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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 12, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 102

                            Headlines

BANK 2018-BNK11: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at B-sf
CENTEX HOME 2004-D: Moody's Lowers Cl. MF-1 Debt Rating to B3(sf)
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC23: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs
CONN'S RECEIVABLES: Fitch Puts 4 Outstanding Trusts on Watch Neg.
GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS6: Moody's Affirms Class F Certs at B-sf

JP MORGAN 2020-3: DBRS Finalizes B(high) Rating on 2 Classes
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C29: Fitch Cuts Class F Debt to 'CCCsf'
JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at B-sf
MCAP CMBS 2014-1: Fitch Affirms Class G Certs at Bsf
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-XLF2: Fitch Cuts Class SNMD Certs to CCCsf

MULTI SECURITY 2005-RR4: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on N Certs
REALT 2006-1: Fitch Affirms Class G Certs at Bsf
SASCO 2002-AL1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B1 Debt to Ca
TRINITAS CLO XII: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to CCCsf

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C15: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to CCsf
[*] DBRS Reviews 776 Classes From 59 U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] Fitch Takes Action on 10 Trust Preferred CDOs
[*] Moody's Downgrades $32.6 Million of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $346MM of US RMBS Issued 2005-2006


                            *********

BANK 2018-BNK11: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at B-sf
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes and revised the Rating
Outlook of three classes of BANK 2018-BNK11 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2018-BNK11.

RATING ACTIONS

BANK 2018-BNK11    

  - Class A-1 06540TAA8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-2 06540TAC4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3 06540TAD2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 06540TAG5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 06540TAB6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 06540TAH3; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 06540TAJ9; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 06540TAP5; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 06540TAR1; LT BB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F 06540TAT7; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 06540TAE0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 06540TAF7; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-D 06540TAK6; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-E 06540TAM2; LT BB-sf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: While the majority of the pool
continues to exhibit stable performance, loss expectations have
increased primarily because of additional stresses applied to hotel
and retail due to the performance impact of the coronavirus
pandemic and the underperformance of the pool's Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOC). No loans have been delinquent or transferred to
special servicing since issuance. As of the March 2020 distribution
period, there were five loans (10.3%) on the servicer's watchlist
for low DSCR and late insurance payments. Two loans (3.8%) have
been flagged as FLOCs for concentrated tenant rollover and
declining performance.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
in credit enhancement since issuance, as there been minimal
amortization, no payoffs and no defeasance. As of the March 2020
distribution period, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid
down by 1.01% to $681.2 million from $688.2 million at issuance.
There are 15 loans (49.7% of the pool) that are interest only for
the full term, and an additional six loans (17.0% of the pool) that
were structured with partial interest-only periods. Of these six
loans, none have begun amortizing. The pool is expected to pay down
by approximately 8.2% by maturity.

Exposure to Coronavirus: Nine loans (8.1% of the pool) in the pool
are secured by hotel properties. Fitch's base case analysis applied
an additional stress to hotel loans, given the significant declines
in property-level cash flow expected in the short term as a result
of the decrease in travel and tourism from the coronavirus
pandemic. The largest loan collateralized by hotels is the
Northwest Hotel Portfolio (5.7%), which comprises seven properties
in Bend, OR and Salt Lake City, UT; three Hampton by Hilton; two
Hilton Garden Inns; and two La Quinta hotels. Further, retail
properties comprise 27% of the pool including the top 15 loans:
Twelve Oaks Mall (9.5%) and the Shoppes of Benton (3.3%). The
Negative Outlooks on classes E, F, and X-E reflect additional
stresses applied to these properties.

Fitch Loans of Concern:

Peninsula Ridge (2.1%) is collateralized by a low-rise multifamily
located in Brownstown, MI. Subject year-end 2019 NOI has fallen to
$852.9 thousand compared to $1.02 million at YE 2018 and $1.07
million at underwriting. This decline in performance is primarily
due to a 89.6% increase in Real Estate Taxes between YE 2019 and YE
2018. As of YE 2019, subject occupancy and NOI DSCR were 97% and
1.39x, respectively.

Warm Springs Promenade (1.9%) is collateralized by an anchored
neighborhood shopping center located in Henderson, NV. Big Lots
(NRA 17.04%) and At Home (NRA 6.8%) leases are scheduled to expire
in January 2021 and December 2020, respectively. According to the
subject's December 2019 rent roll, Big Lots and At Home were paying
$10.29 psf and $7.00 psf in annual base rent, respectively. Subject
YE 2019 occupancy was 93% above underwritten occupancy at issuance
of 84% and YE 2019 was 2.05x. If both tenants were to vacate, Fitch
estimates subject occupancy would fall to 69%. Fitch has inquired
to the master servicer regarding any leasing activity for the
rolling tenants. Fitch has not received a response.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through D reflect the overall
stable performance of the pool and expected continued amortization.
The Negative Outlooks on class E, F and X-E and reflect concerns
with hotel and retail properties due to expected decline in travel
and commerce as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Downgrades of
a category are more possible.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance. Upgrades
to classes B and C would likely occur with significant improvement
in credit enhancement and/or defeasance; however, adverse selection
and increased concentrations, or the underperformance of particular
loan(s) could cause this trend to reverse. Upgrades to classes D,
X-D would also take into account these factors, but would be
limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for
future concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there were likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the
classes E, F and X-E are not likely until the later years in a
transaction, and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and/or if there is sufficient credit enhancement, which
would likely occur when the NR class is not eroded and the senior
classes payoff.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the senior classes, rated 'AAAsf' are not likely due to the
position in the capital structure and the high credit enhancement
or defeasance, but may occur at 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' should interest
shortfalls occur. Downgrades to classes D, X-D would occur should
overall pool losses increase and/or one or more large loans have an
outsized loss, which would erode credit enhancement. Downgrades to
classes, E, F and X-E would occur should loss expectations increase
due to an increase in specially serviced loans and/or should the
loans vulnerable to the coronavirus pandemic not stabilize.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


CENTEX HOME 2004-D: Moody's Lowers Cl. MF-1 Debt Rating to B3(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six tranches,
from 2 RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime and Option ARM loans.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2016
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2017
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades of Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed
Certificates, Series 2004-2 are due recent deterioration in deal
performance. The rating downgrades of Centex Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-D/ Group I Home Equity Loans Cl. MF-1 and Cl. MF-2 reflect
outstanding interest shortfalls that are not expected to be
recouped as the bonds have weak structural mechanisms to reimburse
accrued interest. The actions also reflect the recent performance
as well as Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying
pools.

Its analysis has considered the increased uncertainty relating to
the effect of the coronavirus outbreak on the US economy as well as
the effects that the announced government measures put in place to
contain the virus, will have on the performance of residential real
estate. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk
under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications for
public health and safety. It is a global health shock, which makes
it extremely difficult to provide an economic assessment. The
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
Moody's expects unemployment rate to rise to about 9% in the second
quarter, and decline thereafter with a slow pace of rehiring,
resulting in an unemployment rate of around 6.5% by the end of
2020. However, there is significant uncertainty around this
forecast and risks are firmly to the downside. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC23: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 13 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2014-GC23.

CGCMT 2014-GC23   

  - Class A-3 17322VAS5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 17322VAT3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-AB 17322VAU0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 17322VAV8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 17322VAW6; LT AAsf; Affirmed

  - Class C 17322VAX4; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 17322VAE6; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 17322VAG1; LT BB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F 17322VAJ5; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class PEZ 17322VBA3; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 17322VAY2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 17322VAZ9; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-C 17322VAA4; LT BB-sf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations; Increased Credit Enhancement: The
affirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
collateral. Credit enhancement has increased since Fitch Ratings'
prior rating action due to six loan payoffs and continued scheduled
amortization.

As of the March 2020 remittance report, the pool has been paid down
by 17.1% to $1.02 billion from $1.23 billion at issuance. Of the 83
loans in the transaction at issuance, 66 loans remain. Seven loans
(13.8%) have been defeased including two large Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs) at last review. Three loans (29.5%) are full-term
interest-only and 28 loans (43.3%) are partial-term interest-only,
all of which have begun amortizing. No remaining loans mature prior
to 2024. There have been no realized losses to date, and there are
currently no interest shortfalls.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Seven loans (12.7% of pool) are FLOCs,
including one loan (6.5%) in the top 15 and two specially serviced
loans (0.7%). The largest FLOC is Chula Vista Center (6.5%), a
regional mall in the San Diego metro where a non-collateral Sears
closed in February 2020. The mall has also experienced declining
occupancy as in-line tenants have vacated over the past several
years. As of 2Q19, total mall and collateral occupancy were 91% and
83% respectively, but after Sears closed, only approximately 63% of
the property is occupied by tenants that are open and operating. As
of the YE 2019 sales report, comp inline sales under 10,000 sf were
$449 psf at YE 2019 compared to $374 psf at issuance.

The second-largest FLOC is NorthCross Shopping Center (3.4%), a
power center in Huntersville, NC. Net operating income (NOI) peaked
in 2016 and has declined each year since. As of 3Q19, the property
is 96% occupied and performing at a 1.39x NOI DSCR.

Smaller FLOCs include a retail property in Modesto, CA (1.3%) with
low DSCR, an industrial property in Solon, OH (0.5%) that is 100%
vacant, a specially serviced hotel in Houma, LA (0.5%) where
performance has declined due to oil exposure, a single-tenant
retail property in La Vergne, TN (0.4%) where the single tenant
went dark, and a specially serviced shopping center in
Lawrenceville, GA (0.2%) where the loan transferred to special
servicing after the borrower requested a modification.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch's analysis included an
additional sensitivity scenario of an outsized 25% loss to the
maturity balance of Chula Vista Center due to the regional mall
asset class, dark anchor space, and temporary closure due to the
coronavirus pandemic. Due to this stressed scenario, Fitch revised
the Outlooks on classes E and F to Negative.

Exposure to Coronavirus: Fitch's base case analysis applied an
additional NOI stress to two retail loans which had an impact on
revising negative outlooks on classes E and F. Five non-defeased
loans collateralized by hotel properties account for 8.5% of the
pool, including two loans (3.0%) in the top 15. Seven non-defeased
loans collateralized by multifamily properties account for 11.7% of
the pool, two (1.3%) of which are student housing. Further, retail
properties comprise 35.6% of the pool while mixed use properties
with a retail component comprise an additional 14.8% of the pool,
including the largest loan in the pool 28-40 West 23rd Street.
Several of the state's most significantly impacted by the
coronavirus pandemic have the largest concentration of loans in the
transaction with New York at 25.9%, followed by California at
15.7%, and Washington at 10.0%.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION

Pool Concentration: The top three loans represent 31.5% of the
current pool balance; the top 10 loans, 62.8%, and the top 15
loans, 73.2%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes E, F, and X-C reflect the
potential for a near-term rating change should the performance of
Chula Vista Center or other FLOCs deteriorate. The Stable Outlooks
on classes A-3 through D reflect the overall stable performance of
the pool and expected continued amortization.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories may occur with significant
improvement in credit enhancement or defeasance but would be
limited should the deal be susceptible to a concentration whereby
the underperformance of Fitch Loans of Concern, such as Chula Vista
Center, could cause this trend to reverse. An upgrade to 'BBBsf'
categories would also take into account these factors, but would be
limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for
future concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the
'BBsf' and 'Bsf' categories is not likely until the later years in
a transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and if there is sufficient credit enhancement, which would
likely occur when the non-rated class is not eroded and the senior
classes payoff.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the senior classes, 'AAAsf' through 'Asf' are not likely due to
the position in the capital structure and the high credit
enhancement and defeasance, but may occur at 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf'
should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to 'BBBsf' class would
occur should overall pool losses increase or one or more large
loans have an outsized loss which would erode credit enhancement.
Downgrades to Classes 'BBsf' and 'Bsf' with a Negative Outlook
would occur should loss expectations increase due to an increase in
specially serviced loans or a continued decline in performance at
Chula Vista Center.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction and serves as the
backup advancing agent. Deutsche Bank's Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) is currently 'BBB' Rating Watch Neg/'F2' Rating Watch
Neg. Fitch relies on the master servicer, Midland Loan Services,
Inc., a division of PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. (A+/F1/
Stable), which is currently the primary advancing agent, as
counterparty. Fitch provided ratings confirmation on Jan. 24,
2018.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


CONN'S RECEIVABLES: Fitch Puts 4 Outstanding Trusts on Watch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch places all outstanding ratings of Conn's Receivables Funding
2017-B, 2018-A, 2019-A and 2019-B on Rating Watch Negative due to
increased delinquencies across the trusts and expected negative
collateral performance caused by economic disruptions resulting
from the coronavirus containment measures and the recent oil price
shock.

Conn's Receivables Funding 2017-B   

  - Class C 20825AAC2; LT BBsf; Rating Watch On

Conn's Receivables Funding 2018-A   

  - Class A 20826JAA6; LT BBBsf; Rating Watch On

  - Class B 20826JAB4; LT BBsf; Rating Watch On

  - Class C 20826JAC2; LT Bsf; Rating Watch On

Conn's Receivables Funding 2019-A   

  - Class A 20827DAA8; LT BBBsf; Rating Watch On

  - Class B 20827DAB6; LT BBsf; Rating Watch On

  - Class C 20827DAC4; LT Bsf; Rating Watch On

Conn's Receivables Funding 2019-B   

  - Class A 20824LAA3; LT BBBsf; Rating Watch On

  - Class B 20824LAB1; LT BBsf; Rating Watch On

  - Class C 20824LAC9; LT Bsf; Rating Watch On

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The coronavirus pandemic has created a spike in unemployment, and
Conn's obligors will be highly impacted. Additionally, the breakout
of the coronavirus pandemic coincided with a drop in oil prices and
subsequent disruption of the oil industry in Texas, where on
average nearly two thirds of Conn's obligors reside based on loan
principal balance. This could exacerbate the unemployment impacts
to Conn's obligors even more than what is seen in the broader U.S.
economy.

In addition, in the months leading up to the pandemic,
delinquencies had risen in all rated portfolios above expected
levels. Delinquencies of 60+ days are over 14% for all the Conn's
trusts as of March 15, 2020, and as high as 29% for the Conn's
2017-B pool. While Conn's had initially hoped servicing efforts and
tax refunds would bring delinquency levels back within
expectations, the coronavirus pandemic will make it more likely
that these borrowers do not return to current status, but instead
roll to default.

Servicing challenges are compounded by "shelter-in-place" orders,
because approximately 20% of borrowers make their monthly payments
at a Conn's store, and half of those borrowers make their payment
in cash (although nearly 95% of borrowers have made a payment other
than cash in the past year). And while borrowers who make payments
in stores may also make payments in other ways, potential store
closures, along with "shelter-in-place" orders, will prevent
borrowers from making repeat purchases, which will lower the
prepayment rates on the portfolios and stretch out the weighted
average life of the loans.

Pandemic and oil shock impacts combined with servicing disruption
make it likely that losses experienced by the Conn's ABS portfolios
exceed base case expectations and could lead to negative rating
actions. In order to resolve the Rating Watch Negative, Fitch would
expect to see performance stabilize before reaching loss levels
that would impact current ratings as economic disruptions begin to
unwind across the country, including the resumption of payments by
borrowers who elect temporary hardship forbearance plans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Coronavirus Impact: Fitch acknowledges the uncertainty and rapidly
evolving events related to the coronavirus pandemic and its impact
on global markets. In the short term, portfolio delinquencies and
defaults will increase driven by a significant rise in unemployment
and loss of income from containment measures. Fitch revised
base-case default assumptions higher to reflect expected weakening
performance from the pandemic and the current high levels of
delinquencies of the trusts.

Subprime Collateral Quality: The Conn's receivables pools each had
a weighted average (WA) FICO of just over 600 at closing, with
approximately 10% of the loans having scores below 550 or no score
at closing. Fitch assigned a base case default rate of between
25.00% and 25.25% at the last review, but due to economic
disruptions resulting from the coronavirus containment measures,
the recent oil price shock and increased delinquencies in recent
months that are expected to further roll into default, Fitch has
revised the lifetime base case default rate to 30% for all trusts.
This base-case default assumption may be revised higher reflective
of the performance of delinquent accounts in the short term and if
there is broader performance deterioration caused by the
coronavirus pandemic. Fitch applied a 2.2x stress at the 'BBBsf'
level during the prior review, reflecting the high absolute value
of the historical defaults, the variability of default performance
in recent years and the high geographical concentration.

Rating Cap at 'BBBsf': Due to the subprime credit-risk profile of
the customer base, higher loan defaults in recent years, the high
concentration of receivables from Texas, management changes at
Conn's, and servicing continuity risk due to in-store payments,
Fitch placed a rating cap on these transactions at 'BBBsf'.

Adequate Servicing Capabilities: Conn Appliances, Inc. has a long
track record as an originator, underwriter and servicer. The credit
risk profile of the entity is mitigated by the backup servicing
provided by Systems & Services Technologies, Inc. (SST), which has
committed to a servicing transition period of 30 days. Fitch
considers all parties to be adequate servicers for these pools at
the expected rating levels, based on prior experience and
capabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Downgrade Stress

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or write-offs
on customer accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of credit enhancement (CE)
and remaining loss coverage levels available to the investments.
Decreased CE will increase the potential for negative rating
actions, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. While
no modeling was conducted as part of this review, the below
sensitivities were disclosed for each deal as of their last
review.

Conn's Receivables Funding 2017-B (November 2019 review):

Rating sensitivity to increased charge-off rate:

  -- Class C current ratings (Remaining Defaults as a percent of
current: 25.81%): 'BBsf';

  -- Increase base case by 10%: 'BBsf';

  -- Increase base case by 25%: 'B+sf',

  -- Increase base case by 50%: less than 'CCCsf'.

Conn's Receivables Funding 2018-A (July 2019 review):

Rating sensitivity to increased charge-off rate:

  -- Class A, B, and C current ratings (Remaining Defaults as a
percent of current: 27.66%): 'BBBsf', 'BBsf', 'Bsf';

  -- Increase base case by 10% for class A, B, and C: 'BBBsf',
'BBsf', 'Bsf';

  -- Increase base case by 25% for class A, B, and C: 'BBB-sf',
'BBsf', 'Bsf';

  -- Increase base case by 50% for class A, B, and C: 'BB+sf',
'B+sf', less than 'CCCsf'.

Conn's Receivables Funding 2019-A (April 2019 new rating
analysis):

  -- Class A, B, and C current ratings (Remaining Defaults as a
percent of current: 25.00%): 'BBBsf', 'BBsf', 'Bsf';

  -- Default increase 10%: class A 'BBB-sf'; class B 'BBsf'; class
C below 'CCCsf';

  -- Default increase 25%: class A 'BB+sf'; class B 'B+sf'; class C
below 'CCCsf';

  -- Default increase 50%: class A 'BBsf'; class B below 'CCCsf';
class C below 'CCCsf';

  -- Recoveries decrease to 0%: class A 'BBB-sf'; class B 'BBsf';
class C 'B-sf'.

Conn's Receivables Funding 2019-B (November 2019 new rating
analysis):

  -- Class A, B, and C current ratings (Remaining Defaults as a
percent of current: 25.00%): 'BBBsf', 'BBsf', 'Bsf';

  -- Default increase 10%: class A 'BBB-sf'; class B 'BBsf'; class
C below 'CCCsf';

  -- Default increase 25%: class A 'BB+sf'; class B 'B+sf'; class C
below 'CCCsf';

  -- Default increase 50%: class A 'BBsf'; class B below 'CCCsf';
class C below 'CCCsf';

  -- Recoveries decrease to 0%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf';
class C 'Bsf'.

Upgrade Stress

Decreases in the frequency of defaults or write-offs on customer
accounts could produce loss levels lower than the base case and
would likely result in increasing CE and the potential for positive
rating actions, but only on the subordinated classes, because
ratings on the senior classes are at the rating cap of 'BBBsf'.

As the ratings have been placed on Rating Watch Negative, Fitch
does not currently anticipate developments in the short-term that
will lead to an upgrade. The main constraint to the ratings is the
expected negative collateral performance caused by economic
disruptions resulting from the coronavirus containment measures and
the recent oil price shock. Should economic disruptions caused by
the coronavirus subside and the trust structures continue to
deleverage, upgrades could be considered.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transactions are exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. These results should not be used as an
indicator of possible future performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS6: Moody's Affirms Class F Certs at B-sf
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2017-GS6.

GSMS 2017-GS6

  - Class A-1 36253PAA0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-2 36253PAB8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3 36253PAC6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-AB 36253PAD4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 36253PAG7; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 36253PAH5; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 36253PAJ1; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 36253PAK8; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 36253PAP7; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class F 36253PAR3; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 36253PAE2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 36253PAF9; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-D 36253PAM4; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance and loss expectations with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. There have been no
specially serviced loans since issuance. Four loans (14.9%% of
pool) is on the servicer watchlist due to deferred maintenance or
concerns with large tenants; three (7.4%) were flagged as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs).

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the March 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 0.7% to $952.8 million from $959.1 million at issuance. All
original 33 loans remain in the pool. Based on the loans' scheduled
maturity balances, the pool is expected to amortize 5.3% during the
term. Thirteen loans (54.2% of pool) are full-term, interest-only
and 12 loans (28.9%) have a partial-term, interest-only component
of which six (10.8%) have begun to amortize.

Coronavirus Exposure: Two loans (3.3%) are secured by hotel
properties and ten loans (17%) are secured by retail properties. As
part of Fitch's base case scenario, Fitch included an additional
stress on all hotels to address the expected declines due to lack
of travel related to the coronavirus pandemic; however, the
additional stress did not affect the ratings. Fitch will continue
to monitor any declines in loan performance and will adjust ratings
and outlooks accordingly.

Loan Concentration: The pool is concentrated with a total of 33
loans. The largest 10 loans comprise 66.6% of the pool. The largest
property-type concentration is office at 48.6% of the pool,
followed by mixed use at 18.7% and retail at 17%.

Pari Passu Loans: Nine of the top 10 loans (61.7%) have pari-passu
additional debt.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC, Redlands Towne Center
(4.9%), is secured by a 251,621 sf anchored retail property
anchored by (39% NRA; lease will expire 2026) located in Redlands,
C.A., Babies/Toys R Us, the second largest tenant representing 25%
of NRA vacated in June 2018 prior to its 2023 lease expiration. As
a result, occupancy declined to 69.3% from 100% at YE17. EoS
Fitness (17.5% NRA) subsequently released approximately 69% of the
former vacant space at a higher rate from November 2019 through
November 2034. Occupancy was a reported 84.7% per the December 2019
rent roll.

The second largest FLOC,River Ranch (1.9%) is secured by a 140,701
sf mixed use property (retail/multifamily) located in Lafayette,
LA. The largest tenant, Paul Michael Company (23.5% NRA), vacated
in January 2020 prior to its 2022 lease expiration. The loan is
currently being cash managed.

The smallest FLOC, 1076 Pittsburgh Drive (0.6%), is secured by a
362,260 sf warehouse located in Delaware, OH. NEX (45% NRA) vacated
upon its Dec. 31, 2019 lease expiration. Per June 30, 2019 Pro
forma analysis, the DSCR would be under 1.0x excluding income from
Union NEX.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Near-term rating changes are expected to be limited as indicated by
the sufficient credit enhancement, continued amortization, and
stable performance of the pool as evidenced by the Stable Outlooks
assigned to classes A-1 through X-D.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' categories would likely occur
with significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or
defeasance; however, the underperformance of the FLOCs could limit
future upgrades.

Upgrades to the 'BBB-sf' and below categories are considered
unlikely and would be limited based on the sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentrations. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood for
interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'BB-sf' and 'B-sf'
categories is not likely until the later years in a transaction and
only if the performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or if
there is sufficient credit enhancement, which would likely occur
when the non-rated class is not eroded and the senior classes pay
off.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to the senior classes, 'AA-sf' through 'AAAsf' are not
likely due to the position in the capital structure and high credit
enhancement; however, downgrades of these classes may occur should
there be interest shortfalls to these classes. Downgrades to the
classes rated 'BBB-sf' and below would occur if the performance of
the FLOCs continues to decline or fails to stabilize.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Best/Worst Case Rating Scenarios - Structured Finance:

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


JP MORGAN 2020-3: DBRS Finalizes B(high) Rating on 2 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-3 (the
Certificates) issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-3:

-- $559.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $523.6 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $481.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $481.7 million Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $481.7 million Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $361.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.3 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $361.3 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $120.4 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $120.4 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $120.4 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $286.5 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $286.5 million Class A-6-A at AAA (sf)
-- $286.5 million Class A-6-X at AAA (sf)
-- $195.2 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $195.2 million Class A-7-A at AAA (sf)
-- $195.2 million Class A-7-X at AAA (sf)
-- $74.7 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $74.7 million Class A-8-A at AAA (sf)
-- $74.7 million Class A-8-X at AAA (sf)
-- $38.7 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $38.7 million Class A-9-A at AAA (sf)
-- $38.7 million Class A-9-X at AAA (sf)
-- $81.7 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $81.7 million Class A-10-A at AAA (sf)
-- $81.7 million Class A-10-X at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $514.6 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.7 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $559.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $559.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $10.4 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $10.4 million Class B-1-A at AA (sf)
-- $10.4 million Class B-1-X at AA (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-2-A at A (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-2-X at A (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3-X at BBB (sf)
-- $3.0 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.8 million Class B-5 at B (high) (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class B-X at BBB (sf)
-- $1.8 million Class B-5-Y at B (high) (sf)

Classes A-3-X, A-4-X, A-5-X, A-6-X, A-7-X, A-8-X, A-9-X, A-10-X,
A-11-X, A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, B-1-X, B-2-X, B-3-X, and B-X
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-3-X, A-4, A-4-A, A-4-X, A-5, A-5-A,
A-5-X, A-6, A-7, A-7-A, A-7-X, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-12, A-13, A-14,
A-16, A-17, A-X-2, A-X-3, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-X, and B-5-Y are
exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations
of exchange notes as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, A-4-A, A-5, A-5-A, A-6, A-6-A, A-7,
A-7-A, A-8, A-8-A, A-9, A-9-A, A-10, A-10-A, A-11, A-12, and A-13
are super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from
additional protection from the senior support certificates (Classes
A-14 and A-15) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 6.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (high) (sf) ratings reflect
4.25%, 2.80%, 1.55%, 1.05%, and 0.75% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien fixed-rate prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 806 loans with a total principal
balance of $595,006,943 as of the Cut-Off Date (March 1, 2020).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of up to 30 years. Approximately 35.0%
of the loans in the pool are conforming mortgage loans
predominantly originated by United Shore Financial Services, LLC
(USFS) doing business as United Wholesale Mortgage and Shore
Mortgage; LoanDepot.com, LLC (LoanDepot.com); LendUS, LLC (LendUS);
Bay Equity, LLC; Guaranteed Rate, Inc.; and Primary Residential
Mortgage Inc., which were eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMCB; rated AA with a
Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) generally delegates conforming
loan underwriting authority to correspondent lenders and does not
subsequently review those loans. Details on the underwriting of
conforming loans can be found in the Key Probability of Default
Drivers section of the related rating report.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are USFS (75.6%),
LoanDepot.com (12.6%), LendUS (1.1%), and various other originators
that each comprise less than 2.0% of the mortgage loans.
Approximately 4.5% of the loans sold to the mortgage loan seller
were acquired by MAXEX Clearing LLC, which purchased such loans
from the related originators or an unaffiliated third party that
directly or indirectly purchased such loans from the related
originators.

Cenlar FSB (87.1%), NewRez doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (SMS; 12.5%), and Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. (0.4%) will
service or sub-service the mortgage loans.

Servicing will be transferred to JPMCB from SMS on the servicing
transfer date (June 1, 2020, or a later date) as determined by the
issuing entity and JPMCB. For this transaction, the servicing fee
payable for mortgage loans serviced by JPMCB and SMS (which will be
subsequently serviced by JPMCB) is composed of three separate
components: the aggregate base servicing fee, the aggregate
delinquent servicing fee, and the aggregate additional servicing
fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency status of the related
loan and will be paid from interest collections before distribution
to the securities.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the Master Servicer. Citibank,
N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will
act as Securities Administrator and Delaware Trustee. JPMCB and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as Custodians. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
will serve as the Representations and Warranties Reviewer.

The Seller intends to retain (directly or through a majority-owned
affiliate) a vertical interest in 5% of the principal amount or
notional amount of all the senior and subordinate certificates to
satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C29: Fitch Cuts Class F Debt to 'CCCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades four classes and affirms 13 classes of
JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2015-C29.

JPMBB 2015-C29   

  - Class A-2 46644RAX3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3A1 46644RAY1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3A2 46644RAA3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 46644RAZ8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 46644RBD6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 46644RBA2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 46644RBE4; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 46644RBF1; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 46644RBH7; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 46644RAN5; LT Bsf; Downgrade

  - Class EC 46644RBG9; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F 46644RAQ8; LT CCCsf; Downgrade

  - Class X-A 46644RBB0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 46644RBC8LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-D 46644RAE5; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-E 46644RAG0; LT Bsf; Downgrade

  - Class X-F 46644RAJ4; LT CCCsf; Downgrade

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced Loans: Three loans
(7.7%) have been transferred to special servicing since Fitch's
last rating action. Nine loans (30.3%) are currently on the master
servicer's watchlist primarily for upcoming rollover, tenant
bankruptcies, occupancy declines, renovations due to hurricane
damage and deferred maintenance issues. Thirteen loans (32%) are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), including the three
specially serviced loans. Additionally, the FLOCs include seven of
the top 15 loans in the transaction (33.7%).

The largest specially serviced loan (3.4%) is a 500-unit student
housing property located in Corpus Christi, TX. The property was
developed in 2014 and opened for occupancy in July 2014. Amenities
at the property include a resort-style pool, 24-hour fitness
center, tanning salon, clubhouse with wi-fi access and gaming area,
computer lab, movie theater, free parking, volleyball court and dog
park. The property has an approximate 90% student tenant
concentration and is located three miles from Texas A&M-Corpus
Christi. All leases are year-long and approximately 90% are backed
by parental guarantees. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in December 2019 due to monetary default. The property
was 74.8% occupied as of February 2019 with average rent per unit
$705. The loan has been hard cash managed since 2018 due to low
DSCR with a sweep of any and all excess cash to a reserve held on
the loan. The loan defaults include the borrower withholding rents
from the deposit account along with the failure to make the
December senior mortgage payment. Per the special servicer, they
expect to resolve the loan via a discounted payoff (DPO) by 2Q
2020.

The second largest specially serviced loan (3.3%) is secured by a
portfolio consisting of three retail outlet centers with a combined
sf of 555,682, located in Oshkosh, WI; Burlington, WA and Fremont,
IN. As of YE 2019, the portfolio has experienced a 32% decline in
NOI. The three properties are located in tertiary markets and
tenants at all three properties have been struggling to maintain
sales. They have requested shorter renewal terms (usually one year)
and significantly reduced rents, some going from a psf basis to a
percentage of sales. The portfolio is 77.2% occupied as of February
2020.

The third specially serviced loan (1%) is secured by a 122-bed
student housing property serving Temple University. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in April 2019 for payment default.
The borrower failed to cure the default and filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy prior to the receivership hearing. The bankruptcy was
dismissed in December 2019. Per the special servicer, foreclosure
is in process.

The largest FLOC (8.1%) is a 191,248 sf office property located in
Washington, DC. The largest tenants are Radio Free Asia (38%),
expiry 3/31/24; SmithBucklin Corporation (24%), expiry June
30,2020; America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc.
(11%), expiry June 30, 2026. The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist as the tenant SmithBucklin Corporation intends to vacate
at lease expiration in June 2020; there is no prospective tenant at
this time. The property is 92.2% occupied as of December 2019 with
a below market average rent of $46.92 psf. There is approximately
29% upcoming rollover in 2020.

The second largest FLOC (7.9%) is a 602,122 sf office property
located in the heart of Houston's CBD in Houston, TX. The largest
tenants are Waste Management (40%), expiry December (IG rated
'BBB+/Sta); Energy XXI Ltd (14%), expiry Jan. 31, 2024; and Ballard
Exploration (2.9%), expiry August 31, 2027. The subject is located
in Houston, which has been negatively impacted by the volatile oil
industry. The loan is on the watchlist as the largest tenant, Waste
Management, has signed a long-term lease in another location and is
expected to vacate at lease expiration in December 2020. The tenant
is expected to pay rent through that period. The property's
occupancy remains low at 67.7% as of YE 2019 compared to 66.7% YE
2018, 71.5% YE 2017 and 81.2% YE 2016. There is approximately 40%
upcoming rollover in 2020.

The third largest FLOC (4.1%) is a multifamily property consisting
of 256 units ranging from 573 sf to 1,307 sf located in Houston,
TX. The property is located just off Westheimer Road in the Houston
Westchase District, approximately five miles east of The Houston
Galleria and 15 miles west of Houston's CBD. The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to performance declines resulting
from soft market and per the master servicer, the borrower has
indicated they've employed pricing strategies to maintain high
occupancy levels. The most recent NOI DSCR as of 3Q 2019 is 1.21x
with occupancy at 92.6% and average rent of $1,155.

Coronavirus Exposure: Eight loans (16.4% of the pool) are secured
by hotel properties, including three (9.5%) in the top 15. The
weighted average DSCR for all hotel loans is 2.35x. On average, the
hotel loans could average a 55.5% decline in NOI before the actual
DSCR would fall below 1.0x. Thirteen loans (15.7%) are secured by
retail properties including a factory outlet center portfolio
(3.3%) which is currently in special servicing; there are no
regional malls. Additional stresses were applied to three hotels
loans and one retail loan, and while not directly contributing to
the downgrades, did have an impact on maintaining the negative
outlooks on classes D, E, X-D and X-E.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

Pool Concentrations: 2 loans (7%) mature in 2020, one loan (2.7%)
in 2024, 52 loans (75.6%) in 2025, and two loans (2.9%) in 2030.
The largest property types are retail (15.7%), office (30%), hotel
(16.4%) and multifamily (16%). The larger retail loans consist of
retail center portfolios and a factory outlet center, there are no
regional malls. Three loans (6.1%) are secured by student housing
properties of which two (4.4%) are specially serviced.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Near-term rating changes for classes with Negative Outlooks are
possible should loss expectations increase on the specially
serviced loans or larger FLOCs default. Downgrades of a category or
more are possible.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance;
however, adverse selection and increased concentrations, or the
underperformance of particular loan(s) could cause this trend to
reverse. Upgrades to 'BBBsf' and below categories are considered
unlikely and would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is likelihood for
interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'Bsf' category is not likely
until the later years in a transaction and only if the performance
of the remaining pool is stable and/or if there is sufficient
credit enhancement, which would likely occur when the non-rated
class is not eroded and the senior classes payoff.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the classes rated 'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to the
position in the capital structure, but may occur at 'AAAsf' or
'AAsf' should interest shortfalls occur.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at B-sf
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of JPMDB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2016-C2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

JPMDB 2016-C2;    

  - Class A-1 46590LAQ5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-2 46590LAR3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3A 46590LAS1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-3B 46590LAA0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 46590LAT9; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 46590LAX0; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 46590LAU6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 46590LAY8; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 46590LAZ5; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 46590LAE2; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 46590LAG7; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class F 46590LAJ1; LT B-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 46590LAV4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class X-B 46590LAW2; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-C 46590LAC6; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Generally Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: Overall pool
performance and loss expectations have remained relatively stable,
with no material changes to pool metrics since issuance. One loan
(1.6% of pool) is fully defeased. There have been no specially
serviced loans since issuance.

One loan in the top 15 (5.5% of pool), Four Penn Center, was
designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern due to occupancy declines.
Four Penn Center is a 522,600 sf office property located in the
central business district of Philadelphia, PA. Property occupancy
declined to 61% as of September 2019 from 84% at issuance, mainly
due to the largest tenant, RELX, downsizing in June 2018 to 15.6%
of the NRA (from 25.9%) and Federal Insurance Company, which
formerly occupied 11.3% of the NRA, vacating at its March 2018
lease expiration. As part of RELX's downsizing, the tenant also
renewed its lease to September 2025 from June 2018.

Exposure to Coronavirus: Eight loans (19.5%) in the pool are
secured by hotel properties, and one loan (2.4% of the pool) is
secured by a student-housing property. The weighted average debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for all hotel loans is 1.92x. On
average, the hotel loans could average a 53.5% decline in net
operating income (NOI) before the actual DSCR would fall below 1.0x
coverage. Four retail properties across four loans make up 20.3% of
the pool, including two regional mall loans (12.97%) and an outlet
loan (5.72%) in the top 15: Quaker Bridge Mall (9.5% of pool;
Lawrenceville, NJ); Williamsburg Premium Outlets (5.7%;
Williamsburg, VA) and Palisades Center (3.4%; West Nyack,
NY).Additional coronavirus specific stresses were applied to five
hotel loans and contributed to the negative outlooks being assigned
to classes D, E, F, and X-C.

Minimal Changes in Credit Enhancement: There have been minimal
changes to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the March 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 2.2% to $873 million from $893 million at issuance.
Six loans, representing 38.2% of the current pool, are full-term
interest-only and 11 loans (39.2%) are partial-term, interest only
of which five loans (19.9%) have not yet begun to amortize.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on classes A-1 to C and the IO classes X-A through X-B
remain Stable. The Outlooks on classes D, E, F, and the IO class
X-C are revised to Negative from Stable stemming from the expected
cash flow disruption to hotels in particular, which represent 19.5%
of the underlying collateral. Many hotels in gateway cities are
closing due to the spread of the Coronavirus. The hotel sector as a
whole is expected to experience significant declines in RevPAR with
the decline in travel. Downgrades are possible should cash flow
disruption extend for a prolonged period. Ratings would remain
stable if property performance recovers promptly.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' rated classes would likely occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance;
however, adverse selection and increased concentrations, or the
underperformance of particular loan(s) could limit upgrades.
Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is likelihood
for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'BBB-sf', 'BBsf', and
'B-sf' rated classes is not likely until the later years in a
transaction and only if the properties vulnerable to the
coronavirus return to pre-pandemic levels and/or the performance of
the remaining pool is stable and/or if there is sufficient credit
enhancement, which would likely occur when the non-rated class is
not eroded and the senior classes payoff.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the classes rated 'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to the
position in the capital structure, but may occur at 'AAAsf' or
'AAsf' should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to classes with
Negative Rating Outlooks are likely with cash flow disruption
related to hotel closures or in the event the FLOC does not
stabilize.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


MCAP CMBS 2014-1: Fitch Affirms Class G Certs at Bsf
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of MCAP CMBS Issuer
Corporation's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2014-1. All currencies are denominated in Canadian dollars.

MCAP CMBS Issuer Corpation 2014-1    

  - Class C 55280LAD0; LT Asf; Affirmed

  - Class D 55280LAJ7 LT BBBsf; Affirmed

  - Class E 55280LAE8; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F 55280LAF5; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class G 55280LAG3; LT Bsf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations; Specially Serviced Loan: The Negative
Rating Outlook revision on class G reflects an increase in Fitch's
loss expectations since the last rating action, due to the transfer
of the largest loan in the pool, 1121 Centre Street NW (35.7% of
pool), to special servicing. The loan, which is secured by a
62,843-sf office building located in Calgary, AB, was transferred
to special servicing in January 2020 for maturity default after
failing to repay at its December 2019 extended maturity date.
Property occupancy and cash flow had declined after the second
largest tenant, BGC Engineering, which occupied nearly 20% of the
property's total NRA, vacated in 2018 prior to its September 2019
lease expiration. The property was approximately 75% occupied as of
December 2019, unchanged from December 2018 and down from 94% in
February 2018. A receiver was appointed in February 2020 and is
currently working to list the property for sale. At issuance, the
loan carried a full recourse guarantee from the sponsor and
borrower, Riaz Mamdani and Irrational Exuberance Corp, on a joint
and several bases.

Increasing Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has increased
significantly since issuance from loan payoffs and continued
amortization. Since Fitch's last rating action, nine loans totaling
$64.2 million were repaid in full at or post-maturity between
October 2019 and February 2020. As of the March 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance had paid down by 88.7%
to $25.4 million from $224.0 million at issuance. Excluding the
specially serviced loan, the pool has a weighted average
amortization term of 26.7 years, which represents faster
amortization than U.S. conduit loans. There are no partial or
full-term, interest-only loans.

Canadian Loan Attributes: The ratings reflect strong Canadian
commercial real estate loan performance, including a low
delinquency rate and low historical losses of less than 0.1%, as
well as positive loan attributes, such as short amortization
schedules, recourse to the borrower and additional guarantors. Of
the remaining pool, 53.4% of the loans feature full or partial
recourse to the borrowers and/or sponsors. With the exception of
the specially serviced loan, the remainder of the pool continues to
perform within Fitch's expectations at issuance.

Increasing Pool Concentration; Limited Upcoming Loan Maturities:
The Stable Rating Outlook revision on class C reflects that while
the majority of the pool continues to exhibit stable performance,
the pool is becoming increasingly concentrated with only five of
the original 32 loans remaining, the largest of which (1121 Centre
Street NW; 35.7% of pool) is currently in special servicing. The
four non-specially serviced loans (64.3%) are all amortizing
balloon loans that are scheduled to mature between April and
October 2024.

Coronavirus Exposure: No loans in the pool are secured by hotel
properties and Fitch does not expect any immediate impact to the
ratings from the coronavirus pandemic. There are two loans (16.1%
of pool) secured by retail properties. One of these loans (5.2%) is
secured by a single-tenant bank, which remains open and has been
deemed essential during the pandemic. Fitch will continue to
monitor any declines in loan performance and will adjust ratings
and Outlooks accordingly.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Positive Rating Action Include:

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes C through F reflect the
relatively stable performance of the majority of the remaining
pool, increasing credit enhancement and expected continued
amortization. Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.
An upgrade of class C would likely occur with significant
improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance; however,
adverse selection and increased concentrations or the
underperformance of the specially serviced loan could cause this
trend to reverse. An upgrade of classes D and E would also take
into account these factors but would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
is a likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to class F is
not likely given the concerns surrounding the specially serviced
loan but may occur should credit enhancement increase and
performance of the specially serviced loan improve or should the
loan be resolved. Future upgrades will be limited due to the small
remaining class size of the junior certificates and the pool
concentration.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action Include:

The Negative Rating Outlook on class G reflects the potential for
downgrade if losses from the specially serviced 1121 Centre Street
NW loan are greater than expected. Factors that lead to downgrades
include an increase in pool level losses from underperforming or
specially serviced loans. Downgrades of the senior classes C
through E are not likely due to the position in the capital
structure and the high credit enhancement. Should the specially
serviced loan be resolved with lower than expected losses, the
Negative Rating Outlook on class G may be revised to Stable. Other
factors that could lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from additional underperforming or specially
serviced loans. However, any potential losses could be mitigated by
loan recourse provisions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Best/Worst Case Rating Scenarios - Structured Finance:

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-XLF2: Fitch Cuts Class SNMD Certs to CCCsf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed all classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust MSCI 2015-XLF2 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2015-XLF2 from Rating Watch
Negative.

MSCI 2015-XLF2   

  - Class SNMA 61765VAA6; LT Asf; Downgrade

  - Class SNMB 61765VAC2; LT BBsf; Downgrade

  - Class SNMC 61765VAE8; LT Bsf; Downgrade

  - Class SNMD 61765VAG3; LT CCCsf; Downgrade

The SNM certificates represent the beneficial interests in the
Starwood National Mall Portfolio non-pooled trust assets.

The class AFSA, AFSB, AFSC, and AFSD certificates have been paid in
full. The classes AFX1 and AFX2 certificates were not part of the
final structure of this transaction and had been previously
withdrawn.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

At issuance, the transaction certificates represented the
beneficial interests in two floating-rate first lien mortgage
loans, representing 51.3% and 48.7% of the transaction,
respectively. The loans were originated by Morgan Stanley Bank,
N.A. The SNM classes represent the Starwood National Mall Portfolio
loan, which is secured by three regional malls totaling 3.3 million
(1.6 million collateral) Shops at Willow Bend located in Plano, TX,
Fairlane Town Center in Dearborn, MI and Stony Point Park in
Richmond, VA. The malls were purchased by Starwood from Taubman in
2014. The AFS certificates were secured by seven hotel properties
across the U.S and were paid in full in June 2018. The certificates
follow a sequential-pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Recent Transfer to Special Servicing: The loan transferred to the
special servicer after the proposed loan modification did not occur
as expected on March 4, 2020. The final maturity date for the
Starwood National Mall Portfolio was Nov. 8, 2019 and the loan did
not pay off at maturity. The master servicer initially granted the
borrower an extension and forbearance while working on a
modification.

Sustained Property Cash Flow Decline: Portfolio performance has
declined since issuance due to lower revenues and increased
expenses. Per the servicer provided trailing twelve-month (TTM)
November 2019 operating statement analysis report (OSAR), total
revenues declined to $48.7 million from $52 million as of year-end
2018 and $55.1 million at issuance. Revenue declines are primarily
attributed to lower reimbursements.

For the same period, the portfolio's reported net cash flow was
$15.1 million, down from $17.3 million for YE 2018, $16.9 million
for YE 2017 and $23.8 million at issuance. Fitch's adjusted cash
flow is $14.1 million, based on TTM November 2019, adjusted for
standard leasing commissions, capital expenditures and other
expenses, represents a 34% reduction from issuance.

Vulnerability to Coronavirus: Fitch expects the malls' current
closures due to the coronavirus will have a significant short-term
impact on the properties' performance. The longer-term impact from
the virus is harder to discern, but the closures and the virus will
prolong any potential recovery in revenues and cash flow further
weakening debt coverage metrics. The ratings downgrades are greater
by a category than would have likely occurred had the coronavirus
pandemic not occurred.

The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect both the potential for
additional downgrades if performance declines further and if a
prolonged workout is required given the already limited liquidity
for malls made worse by the impact of the coronavirus.

Inline Occupancy and Sales: As of the September 2019 occupancy and
sales have been reasonably steady:

  -- Fairlane Town Center inline occupancy is 81% compared to 78.4%
as of June 2018 and 86.2% in 2017; sales declined to $457 from $470
the year before;

  -- Stony Point Park is 80% (77.7% and 64.1%); sales $379 ($427);

  -- Shops at Willow Bend is 81.3% (80.6% and 79.2%); sales at $358
($382).

Weak Anchor Tenants: Fairlane Town Center has exposure to Macy's
and JC Penney, while Sears closed in September 2018. None of these
anchors are part of the collateral. The vacant former Lord & Taylor
was leased to the Ford Motor Company who is using it as their
research and development division. The Shops at Willow Bend has
exposure to Macy's, Dillard's, and Neiman Marcus, which are not
part of the collateral. The still vacant former anchor Saks Fifth
Avenue is part of the collateral. Stony Point Fashion Park anchors
are Saks Fifth Avenue, Dillard's (neither are collateral) and Cobb
Cinemas. A major tenant, Dick's Sporting Goods, vacated in
September 2018.

Fitch Leverage: The $135.7 million loan has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of
0.92x and 101.0%, calculated using a stressed constant of 11.25%
and cap rate of 10.50%.

Reported updated appraisals indicate current values greater than
the outstanding debt. However, the updated appraisal values
represent over a 50% decline from the appraisal values at issuance
and values are expected to decline further, and special servicing
fees will accrue, now the loan has transferred to special
servicing. Starwood contributed approximately $105.5 million of
cash equity when it acquired the properties from Taubman Centers in
2014.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ongoing Redevelopment and Renovation: The Shops at Willow Bend
underwent an interior refresh that was completed in May 2018. The
mall has since signed new leases including the Crayola Experience
(opened in April 2018), The District eating precinct (four
restaurants between October 2018 and March 2019), Equinox Health
Club (October 2019), and Cinepolis (a movie theatre expected to
open 3Q 2020). Fitch visited the property in February 2020 and
thought the overall appearance of the mall is attractive. The new
District section, which replaced former anchor tenant Saks Fifth
Avenue, adds a lifestyle component to the mall with a variety of
chef driven restaurants surrounding an attractively landscaped
courtyard. At Stony Point Park a common area refresh was completed
in the fall of 2017 and newly signed leases included H&M, which
opened in December 2017. While Starwood has publicly reported that
additional renovations are planned, per the servicer, no
renovations are underway.

Sponsorship: The loan is sponsored by Starwood Property Trust, a
diversified real estate finance company.

Floating-Rate Debt: The LIBOR-based floating-rate loan has an
interest rate cap in place and must maintain a cap for any
extension options exercised.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  -- All non-distressed classes are on Rating Outlook Negative
given the concern with further performance declines, which will be
exacerbated by the coronavirus impact and the potential for a
prolonged workout given lack of liquidity in the market for malls.
Factors that lead to additional downgrades include a decline in
occupancy, cash flow and/or sales, as well as a decline in
appraisal values. Downgrades to all classes, 'Asf' through 'CCCsf',
are possible. Downgrades to classes A and B could be a full
category or more, class C could be rated 'CCCsf' or below, and
class D could be downgraded to 'CCsf' or 'Csf' or 'Dsf' if losses
are incurred.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  -- Upgrades are currently not expected given the outlook for
retail mall performance, the expectation of the negative impact of
the coronavirus and expected prolonged workout. Factors that lead
to upgrades would include significant improvement to cash flow,
sales, paydown from the release of properties, increase in
appraisal values or a viable workout plan that indicates a more
positive outcome than currently expected. Upgrades of the 'Asf' and
'BBsf' categories would occur with significant improvement in
credit enhancement and property valuation. Classes would not be
upgraded above 'Asf' if there is likelihood for interest shortfalls
which could occur with a significant reduction in servicing
advancing if appraisal values decline. An upgrade to classes rated
'Bsf' and 'CCCsf' categories are not likely given the current
performance, expectation of additional declines and lower position
in the capital stack; however, are possible if properties are
released that result in significant credit enhancement improvement
and the remaining assets have strong performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.


MULTI SECURITY 2005-RR4: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on N Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-RR4, Class N issued by Multi
Security Asset Trust LP, Series 2005-RR4 (MSAT 2005-RR4) at BB
(high) (sf). The trend is Stable.

The rating confirmation reflects the continued stable performance
of the one remaining underlying commercial mortgage-backed security
(CMBS) transaction contributing to the MSAT 2005-RR4 capital
structure. While there has been a slight erosion of credit support
since the last review of 1.6% because of interest shortfalls, Class
N of the subject transaction has current credit support of 43.5%
from the unrated bond, Class O. Of the original 16 underlying CMBS
transactions that contributed to the MSAT 2005-RR4 transaction, the
contributing classes in 15 transactions have paid off in full. The
PMAC 1999-C1 transaction is the only remaining underlying
transaction currently contributing to the MSAT 2005-RR4
transaction, which has experienced a collateral reduction of 99.2%
since issuance because of successful loan repayments and recoveries
on liquidated loans.

As of the March 2020 remittance, there are two loans remaining in
the PMAC 1999-C1 transaction, both of which are performing. The
larger of the two loans, Regal Cinemas, Inc. (Regal Cinemas; 82.6%
of the current underlying pool balance), is secured by a
single-tenant movie theatre located in Fredericksburg, Virginia.
The property is 100.0% occupied by Regal Cinemas on a lease through
June 2023, coterminous with loan maturity. Per the YE2019
financials, the loan reported a debt service coverage ratio and
debt yield of 1.07 times and 18.1%, respectively. The performance
of the loan has remained consistent since issuance.

Notes: The principal methodology is the North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology.


REALT 2006-1: Fitch Affirms Class G Certs at Bsf
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust's (REALT) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-1.

REAL-T 2016-1       

  - Class A-1 75585RMW2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-2 75585RMY8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 75585RNC5; LT AAsf; Affirmed

  - Class C 75585RNE1; LT Asf; Affirmed

  - Class D 75585RNG6; LT BBBsf; Affirmed

  - Class E 75585RNJ0; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class F 75585RNL5; LT BBsf; Affirmed

  - Class G 75585RNM3; LT Bsf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The overall pool
performance remains stable from issuance. There are no delinquent
or specially serviced loans. One loan (4.91% of the pool), Ste.
Catherine Street Retail Montreal, has been designated as a Fitch
loan of concern (FLOC) given Forever 21, formerly the primary
tenant occupying 86% of net rentable area, vacated all Canadian
properties as of November 2019, prior to the scheduled lease
expiration for this location in April 2025.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the March, 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by 10.1% to
$360.4 million, from $401.0 million at issuance. At issuance, the
pool was scheduled to amortize 23.3% with the remaining loans
maturing in 2020 through 2026. There are no interest-only loans in
the pool.

Canadian Loan Attributes and Historical Performance: The ratings
reflect strong historical Canadian commercial real estate loan
performance, as well as positive loan attributes, such as short
amortization schedules, recourse to the borrower and additional
guarantors. Approximately 82.1% of the loans in the pool reflect
full or partial recourse.

Coronavirus: The pool contains two loans (3.0% of the pool) secured
by hotels with a weighted average debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 6.15x. Retail properties account for 38.6% of the pool
balance and have weighted average DSCR of 1.71x. Cash flow
disruptions are expected as a result of property and consumer
restrictions due to the spread of coronavirus. However, Fitch did
not perform any additional coronavirus specific stresses given the
strong overall credit metrics of the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on classes A-1 to F remain Stable. The Stable Rating
Outlooks reflect the relatively stable performance of the majority
of the pool, increasing credit enhancement, and expected continued
amortization. The Outlook on class G is revised to Negative from
Stable stemming from the expected cash flow disruption primarily
due to lower occupancy at Ste Catherine Street Retail, which
represents 4.9% of the underlying collateral. Many retail
properties in gateway cities are closing to slow the spread of
coronavirus, prolonging the lease-up period of the vacant space.
The retail sector as a whole is expected to experience significant
declines in revenue with country-wide stay at home orders in place.
Downgrades are possible should cash flow disruption extend for a
prolonged period. Ratings would remain stable if property
performance recovers promptly.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of Classes B and C would likely occur with significant improvement
in credit enhancement and/or defeasance; however, adverse selection
and increased concentrations, or the underperformance of particular
loan(s) could limit upgrades. Classes would not be upgraded above
'Asf' if there is likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to
Classes D through G is not likely until the later years in a
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and/or if there is sufficient credit enhancement, which
would likely occur when the non-rated class is not eroded and the
senior classes payoff.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the classes rated 'AAAsf' are not considered likely due to the
position in the capital structure, but may occur at 'AAAsf' or
'AAsf' should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to classes C
through F would occur should overall pool losses increase or one or
more large loans have an outsized loss which would erode credit
enhancement. Downgrades to Class G are likely in the event the FLOC
does not stabilize.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


SASCO 2002-AL1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B1 Debt to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded five tranches from two
transactions backed by Subprime loans and Disaster Assistance
loans.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp. (SASCO) Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-AL1

Cl. APO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2017
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-NC1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The ratings downgrades for bonds in Structured Asset
Securities Corp. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AL1 are
primarily due to the deterioration of credit enhancement resulting
from realized losses and amortization of the subordinate tranches.
The ratings downgrade of Class M-1 in MASTR Asset Backed Securities
Trust 2005-NC1 is primarily due to the outstanding interest
shortfalls on the bond which are not expected to be recouped. In
the transaction's waterfall structure, interest shortfalls are
reimbursed from excess interest only after the
overcollateralization has built to a pre-specified target amount.
Due to the transaction's performance and its level of
overcollateralization, the shortfalls are unlikely to be reimbursed
and could be permanent.

Its analysis has considered the increased uncertainty relating to
the effect of the coronavirus outbreak on the US economy as well as
the effects that the announced government measures put in place to
contain the virus, will have on the performance of residential real
estate assets. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social
risk under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications
for public health and safety. It is a global health shock, which
makes it extremely difficult to provide an economic assessment. The
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
Deviations from Moody's forecasts could lead to rating actions in
the sector. House prices are another key driver of US RMBS
performance. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


TRINITAS CLO XII: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by Trinitas CLO XII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$290,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class A-2
Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class
B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$28,450,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class B-2
Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$23,850,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$30,200,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$23,750,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$11,250,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E
Notes, and the Class F Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on its methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Trinitas XII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible principal investments, up to 7.5%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and up to 2.5% of
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 90% ramped as of
the closing date.

Trinitas Capital Management, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2739

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Its analysis has considered the increased uncertainty relating to
the effect of the coronavirus outbreak on the US economy as well as
the effects that the announced government measures put in place to
contain the virus, will have on the performance of corporate
assets. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk
under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications for
public health and safety. It is a global health shock, which makes
it extremely difficult to provide an economic assessment. The
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to CCCsf
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes and affirms seven classes of
UBS Commercial Trust 2012-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

UBS 2012-C1
      
  - Class A-3 90269GAC5; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-AB 90269GAD3; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 90269GAE1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 90269GAF8; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class C 90269GAL5; LT AAsf; Affirmed

  - Class D 90269GAN1; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 90269GAQ4; LT Bsf; Downgrade

  - Class F 90269GAS0; LT CCCsf; Downgrade

  - Class X-A 90269GAG6; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

Class X-A and X-B are interest only.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: While the majority of the pool has
maintained stable performance, loss expectations have increased
recently due to the slowdown in economic activity related to the
coronavirus pandemic. The downgrades to the junior most rated
classes primarily reflect the more imminent loan maturity and
increased loss expectations on the Poughkeepsie Galleria loan (7.5%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a 691,325-sf portion of a
regional mall located in Poughkeepsie, NY. The mall, which is
anchored by Sears, JCPenney and non-collateral Macy's and Target,
has seen declining performance over the past few years with a
servicer reported YTD Sept. 2019 NOI DSCR of 0.97x and an August
2019 collateral occupancy of 78.8%. Comparable in line sales are
not strong at $384 psf, as of TTM August 2019. The mall is
currently closed due to the coronavirus pandemic. However, Sears
and non-collateral Target remain open as essential businesses while
Best Buy, Dick's Sporting Goods and Ruby Tuesdays are reportedly
open for pickup only. Fitch expects the mall's closure will have a
significant short-term impact on property performance causing
further weakening to property metrics. Furthermore, the refinance
prospects of the loan, which will mature in November 2021, have
become increasingly challenged. Fitch assumed a 50% loss on this
loan in its base case analysis resulting in the downgrade of
classes E and F.

Improved Credit Enhancement, Significant Defeasance: As of the
March 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance had been paid down by 23.2% to $1 billion from $1.3 billion
at issuance. Seven loans have paid off since issuance. 21 loans
(47.7%) are fully defeased, including five of the top 10 loans in
the pool. Only one defeased loan (11.7%) remains interest only, all
other loans are currently amortizing. No loans mature or have their
anticipated repayment dates (ARD) prior to 2021 (17.5%) or 2022
(82.5%). Since the last rating action, the REO Emerald Coast Hotel
Portfolio was disposed at a loss of $5.4 million. No other loans
were disposed or paid off in the period.

Exposure to Coronavirus: Significant economic impact to certain
hotels, retail and multifamily properties is expected from the
coronavirus pandemic due to the recent and sudden reductions in
travel and tourism; temporary property closures; and lack of
clarity at this time on the potential length of the impact. The
pandemic has already prompted the closure of several hotel
properties in gateway cities as well as malls, entertainment venues
and individual stores.

Loans secured by hotels do not comprise a significant portion of
the transaction collateral at only 7.6% of the pool while loans
secured by retail properties comprise 23.5% of the pool, including
the largest non-defeased loan in the pool, the Poughkeepsie
Galleria loan. Loans secured by multifamily properties comprise 12%
of the pool, including one student housing property (1.5%). Fitch
applied additional stresses to hotel, retail and multifamily loans
to account for potential cash flow disruptions due to the
coronavirus pandemic. The downgrades to classes E and F reflect
this analysis.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Six loans (14.5%) are designated Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs), including one specially serviced loan
(1.6%). Aside from the Poughkeepsie Galleria loan, the largest FLOC
is the Meadows Crossing loan (2.3%), which is secured by a 189-unit
(748 beds) off-campus student housing complex located in Allendale,
MI, less than one-half from Grand Valley State University (GVSU),
which is now conducting all classes remotely due to the coronavirus
pandemic. Recent performance has been impacted by increased
competition in the submarket.

The next largest FLOC is the specially serviced Westminster Square
loan (1.6%), which is secured by an 195,000-sf office property
located in downtown Providence, RI. Per the most recent rent roll,
the property was 74.6% with an additional 40% of the NRA scheduled
to roll over the next year.

The remaining three FLOCs include loans secured by a four property
office portfolio (1.6%), which has seen a large tenant that
occupied 19% of the NRA reportedly vacate, a three property hotel
portfolio (1.4%), which has a YE18 NOI DSCR below 1.0x, and a
31,000 sf retail center (0.2%) located in Hurst, TX, which has a
most recent servicer reported occupancy of 60%. Fitch will continue
to monitor these loans going forward.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class E reflects the potential for further
downgrade due to concerns surrounding the ultimate impact of the
coronavirus pandemic and the refinance risk associated with the
Poughkeepsie Galleria. Rating Outlooks for the senior classes
remain Stable due to the significant credit enhancement, defeasance
and the stable performance of the majority of the remaining pool
and continued expected amortization. Rating upgrades may be limited
due to increasing pool concentration and adverse selection.

Sensitivity Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.
Upgrades of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur with
significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance;
however, adverse selection and increased concentrations, or the
underperformance of particular loan(s) could cause this trend to
reverse. Upgrades to 'BBBsf' and below categories are considered
unlikely and would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is likelihood for
interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'Bsf' category is only
likely if the performance of the remaining pool is stable and/or
properties vulnerable to the coronavirus return to pre-pandemic
levels, and there is sufficient credit enhancement to the class.

Sensitivity Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the classes rated 'AAAsf' are not considered likely
due to the position in the capital structure but may occur at
'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to
classes with Negative Rating Outlooks are possible if hotel and
retail performance fails to improve once the coronavirus pandemic
is over.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction and also serves as
the backup advancing agent. Fitch's Issuer Default Rating for
Deutsche Bank is currently 'BBB'/'F2'/Negative. Fitch relies on the
master servicer, Wells Fargo & Company (A+/F1/Stable), which is
currently the primary advancing agent, as a direct counterparty.
Fitch provided ratings confirmation on Dec. 12, 2018.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C15: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to CCsf
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed nine classes of WFRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2013-C15.

WFRBS 2013-C15       

  - Class A-3 92938CAC1; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-4 92938CAD9; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-S 92938CAF4; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 92938CAE7; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

  - Class B 92938CAH0; LT AA-sf; Affirmed

  - Class C 92938CAJ6; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class D 92938CAL1; LT BBB-sf; Affirmed

  - Class E 92938CAN7; LT CCCsf; Downgrade

  - Class F 92938CAQ0; LT CCsf; Downgrade

  - Class PEX 92938CAK3; LT A-sf; Affirmed

  - Class X-A 92938CAG2; LT AAAsf; Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades to classes E and F
reflect an increase in loss expectations since Fitch's last rating
action, primarily due to performance deterioration on the six Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 22.7% of the pool), which include three
REO assets (3.6%). The affirmations of classes A-3 through D
reflect sufficient credit enhancement (CE) relative to expected
losses.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The Carolina Place loan (9.5%) is secured
by a 694,983-sf portion of a 1.2 million-sf regional mall located
in Pineville, NC. Collateral occupancy decreased to 74.5% after
Sears closed in January 2019. In-line sales at YE 2018 decreased to
$376 psf from $383 psf at YE 2017 and $412 psf at issuance. The
former non-collateral Macy's space has been backfilled by a Dick's
Sporting Goods and Golf Galaxy, which opened in May 2019. The
servicer-reported YE 2018 NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
was 1.90x.

The second largest FLOC, the Kitsap Mall loan (9.2%), is secured by
a 579,894-sf portion of a 761,840-sf regional mall located in
Silverdale, WA. While collateral occupancy as of December 2019
remains high at 94.7%, total mall occupancy fell to 82.1% from
96.5% at YE 2018 after the non-collateral Sears closed in October
2019. In-line sales fell to $406 psf at YE 2018 from $430 psf at YE
2017. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR decreased to 1.49x as of YTD
September 2019 from 1.82x at YE 2018 and 1.89x at YE 2017. The loan
began amortizing in July 2019. Fitch's inquiry to the servicer for
an update on whether any co-tenancies were triggered by Sears'
departure remains outstanding.

The third largest FLOC, the REO Cleveland Airport Marriott (1.9%),
is a 372-key, full-service hotel located in Cleveland, OH. The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2017 due to imminent
payment default related to declining performance caused by the
overbuilt local lodging market. The asset became REO in February
2019 and is currently being marketed for sale.

The remaining FLOCs include two REO vacant Gander Mountain stores
(1.1%) located in Valdosta, GA and Opelika, AL; a REO anchored
retail property located in North Olmsted, OH (0.5%) that is
anchored by a vacant former Babies "R" Us and an extended-stay
hotel located in College Station, TX (0.5%) that has experienced
performance decline due to the overbuilt local lodging market.
Fitch expects significant losses upon disposition of the REO
assets.

Increased Credit Enhancement: CE has increased since issuance due
to loan payoffs, defeasance and scheduled amortization. As of the
March 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been paid down by 24.7% to $833.1 million from $1.107
billion at issuance and by 13.4% since Fitch's last rating action.
Since issuance, 11 loans (16.2%) have paid off, including four
loans in the past year. Realized losses to date total $4.7 million
(0.4% of the original pool balance). Fourteen loans (10.7% of the
current pool balance) are fully defeased. Three loans (13.9%) are
full-term interest-only, including the largest loan in the pool.
All loans with partial interest-only periods at issuance are
currently amortizing. Remaining loan maturities are concentrated in
2023 (96.2%), with limited maturities scheduled in 2020 (2.5%) and
2028 (1.3%).

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario that assumed a potential outsized loss of 25%
on the current balance of the Kitsap Mall loan to reflect the
declining cash flow and inline sales and loss of the non-collateral
anchor Sears, while also factoring in the expected paydown of the
transaction from defeased loans. This scenario contributed to
maintaining the Negative Rating Outlook on class D.

Coronavirus Exposure: Eight loans (19.3%) are secured by hotel
properties, including three in the top 15 (14.4%). Excluding the
REO Cleveland Airport Marriott, the weighted average NOI DSCR for
all the performing hotel loans is 2.36x; these hotel loans could
sustain a weighted average decline in NOI of 54.7% before DSCR
falls below 1.0x. Seventeen loans (45.0%) are secured by retail
properties, including three regional mall loans in the top five:
Augusta Mall (13.2%; Augusta, GA), Carolina Place (9.5%; Pineville,
NC) and Kitsap Mall (9.2%; Silverdale, WA). Additional coronavirus
specific stresses were applied to three hotel loans and six retail
loans, and while not directly contributing to the downgrades, did
have an impact on maintaining the Negative Outlook on class D.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Near-term rating changes are limited, as indicated by the
increasing CE, continued amortization and relatively stable
performance for the majority of the pool, as evidenced by the
Stable Rating Outlooks assigned to classes A-3 through C.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of the 'Asf' and 'AAsf' categories would likely occur with
significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance; however, adverse
selection and increased concentrations, further underperformance of
the FLOCs or higher than expected losses on the specially serviced
assets could cause this trend to reverse. An upgrade of the 'BBBsf'
category is considered unlikely and would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
is likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the 'CCCsf'
and 'CCsf' categories is not likely until the later years of the
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and/or if there is sufficient CE, which would likely occur
if the non-rated class is not eroded and the senior classes pay
off.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the 'Asf', 'AAsf' and 'AAAsf' categories are not likely due to
the position in the capital structure and the high CE and
defeasance, but may occur at the 'AAsf' or 'AAAsf' categories
should interest shortfalls occur. Downgrades to the class rated
'BBB-sf' would occur if an outsized loss were to occur on the
Kitsap Mall loan, the FLOCs continue to experience further
performance deterioration or fail to stabilize and/or losses on the
specially serviced assets are higher than expected. The Rating
Outlook on class D may be revised back to Stable if performance of
the FLOCs improves or if the REO assets are resolved with better
recoveries than expected. Further downgrades to the 'CCCsf' and
'CCsf' classes will occur as losses are realized.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to a mall that is underperforming as a result of
changing consumer preferences to shopping. This has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the rating,
resulting in the Negative Outlook on class D.


[*] DBRS Reviews 776 Classes From 59 U.S. RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 776 classes from 59 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 776 classes
reviewed, DBRS Morningstar upgraded eight ratings, confirmed 754
ratings, and discontinued 14 ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating confirmations reflect asset
performance and credit-support levels that are consistent with the
current ratings. The discontinued ratings reflect the transactions
exercising their cleanup call option or the full repayment of
principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application
of the "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in February
2020.

The Affected Ratings are Available at https://bit.ly/2K0DVyZ

The pools backing these RMBS transactions consist of prime,
manufactured housing, second lien, and ReREMIC collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS Morningstar
considers this difference to be a material deviation, but in this
case, the ratings of the subject notes reflect either additional
seasoning being warranted to substantiate a further upgrade, or
actual deal or tranche performance not being fully reflected in the
projected cash flows/model output.

-- Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-3

-- Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-4

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-J1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-J1, Class B-4

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-J2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-J2, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2013-6, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-6, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN1, Class B-4

-- CSMC 2017-HL1 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-HL1, Class B-2

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-2

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-3

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-4

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-5

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-4, Class B-2

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-4, Class B-3

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-4, Class B-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-3, Cl B-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-3, Cl B-5

-- Onslow Bay Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-3

-- Onslow Bay Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-4

-- PSMC 2018-2 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-2, Class B-2

-- PSMC 2018-2 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-2, Class B-3

-- PSMC 2018-2 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-2, Class B-4

-- Shellpoint Asset Funding Trust 2013-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-1, Class B-3

-- Shellpoint Asset Funding Trust 2013-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-1, Class B-4

-- APS Resecuritization Trust 2015-3, REMIC Notes, Series 2015-3,
Class 1-A

-- Deutsche ALT-A Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust, Series
2007-RS1, Re-REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2007-1, Class A-3

-- Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. REMIC Trust, Series
2008-RS1, REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2008-RS1, Class 1-A-1

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 1-A2

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 1-A3

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 2-A2

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 2-A3

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 3-A2

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 4-A3

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 5-A3

-- Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates 2009-R4, Class 6-A2

-- J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2010-1, Series
2010-1 Trust Certificates, Class 2-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2010-1, Series
2010-1 Trust Certificates, Class 2-A-5

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2015-R2, Resecuritization
Pass-Through Securities, Series 2015-R2, Class 1-A2

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2015-R2, Resecuritization
Pass-Through Securities, Series 2015-R2, Class 2-A1

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2015-R2, Resecuritization
Pass-Through Securities, Series 2015-R2, Class 2-A2

-- Nomura Resecuritization Trust 2015-5R, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Series 2015-5R, Class 4A1

-- Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-2, Series
2005-2, Class A3

-- Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-2, Series
2005-2, Class II-X

-- C-BASS 2006-MH1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-MH1, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2006-MH1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-MH1, Class B-1

Notes: The principal methodologies are the U.S. RMBS Surveillance
Methodology and RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities Model and Rating Methodology.


[*] Fitch Takes Action on 10 Trust Preferred CDOs
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 65, upgraded 12, and revised or assigned
Rating Outlooks to eight tranches from 10 collateralized debt
obligations backed primarily by trust preferred securities issued
by banks and insurance companies. Rating actions and performance
metrics for each CDO are reported in the accompanying rating action
report.

The social and market disruptions caused by coronavirus and the
related containment measures did not negatively affect the ratings
for the 10 CDOs. Fitch expects underlying portfolio quality to
deteriorate, driven by the likely future rise in non-current loans
and low interest rates. However, due to the application of
performing CE caps, as per Fitch's "U.S. Trust Preferred CDOs
Surveillance Rating Criteria" (TruPS CDO Criteria), Fitch expects
TruPS CDO ratings to be insulated from the impact of coronavirus in
its base scenario.

Preferred Term Securities XXVII, Ltd./Inc.   

  - A-1 74042TAA9; LT Asf Affirmed

  - A-2 74042TAC5; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - B 74042TAE1; LT Bsf Affirmed

  - C-1 74042TAJ0; LT CCCsf Upgrade

  - C-2 74042TAL5; LT CCCsf Upgrade

  - D 74042TAN1; LT Csf Affirmed

Trapeza CDO XIII, Ltd./Inc.   

  - A-1 894135AA0; LT AAsf Upgrade

  - A-2A 894135AC6; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - A-2B 894135AY8; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - A-3 894135AE2; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - B 894135AG7; LT BBsf Affirmed

  - C-1 894135AJ1; LT Bsf Upgrade

  - C-2 894135AL6; LT Bsf Upgrade

  - D 894135AN2; LT Csf Affirmed

  - E 894135AS1; LT Csf Affirmed

  - F 894135AW2; LT Csf Affirmed

  - G 894138AC0; LT Csf Affirmed

Trapeza CDO X, Ltd/Inc.   

  - A-1 89413CAA5; LT Asf Affirmed

  - A-2 89413CAC1; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - B 89413CAE7; LT Bsf Affirmed

  - C-1 89413CAG2; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-2 89413CAN7; LT Csf Affirmed

  - D-1 89413CAJ6; LT Csf Affirmed

  - D-2 89413CAL1; LT Csf Affirmed

  - Subordinated Notes 89413DAA3; LT Csf Affirmed

Trapeza CDO XII, LTD./INC.   

  - A-1 89413GAA6; LT AAsf Affirmed

  - A-2 89413GAC2; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - A-3 89413GAE8; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - B 89413GAG3; LT Bsf Affirmed

  - C-1 89413GAJ7; LT CCCsf Upgrade

  - C-2 89413GAL2; LT CCCsf Upgrade

  - D-1 89413GAN8; LT Csf Affirmed

  - D-2 89413GAQ1; LT Csf Affirmed

  - E-1 89413GAS7; LT Csf Affirmed
  
  - E-2 89413GAU2; LT Csf Affirmed

  - F 89413EAA1; LT Csf Affirmed

Preferred Term Securities XVII, Ltd./Inc.   

  - A-1 74042EAA2; LT AAsf Upgrade

  - A-2 74042EAB0; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - Class B 74042EAC8; LT BBsf Affirmed

  - Class C 74042EAD6; LT CCsf Affirmed

  - Class D 74042EAE4; LT Csf Affirmed

Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd./Inc.   

  - A-1 89412KAA8; LT AAsf Affirmed

  - A-2 89412KAC4; LT BBBsf Affirmed
  
  - A-3 89412KAE0; LT BBsf Affirmed

  - B 89412KAG5; LT Bsf Upgrade

  - C 89412KAJ9; LT CCsf Affirmed

  - D-1 89412KAN0; LT Csf Affirmed

  - D-2 89412KAQ3; LT Csf Affirmed

  - E-1 89412KAS9; LT Csf Affirmed

  - E-2 89412KAU4; LT Csf Affirmed

  - F 89412JAA1; LT Csf Affirmed

Preferred Term Securities XVIII, Ltd./Inc.   

  - Class A1 Senior Notes 74042WAA2; LT AAsf Affirmed

  - Class A2 Senior Notes 74042WAB0; LT Asf Affirmed

  - Class B Mezz Notes 74042WAC8; LT BBsf Affirmed

  - Class C Mezz Notes 74042WAD6; LT CCCsf Affirmed

  - Class D Mezz Notes 74042WAE4; LT Csf Affirmed

ALESCO Preferred Funding V, Ltd./Inc.   

  - A-1 Floating 01448TAA2; LT AAsf Affirmed

  - A-2 Floating 01448TAB0; LT AAsf Upgrade

  - B Floating 01448TAC8; LT Asf Affirmed

  - C-1 Floating 01448TAD6; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-2 Fixed 01448TAE4; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-3 01448TAF1; LT Csf Affirmed

  - D Floating 01448TAG9; LT Csf Affirmed

ALESCO Preferred Funding VII, Ltd./Inc.   

  - A-1-B 01448YAB9; LT AAsf Affirmed

  - A-2 01448YAC7; LT Asf Affirmed

  - B 01448YAD5; LT Dsf Affirmed

  - C-1 01448YAE3; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-2 01448YAF0; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-3 01448YAG8; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-4 01448YAH6; LT Csf Affirmed

  - C-5 01448YAJ2; LT Csf Affirmed

Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd./Inc.   

  - Class A-1 74041EAA3; LT AAsf Upgrade

  - Class A-2 74041EAB1; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - Class A-3 74041EAL9; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - Class B 74041EAC9; LT BBsf Upgrade

  - Class C 74041EAD7; LT Csf Affirmed

  - Class D 74041EAG0; LT Csf Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The main driver behind the upgrades was deleveraging from
collateral redemptions and excess spread, which resulted in
paydowns to the senior most notes, ranging from 6% to 70% of their
balances at last review. The magnitude of the deleveraging for each
CDO is reported in the accompanying rating action report.

For six transactions, the credit quality of the collateral
portfolios, as measured by a combination of Fitch's bank scores and
public ratings, remained stable or improved, with the other four
exhibiting negative credit migration. There were two new cures
since last review. No new deferrals have been reported.

The ratings on 34 classes of notes in the 10 transactions have been
capped based on the application of the performing CE cap as
described in Fitch's TruPS CDO Criteria.

The ratings for class A-1 in Alesco Preferred Funding V, Ltd./Inc.
and class A-1 in Preferred Term Securities XVIII, Ltd./Inc. are one
category lower than the model-implied ratings. The transaction
documents do not conform to Fitch's "Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds Counterparty Rating Criteria" regarding rating requirements
and remedial actions expected for the issuer account bank. These
transactions are allowed to hold cash, and the account bank does
not collateralize cash. Therefore, the two classes of notes are
capped at the same rating category as their issuer account bank.

In addition, Fitch affirmed the rating on the non-deferrable class
B notes in Alesco Preferred Funding VII, Ltd./Inc. at 'Dsf'. An
event of default occurred in March 2012 due to the class A/B
overcollateralization ratio falling below 100%, followed by an
acceleration of maturity in April 2012. The class B notes have not
received their timely interest since the acceleration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Ratings of the notes issued by these CDOs remain sensitive to
significant levels of defaults, deferrals, cures, and collateral
redemptions. To address potential risks of adverse selection and
increased portfolio concentration, Fitch applied a sensitivity
scenario, as described in the criteria, to applicable
transactions.

Future upgrades to the rated notes may occur if a transaction
experiences improvement in credit enhancement through deleveraging
from collateral redemptions and/or interest proceeds being used for
principal repayment.

Downgrades to the rated notes may occur if a significant share of
the portfolio issuers defers or defaults on their TruPS
instruments, which would cause a decline in performing CE levels.
If the disruptions due to the pandemic become more severe, the
banking and insurance sectors could come under more pressure, and
Fitch will formulate a sensitivity scenario addressing such
economic environment.


[*] Moody's Downgrades $32.6 Million of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of eighteen
tranches from seven transactions backed by prime jumbo and
resecuritized RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B

Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-C, Series 2003-C

Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-CB1

Cl. B3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2003-D/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2003-D

Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-A/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-A

Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-B/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-B

Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-B

Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2019 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance and Moody's
updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The rating
downgrades are due to erosion of credit enhancement available to
the bonds and weak performance of the underlying collateral.

The downgrade of Class B9 in Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked
Notes, Series 2003-B is due to the downgrade of the referenced
tranche Class B9 in RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B.

Its analysis has considered the increased uncertainty relating to
the effect of the coronavirus outbreak on the US economy as well as
the effects that the announced government measures put in place to
contain the virus, will have on the performance of residential
mortgages. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social
risk under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications
for public health and safety. It is a global health shock, which
makes it extremely difficult to provide an economic assessment. The
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

The principal methodology used in rating all deals except Resix
Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-B was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019. The principal
methodology used in rating Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked
Notes, Series 2003-B was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged
Securities" published in March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, particularly the unemployment rate.
Moody's expects unemployment rate to rise to about 9% in the second
quarter, and decline thereafter with a slow pace of rehiring,
resulting in an unemployment rate of around 6.5% by the end of
2020. However, there is significant uncertainty around this
forecast and risks are firmly to the downside. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $346MM of US RMBS Issued 2005-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 25 tranches
and upgraded the rating of one tranche, from six RMBS transactions,
backed by prime jumbo, subprime and Alt-A loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A6CB

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X*, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2017
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A1

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-7*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-X*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2019 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-6

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades of tranches from Residential Asset
Securitization Trust 2005-A6CB, Residential Asset Securitization
Trust 2006-A1, Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-1 and Thornburg Mortgage
Securities Trust 2006-6 are due to a recent deterioration in deal
performance, and erosion in credit enhancement. The rating
downgrade on Cl. A-2 from the resecuritization transaction
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2 is due to the
downgrades of the reference bonds, Cl. 1-A-1 and Cl. 1-A-3 from
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A1. The rating upgrade
of Cl. A-1 of Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust
2006-WM2 is primarily due to the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bond as a result of funds distributed to the
transaction in December 2019 pursuant to a settlement between GE
Capital and certain RMBS investors. The action also reflects the
recent performance as well as Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying pools.

Its analysis has considered the increased uncertainty relating to
the effect of the coronavirus outbreak on the US economy as well as
the effects that the announced government measures put in place to
contain the virus, will have on the performance of residential real
estate. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk
under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications for
public health and safety. It is a global health shock, which makes
it extremely difficult to provide an economic assessment. The
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

The principal methodology used in rating Residential Asset
Securitization Trust 2006-R2 Cl. A-2 was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in March 2019. The
principal methodology used in rating Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-1
Cl. A-2, Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A6CB Cl. A-1,
Cl. A-2, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-5, Cl. A-6, Cl. A-7 and Cl. PO ,
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A1 Cl. 1-A-4, Cl. 1-A-6
, Cl. 1-A-8 , Cl. PO , Cl. 1-A-1 , Cl. 1-A-3 , Cl. 3-A-1 , Cl.
3-A-2 ,Cl. 3-A-3 ,Cl. 3-A-4 and Cl. 2-A-1, Securitized Asset Backed
Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM2 Cl. A-1 and Thornburg Mortgage
Securities Trust 2006-6 Cl. A-1 was "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in February 2019. The methodologies used in
rating interest-only classes were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in February 2019 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
Moody's expects unemployment rate to rise to about 9% in the second
quarter, and decline thereafter with a slow pace of rehiring,
resulting in an unemployment rate of around 6.5% by the end of
2020. However, there is significant uncertainty around this
forecast and risks are firmly to the downside. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
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