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The loan is secured by the Fairfax Multifamily Portfolio, which
consists of three multifamily properties totalling 870 units in
Fairfax and Herndon, Virginia. The sponsor used loan proceeds as
well as its ownership equity of $2.1 million and preferred equity
of $36.0 million to acquire the Ellipse at Fairfax Corner asset for
$98.0 million ($112,644 per unit), to refinance the short-term
bridge loan on the Windsor at Fair Lakes and Townes at Herndon
Center properties for $86.1 million, and to fund an upfront
replacement reserve of $11.1 million. The whole loan is composed of
an $82 million trust loan (two senior notes and two junior notes)
and a $70 million nontrust pari passu companion loan (five senior
notes) for a total first mortgage of $152 million. In addition to
the senior debt, the transaction was structured with a $25 million
senior mezzanine loan and a $20 million junior mezzanine loan,
which are held outside the trust. The 10-year loan is interest only
(IO) for the entire period.

All three properties are well situated in close proximity to I-66
and I-495, providing direct access to Arlington, Washington, D.C.,
and other major cities in Virginia. The properties are close to
good school districts, grocery stores, hospitals, and shopping
centers. Fairfax Multifamily Portfolio is located in a strong
multifamily submarket with rental rates increasing year over year.
The submarket, which is popular among young to middle-aged
individuals, has had a vacancy rate of less than 5% over the past
five years. The portfolio has an average occupancy of 94.6% with
the individual properties ranging from 94.0% to 95.6%. The previous
owner invested over $22.8 million in capital improvements and
renovated 248 of the 870 units in the portfolio. The sponsor
budgeted an additional $11.0 million, or $12,800 per unit, for
future renovations and upgrades, which will increase in-place rents
and keep the property competitive. At issuance, there were concerns
about new supply in the West Fairfax County submarket, but the
portfolio's location, its proximity to employment centers and
transportation nodes, and the stability in the immediate area
mitigate these concerns.

The loan sponsor is Tomas Rosenthal, the Chief Executive Officer of
Hampshire Properties Ltd., which is a New York-based privately held
real estate investment firm specializing in value-add
opportunities. Rosenthal founded the company in 1988 and its
current portfolio consists of office buildings, industrial
properties, and multifamily complexes across the United States and
Canada, valued at approximately $1 billion.

The DBRS Morningstar NCF derived at issuance was reanalyzed for the
subject rating action to confirm its consistency with the "DBRS
Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate Property Analysis
Criteria." The resulting NCF figure was $11.4 million, and a cap
rate of 6.75% as well as a value adjustment for reserved renovation
funds were applied, resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of $180.4
million, a variance of -28.3% from the appraised value at issuance
of $251.5 million. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of
84.2% compared with the LTV of 60.4% on the appraised value of at
issuance, excluding the mezzanine funding. The NCF figure applied
as part of the analysis represents a -5.8% variance from the
Issuer's NCF, primarily driven by management fee and payroll
expenses.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the lower to middle end
of the DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for multifamily properties,
reflecting the properties' ages and the submarket. In addition, the
6.75% cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is above the implied cap
rate of 4.9% based on the Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised
value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totalling 2.5%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Class X-A is an IO certificate that references a single rated
tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CIM TRUST 2020-R5: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class B2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to CIM Trust 2020-R5.

RATING ACTIONS

CIM Trust 2020-R5

Class A-IO-S; LT NRsf New Rating;  previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class A1;     LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A1-A;   LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A1-B;   LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A1-IO;  LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class B1;     LT BBsf New Rating;  previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class B2;     LT Bsf New Rating;   previously at B(EXP)sf

Class B3;     LT NRsf New Rating;  previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class M1;     LT AAsf New Rating;  previously at AA(EXP)sf

Class M1-IO;  LT AAsf New Rating;  previously at AA(EXP)sf

Class M2;     LT Asf New Rating;   previously at A(EXP)sf

Class M2-IO;  LT Asf New Rating;   previously at A(EXP)sf

Class M3;     LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

Class M3-IO;  LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
2,222 seasoned performing loans (SPLs) and re-performing loans
(RPLs) with a total balance of approximately $338.4 million, which
includes $14.5million, or 4%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the cut-off
date.

Distributions of principal and interest (P&I) and loss allocations
are based on a traditional senior-subordinate, sequential
structure. The sequential-pay structure locks out principal to the
subordinated notes until the most senior notes outstanding are paid
in full. The servicers will not be advancing delinquent monthly
payments of P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Revised GDP Due to Coronavirus (Negative): Coronavirus and the
resulting containment efforts have resulted in revisions to Fitch's
GDP estimates for 2020. Its baseline global economic outlook for
U.S. GDP growth is currently a 5.6% decline for 2020, down from
1.7% for 2019. Fitch's downside scenario would see an even larger
decline in output in 2020 and a weaker recovery in 2021. To account
for declining macroeconomic conditions resulting from coronavirus,
an Economic Risk Factor (ERF) floor of 2.0 (the ERF is a default
variable in the U.S. RMBS loan loss model) was applied to 'BBBsf'
ratings and below.

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, seasoned performing and RPLs.
Of the pool, 2.5% was 30 days delinquent as of the cut-off date or
currently on a deferral plan and treated as delinquent in Fitch's
analysis, and 44.6% of loans are current but have had recent
delinquencies or incomplete pay strings. 49% of the loans are
seasoned over 24 months and have been paying on time for the past
24 months. Roughly 69% have been modified.

Payment Deferrals (Negative): As of the cutoff date, approximately
2.5% (by UPB) of the loans in the pool have received and are still
on coronavirus deferral relief. To account for potential permanent
hardship and default risk as these borrowers are not cashflowing,
Fitch assumed all loans with active deferrals to be 30-days
delinquent. This assumption resulted in an increase to Fitch's
'AAAsf' expected loss of less than 100bps.

Expected Payment Forbearance and Deferrals Related to Coronavirus
(Negative): The outbreak of coronavirus and widespread containment
efforts in the U.S. will result in increased unemployment and cash
flow disruptions. Mortgage payment forbearance or deferrals will
provide immediate relief to affected borrowers and Fitch expects
servicers to broadly adopt this practice. The missed payments will
result in interest shortfalls that will likely be recovered, the
timing of which will depend on repayment terms; if interest is
added to the underlying balance as a non-interest-bearing amount,
repayment will occur at refinancing, property liquidation, or loan
maturity.

To account for the potential for cash flow disruptions, Fitch
assumed deferred payments on a minimum of 40% of the pool for the
first six months of the transaction at all rating categories with a
reversion to its standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve
by month 10. The 40% assumption is based on observed peak
delinquencies for legacy Alt-A collateral. Under these assumptions
the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' classes did not incur any shortfalls and are
expected to receive timely payments of interest. The cash flow
waterfall providing for principal otherwise distributable to the
lower rated bonds to pay timely interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf'
bonds and availability of excess spread also mitigate the risk of
interest shortfalls. The 'Asf' through 'Bsf' rated classes incurred
temporary interest shortfalls that were ultimately recovered.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is well controlled
for in this transaction. Chimera has actively purchased
re-performing loans (RPLs) over the past 12 years and is assessed
as an 'Average' aggregator by Fitch. Fay Servicing, LLC (Fay) and
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) will be the named servicers
for the transaction after the closing date and are responsible for
primary and special servicing functions. Fitch views SPS as a
strong servicer of RPLs and is rated 'RPS1-'. High rated servicers
receive a credit in Fitch's loss model, which helped decrease the
loss expectations for the pool by 76 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
stress. Issuer retention of at least 5% of the bonds also helps
ensure an alignment of interest between both the issuer and
investor.

Adequate Servicing Fee (Neutral): Fitch determined that the stated
servicing fee (including the excess servicing fee strip) of
approximately 50 bps is sufficient to attract subsequent servicers
even under a period of poor performance and high delinquencies. The
stated 50 bps was more than sufficient to cover Fitch's stressed
servicing fee for this transaction of 40 bps.

Due Diligence Review Results (Negative): Third-party due diligence
was performed on 100% of the pool by SitusAMC, Clayton Services and
Opus CMC which are assessed by Fitch as an 'Acceptable - Tier 1 and
Tier 2' TPR firm. The results of the review indicate moderate
operational risk with approximately 14% of the loans assigned a 'C'
or 'D' grade. 7% of the pool was graded 'D' for missing or
estimated final HUD-1 documents yet is subject to testing for
compliance with predatory lending regulations. Fitch applied loss
severity adjustments for these loans due to exposure additional
assignee liability, which was approximately 50 bps at the 'AAAsf'
rating stress. However, the overall concentration of material
exceptions is consistent with prior Fitch-rated RPL RMBS.

Representation Framework (Negative): The loan-level representations
and warranties (R&Ws) are mostly consistent with a tier 1
framework. While the framework is strong, repurchase obligations
are designated to a separate fund that does not hold an investment
grade rating, and the fund may have issues fulfilling repurchases
in times of economic stress. Fitch increased its loss expectations
by 111 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating category to account for the
non-investment grade counterparty risk of the R&W provider.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. P&I advances made on behalf of loans that
become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation
proceeds to the trust. Due to the lack of P&I advancing, the
loan-level loss severity (LS) is less for this transaction than for
those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural
provisions and cash flow priorities, together with increased
subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
that class in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $14.5 million (4.3%) of the UPB are
outstanding on 722 loans. Fitch included the deferred amounts when
calculating the borrower's loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and
sustainable LTV (sLTV), despite the lower payment and amounts not
being owed during the term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in a
higher probability of default (PD) and LS than if there were no
deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior for these
loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit strategies
(i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to those
borrowers with more equity in the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
The implied rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of
the potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that
the transaction may become exposed to or that may be considered in
the surveillance of the transaction. Sensitivity analyses was
conducted at the state and national levels to assess the effect of
higher MVDs for the subject pool as well as lower MVDs, illustrated
by a gain in home prices.

Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model-projected 39.4% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national level, or
in other words positive home price growth with no assumed
overvaluation. The analysis assumes positive home price growth of
10%. Excluding the senior class, which is already 'AAAsf', the
analysis indicates there is potential positive rating migration for
all of the rated classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices
would result in a full category upgrade for the rated class
excluding those being assigned ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and
down-environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

Fitch has added a Coronavirus Sensitivity Analysis that that
includes a prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer
demand and a protracted period of below-trend economic activity
that delays any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this
severe scenario, Fitch expects the ratings to be impacted by
changes in its sustainable home price model due to updates to the
model's underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term impact
arising from coronavirus disruptions on these economic inputs will
likely affect both investment and speculative grade ratings

CRITERIA VARIATION

There is one variation to Fitch's U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria. Almost
50% of the loans had a tax and title search performed outside of
the six-month window that Fitch looks for in its criteria. Given
the fairly minor amount of unpaid taxes and liens as well as the
fact that all of the searches were performed within one year, Fitch
deemed the dated searches immaterial to the rating and did not make
any adjustments.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

A third-party regulatory compliance review was completed on
approximately 100% of the loans in the transaction pool. The review
was performed by SitusAMC, Clayton Services, and Opus CMC which are
assessed by Fitch as an 'Acceptable - Tier 1 and Tier 2' TPR firm.
The due diligence testing scope is consistent with Fitch criteria
for RPL RMBS. Approximately 14% of loans were assigned a grade of
'C' or 'D'. Fitch applied loss severity adjustments on 7% of the
pool (162 loans) graded 'C' or 'D' because the loan files reviewed
had missing or estimated final HUD-1 documents. The final HUD-1 is
necessary to test for compliance with predatory lending
regulations, and the inability to test them may expose the trust to
potential assignee liability which adds risk for bond investors.

Fitch adjusted its loss expectation at the 'AAAsf' rating stress by
approximately 50bps to reflect these additional risks. The
remaining 'C' and 'D' grades (7% of the pool or 153 loans) reflect
missing final HUD-1 documents for loans that are not subject to
predatory lending, missing state disclosures, and other absent
compliance related documents where the assignee liability is
outside of the applicable statute of limitations. No adjustment to
loss expectations were made for these loans.

Form ABS Due Diligence 15E was received and reviewed in accordance
with this transaction

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2013-GC15: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 12 classes and revises outlooks on three
classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2013-GC15.

RATING ACTIONS

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-GC15

  - Class A-3 17321JAC8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 17321JAD6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-AB 17321JAE4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 17321JAF1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 17321JAG9; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 17321JAH7; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 17321JAP9; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 17321JAR5; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class F 17321JAT1; LT Bsf; Affirmed

  - Class PEZ 17321JAZ7; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 17321JAJ3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-C 17321JAM6; LT BBsf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced Loans: Loss
expectations have increased since Fitch's last rating action due to
significantly higher losses on the largest specially serviced loan,
additional loans transferring to special servicing, higher losses
on Fitch Loans of Concern due to declines in performance, upcoming
rollover, and/or additional stresses applied due to coronavirus
pandemic concerns.

The largest specially serviced loan, 735 Sixth Avenue (4.4% of the
pool), is secured by 16,500 sf of retail located on the ground
level of a 40-story, mixed-use residential condominium building
totaling approximately 250,000 sf, located in NYC along 6th Avenue
between W. 24-25 Streets. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2019 due to delinquent payments and is
currently 90 days delinquent. The two largest tenants, David's
Bridal and T-Mobile vacated at their respective lease expirations
in October and November 2018 causing a decline in collateral
occupancy to 20%. Per the special servicer, there are no
prospective tenants. They are dual tracking foreclosure while
continuing discussions with the borrower on alternate workout
strategies. The most recent appraisal value indicates significant
losses upon liquidation; however, given the property's location,
losses may not be incurred.

The second largest specially serviced loan, Walpole Shopping Mall
(2.1% of the pool), is secured by a anchored retail center
consisting of eight buildings with one large contiguous retail
building containing 363,132 sf and seven pad/outparcel sites
containing 34,880 sf. The loan was transferred to special servicing
in May 2020 due to imminent monetary default after being impacted
by the coronavirus pandemic. The property is currently 88.9%
occupied with major tenants including Kohl's (102,445 sf), L.A.
Fitness (45,000 sf), Barnes & Noble (27,831 sf), Jo-Ann Stores
(24,760 sf) and PetSmart (20,000 sf). Per the special servicer,
legal counsel has been engaged and broker opinion values have been
ordered and a proposal has been received and is under review.

The remaining two specially serviced loans totaling (2.9% of the
pool) are secured by a portfolio of two hotels (one full-service
and one-limited service) located in Shreveport, LA and Natchez, MS;
respectively and one hotel located in Victorville, CA. Both
transferred due to relief requests due to the coronavirus.

The largest non-specially serviced FLOC, Parkway Centre East (3.1%
of the pool) is secured by a 162,470-sf retail center located
within a larger retail development known as Parkway in the Columbus
suburb of Grove City, OH. The property is anchored by Hobby Lobby
(35% NRA; expires August 2026) and AMC Theaters (34%; expires
January 2022). There is approximately 14% upcoming rollover. The
loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to tenant, LA
Fitness, providing notice of lease termination at lease expiration
June 2020. LA Fitness occupies 20,000 sf (12.3% gross leasable
area). There is a trigger event associated with LA Fitness
providing notice to terminate their lease. The master servicer is
in the process of implementing cash management due to the notice to
terminate. The loan is currently due for the May and June 2020
payments. Additionally, the borrower has notified the master
servicer of COVID-19 related hardships.

Improved Credit Enhancement: The transaction's credit enhancement
(CE)has increased slightly due to continued amortization and
additional defeasance since Fitch's last rating action. Nine loans
(8.1%) are defeased, of which three (2.8%) were defeased since
Fitch's last rating action. Three loans (18.5%) are full-term
interest only. There are 65 balloon loans (54.8%). Eleven loans
(26.8%) were structured as partial interest-only (I/O) and have
transitioned into their amortization periods.

Coronavirus Exposure: Significant economic impact to certain
hotels, retail and multifamily properties is expected from the
coronavirus pandemic, due to the recent and sudden reductions in
travel and tourism, temporary property closures and lack of clarity
on the potential length of the impact. The pandemic has already
prompted the closure of several hotel properties in gateway cities
as well as malls, entertainment venues and individual stores.

Nine loans (10.7% of the pool) are secured by hotel loans and
thirty-four loans (34.9% of the pool) are secured by retail
properties. The hotel loans have a weighted average debt service
coverage ratio of 1.80x. On average, the hotel loans can sustain an
average decline of 44.5% before the NOI DSCR would fall below 1.0x.
On average, the retail loans have a WA DSCR of 1.70x and would
sustain a 41.1% decline in NOI before the DSCR would fall below
1.0x. Fitch's base case analysis applied additional stresses to
hotel, retail and multifamily loans to account for potential cash
flow disruptions due to the coronavirus pandemic. However, these
stresses contributed minimally to the Negative Outlook revisions to
classes E, F, and interest-only class X-C.

Additional Considerations:

Pool Concentrations: Highly diverse pool with the top 10 loans
representing 44.8% of the pool balance. Nine loans (10.7% of the
pool) are secured by hotel loans and 34 loans (34.9% of the pool)
are secured by retail properties, including six loans (15.3%)
within the top 15, none of which are classified as regional malls.

Loan Maturities: All of the remaining loans mature in 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook revisions on classes E and F reflects
increased losses on specially serviced loans/FLOCs and performance
concerns with hotel and retail properties due to decline in travel
and commerce as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The Stable
Outlooks on classes A-2 through D reflect the increasing CE,
defeasance, continued amortization and overall stable performance
of the majority of the pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to classes B and C, rated 'AA-sf' and 'A-sf', would likely
occur with significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance;
however, adverse selection and increased concentrations, or further
underperformance or default of the FLOCs could cause this trend to
reverse. An upgrade of class D, rated 'BBB-sf', is considered
unlikely and would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is likelihood for
interest shortfalls. An upgrade to classes E, rated 'BBsf', is not
likely until the later years of the transaction and only if the
performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or properties
vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and
there is sufficient CE to the class.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-SB, A-S, B and C, rated
'AAAsf', 'AA-sf' and 'A-sf', are not likely due to the position in
the capital structure, but may occur at the 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf'
categories should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to classes
D and E, rated in the 'BBB-sf' and 'BBsf' categories would occur
should overall pool losses increase and/or one or more large FLOCs
have an outsized loss or should loss expectations increase on the
specially serviced loans or additional loans transfer to special
servicing and/or properties vulnerable to the coronavirus fail to
return to pre-pandemic levels. The Rating Outlooks on classes E and
F may be revised back to Stable should realize losses on specially
serviced loans upon liquidation be better than expected, the 735
Sixth Avenue loan return to performing, performance of the FLOCs
improves and/or properties vulnerable to the coronavirus stabilize
once the pandemic is over.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook or
those with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded one or more
categories.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
series 2016-C2.

CGCMT 2016-C2

  - Class A-1 17291CBN4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-2 17291CBP9; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3 17291CBQ7; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 17291CBR5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-AB 17291CBS3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 17291CBT1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 17291CBU8; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 17291CBV6; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 17291CAA3; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 17291CAG0; LT BB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E-1 17291CAC9; LT BB+sf; Affirmed

  - Class E-2 17291CAE5; LT BB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class EF 17291CBC8; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F 17291CAN5; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 17291CBW4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 17291CBX2; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-D 17291CBG9; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations/ High Concentration of Fitch Loans of
Concern: The Negative Outlook revisions reflect an increase in
Fitch's loss expectations, primarily due to the performance
deterioration on an increasing number of Fitch Loans of Concern and
the slowdown in economic activity related to the coronavirus. Fitch
has designated 13 loans (33.7% of pool) as FLOCs, which includes
five loans (20.3%) that have transferred to special servicing since
March 2020.

Fitch Loans of Concern/Specially Serviced Loans: The largest FLOC
and the third largest loan in the pool is Crocker Park Phase One
and Two (10.1%) which transferred to the special servicer in April
2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. The loan became 90 days
delinquent in July 2020. The special servicer is actively
negotiating a workout with the borrower. The loan is secured by a
615,062-sf mixed use retail/office property built in 2004 and
located in Westlake, OH. Major tenants include Dick's Sporting
Goods, L.A. Fitness, Cheesecake Factory, Barnes & Noble, and Regal
Cinemas. As of March 2020, the property was 90.4% occupied down
from 95.7% at YE 2018 and performing at a 1.58x NOI DSCR at YE 2019
compared to 1.71x at YE 2018. According the properties website only
two restaurants remain closed and approximately 20 stores including
Regal cinemas remain closed due to coronavirus.

The second largest FLOC is Staybridge Suites Times Square (4.9%),
secured by a 310-key extended stay hotel built in 2010 and located
in New York City. The hotel's franchise is changing to Marriott
Delta from Staybridge Suites after the borrower entered into a new
long-term agreement extending until October 2034. The hotel
continues to operate as a Staybridge Suites and is currently open
during the pandemic. Coronavirus relief was requested by the
borrower and the servicer denied the request. The loan remains
current. The TTM March 2020 occupancy is 93.8% down from 97.8% as
of TTM March 2019 and the NOI DSCR as of YE 2019 was 2.59x.

The third largest FLOC in the pool, Welcome Hospitality Portfolio
(4.0%), was transferred to the special servicer in May 2020 due to
the coronavirus pandemic and the loan became 60 days delinquent in
July 2020. The majority of tenants sent letters stating they would
not be able to pay April rent and requested various forms of relief
for future months. The special servicer is actively negotiating a
workout with the borrower. The loan is secured by the 175 key
Hilton Scranton Downtown located in Scranton, PA and the 125 key
Hampton Inn West Springfield located in West Springfield, MA. The
combined TTM YE 2019 occupancy was 71%, down slightly from 73% at
YE 2018 and the YE 2019 NOI DSCR was 2.0x.

The fourth largest FLOC in the pool, Jay Scutti Plaza (2.7%), was
transferred to the special servicer in June 2020 for imminent
monetary default due to the coronavirus pandemic, but the loan is
current as of July 2020. Per servicer comments, the majority of
tenants sent letters stating they would not be able to pay April
rent and requested various forms of relief for future months. The
special servicer plans to engage the borrower in workout
discussions. The loan is secured by 288,971 sf community shopping
center built in 1991 and located in Rochester, NY. Occupancy was
previously 100% but declined to 92% at YE 2019 when AC Moore
vacated before their July 2021 lease expiration. The YE 2019 NOI
DSCR was 1.5x down from 1.78x at YE 2018 and 1.75x at YE 2017.

Coronavirus Exposure: Fitch expects significant economic impact to
certain hotels, retail, and multifamily properties from the
coronavirus pandemic, due to the sudden reductions in travel and
tourism, temporary property closures and lack of clarity at this
time on the potential duration of the impact. The pandemic has
prompted the closure of several hotel properties in gateway cities
as well as malls, entertainment venues and individual stores.

Loans collateralized by retail properties and mixed-use properties
with a retail component account for 21 loans (49.1% of the pool),
including one regional mall (10.1%) and a specially serviced
mixed-use property (10.1%) in the top three. Hotel properties
account for seven loans (19.5% of the pool), including four (15.7%)
in the top 15. Four loans (10.1%) are secured by multifamily
properties. Fitch's base case analysis applied additional stresses
to seven hotels and nine retail and mixed-use loans due to their
vulnerability to the coronavirus pandemic. These additional
stresses contributed to the Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D,
E, E-1, E-2, F, EF, and XD.

Minimal Credit Enhancement Improvement/Limited Amortization: As of
the July 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been paid down by 2.4% to $594.6 million from $609.2
million at issuance.

The pool is scheduled to amortize by 9.6% of the initial pool
balance through maturity. Of the current pool, 11 loans (33.1%) are
full-term IO, and 3 loans (19.3%) have partial-term IO periods
remaining. Three loans (6.2%) have been defeased.

Maturity Concentration: Maturities for the pool are as follows:
2021 - one loan (2.5%), 2025 - one loan (1.5%), and 2026 - 42 loans
(96.0%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes D, E, E-1, E-2, F, EF, and XD
reflect performance concerns over the FLOCs, including five
specially serviced loans as well as the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic on the loans in the pool. The Stable Outlooks on classes
A-1 through C, X-A, and X-B reflect the substantial CE to the
classes and senior position in the capital stack along with
expected continued amortization.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades would include
stable to improved asset performance, particularly on the FLOCs,
coupled with additional paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to the
'AA-sf' and 'A-sf' rated classes are not expected but would likely
occur with significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance and/or
the stabilization to the properties impacted from the coronavirus
pandemic. Upgrades of the 'BBB-sf'-, 'BB+sf'-, and 'BB-sf'-rated
classes are considered unlikely in the near term and would be
limited based on the sensitivity to concentrations or the potential
for future concentrations. Classes would not be upgraded above
'Asf' if there is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. The 'B-sf'
rated classes are unlikely to be upgraded absent significant
performance improvement on the FLOCs and substantially higher
recoveries than expected on the specially serviced loans/assets.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans/assets. Downgrades to the super-senior 'AAAsf'-rated classes
are not likely due to the position in the capital structure and the
high CE but could occur if interest shortfalls occur or if a high
proportion of the pool defaults and expected losses increase
significantly. A downgrade of one category to the junior 'AAAsf'
rated class (class A-S) is possible should expected losses for the
pool increase significantly and/or should many of the loans
susceptible to the coronavirus pandemic suffer losses. Downgrades
to 'AA-sf'- and 'A-sf'-rated classes are possible should
performance of the FLOCs continue to decline, should additionally
loans transfer to special servicing and/or should loans susceptible
to the coronavirus pandemic not stabilize. Downgrades to 'BBB-sf'-,
BB+sf'-, 'BB-sf'- and 'B-sf'-rated classes with Negative Outlooks
would occur should loss expectations increase due to an increase in
specially serviced loans, the disposition of a specially serviced
loan/asset at a high loss, or a decline in the FLOCs' performance.
The Negative Rating Outlooks may be revised back to Stable if
performance of the FLOCs improves and/or properties vulnerable to
the coronavirus stabilize once the pandemic is over.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, classes with Negative Rating
Outlooks will be downgraded one or more categories.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction, and also serves
as the backup advancing agent. Fitch's Issuer Default Rating for
Deutsche Bank is currently 'BBB'/Outlook Negative/'F2'. Fitch
relies on the master servicer, Midland Loan Services, a division of
PNC Bank, N.A. (A+/Stable/F1), which is currently the primary
advancing agent, as counterparty. Fitch provided ratings
confirmation on Jan. 24, 2018.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-C4: Fitch Affirms Cl. H-RR Certs at B-sf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
series 2017-C4.

RATING ACTIONS

CGCMT 2017-C4

Class A-1 17326FAA5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 17326FAB3;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 17326FAC1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 17326FAD9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-AB 17326FAE7; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 17326FAH0;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 17326FAJ6;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 17326FAK3;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 17326FAL1;    LT BBBsf Affirmed;  previously at BBBsf

Class E-RR 17326FAN7; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class F-RR 17326FAQ0; LT BB+sf Affirmed;  previously at BB+sf

Class G-RR 17326FAS6; LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class H-RR 17326FAU1; LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

Class X-A 17326FAF4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 17326FAG2;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-D 17326FAY3;  LT BBBsf Affirmed;  previously at BBBsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Generally Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The
affirmations reflect the overall stable performance and loss
expectations of the pool, which remains generally in line with
Fitch's issuance expectations. Five loans (11.5% of pool) have been
designated Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), including two loans in
the top 15 (7.6%), one of which is 30 days delinquent (4.7%), and
one specially serviced loan (0.8%) that is 60 days delinquent.

The largest FLOC, the Godfrey Hotel (4.7%), is secured by a 221-key
full-service hotel located in the River North district of Chicago,
IL. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to being 30
days delinquent as of the June 2020 remittance. Per the servicer,
the borrower has requested coronavirus relief and is working with
the lender toward a possible solution. As of the TTM March 2020 STR
report, occupancy, ADR and RevPAR decreased to 92.4%, $153 and
$142, respectively, from 96.9%, $158 and $153 at YE 2018. The
servicer-reported amortizing NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
was 2.04x as of YE 2019.

The second largest FLOC, the Mall of Louisiana (2.9%), is secured
by a 776,789-sf portion of a 1.5 million-sf regional mall located
in Baton Rouge, LA. As of the March 2020 rent roll, collateral
occupancy was 93% and total mall occupancy was 96%. While property
cash flow has remained stable, comparable inline sales for tenants
occupying less than 10,000 sf decreased to $414 psf (excluding
Apple) as of TTM March 2020 from $461 psf at YE 2018 and $461 psf
around the time of issuance as of March 2018. The largest tenant,
AMC Theatres (9.6% of NRA), also reported declining sales of
$342,933 per screen as of TTM March 2020 from $390,617 per screen
at YE 2018 and $560,583 per screen at issuance. While the subject
is the dominant mall in its trade area, it is located in a
secondary market with few demand drivers. The servicer-reported NOI
DSCR was 2.39x as of YE 2019. The loan begins amortizing in
September 2020.

The two other non-specially serviced FLOCs outside of the top 15
are secured by two suburban office buildings (2.1%) located in
Rancho Cordova, CA and a grocery-anchored shopping center (1.0%)
located in Greensboro, NC; both of these properties have
experienced occupancy declines since issuance. The specially
serviced HIE&S Sequim loan (0.8%), which is secured by a 77-key
limited service hotel located in Sequim, WA, became 60 days
delinquent in June 2020. The loan transferred to special servicing
in May 2020 due to the borrower's request for COVID-19 relief. The
servicer-reported amortizing NOI DSCR was 2.00x as of YE 2019.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement: As of the July 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 1.3% to $964.4 million from $977.1 million at
issuance. No loans have paid off or defeased since issuance. There
have been no realized losses to date. Cumulative interest
shortfalls totaling $3,630 is affecting the non-rated class J-RR.
Nineteen loans (42.4% of pool) are full-term interest-only and 10
loans (23.0%) currently remain in their partial-interest-only
periods, compared with 19 loans (32.5%) at issuance. The
transaction is scheduled to pay down by 7.5% of the original pool
balance prior to maturity. Loan maturities are concentrated in 2022
(11.0%) and 2027 (89.0%).

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario that assumed a potential outsized loss of 20%
on the maturity balance of the Mall of Louisiana to reflect the
regional mall asset class, secondary market, declining sales and
economic volatility due to the coronavirus. This additional
sensitivity scenario contributed to maintaining the Negative Rating
Outlook on class H-RR.

Coronavirus Exposure: Nine loans (20.5% of pool) are secured by
hotel properties, including three loans in the top 10 (12.7%). The
weighted average (WA) NOI DSCR for the hotel loans is 2.50x; these
hotel loans could sustain a decline in NOI of 54.5% before DSCR
falls below 1.0x. Eighteen loans (25.4%) are secured by retail
properties, including four loans in the top 15 (12.7%). The WA NOI
DSCR for the retail loans is 1.90x; these retail loans could
sustain a decline in NOI of 42.8% before DSCR falls below 1.0x.
Four loans (5.1%) are secured by multifamily properties. The WA NOI
DSCR for the multifamily loans is 1.57x, these multifamily loans
could sustain a decline in NOI of 32.0% before DSCR falls below
1.0x.

Fitch applied additional stresses to seven hotel loans and four
retail loans to account for potential cash flow disruptions due to
the coronavirus pandemic. Fitch also applied additional stresses to
three loans considered highly vulnerable to the coronavirus
pandemic, including the 50 Varick Street loan (3.6%), which is
secured by a 158,574-sf portion of an eight-story office property
located in the Tribeca neighborhood of Manhattan that is 100%
occupied by an event space operator and a private co-working space
and social club; the 164 Fifth Avenue loan (2.4%), which is secured
by a 16,280-sf single tenant retail property located in the
Flatiron District Manhattan occupied by a yoga apparel retailer;
and the St. Louis Cardinals Lot loan (0.6%), which is secured by a
111,514-sf parking lot located outside of Busch Stadium in St.
Louis, MO. These additional stresses contributed to maintaining the
Negative Rating Outlook on class H-RR.

The borrowers for 18 loans (33.4%) have requested forbearances due
to economic hardship sustained from the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic. Three loans, 50 Varick Street (3.6%), Westin Crystal City
(2.5%) and Hotel Normandie (1.2%), were granted three-month
forbearances that commenced between May 2020 and June 2020.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlook on class H-RR reflects the potential
for downgrade due to concerns surrounding the ultimate impact of
the coronavirus pandemic and the performance concerns associated
with the FLOCs. The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through
G-RR and interest-only classes X-A, X-B and X-D reflect the
increasing credit enhancement, continued amortization and
relatively stable performance of the majority of the pool.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Positive Rating Action/Upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance.
However, adverse selection, increased concentrations and further
underperformance of the FLOCs or loans expected to be negatively
affected by the coronavirus pandemic could cause this trend to
reverse. Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' category would also take into
account these factors, but would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood for
interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories
are not likely until the later years in a transaction and only if
the performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or properties
vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels, and
there is sufficient credit enhancement to the classes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Negative Rating Action/Downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the 'Asf', 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf' categories are not
likely due to the position in the capital structure, but may occur
at the 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf' categories should interest shortfalls
occur. Downgrades to the 'BBBsf' category would occur should
overall pool losses increase and/or one or more large loans have an
outsized loss, which would erode credit enhancement. Downgrades to
the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories would occur should loss
expectations increase due to an increase in specially serviced
loans and/or the loans vulnerable to the coronavirus pandemic not
stabilize.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
negative rating actions, including downgrades or Negative Rating
Outlook revisions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


COLONNADE GLOBAL 2018-5: DBRS Puts 11 Tranches Under Review
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited placed the provisional ratings of the 11
tranches of the unexecuted, unfunded financial guarantee regarding
the Colonnade Programme - Series Global 2018-5 (Colonnade Global
2018-5) portfolio Under Review with Negative Implications
(UR-Neg.).

The transaction is a synthetic balance-sheet collateralized loan
obligation structured in the form of a financial guarantee (the
Guarantee). The tranches are collateralized by a portfolio of
corporate loans and credit facilities (the Guaranteed Portfolio)
originated by Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays or the Beneficiary). The
rated tranches are unfunded and the senior guarantee remains
unexecuted.

The Affected Ratings are Available at https://bit.ly/3iWrGDy

The ratings address the likelihood of a loss under the guarantee on
the respective tranche resulting from borrower defaults at the
legal final maturity dates of each transaction. Borrower default
events are limited to failure to pay, bankruptcy, and restructuring
events. The ratings assigned by DBRS Morningstar to each tranche
are expected to remain provisional until the senior guarantee is
executed. The ratings do not address counterparty risk nor the
likelihood of any event of default or termination events under the
agreement occurring.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND CONSIDERATIONS

On May 18, 2020, DBRS Morningstar published a commentary outlining
how the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) is likely to affect DBRS
Morningstar-rated Structured Credit transactions in Europe. For
more details, please see:
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/361098/european-structured-credit-transactions-risk-exposure-to-coronavirus-covid-19-effect
and
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/362712/european-structured-finance-covid-19-credit-risk-exposure-roadmap,
where DBRS Morningstar discussed the overall risk exposure of the
Structured Credit sector to the coronavirus and provided a
framework for identifying the transactions that are more at risk
and likely to be affected by the fallout of the pandemic on the
economy. In synthetic risk transfer transactions, the portfolios
tend to be more bespoke and defined around both protection buyer's
regulatory capital optimization needs as well as protection seller
risk and sector preferences. The Colonnade Global 2018-5
transaction is still in its revolving period ending in December
2021. DBRS Morningstar's assessment of the risk of the revolving
portfolio is based on a worst-case composition as per the
replenishment criteria. DBRS Morningstar's review found that 2.0%
and 23.5% of the outstanding portfolio balance as of 28 May 2020
belonged to industries classified in mid-high and high risk
economic sectors, respectively as per the commentary mentioned
above.

DBRS Morningstar typically endeavors to resolve the status of
ratings UR-Neg. as soon as appropriate. If heightened market
uncertainty and volatility persist, DBRS Morningstar may extend the
Under Review status for a longer period of time.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COLUMBIA CENT 29: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Columbia
Cent CLO 29 Ltd.'s floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 15,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Columbia Cent CLO 29 Ltd.

  Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1N                  AAA (sf)              200.00
  A-1F                  AAA (sf)               40.00
  A-2                   AAA (sf)               12.00
  B-1                   AA (sf)                38.00
  B-F                   AA (sf)                10.00
  C-1 (deferrable)      A (sf)                 18.00
  C-F (deferrable)      A (sf)                 10.00
  D-1 (deferrable)      BBB (sf)               18.00
  D-2 (deferrable)      BBB- (sf)               8.00
  E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)                6.00
  Subordinated notes    NR                     34.30

  NR--Not rated.


COMM 201-LC6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class X-C Debt to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on eight classes,
confirmed the ratings on one class and downgraded the ratings on
two classes in COMM 2013-LC6 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-LC6 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2019 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. X-C*, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed and the ratings on one
P&I class E was confirmed because the transaction's key metrics,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl
Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on one P&I class, Cl. F, was downgraded due to
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The ratings on two interest only (IO) classes were affirmed based
on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

The ratings on one IO class, Cl. X-C, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in US economic activity in the second quarter and a
gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However, that
outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their economies
while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge
in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 44.2% to $832.1
million from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 49.8% of the pool. Ten loans, constituting
16.5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

As of the June 2020 remittance report, loans representing 96.1%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 1.5% were delinquent at 30 days and 2.4% were delinquent
at 60 days or more.

Fifteen loans, constituting 40.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a minimal
realized loss. There are currently four loans in special servicing,
constituting 3.3% of the pool. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Campus Pointe & Campus Manor Apartments Loan ($15.9 million
-- 1.9% of the pool), which is secured by two jointly owned and
managed student housing properties located in Macomb, Illinois. The
properties serve the student population of Western Illinois
University and have a combined 356-units containing 631 beds. The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2017 for imminent
maturity default due to a significant decline in rental revenue.
The property's occupancy had declined from a high of 94% in 2014 to
67% at year-end 2017. The reported occupancy as of February 2020
was 64%. The property became REO in June 2019 .

The other three specially serviced loans are secured by limited
serviced hotels, located in Spring Lake, NC, Kingwood, TX and
Beavercreek, OH. Two of the loans transferred to special servicing
requesting relief as a result of the coronavirus outbreak and are
30+ days delinquent, and one is REO.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 4.8% of the pool, secured by
multifamily and retail properties located in Athens, OH and
Watertown, WI. Both loans are on the servicer's watchlist due to
declining performance since securitization. Moody's has estimated
an aggregate loss of $26.5 million (a 44% expected loss on average)
from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 100% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 89% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 22% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.67X and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 1.72X and 1.23X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Coastland Center Loan ($110.0 million --
13.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 459,000 square feet (SF)
portion of a 926,000 SF regional mall located in Naples, Florida.
The mall currently has two non-collateral anchors, Dillard's and
Macys and one collateral anchor, J.C. Penney. A former
non-collateral anchor, Sears, closed its store in November 2018.
The former Sears location is being demolished and there are plans
for a stand-alone luxury movie theater. As of December 2019, the
mall had a total occupancy was 98% (however, excluding Sears total
occupancy would be 82%) and inline occupancy was 90%. The loan is
current but was placed on the servicer's watchlist in June 2020 due
to relief requested in relation to the coronavirus outbreak.
Overall, property performance improved from securitization through
year-end 2016, however, the reported NOI in 2017, 2018 and 2019
declined below the levels at securitization. The loan has amortized
nearly 15% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 115% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 108% and 0.97X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Innisfree Pensacola Beach Hotel
Portfolio Loan ($60.3 million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is
secured by two adjacent full-service hotel properties located
directly on the beach in Pensacola, Florida. The larger hotel, The
Hilton, is a 275-key, 17-story resort and conference center, built
in 2003 with an addition in 2007. The smaller hotel, The Holiday
Inn, is a 206-key, 11-story resort built in 2011. The portfolio's
NOI has increased since securitization primarily due to higher
RevPAR. The 2019 NOI was 5% above 2018 NOI and 39% above the
securitization levels. The loan benefits from amortization and has
amortized by 13% since securitization. The loan is current but was
placed on the servicer's watchlist in May 2020 due to relief
requested in relation to the coronavirus outbreak. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 70% and
1.62X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Rudgate Manor & Rudgate Clinton MHC
Portfolio Loan ($39.8 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is
secured by two Class B manufactured housing communities located
approximately 11 miles from each other in Macomb County, MI. As of
December 2019, occupancy was 98%, compared to 99% as of December
2018. Performance has been stable over the last few years. The loan
has amortized by 13% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 57% and 1.84X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.82X at
the last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to Csf
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2012-CCRE4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2012-CCRE4.

COMM 2012-CCRE4

  - Class A-3 12624QAR4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-M 12624QAT0; LT AAsf; Downgrade

  - Class A-SB 12624QAQ6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 12624QBA0; LT BBBsf; Downgrade

  - Class C 12624QAC7; LT BBsf; Downgrade

  - Class D 12624QAE3; LT CCCsf; Affirmed

  - Class E 12624QAG8; LT CCsf; Affirmed

  - Class F 12624QAJ2; LT Csf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 12624QAS2; LT AAsf; Downgrade

  - Class X-B 12624QAA1; LT BBsf; Downgrade

KEY RATING DRIVERS

No Performance Improvement; Loss Expectations Remain High: The
Fitch Loans of Concern have not stabilized and Fitch's loss
expectations as a percentage of the original pool balance remain
high. They continue to be driven by Fashion Outlets of Las Vegas
(7.3% of the pool), which is REO and one of six Fitch Loans of
Concern. The asset is an enclosed outlet mall located in Primm,
Nevada, 45 miles southwest of Las Vegas and in close proximity to
the California/Nevada border. As December 2019, occupancy was
51.6%, down from 68% at YE2018, 75% at YE2017 and 96% at
securitization. Of total revenues, 31% is estimated to be
attributable to percentage rents, with many tenants paying as low
as 1% of sales. The vast majority of in-place leases are scheduled
to roll within the next 24-36 months. The property is located in a
tertiary market well outside of Las Vegas' commercial center, and
competes with two Simon properties that are better located and
better occupied. Sales and foot traffic at the subject are low.
Losses associated with this loan are expected to be significant,
and have contributed to the downgrade of class A-M.

Eastview Mall and Commons (13.9% of the pool) is the largest Fitch
Loan of Concern and the second largest loan in the pool. The
collateral is two adjacent retail properties in Victor, NY.
Eastview Mall is a 1.4 million sf regional mall, 725,303 sf of
which is collateral, anchored by Regal Cinemas, JCPenney, Lord &
Taylor and Von Maur. Eastview Commons is a 341,871-sf power center,
86,368 sf of which is collateral, anchored by Target and Home
Depot. Of the anchor tenants, only Regal Cinemas serves as
collateral. The non-collateral Sears anchor closed in December
2018. According to the servicer, no co-tenancy clauses were
triggered. The pad is owned by Seritage, and it has been reported
that Dick's Sporting Goods will backfill the space. However,
occupancy and NOI have declined and there are refinance concerns
surrounding the lack of amortization and potential lack of
liquidity given the subject property type, market location and
nearby competition. The loan, which transferred to the special
servicer at the borrower's request in May 2020 and is now in
forbearance, is sponsored by Wilmorite.

One other top 15 loan is flagged as a Fitch Loan of Concern. The
seventh largest loan in the pool is Emerald Square Mall (4.0% of
the pool). The subject is an enclosed regional mall located in
North Attleboro, MA and anchored by JCPenney, Macy's, Macy's Men's
and Home Store, and Sears. The collateral for this loan consists of
the JCPenney anchor and the in-line retail space. JCPenney recently
exercised a five-year extension option. Neither Macy's nor Sears
are on either of the retailers' closure lists. However, there is a
significant amount of upcoming lease roll in the near term and a
number of competing malls located nearby. As with the above asset,
Fitch remains concerned about the loan's upcoming maturity and
potential lack of liquidity given the subject property type, market
location and nearby competition. The loan, which made its last debt
service payment in March 2020 but has not yet transferred to the
special servicer, is sponsored by Simon Property Group.

No Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal
amortization since the last rating action in December 2019. Since
issuance, the transaction has experienced 22.3% of collateral
reduction. Loans representing 38.4% of the pool are interest only
for the full term, including the two largest loans. Additionally,
the third largest loan has defaulted and the property is REO. There
are no scheduled maturities until 2022. Although near-term paydown
is limited to monthly amortization from performing loans, eleven
loans representing 19.4% of the pool are fully defeased.

Coronavirus Exposure: The downgrades to classes B and C can be
attributed to the social and market disruption caused by the
effects of the coronavirus pandemic and related containment
measures. Of particular concern is the underlying pool's exposure
to retail properties, which represent 42.8% of the pool. Many
non-essential retailers remain closed or have significantly reduced
operations due to the spread of coronavirus. Retail properties are
expected to face cash flow disruption as tenants may not be able to
pay rent or as leases with upcoming expiration dates are not
renewed. The pool's retail component includes three regional malls
in the Top 15, all of which are Fitch Loans of Concern. Fitch also
ran an additional sensitivity stress on the 17th largest loan,
Starplex Portfolio, which is secured by a portfolio of five
single-tenant movie theaters, all of which are temporarily closed
for business.

There are five loans representing 10.8% of the pool backed by
hotels, including two loans in the Top 15. Additional stresses were
applied to three hotels, the two regional malls not in special
servicing, and another FLOC outside the Top 15 related to ongoing
performance concerns in light of the recent coronavirus outbreak.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on classes A-SB and A-3 remain Stable.

The Outlook on classes A-M, B, C and the IO classes X-A and X-B
remains Negative.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include significantly improved
performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. An upgrade to
class A-M would occur with stabilization of the FLOCs, but would be
limited as concentrations increase. Upgrades of classes B and C
would only occur with significant improvement in credit enhancement
and stabilization of the FLOCs. Classes would not be upgraded above
'Asf' if there is likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to
classes D through F is not likely unless performance of the FLOCs
improves and if performance of the remaining pool is stable.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the classes rated 'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to
defeasance and position in the capital structure, but may occur at
'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to
classes B and C are possible should the malls fail to refinance or
additional loans default. Downgrades to the distressed classes are
expected as losses are realized.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook or
those with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded one or more
categories.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

COMM 2012-CCRE4 has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to significantly high retail exposure included
three regional malls that are currently or at risk of
underperforming as a result of changing consumer preferences in
shopping, which has a negative impact on the credit profile and is
highly relevant to the rating. This has contributed to the
downgrades and Negative Outlooks of classes A-M, B and C
certificates, as well as the IO X-A and X-B certificates.

Except for the matters discussed, the highest level of ESG credit
relevance, if present, is a score of '3' - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity(ies),
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity(ies).


COMM 2013-CCRE10: Moody's Lowers Class F Debt to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on eleven classes,
confirmed the rating on one class and downgraded the rating on one
class in COMM 2013-CCRE10 Mortgage Trust, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PEZ**, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

** Reflects exchangeable classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on nine P&I classes were affirmed and one P&I class was
confirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on one P&I class, Cl. F, was downgraded due to the
decline in pool performance, driven primarily by the loans secured
by retail and hotel properties.

The ratings on one interest only (IO) class was affirmed based on
the credit quality of the referenced classes.

The ratings on one exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ, was affirmed based
on the credit quality of its referenced exchangeable classes.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in US economic activity in the second quarter and a
gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However, that
outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their economies
while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge
in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.2% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $796.2
million from $1.01 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 54.4% of the pool. One loan, constituting
12.6% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Twelve loans, constituting 21.6% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a realized
loss of $17.2 million (for a loss severity of 99.8%). There are
currently no loans in special servicing.

As of the June 2020 remittance report, loans representing 94.6%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, and 5.4% were between 30 -- 59 days delinquent.

Nine loans, constituting 17.1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 96% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 89% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.42X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.58X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the One Wilshire
Loan ($100.0 million -- 12.6% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu portion of a $180.0 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 663,000 square-foot (SF) Class A office building and
colocation center in Los Angeles, California. The building operated
as a traditional office building until 1992, when the building was
converted to a telecommunication building through installation of
infrastructure necessary to attract telecommunication companies.
The building is recognized as the primary communications hub
connecting North America and Asia, the most significant point of
interconnection in the western United States, and of one the top
three network interconnections points in the world. The property
was 90% leased as of December 2019, compared to 86% leased as of
December 2017 and 92% at securitization. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and 1.59X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 17.6% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the RHP Portfolio IV Loan ($50.6 million --
6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of five
manufactured housing communities located across four states:
Florida (2), Kansas (1), New York (1), and Utah (1). The property
was acquired by the sponsor in 2013 as part of a 35-property
portfolio. The sponsor, RHP Properties, is one of the largest
operators of manufactured housing communities in the United States.
The portfolio was 98% leased as of December 2019, compared to 84%
leased as of December 2018 and 83% at securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
107% and 0.93X at last review.

The second largest loan is the RHP Portfolio V Loan ($49.2 million
-- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of seven
manufactured housing communities located across four states:
Florida (2), Kansas (1), New York (1), and Utah (3). The property
was acquired by the sponsor in 2013 as part of a 35-property
portfolio. The sponsor is also RHP Properties. The portfolio was
78% leased as of March 2020, compared to 79% in December 2018 and
at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and
0.94X, respectively, compared to 105% and 0.93X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Brighton Town Square Loan ($40.4
million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 328,000 SF
mixed-use power center located in Brighton, Michigan, approximately
20 miles north of Ann Arbor and 45 miles northwest of Detroit. The
property is comprised of a 236,000 SF retail component and 91,500
SF office component. Major tenants at the property include Home
Depot, MJR Theatre, and the University of Michigan, which operates
a medical office at the property. Other major tenants include
Staples, Party City, and KeyBank. The collateral is also
shadow-anchored by a Target. The property was 99% leased as of
December 2019, the same in December 2018 and 94% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 1.06X, respectively,
compared to 101% and 1.05X at last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to B3(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on ten classes,
confirmed the rating on one class and downgraded the ratings on two
classes in COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE6, as follows:

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PEZ**, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2019 Affirmed A1
(sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

** Reflects exchangeable classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed and the ratings on
one P&I class, Cl. D, was confirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes, Cl. E and Cl. F, were downgraded
due to a decline in pool performance, driven primarily by the
decline in performance of a regional mall, The Avenues Mall,
representing 12.1% of the pool.

The ratings on two interest only (IO) classes were affirmed based
on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

The ratings on one exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ, was affirmed based
on the credit quality of its referenced exchangeable classes.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in US economic activity in the second quarter and a
gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However, that
outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their economies
while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge
in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to $908 million
from $1.50 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 73.4% of the pool. Nine loans,
constituting 6.6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

As of the June 2020 remittance report, loans representing 92.4%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 5.5% were delinquent at 30 days and 2.1% were delinquent
at 60 days or more.

Nine loans, constituting 43.9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a minimal
realized loss to the trust. There are currently no loans in special
servicing. However, Moody's has assumed a high default probability
for two poorly performing loans, constituting 4.2% of the pool, and
has estimated an aggregate loss of $10.7 million (28% expected on
average) from these troubled loans. The loans are secured by retail
and hotel properties, located in Yorba Linda, CA and Lubbock, TX,
respectively. Both loans are on the servicer's watchlist.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 93% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 91% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 24% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.94X and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.89X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 35.6% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Federal Center Plaza Loan ($130.0 million
-- 14.3% of the pool), which is secured by two adjacent office
buildings totaling 725,000 square feet (SF) in Washington, DC. The
property is well-located between the US Capitol and Washington
Monument, two blocks from two separate metro stations (Federal
Center SW and L'Enfant Plaza). The property was 95% leased as of
March 2020, compared to 87% leased as of March 2018, compared to
94% as of December 2016. The property's largest tenants include
federal government agencies as the largest tenants with a
significant near term lease rollover risk from the GSA (Department
of State) (42% of the NRA), which has a lease expiration date in
August 2020 and Federal Emergency Management Agency (48% of the
NRA), which has a lease expiration date in January 2021. A cash
flow sweep period is in effect and the servicer has collected $15
million in this reserve account (the capped amount of the cash flow
sweep). Due to the significant tenant concentration at the
property, Moody's value incorporated a partial Lit/Dark analysis.
The loan is the interest only for the entire 10-year term. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.21X, respectively.

The second largest loan is The Avenues Loan ($110.0 million --
12.1% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 599,000 SF
retail component of a 1.1 million SF super-regional mall in
Jacksonville, Florida. The mall is anchored by Dillard's (not part
of the collateral), Belk (not part of the collateral), J.C Penny
(not part of the collateral) and Sears. Sears (121,000 SF) closed
its store in December 2019. The collateral was 80% leased as of
December 2019, compared to 87% as of December 2018. Inline
occupancy was 70% as of June 2019 rent roll, compared to 81% as of
March 2018. Without the Sears tenant, the current occupancy is 59%.
Property performance has deteriorated since securitization, and the
2019 NOI was 11% lower than in 2018 and 16% lower from
securitization levels primarily due to declining rental revenues.
The loan is interest only for its entire term and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 101%
and 1.10X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Paramount Plaza Loan ($83.1 million
-- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by two 21-story, Class B
office buildings connected by a shared parking garage. The property
is located within the Mid-Wilshire submarket of Los Angeles,
California, approximately ten miles from LAX airport. As of
September 2019, the property was 61% leased, compared to 62% in
June 2018. Despite the low occupancy, property performance has been
stable and the 2019 NOI was above levels at securitization. The
loan has amortized 13% since securitization and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 101% and
1.02X at the last review.


COMM 2013-GAM: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of COMM 2013-GAM Mortgage
Trust.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2013-GAM Mortgage Trust

Class A-1 12624UAA2; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 12624UAC8; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 12624UAJ3;   LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 12624UAL8;   LT Asf Affirmed;    previously at Asf

Class D 12624UAN4;   LT BBBsf Affirmed;  previously at BBBsf

Class E 12624UAQ7;   LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class F 12624UAS3;   LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class X-A 12624UAE4; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Decline in Physical Occupancy; Stable Collateral Net Cash Flow:
Physical occupancy has declined to 86% from 91.3% at the prior
review, 97.8% at March 2019, 99.1% at March 2018, and 97.9% at
March 2017. The decline is mainly due to the departure of Kohl's in
April 2019, who continues to pay rent as their lease expires in
2031 and JCPenney plans to vacate after the liquidation sale which
was postponed. The servicer reported TTM March 2020 and YE 2019 net
cash flow (NCF) debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) were 1.82x,
compared to 1.85x at YE2018, 1.81x at YE 2017, 1.80x at YE 2016 and
1.71x at issuance. Fitch's analysis includes an additional vacancy
assumption to address the departure of Kohl's and JCPenney, lease
rollover through 2021, and potential performance decline from the
coronavirus pandemic. The Fitch NCF was $26.5 million as of YE 2019
compared with $27.9 million at issuance.

Specially Serviced Transfer; Expected to Return to Master: The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2020 due to imminent
monetary default as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The
special servicer was considering the borrowers request for relief,
but the borrower terminated the forbearance request, and the loan
is being returned to the master servicer.

Declining inline Sales: Comparable in-line sales were $604 psf (as
of TTM March 2020, compared with $650 psf as of TTM March 2019,
$635 psf as of TTM March 2018, $611 psf at March 2017, $650 psf at
YE 2015, $580 psf at YE 2014 and $501 psf at issuance. The servicer
provided sales report had several tenants with active leases that
did not report sales and have been omitted from the in-line sales
figures. Macy's sales increased slightly to $186 psf from $177 psf
as of TTM September 2018 but down from $204 psf at YE 2015 and $225
psf at issuance, while Macy's Men's & Furniture increased slightly
to $143 psf from $140 psf as of TTM September 2018 but has declined
from $173 psf at issuance. BJ's Wholesale Club did not report March
2020 sales, and the latest available sales are $899 psf from
September 2018, which compares to $896 psf at YE 2015 and $928 psf
at issuance. Sears also did not report March 2020 sales but were
$241 psf at September 2018 compared to $242 psf at issuance.

Vulnerability to Coronavirus: The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect
potential refinance concerns at the upcoming maturity in February
2021 and potential future downgrades should performance continue to
be negatively affected by the coronavirus pandemic. If the property
reverts back to their pre-pandemic performance, the ratings would
be affirmed and Outlooks revised to Stable. Fitch will continue to
monitor any declines in loan performance and will adjust ratings
and Outlooks accordingly.

Single Asset Concentration: The Green Acres Mall loan is an
eight-year amortizing, fixed rate loan (3.4325%) secured by a
1,811,441-sf enclosed two-level regional mall located in a densely
populated area on Sunrise Highway in Valley Stream, NY. The mall
was built in 1956 and has been expanded several times with the
latest in 2007 and 2015. The transaction is secured by the single
property and, therefore, is more susceptible to single-event risk
related to the market, sponsor, or the largest tenants occupying
the property. The loan sponsor is an entity controlled by Macerich
Company, an experienced owner of regional shopping centers and
malls. The sponsor acquired the property in January 2013 at a cost
of $507 million.

Fitch Leverage: The Fitch DSCR and LTV for the asset is 1.08x and
82.1%, respectively. The Fitch debt yield is 9.6%.

Amortization: The loan will amortize by $60 million over the
eight-year loan term. As of the June 2020 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate certificate balance has paid down approximately
15.4% as a result of scheduled amortization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes A-1 through D remain Stable due
to relatively stable performance since issuance and continued
amortization. The Negative Outlooks on classes E and F reflect
refinancing concerns with the upcoming loan maturity in February
2021 as well as expected lack of financing due to the economic
slowdown stemming from the coronavirus pandemic and asset type.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades are not expected, however factors that lead to upgrades
would include stable to improved asset performance coupled with
continued paydown. Upgrades to classes B through D may occur with
significant improved performance of the underlying asset and cash
flow. Upgrades of classes E and F are not likely in the near term
and only if the performance of the asset is stable and returns to
pre-pandemic levels.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include a sustained decline in
occupancy and/or property cash flow or loan default. Downgrades to
the senior classes, A-1, A-2, X-A, and B are not likely due to the
position in the capital structure, amortization and the high CE,
but may occur at 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' should interest shortfalls be
incurred. A downgrade to classes C or D is possible should the loan
default or transfer back to special servicing. Downgrades to
classes E and F, would occur should occupancy continues to decline
or the performance is not expected to improve. The Negative Rating
Outlooks on classes E and F may be revised back to Stable if
performance stabilizes and returns to pre-pandemic levels.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook or
those with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded one or more
categories.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


CSAIL 2018-C12: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. G-RR Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of CSAIL 2018-CX12
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2018-CX12. Fitch also revised outlooks on five
classes to Stable from Negative.

RATING ACTIONS

CSAIL 2018-CX12

Class A-1 12595XAQ6;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 12595XAR4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 12595XAS2;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 12595XAT0;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 12595XAX1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 12595XAU7; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 12595XAY9;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 12595XAZ6;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 12595XAC7;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E-RR 12595XAE3; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class F-RR 12595XAG8; LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class G-RR 12595XAJ2; LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

Class X-A 12595XAV5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 12595XAW3;  LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class X-D 12595XAA1;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable to Improved Performance: While loss expectations have
increased since issuance, overall pool performance is generally
stable. The pool's weighted-average (WA) servicer-reported NOI
represents a 2.6% improvement over the issuance figures. Despite
this, seven loans (12.3% of the pool) have been flagged as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOC), including six loans (11.7% of the pool)
which have been modified and are now in forbearance.

Minimal Changes in Credit Enhancement (CE): There has been minimal
change to CE since issuance. As of the June 2020 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down by 0.84% to $667
million from $673 million at issuance. All original 41 loans remain
in the pool. Fourteen loans (47.1% of the pool) are full-term, IO
and 12 loans (24.5%) have a partial-term, IO component, of which
six loans (12.9%) have not yet begun amortizing.

Coronavirus Exposure: The social and market disruption caused by
the coronavirus pandemic is the main driver for Negative Outlooks
on classes E-RR, F-RR and G-RR. The hotel sector as a whole is
expected to experience significant declines in RevPAR in the near
term due to a significant slow-down in travel. Additionally, retail
properties are expected to face hardship as tenants may not be able
to pay rent or as leases with upcoming expiration dates are not
renewed given that many retailers are closed for business or have
drastically reduced operating hours.

Although the transaction has a high hotel and retail concentration,
the loan performance prior to the pandemic was relatively strong.
Within the pool, there are 11 non-defeased loans secured by hotel
properties (26.8% of pool), with a WA NOI DSCR of 2.33x. On
average, these hotel loans could withstand a 56% decline in NOI
before the actual DSCR would fall below 1.0x coverage. There are 12
non-defeased loans secured by retail properties (36.6%), with a WA
NOI DSCR of 2.28x. On average, these retail loans could withstand a
49% decline in NOI before the actual DSCR would fall below 1.0x
coverage.

Fitch's base case analysis included additional stresses to eight
hotel loans (21.7% of the pool), six retail loans (10.8% of the
pool), and one student housing loan (2.9% of the pool) related to
ongoing performance concerns in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through D reflect the overall
stable performance of the pool and expected continued amortization.
The Negative Outlooks on classes E-RR through G-RR reflect Fitch's
increased loss expectations since issuance, which are largely
attributable to performance concerns related to the coronavirus
pandemic.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of classes B and C would likely occur with a significant
improvement in CE and/or defeasance; however, increased
concentrations, further underperformance of FLOCs or new
delinquencies/defaults may prevent this. An upgrade to class D
would be limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the
potential for future concentration. Classes would not be upgraded
above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls.
Upgrades to classes E-RR, F-RR and G-RR are not likely due to
actual or expected performance decline for FLOCs, but could occur
if performance of the FLOCs improves, the current credit
environment stabilizes and if there is an increase in CE.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming loans. Downgrades to the classes rated
'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to the position in the
capital structure, but may occur at 'AAAsf' or 'AA-sf' should
interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades of classes C and D are
possible should Fitch's projected losses increase due to declined
pool performance or loan defaults. Downgrades of classes E-RR,
F-RR, and G-RR are possible should the performance of the FLOCs
fail to stabilize or decline further.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021;
should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Outlook or those
with Negative Outlooks will be downgraded one or more categories.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


CSMC 2019-ICE4: DBRS Assigns B(High) Rating on Class HRR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-ICE4 issued by CSMC 2019-ICE4 as
follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 16, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The collateral for the CSMC 2019-ICE4 mortgage trust is a $2.35
billion first-lien mortgage loan on 64 industrial cold storage and
distribution facilities (and certain equipment used at such
facilities) in 22 states. There is more than 17.7 million square
feet (sf) of storage space, of which 14.1 million sf and 527.1
million cubic feet (MMcf) is temperature-controlled space.

Forty-six of the properties were previously securitized in the COLD
2017-ICE3 transaction (April 2017). The CSMC 2019-ICE4 transaction
included 18 additional properties encompassing 2.3 million sf of
temperature-controlled space owned by the sponsor that were not
part of the prior transaction. The sponsor will use the loan
proceeds to retire the COLD 2017-ICE3 debt of $1.3 billion and the
existing debt on 10 of the 18 additional assets totaling $157
million. On February 25, 2019, Lineage Logistics, LLC (Lineage)
announced it had entered into an agreement to acquire Preferred
Freezer Services, LLC, and a temperature-controlled warehouse
provider with 39 facilities in the U.S. Postmerger, Lineage became
the largest cold storage warehouse operator in the U.S. with 1.3
billion cubic feet, followed by Americold Logistics, LLC with 924
MMcf.

Column Financial, Inc.; Bank of America, N.A. (rated AA (low) with
a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar); and Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A.
originated the five-year (two years plus three successive one-year
extensions) loan that pays floating-rate interest of Libor plus
1.500% on an interest-only basis through the initial maturity of
the loan. The guarantor also has certain corporate debt under a
$747.25 million, first-lien term loan for which Credit Suisse AG
(rated "A" with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) is the
administrative agent and a $300 million asset-backed revolving loan
facility in place for which JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (rated AA
with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) is the administrative
agent. The term loan and revolver are not collateralized by any of
the trust assets; rather, they are corporate obligations of the
borrower.

The borrowers purchased interest rate cap protection for the trust
mortgage at a strike price of 5.00%, which DBRS Morningstar used
for the Libor component of the interest rate for its debt service
calculations. The borrowers were also required to obtain an
interest rate cap with a strike rate that would result in a debt
service coverage ratio of at least 1.10 times during any extension
period. The entire $2.35 billion mortgage loan was securitized in
this transaction.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
re-analyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its
consistency with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial
Real Estate Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure
was $226,623,937 million and a cap rate of 8.75% was applied,
resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of $2.6 billion, a variance
of -21.8% from the appraised value at issuance of $3.3 billion. The
DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 90.7%, as compared with
the LTV on the issuance appraised value of 70.9%. The NCF figure
applied as part of the analysis represents a -7.6% variance from
the Issuer's NCF.

The cap rate applied is at the middle of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for industrial properties, reflective
of the subject's cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals. In addition, the 8.75% cap rate applied is above the
implied cap rate of 7.4% based on the Issuer's underwritten NCF and
appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 7.5%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals. DBRS Morningstar also made other positive adjustments
to account for the portfolio's geographic diversity. DBRS
Morningstar has a favorable long-term outlook for cold storage,
especially given the increased demand for the property type from
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and increased
popularity of online grocery shopping.

Additionally, DBRS Morningstar made the following negative
adjustments. DBRS Morningstar made negative adjustments to account
for the loan's partial pro rata release structure, with respect to
voluntary principal prepayments, up to the free prepayment amount
of $470.0 million. DBRS Morningstar reduced its LTV attachments at
the AAA category by 1.98% and then tapered the decrease to 1.15% at
A (high). DBRS Morningstar also made a negative adjustment to
account for the impact of the loan's property release structure
(115% release premium for first 20% of the original loan amount),
and deducted 25 basis points from its LTV attachments to account
for this.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DBGS 2018-BIOD: DBRS Assigns B (low) Rating on Class HRR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-BIOD issued by DBGS 2018-BIOD Mortgage
Trust (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 16, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The Issuer used a $725.0 million senior note combined with $140
million of senior mezzanine debt and $95.0 million of junior
mezzanine debt at issuance to refinance $714.6 million of existing
debt, return approximately $216.9 million of equity to the sponsor,
fund upfront reserves of approximately $15.4 million, and cover
closing costs of approximately $13.0 million. The loan is sponsored
by an affiliate of The Blackstone Group Inc. Most of the properties
secured in this transaction comprise a subset of a portfolio that
an affiliate of the sponsor acquired from BioMed Realty Trust, Inc.
in January 2016. The loan had a two-year initial term with five
one-year extension options. The initial maturity date was scheduled
to occur in May 2020, but the borrower exercised the first
extension option. The transaction at issuance was secured by 18
office/lab buildings, three office buildings, and one parking
garage. The loan is structured with a partial pro
rata/sequential-pay structure, as the loan allows for pro rata
paydowns for the first 25.0% of the unpaid principal balance. The
underlying release provisions convey the prepayment premium for the
release of individual assets at 105.0% for the first 25.0% of the
senior loan balance and 110.0% thereafter.

Since issuance, two office/lab properties located in
Colorado—Walnut Street and Trade Centre Avenue—have been
released, collectively representing 5.4% of the issuance allocated
loan amount (ALA) and 6.1% of the issuance aggregate individual
properties' appraised value. The current senior note balance of
$672.9 million reflects the released properties. At issuance, the
appraiser assumed a premium on the individual asset values to
account for the $1.27 billion value of the portfolio. The portfolio
value resulted in an LTV of 57.0%. With the paydowns in the
portfolio, the concluded LTV is 57.8% on the first mortgage, which
includes no premium for the portfolio value. The LTV at issuance,
not accounting for any portfolio premium, was 58.7%.

The loan is currently secured by 16 office/lab buildings, three
office buildings, and one parking garage located across California,
Washington, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.
The loan benefits from its collateral concentration within the
top-tier life science clusters: Boston-Cambridge and the San
Francisco Bay Area, together representing 49.7% of the current ALA.
A CB Richard Ellis 2019 U.S. Life Science Cluster report noted that
San Diego and New Jersey are second-tier primary life science
markets in the United States relative to the two top-tier markets
and Seattle is an emerging life science hub. The loan is currently
secured by collateral with ALA equating to a 28.6% concentration in
Seattle, a 14.4% concentration in San Diego, and a 1.9%
concentration in New Jersey.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
re-analyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its
consistency with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial
Real Estate Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure
was $52.8 million and a cap rate of 7.28% was applied, resulting in
a DBRS Morningstar Value of $726.0 million, a variance of -37.6%
from the remaining collateral's issuance appraised value of $1.16
billion. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 92.7% on the
current senior mortgage balance compared with the LTV of 57.8% on
the remaining collateral issuance appraised values. On the total
current debt stack inclusive of the mezzanine debt, the DBRS
Morningstar Value represents an LTV of 123.3% compared with the
remaining collateral issuance appraised values LTV of 76.9%. The
NCF figure applied as part of the analysis represents a -16.8%
variance from the Issuer's issuance NCF assumptions for the
remaining collateral, primarily driven by vacancy and leasing
costs. As of the trailing 12-month period ending September 2019,
the servicer reported a NCF figure of $62.4 million, a -15.3%
variance from the DBRS Morningstar NCF figure, primarily a factor
of vacancy and leasing costs.

The cap rate applied is at the lower end of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflective of
the location within life science markets and property quality. In
addition, the 7.28% cap rate applied is well above the implied cap
rate of 5.46% based on the Issuer's issuance underwritten NCF
assumptions for the remaining collateral and the remaining
collateral's issuance appraised values.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 3.5%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals. DBRS Morningstar also made other negative adjustments
to account for certain release provisions and pro rata paydown
structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DBGS MORTGAGE 2019-1735: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates issued by DBGS 2019-1735 Mortgage Trust (the Issuer)
as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 24, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The $311.4 million ($242 per square foot (psf)) first-lien mortgage
loan is secured by the fee simple interest in a 1.3 million sf
(including approximately 44,000 sf of retail space) Class A office
building in Center City, Philadelphia. Deutsche Bank AG, New York
Branch and Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company originated the 10-year
fixed-rate, interest-only (IO) loan, which has an interest rate of
4.2129%. The sponsor, Silverstein Properties, Inc. (Silverstein),
used loan proceeds along with $164.2 million of cash equity to
acquire the asset for a $451.6 million purchase price. Silverstein
is a privately held real estate development and management firm
based in New York City with a portfolio of more than 13.0 million
sf of office, residential, and retail properties. Some of
Silverstein's major projects include the new World Trade Center, 30
Park Place, 120 Wall Street, and the Equitable Building, among
others. The entire mortgage loan was securitized in the
transaction.

Built in 1990, the building is located on 18th Street between
Market Street and JFK Boulevard with direct concourse access to
SEPTA's Suburban Station and a 176-space parking garage. The
subject property is in the Market Street West submarket, which is
the largest office submarket in Philadelphia with approximately 39
million sf of office space. The submarket reported a vacancy of
8.2% and average rental rate of $32.38 psf gross. The collateral
achieves higher rental rates as it is considered one of the top two
multitenant office buildings in the Philadelphia central business
district (CBD), along with One Liberty Place. The DBRS Morningstar
average gross rent for the property is $37.50 psf.

Currently 92.2% leased to 75 tenants, the property benefits from
institutional tenancy with nearly half of the building leased to
investment-grade tenants or major law firms, including Ballard
Spahr LLP (Ballard Spahr; 14.9% of net rentable area (NRA)), Hogan
Lovells (2.7% of NRA), and Ogletree Deakins (1.2% of NRA). Large
corporate tenants include Willis Towers Watson (7.6% of NRA);
Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC (Brandywine; 5.2% of
NRA); The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (3.7% of NRA); The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (1.7% of NRA); and JPMorgan Chase & Co.
(0.8% of NRA; rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar), among others. Furthermore, three of the 10-largest
tenants, totaling 25.9% of the NRA, are headquartered at 1735
Market Street, including Ballard Spahr, Montgomery McCracken Walker
& Rhoads LLP, and Brandywine.

The largest concentration of lease rollover is not until 2028 when
11.4% of the space is expected to roll. Over the 10-year loan term,
approximately half of the space is scheduled to expire; however,
the property has proven successful at attracting and retaining
institutional-quality tenants. Beginning in 2015, the building
suffered the loss or downsizing of three major tenants, which
reduced occupancy to approximately 65.0%. This included the
downsizing of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and Sunoco LP
as well as the loss of FMC Corporation, which vacated the property
for its build-to-suit headquarters at Cira Centre South/FMC Tower.
Since then, the previous owner has increased the property's
occupancy to 92.0%—a testament to the overall desirability of
1735 Market Street.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
reanalyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its consistency
with the “DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate
Property Analysis Criteria.” The resulting NCF figure was $22.5
million and a cap rate of 6.75% was applied, resulting in a DBRS
Morningstar Value of $334 million, a variance of -24.2% from the
appraised value at issuance of $440.3 million. The DBRS Morningstar
Value implies an LTV of 93.2% compared with the LTV of 70.7% on the
appraised value at issuance. The NCF figure DBRS Morningstar
applied as part of the analysis represents a -15.8% variance from
the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven by tenant improvements/leasing
commissions, vacancy, and in-place base rent.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the lower end of the
DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflecting
the subject property's location within the Philadelphia CBD, strong
sponsorship, and institutional-quality tenant roster. In addition,
the 6.75% cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is slightly higher than
the implied cap rate of 6.10% based on the Issuer's underwritten
NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 2.50%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Class X is an IO certificate that references a single rated tranche
or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DBUBS 2011-LC2: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight
classes, confirmed the rating on one class and downgraded the
ratings on three classes in DBUBS 2011-LC2 Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2011-LC2:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-1C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. FX*, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Reflects interest-only classes

The ratings on seven principal and interest classes were affirmed
and one P&I class was confirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio and the transaction's Herfindahl Index,
are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on one P&I class, Cl. F, was downgraded due to
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

The ratings on two IO classes, Cl. X-B and Cl. FX, were downgraded
based on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in US economic activity in the second quarter and a
gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However, that
outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their economies
while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge
in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 44% to $1.21 billion
from $2.14 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 41 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 55% of the pool. One loan, constituting 2%
of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit assessment.
Fourteen loans, constituting 31% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of eight, compared to nine at Moody's last review.

As of the June 12, 2020 remittance report, loans representing 97%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments and 2% were beyond their grace period but less than 30
days delinquent.

Seven loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $7.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 91%).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for three
poorly performing loans, constituting 10% of the pool, and has
estimated an aggregate loss of $28.4 million (a 24% expected loss
on average) from these troubled loans. The troubled loans are
secured by a retail property in Chicago, Illinois; a full service
hotel in Houston, Texas and an office property in Shreveport,
Louisiana.

Moody's received full year 2018 and 2019 operating results for 93%
and 95% of the pool, respectively (excluding specially serviced and
defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 82%, the
same as at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.27X,
respectively, compared to 1.47X and 1.25X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Angelica
Portfolio Loan ($19.9 million -- 1.6% of the pool), , which is
secured by 12 industrial facilities located in eight states. The
properties are 100% occupied by Angelica Corporation under a
20-year lease, expiring in January 2030. The average age of the
collateral is 25 years. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's
utilized a lit/dark analysis on this portfolio. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.71X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 36% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the US Steel Tower Loan ($188.7 million -- 15.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a 64-story, Class A office building
located in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The property serves
as the headquarters for US Steel and the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center. The property was 84% leased as of December 2019,
compared to 87% as of September 2017. Property performance has
improved, and the loan has amortized 14% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.36X, respectively,
compared to 75% and 1.33X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Willowbrook Mall Loan ($181.5
million -- 15.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 400,00 square
foot (SF) portion of a 1.5 million SF regional mall located in
Houston, Texas. Anchors include Macy's, Macy's Men and Furniture
and J.C. Penney. All anchors own their own improvements and are not
part of the collateral. Non-collateral anchor Sears closed in 2020.
Total property occupancy was 100% as of December 2019, up from 99%
as of September 2017. The property has continued to report strong
tenant sales with comparable in-line tenants less than 10,000 SF of
$674 per square foot for the trailing twelve-month period ending
April 2019, up from $641 per square foot for the TTM period ending
September 2018. Additionally, 2019 NOI has increased by more than
20% since securitization. The loan has amortized nearly 15% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 79% and 1.19X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Barneys Chicago Loan ($69.4 million
-- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 6-story retail property
located in Chicago, Illinois. The property was constructed in 2009
and is located on East Oak Street, 3 blocks west of Michigan Ave in
downtown Chicago. The property was built-to-suit for Barney's and
served as the flagship store for Barneys in Chicago. Barneys filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August 2019 and announced that they
will be closing this location. Barneys leased 95% of the NRA
through 2024 and represented approximately 86% of the 2018 base
rental revenue. The remainder of the square footage and base rent
is from Citibank, which recently renewed their lease through 2025.
If Barney's were to cease paying rent, the property's cash flow
would no longer cover its loan debt service payments and, in the
absence of a replacement tenant, would reduce the loan's ability to
refinance at loan maturity in May 2021. The property benefits from
its premier location in a high-density trade area within the Gold
Coast neighborhood of Chicago. However, finding a replacement
tenant for the higher floors could pose a challenge and potential
need for redevelopment to other uses. The loan benefits from
amortization and has amortized 13% since securitization. Moody's
has identified this loan as a troubled loan due to the heightened
risk in connection with the recent tenant departure announcement.


DBUBS 2017-BRBK: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating on Class HRR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-BRBK issued by DBUBS 2017-BRBK Mortgage
Trust (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class XA at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 24, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The collateral for the transaction is a $530.0 million portion of a
$660.0 million first-lien mortgage loan on a portfolio of four
Class A office properties totaling 2.1 million square feet (sf).
Through one or more affiliates, The Blackstone Group Inc. acquired
an 80.0% interest in each property in the portfolio from certain
separate joint ventures comprising Worthe Real Estate Group Inc.
(Worthe) affiliates and certain third parties In connection with
the acquisition. Through one of more affiliates, Worthe acquired or
retained the remaining 20.0% interest in each property in the
portfolio. Worthe operates media and technology campuses in Los
Angeles with an existing portfolio comprising 35 assets totaling
approximately 5.4 million sf. Worthe is the largest owner and
manager of real estate by square footage in Burbank, California,
and manages all four assets in the portfolio.

The four properties comprising the portfolio include three office
towers in Burbank's Media District known as The Pointe, 3800
Alameda, and Central Park as well as a five-building creative
office campus, the Media Studios, four miles north of the Media
District adjacent to the Hollywood Burbank Airport. Historically,
the properties have had high occupancy levels, although the newest
building, The Pointe, was delivered vacant in 2009 and the
ownership entity decided to strategically delay lease-up until more
favorable market terms prevailed. The other three office properties
averaged 96.0% occupancy levels over the most recent 10 years and
current occupancy for all properties, including The Pointe, is
92.4% since issuance. The tenant roster provides some granularity
to the transaction, but nearly all are in the media and
entertainment industry.

Burbank is in the entertainment industry's Thirty Mile Zone, which
favors production and related activities with established union
wage scales and workplace rules implemented by the media and
entertainment industry unions more than 100 years ago, making
production more expensive and difficult outside the designated
area. Originally known as the Studio Zone, original union
restrictions applied only to a six-mile radius but extended in 1970
to a 30-mile radius from the intersection of West Beverly Boulevard
and North La Cienega Boulevard in Los Angeles. Burbank's location
along the boundary of the original six-mile Studio Zone resulted in
the largest concentration of television and motion picture studio
space in Los Angeles. Three of the industry's "Big Six"
studios—The Walt Disney Company (Disney)/The American
Broadcasting Company, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., and Comcast
Corporation/NBC Universal Media, LLC—are in Burbank's Media
District and cover more than 640 acres with 72 soundstages totaling
more than 1.0 million sf.

When analyzing the risk of the property's cash flow single-industry
dependency, DBRS Morningstar considered that investment-grade
tenants leased 61.4% of the building area at issuance, including
Disney, Time Warner's Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. and Warner
Bros., and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. As of Q3 2019, the
in-place occupancy was 93.4% compared with 92.4% at issuance,
indicating positive momentum.

DBRS Morningstar also considered portfolio rollover risk of 74.4%
of net rentable area at issuance, which will expire during the
seven-year loan term. Recognizing that rollover exposure is high,
closer consideration of the functional groups and proximity to
studio headquarters for the three-largest tenants with leases
expiring during the term should mitigate this risk. Disney occupies
the single-tenant building at 3800 Alameda and originally developed
the property in 1984, adjacent to its studio headquarters. Worthe
is Disney's largest landlord, which bought the property from Disney
in 2007 in a sale-leaseback transaction. The building is considered
a mission-critical location for Disney, which has invested over $40
million in the building's infrastructure ($98 per sf). The building
serves as Radio Disney's headquarters, the broadcasting home to the
Disney Channel and others, and as the backup location for Disney's
East Coast operations, including ESPN Inc. Because Disney's
operations are critical to the building, it has a triple-backup
power supply and a number of other features considered essential to
operations at the property.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
reanalyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its consistency
with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate
Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure was $48.3
million and a cap rate of 7.25% was applied, resulting in a DBRS
Morningstar Value of $666.6 million, a variance of -35.8% from the
appraised value at issuance of $1.04 billion. The DBRS Morningstar
Value implies an LTV of 99.0% compared with the LTV of 63.6% on the
appraised value at issuance. The NCF figure applied as part of the
analysis represents a -23.5% variance from the Issuer's NCF,
primarily driven by vacancy, step rent, and concessions. As of the
trailing 12 months ending September 2019, the servicer reported an
annualized NCF figure of $59.1, a 18.2% variance from the DBRS
Morningstar NCF figure, primarily a factor of differences in
vacancy, step rent assumptions, and concessions

DBRS Morningstar applied a cap rate at the middle end of the DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflecting the
strong entertainment market, the investment-grade tenancy, and
strong tenant investment. In addition, the 7.25% cap rate DBRS
Morningstar applied is above the implied cap rate of 6.1% based on
the Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis totaling 3.25%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Class XA is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ELMWOOD CLO V: S&P Rates Class E Notes 'BB- (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Elmwood CLO V
Ltd./Elmwood CLO V LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by primarily
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

  -- The diversification of the collateral pool;

  -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

  -- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

  -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution
of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is
that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions
but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is
widely available, which may not occur until the second half of
2021. S&P is using this assumption in assessing the economic and
credit implications associated with the pandemic. As the situation
evolves, the rating agency will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Elmwood CLO V Ltd./Elmwood CLO V LLC

  Class                  Rating       Amount
                                  (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)    239.500
  A-2                    AAA (sf)     12.500
  B                      AA (sf)      49.000
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)       28.000
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)    20.000
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)     13.000
  Subordinated notes     NR           30.400

NR--Not rated.


FREDDIE MAC 2020-2: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on Cl. M Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned a provisional rating to the following
Mortgage-Backed Security, Series 2020-2 to be issued by Freddie Mac
Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2020-2 (the Trust):

-- $84.1 million Class M at B (low) (sf)

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned,
reperforming first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the certificates, which are backed by 9,702 loans with
a total principal balance of $1,572,659,156 as of the Cut-Off
Date.

The mortgage loans were either purchased by Freddie Mac from
securitized Freddie Mac Participation Certificates or retained by
Freddie Mac in whole-loan form since their acquisition. The loans
are currently held in Freddie Mac's retained portfolio and will be
deposited into the Trust on the Closing Date.

The loans are approximately 157 months seasoned and most loans have
been modified (97.5%). Each modified mortgage loan was modified
under either government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) or GSE non-HAMP modification programs.
Within the pool, 3,018 mortgages have forborne principal amounts as
a result of modification, which equates to 10.7% of the total
unpaid principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. For 80.2% of the
modified loans, the modifications happened more than two years
ago.

The loans are all current as of the Cut-Off Date. Furthermore,
84.7% and 33.8% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days
delinquent for at least the past 12 months and 24 months,
respectively, under the Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency
methods. DBRS Morningstar assumed that all loans within the pool
are exempt from the Qualified Mortgage rules because of their
eligibility to be purchased by Freddie Mac.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc (the Servicer). The Servicer will not be advancing any
delinquent principal or interest on any mortgages; however, the
Servicer is obligated to advance to third parties any amounts
necessary for the preservation of mortgaged properties or real
estate owned properties that the Trust acquires through foreclosure
or a loss mitigation process.

Freddie Mac will serve as the Sponsor, Seller, and Trustee of the
transaction as well as Guarantor of the senior certificates (Class
A-IO, Class HAU, Class HA, Class HA-IO, Class HBU, Class HB, Class
HB-IO, Class HTU, Class HT, Class HT-IO, Class HV, Class HZ, Class
MAU, Class MA, Class MA-IO, Class MBU, Class MB, Class MB-IO, Class
MTU, Class MT, Class MT-IO, Class MV, Class MZ, Class M55D, Class
M55E, Class M55G, Class M55H, and Class M55I; collectively, the
Guaranteed Certificates). Wilmington Trust National Association
(Wilmington Trust; rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will serve as Trust Agent. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will serve as
the Custodian for the Trust. U.S. Bank National Association (rated
AA (high) with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will serve as
the Securities Administrator for the Trust and will also act as
Paying Agent, Registrar, Transfer Agent, and Authenticating Agent.

Freddie Mac, as the Seller, will make certain representations and
warranties (R&W) with respect to the mortgage loans. Freddie Mac
will be the only party from which the Trust may seek
indemnification (or, in certain cases, a repurchase) as a result of
a breach of R&Ws. If a breach review trigger occurs during the
warranty period, the Trust Agent, Wilmington Trust, will be
responsible for the enforcement of R&Ws. The warranty period will
only be effective through July 13, 2023 (approximately three years
from the Closing Date), for substantially all R&Ws other than the
real estate mortgage
investment conduit R&W, which will not expire.

The mortgage loans will be divided into three loan groups: Group H,
Group M, and Group M55. The Group H loans (5.7% of the pool) were
subject to step-rate modifications and had not yet reached their
final step rate as of April 30, 2020. As of the Cut-Off Date, the
borrower, while still current, has not made any payments accrued at
such final step rate. Group M loans (83.8% of the pool) and Group
M55 loans (10.5% of the pool) include loans never modified, and
loans that were subject to either fixed-rate modifications or
step-rate modifications that have reached their final step rates
and, as of the Cut-Off Date, the borrowers have made at least one
payment after such mortgage loans reached their respective final
step rates. Each Group M loan has a mortgage interest rate less
than or equal to 5.5% and has no forbearance amount or may have
forbearance amount and any mortgage interest rate. Each Group M55
loan has a mortgage interest rate greater than 5.5% and no
forbearance amount. All groups have loans in forbearance related to
the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, but are all current as
of the Cut-off-Date.

Principal and interest (P&I) on the Guaranteed Certificates will be
guaranteed by Freddie Mac. The Guaranteed Certificates will be
primarily backed by collateral from each group, respectively. The
remaining Certificates, including the subordinate, nonguaranteed,
interest-only mortgage insurance and residual Certificates, will be
cross-collateralized among the three groups.

The transaction employs a pro rata pay cash flow structure among
the senior group certificates with a sequential-pay feature among
the subordinate certificates. Certain principal proceeds can be
used to cover interest shortfalls on the rated Class M
Certificates. Senior classes benefit from P&I payments that are
guaranteed by the Guarantor, Freddie Mac; however, such guaranteed
amounts, if paid, will be reimbursed to Freddie Mac from the P&I
collections prior to any allocation to the subordinate
certificates. The senior principal distribution amounts vary
subject to the satisfaction of a step-down test. Realized losses
are allocated in reverse sequential order.

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) PANDEMIC IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

Seasoned reperforming loans (RPL) is a traditional RMBS asset class
that consists of securitizations backed by pools of seasoned
performing and reperforming residential home loans. Although
borrowers in these pools may have experienced delinquencies in the
past, the loans have been largely performing for the past six
months to 24 months since modification. Generally, these pools are
highly seasoned and contain sizable concentrations of previously
modified loans.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update,"
published on June 1, 2020), for the RPL asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
DBRS Morningstar derives such MVD assumptions through a fundamental
home price approach based on the forecasted unemployment rates and
GDP growth outlined in the moderate scenario. In addition, for
pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS Morningstar may assume
higher loss expectations above and beyond the coronavirus
assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher expected losses
on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit
enhancement.

In the RPL asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that loans with previous
delinquencies, recent modifications, or higher updated
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios may be more sensitive to economic
hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and lower
incomes. Borrowers with previous delinquencies or recent
modifications have exhibited difficulty in fulfilling payment
obligations in the past and may revert to spotty payment patterns
in the near term. Higher LTV borrowers with lower equity in their
properties generally have fewer refinance opportunities and,
therefore, slower prepayments.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the CARES Act), signed into
law on March 27, 2020, approximately 6.84% of the pool balance
(approximately 8.76%, 6.98%, and 4.67% of Group H mortgage loans,
Group M mortgage loans, and Group M55 mortgage loans, respectively,
were in an active forbearance plan) are on coronavirus-related
forbearance plans because the borrowers reported financial
hardship; however, the loans are current as of the Cut-Off Date.
These forbearance plans allow temporary payment relief, followed by
repayment once the forbearance period ends. The Servicer, is
generally offering borrowers a three-month payment forbearance
plan. Beginning in month four, the borrower can repay all the
missed mortgage payments at once or opt to go on a repayment plan
to catch up on missed payments for a maximum of six months to 12
months. During the repayment period, the borrower needs to make
regular payments and additional amounts to catch up on the missed
payments. Generally, the Servicer would attempt to contact the
borrowers before the expiration of the forbearance period and
evaluate the borrowers' capacity to repay the missed amounts. As a
result, the Servicer, in adherence to the CARES Act, may offer a
repayment plan or other forms of payment relief, such as deferrals
of unpaid P&I amounts or a loan modification, in addition to
pursuing other loss mitigation options.

For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar applied additional
assumptions to evaluate the impact of potential cash flow
disruptions on the rated tranches due to the coronavirus, stemming
from lower P&I collections. These assumptions include: (1)
Increased delinquencies for the first 12 months. (2) A
weighted-average coupon deterioration stress incorporated into the
cash flow runs.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


FREDDIE MAC 2020-HQA3: Moody's Gives (P)Ba1 Rating on M-2UB Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 23
classes of credit risk transfer notes issued by Freddie Mac STACR
REMIC 2020-HQA3. The ratings range from (P)A3 (sf) to (P)Ba1 (sf).

Freddie Mac STACR REMIC 2020-HQA3 is the third transaction of 2020
in the HQA series issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation to share the credit risk on a reference pool of
mortgages with the capital markets. The transaction is structured
as a real estate mortgage investment conduit.

The notes in STACR 2020-HQA3 receive principal payments as the
loans in the reference pool amortize or prepay. Principal payments
to the notes are paid from assets in the trust account established
from proceeds of the note's issuance. Interest payments to the
notes are paid from a combination of investment income from trust
assets, an asset of the trust known as the interest-only Q-REMIC
interest, and Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac is responsible to cover (1)
any interest owed on the notes not covered by the investment income
from the trust assets and the yield on the IO Q-REMIC interest and
(2) to reimburse the trust for any investment losses from sales of
the trust assets.

Investors have no recourse to the underlying reference pool. The
credit risk exposure of the notes depends on the actual realized
losses and modification losses incurred by the reference pool.
Freddie Mac is obligated to pay off the notes in July 2050 if any
balances remain outstanding.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Freddie Mac STACR REMIC 2020-HQA3

Cl. M-1, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2A, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AI*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AR, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AS, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AT, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AU, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2B, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BI*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BR, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BS, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BT, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BU, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2I*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2R, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2RB, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2S, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2SB, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2T, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2TB, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2U, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2UB, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
1.02%, in a baseline scenario-median is 0.78%, and reaches 5.50% at
a stress level consistent with its Aaa ratings. Moody's calculated
losses on the pool using its US Moody's Individual Loan Analysis
(MILAN) GSE model based on the loan-level collateral information as
of the cut-off date. Loan-level adjustments to the model results
included, but were not limited to, qualitative adjustments for
origination quality and third-party review scope.

Its analysis has considered the effect of the COVID-19 outbreak on
the US economy as well as the effects that the announced government
measures, put in place to contain the virus, will have on the
performance of mortgage loans. Specifically, for US RMBS, loan
performance will weaken due to the unprecedented spike in the
unemployment rate, which may limit borrowers' income and their
ability to service debt. The softening of the housing market will
reduce recoveries on defaulted loans, also a credit negative.
Furthermore, borrower assistance programs, such as forbearance, may
adversely impact scheduled cash flows to bondholders.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of US RMBS from the collapse in the
US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual recovery
in the second half of the year. However, that outcome depends on
whether governments can reopen their economies while also
safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections.

The contraction in economic activity in the second quarter was
severe and the overall recovery in the second half of the year will
be gradual. However, there are significant downside risks to its
forecasts in the event that the pandemic is not contained and
lockdowns have to be reinstated. As a result, the degree of
uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
increased its model-derived median expected losses by 15% (12.34%
for the mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely
performance deterioration resulting from of a slowdown in US
economic activity in 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

Moody's regards the COVID-19 outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Servicing practices, including tracking COVID-19-related loss
mitigation activities, may vary among servicers in the transaction.
These inconsistencies could impact reported collateral performance
and affect the timing of any breach of performance triggers and the
amount of modification losses.

Moody's may infer and extrapolate from the information provided
based on this or other transactions or industry information, or
make stressed assumptions.

Collateral Description

The reference pool consists of over one-hundred eighteen thousand
prime, fixed-rate, one- to four-unit, first-lien conforming
mortgage loans acquired by Freddie Mac. The loans were originated
on or after January 1, 2015 with a weighted average seasoning of
eight months. Each of the loans in the reference pool had a
loan-to-value ratio at origination that was greater than 80% and
less than or equal to 97%. 13.6% of the pool are loans underwritten
through Freddie Mac's Home Possible program and 98.7% of loans in
the pool are covered by mortgage insurance as of the cut-off date.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's considers Freddie Mac's overall seller management and
aggregation practices to be adequate and Moody's did not apply a
separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation quality.

Underwriting

Freddie Mac uses a delegated underwriting process to purchase
loans. Sellers are required to represent and warrant that loans are
made in accordance with negotiated terms or Freddie Mac's guide.
Numerous checks in the selling system ensures that loans with the
correct characteristics are delivered to Freddie Mac. Sellers are
required to cure, make an indemnification payment or repurchase the
loans if a material underwriting defect is discovered subject to
certain limits. In certain cases, Freddie Mac may elect to waive
the enforcements of the repurchase if an alternative such as an
indemnification payment is provided.

Quality control

Freddie Mac monitors each seller's risk exposure both on an
aggregated basis as well as by product lines. A surveillance team
reviews sellers' financials at least on an annual basis, monitors
exposure limits, risk ratings, lenders QC reports and internal
audit results and may adjust credit limits, require additional
loan/operational reviews or put the seller on a watch list, as
needed.

Home Possible loans: Approximately 13.6% of the loans by Cut-off
Date Balance were originated under the Home Possible program. The
program is designed to make responsible homeownership accessible to
low- to moderate-income homebuyers, by requiring low down payments,
lower risk-adjusted pricing, flexibility in sources of income, and,
in certain circumstances, lower than standard mortgage insurance
coverage. Home Possible loans in STACR 2020-HQA3's reference pool
have a WA FICO of 745 and WA LTV of 93.8%, versus a WA FICO of 753
and a WA LTV of 91.3% for the rest of the loans in the pool. While
its MILAN model takes into account characteristics listed on the
loan tape, such as lower FICOs and higher LTVs, there may be risks
not captured by its model due to less stringent underwriting,
including allowing more flexible sources of funds for down payment
and lower risk-adjusted pricing. Moody's applied an adjustment to
the loss levels to address the additional risks that Home Possible
loans may add to the reference pool.

Enhanced Relief Refinance

The ERR program is designed to provide refinance opportunities to
borrowers with existing Freddie Mac's mortgage loans who are
current on their mortgage payments but whose LTV ratios exceed the
maximum permitted for standard refinance products. The program is
intended to offer refinance opportunities to borrowers so they can
reduce their monthly payment. STACR 2020-HQA3's reference pool does
not include ERR loans at closing, however, transaction documents
allow for the replacement of loans in the reference pool with ERR
loans in the future. The replacement will not constitute a
prepayment on the replaced loan, credit event or a modification
event.

At closing, Moody's did not make any adjustment to its collateral
losses due to the existence of the ERR program. Moody's believes
the programs are beneficial for loans in the pool, especially
during an economic downturn when limited refinancing opportunities
would be available to borrowers with low or negative equity in
their properties. However, since such refinanced loans are likely
to have later maturities and slower prepayment rates than the rest
of the loans, the reference pool is at risk of having a high
concentration of high LTV loans at the tail of the transaction's
life. Moody's will monitor ERR loans in the reference pool and may
make an adjustment in the future if the percentage of them becomes
significant after closing.

Servicing arrangement

As master servicer, Freddie Mac has strong servicer oversight and
monitoring processes. Generally, Freddie Mac does not itself
conduct servicing activities. When a mortgage loan is sold to
Freddie Mac, the seller enters into an agreement to service the
mortgage loan for Freddie Mac in accordance with a comprehensive
servicing guide for servicers to follow. Freddie Mac monitors
primary servicer performance and compliance through its Servicer
Success Program, scorecard and servicing quality assurance group.
Freddie Mac also reviews individual loan files to identify
servicing performance gaps and trends.

Moody's considers the servicing arrangement to be adequate and
Moody's did not make any adjustments to its loss levels based on
Freddie Mac's servicer management.

Third-party Review

Moody's considers the scope of the TPR based on Freddie Mac's
acquisition and QC framework to be adequate. Moody's assessed an
adjustment to loss at a Aaa stress level due to lack of compliance
review on TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure violations.

The results and scope of the pre-securitization third-party,
loan-level review (due diligence) suggest a heavier reliance on
sellers' representations and warranties compared with private label
securitizations. The scope of the TPR, for example, is weaker
because the sample size is small (only 0.39% of the loans in
reference pool are included in the sample). To the extent that the
TPR firm classifies certain credit or valuation discrepancies as
'findings', Freddie Mac will review and may provide rebuttals to
those findings, which could result in the change of event grades by
the review firm.

The third-party due diligence scope focuses on the following:

Compliance: The diligence firm reviewed 333 loans for compliance
with federal, state and local high cost Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act regulations (297 loans were reviewed for compliance
plus 36 loans were reviewed for both credit/valuation and
compliance). None were deemed to be noncompliant.

Appraisals: The third-party diligence provider also reviewed
property valuation on 999 loans in the sample pool (963 loans were
reviewed for credit/valuation plus 36 loans were reviewed for both
credit/valuation and compliance). Seven loans received final
valuation grades of "C". The third-party diligence provider was not
able to obtain property appraisal risk reviews on 1 mortgage loan
due to properties located in Guam. The remaining 6 loans had
Appraisal Desktop with Inspections which did not support the
original appraised value within the 10% tolerance.

Credit: The third-party diligence provider reviewed credit on 999
loans in the sample pool. Five loans had final grades of "D" and
six loans had final grades of "C" due to underwriting defects.
These loans were removed from the reference pool. The results were
consistent with prior STACR transactions Moody's rated.

Data integrity: The third-party review firm analyzed the sample
pool for data calculation and comparison to the imaged file
documents. The review revealed 74 data discrepancies on 67 loans,
with 26 discrepancies related to DTI and 13 discrepancies related
to first time home buyers.

Unlike private label RMBS transactions, a review of TRID violation
was not part of Freddie Mac's due diligence scope. A lack of
transparency regarding how many loans in the transaction contain
material violations of the TRID rule is a credit negative. However,
since Moody's expects overall losses on STACR transactions owing to
TRID violations to be fairly minimal, Moody's only made a slight
qualitative adjustment to losses under a Aaa scenario. Furthermore,
lender R&Ws and the GSEs' ability to remove defective loans from
the transactions will likely mitigate some of aforementioned
concerns.

Reps & Warranties Framework

Freddie Mac is not providing loan level (R&Ws for this transaction
because the notes are a direct obligation of Freddie Mac. The
reference obligations are subject to R&Ws made by the sellers. As
such, Freddie Mac commands robust R&Ws from its seller/servicers
pertaining to all facets of the loan, including but not limited to
compliance with laws, compliance with all underwriting guidelines,
enforceability, good property condition and appraisal procedures.
Freddie Mac will be responsible for enforcing the R&Ws made by the
sellers/lenders in the reference pool. To the extent that Freddie
Mac discovers a confirmed underwriting defect or a major servicing
defect, the respective loan will be removed from the reference
pool. Since Freddie Mac retains a significant portion of the risk
in the transaction, it will likely take necessary steps to address
any breaches of R&Ws. For example, Freddie Mac undertakes quality
control reviews and servicing quality assurance reviews of small
samples of the mortgage loans that sellers deliver to Freddie Mac.
These processes are intended to determine, among other things, the
accuracy of the R&Ws made by the sellers in respect of the mortgage
loans that are sold to Freddie Mac. Moody's made no adjustments to
the transaction regarding the R&W framework.

The Notes

Moody's refers to the M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1A, B-1B, B-2A and B-2B
notes as the original notes, and the M-2, M-2R, M-2S, M-2T, M-2U,
M-2I, M-2AR, M-2AS, M-2AT, M-2AU, M-2AI, M-2BR, M-2BS, M-2BT,
M-2BU, M-2BI, M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB, M-2UB, B-1, B-2, B-1AR, B-1AI,
B-2AR and B-2AI notes as the Modifiable and Combinable REMICs
notes; together Moody's refers to them as the notes.

The M-2 notes can be exchanged for M-2A and M-2B notes, M-2R and
M-2I notes, M-2S and M-2I, M-2T and M-2I, and M-2U and M-2I notes.

The M-2A notes can be exchanged for M-2AR and M-2AI notes, M-2AS
and M-2AI notes, M-2AT and M-2AI, and M-2AU and M-2AI notes.

The M-2B notes can be exchanged for M-2BR and M-2BI notes, M-2BS
and M-2BI notes, M-2BT and M-2BI notes, and M-2BU and M-2BI notes.

Classes M-2I, M-2AI, M-2BI, B-1AI and B-2AI are interest only
tranches referencing to the notional balances of Classes M-2, M-2A,
M-2B, B-1A and B-2A, respectively.

Classes M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB and M-2UB are each an exchangeable for
two classes that are initially offered at closing. Its ratings of
M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB and M-2UB reference the rating of Class M-2B
only, disregarding the rating of M-2AI. This is the case because
Class M-2AI's cash flow represents an insignificant portion of the
overall promise. In the event Class M-2B gets written down through
losses and Class M-2AI is still outstanding, Moody's would continue
to rate Classes M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB and M-2UB consistent with Class
M-2B's last outstanding rating so long as Classes M-2RB, M-2SB,
M-2TB and M-2UB are still outstanding.

Transaction Structure

Credit enhancement in this transaction is comprised of
subordination provided by mezzanine and junior tranches. Realized
losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order starting with
the Class B-3H reference tranche.

Interest due on the notes is determined by the outstanding
principal balance and the interest rate of the notes. The interest
payment amount is the interest accrual amount of a class of notes
minus any modification loss amount allocated to such class on each
payment date, plus any modification gain amount. The modification
loss and gain amounts are calculated by taking the respective
positive and negative difference between the original accrual rate
of the loans, multiplied by the unpaid balance of the loans, and
the current accrual rate of the loans, multiplied by the
interest-bearing unpaid balance.

So long as the senior reference tranche is outstanding, and no
performance trigger event occurs, the transaction structure
allocates principal payments on a pro-rata basis between the senior
and non-senior reference tranches. Principal is then allocated
sequentially amongst the non-senior tranches.

The STACR 2020-HQA3 transaction allows for principal distribution
to subordinate notes by the supplemental subordinate reduction
amount even if performance triggers fail. The supplemental
subordinate reduction amount equals the excess of the offered
reference tranche percentage over 6.15%. The distribution of the
supplemental subordinated reduction amount would reduce principal
balances of the offered reference tranche and correspondingly limit
the credit enhancement of class A note to be always below 6.15%
plus the note balance of B-3H. This feature is beneficial to the
offered certificates.

Credit Events and Modification Events

Reference tranche write-downs occur as a result of loan level
credit events. A credit event with respect to any loan means any of
the following events: (i) a short sale with respect to the related
mortgaged property is settled, (ii) a related seriously delinquent
mortgage note is sold prior to foreclosure, (iii) the mortgaged
property that secured the related mortgage note is sold to a third
party at a foreclosure sale, (iv) an REO disposition occurs, or (v)
the related mortgage note is charged-off. As a result, the
frequency of credit events will be the same as actual loan default
frequency, and losses will impact the notes similar to that of a
typical RMBS deal.

Loans that experience credit events that are subsequently found to
have an underwriting defect, a major servicing defect or are deemed
ineligible will be subject to a reverse credit event. Reference
tranche balances will be written up for all reverse credit events
in sequential order, beginning with the most senior tranche that
has been subject to a previous write-down. In addition, the amount
of the tranche write-up will be treated as an additional principal
recovery, and will be paid to noteholders in accordance with the
cash flow waterfall.

If a loan experiences a forbearance or mortgage rate modification,
the difference between the original mortgage rate and the current
mortgage rate will be allocated to the reference tranches as a
modification loss. The Class B-3H reference tranche, which
represents 0.25% of the pool, will absorb modification losses
first. The final coupons on the notes will have an impact on the
amount of interest available to absorb modification losses from the
reference pool.

Tail Risk

Similar to prior STACR transactions, the initial subordination
level of 4% is lower than the deal's minimum credit enhancement
trigger level of 4.50%. The transaction begins by failing the
minimum credit enhancement test, leaving the subordinate tranches
locked out of unscheduled principal payments until the deal builds
an additional 0.50% subordination. STACR 2020-HQA3 does not have a
subordination floor. This is mitigated by the sequential principal
payment structure of the deal, which ensures that the credit
enhancement of the subordinate tranches is not eroded early in the
life of the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


HILDENE TRUPS 2020-3: Moody's Rates Class B Notes 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to two
classes of notes issued by Hildene TruPS Securitization 2020-3,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$117,125,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2038
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

US$28,750,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2038 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes and the Class B Notes are referred to herein,
together, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on its methodology and
considers all relevant risks particularly those associated with the
CDO's portfolio and structure.

Hildene 2020-3 is a static cash flow TruPS CDO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by a portfolio of (1) trust
preferred securities, senior notes and subordinated notes issued by
US community banks and their holding companies and (2) TruPS and
surplus notes issued by insurance companies and their holding
companies. The portfolio is 100% ramped as of the closing date.

Hildene Structured Advisors, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer.
The Manager will direct the disposition of any defaulted securities
or credit risk securities. The transaction prohibits any asset
purchases or substitutions at any time.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

The portfolio of this CDO consists of (1) TruPS, senior notes and
subordinated notes issued by 29 US community banks and (2) TruPS
and surplus notes issued by two insurance companies, the majority
of which Moody's does not rate. Moody's assesses the default
probability of bank obligors that do not have public ratings
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc, an econometric model
developed by Moody's Analytics. Moody's evaluation of the credit
risk of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2020
financial data. Moody's assesses the default probability of
insurance company obligors that do not have public ratings through
credit assessments provided by its insurance ratings team based on
the credit analysis of the underlying insurance companies' annual
statutory financial reports. Moody's assumes a fixed recovery rate
of 10% for both the bank and insurance obligations.

In addition, its analysis considered the concentrated nature of the
portfolio. There are 11 issuers that constitutes 3% or more of the
portfolio par. In its base case analysis, Moody's assumed a
two-notch downgrade for these obligors for up to 30% of the
portfolio par.

Moody's notes the portfolio WARF has deteriorated from 929 to 1106
since the assignment of the provisional ratings on July 1, 2020.
Despite the increase in the WARF, Moody's concluded that the
expected losses on all the rated notes remain consistent with the
assigned provisional ratings following the analysis of the
portfolio and the full set of structural features of the
transaction.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $175,750,000

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 1106

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) for floating assets only: 2.933%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC) for fixed assets only: 6.478%

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) for fixed to floating assets: 4.980%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC) for fixed to floating assets: 6.158%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 10.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.91 years

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors were part of the rating committee
consideration. Moody's considers the structural protections in the
transaction, the risk of an event of default, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transaction, influenced the final rating decision.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of bank and insurance assets from the
collapse in United States economic activity in the second quarter
and a gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However,
that outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their
economies while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a
further surge in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty
around its forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the
coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework,
given the substantial implications for public health and safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit assessments.
Because these are not public ratings, they are subject to
additional estimation uncertainty.

Moody's obtained a loss distribution for this CDO's portfolio by
simulating defaults using Moody's CDOROM, which used Moody's
assumptions for asset correlations and fixed recoveries in a Monte
Carlo simulation framework. Moody's then used the resulting loss
distribution, together with structural features of the CDO, as an
input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.


HOMEWARD OPPORTUNITIES 2020-2: DBRS Gives B Rating on B-2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-2 (the Certificates) to be
issued by Homeward Opportunities Fund Trust 2020-2 (HOF 2020-2 or
the Trust):

-- $372.6 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $48.9 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $61.4 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $34.9 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $36.8 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects 40.25%
of credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 32.40%,
22.55%, 16.95%, 11.05%, and 6.40% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime, expanded prime, and nonprime first-lien
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 1,241 mortgage loans with a total
principal balance of $623,530,282 as of the Cut-Off Date (June 1,
2020).

The originators for the mortgage pool are 5th Street Capital, Inc.
(24.9%), Sprout Mortgage Corporation (19.0%), Sharestates (18.3%),
and other originators that each comprises less than 15.0% of the
mortgage loans. Fay Servicing, LLC (58.2%); Specialized Loan
Servicing LLC (26.5%); Lima One Capital, LLC (12.0%); and RF Renovo
Management Company, LLC (3.3%) will service all loans within the
pool.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) Qualified Mortgage (QM) and
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers who
generally do not qualify for agency, government, or private-label
nonagency prime jumbo products for various reasons. In accordance
with the QM/ATR rules, 39.3% of the loans are designated as non-QM.
Approximately 60.6% of the loans are made to investors for business
purposes and, hence, are not subject to the QM/ATR rules. One loan
in the pool is classified as QM Safe Harbor.

Homeward Opportunities Fund LP (HOF) is the Sponsor, the initial
Controlling Holder, and the Servicing Administrator of the
transaction. HOF Asset Selector LLC serves as the Asset Selector
for securitizations sponsored by HOF and, for this transaction,
determined which mortgage loans would be included in the pool. The
Sponsor, Depositor, Asset Selector, and Servicing Administrator are
affiliates of the same entity.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA with a Negative trend
by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Master Servicer. U.S. Bank
National Association (rated AA (high) with a Negative trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will serve as Trustee, Securities Administrator,
Certificate Registrar, and Custodian.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible horizontal residual interest in
at least 5% of the Certificates (Class X Certificates) issued by
the Issuer, to satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements under
Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the Distribution date occurring in
June 2023 or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Depositor has the option to purchase all outstanding
certificates at a price equal to the outstanding class balance plus
accrued and unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts.
After such purchase, the Depositor then has the option to complete
a qualified liquidation, which requires (1) a complete liquidation
of assets within the Trust and (2) proceeds to be distributed to
the appropriate holders of regular or residual interests.

The Sponsor will have the option, but not the obligation, to
repurchase any mortgage loan (other than loans under forbearance
plan as of the Closing Date) that becomes 90 or more days
delinquent or are in real estate owned at the repurchase price (par
plus interest), provided that such repurchases in aggregate do not
exceed 10% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date.

Unlike the prior HOF non-QM securitizations, with the exception of
HOF I 2020-1, the Servicers funded advances of delinquent principal
and interest (P&I) on loans that up to 180 days delinquent, for
this transaction, the Servicers will only fund advances for 30 days
of delinquent P&I. The Servicers, however, are obligated to make
advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable
costs incurred in the course of servicing and disposing properties.
The one-month advancing mechanism may significantly increase the
probability of periodic interest shortfalls in the current economic
environment affected by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). As a
large number of borrowers seek forbearance on their mortgages in
the coming months, P&I collections may be reduced meaningfully.

Unlike the prior HOF non-QM (or traditional non-QM)
securitizations, with the exception of HOF I 2020-1, which
incorporate a pro rata feature among the senior tranches, this
transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure across the
entire capital stack. Principal proceeds can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Certificates as the more senior
Certificates are paid in full. Furthermore, excess spread can be
used to cover realized losses and prior period bond writedown
amounts first before being allocated to unpaid cap carryover
amounts to Class A-1 up to Class B-1.

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes; some will likely be affected meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside the CFPB ATR rules, which became effective on
January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans encompass the entire credit
spectrum. They range from high-FICO, high-income borrowers who opt
for interest-only or higher debt-to-income ratio mortgages, to
near-prime debtors who have had certain derogatory pay histories
but were cured more than two years ago, to nonprime borrowers whose
credit events were only recently cleared, among others. In
addition, some originators offer alternative documentation or bank
statement underwriting to self-employed borrowers in lieu of
verifying income with Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement or tax
returns. Finally, foreign nationals and real estate investor
programs, while not necessarily non-QM in nature, are often
included in non-QM pools.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update,"
published on June 1, 2020), for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
DBRS Morningstar derives such MVD assumptions through a fundamental
home price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and
GDP growth outlined in the moderate scenario. In addition, for
pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS Morningstar may assume
higher loss expectations above and beyond the coronavirus
assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher expected losses
on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit
enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that loans originated to (1)
borrowers with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers,
or (3) higher loan-to-value ratio (LTV) borrowers may be more
sensitive to economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment
rates and lower incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have
exhibited difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the
past and may revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term.
Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile
income sources, which could lead to reduced cash flows generated
from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers with lower equity in
their properties generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March
27, 2020, 11.1% of the borrowers are on forbearance plans because
the borrowers reported financial hardship related to coronavirus.
These forbearance plans allow temporary payment holidays, followed
by repayment once the forbearance period ends. The Servicer, in
collaboration with the Servicing Administrator, is generally
offering borrowers a three-month payment forbearance plan. At the
end of the forbearance period with respect to COVID-19 Mortgage
Loans, the related Servicer will seek to obtain from any mortgagor
who cannot repay related forborne amounts in full, a package of
employment, financial, and credit information. The related
Servicer, in collaboration with the Servicing Administrator, may
offer a repayment plan or other forms of payment relief, such as
deferrals of the unpaid P&I amounts or a loan modification, in
addition to pursuing other loss mitigation options.

For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar applied additional
assumptions to evaluate the impact of potential cash flow
disruptions on the rated tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I
collections and (2) limited servicing advances on delinquent P&I.
These assumptions include:

(1) Increasing delinquencies for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating
    levels for the first 12 months,
(2) Increasing delinquencies for the A (sf) and below rating
    levels for the first nine months,
(3) Applying no voluntary prepayments for the AAA (sf) and AA (sf)
    rating levels for the first 12 months, and
(4) Delaying the receipt of liquidation proceeds for the AAA (sf)
    and AA (sf) rating levels for the first 12 months.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

-- Robust loan attributes and pool composition,
-- Satisfactory third-party due diligence review,
-- Improved underwriting standards, and
-- Compliance with the ATR rules.

The transaction also includes the following challenges:

-- Borrowers on forbearance plans,
-- One-month servicer advances of delinquent P&I,
-- Representations and warranties framework,
-- Certain nonprime, non-QM, and investor loans,
-- Servicer's financial capability, and
-- High loan amounts.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


HOMEWARD OPPORTUNITIES 2020-2: S&P Rates Class B-2 Certs 'B (sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Homeward Opportunities
Fund Trust 2020-2's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, fully amortizing
residential mortgage loans (many with interest-only periods) to
prime and non-prime borrowers, generally secured by single-family
residential properties, planned-unit developments, condominiums,
two- to four- family residential properties, five- to eight-unit
multifamily residential properties and mixed-use properties. The
loans are mainly nonqualified or exempt mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement;

-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;

-- The transaction's representation and warranty (R&W) framework;

-- The transaction's geographic concentration;

-- The mortgage aggregator, Neuberger Berman Investment Advisors
LLC (Neuberger Berman); and

-- The impact that the economic stress brought on by the COVID-19
pandemic is likely to have on the performance of the mortgage
borrowers in the pool and liquidity available in the transaction.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution
of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is
that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions
but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is
widely available, which may not occur until the second half of
2021. S&P is using this assumption in assessing the economic and
credit implications associated with the pandemic. As the situation
evolves, the rating agency will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Homeward Opportunities Fund Trust 2020-2

  Class       Rating(i)               Amount ($)
  A-1         AAA (sf)               372,559,000
  A-2         AA (sf)                 48,947,000
  A-3         A+ (sf)                 61,418,000
  M-1         BBB (sf)                34,917,000
  B-1         BB (sf)                 36,789,000
  B-2         B (sf)                  28,994,000
  B-3         NR                      39,906,281
  A-IO-S      NR                        Notional(ii)
  X           NR                        Notional(ii)
  R           NR                             N/A

(i)The ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal. They do not address payment of the cap carryover
amounts.
(ii)The notional amount will equal the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans as of the first day of the related
due period.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


IMT TRUST 2017-APTS: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Class F-FX Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on 14 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from IMT Trust 2017-APTS, a U.S.
CMBS transaction. At the same time, S&P withdrew its rating on the
class XFL-CP certificates.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the principal- and interest-paying
classes because the current rating levels were in line with the
model-indicated ratings. The rating affirmations primarily reflect
the steady performance of the underlying collateral. While there
has been a deleveraging of the mortgage loan, totaling $27.8
million, due to the release of the Kingwood property, the credit
enhancement levels of the rated certificates remain unchanged due
to the transaction structure, whereby all voluntary principal
prepayments are paid pro rata to the floating-rate portion of the
trust certificates.

S&P withdrew its rating on the class XFL-CP interest-only (IO)
certificates because, according to the transaction documents, the
class is currently not accruing interest nor entitled to
distributions.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
$510.2 million commercial mortgage loan split into two pari passu
components: a $242.2 million floating-rate component and a $268.0
million seven-year fixed-rate component. The mortgage loan is
secured by the cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted first liens
on the borrowers' fee simple interests in 10 multifamily properties
(down from 11 properties at the time of issuance), totaling 4,194
units across three different states. The properties are located in
the following states: Texas (54.79% of allocated loan amount
[ALA]), Florida (27.66%), and California (17.55%).

As of the June 2020 trustee remittance report, one property
totaling 294 rooms has been released to date (the Kingwood property
noted above). S&P's property-level analysis included a
re-evaluation of the 10 multifamily properties that secures the
mortgage loan. S&P also considered the portfolio's relatively
stable servicer-reported net operating income and occupancy for the
past three years (2017 through 2019). The master servicer, Wells
Fargo Bank N.A., reported an overall debt service coverage ratio
and occupancy of 1.86x and 95.68%, respectively, on the trust
balance for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2019. The rating agency
derived its sustainable in-place net cash flow, which it divided by
a 6.69% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization rate to
determine its expected-case value. This yielded an S&P Global
Ratings' loan-to-value ratio of 99.1% on the trust balance.

According to the June 2020 trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $510.2 million,
down from $536.0 million at issuance. The loan's floating-rate
component pays a per annum interest rate of LIBOR plus 1.6%, and
currently has a maturity date of June 9, 2021, with a fully
extended maturity date in June 2022. The loan's fixed-rate
component pays a per annum interest rate of 3.51%, with a maturity
date of June 9, 2024. To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among
health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its
peak in some regions, but will remain a threat until a vaccine or
effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until
the second half of 2021. S&P is using this assumption in assessing
the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.
As the situation evolves, S&P will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  IMT Trust 2017-APTS
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

  Class     Rating
  A-FX      AAA (sf)
  B-FX      AA- (sf)
  C-FX      A- (sf)
  D-FX      BBB- (sf)
  E-FX      BB- (sf)
  F-FX      B- (sf)
  XFX-A     AAA (sf)
  A-FL      AAA (sf)
  B-FL      AA- (sf)
  C-FL      A- (sf)
  D-FL      BBB- (sf)
  E-FL      BB- (sf)
  F-FL      B- (sf)
  XFL-NCP   BBB- (sf)

  RATING WITHDRAWN

  IMT Trust 2017-APTS
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

  Class        Rating
          To        From
  XFL-CP    NR        BBB- (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on 5 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2006-LDP7 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

RATING ACTIONS

J. P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2006-LDP7

Class A-J 46628FAN1; LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class B 46628FAP6;   LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class C 46628FAQ4;   LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class D 46628FAR2;   LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class E 46628FAS0;   LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class F 46628FAU5;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class G 46628FAW1;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class H 46628FAY7;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class J 46628FBA8;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf


Class K 46628FBC4;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class L 46628FBE0;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class M 46628FBG5;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Significant REO Composition; Loss Expectations Remain High: The
pool remains highly concentrated with 13 loans; REO assets comprise
98.1% of the remaining pool balance. Given the large concentration
of REO assets, losses are considered inevitable.

The largest asset is the Westfield Centro Portfolio (76.2%). The
loan, which was originally secured by a portfolio of five retail
centers totaling 2.4 million square feet, was transferred to
special servicing in May 2014 for imminent default due to a
significant decline in portfolio cashflow as a result of a decline
in anchor and inline occupancy and increasing operating expenses.
The asset became REO in 2016. Three of the five properties were
sold between the third quarter of 2017 and first quarter of 2019.
The remaining two properties, the Westfield West Park located in
Cape Girardeau, MO and Westfield Eagle Rock located in Los Angeles,
CA, are both regional malls. Westfield West Park, which was 92%
occupied as of YE 2019, is anchored by Macy's, JCPenney and Ashley
Home Furniture. The space currently occupied by Ashley Home
Furniture has historically suffered from frequent tenant turnover.
Westfield Eagle Rock, which was 94% occupied as of year-end 2019,
is anchored by Macy's and Target. According to the special
servicer, Eagle Rock is currently listed for sale while West Park
is not currently being marketed for sale. Based on the significant
outstanding loan exposure and the most recent 2019 appraisal
valuations for these two remaining properties, significant losses
are expected.

The ultimate timing and disposition strategies of all the REO
assets remain uncertain at this time.

Minor Improvement in Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has
increased slightly since Fitch's last rating action due to the full
repayment of two loans totaling $5.4 million (1.7% of prior review
deal balance). However, future increases in credit enhancement are
expected to be minimal given the transaction's high REO composition
and adverse selection. As of the June 2020 remittance report, the
pool balance has been reduced by 92% to $314.8 million from $3.9
billion at issuance. Realized losses to date total $287.3 million
or 7.3% of the deal's original balance. Of the remaining five
performing loans, one is defeased and four are fully amortizing.

Coronavirus Exposure: Given the number of REO assets, Fitch expects
the coronavirus to have limited effect on property level
performance. However, the economic slowdown associated with the
virus may hinder the ability of several properties to re-lease and
may delay any disposition plans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The affirmations at distressed rating levels reflect the classes'
reliance on proceeds from REO assets. The disposition of these
assets is expected to generate significant losses and impact all of
the remaining classes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance. Upgrades are considered unlikely given
the pool's concentration of REO assets. Upgrades would occur if the
REO assets are liquidated with significantly higher recoveries than
expected. Upgrades to the 'Dsf' rated classes are not possible;
these classes have previously incurred principal losses.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the distressed classes are possible as losses
materialize and credit enhancement becomes eroded.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


JP MORGAN 2020-4: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-4 (the
Certificates) to be issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-4:

-- $502.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $470.3 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $396.4 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $396.4 million Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $396.4 million Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $297.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.3 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $297.3 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $99.1 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $99.1 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $99.1 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $236.2 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $236.2 million Class A-6-A at AAA (sf)
-- $236.2 million Class A-6-X at AAA (sf)
-- $160.2 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $160.2 million Class A-7-A at AAA (sf)
-- $160.2 million Class A-7-X at AAA (sf)
-- $61.1 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $61.1 million Class A-8-A at AAA (sf)
-- $61.1 million Class A-8-X at AAA (sf)
-- $29.7 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $29.7 million Class A-9-A at AAA (sf)
-- $29.7 million Class A-9-X at AAA (sf)
-- $69.4 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.4 million Class A-10-A at AAA (sf)
-- $69.4 million Class A-10-X at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-11-A at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-11-AI at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-11-B at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-11-BI at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.1 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.1 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $423.4 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $78.9 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $502.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $502.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $73.9 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.1 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-1-A at AA (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-1-X at AA (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class B-2-A at A (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class B-2-X at A (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class B-3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class B-3-X at BBB (sf)
-- $3.5 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.6 million Class B-5 at B (sf)
-- $24.3 million Class B-X at BBB (sf)
-- $1.6 million Class B-5-Y at B (sf)

Classes A-3-X, A-4-X, A-5-X, A-6-X, A-7-X, A-8-X, A-9-X, A-10-X,
A-11-X, A-11-AI, A-11-BI, A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, B-1-X, B-2-X,
B-3-X, and B-X are interest-only certificates. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-3-X, A-4, A-4-A, A-4-X, A-5, A-5-A,
A-5-X, A-6, A-7, A-7-A, A-7-X, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11-A, A-11-AI,
A-11-B, A-11-BI, A-12, A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-X-2, A-X-3, B-1,
B-2, B-3, B-X, B-5-Y, B-6-Y, and B-6-Z are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
base depositable certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, A-4-A, A-5, A-5-A, A-6, A-6-A, A-7,
A-7-A, A-8, A-8-A, A-9, A-9-A, A-10, A-10-A, A-11, A-11-A, A-11-B,
A-12, and A-13 are super-senior certificates. These classes benefit
from additional protection from the senior support certificates
(Classes A-14 and A-15) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 6.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 4.40%, 2.60%,
1.45%, 0.80%, and 0.50% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien fixed-rate prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 763 loans with a total principal
balance of $534,399,556 as of the Cut-Off Date (June 1, 2020).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of up to 30 years. Approximately 48.3%
of the loans in the pool are conforming mortgage loans
predominantly originated by United Shore Financial Services, LLC
doing business as (dba) United Wholesale Mortgage and Shore
Mortgage (USFS), loanDepot.com, LLC (loanDepot), Quicken Loans Inc.
(Quicken), and Amerihome Mortgage Company, LLC (Amerihome), which
were eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Details on
the underwriting of conforming loans can be found in the Key
Probability of Default Drivers section in the related rating
report.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are USFS (48.0%),
Quicken (22.9%), loanDepot (15.8%), and various other originators,
each comprising less than 15.0% of the mortgage loans. The mortgage
loans will be serviced or subserviced by Cenlar FSB (Cenlar;
72.6%), Quicken (22.9%), and Nationstar Mortgage LLC. dba Mr.
Cooper (Nationstar, 4.5%). For Cenlar subserviced loans, the
Servicers include Amerihome, loanDepot, and USFS. For Nationstar
subserviced mortgage loans, the Servicer is USAA Federal Savings
Bank. For this transaction, the servicing fee payable for mortgage
loans serviced by USFS is composed of three separate components:
the aggregate base servicing fee, the aggregate delinquent
servicing fee, and the aggregate additional servicing fee. These
fees vary based on the delinquency status of the related loan and
will be paid from interest collections before distribution to the
securities.

Nationstar will act as the Master Servicer. Citibank, N.A. (rated
AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as
Securities Administrator and Delaware Trustee. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (rated AA with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act
as Custodian. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will serve as the
representations and warranties (R&W) Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

As of the Cut-off Date, no borrower within the pool has entered
into a Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)-related forbearance plan with
a servicer. If a borrower requests or enters into a
coronavirus-related forbearance plan after the Cut-off Date but
prior to the Closing Date, the Mortgage Loan Seller will remove
such loan from the mortgage pool and remit the related Closing Date
substitution amount. Loans that enter a coronavirus-related
forbearance plan after the Closing Date will remain in the pool.

Coronavirus Pandemic Impact

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to raise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The prime mortgage sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that
consists of securitizations backed by pools of residential home
loans originated to borrowers with prime credit. Generally, these
borrowers have decent FICO scores, reasonable equity, and robust
income and liquid reserves.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update,
published on June 1, 2020), for the prime asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than what it previously
used. Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home
price approach based on the forecasted unemployment rates and GDP
growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the prime asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that this sector should have low
intrinsic credit risk. Within the prime asset class, loans
originated to (1) self-employed borrowers or (2) higher
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Self-employed borrowers are potentially exposed to
more volatile income sources, which could lead to reduced cash
flows generated from their businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with
lower equity in their properties, generally have fewer refinance
opportunities and therefore slower prepayments. In addition,
certain pools with elevated geographic concentrations in densely
populated urban metropolitan statistical areas may experience
additional stress from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown
of the economy.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2020-5: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on Class B-5-Y Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 55
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by J.P.
Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-5. The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to
(P)B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 944 fully-amortizing fixed-rate
mortgage loans with a total balance of $749,907,343. as of the July
1, 2020 cut-off date. The loans have original terms to maturity of
up to 30 years. Similar to prior JPMMT transactions, JPMMT 2020-5
includes agency-eligible mortgage loans (approximately 20.0% by
loan balance) underwritten to the government sponsored enterprises
guidelines, in addition to prime jumbo non-agency eligible
mortgages purchased by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., the
sponsor and mortgage loan seller, from various originators and
aggregators. United Shore Financial Services, LLC dba United
Wholesale Mortgage and Shore Mortgage originated approximately
53.0% of the mortgage loans (by balance) in the pool. All other
originators accounted for less than 10% of the pool by balance.
With respect to the mortgage loans, each originator made a
representation and warranty that the mortgage loan constitutes a
qualified mortgage under the qualified mortgage rule.

United Shore will service about 51.8% (subserviced by Cenlar, FSB),
Quicken Loans Inc. will service about 8.6%, loanDepot.com, LLC will
service about 7.7% (subserviced by Cenlar, FSB), Johnson Bank will
service about 1.6% and USAA Federal Savings Bank will service about
1.4% (subserviced by Nationstar). NewRez LLC f/k/a New Penn
Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will service
about 28.3% of the mortgage loans on behalf of JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. Shellpoint will act as interim servicer for the JPMCB mortgage
loans from the closing date until the servicing transfer date,
which is expected to occur on or about September 1, 2020 (but which
may occur after such date). After the servicing transfer date,
these mortgage loans will be serviced by JPMCB. In addition, NewRez
LLC f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC, will service approximately 0.7%
of the mortgage loans for which it will own the servicing rights.

The servicing fee for loans serviced by JPMCB (and Shellpoint,
until the servicing transfer date), loanDepot and United Shore will
be based on a step-up incentive fee structure and additional fees
for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans. Johnson Bank, NewRez,
Quicken, and USAA have a fixed fee servicing framework. Nationstar
Mortgage LLC will be the master servicer and Citibank, N.A. will be
the securities administrator and Delaware trustee. Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC will be the representations and warranties breach
reviewer. Distributions of principal and interest and loss
allocations are based on a typical shifting interest structure that
benefits from senior and subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-5

Cl. A-1, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-AI*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-B, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-BI*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Rating Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Rating Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Rating Assigned (P) Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Rating Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Rating Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Rating Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Rating Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Rating Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-X*, Rating Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
0.51% and reaches 5.54% at a stress level consistent with its Aaa
ratings.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of US RMBS from the collapse in the
US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual recovery
in the second half of the year. However, that outcome depends on
whether governments can reopen their economies while also
safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections.

The contraction in economic activity in the second quarter was
severe and the overall recovery in the second half of the year will
be gradual. However, there are significant downside risks to its
forecasts in the event that the pandemic is not contained and
lockdowns have to be reinstated. As a result, the degree of
uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. As a result,
the degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.
Moody's increased its median expected losses by 15% (10.5% for the
mean) and its Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the likely performance
deterioration resulting from of a slowdown in US economic activity
in 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

Moody's regards the COVID-19 outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Servicing practices, including tracking COVID-19-related loss
mitigation activities, may vary among servicers in the transaction.
These inconsistencies could impact reported collateral performance
and affect the timing of any breach of performance triggers,
servicer advance recoupment, the extent of servicer fees, and
additional expenses for R&W breach reviews when loans become
seriously delinquent.

Moody's may infer and extrapolate from the information provided
based on this or other transactions or industry information, or
make stressed assumptions.

Moody's based its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2020-5 is a securitization of a pool of 944 fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of $749,907,343 as
of the cut-off date, with a weighted average remaining term to
maturity of 356 months, and a WA seasoning of 4 months. The WA
current FICO score is 767 and the WA original combined
loan-to-value ratio is 69.1%. The characteristics of the loans
underlying the pool are generally comparable to those of other
JPMMT transactions backed by prime mortgage loans that Moody's has
rated.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's considers JPMMAC's aggregation platform to be adequate and
Moody's did not apply a separate loss-level adjustment for
aggregation quality. In addition to reviewing JPMMAC as an
aggregator, Moody's has also reviewed the originator(s)
contributing a significant percentage of the collateral pool (above
10%). Additionally, Moody's did not make an adjustment for
GSE-eligible loans, since those loans were underwritten in
accordance with GSE guidelines. Moody's increased its base case and
Aaa loss expectations for certain originators of non-conforming
loans where it dord not have clear insight into the underwriting
practices, quality control and credit risk management. In addition,
it reviewed the loan performance for some of these originators. It
viewed the loan performance as comparable to the GSE loans due to
consistently low delinquencies, early payment defaults and
repurchase requests.

United Shore (originator): Loans originated by United Shore have
been included in several prime jumbo securitizations that it has
rated. United Shore originated approximately 53.0% of the mortgage
loans by pool balance (59.0% for non-conforming loans and 29.0% for
conforming loans). The majority of these loans were originated
under United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program which are
processed using the Desktop Underwriter automated underwriting
system, and are therefore underwritten to Fannie Mae guidelines.
The loans receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due to the loan
amount only. Moody's made a negative origination adjustment (i.e.
Moody's increased its loss expectations) for United Shore's loans
due mostly to 1) the lack of statistically significant program
specific loan performance data and 2) the fact that United Shore's
High Balance Nationwide program is unique and fairly new and no
performance history has been provided to Moody's on these loans.
Under this program, the origination criteria rely on the use of GSE
tools (DU/LP) for prime-jumbo non-conforming loans, subject to
Qualified Mortgage overlays. More time is needed to assess United
Shore's ability to consistently produce high-quality prime jumbo
residential mortgage loans under this program.

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate given the strong servicing arrangement of the
servicers, as well as the presence of a strong master servicer to
oversee the servicers. The servicers are contractually obligated to
the issuing entity to service the related mortgage loans. However,
the servicers may perform their servicing obligations through
sub-servicers. In this transaction, Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc. rated B2) will act as the master
servicer. The servicers are required to advance principal and
interest on the mortgage loans. To the extent that the servicers
are unable to do so, the master servicer will be obligated to make
such advances. In the event that the master servicer, Nationstar,
is unable to make such advances, the securities administrator,
Citibank (rated Aa3) will be obligated to do so to the extent such
advance is determined by the securities administrator to be
recoverable.

COVID-19 Impacted Borrowers

Per its conversation with multiple servicers in the market, the
process related to borrower relief efforts for COVID-19 impacted
loans is generally similar across servicers. Typically, the
borrower must contact the servicer and attest they have been
impacted by a COVID-19 hardship and that they require payment
assistance. The servicer will offer an initial forbearance period
to the borrower, which can be extended if the borrower attests that
they require additional payment assistance.

At the end of the forbearance period, if the borrower is unable to
make the forborne payments on such mortgage loan as a lump sum
payment or does not enter into a repayment plan, the servicer may
defer the missed payments, which could be added as a
non-interest-bearing payment due at the end of the loan term. If
the borrower can no longer afford to make payments in line with the
original loan terms, the servicer would typically work with the
borrower to modify the loan (although the servicer may utilize any
other loss mitigation option permitted under the pooling and
servicing agreement with respect to such mortgage loan at such time
or any time thereafter).

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for loans serviced by JPMCB (and Shellpoint,
until the servicing transfer date), loanDepot and United Shore will
be based on a step-up incentive fee structure with a monthly base
fee of $40 per loan and additional fees for delinquent or defaulted
loans. Johnson Bank, NewRez, Quicken, and USAA will be paid a
monthly flat servicing fee equal to one-twelfth of 0.25% of the
remaining principal balance of the mortgage loans.

By establishing a base servicing fee for performing loans that
increases when loans become delinquent, the fee-for-service
structure aligns monetary incentives to the servicer with the costs
of servicing. The servicer receives higher fees for labor-intensive
activities that are associated with servicing delinquent loans,
including loss mitigation, than they receive for servicing a
performing loan, which is less costly and labor-intensive. The
fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and adequate for this
transaction because it better aligns the servicer's costs with the
deal's performance. Furthermore, higher fees for the more
labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these loans to another
servicer easier, should that become necessary.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $40 for all performing loans and increases according to a
pre-determined delinquent and incentive servicing fee schedule. The
delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from the
available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-Party Review

Four third party review firms, AMC Diligence, LLC, Clayton Services
LLC, Inglet Blair LLC and Opus Capital Markets Consultants, LLC
(collectively, TPR firms) verified the accuracy of the loan-level
information that Moody's received from the sponsor. These firms
conducted detailed credit, valuation, regulatory compliance and
data integrity reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR
results indicated compliance with the originators' underwriting
guidelines for majority of loans, no material compliance issues,
and no appraisal defects. Overall, the loans that had exceptions to
the originators' underwriting guidelines had strong documented
compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves,
high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms also
identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure violations related to fees
that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed. In
terms of valuation, there are three loans that have property
inspection waiver, of which original valuation reference to AVM or
other alternative valuations, instead of appraisal or sales price.
These PIW loans are all GSE-eligible refinance loans, underwritten
through AUS. Moody's assessed the PIW process and criteria, and
considered it less robust than traditional appraisal, and tested
the pool loss sensitivity on the property valuation volatilities of
these three loans. However, potential impact is de minimis due to
the low percentage of PIW loans in pool.

R&W Framework

JPMMT 2020-5's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance. Its
review of the R&W framework considers the financial strength of the
R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets) and
enforcement mechanisms. The R&W providers vary in financial
strength. The creditworthiness of the R&W provider determines the
probability that the R&W provider will be available and have the
financial strength to repurchase defective loans upon identifying a
breach. An investment grade rated R&W provider lends substantial
strength to its R&Ws. Moody's analyzes the impact of less
creditworthy R&W providers case by case, in conjunction with other
aspects of the transaction.

The R&W providers are unrated and/or financially weaker entities.
Moody's applied an adjustment to the loans for which these entities
provided R&Ws. For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MAXEX
Clearing LLC platform, MaxEx under the assignment, assumption and
recognition agreement with JPMMAC, will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws
provided by MaxEx to JPMMAC and assigned to the trust are in line
with the R&Ws found in other JPMMT transactions, hence Moody's
applied the same adjustment as other loans in the pool.

No other party will backstop or be responsible for backstopping any
R&W providers who may become financially incapable of repurchasing
mortgage loans. With respect to the mortgage loan R&Ws made by such
originators or the aggregator, as applicable, as of a date prior to
the closing date, JPMMAC will make a "gap" representation covering
the period from the date as of which such R&W is made by such
originator or the aggregator, as applicable, to the cut-off date or
closing date, as applicable. Additionally, no party will be
required to repurchase or substitute any mortgage loan until such
loan has gone through the review process.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction Delaware trustee is Citibank. The custodian's
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by Citibank.
Nationstar, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, servicer termination and for the appointment of any
successor servicer. In addition, Nationstar is committed to act as
successor if no other successor servicer can be found. The master
servicer is required to advance principal and interest if the
servicer fails to do so. If the master servicer fails to make the
required advance, the securities administrator is obligated to make
such advance.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.70% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. The
subordinate bonds benefit from a floor as well. When the total
current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus the aggregate
balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior to it amount to
less than 0.65% of the original pool balance, those tranches that
are junior to it do not receive principal distributions. The
principal those tranches would have received is directed to pay
more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

In addition, until the aggregate class principal amount of the
senior certificates (other than the interest only certificates) is
reduced to zero, if on any distribution date, the aggregate
subordinate percentage for such distribution date drops below 6.00%
of current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will
include all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero.

Moody's calculates the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in its principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor is equal to an amount which is the sum of the
balance of the six largest loans at closing multiplied by the
higher of their corresponding MILAN Aaa severity or a 35% severity.
The credit neutral floor for Aaa rating is $4,914,711. The senior
subordination floor of 0.70% and subordinate floor of 0.65% are
consistent with the credit neutral floors for the assigned
ratings.

Transaction Structure

The transaction has a shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds (other than the
Class A-R Certificates) is based on the net WAC as reduced by the
sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and (ii) the capped trust
expense rate. In the event that there is a small number of loans
remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate can be reduced to
zero.

The Class A-11, Class A-11-A, Class A-11-B Certificates will have a
pass-through rate that will vary directly with the rate of
one-month LIBOR and the Class A-11-X Certificates will have a
pass-through rate that will vary inversely with the rate of
one-month LIBOR. If the securities administrator notifies the
depositor that it cannot determine one-month LIBOR in accordance
with the methods prescribed in the sale and servicing agreement and
a benchmark transition event has not yet occurred, one-month LIBOR
for such accrual period will be one-month LIBOR as calculated for
the immediately preceding accrual period. Following the occurrence
of a benchmark transition event, a benchmark other than one-month
LIBOR will be selected for purposes of calculating the pass-through
rate on the Class A-11, Class A-11-A, Class A-11-B certificates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in April 2020.


LEHMAN ABS 2001-B: S&P Affirms B- (sf) Rating on Class M-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on Lehman ABS
Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B's class M-1 notes and
affirmed its 'CCC (sf)' rating on Madison Avenue Manufactured
Housing Contract Trust 2002-A's class B-2 notes.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among
health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its
peak in some regions, but will remain a threat until a vaccine or
effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until
the second half of 2021. S&P is using this assumption in assessing
the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.
As the situation evolves, the rating agency will update its
assumptions and estimates accordingly.

The collateral pools backing the two transactions consist of
manufactured housing loans that are currently serviced by
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing.

"The affirmations reflect the two transactions' collateral
performance to date, our views regarding future collateral
performance, the transactions' structures, the credit enhancement
available, and the economic outlook. We took into account an uptick
in delinquencies since our last review, and, where we believe is
warranted, we have adjusted our expected cumulative net loss
expectations accordingly," S&P said.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
As of the June 2020 distribution date
                                             Prior      Current
                             90+ day      expected     expected
          Current  Current    delinq.     lifetime     lifetime
Deal  Mo.  PF (%)  CNL (%)     (%)(i)   CNL (%)(ii)     CNL (%)
Lehman 2001-B                    
      224    7.89    21.88      11.41    22.50-24.00  23.50-25.00
Madison 2002-A
      219    8.61    28.66      15.46    32.00-33.00  32.00-33.00

(i) Aggregate 90-plus day delinquencies as a percentage of the
current pool balance.
(ii) As of October 2018 for Lehman 2001-B, Nov. 2015 for Madison
2002-A.
Mo.--months.
PF--Pool factor.
CNL--cumulative net loss.
Lehman 2001-B--Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2001-B.
Madison 2002-A-- Madison Avenue Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2002-A.

The affirmations also reflect S&P's view that the total credit
support as a percentage of the amortizing pool balances, compared
with its expected remaining cumulative net losses, is commensurate
with the current ratings.

Table 2
Hard Credit Support
As of the June 2020 distribution date
                           Total hard              Current total   
       
                       credit support        hard credit support
Deal   Class   (% of current)(i)(ii)         (% of current)(ii)
Lehman 2001-B
        M-1                     26.44                      29.32
Madison 2002-A
       B-2                     29.70                      40.51

(i)As of the September 2018 distribution date.
(ii)Current hard credit support consists solely of subordination
for Lehman 2001-B and Madison 2002-A.
Lehman 2001-B--Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2001-B.
Madison 2002-A-- Madison Avenue Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2002-A.

The transactions' current hard credit enhancement consists of
subordination for the rated classes. Additionally, the rated
classes' subordination has experienced writedowns.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take further rating actions as
it deems necessary.

The analysts would like to thank Travis Erb for his contributions
to this report.

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B
  Class     Rating
  M-1       B- (sf)

  Madison Avenue Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2002-A
  Class     Rating
  B-2       CCC (sf)


MADISON PARK XVII: Moody's Cuts Class F-R Notes to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Madison Park Funding XVII, Ltd.:

US$43,500,000 Class C-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2030
(the "Class C-R Notes"), Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June
3, 2020 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$48,500,000 Class D-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2030
(the "Class D-R Notes"), Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$42,300,000 Class E-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2030
(the "Class E-R Notes"), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April
17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$18,000,000 Class F-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2030
(the "Class F-R Notes"), Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class D-R, Class E-R, and Class F-R Notes and on
June 3, 2020 on the Class C-R Notes. The collateralized loan
obligation, originally issued in May 2015 and refinanced in June
2017, is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
July 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade on the Class C-R, Class D-R, Class E-R, and Class F-R
Notes reflects the credit deterioration and par loss observed in
the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily prompted by
economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. Since the
outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate credit has
resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other negative
rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing the CLO.
Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has increased
substantially and the credit enhancement available to the CLO notes
has eroded, exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased
significantly, and expected losses on certain notes have increased
materially.

Based on the June 2020 trustee report [1], the weighted average
rating factor was 3624, or 22% worse compared to a WARF of 2966
reported in the March 2020 trustee report [2] and was failing the
test level of 3060 by 564 points. Moody's noted that approximately
37.2% of the CLO's par was from obligors assigned a negative
outlook and 2.0% from obligors whose ratings are on review for
downgrade. Additionally, based on Moody's calculation, the
proportion of obligors in the portfolio with Moody's corporate
family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1 or lower (adjusted for
negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade) was approximately
25.4% of the CLO par as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's
calculated the total collateral par balance, including recoveries
from defaulted securities, at $786.0 million, or $14.0 million less
than deal's ramp-up target par balance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $778.1 million, defaulted par of
$22.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 29.35%
(implying a WARF of 3569), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.01%, a diversity score of 78 and a weighted average
spread of 3.47%. Finally, Moody's also considered in its analysis
the CLO manager's recent investment decisions and trading
strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


MARATHON CLO VIII: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D-R Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Marathon CLO VIII Ltd.:

US$56,250,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 2031, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 3, 2020
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$24,750,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due October 2031, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$27,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due October 2031, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April
17, 2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$22,000,000 Class D-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 2031, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the reviews for downgrade initiated on June
3, 2020 on the Class A-2-R notes and on April 17, 2020 on the Class
B-R, Class C-R and Class D-R notes. The CLO, issued in July 2015
and refinanced in September 2018, is a managed cashflow CLO. The
notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly
syndicated senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's
reinvestment period will end on October 2023.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating actions on the Class A-2-R, Class B-R, Class
C-R and Class D-R notes reflect the risks posed by credit
deterioration and loss of collateral coverage observed in the
underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily prompted by
economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. Since the
outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate credit has
resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other negative
rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing the CLO.
Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has increased
substantially, credit enhancement available to the CLO notes has
markedly declined, exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased
significantly and expected losses on certain notes have increased
materially.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor is
3830 as of June 2020, or 23.1% worse compared to 3111 reported in
the March 2020 trustee report [1]. The recent WARF is worse than
the average observed for other BSL CLOs. Moody's calculation also
showed the WARF was failing the test level of 3300 reported in the
June 2020 trustee report [2] by 530 points, and both the rate and
the magnitude of the WARF deterioration are higher than the
averages Moody's has observed for other BSL CLOs. Moody's noted
that approximately 45.0% of the CLO's par was from obligors
assigned a negative outlook and 4.9% from obligors whose ratings
are on review for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on
Moody's calculation, the proportion of obligors in the portfolio
with Moody's corporate family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1
or lower (adjusted for negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade)
was approximately 32% as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's
calculated the total collateral par balance, including recoveries
from defaulted securities, at $429.2 million, or $20.8 million less
than the deal's original ramp-up target par balance, and Moody's
calculated the over-collateralization ratios (excluding haircuts)
for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes as of June 2020
at 127.2%, 118.5%, 110.3% and 104.4% respectively. Moody's noted
that interest collections were recently applied to repay the senior
notes as a result of OC test failures on the April 2020
determination date. Moreover, the OC tests for the Class B, Class C
and Class D notes as well as the interest diversion test were
recently reported in June 2020 trustee report [3] as failing their
respective trigger levels. If these failures were to occur on the
next payment date they would result in the repayment of senior
notes or a portion of excess interest collections being diverted
towards reinvestment in collateral.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $422.8 million, defaulted par of
$21.4 million, a weighted average default probability of 31.17%
(implying a WARF of 3830), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.68%, a diversity score of 68 and a weighted average
spread of 3.87%. Moody's also analyzed the CLO by incorporating an
approximately $13 million par haircut in calculating the OC and
interest diversion test ratios. Finally, Moody's also considered in
its analysis the CLO manager's recent investment decisions and
trading strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


MOFT TRUST 2020-ABC: DBRS Gives B(low) Rating on Class D Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2020-ABC issued by MOFT Trust 2020-ABC (the
Issuer) as follows:

-- Class X-A at A (sf)
-- Class A at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class D at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 24, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The collateral for the $770.0 million ($790 per square foot (psf))
first-mortgage loan is the fee-simple interest in three Class A
office buildings totaling more than 950,000 square feet (sf) in
Sunnyvale, California. The A, B, and C buildings were built in 2008
by Jay Paul Company and are a component of the larger Moffett
technology office campus, with firms like Amazon and Facebook
occupying significant space in other nearby buildings. The whole
loan comprises 21 pari passu senior notes with an aggregate
principal balance of $442 million and three junior notes with an
aggregate principal balance of $328 million for a total whole loan
balance of $770 million. The MOFT 2020-ABC mortgage trust consists
of the three junior notes in addition to three of the 21 senior
notes, including the controlling senior note, for a total trust
balance of $328 million. The remaining $442 million in senior notes
will not be assets of the MOFT 2020-ABC mortgage trust and are
likely to be contributed to future securitizations. Loan proceeds
were used to pay off existing debt totaling $364.0 million, return
$314.1 million of cash equity to the sponsor, cover unfunded
sponsor obligations totaling $89.2 million, and pay closing costs
of $2.7 million.

The three buildings are 100.0% leased to five tenants, with
high-investment-grade tenants Google LLC (Google; 835,328 sf) and
Comcast Corporation (114,419 sf) accounting for more than 97% of
the portfolio's base rent. Google expanded its footprint by
recently signing a lease for all of Building B and more than half
of Building C. The Google leases have no termination options and
have seven-year extension options with 3% annual escalations.
Additionally, the Google lease for Building A is currently below
market compared with the new lease the firm signed for Building B.
Google is paying approximately $60 psf gross for Building A, but
executed a new lease for about $70 psf gross for Building B. The
lease for Building A has a fair market value renewal option, and
DBRS Morningstar believes that there is potential upside in the
property's cash flow if and when Google renews its Building A lease
at market rates.

Leases representing approximately 65% of DBRS Morningstar's
underwritten base rent and 67% of the property's net rentable area
(NRA) are scheduled to roll over through the fully extended loan
term. Furthermore, the Google lease for Building B is scheduled to
expire just 11 months after loan maturity, which would mean that
100% of the property's underwritten base rent and NRA is expiring
within 12 months of loan maturity. While demand for this type of
office space remains strong, the loan could experience elevated
refinance risk if the sponsor is unsuccessful in negotiating lease
extensions or signing replacement tenants.

The buildings are a part of a larger development known as Moffett
Towers. The campus, centrally located in the heart of Silicon
Valley in Sunnyvale, counts other large tech firms such as Facebook
and Amazon as major tenants. The Moffett campus is easily
accessible via the U.S. 101 freeway and the Valley Transportation
Authority's light-rail system, which has four stops across the
campus. The Sunnyvale office market is also desirable because of
its relative affordability compared with nearby markets like
Mountain View and Palo Alto. The Sunnyvale submarket has a Class A
office vacancy rate of less than 4.0%, and the Moffett Park
complex, which has more than 9 million sf of space, currently has a
vacancy rate of only 1.5%. The continued growth and expansion of
major technology firms in the area, along with the rent discount
compared with Mountain View and Palo Alto, likely means that market
dynamics will remain favorable.

The sponsor is an affiliate of Jay Paul Company, a well-known San
Francisco real estate owner and developer with an extensive
portfolio of build-to-suit Class A office assets. The firm was
founded in 1975 and has built and leased office space to a long
list of Silicon Valley technology firms including Amazon, Facebook,
Microsoft, HP, among others. Jay Paul Company has developed and/or
acquired over 13 million sf of office space and closed more than
$10 billion in debt and equity financing since its inception. The
sponsor's other major projects include the 181 Fremont tower in
downtown San Francisco, the Central and Wolfe campus, and various
other Moffett buildings.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
re-analyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its
consistency with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial
Real Estate Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure
was $47.9 million and a cap rate of 6.50% was applied, resulting in
a DBRS Morningstar Value of $737.6 million, a variance of -35.6%
from the appraised value at issuance of $1.15 billion. The DBRS
Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 104.4%, as compared with the
LTV on the issuance appraised value of 67.3%. The NCF figure
applied as part of the analysis represents a -15.7% variance from
the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven by tenant improvements and
leasing commissions, rent steps, and real estate taxes.

The cap rate applied is at the lower end of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflective of
the property's location, high quality, and position in the market.
In addition, the 6.50% cap rate applied is above the implied cap
rate of 4.97% based on the Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised
value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 6.50%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Class X-A is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MONROE CAPITAL 2015-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class F Notes to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Monroe Capital BSL CLO 2015-1, Ltd.:

US$22,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2027 (current outstanding balance of $22,413,161),
Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$8,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2027 (current outstanding balance of $8,174,685),
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's also confirmed the rating on the following notes:

US$24,000,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (current outstanding balance of $24,318,721),
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class D-R notes, Class E notes, and Class F notes.
The CLO, originally issued in May 2015 and partially refinanced in
August 2017 is a static cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May
2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades on the Class E notes and Class F notes reflect the
risks posed by credit deterioration and loss of collateral coverage
observed in the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily
prompted by economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic.
Since the outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate
credit has resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other
negative rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing
the CLO. Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has
increased substantially, the credit enhancement available to the
CLO notes has eroded, exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased
significantly, and expected losses (ELs) on certain notes have
increased materially.

Despite the credit quality deterioration stemming from the
coronavirus outbreak, Moody's concluded that the expected losses on
the Class D-R Notes continue to be consistent with the current
rating after taking into account the CLO's latest portfolio, its
relevant structural features and its actual over-collateralization
(OC) levels. Consequently, Moody's has confirmed the rating on the
Class D-R Notes.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) was 4734 as of July 2020, or 33.7% worse compared to 3540
reported in the March 1, 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's
calculation also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 2928
reported in the trustee report dated May 31, 2020 [2] by 1806
points. Moody's noted that approximately 43.4% of the CLO's par was
from obligors assigned a negative outlook and 5.8% from obligors
whose ratings are on review for possible downgrade. Based on the
trustee report dated May 31, 2020[3], the over-collateralization
(OC) ratios for the Class D and Class E are reported at 106.15% and
97.23%, respectively, and are failing their respective trigger
levels of 109.94% and 104.99%.

Nevertheless, the Class A-R notes have been paid down by
approximately 40.2% or $101.2 million since the end of the
reinvestment period. Also, as of the May 2020 payment date,
approximately $1.7 million of interest proceeds was diverted to pay
down the notes due to the Class C OC failure. The Class C OC
failure has been cured since then, and is currently in compliance
based on the trustee report dated May 31, 2020[4].

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par of
$276.7 million, defaulted par of $24.8 million, a weighted average
default probability of 30.72% (implying a WARF of 4734), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.43%, a diversity score of
41 and a weighted average spread of 3.90%. Moody's also analyzed
the CLO by incorporating an approximately $29.3 million par haircut
in calculating the OC and interest diversion test ratios.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; and some improvement in WARF
as the US economy gradually recovers in the second half of the year
and corporate credit conditions generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


N-STAR REL VI: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class J Debt to Csf
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed one class of N-Star
REL CDO VI, Ltd./LLC.

N-Star REL CDO VI, Ltd./LLC

  - Class J; LT Csf; Downgrade

  - Class K; LT Csf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations; Concentration and Adverse Selection: The
downgrade of class J reflects a greater certainty of loss. Default
is considered inevitable for both classes J and K. The pool's base
case loss expectation is 88.2%.

The collateralized debt obligation is highly concentrated with six
assets from four obligors remaining. As of the June 2020 trustee
report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was invested in two
commercial real estate loans (66.8% of pool) and four CRE CDO bonds
(33.2%).

Due to concentration and adverse selection concerns, a look-through
analysis of the remaining pool was the determining factor in the
rating actions. Both classes J and K are reliant on defaulted
assets to repay. Defaulted assets comprise 68.5% of the pool and
include an A-note (42.8%) secured by undeveloped land in the
Poconos Mountains, in which the lender is pursuing foreclosure; an
overleveraged B-note (24.0%) secured by a leasehold interest on an
office property located in Cincinnati, OH; and one of the CRE CDO
bonds (1.7%), N-Star REL CDO VIII E, which is rated 'Csf' by Fitch.
Fitch modeled full losses on the defaulted assets.

Declining Credit Enhancement: Since Fitch's last rating action, the
credit enhancement to both classes J and K have declined. The Value
Place mezzanine hotel loan (4% of last rating action pool balance)
was liquidated with a full loss, which was in line with
expectations.

As of the June 2020 payment date, there were insufficient interest
collections to pay the entire senior management fee. Principal
collections were applied to pay the remainder of the senior
management fee and a portion of class J's interest payment. The
remainder of class J's missed interest payment was capitalized, and
class K is capitalizing the entirety of its missed interest
payment. Given class J is the senior-most class, it requires timely
payment of full interest. The trustee had previously issued notices
of default in March 2019, June 2019 and June 2020, due to a default
in the payment of interest due on the class J notes; however, in
each of these instances, the default was waived as 100% of the
holders of the class J notes agreed to waive the default.

Coronavirus Impact: The three other non-defaulted CRE CDO bonds are
from the same obligor, CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A
(CapitalSource 2006-A), and are rated 'BBsf'/Stable (0.4% of pool),
'Bsf'/Negative (20.8%) and 'CCCsf' (10.4%) by Fitch. Two loans,
comprising 65% of the CapitalSource 2006-A pool, are secured by
skilled nursing and/or assisted living healthcare properties, which
are vulnerable to the negative economic impact related to the
coronavirus pandemic. The largest loan (62% of the CapitalSource
2006-A pool), the Miller Portfolio, is comprised of 22
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by a
portfolio of 28 healthcare properties totaling 2,070 beds, which
include nine assisted living facilities and 19 skilled nursing
facilities, located primarily in secondary markets within the state
of Indiana. The properties in the portfolio are included in a
master lease agreement and managed by Miller's Health Systems.
According to the asset manager, portfolio NOI in 2018 was $30.5
million, with an expense ratio of 78%. The NOI to lease payment
coverage was 1.96x. Revenue sources in 2018 include Medicaid
(approximately 39% of total revenues), private pay (24%), Medicare
(13%) and an intergovernmental transfer program available in
Indiana (16%). More recent financials were not provided. The loan
matures in September 2021.

The CDO is managed by NS Advisors, LLC, which was previously a
wholly owned subsidiary of NorthStar Realty Finance Corp. In
January 2017, NRF, along with Northstar Asset Management, merged
with Colony Capital, Inc. to form Colony Northstar Inc.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating actions/upgrades:

Upgrades to the 'Csf' rated classes are not expected due to the
concentration and adverse selection of the remaining pool and the
allocation of principal proceeds to cover trust expenses and
interest payments. Interest collections from the remaining assets
are not substantial enough to pay the interest payments on the
outstanding classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating actions/downgrades:

Downgrades of the 'Csf' rated classes to 'Dsf' would occur at/or
prior to legal final maturity as default is inevitable. The
majority of the remaining assets in the pool have defaulted, with
limited recovery prospects.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-ALXA: DBRS Hikes Cl. E Rating to BB(High)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-ALXA
issued by Natixis Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-ALXA
(the Issuer):

-- Class B to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C to A (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BB (high) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the rating on the following class:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable. The ratings have been removed from Under
Review with Developing Implications, where they were placed on
November 14, 2019.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

Prior to the finalization of the NA SASB Methodology, the DBRS
Morningstar ratings for the subject transaction and all other DBRS
Morningstar-rated transactions subject to the methodology in
question were previously placed Under Review with Developing
Implications, as the proposed methodology changes were material.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The subject loan is secured by the fee interest in a 356,909-square
foot (sf) condominium portion of a newly constructed Class A office
building in downtown Bellevue, Washington, approximately 10.0 miles
east of Seattle. The condominium interest includes 98.3% of the
leasable square footage within the 16-story structure in addition
to the entire eight-level underground parking garage. Completed in
Q2 2017, the collateral is situated in the heart of downtown
Bellevue, which includes nearly 5.0 million sf of retail and
entertainment developments and just under 7.0 million sf of office
space. The subject's immediate area is home to the 1.3 million sf
Bellevue Square retail center as well as its mixed-use and
retail-centric sister properties, Lincoln Square and Bellevue
Place, all three of which are connected via aboveground pedestrian
skybridges. The sponsor used loan proceeds of $266.1 million ($745
per sf (psf)), including $57.6 million of mezzanine debt and $71.7
million of borrower equity, to finance the acquisition of the
subject for a purchase price of $313.0 million ($877 psf); fund
upfront free rent and tenant improvement/leasing commission
reserves totaling approximately $18.0 million; and pay closing
costs. The loan is a 10-year fixed-rate interest-only mortgage loan
with an anticipated repayment date (ARD) structure and final loan
maturity in 2033.

The property is currently 100.0% occupied by two
investment-grade-rated tenants, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) and
Starbucks Corporation (Starbucks), with Amazon accounting for 99.4%
of the net rentable area. In 2017, Amazon executed a 16-year
triplet net (NNN) lease that extends well beyond the 10-year loan
term to September 30, 2033. Amazon's initial base rental payment is
$34.63 psf with annual escalations of 2.25%, which equates to a
gross equivalent rent of roughly $50.00 psf; this compares
favorably with the average Class A submarket rents in the $45.50
psf to $47.00 psf gross range. Based on Amazon's long-term
investment-grade characteristics at the subject, its rent has been
straight-lined over the loan term to $38.35 psf. Starbucks signed a
10-year NNN lease in 2017, paying $39.90 psf base rent for the
first five years of the lease term and escalating by 10.0% to
$43.89 psf for the last five years.

The sponsors for this loan are RFR Holding LLC (RFR) and TriStar
Capital, LLC (TriStar Capital). RFR is a private full-service
company established in Manhattan, New York, in 1991 with a current
multinational portfolio of over 100 assets across a diverse array
of property types and markets. TriStar Capital is a real estate
investment firm based in New York with more than two decades of
experience in the financing and development of commercial real
estate. The principals of the sponsors—David Edelstein of TriStar
Capital and Aby Rosen and Michael Fuchs of RFR—will serve as
guarantors for the transaction. The guarantors have a combined net
worth and liquidity of $3.4 billion and $146.9 million,
respectively.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
reanalyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its consistency
with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate
Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure was $15.3
million and a cap rate of 6.50% was applied, resulting in a DBRS
Morningstar Value of $234.7 million, a variance of -25.7% from the
appraised value at issuance of $316.0 million. The DBRS Morningstar
Value, excluding the mezzanine debt, implies an LTV of 88.8%
compared with the LTV of 66.0% on the appraised value at issuance.
The NCF figure DBRS Morningstar applied as part of the analysis
represents a +0.2% variance from the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven
by the management fee.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the lower end of the
DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflecting
the above-average property quality, strong market, and long-term
investment-grade tenancy. In addition, the 6.50% cap rate DBRS
Morningstar applied is substantially above the implied cap rate of
4.80% based on the Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis totaling 6.50%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals. DBRS Morningstar also made other positive adjustments
to account for the loan's five-year ARD tail, resulting in an
implied amortization of 20.5%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-TECH: DBRS Confirms B Rating on G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-TECH
issued by Natixis Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-TECH
(the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable. The ratings have been removed from Under
Review with Developing Implications, where they were placed on
November 14, 2019.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

Prior to the finalization of the NA SASB Methodology, the DBRS
Morningstar ratings for the subject transaction and all other DBRS
Morningstar-rated transactions subject to the methodology in
question were previously placed Under Review with Developing
Implications, as the proposed methodology changes were material.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The subject loan is secured by a 626,233-square foot (sf) complex
comprising seven Class B office and research and development (R&D)
buildings in Santa Clara, California, just outside the Golden
Triangle area. Loan proceeds of $195.0 million ($311 per square
foot (psf)) and sponsor equity of $58.5 million financed the
asset's acquisition price of $240.4 million, funded $14.3 million
of upfront reserves, and covered closing costs totaling $12.9
million. Loan proceeds comprise a $150.0 million senior mortgage
note and $45.0 million of mezzanine debt. The loan sponsor is
Preylock Real Estate Holdings, LLC, a Los Angeles-based real estate
investment and development firm that has acquired 1.0 million sf of
commercial space since its inception, primarily in major West Coast
markets. The guarantors are well capitalized and have no credit
history of foreclosures, defaults, or bankruptcies.

The property is currently 100.0% leased to two tenants: NVIDIA
Corporation (NVIDIA), the largest tenant which occupies 60.7% of
the total net rentable area (NRA) and contributes 57.9% of the
total DBRS Morningstar Base Rent, and Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
(Huawei), which occupies 39.3% of the total NRA and contributes
42.1% of the total DBRS Morningstar Base Rent. The collateral
houses conventional office space and R&D facilities for both NVIDIA
and Huawei, which have used these specialized labs for research,
design, and implementation purposes across several sectors of both
companies' product lines.

NVIDIA has had a presence at the property—specifically, the 2880
Scott Boulevard building—since 1997. NVIDIA extended its lease at
the 2770-2800 Scott Boulevard property, representing 15.9% of total
portfolio NRA, through December 2025 as its lease expiry at
issuance occurred in December 2020. DBRS Morningstar noted on the
site inspection at issuance that the 2770-2800 Scott Boulevard
building was unique in that it housed a large server room on the
first floor, which serves much of the NVIDIA facilities in the
area.

Huawei subsidiary, Futurewei Technologies, Inc. (Futurewei), has
occupied the property since 2009 and historically used the space
for R&D. Futurewei executed a 10-year lease renewal beginning in
August 2017 that includes a one-time right to terminate the lease
on July 31, 2024, which is four months before the fully extended
maturity date. If Futurewei exercises its early-termination option,
then the tenant must pay an early-termination fee of approximately
$4.9 million based on the unamortized amount of leasing costs plus
a termination penalty of $2.2 million, resulting in a total payment
of $7.1 million, equal to $28.80 psf for Futurewei's space. The
Issuer will also sweep 12 months of cash flow before the July 31,
2024, date. Futurewei delivered the borrower letters of credit
(LOCs) issued by Standard Chartered Bank to serve as protection for
Futurewei's full and faithful performance of all its obligations
under the 2882 & 2890 Scott Lease and Central Expressway leases,
respectively. While the LOCs at issuance totaled $1.7 million, the
LOCs reduce to $1.2 million on August 1, 2022. DBRS Morningstar did
not incorporate value from Futurewei's termination penalty, cash
flow sweep, or LOCs in the DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF)
surveillance analysis or the hypothetical discounted cash flow
(DCF) analysis.

According to a December 2019 article in "The Mercury News," a
newspaper published in San Jose, California, Huawei cut up to 600
jobs at Futurewei's space at the property in June 2019 following
the U.S. Commerce Department's May 2019 decision to put the firm on
its list of organizations that pose security risks. Additionally,
Futurewei held an equipment auction at the 2330 Central Expressway
property in March 2020 according to Heritage Global Partners Asset
Advisory and Auction Services' website. According to the servicer,
Futurewei's space at the property was not dark and no formal notice
of subleases had been submitted as of April 2020. To account for
the risks associated with Huawei's occupancy at the property when
reanalyzing the DBRS Morningstar NCF, DBRS Morningstar increased
its vacancy rate assumption to 20.0%, twice the vacancy rate
assumption at issuance, and its renewal probability assumption to
50.0%, a decrease from its 65.0% renewal probability assumption at
issuance, to Huawei's space.

DBRS Morningstar performed a hypothetical DCF analysis to access
the hypothetical discounted value of the property, assuming Huawei
completely vacates its space and the sponsor had to re-lease the
property to a market-oriented level. DBRS Morningstar determined
that the property's hypothetical discounted value was above the
cumulative proceeds through Class G at $240 psf.

Per Reis, Inc. (Reis), the collateral is in the Santa Clara
submarket, which is part of the greater San Jose flex/R&D market.
Reis reported a submarket vacancy rate of 8.1% for Q1 2020, but
forecast the submarket vacancy rate to increase to 10.5% in 2022,
the year of the initial maturity date, and to 9.5% in 2024, the
year of the fully extended maturity date. The property benefits
from its favorable location in Santa Clara, which is part of
Silicon Valley—the premier market for high-technology companies.
The subject has favorable access and visibility as it is located at
the junction of Central Expressway and San Tomas Expressway, two
highly trafficked thoroughfares that facilitate access to several
demand generators in the local area. If NVIDIA or Huawei vacates or
reduces the size of its respective space, the sponsor could
potentially find other similar tenants to occupy the buildings
without necessarily converting every suite back to conventional
office space.

The DBRS Morningstar NCF derived at issuance was reanalyzed for the
subject rating action to confirm its consistency with the "DBRS
Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate Property Analysis
Criteria." The resulting NCF figure was $12.3 million and a cap
rate of 7.5% was applied, resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of
$164.4 million, a variance of -37.0% from the appraised value at
issuance of $261.2 million. The NCF figure applied as part of the
analysis represents a -21.6% variance from the Issuer's NCF,
primarily driven by vacancy, leasing costs, and rent step credit.
As of YE2019, the servicer reported a NCF figure of $14.7 million,
a -16.0% variance from the DBRS Morningstar NCF figure, primarily a
factor of vacancy and leasing costs. The DBRS Morningstar Value
implies an LTV of 91.2% compared with the LTV of 57.4% on the
appraised value at issuance. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an
LTV of 118.6%, including mezzanine debt of $45.0 million, compared
with the LTV of 74.7% on the appraised value at issuance. The DBRS
Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 91.2% on the first mortgage
compared with the LTV of 57.4% on the appraised value at issuance.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the middle end of the
DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflecting
the property's location, market position, and quality. In addition,
the 7.50% cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is above the implied
cap rate of 6.02% based on the Issuer's underwritten NCF and
appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis totaling 1.75%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Classes X-CP, X-EXT, and X-F are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


OBX TRUST 2020-EXP2: Fitch to Rate Class B-5 Debt 'B(EXP)sf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to OBX 2020-EXP2 Trust
(OBX 2020-EXP2).

RATING ACTIONS

OBX 2020-EXP2

Class A-1;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-2;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-3;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-4;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-5;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-6;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-7;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-8;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-9;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-10;    LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-11;    LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-11X;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-12;    LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO1;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO2;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO3;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO4;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO5;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO6;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO71;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO72;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO81;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO82;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO781; LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A-IO782; LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class B-1;     LT A+(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B1-IO;   LT A+(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B1-A;    LT A+(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B2-1;    LT A+(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B2-1-IO; LT A+(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B2-1-A;  LT A+(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B2-2;    LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B2-2-IO; LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B2-2-A;  LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B-3;     LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class B-4;     LT BB(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B-5;     LT B(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B-6;     LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes are supported by 961 loans with a total unpaid principal
balance of approximately $489.4 million as of the cutoff date. The
pool consists of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) acquired by Annaly
Capital Management, Inc. (Annaly) from various originators and
aggregators. Distributions of principal and interest (P&I) and loss
allocations are based on a traditional senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Coronavirus Impact Addressed (Negative): Coronavirus and the
resulting containment efforts have resulted in revisions to its GDP
estimates for 2020. Fitch's current baseline outlook for U.S. GDP
growth is -5.6% for 2020, down from 1.7% for 2019. To account for
declining macroeconomic conditions, the Economic Risk Factor (ERF)
default variable for the 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' rating categories was
increased from a floor of 1.0 and 1.5, respectively to 2.0.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of 30-year
and 40-year fixed-rate fully amortizing loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, relatively low leverage and large liquid
reserves. The loans are seasoned an average of seven months. The
pool has a weighted average (WA) Fitch calculated model FICO score
of 761, high average balance of $509,211 and a low sustainable
loan-to-value (sLTV) ratio of 70.1%.

Expected Payment Deferrals Related to the Coronavirus (Negative):
The outbreak of coronavirus and widespread containment efforts in
the U.S. will result in increased unemployment and cash flow
disruptions. To account for the cash flow disruptions, Fitch
assumed at least 40% of the pool will be delinquent for the first
six months of the transaction at all rating categories with a
reversion to its standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve
by month 10. This assumption is based on observations of legacy
Alt-A delinquencies observed in 2009.

Payment Forbearance (Mixed): There are currently 65 loans (7.6% by
UPB) on a coronavirus-related forbearance plan and an additional
five loans (0.8%) that are on a coronavirus-related deferral plan.
All of the borrowers on a coronavirus-related forbearance plan are
currently making their payments; however, in Fitch's analysis, any
borrower on a deferral plan was treated as delinquent regardless of
the reported current payment status. A payment deferral moves the
borrower's payment due date forward a month and therefore the
borrower is not counted as delinquent per the RMBS documentation.

The servicers or the P&I advancing party will advance delinquent
P&I for borrowers not making the monthly payment during the
forbearance period. If at the end of the forbearance period the
borrower begins making payments, the advancing party will be
reimbursed from any catch-up payment amount.

If the borrower doesn't resume making payments, the loan will
likely become modified and the advancing party will be reimbursed
from available funds. Fitch increased its loss expectations by 25
bps at each rating category to address the potential for
write-downs due to reimbursements of servicer advances. This
increase is based on Fitch's 40% payment stress assumption first
six months.

Investor Properties, Non-QM and Alternative Documentation
(Negative): The pool contains a meaningful amount of investor
properties (42%), nonqualified mortgage (non-QM) loans (58%) and
non-full documentation loans (27%). Fitch's loss expectations
reflect the higher default risk associated with these attributes as
well as loss severity adjustments for potential ability-to-repay
(ATR) challenges. Higher LS assumptions are assumed for the
investor property product to reflect potential risk of a distressed
sale or disrepair.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is
well-controlled in this transaction. Annaly employs an effective
loan aggregation process and has an 'Average' assessment from
Fitch. The majority of the loans (87%) are being serviced by Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), which is rated 'RPS1-'/Negative
for this product. 10% of the loans are serviced by Quicken Loans
(Quicken), which is not rated by Fitch and the remaining 3% are
serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS), which is rated
'RPS2/Negative'. Fitch applies a servicer credit to servicers rated
RPS1- or higher, which resulted in a reduction of 81bps to the
'AAAsf' expected loss. The issuer's retention of at least 5% of the
bonds helps ensure an alignment of interest between issuer and
investor.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch considers
the transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier 2 quality. The RW&Es
are being provided by Onslow Bay Financial, LLC, which does not
have a financial credit opinion or public rating from Fitch. While
an automatic review can be triggered by loan delinquencies and
losses, the triggers can toggle on and off from period to period.
Additionally, a high threshold of investors is needed to direct the
trustee to initiate a review. The Tier 2 framework and non-rated
counterparty resulted in a loss penalty of 76 bps at 'AAAsf'.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Positive): A very low incidence of
material defects was found in the third-party credit, compliance
and valuation due diligence performed on 100% of the pool. A
third-party review (TPR) was conducted by SitusAMC and IngletBlair;
SitusAMC is assessed by Fitch as 'Acceptable - Tier 1' and
IngletBlair is assessed as 'Acceptable - Tier 2'. The due diligence
results are in line with industry averages, and based on loan
count, 100% were graded 'A' or 'B'. Since loan exceptions either
had strong mitigating factors or were accounted for in Fitch's loan
loss model, no additional adjustments were made. The model credit
for the high percentage of loan level due diligence combined with
the adjustments for loan exceptions reduced the 'AAAsf' loss
expectation by 31 bps.

Servicing Advancing (Neutral): Advances of delinquent P&I will be
made on the mortgage loans for the first 120 days of delinquency to
the extent such advances are deemed recoverable. Quicken will be
responsible for advancing delinquent monthly scheduled payments of
P&I in respect of the loans serviced by Quicken, to the extent
deemed recoverable. For the loans serviced by SPS and SLS, advances
will be made (to the extent deemed recoverable) from amounts on
deposit for future distribution, the excess servicing strip fee
that would otherwise be allocable to the class A-IO-S notes and the
P&I advancing party fee. If such amounts are insufficient, the P&I
advancing party (Onslow Bay Financial LLC) will be responsible for
any remaining amounts. In the event the underlying obligations are
not fulfilled, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), as master
servicer, will be required to make advances.

High California Concentration (Negative): Approximately 52% of the
pool is located in California. In addition, the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) concentration is large, as the top three
MSAs (Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco) account for 42% of
the pool. As a result, a geographic concentration penalty of 1.04x
was applied to the probability of default (PD).

Shifting Interest Deal Structure (Negative): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. While there is
only minimal leakage to the subordinate bonds early on in the
transaction, the structure is more vulnerable to defaults occurring
later on in the life of the deal compared with a sequential or
modified sequential structure. To help mitigate tail risk, which
arises as the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a
subordination floor of 1.75% of the original balance will be
maintained for the notes.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net weighted average coupon of the
loans, which does not affect the contractual interest due on the
notes. Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are
capped at $275,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year,
subject to the cap until paid in full.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are only
an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or
that may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Sensitivity analysis was conducted at the state and national levels
to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool, as well
as lower MVDs illustrated by a gain in home prices.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to negative MVDs at the national level, or
positive home price growth with no assumed overvaluation. The
analysis assumes positive home price growth of 10%. Excluding the
senior class, which is already 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates
there is potential positive rating migration for all of the rated
classes. Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in an
upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned ratings
of 'AAAsf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

This defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30% in addition to the
model-projected 7.1% at. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated classes,
compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10% additional
decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by one full
category.

Fitch has added a coronavirus sensitivity analysis that includes a
prolonged health crisis resulting in depressed consumer demand and
a protracted period of below-trend economic activity that delays
any meaningful recovery to beyond 2021. Under this severe scenario,
Fitch expects the ratings to be affected by changes in its
sustainable home price model due to updates to the model's
underlying economic data inputs. Any long-term effects arising from
coronavirus-related disruptions on these economic inputs will
likely affect both investment- and speculative-grade ratings.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


OCEAN TRAILS 8: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Ocean Trails CLO 8/Ocean
Trails CLO 8 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured term loans
that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Ocean Trails CLO 8/Ocean Trails CLO 8 LLC

  Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)                180.00
  A-2                    NR                       12.00
  B                      AA (sf)                  33.00
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   19.50
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)                15.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                 10.50
  Subordinated notes     NR                       32.75

  NR--Not rated.


PRIMA CAPITAL 2019-RK1: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on C-D Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-RK1
issued by Prima Capital CRE Securitization 2019-RK1 (the Issuer):

DreamWorks Campus and Headquarters (Dreamworks; Group D):

-- Class A-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-D at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-D at B (low) (sf)

The Gateway (Gateway; Group G):

-- Class A-G at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B-G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-G at BB (high) (sf)

TriBeCa House (TriBeCa; Group T):

-- Class A-T at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-T at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class C-T at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable. The ratings have been removed from Under
Review with Developing Implications, where they were placed on
November 14, 2019. Interest is deferable on all rated Certificates
other than Classes A-D, A-G, A-T, and B-G.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

Prior to the finalization of the NA SASB Methodology, the DBRS
Morningstar ratings for the subject transaction and all other DBRS
Morningstar-rated transactions subject to the methodology in
question were previously placed Under Review with Developing
Implications, as the proposed methodology changes were material.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The transaction has a total mortgage balance of $152.25 million and
consists of three nonpooled B notes tied to previously securitized
collateral. The collateral includes one office property,
DreamWorks, and two multifamily properties, Gateway and TriBeCa.
The notes are secured by the grantor trust certificate representing
beneficial interests in a subordinate loan, which is a portion of a
whole loan. The transaction comprises Group D, Group G, and Group T
(each, a Loan Group) with certificates tied to each of the three
subjects. Because the notes are not pooled, proceeds from the
Collateral Interest relating to any Loan Group will not be
available to support shortfalls in collections on the Collateral
Interest relating to any other Loan Group.

For further information on these loans, please visit the DBRS
Viewpoint platform, for which information has been provided below.
Below, DBRS Morningstar has provided a summary of assumptions and
adjustments used during the application of the NA SASB Methodology
and the "North American CMBS Surveillance Methodology". The DBRS
Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was reanalyzed
for each Loan Groups.

DREAMWORKS CAMPUS

The resulting NCF figure was $11.3 million and a cap rate of 7.25%
was applied, resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of $156.4
million, a variance of 47.4% from the appraised value at issuance
of $297.0 million. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of
127.9% compared with the LTV of 67.3% on the appraised value at
issuance based on the whole-loan amount of $200.0 million. The NCF
figure applied as part of the analysis represents a 16.1% variance
from the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven by vacancy as well as
tenant improvement and leasing commissions costs.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the lower end of the
DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflecting
the quality of the properties and amenity packages, the tenants'
commitment to the property, and the position of the property in a
growing market, which DBRS Morningstar views as a mitigant against
potential relocation risk with the single-tenant property. In
addition, the 7.25% cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is
substantially above the implied cap rate of 5.0% based on the
Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis totaling 2.5%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals. DBRS Morningstar also made other negative adjustments
to account for the high implied total LTV of 127.9% based on the
DBRS Morningstar Value.

THE GATEWAY

The resulting NCF figure was $33.6 million and a cap rate of 6.25%
was applied, resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of $538.3
million, a variance of 38.0% from the appraised value at issuance
of $868.8 million. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of
102.2% compared with the LTV of 63.3% on the appraised value at
issuance based on the whole-loan amount of $550.0 million.
Including mezzanine debt of $115.0 million, the loan has an implied
LTV of 123.5%. The NCF figure applied as part of the analysis
represents a 9.3% variance from the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven
by real estate taxes.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the lower end of the
DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for multifamily properties,
reflecting the property's desirable location in downtown San
Francisco, which benefits from favorable demographics and low
submarket vacancy of under 5.0%. In addition, the 6.25% cap rate
DBRS Morningstar applied is well above the implied cap rate of 5.0%
based on the Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis totaling 4.0%
to account for cash flow volatility and market fundamentals. DBRS
Morningstar also made other negative adjustments to account for the
high implied LTV of 123.5% (including mezzanine debt) based on the
DBRS Morningstar Value.

TRIBECA HOUSE

The resulting NCF figure was $17.4 million and a cap rate of 6.25%
was applied, resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of $278.9
million, a variance of 51.9% from the appraised value at issuance
of $580.0 million. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of
92.2% compared with the LTV of 44.3% on the appraised value at
issuance based on the whole-loan amount of $257.0 million.
Including mezzanine debt of $103.0 million, the loan has an implied
LTV of 129.1%. The NCF figure applied as part of the analysis
represents a 5.2% variance from the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven
by operating expenses.

The cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied is at the lower end of the
DBRS Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for multifamily properties,
reflecting the property's location, large unit sizes, and updated
finishes. In addition, the 6.25% cap rate DBRS Morningstar applied
is substantially above the implied cap rate of 4.5% based on the
Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis totaling 4.0%
to account for cash flow volatility and market fundamentals. DBRS
Morningstar also made other negative adjustments to account for the
high implied LTV of 129.1% (including mezzanine debt) based on the
DBRS Morningstar Value.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


PRIMA CAPITAL 2020-VIII: Moody's Rates Class C Notes 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to three class of
notes issued by Prima Capital CRE Securitization 2020-VIII Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Cl. A, B and C notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on its methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CRE CLO's portfolio and structure.

Prima Capital CRE Securitization 2020-VIII Ltd. is a cash flow
commercial real estate CLO that does not have a reinvestment
option; and 100% of the assets are identified and closed as of the
transaction closing date. The closing date pool is collateralized
by 12 collateral interests (12 obligors) in the form of: i) single
asset/single borrower commercial real estate bonds (CMBS and
B-Notes), primarily secured by industrial, office and multifamily
properties (76.5% of the initial pool balance) and ii) whole loans
on commercial real estate secured by industrial properties (23.5%).
Approximately 2.7% of the collateral assets are currently rated by
Moody's and the other 97.3% of the collateral assets were provided
an assessment of credit. The total closing date par amount is
$203,106,729. The closing date portfolio consists of 76.5% fixed
rate obligations with a 3.71% weighted average coupon. There are
two floating rate assets (23.5% of the portfolio balance) with a
weighted average spread of 1.50% over 1-month LIBOR.

The transaction closed on July 15, 2020.

PMIT Master Fund, LLC is the collateral seller of all the assets in
the pool. Prima Capital Advisors LLC will act as trust advisor
pursuant to the indenture and will perform certain reporting duties
for the benefit of the noteholders. As the transaction is static,
unscheduled principal payments and sale proceeds of credit risk and
defaulted assets will be used to pay down the notes per the
transaction waterfall.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes and one class of preferred shares.

The transaction incorporates par coverage and interest coverage
tests which, if triggered, diverts interest proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CLO transactions: weighted average
rating factor, a primary measure of credit quality with credit
assessments completed for all of the collateral, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, number of asset obligors; and
pair-wise asset correlation. These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $203,106,729

Number of obligors: 12

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2885

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 35.85%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.19 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAC): 3.22%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAS): n/a

Pair-wise asset correlation: 35.0%

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2020.

Factors That Would Lead to a Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The administrator's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base-case.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in US economic activity in the second quarter and a
gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However, that
outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their economies
while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge
in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.


READY CAPITAL 2020-FL4: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings of the following
classes of notes issued by Ready Capital Mortgage Financing
2020-FL4, LLC (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes E, F, and G have been privately
placed.

The initial collateral consists of 56 floating-rate mortgages
secured by 63 mostly transitional real estate properties, with a
cut-off date pool balance of approximately $405.3 million,
excluding $147.5 million of outstanding future funding commitments.
Most properties are in a period of transition with plans to
stabilize and improve the asset value. Fifty-one of the mortgages
(representing 82.5% of the cut-off date pool balance) have future
funding participations that the Issuer may acquire with principal
repayment proceeds. During the Permitted Funded Companion
Participation Acquisition Period, the Issuer may acquire future
funding participations without being subject to rating agency
confirmation. Acquisitions of Permitted Funded Companion
Participations will be limited to a $65.0 million cumulative limit
on the aggregate amount of future funding that may be acquired into
the trust. The transaction will have a sequential-pay structure.

The pool consists of mostly transitional assets. Given the nature
of the assets, DBRS Morningstar determined a sample size,
representing 65.7% of the pool cut-off date balance. Physical site
inspections were also performed, some of which included management
meetings. DBRS Morningstar also notes that when DBRS Morningstar
analysts visit the markets, they may actually visit properties more
than once to follow the progress (or lack thereof) toward
stabilization. The servicer is also in constant contact with the
borrowers to track progress.

The loans are generally secured by traditional property types
(i.e., retail, multifamily, and office) with no loans secured by
hospitality properties. Additionally, only one of the multifamily
loans in the pool (MySuite Coliving Portfolio, representing 2.9% of
the cut-off date pool balance) is secured by a student housing
property. Loans secured by student housing properties often exhibit
higher cash flow volatility than traditional multifamily
properties.

Only six loans, representing a combined 5.6% of the initial pool
balance, are secured by properties located in an area with a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of 2 or lower. Areas with a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of 2 or lower are generally considered to
be tertiary or rural markets. Additionally, 13 loans, representing
30.9% of the initial pool balance, are secured by properties
located in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 6 or
higher. Areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of six or higher
are generally characterized as urbanized locations. These markets
benefit from lower default frequencies than less dense suburban,
tertiary, and rural markets. Areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 7 or 8 are especially densely urbanized and benefit from
significantly elevated liquidity. Eleven loans representing a
collective 28.8% of the initial pool balance are secured by
properties located in such areas.

The outstanding future funding amount of $147.5 million represents
a relatively high 36.4% of the initial pool balance. By contrast,
outstanding future funding represented 14.1% of the initial pool
balance for the recent MF1 2020-FL3, Ltd. (MF1 2020-FL3) commercial
real estate/collateralized loan obligation (CRE/CLO) transaction
and 9.5% of the initial pool balance for the recent Grand Avenue
CRE 2020-FL2 Ltd. (GACM 2020-FL2) CRE/CLO transaction. Outstanding
future funding commitments represented 31.6% of the initial pool
balance securitized by Ready Capital Mortgage Financing 2019-FL3.
Acquisitions of Permitted Funded Companion Participations will be
limited to a $65.0 million cumulative limit on the aggregate amount
of future funding that may be acquired into the trust. The
cumulative participation acquisition threshold of $65.0 million
represents 16.0% of the initial pool balance, which is generally
more in line with recent CRE/CLO securitizations. The significant
level of future funding associated with the trust is generally
reflected in the average DBRS Morningstar Business Plan Score of
2.53, which is greater than the average DBRS Morningstar Business
Plan Score of 1.94 for the MF1 2020-FL3 CRE/CLO transaction and the
average DBRS Morningstar Business Plan Score of 2.07 for the GACM
2020-FL2 CRE/CLO transaction.

Based on the initial pool balances, the overall Weighted-Average
(WA) DBRS Morningstar As-Is Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of
0.56 times and the WA Issuance Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV), which
includes all future funding in the calculation, of 87.8% are
reflective of the highly transitional nature of the pool as well as
the generally high leverage financing. The assets are generally
well positioned to stabilize, and any realized cash flow growth
would help to offset a rise in interest rates and improve the
overall debt yield of the loans. DBRS Morningstar associates its
loss severity given default (LGD) based on the assets' as-is LTV
that does not assume that the stabilization plan and cash flow
growth will ever materialize. The DBRS Morningstar As-Is DSCR at
issuance does not consider the sponsor's business plan, as the DBRS
Morningstar As-Is Net Cash Flow (NCF) was generally based on the
most recent annualized period. The sponsor's business plan could
have an immediate impact on the underlying asset performance that
the DBRS Morningstar As-Is NCF is not accounting for.

The pool includes 14 loans, representing 20.2% of the initial pool
balance, that exhibited negative or $0 Issuer As-Is NCFs. In most
instances, the Issuer's As-Is NCF reflected the most recent
performance of the underlying collateral, indicating in these
instances that 14 loans in the pool are secured by properties with
negative or near-$0 cash flows upon securitization. Of the 14 loans
identified to have negative or near-$0 cash flows at issuance, nine
loans (representing 66.3% of the identified negative or near-$0
issuance cash flow loans) represent acquisition financings, which
generally required the respective sponsor(s) to contribute material
cash equity as a source of funding in conjunction with the mortgage
loans, resulting in a higher sponsor cost basis in the underlying
collateral. All 14 of the identified loans are structured with
upfront debt service reserves. When the DBRS Morningstar stressed
interest-only debt service at issuance was measured against the
upfront debt service reserve, upfront debt service reserves were
sufficient to cover anywhere from two months to almost 28 months of
scheduled debt service payments for the 14 identified loans.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the current in-place cash flow.
There is a possibility that the sponsor will not execute its
business plans as expected and that the higher stabilized cash flow
will not materialize during the loan term. Failure to execute the
business plan could result in a term default or the inability to
refinance the fully funded loan balance. DBRS Morningstar made
relatively conservative stabilization assumptions and, in each
instance, considered the business plan to be rational and the
future funding amounts to be sufficient to execute such plans. In
addition, DBRS Morningstar analyzes LGD based on the As-Is LTV
assuming the loan is fully funded.

With regard to the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), the magnitude
and extent of performance stress posed to global structured finance
transactions remains highly uncertain. This considers the fiscal
and monetary policy measures and statutory law changes that have
already been implemented or will be implemented to soften the
impact of the crisis on global economies. Some regions,
jurisdictions, and asset classes are, however, affected more
immediately. Accordingly, DBRS Morningstar may apply additional
short-term stresses to its rating analysis, for example by
front-loading default expectations and/or assessing the liquidity
position of a structured finance transaction with more stressful
operational risk and/or cash flow timing considerations.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


RESIDENTIAL MORTAGAGE 2020-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on B1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2020-2 (the Notes) issued by
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2020-2 (RMLT 2020-2):

-- $246.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.5 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $12.4 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflect 30.25% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), and BB (sf) ratings reflect 25.30%, 18.05%,
11.10%, and 7.60% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

RMLT 2020-2 is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate expanded prime and nonprime primarily first-lien
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Notes. The
Notes are backed by 793 mortgage loans with a total principal
balance of $353,014,444 as of the Cut-Off Date (June 1, 2020).

The originators for the mortgage pool are HomeXpress Mortgage Corp.
(36.1%); Greenbox Loans, Inc. (22.5%); Excelerate (13.6%); and
other originators, which comprise 27.8% of the mortgage loans. The
Servicer of the loans is Servis One, Inc. doing business as BSI
Financial Services.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's Qualified Mortgage (QM) and
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers who
generally do not qualify for agency, government, or private-label
nonagency prime jumbo products for various reasons. In accordance
with the QM/ATR rules, 69.4% of the loans are designated as Non-QM,
1.6% as QM Safe Harbor, and 3.9% as QM Rebuttable Presumption.
Approximately 25.1% of the loans are to investors for business
purposes and, hence, are not subject to the QM/ATR rules.

The Sponsor, directly or indirectly through a majority-owned
affiliate, will retain an eligible horizontal residual interest
consisting of the Class B-3 and XS Notes representing at least 5%
of the Notes to satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements
under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
regulations promulgated thereunder.

On or after the earlier of (1) the payment date occurring in June
2023 or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal balance of
the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date balance,
the Administrator, at the Issuer's option, may redeem all of the
outstanding Notes at a price equal to the class balances of the
related Notes plus accrued and unpaid interest, including any cap
carryover amounts. After such purchase, the Depositor must complete
a qualified liquidation, which requires (1) a complete liquidation
of assets within the Trust and (2) proceeds to be distributed to
the appropriate holders of regular or residual interests.

The Servicer will fund advances of delinquent principal and
interest (P&I) on any mortgage until such loan becomes 90 days
delinquent. The Servicer is also obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred
in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

UNIQUE TRANSACTION FEATURES

Unlike most prior RMLT non-QM securitizations where the Servicer
funds advances of delinquent P&I on loans up to 180 days
delinquent, for this transaction, the Servicer will only fund
advances up to 90 days of delinquent P&I. The Servicer has no
obligation to advance P&I on a mortgage approved for a forbearance
plan during its related forbearance period. However, the Servicer
will be required to advance P&I at the end of the related
forbearance period. The Servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes, insurance premiums, and reasonable costs incurred
in the course of servicing and disposing properties. The
three-month advancing mechanism may increase the probability of
periodic interest shortfalls in the current economic environment
affected by the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic. As a large
number of borrowers seek forbearance on their mortgages in the
coming months, P&I collections may reduce meaningfully.

Unlike the prior RMLT non-QM (or traditional non-QM)
securitizations, which incorporate a pro rata feature among the
senior tranches, this transaction employs a sequential-pay cash
flow structure across the entire capital stack. Principal proceeds
can cover interest shortfalls on the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes
sequentially. For more subordinated Notes, principal proceeds can
cover interest shortfalls as the more senior Notes are paid in
full. Furthermore, excess spread can cover realized losses and
prior period bond writedown amounts first before being allocated to
unpaid cap carryover amounts to Class A-1 down to Class B-2.

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to raise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

The non-QM sector is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists
of securitizations backed by pools of residential home loans that
may fall outside of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's ATR
rules, which became effective on January 10, 2014. Non-QM loans
encompass the entire credit spectrum. They range from high-FICO,
high-income borrowers who opt for interest-only or higher
debt-to-income ratio mortgages, to near-prime debtors who have had
certain derogatory pay histories but were cured more than two years
ago, to nonprime borrowers whose credit events were only recently
cleared, among others. In addition, some originators offer
alternative documentation or bank statement underwriting to
self-employed borrowers in lieu of verifying income with W-2s or
tax returns. Finally, foreign nationals and real estate investor
programs, while not necessarily non-QM in nature, are often
included in non-QM pools.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario, (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update,"
published on June 1, 2020), for the non-QM asset class, DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than what it previously
used. Such MVD assumptions are derived through a fundamental home
price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and GDP
growth outlined in the aforementioned moderate scenario. In
addition, for pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS
Morningstar may assume higher loss expectations above and beyond
the coronavirus assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher
expected losses on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher
credit enhancement.

In the non-QM asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes loans originated to (1) borrowers
with recent credit events, (2) self-employed borrowers, or (3)
higher loan-to-value ratio (LTV) borrowers may be more sensitive to
economic hardships resulting from higher unemployment rates and
lower incomes. Borrowers with prior credit events have exhibited
difficulties in fulfilling payment obligations in the past and may
revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term. Self-employed
borrowers are potentially exposed to more volatile income sources,
which could lead to reduced cash flows generated from their
businesses. Higher LTV borrowers, with lower equity in their
properties, generally have fewer refinance opportunities and
therefore slower prepayments. In addition, certain pools with
elevated geographic concentrations in densely populated urban
metropolitan statistical areas may experience additional stress
from extended lockdown periods and the slowdown of the economy.

In addition, for this transaction, as permitted by the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, signed into law on March
27, 10.2% (as of June 12, 2020) of the borrowers are on forbearance
plans because the borrowers reported financial hardship related to
coronavirus. These forbearance plans allow temporary payment
holidays, followed by repayment once the forbearance period ends.

For the loans, DBRS Morningstar applied additional assumptions to
evaluate the impact of potential cash flow disruptions on the rated
tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I collections and (2) limited
servicing advances on delinquent P&I. These assumptions include:

Increasing delinquencies on the AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating levels
for the first 12 months.

Increasing delinquencies on the A (sf) and below rating levels for
the first nine months.

Assuming no voluntary prepayments for the first 12 months for the
AAA (sf) and AA (sf) rating levels.
Assuming no liquidation recovery for the first 12 months for all
rating levels.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


SARANAC CLO VII: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E-R Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Saranac CLO VII Limited:

US$31,500,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June
03, 2020 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$20,000,000 Class C-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
on April 17, 2020 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$19,240,570 Class D-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$19,399,695 Class E-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
on April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

These actions conclude the reviews for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class C-R, D-R and E-R notes, and on June 3, 2020
on the Class B-R notes, issued by the CLO. Saranac CLO VII Limited,
issued in April 2014 and refinanced in November 2017 is a managed
cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans. The
transaction's reinvestment period will end on November 2021.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades on the Class B-R, C-R, D-R and E-R notes reflect the
risks posed by credit deterioration and loss of collateral coverage
observed in the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been primarily
prompted by economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus pandemic.
Since the outbreak widened in March, the decline in corporate
credit has resulted in a significant number of downgrades, other
negative rating actions, or defaults on the assets collateralizing
the CLO. Consequently, the default risk of the CLO portfolio has
increased substantially, the credit enhancement available to the
CLO notes has markedly declined, exposure to Caa-rated assets has
increased significantly, and expected losses on certain notes have
increased materially.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
was 3678 as of June 2020, or 22% worse compared to 3016 reported in
the March 2020 [1] trustee report. The recent WARF, and the rate
and magnitude of the WARF deterioration, are worse than the
averages Moody's has observed for other BSL CLOs. Moody's
calculation also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 3037
reported in the June 2020 trustee report [2]by 641 points. Moody's
noted that approximately 35.5% of the CLO's par was from obligors
assigned a negative outlook and 4.0% from obligors whose ratings
are on review for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on
Moody's calculation, the proportion of obligors in the portfolio
with Moody's corporate family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1
or lower (adjusted for negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade)
was approximately 29% as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's
calculated the total collateral par balance, including recoveries
from defaulted securities, at $322.8 million, or $17.2 million less
than the deal's ramp-up target par balance, and Moody's calculated
the over-collateralization ratios (excluding haircuts) for the
Class B-R, Class C-R, Class D-R and Class E-R notes as of June 2020
at 126.67%, 117.45%, 109.77%, and 102.97%, respectively. Moody's
noted that interest payments were deferred on the Class D-R and
Class E-R notes, and collections were recently applied to repay the
senior notes as a result of OC test failures on the May 2020
determination date. Moreover, the OC tests for the Class C-R, Class
D-R and Class E-R notes, as well as the interest diversion test was
recently reported in June 2020 trustee report [3] as failing their
respective triggers. If these failures were to occur on the next
payment date they could result in the repayment of senior notes,
deferral of current interest payments on the more-junior notes, or
a portion of excess interest collections being diverted towards
reinvestment in collateral.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $317.8 million, defaulted par of
$13.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 29.86%
(implying a WARF of 3678), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.41%, a diversity score of 78 and a weighted average
spread of 3.71%. Moody's also analyzed the CLO by incorporating an
approximately $8 million par haircut in calculating the OC and
interest diversion test ratios. Finally, Moody's also considered in
its analysis the CLO manager's recent investment decisions and
trading strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


SCF EQUIPMENT 2017-1: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Stonebriar Commercial Finance LLC.

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-1 LLC

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class C, Confirmed at A2 (sf);
previously on Apr 23, 2020 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class D, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);
previously on Apr 23, 2020 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-2 LLC

Class D Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf);
previously on Apr 23, 2020 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
23rd, 2020 on the notes. The transactions are securitizations of
equipment loans and leases secured primarily by railcars, corporate
aircraft, transportation equipment, marine vessels, other
manufacturing and industrial equipment, and owner-occupied
commercial real estate loans.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Its rating actions are the result of stabilized credit quality of
the obligors since the beginning of the coronavirus outbreak as
well as the continuous build-up of credit enhancement levels.

Despite the credit quality deterioration stemming from economic
shocks triggered by the coronavirus outbreak, Moody's concluded
that the risk posed to, and the expected losses on, the notes
continue to be consistent with the current ratings of the notes.
Expected loss on the loans and leases is a function of, among other
things, financial health of the obligors, the asset value of the
collaterals, and the amortization of the loan or lease contracts.
The credit quality of the pool has stabilized since April as
evidenced by fewer than expected negative rating actions on
underlying obligors' ratings. In addition, credit enhancement,
including overcollateralization and non-declining reserve account,
continued to provide support to the transactions and has increased
moderately since April. Other considerations include the structural
features such as sequential pay structures, and high level of pool
concentrations in these transactions.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the U.S. economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in May 2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or lower than
expected depreciation in the value of the equipment and commercial
real estate that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the
primary drivers of performance, positive changes in the US macro
economy and the strong performance of various sectors where the
obligors operate could also affect the ratings.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or a greater than
expected deterioration in the value of the equipment and commercial
real estate that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the
primary drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro
economy and the weak performance of various sectors where the
obligors operate could also affect Moody's ratings. Other reasons
for worse performance than Moody's expectations could include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack of
transaction governance and fraud.


SG COMMERCIAL 2019-787E: DBRS Assigns BB(low) Rating on F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-787E issued by SG Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2019-787E as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 16, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings. Information about the MCR ratings, including the history
of the MCR ratings, can be found at
www.morningstarcreditratings.com.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The loan is secured by the borrower's fee-simple interest in 787
Eleventh Avenue, a 513,397-square foot (sf) Class A mixed-use
property located in New York. The subject was 88.4% leased to a
combination of car dealerships and office tenants as of the
November 2018 rent roll. Loan proceeds of $410.0 million will be
used to refinance the $349.5 million construction loan, fund the
$48.1 million in holdback reserves, fund the $6.2 million in
returned equity, and cover the approximate $6.2 million in closing
costs. The total financing is divided into $175.0 senior companion
loans, a $117.5 subordinate A note, and a $117.5 million junior B
note. The subject securitization contains the $70.0 million A-1A
note and the subordinate $117.5 A-2 note. Noncontrolling A notes
with a combined $105.0 million trust balance are included in the
CSAIL 2019-C16, BBCMS 2019-C3, and CSAIL 2019-C15 securitizations.
The B note was held by the lender at issuance and DBRS Morningstar
expected the B note to be sold to a third-party investor. The
10-year loan is interest only (IO) for the entire period.

The collateral is well situated in the heart of Automotive Row
along with 20 other automotive dealerships. The corridor and its
concentration of dealerships is the result of a favorable rezoning
by New York so that property owners can operate showrooms and
service centers at the same location. The largest tenant is a
dealership for JaguarLand Rover Limited PLC (JLR). In 2018, the JLR
dealership reported sales of $150.7 million. The JLR dealership at
the property is the only one in Manhattan and is reportedly the
second-ranked Jaguar dealership in the country by sales volume.
Nissan North America (Nissan), the second-largest tenant at the
subject and an investment-grade tenant, subleases the space to a
Nissan car dealership at the property through a franchisee. As of
March 31, 2018, the tenant reported a total net revenue of $108.0
billion and a net income of $6.8 billion. The property benefits
from a lease guaranteed by Nissan, which is unusual for car
dealerships but provides additional credit characteristics to the
loan. The loan documents provide for a condominium conversion of
the property and a one-time release option of the retail/showroom
portion of the building subsequent to such a conversion. Upon a
release of the retail condominium, the loan is structured with a
release premium of 105.0% of the appraised value of the retail
condominium unit subject to a minimum debt yield test of 6.2% and a
minimum LTV test of 63.1%.

The three office tenants include Spaces, an IWG plc subsidiary;
Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.; and Dwight Capital LLC,
which have a combined average remaining lease term of more than 12
years, indicating there is no scheduled rollover risk during the
loan term. Spaces is a coworking tenant with an international
community that includes 2.5 million members and 3,000 business
centers spanning 1,000 cities in 110 countries. DBRS Morningstar
performed a hypothetical net cash flow (NCF) scenario assuming
Spaces vacates the property because of concerns around coworking
tenants. The resulting hypothetical DBRS Morningstar NCF represents
a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12 times (x) on the
capital stack through the subordinate A-2 note within the trust,
but a DSCR of 0.99x on the entire capital stack inclusive of the B
note. The DBRS Morningstar hypothetical NCF implies there is an
elevated risk of term default if Spaces stops paying rent at the
property.

The Georgetown Company, LLC (Georgetown) and Table Holdings sponsor
the loan. Georgetown is a private real estate investment company
based in New York with offices across the country. Georgetown has a
portfolio of 22.0 million sf of diverse commercial property assets
that have been developed, owned, and overseen by the company. Table
Holdings is an investment office owned by the Ackman family. The
company has invested over $300.0 million in equity in a portfolio
consisting of 2,700 multifamily units as well as other property
interests. Since acquiring the property in 2015 for $255.5 million,
the sponsors have commenced a $275.2 million renovation of the
building, including conversion of three floors in the existing
building from showroom to office space and adding two office
floors. Although this financing will result in a $36.3 million
return of equity to the sponsors, they will have significant equity
remaining in the property based on a cost basis.

The DBRS Morningstar NCF derived at issuance was re-analyzed for
the subject rating action to confirm its consistency with the "DBRS
Morningstar North American Commercial Real Estate Property Analysis
Criteria." The resulting NCF figure was $21.5 million and a cap
rate of 6.5% was applied, resulting in a DBRS Morningstar Value of
$331.1 million, a variance of -49.1% from the appraised value at
issuance of $650.0 million. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an
LTV of 123.8%, as compared with the LTV on the issuance appraised
value of 63.1%. The NCF figure applied as part of the analysis
represents a -11.0% variance from the Issuer's NCF, primarily
driven by expenses and leasing costs.

The cap rate applied is at the lower end of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflective of
the location and quality. In addition, the 6.5% cap rate applied is
substantially above the implied cap rate of 3.7% based on the
Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 3.5%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Class X is an IO certificate that references a single rated tranche
or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


SILVER CREEK: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to B1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Silver Creek CLO, Ltd.:

US$7,800,000 Class E-1R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E-1R Notes"), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$10,000,000 Class E-2R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E-2R Notes"), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's also confirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$21,600,000 Class D-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on
April 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class D-R notes, E-1R notes, and E-2R notes. The
CLO, issued in July 2014 and refinanced in July 2017 is a managed
cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans. The
transaction's reinvestment period will end in July 2021.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades on the Class E-1R notes and Class E-2R notes reflect
the risks posed by credit deterioration and loss of collateral
coverage observed in the underlying CLO portfolio, which have been
primarily prompted by economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus
pandemic. Since the outbreak widened in March, the decline in
corporate credit has resulted in a significant number of
downgrades, other negative rating actions, or defaults on the
assets collateralizing the CLO. Consequently, the default risk of
the CLO portfolio has increased substantially, the credit
enhancement available to the CLO notes has eroded, exposure to
Caa-rated assets has increased significantly, and expected losses
(ELs) on certain notes have increased materially.

Despite the credit quality deterioration stemming from the
coronavirus outbreak, Moody's concluded that the expected losses on
the Class D-R Notes continue to be consistent with the current
rating after taking into account the CLO's latest portfolio, its
relevant structural features and its actual over-collateralization
(OC) levels. Consequently, Moody's has confirmed the rating on the
Class D-R Notes.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) was 3238 as of July 2020, or 14.5% worse compared to 2828
reported in the March 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's calculation
also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 2844 reported in
the May 2020 trustee report [2] by 394 points. Moody's noted that
approximately 25.4% of the CLO's par was from obligors assigned a
negative outlook and 3.2% from obligors whose ratings are on review
for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on Moody's calculation,
the proportion of obligors in the portfolio with Moody's corporate
family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1 or lower (adjusted for
negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade) was approximately
17.5% as of July 2020. Furthermore, Moody's calculated the total
collateral par balance, including recoveries from defaulted
securities, at $341.1 million, or $8.9 million less than the deal's
ramp-up target par balance, and Moody's calculated the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios (excluding haircuts) for the
Class A/B, Class C-R, Class D-R and Class E-R notes as of July 2020
at 130.18%, 121.98%, 113.24%, and 106.92%, respectively.
Nevertheless, Moody's noted that the OC tests for the Class D-R,
Class E-1R and E-2R notes, as well as the interest diversion test
were recently reported [3] as passing.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $339.4 million, defaulted par of $3.6
million, a weighted average default probability of 26.63% (implying
a WARF of 3238), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.07%, a diversity score of 86 and a weighted average spread of
3.21%. Moody's also analyzed the CLO by incorporating an
approximately $3.0 million par haircut in calculating the OC and
interest diversion test ratios.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; and some improvement in WARF
as the US economy gradually recovers in the second half of the year
and corporate credit conditions generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


SOUND POINT VIII: Moody's Lowers Class F Notes Rating to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Sound Point CLO VIII-R, Ltd.:

US$31,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2030, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2019
Assigned A2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2030, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 17,
2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$14,000,000 Class D-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2030, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 17,
2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$29,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2030, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$13,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2030, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class D-1, Class D-2, Class E and Class F notes.
The CLO, issued in April 2019 is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes
are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in April 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades on the Class C, Class D-1, Class D-2, Class E and
Class F notes reflect the risks posed by credit deterioration and
loss of collateral coverage observed in the underlying CLO
portfolio, which have been primarily prompted by economic shocks
stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. Since the outbreak widened
in March, the decline in corporate credit has resulted in a
significant number of downgrades, other negative rating actions, or
defaults on the assets collateralizing the CLO. Consequently, the
default risk of the CLO portfolio has increased substantially, the
credit enhancement available to the CLO notes has eroded and
exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased significantly.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) was 3076 as of June 2020, or 19.5% worse compared to 2573
reported in the March 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's calculation
also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 2794 reported in
the June 2020 trustee report [2] by 282 points. Moody's noted that
approximately 30.3% of the CLO's par was from obligors assigned a
negative outlook and 2.8% from obligors whose ratings are on review
for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on Moody's calculation,
the proportion of obligors in the portfolio with Moody's corporate
family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1 or lower (after any
adjustments for negative outlook and watchlist for possible
downgrade) is approximately 15.6% as of June 2020. Furthermore,
Moody's calculated total collateral par balance, including
recoveries from defaulted securities, is at $575.8 million, or
$24.2 million less than the deal's ramp-up target par balance.
Moody's noted that interest diversion test was recently reported as
failing, which if were to occur on the next payment date would
result in repayment of senior notes or in a proportion of excess
interest collections being diverted towards reinvestment in
collateral.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $574.0 million, defaulted par of $4.6
million, a weighted average default probability of 25.68% (implying
a WARF of 3076 ), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.52%, a diversity score of 83 and a weighted average spread of
3.60%. Finally, Moody's also considered in its analysis the CLO
manager's recent investment decisions and trading strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


TOWD POINT 2018-SL1: DBRS Puts BB(low) Rating on Class D-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. placed the following two classes of securities issued by
Towd Point Asset Trust 2018-SL1 Under Review with Negative
Implications:

-- Class D-1 Notes rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D-2 Notes rated BB (low) (sf)

These rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set of
macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), available in its commentary "Global
Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update," published on June 1, 2020.
DBRS Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on
April 16, 2020. The scenarios were updated on June 1, 2020, and are
reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary (the moderate scenario serving as the
primary anchor for current ratings). The moderate scenario assumes
some success in the containment of the coronavirus within Q2 2020
and a gradual relaxation of restrictions, enabling most economies
to begin a gradual economic recovery in Q3 2020.

-- The DBRS Morningstar adjusted default and forbearance
expectations that consider the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.

-- The likelihood that the proportion of loans that are either
delinquent or nonperforming will result in increased defaults.

-- The transaction's current form and sufficiency of available
credit enhancement benefitting the notes.

When placing a rating Under Review with Negative Implications, DBRS
Morningstar seeks to complete its assessment and remove the rating
from this status as soon as appropriate. Upon the resolution of the
Under Review status, DBRS Morningstar may confirm or downgrade the
ratings on the affected classes.

Notes: The principal methodology is DBRS Morningstar Master U.S.
ABS Surveillance (May 27, 2020), which can be found on
dbrsmorningstar.com under Methodologies & Criteria.


TOWD POINT 2020-3: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Asset-Backed
Securities, Series 2020-3 (the Notes) to be issued by Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2020-3 (TPMT 2020-3 or the Trust) as follows:

-- $1.0 billion Class A1A at AAA (sf)
-- $179.5 million Class A1B at AAA (sf)
-- $89.2 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $68.1 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $58.4 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $25.9 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $1.2 billion Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $89.2 million Class A2A at AA (sf)
-- $89.2 million Class A2AX at AA (sf)
-- $89.2 million Class A2B at AA (sf)
-- $89.2 million Class A2BX at AA (sf)
-- $68.1 million Class M1A at A (sf)
-- $68.1 million Class M1AX at A (sf)
-- $68.1 million Class M1B at A (sf)
-- $68.1 million Class M1BX at A (sf)
-- $58.4 million Class M2A at BBB (sf)
-- $58.4 million Class M2AX at BBB (sf)
-- $58.4 million Class M2B at BBB (sf)
-- $58.4 million Class M2BX at BBB (sf)
-- $1.3 billion Class A3 at AA (sf)
-- $1.4 billion Class A4 at A (sf)
-- $1.4 billion Class A5 at BBB (sf)

Classes A2AX, A2BX, M1AX, M1BX, M2AX, and M2BX are interest-only
notes. The class balances represent a notional amount.

Classes A1, A2A, A2AX, A2B, A2BX, M1A, M1AX, M1B, M1BX, M2A, M2AX,
M2B, M2BX, A3, A4, and A5 are exchangeable notes. These classes can
be exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as specified in the
offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 26.20% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates. The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect 20.70%, 16.50%,
12.90%, 10.70%, and 9.10% of credit enhancement, respectively.
Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and reperforming primarily first-lien mortgages funded
by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 12,585 loans
with a total principal balance of $1,643,121,756 as of the
Statistical Calculation Date (May 31, 2020).

The portfolio is approximately 149 months seasoned, and 55.3% of
the loans are modified. The modifications happened more than two
years ago for 90.7% of the modified loans. Within the pool, 2,656
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equate
to approximately 3.7% of the total principal balance. There are no
Home Affordable Modification Program and proprietary principal
forgiveness amounts included in the deferred amounts.

As of the Statistical Calculation Date, 94.3% of the pool is
current, 3.7% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) delinquency method, and 2.1% is in bankruptcy
(all bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).
Approximately 72.9% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30
days delinquent for at least the past 24 months under the MBA
delinquency method.

The majority of the pool (88.5%) is exempt from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay (ATR)/Qualified
Mortgage (QM) rules. The loans subject to the ATR rules are
designated as QM Safe Harbor (10.1%), QM Rebuttable Presumption
(0.2%), and non-QM (1.2%).

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from
various transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between December
2013 and June 2020 and are beneficially owned by funds managed by
affiliates of Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. Upon acquiring the
loans from the transferring trusts, FirstKey, through a wholly
owned subsidiary, Towd Point Asset Funding, LLC (the Depositor),
will contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, FirstKey,
through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
(other than any residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements. These loans were originated and previously
serviced by various entities through purchases in the secondary
market.

The loans will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(97.6%) and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (2.4%). The initial
aggregate servicing fee for the TPMT 2020-3 portfolio will be
0.1736% per annum, lower than transactions backed by similar
collateral. DBRS Morningstar stressed such servicing expenses in
its cash flow analysis to account for a potential fee increase in a
distressed scenario.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of homeowner association fees, taxes, and insurance;
installment payments on energy improvement liens; and reasonable
costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing and
disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
nonperforming loans or real estate owned (REO) properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. Bulk
sales require an asset sale price to at least equal a minimum
reserve amount of the product of (1) 62.03% and (2) the current
principal amount of the mortgage loans or REO properties as of the
bulk sale date.

When the aggregate pool balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to
less than 30.0% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the holders of more
than 50% of the Class X Certificates will have the option to cause
the Issuer to sell all of its remaining property (other than
amounts in the Breach Reserve Account) to one or more third-party
purchasers so long as the aggregate proceeds meet a minimum price.

When the aggregate pool balance is reduced to less than 10% of the
balance as of the Cut-Off Date, the majority representative as
appointed by the holder(s) of more than 50% of the notional amount
of the Class X Certificates or their affiliates, may purchase all
of the mortgage loans, REO properties, and other properties from
the Issuer so long as the aggregate proceeds meet a minimum price.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds and excess interest can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1
and more subordinate bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds
until the Class A1A, A1B, and A2 Notes are retired.

For this transaction, unlike previous TPMT reperforming loan (RPL)
deals, the representations and warranties (R&W) framework
incorporates only a realized loss event or enforceability event
review trigger. A delinquency trigger, which was in prior TPMT RPL
deals, was removed from this transaction. In addition, the R&W
framework removes the delinquency component from the calculation of
a threshold event. The absence of the delinquency component in both
the review trigger and the threshold event may prolong the length
of time before a loan is reviewed for a potential breach of R&W.
Because the TPMT RPL shelf has a long history of transactions with
no R&W putbacks and the deal incorporates a comprehensive
third-party due diligence review, DBRS Morningstar deems this
change acceptable.

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) IMPACT

The coronavirus pandemic and the resulting isolation measures have
caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in
unemployment rates and income reductions for many consumers. DBRS
Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies may continue to rise in
the coming months for many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) asset classes, some meaningfully.

RPL is a traditional RMBS asset class that consists of
securitizations backed by pools of seasoned performing and
reperforming residential home loans. Although borrowers in these
pools may have experienced delinquencies in the past, the loans
have been largely performing for the past six to 24 months since
issuance. Generally, these pools are highly seasoned and contain
sizable concentrations of previously modified loans.

As a result of the coronavirus, DBRS Morningstar expects increased
delinquencies, loans on forbearance plans, and a potential
near-term decline in the values of the mortgaged properties. Such
deteriorations may adversely affect borrowers' ability to make
monthly payments, refinance their loans, or sell properties in an
amount sufficient to repay the outstanding balance of their loans.

In connection with the economic stress assumed under its moderate
scenario (see "Global Macroeconomic Scenarios: June Update,"
published on June 1, 2020), for the RPL asset class DBRS
Morningstar applies more severe market value decline (MVD)
assumptions across all rating categories than it previously used.
DBRS Morningstar derives such MVD assumptions through a fundamental
home price approach based on the forecast unemployment rates and
GDP growth outlined in the moderate scenario. In addition, for
pools with loans on forbearance plans, DBRS Morningstar may assume
higher loss expectations above and beyond the coronavirus
assumptions. Such assumptions translate to higher expected losses
on the collateral pool and correspondingly higher credit
enhancement.

In the RPL asset class, while the full effect of the coronavirus
may not occur until a few performance cycles later, DBRS
Morningstar generally believes that loans that were previously
delinquent, recently modified, or have higher updated loan-to-value
ratios (LTVs) may be more sensitive to economic hardships resulting
from higher unemployment rates and lower incomes. Borrowers with
previous delinquencies or recent modifications have exhibited
difficulty in fulfilling payment obligations in the past and may
revert to spotty payment patterns in the near term. Higher LTV
borrowers with lower equity in their properties generally have
fewer refinance opportunities and, therefore, slower prepayments.

In addition, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act, signed into law on March 27, 2020, mandates that all
mortgagors with government-backed mortgages be allowed to delay at
least 180 days of monthly payments (followed by another period of
180 days if the mortgagor requests it). For loans not subject to
the CARES Act, servicers may still provide payment relief to
borrowers who report financial hardship related to coronavirus.
Within this pool, although not subject to the CARES Act, 2.4% of
the borrowers are on coronavirus-related forbearance or deferral
plans. These forbearance plans allow temporary payment holidays,
followed by repayment once the forbearance period ends.

For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar applied additional
assumptions to evaluate the impact of potential cash flow
disruptions on the rated tranches, stemming from (1) lower P&I
collections and (2) no servicing advances on delinquent P&I. These
assumptions include the following:

Increased delinquencies for the first 12 months at the AAA (sf) and
AA (sf) rating levels.
Increased delinquencies for the first nine months at the A (sf) and
below rating levels.

No voluntary prepayments for the first 12 months for the AAA (sf)
and AA (sf) rating levels.
No liquidation recovery for the first 12 months for the AAA (sf)
and AA (sf) rating levels.

The DBRS Morningstar ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the
timely payment of interest and full payment of principal by the
legal final maturity date in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the related notes. The DBRS Morningstar ratings of A
(sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of
interest and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity
date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
notes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TRINITAS CLO III: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to Ca
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trinitas CLO III, Ltd.:

US$21,250,000 Class D-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July
2027, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$16,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 2027
(current outstanding balance of $16,795,347.14), Downgraded to Caa1
(sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$8,000,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due July 2027
(current outstanding balance of $8,168,476.39), Downgraded to Ca
(sf); previously on April 17, 2020 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class D-R, Class E and the Class F notes. The CLO,
issued in June 2015 and partially refinanced in February 2018, is a
managed cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized primarily by a
portfolio of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating actions on the Class D-R, Class E, and the
Class F notes reflect the risks posed by credit deterioration and
loss of collateral coverage observed in the underlying CLO
portfolio, which have been primarily prompted by economic shocks
stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. Since the outbreak widened
in March, the decline in corporate credit has resulted in a
significant number of downgrades, other negative rating actions, or
defaults on the assets collateralizing the CLO. Consequently, the
default risk of the CLO portfolio has increased, the credit
enhancement available to the CLO notes has declined significantly,
and exposure to Caa-rated assets has increased. The actions also
reflect the negative credit implications of the CLO portfolio's
lower than average weighted average spread (WAS).

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) is 3287 as of June 2020, or 11.5% worse compared to 2949
reported in the February 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's
calculation also showed the WARF was failing the test level of 1784
reported in the May 2020 trustee report [2] by 1503 points. Moody's
noted that approximately 35.2% of the CLO's par was from obligors
assigned a negative outlook and 4.1% from obligors whose ratings
are on review for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on
Moody's calculation, the proportion of obligors in the portfolio
with Moody's corporate family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1
or lower (adjusted for negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade)
was approximately 18% as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's
calculated the over-collateralization (OC) ratios (excluding
haircuts) for the Class D, Class E and Class F notes as of June
2020 is at 109.3%, 102.4% and 99.4% respectively. Moody's noted
that interest was deferred on the Class E and Class F notes while
interest collections were recently applied to repay the senior
notes. Moreover, the OC tests for both the Class D and Class E
notes were recently reported in May 2020 trustee report [3] as
failing their respective trigger levels. If these failures were to
occur on the next payment date they would result in the repayment
of senior notes.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a portfolio par of
$261.2 million, defaulted par of $4.2 million, a weighted average
default probability of 22.08% (implying a WARF of 3287), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.29%, a diversity score of
43 and a weighted average spread of 3.02%. Moody's also analyzed
the CLO by incorporating an approximately $9 million par haircut in
calculating the OC and interest diversion test ratios. Finally,
Moody's also considered in its analysis restrictions on trading
resulting from the end of the reinvestment period and the CLO
manager's recent investment decisions.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. Although
the CLO manager's latitude for investment decisions and management
of the transaction has become more limited after the end of the
reinvestment period, any such activities will nonetheless also
affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2017-C3: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class G-RR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2017-C3.

UBS 2017-C3

  - Class A-1 90276GAN2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-2 90276GAP7; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3 90276GAR3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 90276GAS1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 90276GAW2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 90276GAQ5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 90276GAX0; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 90276GAY8; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D-RR 90276GAA0; LT BBBsf; Affirmed

  - Class E-RR 90276GAC6; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F-RR 90276GAE2; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class G-RR 90276GAG7; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 90276GAU6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 90276GAV4; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Loss expectations have increased since
issuance due to performance concerns associated with the Fitch
Loans of Concern and the significant economic impact of the
coronavirus pandemic. Fitch designated nine loans (29.6% of pool)
as FLOCs, including five loans (25.9%) in the top 15, two of which
(8%) are in special servicing.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC, TZA Multifamily I loan
(7.2% of pool), is secured by 14 cross-collateralized apartment
properties (2,382 units) located across the Tampa-St. Petersburg,
Sarasota, Lakeland, Orlando and Jacksonville, FL markets. The
borrower has requested coronavirus relief and is working with the
lender toward a possible solution. Per the servicer, the currently
interest-only loan had a YE 2019 NOI debt service coverage ratio of
2.05x, with an overall occupancy of 91%. However, the loan is 30+
days delinquent with a lockbox activated in May 2020. Further, the
portfolio has multiple deferred maintenance issues noted.

The Embassy Suites - Santa Ana loan (5.4%), which is secured by a
301-room full-service hotel located in Santa Ana, CA, was flagged
for declining performance even prior to the coronavirus. The loan
has been on the servicer's watchlist since August 2019 for low
DSCR. Property-level NOI declined further by 11.6% between YE 2019
and TTM March 2020; as a result, the servicer-reported NOI DSCR
dropped to 1.23x as of TTM March 2020 from 1.64x at YE 2019. As of
the March 2020 STR report, the property underperformed its
competitive set in RevPAR and ADR, with penetration rates of 96.1%
and 92.2%, respectively.

The OKC Outlets loan (5.3%), which is secured by a 394,240-sf
outlet center located in Oklahoma City, OK, was flagged for
declining NOI and significant near-term lease rollover concerns. As
of the June 2020 remittance, the loan was reported as 30 days
delinquent; however, per the servicer, the borrower has since made
a payment and is in the process of negotiating a potential workout.
Property cash flow had been trending downward prior to the
coronavirus due to increased operating expenses, primarily
advertising and marketing; NOI declined 3.4% between 2018 and 2019.
Although property occupancy was 92.6% as of September 2019, up from
89.8% at YE 2018 and 87.5% at issuance, near-term lease rollover
includes 5.5% of the NRA expiring in 2020 (across two tenants),
37.4% in 2021 (36 tenants), 23.1% in 2022 (19 tenants) and 5% in
2023 (three tenants). Fitch was not provided updated sales
information; however, around the time of issuance, tenant sales for
December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017 had already showed
same-month sales declines of 2.5%, 16.8% and 14.7%, respectively.
Additionally, Oklahoma's economy is heavily reliant upon the energy
market. The specially serviced JW Marriott Chicago loan (4.1%) is
secured by a 610-room full-service hotel located in Chicago, IL.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2020 due to
imminent monetary default. Property-level NOI declined further by
12.1% between YE 2019 and TTM March 2020; as a result, the
servicer-reported NOI DSCR dropped to 1.32x as of TTM March 2020
from 1.50x at YE 2019. Per the servicer, the borrower was granted
coronavirus relief in June 2020.

The specially serviced JW Marriott Chicago loan (4.1%) is secured
by a 610-room full-service hotel located in Chicago, IL. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in April 2020 due to imminent
monetary default. A COVID-19 relief agreement was executed with the
borrower in June 2020. The servicer-reported TTM March 2020 NOI
DSCR was 1.32x. The total senior debt on the property is
approximately $130,000 per key.

The specially serviced IC Leased Fee Hotel Portfolio loan (3.9%) is
secured by a leased fee interest in the land underneath seven
full-service hotels (2,168 keys) located across seven states. The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2019 as a result of
the borrower's failure to pay taxes; a protective advance was made
and a notice of default was issued. The borrower filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection in July 2019. The leasehold control of six
of the hotels has transitioned to the leasehold lenders and the
seventh is in receivership. Per the servicer, three of the hotels
closed permanently prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic
while another closed recently. Bankruptcy proceedings are ongoing.

The four FLOCs outside of the top 15 (3.7%) include three hotel
loans (3.3%) secured by properties located in TX, TN and AR that
were negatively affected by the coronavirus and one multifamily
loan secured by an 84-unit property located in Montgomery, AL that
has yet to stabilize following new ownership in September 2018 and
renovation delays due to the coronavirus.

Coronavirus Exposure: Nine loans (19.6% of pool) are secured by
hotel loans and 10 loans (21.9%) are secured by retail loans.
Fitch's base case analysis applied additional coronavirus-related
stresses to eight hotel loans (17.7%) and five retail loans (6.3%).
The hotel loans that were applied additional stresses have a
weighted average NOI DSCR of 1.50x and can sustain an average NOI
decline of 29.8% before NOI DSCR falls below 1.0x. The retail loans
that were applied additional stresses have a WA NOI DSCR of 1.51x
and can sustain an average NOI decline of 33.6% before NOI DSCR
falls below 1.0x. These additional stresses contributed to the
Negative Outlook revisions on classes A-S, B, C, D-RR, E-RR and
F-RR and maintaining the Negative Outlook on class G-RR.

As of the June 2020 remittance, 12 loans (31.4%) have requested
coronavirus relief; the borrowers for three of these loans (11.7%)
were granted relief and the borrower for one loan (1.1%) has
cancelled the relief request.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the June 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 1.8% to $695.8 million from $708.6 million at issuance.
Eight loans (35.3% of pool) are full-term, interest-only. An
additional five loans (24.7%) remain in their partial interest-only
period. The remaining 29 loans (40%) are currently amortizing.
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will pay down
by 10.7%. Scheduled loan maturities include three loans (13.7%) in
2022 and 39 loans (86.3%) in 2028.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans, representing
16.8% of the pool, received investment-grade credit opinions on a
stand-alone basis at issuance: Del Amo Fashion Center (7.2%;
BBBsf), 245 Park Avenue (5.5%; BBBsf) and Park West Village (4.3%;
BBB-sf).

Pari-Passu Loans: Eleven loans (54.9% of pool), all in the top 15,
are pari passu loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes A-S, B, C, D-RR, E-RR, F-RR and
G-RR reflect the potential for downgrade due to concerns
surrounding the ultimate impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the
performance concerns associated with the FLOCs.

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-SB reflect
the overall stable pool performance for the majority of the pool
and expected continued paydowns.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance. Upgrades
are not likely in the near term and would only occur with
improvement in performance of the FLOCs.

Upgrades to the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories are possible with
significant improvement in performance, credit enhancement and/or
defeasance. Upgrades to the 'BBBsf' category would also take into
account these factors but again would be limited based on the
concentration of FLOCs. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf'
if there were likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
'Bsf' and 'BBsf' categories are not likely until the later years in
the transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool
is stable and/or properties vulnerable to the coronavirus return to
pre-pandemic levels, and there is sufficient credit enhancement to
the classes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced
loans.

Downgrades to the senior 'AAAsf' rated classes are not likely due
to the position in the capital structure, but may occur should
interest shortfalls affect these classes. A downgrade of one
category to the junior 'AAAsf' rated class (class A-S) is possible
should expected losses for the pool increase and/or all of the
loans susceptible to the coronavirus pandemic suffer losses.
Downgrades to the 'AAsf', 'Asf' and 'BBBsf' categories are possible
should the larger FLOCs experience significant losses, which would
erode credit enhancement. Downgrades to the 'BBsf' and 'Bsf'
categories would occur should loss expectations increase due to a
continued decline in the performance of the FLOCs, should
additionally loans transfer to special servicing and/or should
loans susceptible to the coronavirus pandemic not stabilize.

In addition to its baseline scenario related to the coronavirus,
Fitch also envisions a downside scenario where the health crisis is
prolonged beyond 2021; should this scenario play out, Fitch expects
further negative rating actions, which may include multi-category
downgrades.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


UNITED AUTO 2020-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by United Auto Credit Securitization Trust
2020-1 (UACST 2020-1 or the Issuer):

-- $116,420,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $32,780,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $32,780,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $18,730,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)

In addition, DBRS Morningstar upgraded and finalized its
outstanding provisional ratings on the following classes of notes:

-- $31,450,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $7,360,000 Class F Notes rated B (high) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar upgraded these tranches by one notch between the
time the provisional rating report was issued and closing because
of the estimated coupons in credit enhancement cash flow exercises
versus those the Issuer obtained in pricing the transaction.

The ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of the following
analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization
(OC), subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund, and excess
spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS Morningstar-projected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption
under various stress scenarios.

-- DBRS Morningstar's projected CNL assumption includes an
assessment of how collateral performance could deteriorate because
of macroeconomic stresses related to the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic.

-- The transaction assumptions include an increase to the expected
loss. The transaction assumptions consider DBRS Morningstar's set
of macroeconomic scenarios for select economies related to the
coronavirus, available in its commentary "Global Macroeconomic
Scenarios: June Update," published on June 1, 2020. DBRS
Morningstar initially published macroeconomic scenarios on April
16, 2020. The scenarios were updated on June 1, 2020, and are
reflected in DBRS Morningstar's rating analysis. The assumptions
also take into consideration observed performance during the
2008–09 financial crisis and the possible impact of the stimulus
from the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act.

-- The assumptions consider the moderate macroeconomic scenario
outlined in the commentary (the moderate scenario serving as the
primary anchor for current ratings). The moderate scenario assumes
some success in containment of the coronavirus within Q2 2020 and a
gradual relaxation of restrictions, enabling most economies to
begin a gradual economic recovery in Q3 2020.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

(2) UACST 2020-1 provides for a Class C Notes coverage multiple
that is slightly below the DBRS Morningstar range of multiples set
forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS Morningstar
believes that this is warranted, given the magnitude of expected
loss, company history, and structural features of the transaction.

(3) United Auto Credit Corporation's (UACC or the Company)
capabilities with regard to originations, underwriting, and
servicing and the existence of an experienced and capable backup
servicer.

(4) DBRS Morningstar has performed an operational risk review of
UACC and considers the entity an acceptable originator and servicer
of subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
servicer.

(5) The Company's senior management team has considerable
experience and a successful track record within the auto finance
industry.

(6) UACC successfully consolidated its business into a centralized
servicing platform and consolidated originations into two regional
buying centers. The Company retained experienced managers and staff
at the servicing center and buying centers.

(7) UACC continues to evaluate and fine-tune its underwriting
standards as necessary. The Company has a risk management system
allowing centralized oversight of all underwriting and substantial
technology systems, which provide daily metrics on all
originations, servicing, and collections of loans.

(8) The credit quality of the collateral and performance of the
Company's auto loan portfolio.

(9) UACC originates collateral that generally has shorter terms,
higher down payments, lower book values, and higher borrower income
requirements than some other subprime auto loan originators.

(10) UACST 2020-1 provides for Class F Notes with an assigned
rating of B (sf). While DBRS Morningstar's "Rating U.S. Retail Auto
Loan Securitizations" methodology does not set forth a range of
multiples for this asset class at the B (sf) level, the analytical
approach for this rating level is consistent with that contemplated
by the methodology. The typical range of multiples DBRS Morningstar
applies in its stress analysis for a B (sf) rating is 1.00 times
(x) to 1.25x.

(11) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions, which
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
nonconsolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with UACC, that the
trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the assets,
and the consistency with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for
U.S. Structured Finance."

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


VENTURE LTD XIX: Moody's Confirms B3 Rating on Class F-RR Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Venture XIX CLO, Limited:

US$36,500,000 Class D-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2032 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), confirmed at Baa3 (sf);
previously on April 17, 2020 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$25,000,000 Class E-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2032 (the "Class E-RR Notes"), confirmed at Ba3 (sf);
previously on April 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$7,900,000 Class F-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2032 (the "Class F-RR Notes"), confirmed at B3 (sf);
previously on April 17, 2020 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

These actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020 on the Class D-RR Notes, Class E-RR Notes and Class F-RR
Notes. The CLO, originally issued in January 2015, partially
refinanced in December 2016 and refinanced in full in December
2018, is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes are collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end on
January 2024.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Despite the credit quality deterioration stemming from the
coronavirus outbreak, Moody's concluded that the expected losses on
the Class D-RR Notes, the Class E-RR Notes and the Class F-RR Notes
continue to be consistent with the current ratings after taking
into account the CLO's latest portfolio, its relevant structural
features and its actual over-collateralization levels.
Consequently, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on the Class D-RR
Notes, the Class E-RR Notes and the Class F-RR Notes.

Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
was 3021 as of June 2020, or 10.9% worse compared to 2724 reported
in the March 2020 trustee report [1]. Moody's noted that
approximately 31% of the CLO's par was from obligors assigned a
negative outlook and approximately 4% from obligors whose ratings
are on review for possible downgrade. Additionally, based on
Moody's calculation, the proportion of obligors in the portfolio
with Moody's corporate family or other equivalent ratings of Caa1
or lower (adjusted for negative outlook or watchlist for downgrade)
was approximately 17.1% as of June 2020. Furthermore, Moody's
calculated the total collateral par balance, including recoveries
from defaulted securities, at approximately $583.9 million, or
about $16.1 million less than the deal's ramp-up target par
balance, and Moody's calculated the over-collateralization ratios
(excluding haircuts) for the Class D-RR Notes and Class E-RR Notes
as of June 2020 at 110.88% and 105.83%, respectively. Moody's noted
that according to the June 2020 trustee report [2], the WARF and
other collateral quality tests, all the OC tests as well as the
interest diversion test were passing.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $572.7 million, defaulted par of
$21.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 25.43%
(implying a WARF of 3021), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 46.86%, a diversity score of 109 and a weighted average
spread of 3.68%. Finally, Moody's also considered in its analysis
the CLO manager's recent investment decisions and trading
strategies.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the US economy gradually recovers in
the second half of the year and corporate credit conditions
generally stabilize.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of corporate assets from the collapse
in the US economic activity in the second quarter and a gradual
recovery in the second half of the year. However, that outcome
depends on whether governments can reopen their economies while
also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge in
infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty in the
performance of the related CLO's underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. In
particular, the length and severity of the economic and credit
shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will have a
significant impact on the performance of the securities. The CLO
manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Class K Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2007-C30.

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C30

  - Class E 92978QAN7; LT CCsf; Affirmed

  - Class F 92978QAP2; LT Dsf; Affirmed

  - Class G 92978QAR8; LT Dsf; Affirmed

  - Class H 92978QAT4; LT Dsf; Affirmed

  - Class J 92978QAV9; LT Dsf; Affirmed

  - Class K 92978QAX5; LT Dsf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations; Concentration of Specially Serviced
Loans/Assets: Two loans remain in the pool and both are in special
servicing. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans
based on the likelihood of repayment and expects losses for these
assets to be significant based on the servicer's most recent
values.

Specially Serviced Loans: The largest loan, Mercedes-Benz Central
Parts Warehouse (58% of pool), secured by a 518,400-sf industrial
warehouse in Vance, AL, transferred to special servicing in May
2016 for imminent maturity default. The property is 100% leased to
Mercedes-Benz US Industrial through October 2020. Per servicer
updates, the forbearance agreement expired in January 2019. The
borrower submitted a proposal to pay off the loan at a deep
discount in 2019, but the payoff request was declined by the
special servicer. The tenant has given notice of one-year lease
extension with a rent increase based on CPI, which the borrower and
tenant are finalizing. Also, the borrower and special servicer are
in discussions for a one-year extension to the previously expired
forbearance agreement.

The second loan, Silver Oak - Medical Office Building (42%),
secured by a 76,281-sf medical office building in Norfolk, VA
transferred back to special servicing in December 2018 for imminent
monetary default. The loan matured in February 2019 after being
extended for an additional two years. The property is 94% leased to
U.S. Oncology through December 2021. Cash flow continues to be
collected. The special servicer has declined the borrower's
proposals to extend the loan again and is moving forward with
foreclosure.

Decline in Credit Enhancement: Since Fitch's last rating action, CE
has declined on the remaining classes due to losses from the
disposition of two loans, which was anticipated at the prior
review. The two loans, N.J. Industrial and Office Pool and N.J.
Office Pool, were disposed with a combined $58.5 million balance at
disposition and a $33.2 million loss to the trust. As of the June
2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 99.6% to $33.7 million from $7.9 billion at
issuance. There have been $630.3 million (8% of original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Cumulative interest shortfalls
of $110.8 million are currently affecting classes F through S.

Exposure to Coronavirus Pandemic: Two specially serviced loans
remain in the pool. While there is no direct impact from
coronavirus, property performance and workout strategies may be
impacted with an economic downturn.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

A downgrade of class E to 'Csf' or 'Dsf' is considered possible if
expected losses on the specially serviced loans increase or are
realized.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades are currently not expected given the concentration of
specially serviced loans but are possible if valuations improve
significantly and losses are lower than currently expected.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C10: Moody's Cuts Class F Certs to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
and downgraded the ratings on five classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C10, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2012-C10 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2020 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on one IO class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The ratings on four P&I class were downgraded due to a decline in
pool performance driven primarily by exposure to regional malls
representing 19% of the outstanding pooled balance that have
experienced a decline in performance. The loans include Dayton
Mall, Rogue Valley Mall, Animas Valley Mall and Towne Mall.

The rating on one IO Class, Cl. X-B, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in the United States' economic activity in the second
quarter and a gradual recovery in the second half of the year.
However, that outcome depends on whether governments can reopen
their economies while also safeguarding public health and avoiding
a further surge in infections. As a result, the degree of
uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards
the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework,
given the substantial implications for public health and safety.
Stress on commercial real estate properties will be most directly
stemming from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related
to conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot
traffic and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 7.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 2020 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $1.03 billion from
$1.31 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 57% of the pool. One loan, constituting
11% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Thirteen loans, constituting 6.3% of the pool, have
full-defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, the same as at Moody's last review.

As of the June 2020 remittance report, loans representing 94% were
current or within their grace period on their debt service payments
and 6% were over 60 days delinquent.

Fourteen loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 15% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $67 million (a 42% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans. The largest troubled loan is Dayton Mall
(7.6% of the pool), which is discussed in further detail below. The
second largest troubled loan is the Rogue Valley Mall loan ($50.6
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 453,935 square
feet component of an approximately 640,000 SF two-story regional
mall located in Medford, Oregon. The mall has two non-collateral
anchors, Macy's and Kohl's, and two collateral anchors, JCPenney
and Macy's Home Store. The mall is the dominant mall in the trade
area and the only enclosed regional mall within a 100-mile radius.
Performance has been stable in securitization, however performance
declined in 2019 due to a decline in expense reimbursements and
percentage rent. The loan is past due the April 2020 payment date
and Moody's considers this loan as a troubled loan.

The other troubled loans are secured by an industrial property
located in Philadelphia, PA, an office property located in Florham
Park, NJ and a lodging property located in Jericho, NY.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2019 operating results for 98% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 94%, compared to 95% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 21% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.27X,
respectively, compared to 1.62X and 1.24X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Concord Mills
Loan ($110.0 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which represents a
pari-passu participation of a $235 million mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a 1.28 million square foot super-regional mall
located in Concord, North Carolina. Major tenants include Bass Pro
Shops Outdoor, Burlington Coat Factory and AMC Corporation. The
mall was 96% leased as of September 2019 compared to 97% in June
2018. Inline occupancy for the same period was 89% compared to 92%.
Property performance has improved since securitization, however the
2019 NOI has declined slightly since 2018. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.31X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Republic Plaza Loan ($115 million -- 11.2% of
the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a $257.9
million loan. The loan is secured by a 56-story Class-A trophy
office tower and a separate 12-story parking garage located in
downtown Denver, Colorado. Major tenants include Encana Oil & Gas,
DCP Midstream, LP and Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP. The tower was
82% leased as of March 2020, compared to 96% at year-end 2019 and
95% at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and
0.88X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.87X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Dayton Mall Loan ($78 million --
7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 778,500 SF, two-story
regional mall located in Dayton, Ohio. The mall's current anchor
tenants include Macy's (non-collateral), JC Penney (collateral) and
Dick's Sporting Goods (collateral). Sears, a prior non-collateral
anchor, closed at this location during 2018. The mall has had other
major tenants shutter due to bankruptcy including a 203,000 SF
Elder Beerman (non-collateral) in early 2018 and a 30,000 SF
HHgregg (collateral) in 2017. The former HHgregg space has since
been replaced by Ross Dress for Less which opened in October 2019.
The total mall was 92% leased as of March 2020, compared to 88% in
September 2019 and 92% at securitization. Excluding the vacant
anchor spaces (Sears and Elder Beerman), total occupancy is
approximately 66%. As of September 2019, inline occupancy was 71%
compared to 79% in June 2018. Property performance has steadily
declined since securitization and year-end 2019 NOI is 41% lower
than securitization. Due to the decline in NOI and DSCR, Moody's
considers this as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the STAG REIT Portfolio Loan ($49.8
million -- 4.8% of the pool), which was originally secured by 28
industrial buildings totaling 3.6 million SF and located throughout
eight states. Four of the properties have since defeased and one
has been released and currently only 23 properties remain totaling
3.3 million SF. The portfolio was 92% leased as of December 2019,
compared to 96% in December 2018 and 98% at securitization.
Excluding the defeased properties, Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 68% and 1.63X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.58X at the
last review.

There are two additional loans that are secured by malls in
tertiary markets which have experienced declines in operating
performance since securitization. The Animas Valley Mall Loan
($44.6 million -- 4.3% of the pool), is secured by an approximately
477,000 SF regional mall located in Farmington, New Mexico. It is
the only regional enclosed mall in the trade area (30 miles radius)
and the only regional mall serving the Farmington MSA and the Four
Corners market of NM, CO, AZ and UT. The mall was 90% leased as of
December 2019 and the inline occupancy was 62% as of March 2020.
However, as of February 2020, Sears (14% of net rentable area) has
closed at this location. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 127% and
1.0X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.99X at the last review.

The other mall with a decline in performance is the Towne Mall Loan
($20 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 354,000 SF
regional shopping mall located along the primary commercial
district in Elizabethtown, Kentucky approximately three miles south
of the CBD. Sears (20% of NRA) closed in October 2019 and was
temporarily replaced by a Spirit Halloween store. The loan is on
the watchlist due to low DSCR, as a result of declining occupancy
since 2015. The total mall was 87% leased as of March 2020,
unchanged from June 2018 and compared to 94% at year-end 2015. The
property would be 69% leased without the Spirit Halloween tenant.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.99X, respectively,
compared to 122% and 0.99X at the last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C7: Moody's Cuts Class G Debt to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
and downgraded the ratings on six classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C7 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2020 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings five on the P&I classes were downgraded due to the
decline in performance and upcoming refinance risk of four loans
secured by regional malls; Northridge Fashion Center (14.7% of the
pool), Town Center at Cobb (12.7% of the pool), Florence Mall (9.8%
of the pool), and Fashion Square (3.7% of the pool), and the
anticipated losses from troubled loans.

The ratings on one IO class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-B, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes. The IO
Class references seven P&I classes including Class H, which is not
rated by Moody's.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in the United States' economic activity in the second
quarter and a gradual recovery in the second half of the year.
However, that outcome depends on whether governments can reopen
their economies while also safeguarding public health and avoiding
a further surge in infections. As a result, the degree of
uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards
the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework,
given the substantial implications for public health and safety.
Stress on commercial real estate properties will be most directly
stemming from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related
to conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot
traffic and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 5.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 2020 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $918 million from $1.10
billion at securitization. The certificates are collateralized by
54 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 15% of the
pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance) constituting
65% of the pool. Sixteen loans, constituting 15% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, the same as at Moody's last review.

As of the June 2020 remittance report, loans representing 70% were
current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 1% were beyond their grace period but less than 30 days
delinquent and 24% were between 30 -- 59 days delinquent.

Twelve loans, constituting 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, of which eight loans, representing 31% of the
pool, indicate the borrower has requested relief in relation to
coronavirus impact on the property. The watchlist includes loans
that meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $5.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 32%). Four loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing and transferred to special servicing
since March 2020. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Florence Mall loan ($90 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 384,000 SF component of a 957,000 SF regional mall
located in Florence, Kentucky, approximately 12 miles from the
Cincinnati CBD. The property, which is also sponsored by Brookfield
following their acquisition of GGP, is anchored by Macy's, Macy's
Home Store, JCPenney, and Cinemark Theater. With the exception of
14-screen movie theater, all of the anchor boxes are not part of
the loan collateral. Additionally, the non-collateral anchor space
formerly occupied by Sears went dark in November 2018. As of March
2020, the total mall was 79% occupied, unchanged from the prior
review and compared to 96% as of December 2017. As of December
2019, inline occupancy was to 77%, the same as at the prior review.
However, several in-line tenants are on year-to-year leases.
Property performance has declined since the last review and the
year-end 2019 performance remains below underwritten levels. The
remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by two lodging
properties and one retail property. The remaining three specially
serviced loans are secured by two lodging properties and one retail
property.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 17% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $82 million (a 31% expected loss on average)
from these specially serviced and troubled loans. The largest
troubled loan is the Town Center at Cobb Loan ($116.8 million --
12.7% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a $180
million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 560,000 square foot
portion of a 1.3 million SF super-regional mall located in
Kennesaw, Georgia. The property, which is sponsored by Simon
Properties, opened in 1985, was expanded in 1996, and renovated in
2009-2011. The property is anchored by a Macy's, Macy's Furniture,
JC Penney, Sears, and Belk. All of the anchors own their own boxes,
with the exception of Belk and a portion of the JC Penney space.
Sears will be closing its store at this property. Property
performance has declined over the past three years, and the
year-end 2019 performance was below underwritten levels primarily
due to a decline in base rents and expense reimbursements. The
occupancy of the collateral component of the property is 85% as of
March 2020, compared to 84% in December 2019. The loan is past due
the April 2020 payment, and has requested relief as a result of the
coronavirus outbreak.

The second largest troubled loan is the Fashion Square Loan ($34
million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 446,000 square
foot component of a 788,000 SF regional mall located in located in
Saginaw, Michigan. The property is anchored by Macy's and JCPenney,
with only the JCPenney being part of the loan collateral.
Additionally, the non-collateral anchor space formerly occupied by
Sears went dark in October 2019. As of August 2019, the total mall
was 89% leased, however when accounting for the Sears closure, the
occupancy dips to 71%. In July 2016, the former sponsor, CBL &
Associates Properties, sold Fashion Square Mall and The Lakes Mall
in Muskegon, to Namdar Realty for $66.5 million, and Namdar has now
assumed this loan. Moody's anticipates a loss from this loan.
Operating performance of the mall has declined since securitization
and continues to deteriorate.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2019 operating results for 91% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, unchanged from Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 17% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 1.61X and 1.23X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest performing loan is the Northridge Fashion Center Loan
($135 million -- 14.7% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion of a $212 million first-mortgage. The loan is secured by a
644,000 SF component of a 1.5 million SF, two-story, super-regional
mall located in Northridge, California. The property is sponsored
by Brookfield Property Partners following their acquisition of
General Growth Properties. The mall's non-collateral anchors
include Macy's, Macy's Men and Home and JC Penney. The
non-collateral anchor space formerly occupied by Sears went dark in
2018. However, excluding Sears, the total property was 80% occupied
as of December 2019, compared to 81% as of December 2018. Property
performance declined in 2019 due to a decrease in collateral
occupancy and increased expenses but has generally improved since
securitization due to higher rental revenues. The loan has
amortized 14% since securitization and the Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 96% and 1.08X, respectively.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C8: Moody's Cuts Class G Certs to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on one class,
confirmed the ratings on one class and affirmed the ratings on
eleven classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C8,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C8 as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2020 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2019 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the nine P&I classes were affirmed and one P&I class
was confirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio and the transaction's Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on one P&I class, Cl. G, was downgraded due to the
decline in performance and upcoming refinance risk of loans secured
by regional malls including the Northridge Fashion Center (8.2% of
the pool) and Town Center at Cobb (6.7% of the pool).

The ratings on the two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

The actions conclude the review for downgrade initiated on April
17, 2020.

The rapid spread of the coronavirus outbreak, the government
measures put in place to contain it and the deteriorating global
economic outlook, have created a severe and extensive credit shock
across sectors, regions and markets. Its analysis has considered
the effect on the performance of commercial real estate from the
collapse in US economic activity in the second quarter and a
gradual recovery in the second half of the year. However, that
outcome depends on whether governments can reopen their economies
while also safeguarding public health and avoiding a further surge
in infections. As a result, the degree of uncertainty around its
forecasts is unusually high. Moody's regards the coronavirus
outbreak as a social risk under its ESG framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety. Stress on
commercial real estate properties will be most directly stemming
from declines in hotel occupancies (particularly related to
conference or other group attendance) and declines in foot traffic
and sales for non-essential items at retail properties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in May 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 17, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 28% to $933 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 67 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 57% of the pool. Twenty-four loans,
constituting 19.6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

As of the June 2020 remittance report, loans representing 91% were
current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 1% were beyond their grace period but less than 30 days
delinquent and 7% were between 30 -- 59 days delinquent.

Six loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, of which one loan, representing 6.7% of the
pool, indicate the borrower has requested relief in relation to
coronavirus impact on the property. The watchlist includes loans
that meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a minimal
loss to the trust. One loan, constituting 0.7% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Springhill Suites - San Angelo Loan ($6.6 million -- 0.7% of the
pool), which is secured by which is secured by a 96-key limited
service hotel, built in 2010 and located in San Angelo, Texas. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in May 2016 for imminent
monetary default, was foreclosed upon in December 2017 and is now
REO. A property improvement plan was completed in 2018 and the
asset manager continues to work with the property manager to
monitor coronavirus impact on the property and develop an updated
business plan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 9.8% of the pool. The largest
troubled loan is the Town Center at Cobb Loan ($62.9 million --
6.7% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a $180
million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 560,000 square foot
portion of a 1.3 million SF super-regional mall located in
Kennesaw, Georgia. The property, which is sponsored by Simon
Properties, opened in 1985, was expanded in 1996, and renovated in
2009-2011. The property is anchored by a Macy's, Macy's Furniture,
JC Penney, Sears, and Belk. All of the anchors own their own boxes,
with the exception of Belk and a portion of the JC Penney space.
Sears will be closing its store at this property. Property
performance has declined over the past three years, and the
year-end 2019 performance was below underwritten levels primarily
due to a decline in base rents and expense reimbursements. The
occupancy of the collateral component of the property is 85% as of
March 2020, compared to 84% in December 2019. The loan is past due
the April 2020 payment, and has requested relief as a result of the
coronavirus outbreak.

The second largest troubled loan is the Laguna Pavilion Loan ($10.1
million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 64,811 SF
retail property located in Elk Grove, CA. Property performance has
declined since 2017 and has two upcoming tenant bankruptcy related
store closures. Pier 1 (13.93% of net rentable area) and Tuesday
Morning (13.42% of NRA) have filed for bankruptcy and will be
vacating the property.

Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $35.8 million (a 36%
expected loss on average) from the specially serviced and troubled
loans.

Moody's received full year 2019 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2020 operating results for 59% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 88% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.60X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.67X and 1.24X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 30% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 100 Church Street Loan ($135.1 million -- 14.5%
of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a $207.1
million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.1 million, Class
B office property in downtown Manhattan. As of March 2020, the
property was 98% leased, largely unchanged since 2019 and up from
84% at securitization. Property performance has improved since
securitization due to higher revenues and the 2019 reported NOI was
52% higher than 2012. The loan has amortized 10% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.09X at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Northridge Fashion Center Loan
($76.7 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
portion of a $211.7 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
644,000 SF portion of a 1.5 million SF super-regional mall located
in Northridge, California. The property is sponsored by Brookfield
Property Partners following their acquisition of General Growth
Properties. The mall's non-collateral anchors include Macy's,
Macy's Men's and Home, and JC Penney. The non-collateral anchor
space formerly occupied by Sears went dark in 2018. As of December
2019, the in-line space was 96% leased, compared to 98% in December
2018. However, excluding Sears, the total property was 80% occupied
as of December 2019, compared to 81% as of December 2018. Property
performance declined in 2019 due to a decrease in collateral
occupancy and increased expenses but has generally improved since
securitization due to higher rental revenues. The loan has
amortized 14% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 96% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.12X at
Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the BJ's Portfolio Loan ($68.1 million --
7.3% of the pool), which is secured by the first mortgage liens on
six properties consisting of five retail stores of BJ's Wholesale
Club and one industrial center serving as a BJ's Distribution
facility. The portfolio is located in five different states:
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey and Florida. The
portfolio is 100% occupied by a single tenant, BJ's Wholesale Club,
Inc. with all lease expirations in September 2031. Due to the
single tenant exposure, Moody's valuation reflects a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 1.12X at Moody's last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at Bsf
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-C17 pass-through certificates.

WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C17

  - Class A-3 92938GAC2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 92938GAD0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 92938GAF5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 92938GAE8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 92938GAJ7; LT AAsf; Affirmed

  - Class C 92938GAK4; LT Asf; Affirmed

  - Class D 92938GAN8; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 92938GAQ1; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class F 92938GAS7; LT Bsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 92938GAG3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 92938GAH1; LT AAsf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Generally Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The overall
performance of the pool has been generally stable since issuance.
However, three loans representing less than 3% of the pool are in
special servicing; only one is non-performing. The non-performing
loan is secured by a 108-unit multifamily property in Washington,
D.C. The loan transferred to the special servicer for monetary
default despite the collateral property generating adequate cash
flow to make all debt service payments. The servicer is currently
pursuing foreclosure. In addition to the specially serviced loans,
there are two Fitch Loans of Concern totaling 4.79% of the pool's
balance and eight loans totaling 8.64% of the pool are on the
servicer's watchlist, of which, two are FLOCs.

The largest FLOC is the Rockwall Market Center loan (3.5% of the
pool). The loan is secured by a three-building, 209,054 sf retail
power center located in Rockwall, TX, approximately 25 miles
northeast of Dallas. Largest tenants at the subject include Burke's
Outlet Store (16% of NRA), Ross Dress for Less (14% of NRA), and
Michael's (11% of NRA). While the subject's performance has
remained relatively stable, the loan is currently due for the June
and July 2020 payments. As of March 2020, occupancy and NOI DSCR
were reported to be 98% and 1.77x, respectively. The borrower has
notified the servicer of coronavirus-related hardships and a
forbearance request is under review.

Increased Credit Enhancement; Paydown and Defeasance: The pool has
paid down approximately 29% since issuance. Fifteen loans, totaling
10.89% of the pool's balance, are defeased. The paydown and
defeasance has led to increases in credit enhancement. The
defeasance has also reduced the pool-level exposure to
non-traditional properties such as mixed-use, self-storage and
manufactured housing properties.

Coronavirus Exposure: Fitch performed additional haircuts on eight
hotel properties (10% of the pool), twelve retail properties (13%
of the pool), and one multifamily property (less than 1% of the
pool), due to exposure to the coronavirus. There was no impact to
the ratings from these additional stresses.

Additional Considerations

Property Type Concentrations: Excluding the defeased loans,
approximately 33.1%, 26.9%, and 12.9% of the loans in the pool are
secured by retail, hotel, and office properties, respectively.

Maturity Concentration: Excluding the defeased loans, the remaining
loans are scheduled to mature in 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable due to generally
stable performance within the pool.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or continued
defeasance. Upgrades to classes B and C would occur with increased
paydown and/or defeasance combined with increased performance.
Upgrades to classes D through F are not likely unless performance
of the FLOCs stabilize and if the performance of the remaining pool
is continuing to increase. As the remaining loans in the pool do
not mature until 2023, Fitch does not foresee upgrades.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming loans. Downgrades to the classes rated
'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to the position in the
capital structure, but may occur at 'AAsf' or 'Asf' should interest
shortfalls occur. Downgrades to classes E and F are possible should
defaults occur or loss expectations increase or performance of the
FLOCs fail to stabilize or decline further.

In addition to its baseline scenario, Fitch also envisions a
downside scenario where the health crisis is prolonged beyond 2021.
Should this scenario play out, Fitch expects that a greater
percentage of classes may be assigned a Negative Rating Outlook or
those with Negative Rating Outlooks will be downgraded one or more
categories.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).


WORLDWIDE PLAZA 2017-WWP: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-WWP issued by Worldwide Plaza Trust
2017-WWP (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These certificates are currently also rated by DBRS Morningstar's
affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR). In
connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS Morningstar and
MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed its outstanding
ratings of these certificates Under Review–Analytical Integration
Review and that MCR intended to withdraw its outstanding ratings;
such withdrawal will occur on or about July 16, 2020. In accordance
with MCR's engagement letter covering these certificates, upon
withdrawal of MCR's outstanding ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn MCR
ratings.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) sizing benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The subject loan is secured by a 1.8 million-square-foot (sf)
multitenant Manhattan, New York, office property and a pledge of
membership interests, with a collateral assignment of certain
mortgages on the property's amenities parcel. The Issuer used loan
proceeds of $940.0 million and $260.0 million of mezzanine debt to
facilitate the recapitalization financing of the collateral and
cover closing costs. In conjunction with the recapitalization, SL
Green Realty Corp. and RXR Real Estate Value Added Fund – Fund
III LP. acquired a 48.7% ownership interest from New York REIT,
Inc. which previously owned 98.8% of the property. New York REIT,
Inc. retained 50.1% ownership in the property; George Comfort &
Sons, Inc. retained a 1.2% interest. The Issuer contributed two
senior A notes inclusive of the controlling note, with an aggregate
principal balance of $381.3 and two junior notes, with an aggregate
principal balance of $323.7 million, to the WPT 2017-WWP mortgage
trust. Noncontrolling A notes with a combined $235.0 million trust
balance are included in the GSMS 2017-GS8, BMARK 2018-B1, BMARK
2018-B2, and GSMS 2018-GS9 securitizations.

The two largest tenants, Nomura Holdings America, Inc. (Nomura) and
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP. (Cravath), collectively account for
66.8% of net rentable area (NRA) and 73.1% of total DBRS
Morningstar gross base rent. Nomura, representing 40.0% of NRA and
34.2% of DBRS Morningstar gross base rent, uses the space at the
property for its North American headquarters. The average
contractual rent for Nomura was $45.27 per sf (psf) at issuance,
which was 31.8% below the appraiser's market levels of $66.47 psf
for the space. Nomura is an investment-grade tenant and has a lease
expiry in September 2033, but the leases also contain a contraction
option for up to 10.0% of its total NRA for the five-year period
commencing in February 2022 and a one-time termination right for
all of its space in January 2027, following an 18-month notice
period. Cravath, representing 26.8% of NRA and 38.9% of DBRS
Morningstar gross base rent, uses the space for its headquarters
and occupied the highest floors at the property. Cravath's
contractual rental rate at issuance of $92.80 psf was 17.8% above
the appraiser's market rent levels of $78.76 psf for its space.
Cravath's current lease has a lease expiration date in August 2024.
As of April 2020,the tenant is subleasing the entire 31st floor to
McCarter & English LLP and portions of the 18th floor to Heritage
Realty LLC and AMA Consulting Engineers, P.C. Cravath confirmed in
October 2019 that it plans to relocate its headquarters from the
subject property to Two Manhattan West in 2024. While the sponsors
have four years to backfill the space currently leased by Cravath,
the loan was structured with a Cravath rollover reserve account,
which will begin sweeping cash on August 31, 2023, until the
aggregate amount deposited equals $42.4 million, equal to $76.96
psf.

Per Reis, the collateral is in the Midtown West submarket, which is
part of the greater New York Metro office market. Reis reported a
submarket vacancy rate of 7.9% and asking rate of $72.67 psf for Q1
2020, but forecast the submarket vacancy rate to increase to 11.3%
and the asking rent to decrease to $63.30 psf by 2024. The Class A
office properties within the submarket for Q1 2020 exhibited a
vacancy rate of 7.0% and asking rate of $79.51 psf, which compares
favorably relative to the general office submarket. The building's
location in the Eighth Avenue corridor is tenanted by many
financial-services companies, publishing houses, and law firms
because of the convenient access to retail and transportation. The
50th Street subway station, serving the C and E Lines with direct
connections to Penn Station, the Port Authority Bus Terminal, and
Grand Central Station, is connected to the building. The property's
in-place physical occupancy rate of 5.8% as of December 2019 was
below the 2.0% in-place vacancy rate at issuance in October 2017,
but the collateral has outperformed the submarket in terms of
occupancy rate since issuance.

The DBRS Morningstar net cash flow (NCF) derived at issuance was
re-analyzed for the subject rating action to confirm its
consistency with the "DBRS Morningstar North American Commercial
Real Estate Property Analysis Criteria." The resulting NCF figure
was $73.1 million and a cap rate of 6.75% was applied, resulting in
a DBRS Morningstar Value of $1.1 billion, a variance of -37.8% from
the appraised value at issuance of $1.7 billion. The NCF figure
applied as part of the analysis represents a -14.1% variance from
the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven by rental rate markdowns and
leasing costs. The DBRS Morningstar Value implies an LTV of 86.8%
on the first mortgage compared with the LTV of 54.0% on the
appraised value at issuance. On the total debt stack, the DBRS
Morningstar Value represents an LTV of 110.9% compared with the
appraised LTV of 69.0%. As of YE2019, the servicer reported a NCF
figure of $76.9, a -5.0% variance from the DBRS Morningstar NCF
figure, primarily a function of leasing costs.

The cap rate applied is at the lower end of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for office properties, reflective of
the location, market position, and quality. In addition, the 6.75%
cap rate applied is above the implied cap rate of 4.89% based on
the Issuer's underwritten NCF and appraised value.

DBRS Morningstar made positive qualitative adjustments to the final
LTV sizing benchmarks used for this rating analysis, totaling 4.5%
to account for cash flow volatility, property quality, and market
fundamentals.

Class X-A is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


[*] S&P Takes Actions on 49 Classes From 36 U.S. Housing ABS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 49 classes from 36 U.S.
manufactured housing asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions
issued between 1996 and 2002. It raised nine, lowered two, and
affirmed 38 ratings.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution
of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is
that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions,
but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is
widely available, which may not occur until the second half of
2021.

"We are using this assumption in assessing the economic and credit
implications associated with the pandemic. As the situation
evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly,"
S&P said.

All of the affected transactions were formerly serviced by Ditech
Financial. In October of 2019, New Residential Investment Corp.
acquired certain assets from Ditech Holding Corp. Part of that
acquisition was made up of manufactured housing assets, which were
transferred to Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (an NRZ-owned
business) in March 2020.

The rating actions reflect the transactions' collateral performance
to date S&P's views regarding future collateral performance, the
transactions' structures, and the credit enhancement available.
Furthermore, S&P's analysis incorporated secondary credit factors
such as credit stability, payment priorities under certain
scenarios, and sector- and issuer-specific analysis.

The upgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the growth in credit
enhancement for the affected classes in the form of subordination,
which the rating agency expects will mitigate the impact of losses
being higher than originally expected for these pools.

"The lowered ratings reflect our view that the available credit
enhancement, which continues to deteriorate for the affected
classes, is no longer sufficient to support our previous ratings.
Despite the lowering of these ratings, the related class
noteholders are currently receiving full and timely interest based
on the outstanding principal note balance," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our view that the total credit support as
a percentage of the amortizing pool balances, compared with our
expected remaining cumulative net losses, is sufficient to support
the current ratings. For Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2000-4, we affirmed our 'AA (sf)'
rating on the class A-3 certificates based on our 'AA' financial
strength rating on Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., the bond
insurer," the rating agency said.

The affirmation on the class A-3 certificates reflects a guarantee
insurance policy that is provided by Assured Guaranty Municipal
Corp. (Assured), the bond insurer, to pay any principal or interest
shortfalls that may arise. Assured has made claims payments on
principal and interest payment shortfalls that have occurred since
the November 2014 determination date, and S&P believes that Assured
will continue to honor its obligations to make up any shortfalls in
principal and/or interest payments.

The affirmed 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect S&P's view
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected losses for these classes. As defined in its criteria,
the 'CCC (sf)' level ratings reflect S&P's view that the related
classes are still vulnerable to nonpayment and are dependent upon
favorable business, financial, and economic conditions in order to
be paid interest and/or principal according to the terms of each
transaction. Additionally, the 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect S&P's view
that the related classes remain virtually certain to default.

Each transaction was initially structured with
overcollateralization (O/C) and subordination. However, due to
higher-than-expected losses, the O/C on each of these transactions
has been depleted to zero, and many of the subordinated classes
have experienced principal write-downs.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of the transactions
relative to their cumulative net loss expectations and the
available credit enhancement. We will take rating actions as we
consider appropriate," S&P said.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

            https://bit.ly/38VkWBs


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 101 Classes From 26 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 101 classes from 26 U.S.
RMBS transactions issued between 2001 and 2007. All of these
transactions are backed by subprime collateral. The review yielded
11 upgrades, 10 downgrades, 78 affirmations, and two
discontinuances.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the rate of
spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some government
authorities estimate the pandemic will peak around midyear, and the
rating agency is using this assumption in assessing the economic
and credit implications.

"In our view, the measures adopted to contain COVID-19 have pushed
the global economy into recession. Our views also consider that the
loans supporting the RMBS in the rating actions are significantly
seasoned and are to borrowers that have weathered the Great
Recession, a period of significant economic stress. As the
situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates
accordingly," S&P said.

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Some of these considerations may include:

-- Factors related to COVID-19;
-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization;
-- Payment priority,
-- Loan modifications,
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
and
-- Expected short duration.

RATING ACTIONS

"The rating changes reflect our opinion regarding the associated
transaction-specific collateral performance or structural
characteristics, or reflect the application of specific criteria
applicable to these classes. See the ratings list below for the
specific rationales associated with each of the classes with rating
transitions," S&P said.

"The ratings affirmations reflect our opinion that our projected
credit support and collateral performance on these classes has
remained relatively consistent with our prior projections," the
rating agency said.

S&P lowered its rating on class M-1 from 2004-CB8 Trust due to
ultimate interest repayments being unlikely at the previous rating
level, based on the rating agency's assessment of missed interest
payments to the affected class during recent remittance periods.
The lowered rating was derived by applying S&P's interest shortfall
criteria, which impose a maximum rating threshold on classes that
have incurred interest shortfalls resulting from credit or
liquidity erosion. In applying the criteria, S&P looked to see if
the applicable class received additional compensation beyond the
interest due as direct economic compensation for the delay in
interest payments, which this class has. Additionally, this class
has delayed reimbursement provisions. As such, S&P used its
projections in determining the likelihood that the shortfalls would
be reimbursed under various scenarios.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

            https://bit.ly/3hjQV1h


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***