/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/200329.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 29, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 88

                            Headlines

ANCHORAGE CREDIT 10: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
ARES XXXIV: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to Class F-R Notes
ASSET BACKED 2005-HE6: Moody's Cuts Class M4 Debt to 'B1'
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: Fitch Affirms Class G Certs at Bsf
BELLEMEADE RE 2017-1: DBRS Assigns BB(High) Rating on Cl. B1 Debt

BENCHMARK 2020-B17: Fitch Rates Class G-RR Debt 'B-sf'
CIFC FUNDING 2013-I: S&P Affirms BB- (sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
CIM TRUST 2020-R2: Fitch Rates Class B1 Notes 'BBsf'
CITIGROUP 2015-GC27: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
COMM 2013-CCRE10: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs

COMM 2015-PC1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-E Certs
CSAIL 2015-C2: DBRS Confirms B Rating on F Certs, Trend Stable
EAGLE RE 2018-1: DBRS Assigns B(High) Rating on Class B-1 Debt
ELMWOOD CLO IV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
FREDDIE MAC: DBRS Assigns Ratings on 10 STACR Transactions

GCI LIBERTY: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
GOLUB CAPITAL 48(B): S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
GREEN PLAINS: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B-
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs

HARSCO CORP: Egan-Jones Lowers Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB
HOME RE 2018-1: DBRS Rates Class B-1 Debt 'B(High)'
IMSCI 2012-2: DBRS Keeps B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
IMSCI 2013-3: DBRS Keeps B Rating on Class F Certs
IMSCI 2013-4: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs

IMSCI 2015-6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certificates
JC PENNEY: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to C
JP MORGAN 2004-PNC1: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on 7 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2020-3: DBRS Assigns B(High) Rating on 2 Classes
LAREDO PETROLEUM: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B-

MANITOWOC CO: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
MARINER CLO 8: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $22.5MM Cl. E Notes
MATTEL INC: Egan-Jones Lowers Sr. Unsecured Ratings to B
MCAP CMBS 2014-1: DBRS Keeps B Rating on Class G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C31: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to CCC

OAKTOWN RE III: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Class B-1B Debt
RADNOR RE 2018-1: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class B-1 Debt
REALT 2015-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
RR 8 LTD: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $21.25MM Class D Notes
TGIF FUNDING 2017-1: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on A-2 Notes on Watch Neg.

TOWD POINT 2020-2: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Debt 'B(EXP)sf'
WELLS FARGO 2015-C28: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2017-RC1: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class X-F Certs
[*] DBRS Reviews 311 Classes From 33 U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] Fitch Places 35 Tranches from 5 US CMBS Deals on Watch Negative

[*] Fitch Puts 43 Classes From 6 CMBS Transactions on Watch Neg.
[*] S&P Places 25 Ratings on 15 U.S. CLO Transactions on Watch Neg.
[] S&P Takes Various Actions on 24 U.S. CMBS Transactions

                            *********

ANCHORAGE CREDIT 10: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Anchorage Credit Funding 10, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$241,650,000 Class A Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2038
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$68,350,000 Class B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2038 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2038 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2038 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$27,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2038 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on its methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CDO's portfolio and structure.

Anchorage Credit Funding 10 is a managed cash flow CDO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by corporate bonds and
loans. At least 30% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured
loans, senior secured notes, and eligible investments , and up to
20% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, and up to 5%
of the portfolio may consist of letters of credit. The portfolio is
approximately 48% ramped as of the closing date.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest up to 50% of unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2996

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.2%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 36.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 11 years

Its analysis has considered the increased uncertainty relating to
the effect of the coronavirus outbreak on the US economy as well as
the effects that the announced government measures put in place to
contain the virus, will have on the performance of corporate
assets. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk
under its ESG framework, given the substantial implications for
public health and safety. It is a global health shock, which makes
it extremely difficult to provide an economic assessment. The
degree of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


ARES XXXIV: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to Class F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Ares XXXIV CLO Ltd./Ares
XXXIV CLO LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans. This
issuance is a reset of the transaction, which originally closed in
September 2015 and was previously partially refinanced in July
2017. As such, S&P withdrew its rating on the original class A-R
notes, which were redeemed in full on the refinancing date.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool, which consists
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and
lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by collateral
quality tests;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak.

"Some government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak in
June or August, and we are using this assumption in assessing the
economic and credit implications. We believe measures to contain
COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession and could
cause a surge of defaults among nonfinancial corporate borrowers.
As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and
estimates accordingly," S&P said.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Ares XXXIV CLO Ltd./Ares XXXIV CLO LLC

  Class                Rating     Amount (mil. $)

  A-R2                 AAA (sf)            640.00
  B-R2                 AA (sf)             120.00
  C-R (deferrable)     A (sf)               60.00
  D-R (deferrable)     BBB- (sf)            58.00
  E-R (deferrable)     BB- (sf)             42.00
  F-R (deferrable)     B- (sf)              15.00
  Subordinated notes   NR                  108.03

  NR--Not rated.

  RATING WITHDRAWN

  Ares XXXIV CLO Ltd./Ares XXXIV CLO LLC

                      Rating
  Class          To           From

  A-R            NR           AAA (sf)
  
  NR--Not rated.


ASSET BACKED 2005-HE6: Moody's Cuts Class M4 Debt to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan
Trust 2005-HE6.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE6

Cl. M3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades are primarily due to outstanding interest
shortfalls on the bonds which are not expected to be recouped as
the impacted bonds have weak structural mechanisms to reimburse
accrued interest shortfalls. The actions also reflect the recent
performance as well as Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.5% in February 2020 from 3.8% in
February 2019. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.8% to 4.2% for the 2020 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2020. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: Fitch Affirms Class G Certs at Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ten classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-4.

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-4

  - Class G 059513AW1; LT Bsf Affirmed; previously at Bsf

  - Class H 059513AY7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class J 059513BA8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class K 059513BC4; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class L 059513BE0; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class M 059513BG5; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class N 059513BJ9; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class O 059513BL4; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class P 059513BN0; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

  - Class Q 059513BQ3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: The affirmations are due to performance
consistent with Fitch's last rating action. The pool is adversely
selected with only three individual loans remaining.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The largest loan in the pool remains a Fitch
Loan of Concern (FLOC) due to the binary risk associated with the
loan. The FedEx Portland loan (62% of the pool) is secured by a
single tenant property in Portland, Oregon. FedEx operates on a
ground lease and the warehouse was built to suit in 2007. The loan
matures in April 2022 and FedEx's lease expires in June 2022. The
balloon balance equates to $136 per square foot.

The remaining non-defeased loan is secured by a multi-tenant
neighborhood center located in Brentwood, CA. The property is
anchored by Walgreen's (48% of the NRA) and Walgreen's lease
expires in July of 2032. The loan matures in September 2022.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Since the previous rating action, the
pool's balance has decreased by approximately $1.2 million, from
$28 million to $26.8 million. Credit enhancement for class G will
increase with continued paydown. As of the March 2020 distribution
date, the transaction has paid down 98.8% since issuance to $26.8
million from $2.2 billion. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes J through N.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only three
performing loans remaining, inclusive of one fully defeased loan
(3% of the pool). Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans
and ranked them by their perceived likelihood of repayment. The
ratings reflect this sensitivity analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class G remains Stable due to high credit
enhancement and continued deleveraging of the pool. Further
upgrades to class G are unlikely due to the concentrated nature of
the pool.

Factors that would lead to upgrades include improved asset
performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.

Factors that could lead to downgrades would include a decline in
property level performance or the transfer of loans to special
servicing with expected losses.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


BELLEMEADE RE 2017-1: DBRS Assigns BB(High) Rating on Cl. B1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following seven Bellemeade Re
(BMIR) transactions:

Bellemeade Re 2017-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1 at A (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BB (high) (sf)

Bellemeade Re 2018-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1B at A (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BB (sf)

Bellemeade Re 2018-2 Ltd.

-- Class M-1B at AA (sf)
-- Class M-1C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at A (high) (sf)

Bellemeade Re 2018-3 Ltd.

-- Class M-1B at BBB (sf)
-- Class M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (sf)

Bellemeade Re 2019-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1A at A (low) (sf)
-- Class M-1B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (sf)

Bellemeade Re 2019-2 Ltd.

-- Class M-1B at A (low) (sf)
-- Class M-1C at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (high) (sf)

Bellemeade Re 2019-3 Ltd.

-- Class M-1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class M-1B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class M-1C at BBB (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BBB (low) (sf)

The above-referenced securities are currently also rated by DBRS,
Inc.'s affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(MCR). In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these securities Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review and that MCR intended to
withdraw its outstanding ratings; such withdrawal will occur on or
about March 31, 2020. In accordance with MCR's engagement letter
covering these securities, upon withdrawal of MCR's outstanding
ratings, the DBRS Morningstar ratings will become the successor
ratings to the withdrawn MCR ratings.

These seven BMIR transactions are generally classified as mortgage
insurance (MI) linked-notes transactions.

DBRS Morningstar performed the following rating analysis on the
transactions:

-- Loan-level default probability, loss severity, and expected
    loss review;

-- Cash flow analysis to evaluate the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement;

-- Historical performance analysis as reflected in delinquencies,
    cumulative losses, and constant prepayment rates (CPRs);

-- Third-party due diligence sample size review; and

-- Representations and warranties (R&W) framework review.

POOL EXPECTED LOSSES

DBRS Morningstar used its proprietary RMBS Insight 1.3 model to
derive the probability of default on the underlying insured loans
with active insurance policies, loss severities on the insurance
policies, and expected losses for each of the transactions. DBRS
Morningstar recalculated or remapped certain collateral attributes
in its analysis. The size of the pools of insured loans for the
transactions is large and geographically diverse, which generally
suggests a low level of concentration and asset correlation. In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar floored the asset correlation in
accordance with its published principal methodology. The expected
losses for each transaction are generally stepped up from the raw
model results.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

A structural analysis that encompassed 12 cash flow stress
scenarios was performed, which focused on prepayment speeds, timing
of losses, and interest rate stresses.

OPERATIONAL RISK REVIEW

DBRS Morningstar performed an on-site operational risk review of
Arch Mortgage Insurance Company's mortgage insurance platform and
believes the company is an acceptable mortgage loan insurer.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the historical performance of each
transaction, as reflected in delinquencies, cumulative losses, and
CPRs. Overall delinquencies benefitted from robust industry
underwriting practices, a strong employment and economic backdrop,
and rising home prices.

THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the sample size for each of the due
diligence review categories, including credit, valuation, and data
integrity. The sample sizes in the BMIR 2018-3, BMIR 2019-2 and
BMIR 2019-3 transactions do not meet DBRS Morningstar's due
diligence criteria threshold. Some mitigating factors for the lower
due diligence sample include the following: (1) The majority of the
underlying insured mortgage loans for these transactions conform to
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) guidelines. DBRS Morningstar
believes that GSEs have robust originator and servicer approval and
monitoring processes. (2) The insurer can generally rescind MI
claims (subject to rescission relief). DBRS Morningstar did not
review the loan-level due diligence findings for each of the
transactions; rather, it relied on the analysis done by MCR at the
time of assigning ratings to the transactions on or prior to the
closing dates, as well as the satisfactory performance of the
transactions to date.

R&W FRAMEWORK

The transactions are backed by MI policies, and no loans are
pledged to the trusts. Hence, the insurer will not directly make
any R&W to noteholders regarding the underlying insured mortgage
loans. Some mitigating factors for these transactions are as
follows: (1) The master policy generally gives the insurer the
right to rescind (subject to rescission relief) when there is
material misrepresentation and fraud in the origination of an
underlying insured loan. (2) In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar made
a conservative assumption to not give any benefit for potential
rescissions by the insurer. This assumption resulted in a higher
projected MI claim payout and provides additional credit protection
to the noteholders. (3) The insurer retains risk in the capital
structure, which would align the ceding insurer's interest with
that of investors.

OTHER REVIEWS

DBRS Morningstar notes that a legal analysis, which included but
was not limited to legal opinions and various transaction
documents, was performed by MCR as part of its process of assigning
ratings to each transaction on or prior to their closing dates. For
the purpose of assigning ratings to the transactions, DBRS
Morningstar did not perform additional document reviews unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar also took into consideration the
financial strength of the mortgage insurer in conjunction with the
remaining principal balances of the rated tranches. On the closing
date of each transaction, the insurer established a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account, and deposited an
amount generally covering two months of interest payments on the
rated classes. In case the insurer defaults on paying coverage
premium payments to the issuer, the amount available in this
account will be used to make interest payments to the noteholders.
Certain transaction documents do not require the insurer to cure
any deficient amounts in the premium deposit account post-closing.
For such transactions, the bond ratings may be capped based on the
insurer's financial strength, unless the rated tranches are
expected to pay off shortly and there are no deficiencies in the
premium deposit account.

SUMMARY

The ratings are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application of the
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" published in December 2019 unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related notes.

The ratings for the BMIR classes are being initiated by DBRS
Morningstar as part of the announced analytical integration of
certain U.S. RMBS asset classes (see the November 22, 2019, press
release "DBRS and Morningstar Credit Ratings Confirm GSE CRT and
MI-Linked Notes Asset Class Coverage"). As such, the ratings are
deemed to be solicited DBRS Morningstar ratings.

The ratings assigned to certain securities may differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model, but no such difference
constitutes a material deviation. When assigning the ratings, DBRS
Morningstar takes into account the rating analysis detailed in this
press release and may have made qualitative adjustments for the
analytical considerations not fully captured by the quantitative
model.


BENCHMARK 2020-B17: Fitch Rates Class G-RR Debt 'B-sf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following final ratings and Rating
Outlooks to BENCHMARK 2020-B17 Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2020-B17:

Benchmark 2020-B17

  -- Class A-1; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class A-2; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class A-4; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class A-5; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class A-S; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class A-SB; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class B; LT AA-sf New Rating; previously at AA-(EXP)sf

  -- Class C; LT A-sf New Rating; previously at A-(EXP)sf

  -- Class D; LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

  -- Class E; LT BBB-sf New Rating; previously at BBB-(EXP)sf

  -- Class F-RR; LT BB-sf New Rating; previously at BB-(EXP)sf

  -- Class G-RR; LT B-sf New Rating; previously at B-(EXP)sf

  -- Class NR-RR; LT NRsf New Rating; previously at NR(EXP)sf

  -- Class VRR Interest; LT NRsf New Rating; previously at
NR(EXP)sf

  -- Class X-A; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  -- Class X-B; LT A-sf New Rating; previously at A-(EXP)sf

  -- Class X-D; LT BBB-sf New Rating; previously at BBB-(EXP)sf

  -- $6,275,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $188,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $170,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $263,938,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,900,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $746,439,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $78,994,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $105,326,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,214,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,780,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,780,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,752,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,028,000b class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,028,000bd class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,158,000bd class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

  -- $27,477,162bd class NR-RR;
  
  -- $27,500,000bc class VRR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest only (IO).

(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(c) Represents the non-offered, eligible vertical credit-risk
retention interest.

(d) Horizontal risk retention.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Feb. 27, 2020, the
balances for class A-4 and class A-5 were finalized. At the time
that the expected ratings were assigned, the exact initial
certificate balances of class A-4 and class A-5 were unknown and
expected to be approximately $433,938,000 in aggregate. The final
class balances for class A-4 and class A-5 are $170,000,000 and
$263,938,000, respectively. The classes in the table reflect the
final ratings and deal structure.

Additionally, since Fitch published its expected ratings, the
coronavirus pandemic has caused significant disruption to the
financial markets, with a direct and immediate impact to hotel
performance and lack of clarity on the duration of this impact.
Fitch expects the hotels within this transaction to experience
significant declines in property-level cash flow in the short term.
However, over the longer term, Fitch believes there is inherent
value in the assets.

Although cash flow is expected to be significantly disrupted
through reduced occupancy or hotel closures, Fitch anticipates that
many borrowers particularly those of institutional quality are
likely to support their core assets for a period of time. Fitch
performed a breakeven analysis on the hotels to determine the net
cash flow (NCF) declines a hotel can withstand before falling to a
1.0x debt service coverage ratio (DSCR). For this transaction,
hotels can withstand NCF declines ranging from 39% to 89%.

As a further test, Fitch performed a stress scenario with
additional property specific RevPAR declines, increased volatility
adjustments, and an increased probability of default for those
hotels with lower levels of cushion before breaching a 1.0x DSCR as
described above. In that scenario, the resulting credit enhancement
for each category would still be consistent with the assigned
ratings for this securitization.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 35 loans secured by 160
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$943,376,162 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citi Real Estate Funding Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association, and German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 89.7% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.33x is slightly lower than the 2020 YTD average of 1.35x and
higher than the 2019 average of 1.26x, respectively. However, the
pool's Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 92.7% is lower than the 2020
YTD and 2019 averages of 96.9% and 103.0%, respectively. Excluding
investment-grade credit opinion loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR
and LTV of 1.29x and 110.0%, respectively.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down by only 2.2%, which is below the respective
2019 and 2020 YTD averages of 5.9% and 3.7%, respectively.
Twenty-seven loans totaling 85.5% of the deal are full IO loans,
which is higher than the 2019 and 2020 YTD averages of 60.3%% and
76.5%, respectively. Another six loans, representing 12.4% of the
pool, are partial IO loans.

Credit Opinion Loans: Eight loans, representing 39.9% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions. This is above the 2020 YTD
and 2019 averages of 31.0% and 14.2%, respectively. Five loans
including Moffett Towers (8.4% of the pool), 1633 Broadway (5.3%),
650 Madison Avenue (5.3%), CBM Portfolio (5.3%) and Bellagio Hotel
(4.2%) received stand-alone credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*'. 1501
Broadway (5.3%) and Stonemont Net Lease Portfolio (2.7%) received a
stand-alone credit opinion of 'A-sf*'. Kings Plaza (3.4%) received
a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBBsf*'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 23.1% below
the most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI
was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during
this period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
BMARK 2020-B17 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AAsf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could
result.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and the findings
did not have an impact on the agency's analysis or conclusions.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


CIFC FUNDING 2013-I: S&P Affirms BB- (sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CIFC Funding 2013-I
Ltd.'s class A-1-R2 and X-R replacement notes. At the same time,
S&P withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1-R and X notes,
and affirmed its ratings on the class A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R
notes.

The transaction is a U.S. CLO transaction managed by CIFC VS
Management LLC. The replacement notes are being issued via a
supplemental indenture.

On the March 20, 2020, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class A-1-R2 and X-R replacement note issuances were used to redeem
the original class A-1-R and X notes, as outlined in the
transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original notes in line with their full redemption
and assigned final ratings to the new notes. The class A-2-R, B-R,
C-R, and D-R notes are not affected by the changes in the
supplemental indenture.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction, as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance. In line with our criteria,
our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the
expected timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon
default, under various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.
In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's ability to
pay timely interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the
rated tranches," S&P said.

"The assigned ratings reflect our view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels," the
rating agency said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  CIFC Funding 2013-I Ltd.

  Replacement class      Rating         Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R2                 AAA (sf)                313.70
  X-R                    AAA (sf)                  1.88

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN
  CIFC FUNDING 2013-I Ltd.
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-1-R                NR              AAA (sf)
  X                    NR              AAA (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED
  CIFC FUNDING 2013-I Ltd.

  Class                Rating
  A-2-R                AA (sf)
  B-R                  A (sf)
  C-R                  BBB- (sf)
  D-R                  BB- (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


CIM TRUST 2020-R2: Fitch Rates Class B1 Notes 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed notes to be issued by CIM Trust 2020-R2.

CIM Trust 2020-R2

  - Class A-IO-S; LT NRsf New Rating; previously at NR(EXP)sf

  - Class A1; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  - Class A1-A; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  - Class A1-B; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  - Class A1-IO; LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

  - Class B1; LT BBsf New Rating; previously at BB(EXP)sf

  - Class B2; LT Bsf New Rating; previously at B(EXP)sf

  - Class B3; LT NRsf New Rating; previously at NR(EXP)sf

  - Class C; LT NRsf New Rating; previously at NR(EXP)sf

  - Class M1; LT AAsf New Rating; previously at AA(EXP)sf

  - Class M1-IO; LT AAsf New Rating; previously at AA(EXP)sf

  - Class M2; LT Asf New Rating; previously at A(EXP)sf

  - Class M2-IO; LT Asf New Rating; previously at A(EXP)sf

  - Class M3; LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

  - Class M3-IO; LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

  - Class PRA; LT NRsf New Rating; previously at NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
2,250 seasoned performing loans (SPLs) and re-performing loans
(RPLs) with a total balance of approximately $492.3 million, which
includes $41.5million, or 8%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the cut-off
date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Payment Deferrals Related to the Coronavirus Expected (Negative):
The outbreak of the coronavirus and widespread containment efforts
in the U.S. will result in increased unemployment and cash flow
disruptions. Mortgage payment deferrals will provide immediate
relief to affected borrowers and Fitch expects servicers to broadly
adopt this practice. The missed payments will result in interest
shortfalls that will likely be recovered, the timing of which will
depend on repayment terms; if interest is added to the underlying
balance as a non-interest-bearing amount, repayment will occur at
refinancing, property liquidation or loan maturity.

To account for the cash flow disruptions, Fitch assumed deferred
payments on 40% of the pool for the first six months of the
transaction at all rating categories with a reversion to its
standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve by month 10. This
assumption is based on observed peak delinquencies for legacy Alt-A
collateral. Because the cash flow waterfall provides for principal
otherwise distributable to the lower rated bonds to pay timely
interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' bonds, the lowest rate classes
will likely experience interest shortfalls to the extent excess
cash flow is insufficient.

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, seasoned performing and RPLs.
Of the pool, 1.5% was 30 days delinquent as of the cut-off date,
and 15.6% of loans are current but have had recent delinquencies or
incomplete pay strings. 83% of the loans are seasoned over 24
months and have been paying on time for the past 24 months. Roughly
95% have been modified.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Chimera has actively purchased
re-performing loans (RPLs) over the past 12 years and is assessed
as an 'Average' aggregator by Fitch. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. (SPS) is the named servicer for the transaction and is
responsible for primary and special servicing functions. Fitch
views SPS as a strong servicer of RPLs and is rated 'RPS1-'. High
rated servicers receive a credit in Fitch's loss model which helped
decrease the loss expectations for the pool by 223 bps at the
'AAAsf' rating stress. Issuer retention of at least 5% of the bonds
also helps ensure an alignment of interest between both the issuer
and investor.

Adequate Servicing Fee (Neutral): Fitch determined that the stated
servicing fee (including the excess servicing fee strip) of
approximately 50 bps is sufficient to attract subsequent servicers
even under a period of poor performance and high delinquencies. The
stated 50 bps was more than sufficient to cover Fitch's stressed
servicing fee for this transaction of 35 bps.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Neutral): Third-party due diligence was
performed on 100% of the pool by SitusAMC, which is assessed by
Fitch as an 'Acceptable - Tier 1' TPR firm. The results of the
review indicate moderate operational risk with approximately 8% of
the loans assigned a 'C' or 'D' grade. 4.6% of the pool was graded
'D' for missing or estimated final HUD-1 documents yet is subject
to testing for compliance with predatory lending regulations. Fitch
applied loss severity adjustments for these loans due to exposure
additional assignee liability which was less than 25 bps at the
AAAsf rating stress. However, the overall concentration of material
exceptions is consistent with prior Fitch-rated RPL RMBS.

Representation Framework (Negative): The loan-level representations
and warranties (R&Ws) are mostly consistent with a tier 1
framework. While the framework is strong, repurchase obligations
are designated to a separate fund that does not hold an investment
grade rating, and the fund may have issues fulfilling repurchases
in times of economic stress. Fitch increased its loss expectations
by 90 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating category to account for the
non-investment grade counterparty risk of the R&W provider.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. P&I advances made on behalf of loans that
become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation
proceeds to the trust. Due to the lack of P&I advancing, the
loan-level loss severity (LS) is less for this transaction than for
those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural
provisions and cash flow priorities, together with increased
subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
that class in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $41.5 million (8.4%) of the UPB are
outstanding on 444 loans. Fitch included the deferred amounts when
calculating the borrower's loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and
sustainable LTV (sLTV), despite the lower payment and amounts not
being owed during the term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in a
higher probability of default (PD) and LS than if there were no
deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior for these
loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit strategies
(i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to those
borrowers with more equity in the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
The implied rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of
the potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that
the transaction may become exposed to or that may be considered in
the surveillance of the transaction. Three sets of sensitivity
analyses were conducted at the state and national levels to assess
the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model-projected 37.0% at 'AAA'. As shown in the table in the
presale report, the analysis indicates that there is some potential
rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model
projection.

The defined rating sensitivities determine the stresses to MVDs
that would reduce a rating by one full category to non-investment
grade and to 'CCCsf'. The percentage points shown in the table in
the presale report reflect the additional MVDs that would have to
occur to affect ratings for each defined sensitivity for this
transaction.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool by loan count. The third-party due
diligence was consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
AMC Diligence, LLC was engaged to perform the review. Loans
reviewed under this engagement were given compliance grades.
Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due diligence
reports.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered to be
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others, to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


CITIGROUP 2015-GC27: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. (DBRS Morningstar) confirmed all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC27 issued by
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-GC27 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The confirmation of ratings reflects the overall stable performance
of the underlying loans since issuance. As of the February 2020
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 7.0% since
issuance, with 97 loans of the original 100 loans remaining in the
pool. Two loans (Prospectus ID#13 - DoubleTree Little Rock and
Prospectus ID#41 - Willow Lake Apartments) have been repaid in full
during the last 12 months. The pool is relatively diverse based on
loan size as the largest 10 loans represent only 43.1% of the pool
balance. The pool is concentrated by property type as retail
properties encompass 38.1% of the pool balance. There are also 64
loans, totaling 63.3% of the pool balance, that are secured by
properties in tertiary markets. Seven loans, representing 5.1% of
the pool balance, are fully defeased.

Loans representing 92.3% of the current pool balance are reporting
year-end (YE) 2019 or YE2018 figures, with a weighted-average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA loan-to-value ratio (LTV)
of 1.73 times (x) and 65.5%, respectively. The figures are an
improvement compared with the Issuer's WA DSCR of 1.62x and the
issuance WA LTV of 67.2%.

As of the February 2020 remittance, there are three loans,
representing 4.5% of the pool balance, in special servicing and an
additional 10 loans, representing 9.0% of the pool balance, on the
servicer's watchlist. The largest loan in special servicing
(Prospectus ID#5 – Highland Square) is secured by a 753-bed
student housing complex near the main campus of the University of
Mississippi and has been real estate owned by the trust since
October 2019. The loan was originally transferred to the special
servicer in November 2018 after an extended period of cash flow
declines. The property was recently appraised in July 2019 for a
value of $39.0 million, down from $51.0 million at issuance. The
special servicer plans to improve the occupancy rate and market the
property for sale in late 2020. The loan was liquidated from the
transaction as part of the review, which resulted in an implied
loss severity of approximately 15.0%.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are Zane Plaza Shopping
Center (Prospectus ID#45 – 0.7% of the pool balance) and Belmont
Village (Prospectus ID#68 – 0.4% of the pool balance).

Zane Plaza Shopping Center is a neighborhood retail center in the
rural town of Chillicothe, Ohio, that transferred to the special
servicer in July 2018 for imminent default after the anchor tenant,
Elder-Beerman (48.1% of the net rentable area (NRA)), vacated
following the parent company's bankruptcy filing. The special
servicer continues to work with the borrower to stabilize the
property and is reviewing new leasing activity negotiated by the
borrower. The probability of default for this loan was increased to
reflect the increased risk.

Belmont Village is secured by a grocery-anchored shopping center in
Belmont, North Carolina, and the loan was transferred to the
special servicer in October 2019 for imminent default after the
grocery store, Bi-Lo (71.8% of NRA) vacated in March 2019. The loan
was liquidated from the pool as part of the review with an implied
loss severity of approximately 35.0%.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-E, and X-F are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2013-CCRE10: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE10 (the Certificates)
issued by COMM 2013-CCRE10 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

The Class PEZ certificates are exchangeable for the Class A-M,
Class B, and Class C certificates (and vice versa). All trends are
Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has had a collateral reduction of 20.5%
since issuance, with 48 of the original 59 loans remaining in the
pool as of the February 2020 remittance report. Eleven loans,
including three loans in the top 15, are fully defeased,
representing 18.7% of the pool.

Loans representing 76.6% of the pool reported YE2019 and YE2018
financials, with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 2.03 times (x) and 13.1%,
respectively. The largest 15 loans reported either partial-year or
YE2019 financials, with a WA DSCR and debt yield of 2.29x and
13.9%, respectively, representing a WA cash flow improvement of
33.8% over the DBRS Morningstar net cash flow figures derived at
issuance.

As of the February 2020 remittance, eight loans, representing 15.9%
of the pool, are on the servicer's watchlist and no loans are in
special servicing. At issuance, DBRS Morningstar assigned
investment-grade shadow ratings to two loans, including the largest
loan in the pool, One Wilshire (Prospectus ID#1, 12.5% of the pool)
and Raytheon & DirecTV Buildings, (Prospectus ID#4, 6.0% of the
pool), the latter of which is fully defeased. With this review,
DBRS Morningstar has confirmed that the performance of One Wilshire
remains consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics.

Class X-A is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2015-PC1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-PC1 issued by COMM 2015-PC1
Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

DBRS Morningstar removed the Interest in Arrears designation for
Class F.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance when the transaction was composed of
80 loans secured by 147 commercial and multifamily properties. As
of the February 2020 remittance, there has been a collateral
reduction of 7.5% with 74 loans secured by 140 properties remaining
in the transaction. In the past 12 months, four loans have been
repaid in full and three loans have been fully defeased, for a
total of four defeased loans in the transaction, representing 3.1%
of the pool balance as of the February 2020 remittance.

The pool is diverse by loan size as the largest 10 loans comprise
40.0% of the pool balance. Additionally, DBRS Morningstar considers
the property quality of five loans, representing 14.9% of the pool
balance, to be Above Average at issuance. The pool is concentrated
by property type as office properties represent 37.4% of the pool
balance and lodging properties represent 22.3%. Twelve loans,
comprising 22.9% of the pool, including two of the largest four
loans, are structured with full-term interest-only (IO) payments.
Approximately 96.2% of the pool reported a weighted average (WA)
preceding year debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.81 times (x)
and a WA loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 64.2%, compared with the
issuer's WA DSCR of 1.70x and WA LTV of 66.9% derived at issuance.

As of the February 2020 remittance, there were three loans,
representing 5.0% of the pool balance, in special servicing and an
additional nine loans, representing 19.9% of the pool balance, on
the servicer's watchlist.

Three of the top five loans, representing 14.7% of the pool
balance, are on the servicer's watchlist for various reasons.
Princeton GSA Portfolio (8.1% of the pool balance – Prospectus
ID#2) is secured by three office properties in Sacramento,
California; San Diego; and Houston. The loan was added to the
servicer's watchlist in December 2019 because a tenant of the
Sacramento property, General Services Administration, has a lease
expiration in May 2020.

The Plaza at Harmon Meadow (3.6% of the pool – Prospectus ID#4)
is secured by a mixed-use office-retail property in Secaucus, New
Jersey, and was added to the watchlist in January 2020 because of
the upcoming loan maturity in April 2020. CORE West Industrial
Portfolio (3.0% of the pool – Prospectus ID#5) is secured by 10
industrial warehouse properties around Grand Rapids, Michigan, and
was added to the servicer's watchlist in April 2019 for deferred
maintenance.

Two of the largest 11 loans, representing 4.2% of the pool, are in
special servicing; however, the outlook for both is relatively
favorable as outlined, below.

Riverview Center (2.2% of the pool balance – Prospectus ID#6) is
secured by a mixed-use office-industrial warehouse property in
Menands, New York, and was transferred to the special servicer in
December 2019 after the borrower requested a short-term loan
extension to the April 2020 loan maturity. The borrower requested
additional time to renew two leases with the State of New York and
noted the debt cannot be refinanced without the lease renewals.
DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of default for the loan
as part of the review.

100 Pearl Street (2.0% of the pool balance – Prospectus ID#11) is
secured by a high-rise office building in Hartford, Connecticut,
and was transferred to the special servicer in May 2018 upon notice
that its largest tenant would vacate at its lease expiration in
December 2018. The special servicer reported a new lease had been
executed with a tenant that will occupy 29.8% of the net rentable
area and the lease has been approved by the special servicer. The
loan is expected to return to the master servicer in the near term
as a result of the new lease.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, X-D, and X-E are IO certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CSAIL 2015-C2: DBRS Confirms B Rating on F Certs, Trend Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C2 issued by CSAIL 2015-C2
Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has generally remained in line with DBRS
Morningstar's expectations since issuance. As of the February 2020
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 7.8% since
issuance, with 111 of the 118 original loans remaining in the pool.
Seven loans, representing 6.2% of the pool, including two loans in
the top 15, are fully defeased.

Loans representing 87.2% of the current pool balance are reporting
YE2019 or YE2018 figures, with a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.90 times (x) and
10.3%, respectively. The largest 15 loans represent 46.2% of the
pool and the majority of those loans reported partial-year 2019
financials, with a WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.97x and 9.6%,
respectively, representing a WA net cash flow growth of 12.1% over
the DBRS Morningstar cash flow figures derived at issuance.

As of the February 2020 remittance, 15 loans are on the servicer's
watchlist and three loans are in special servicing, representing
9.6% and 2.8% of the pool, respectively. The largest loan in
special servicing, The Depot (Prospectus ID#6, 2.4% of the current
pool balance), is secured by a 642-bed student housing property in
Akron, Ohio, serving the students of the University of Akron. The
loan has been in special servicing since July 2016, after cash flow
declines led to debt service shortfalls.

The transaction has a retail concentration of 38.1%, with two of
the top five loans being secured by regional malls that have Macy's
and JCPenney as anchor tenants. Since both Macy's and JCPenney have
recently announced plans for mass closures across their mall
portfolios in the next several years, DBRS Morningstar will monitor
both loans closely for developments and will provide loan
commentary updates on the DBRS Viewpoint platform as new
information becomes available.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-E, and X-F are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.

Notes: The principal methodology is North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology.


EAGLE RE 2018-1: DBRS Assigns B(High) Rating on Class B-1 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following two Eagle Re (EMIR)
transactions:

Eagle Re 2018-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (high) (sf)

Eagle Re 2019-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1A at AA (sf)
-- Class M-1B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at B (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (sf)

The above-referenced securities are currently also rated by DBRS,
Inc.'s affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(MCR). In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these securities Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review and that MCR intended to
withdraw its outstanding ratings; such withdrawal will occur on or
about March 31, 2020. In accordance with MCR's engagement letter
covering these securities, upon withdrawal of MCR's outstanding
ratings, the DBRS Morningstar ratings will become the successor
ratings to the withdrawn MCR ratings.

These two EMIR transactions are generally classified as mortgage
insurance (MI) linked-notes transactions.

DBRS Morningstar performed the following rating analysis on the
transactions:

-- Loan-level default probability, loss severity, and expected
    loss review;

-- Cash flow analysis to evaluate the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement;

-- Historical performance analysis as reflected in delinquencies,
    cumulative losses, and constant prepayment rates (CPRs);

-- Third-party due diligence sample size review; and

-- Representations and warranties (R&W) framework review.

POOL EXPECTED LOSSES

DBRS Morningstar used its proprietary RMBS Insight 1.3 model to
derive the probability of default on the underlying insured loans
with active insurance policies, loss severities on the insurance
policies, and expected losses for each of the transactions. DBRS
Morningstar recalculated or remapped certain collateral attributes
in its analysis. The size of the pools of insured loans for the
transactions is large and geographically diverse, which generally
suggests a low level of concentration and asset correlation. In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar floored the asset correlation in
accordance with its published principal methodology. The expected
losses for each transaction are generally stepped up from the raw
model results.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

A structural analysis that encompassed 12 cash flow stress
scenarios was performed, which focused on prepayment speeds, timing
of losses, and interest rate stresses.

OPERATIONAL RISK REVIEW

DBRS Morningstar performed an onsite operational risk review of
Radian Guaranty's insurance platform and believes the company is an
acceptable mortgage loan insurer.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the historical performance of each
transaction, as reflected in delinquencies, cumulative losses, and
CPRs. Overall delinquencies benefitted from robust industry
underwriting practices, strong employment and economic backdrop,
and rising home prices.

THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the sample size for each of the due
diligence review categories, including credit, valuation, and data
integrity. The sample size in the EMIR 2019-1 transaction does not
meet DBRS Morningstar's due diligence criteria threshold. Some
mitigating factors for the lower due diligence sample include the
following: (1) The majority of the underlying insured mortgage
loans for these transactions conform to government-sponsored
enterprise (GSE) guidelines. DBRS Morningstar believes that GSEs
have robust originator and servicer approval and monitoring
processes. (2) The insurer can generally rescind MI claims (subject
to rescission relief). DBRS Morningstar did not review the
loan-level due diligence findings for each of the transactions;
rather, it relied on the analysis done by MCR at the time of
assigning ratings to the transactions on or prior to the closing
dates, as well as the satisfactory performance of the transactions
to date.

R&W FRAMEWORK

The transactions are backed by MI policies, and no loans are
pledged to the trusts. Hence, the insurer will not directly make
any R&W to noteholders regarding the underlying insured mortgage
loans. Some mitigating factors for these transactions are as
follows: (1) The master policy generally gives the insurer the
right to rescind (subject to rescission relief) when there are
material misrepresentation and fraud in the origination of an
underlying insured loan. (2) In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar made
a conservative assumption to not give any benefit for potential
rescissions by the insurer. This assumption resulted in a higher
projected MI claim payout and provides additional credit protection
to the noteholders. (3) The insurer retains risk in the capital
structure, which would align the ceding insurer's interest with
that of investors.

OTHER REVIEWS

DBRS Morningstar notes that a legal analysis, which included but
was not limited to legal opinions and various transaction
documents, was performed by MCR as part of its process of assigning
ratings to each transaction on or prior to their closing dates. For
the purpose of assigning ratings to the transactions, DBRS
Morningstar did not perform additional document reviews unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar also took into consideration the
financial strength of the mortgage insurer in conjunction with the
remaining principal balances of the rated tranches. On the closing
date of each transaction, the insurer established a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account, and deposited an
amount generally covering two months of interest payments on the
rated classes. In case the insurer defaults on paying coverage
premium payments to the issuer, the amount available in this
account will be used to make interest payments to the noteholders.
Certain transaction documents do not require the insurer to cure
any deficient amounts in the premium deposit account post-closing.
For such transactions, the bond ratings may be capped based on the
insurer's financial strength, unless the rated tranches are
expected to pay off shortly and there are no deficiencies in the
premium deposit account.

SUMMARY

The ratings are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application of the
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" published in December 2019 unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related notes.

The ratings for the EMIR classes are being initiated by DBRS
Morningstar as part of the announced analytical integration of
certain U.S. RMBS asset classes (see the November 22, 2019, press
release "DBRS and Morningstar Credit Ratings Confirm GSE CRT and
MI-Linked Notes Asset Class Coverage"). As such, the ratings are
deemed to be solicited DBRS Morningstar ratings.

The ratings assigned to certain securities may differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model, but no such difference
constitutes a material deviation. When assigning the ratings, DBRS
Morningstar takes into account the rating analysis detailed in this
press release and may have made qualitative adjustments for the
analytical considerations not fully captured by the quantitative
model.


ELMWOOD CLO IV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Elmwood CLO IV Ltd.'s
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

  -- The diversified collateral pool.

  -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

  -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
the performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing
portfolio management, and trading.

  -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Elmwood CLO IV Ltd.

  Class                  Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  X                      AAA (sf)                2.00
  A                      AAA (sf)              320.00
  B                      AA (sf)                60.00
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)                 30.00
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)              30.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)               17.50
  Subordinated notes     NR                     47.20

  NR--Not rated.


FREDDIE MAC: DBRS Assigns Ratings on 10 STACR Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following 10 Freddie Mac
Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) transactions:

-- STACR 2017-DNA2
-- STACR 2017-HQA3
-- STACR 2017-HRP1
-- STACR 2018-HQA1
-- STACR 2018-DNA2
-- STACR 2018-HRP1
-- STACR 2018-HQA2
-- STACR 2018-HRP2
-- STACR 2019-HRP1
-- STACR 2019-DNA3

The Affected Rating is Available at https://bit.ly/2xlR4zb

The above-referenced securities are currently also rated by DBRS,
Inc.'s affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(MCR). In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these securities Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review and that MCR intended to
withdraw its outstanding ratings; such withdrawal will occur on or
about March 31, 2020. In accordance with MCR's engagement letter
covering these securities, upon withdrawal of MCR's outstanding
ratings, the DBRS Morningstar ratings will become the successor
ratings to the withdrawn MCR ratings.

These 10 STACR transactions are generally classified as
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) CRT transactions.

DBRS Morningstar performed the following rating analysis on the
transactions:

-- Loan-level default probability, loss severity, and expected
    loss review;

-- Cash flow analysis to evaluate the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement;

-- Historical performance analysis as reflected in delinquencies,
    cumulative losses, and constant prepayment rates (CPRs);

-- Third-party due diligence sample size review; and

-- Representations and warranties (R&W) framework review.

POOL EXPECTED LOSSES

DBRS Morningstar used its proprietary RMBS Insight 1.3 model to
derive the probability of defaults, loss severities, and expected
losses for each of the transactions. DBRS Morningstar recalculated
or remapped certain collateral attributes in its analysis. The size
of the reference pools for the transactions is large and
geographically diverse, which generally suggests a low level of
concentration and asset correlation. In its analysis, DBRS
Morningstar floored the asset correlation in accordance with its
published principal methodology. The probability of defaults, loss
severities, and expected losses for each transaction is generally
stepped up from the raw model results.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

A structural analysis that encompassed 12 cash flow stress
scenarios was performed, which focused on prepayment speeds, timing
of losses, and interest rate stresses.

OPERATIONAL RISK REVIEW

DBRS Morningstar conducted an aggregator review to assess Freddie
Mac's seller and servicer approval and oversight procedures. As a
result, DBRS Morningstar believes that the company maintains a
comprehensive credit risk management approach to effectively
oversee the performance of its portfolio, which includes robust
lender approval practices and strong ongoing monitoring programs.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the historical performance of each
transaction, as reflected in delinquencies, cumulative losses, and
CPRs. Overall delinquencies benefitted from robust industry
underwriting practices, strong employment and economic backdrop,
and rising home prices.

THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the sample size for each of the due
diligence review categories, including credit, regulatory
compliance, valuation, and data integrity. The sample sizes in the
transactions, except for transactions STACR 2017-DNA2 and STACR
2017-HQA3, do not meet DBRS Morningstar's due diligence criteria
threshold. Some mitigating factors for the lower due diligence
sample include the following: (1) lender oversight and
post-purchase quality control; (2) Freddie Mac retains risk in
various parts of the capital structure, so it is incentivized to
enforce R&W made by the lenders; and (3) Freddie Mac has a good
record of successfully enforcing repurchases. DBRS Morningstar did
not review the loan-level due diligence findings for each of the
transactions; rather, it relied on the analysis done by MCR at the
time of assigning ratings to the transactions on or prior to the
closing dates, as well as the satisfactory performance of the
transactions to date.

R&W FRAMEWORK

The R&W framework for STACR transactions is unique. Each lender
makes loan-level R&W to Freddie Mac when it sells loans to Freddie
Mac, and such R&W will not be passed through to the holder of the
STACR notes. Instead, Freddie Mac is responsible for enforcing a
breach of R&W made by the lenders on the loans in the reference
pool, which may result in the removal of the loans from the
reference pool and subsequent payments to noteholders.

OTHER REVIEWS

DBRS Morningstar notes that a legal analysis, which included but
was not limited to legal opinions and various transaction
documents, was performed by MCR as part of its process of assigning
ratings to each transaction on or prior to their closing dates. For
the purpose of assigning ratings to the transactions, DBRS
Morningstar did not perform additional document reviews unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

SUMMARY

The ratings are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application of the
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" published in December 2019 unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
certificates.

The ratings for the STACR classes are being initiated by DBRS
Morningstar as part of the announced analytical integration of
certain U.S. RMBS asset classes (see the November 22, 2019, press
release "DBRS and Morningstar Credit Ratings Confirm GSE CRT and
MI-Linked Notes Asset Class Coverage"). As such, the ratings are
deemed to be solicited DBRS Morningstar ratings.

The ratings assigned to certain securities may differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model, but no such difference
constitutes a material deviation. When assigning the ratings, DBRS
Morningstar takes into account the rating analysis detailed in this
press release and may have made qualitative adjustments for the
analytical considerations not fully captured by the quantitative
model.


GCI LIBERTY: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
-----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, upgraded the foreign
currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on debt issued
by GCI Liberty, Incorporated to B from C.

GCI Liberty, Incorporated provides telecommunication services. The
Company offers broadband, television, tariff information, bills
payment, connection and installation, and other related services.
GCI Liberty serves customers in North America.



GOLUB CAPITAL 48(B): S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Golub Capital Partners
CLO 48(B) Ltd.'s fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

  -- The diversification of the collateral pool;

  -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

  -- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

  -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Golub Capital Partners CLO 48(B) Ltd.

  Class                  Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)              341.00
  A-2                    NR                     13.70
  B-1                    AA (sf)                53.60
  B-2                    AA (sf)                 9.60
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)                 34.40
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)              30.30
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)               20.90
  Subordinated notes     NR                     56.20

  NR--Not rated.


GREEN PLAINS: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Green Plains Incorporated to B- from B.

Green Plains Incorporated is an American company based in Omaha,
Nebraska that was founded in 2004. The company is the third-largest
ethanol fuel producer in North America. It was reported in early
2012 that the company ships approximately one billion gallons of
ethanol per year.



GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-GC10 issued by GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GC10 as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class F, which
maintains a Negative trend to reflect the concerns about several
underperforming loans, particularly the largest loan in the pool,
Empire Hotel & Retail (Prospectus ID #1; representing 15.7% of the
pool), which is detailed below.

Although some loans exhibit higher risk profiles related to
performance declines from issuance, there are no delinquent or
specially serviced loans in the pool. In general, the pool has
performed as expected, with 53 of the original 61 loans remaining
as of the February 2020 remittance and a collateral reduction of
21.2% since issuance. In addition, 16 loans, representing 19.4% of
the pool and including four loans in the top 15, are fully
defeased.

Loans representing 80.1% of the current pool balance are reporting
YE2019 or YE2018 figures with a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.87 times (x) and
12.2%, respectively. Eleven loans in the top 15, which represent
61.2% of the pool, are reporting partial-year or YE2019 financials.
These loans reported a WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.68x and 10.4%,
respectively, representing a WA net cash flow growth of 5.6% over
the DBRS Morningstar issuance figures.

As of the February 2020 remittance, eight loans, representing 24.6%
of the current pool balance, are on the servicer's watchlist. The
largest loan in the pool, Empire Hotel & Retail, is secured by a
423-key full-service hotel with ground-level retail located in New
York City (NYC), across the street from Lincoln Center and within
close proximity to Central Park. The loan is being monitored for
its low DSCR, which has remained depressed since YE2016 and was
reported at 0.84x for the trailing 12 months ended September 2019.
According to the servicer, the borrower attributes the revenue
declines to renovation work that occurred between 2014 and 2016, as
well as the softening of the NYC hotel market in recent years. For
additional information on this loan, please see the loan commentary
in the DBRS Viewpoint platform.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-GCJ14 (the Certificates)
issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GCJ14 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

Class PEZ is exchangeable with Classes A-S, B, and C and vice
versa. All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has had a collateral reduction of 18.2%
since issuance with 73 of the original 84 loans remaining in the
pool as of the February 2020 remittance report. The majority of the
remaining loans in the pool was structured with 10-year terms and
will mature in 2023. Eleven loans, including one loan in the top
15, are fully defeased, representing 11.7% of the pool.

Loans representing 86.8% of the pool reported YE2018 financials
with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.69 times (x) and 11.5%, respectively. The largest
15 loans reported either partial-year or YE2018 financials with a
WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.74x and 11.0%, respectively,
representing a WA cash flow improvement of 7.1% over the DBRS
Morningstar cash flow figures derived at issuance.

As of the February 2020 remittance, 14 loans, representing 22.2% of
the pool (including four in the top 15), are on the servicer's
watchlist and one loan, representing 1.3% of the pool, is in
special servicing.

Cobblestone Court (Prospectus ID#14; 1.9% of the pool) and Willow
Knolls Court (Prospectus ID #9; 2.2% of the pool) are DBRS
Morningstar Hotlist loans secured by retail properties that have
lost anchor tenants in recent years. Cobblestone Court was added to
the servicer's watchlist following the loss of its anchor, Kmart
(formerly 45.1% of net rentable area (NRA)), in November 2017.
Kmart continued to pay rent until its lease expired in September
2019. More recently, Dick's Sporting Goods (18.7% of NRA) announced
that it will relocate to a nearby mall, but will continue to honor
its existing lease which expires in January 2022.

Willow Knolls Court, an anchored shopping center in Peoria,
Illinois, is being monitored after Burlington Coat Factory (25.7%
of NRA) closed in January 2019. As of September 2019, the property
was 74.3% occupied and reported a Q3 2019 annualized DSCR of 0.85x.
The property is anchored by Kohl's (33.0% of NRA), whose lease
expires in January 2027, and a 14-screen Goodrich Quality Theater
(14.5% of NRA), whose lease expires in January 2022. For additional
information on these loans, please see the respective loan
commentaries on the DBRS Viewpoint platform.

One loan, the Indiana Mall (Prospectus ID#20; 1.3% of the pool), is
secured by a regional mall in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and is in
special servicing. This loan was transferred to special servicing
in November 2018 for imminent default after losing three of its
four anchor tenants. The mall was 43.2% occupied at Q3 2019 and,
based on the most recent appraisal, DBRS Morningstar believes that
a loss severity approaching 80% could be realized at liquidation
with losses expected to be contained to the unrated Class H
Certificate.

Classes X-A and X-C are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


HARSCO CORP: Egan-Jones Lowers Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB
----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Harsco Corporation to BB from BB+.

Harsco Corporation is a global industrial company based in Camp
Hill, PA. Harsco operates in 30 countries and employs approximately
11,000 people worldwide. The company provides industrial services
and engineered products that serve large industries, including
steel, railways, and energy.



HOME RE 2018-1: DBRS Rates Class B-1 Debt 'B(High)'
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following two Home Re (HMIR)
transactions:

Home Re 2018-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (high) (sf)

Home Re 2019-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (sf)

The above-referenced securities are currently also rated by DBRS,
Inc.'s affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(MCR). In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these securities Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review and that MCR intended to
withdraw its outstanding ratings; such withdrawal will occur on or
about March 31, 2020. In accordance with MCR's engagement letter
covering these securities, upon withdrawal of MCR's outstanding
ratings, the DBRS Morningstar ratings will become the successor
ratings to the withdrawn MCR ratings.

These two HMIR transactions are generally classified as mortgage
insurance (MI) linked-notes transactions.

DBRS Morningstar performed the following rating analysis on the
transactions:

-- Loan-level default probability, loss severity, and expected
    loss review;

-- Cash flow analysis to evaluate the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement;

-- Historical performance analysis as reflected in delinquencies,
    cumulative losses, and constant prepayment rates (CPRs);

-- Third-party due diligence sample size review; and

-- Representations and warranties (R&W) framework review.

POOL EXPECTED LOSSES

DBRS Morningstar used its proprietary RMBS Insight 1.3 model to
derive the probability of default on the underlying insured loans
with active insurance policies, loss severities on the insurance
policies, and expected losses for each of the transactions. DBRS
Morningstar recalculated or remapped certain collateral attributes
in its analysis. The size of the pools of insured loans for the
transactions is large and geographically diverse, which generally
suggests a low level of concentration and asset correlation. In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar floored the asset correlation in
accordance with its published principal methodology. The expected
losses for each transaction are generally stepped up from the raw
model results.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

A structural analysis that encompassed 12 cash flow stress
scenarios was performed, which focused on prepayment speeds, timing
of losses, and interest rate stresses.

OPERATIONAL RISK REVIEW

DBRS Morningstar performed an onsite operational risk review of
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation's insurance platform and
believes the company is an acceptable mortgage loan insurer.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the historical performance of each
transaction, as reflected in delinquencies, cumulative losses, and
CPRs. Overall delinquencies benefitted from robust industry
underwriting practices, strong employment and economic backdrop,
and rising home prices.

THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the sample size for each of the due
diligence review categories, including credit, valuation, and data
integrity. The sample size in the HMIR 2019-1 transaction does not
meet DBRS Morningstar's due diligence criteria threshold. Some
mitigating factors for the lower due diligence sample include the
following: (1) The majority of the underlying insured mortgage
loans for these transactions conform to government-sponsored
enterprise (GSE) guidelines. DBRS Morningstar believes that GSEs
have robust originator and servicer approval and monitoring
processes. (2) The insurer can generally rescind MI claims (subject
to rescission relief). DBRS Morningstar did not review the
loan-level due diligence findings for each of the transactions;
rather, it relied on the analysis done by MCR at the time of
assigning ratings to the transactions on or prior to the closing
dates, as well as the satisfactory performance of the transactions
to date.

R&W FRAMEWORK

The transactions are backed by MI policies, and no loans are
pledged to the trusts. Hence, the insurer will not directly make
any R&W to noteholders regarding the underlying insured mortgage
loans. Some mitigating factors for these transactions are as
follows: (1) The master policy generally gives the insurer the
right to rescind (subject to rescission relief) when there are
material misrepresentation and fraud in the origination of an
underlying insured loan. (2) In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar made
a conservative assumption to not give any benefit for potential
rescissions by the insurer. This assumption resulted in a higher
projected MI claim payout and provides additional credit protection
to the noteholders. (3) The insurer retains risk in the capital
structure, which would align the ceding insurer's interest with
that of investors.

OTHER REVIEWS

DBRS Morningstar notes that a legal analysis, which included but
was not limited to legal opinions and various transaction
documents, was performed by MCR as part of its process of assigning
ratings to each transaction on or prior to their closing dates. For
the purpose of assigning ratings to the transactions, DBRS
Morningstar did not perform additional document reviews unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar also took into consideration the
financial strength of the mortgage insurer in conjunction with the
remaining principal balances of the rated tranches. On the closing
date of each transaction, the insurer established a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account, and deposited an
amount generally covering two months of interest payments on the
rated classes. In case the insurer defaults on paying coverage
premium payments to the issuer, the amount available in this
account will be used to make interest payments to the noteholders.
Certain transaction documents do not require the insurer to cure
any deficient amounts in the premium deposit account post-closing.
For such transactions, the bond ratings may be capped based on the
insurer's financial strength, unless the rated tranches are
expected to pay off shortly and there are no deficiencies in the
premium deposit account.

SUMMARY

The ratings are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application of the
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" published in December 2019 unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related notes.

The ratings for the HMIR classes are being initiated by DBRS
Morningstar as part of the announced analytical integration of
certain U.S. RMBS asset classes (see the November 22, 2019, press
release "DBRS and Morningstar Credit Ratings Confirm GSE CRT and
MI-Linked Notes Asset Class Coverage"). As such, the ratings are
deemed to be solicited DBRS Morningstar ratings.

The ratings assigned to certain securities may differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model, but no such difference
constitutes a material deviation. When assigning the ratings, DBRS
Morningstar takes into account the rating analysis detailed in this
press release and may have made qualitative adjustments for the
analytical considerations not fully captured by the quantitative
model.


IMSCI 2012-2: DBRS Keeps B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited maintained its ratings on four classes and placed one
class of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued
by Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series
2012-2 under review as follows:

-- Class XC at A (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf), Under Review with Negative  
     Implications

-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

-- Class F at BB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

-- Class G at B (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings of the following
classes:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)

Classes D, E, F, and remain Under Review with Negative Implications
to reflect the uncertainty surrounding the resolution of the Centre
1000 loan (Prospectus ID#7, 8.3% of the pool) and the sponsors'
ability to provide partial recourse to cover a portion of the
outstanding loan balance. As a result of the increased risk that
the bottom-rated bonds may experience interest payment disruption
because of this uncertainty, DBRS Morningstar has placed the rating
of Class XC Under Review with Negative Implications. All other
trends are Stable, with the exception of Classes D, E, F, G, and
XC, which have ratings that do not carry trends.

Concerns remain surrounding the resolution for Centre 1000, which
is in special servicing after the loan's sponsor, Strategic Group
LLC (Strategic Group), submitted an application filing in December
2019 under Canada's Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA)
that affected the property and 49 others within the sponsor's
171-property portfolio.

DBRS Morningstar also notes the significantly increased risks from
issuance for the Lakewood Apartments loan (Prospectus ID#3, 9.8% of
the pool), secured by a multifamily property in Fort McMurray,
Alberta, where the sustained decline in oil prices during the past
several years has resulted in a significant economic decline for
the area.

The outlook for both of these loans secured by properties in the
Alberta province, which will likely be the subject of additional
economic stress amid the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak of
2020 that has pushed oil prices even lower, remains significantly
impaired as compared with the issuance analysis. DBRS Morningstar
has confirmed ratings and maintained Stable trends on Classes A-1,
A-2, and B based on the respective classes’ in-place credit
support and the general outlook for the loans in the pool outside
of the two previously outlined.

Centre 1000, a 55,668-sf office property in Calgary, Alberta,
situated in a suburban area north of the downtown core, has
suffered from occupancy declines since issuance amid the
significantly reduced demand within the Calgary office sector.
Occupancy was reported at 73.0% as of the December 2019 rent roll.
While there has been some recent leasing momentum, significant
challenges remain in the subject's falling rental rates and the
difficult market conditions that will likely drive a longer
lease-up period and require significant capital investment to
attract tenants.

The loan was transferred to the special servicer after the CCAA
filing, and the special servicer has confirmed the application for
CCAA protection was denied and the Court has ordered a receivership
for all affected properties, including the subject. The special
servicer has advised that a resolution strategy is in the process
of being determined as of March 2020. Given the sharp declines in
cash flow and a generally difficult market for office properties
from both tenant demand and investor demand perspective, DBRS
Morningstar believes the as-is value has declined sharply from
issuance. With the current economic environment, particularly in
the face of a relatively new threat in COVID-19, the loss severity
at resolution could be significant. There is a partial recourse
guarantee in the amount of $3.1 million in place to Riaz Mamdani,
the guarantor, and Indemnitor, who indirectly controls the
borrowing entity, Centre 1000 LP. The servicer's ability to enforce
recourse provisions may be limited amid the economic difficulties
for the guarantor.

At issuance, the trust was secured by 31 loans at an original trust
balance of $240.2 million. As of the March 2020 remittance, 14
loans remain in the trust at a current balance of $117.9 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 50.9% since issuance as a
result of loan repayment and scheduled loan amortization. One loan,
representing 12.2% of the pool, is fully defeased.

As of the March 2020 remittance, there are five loans, representing
40.4% of the pool, on the servicer's watchlist; however, three
loans, representing 32.9% of the pool, have some form of meaningful
recourse to the respective sponsors. The Lakewood Apartments
remains on the servicer's watchlist and in forbearance under an
agreement that is structured with a delayed November 2022 maturity
date and scheduled lump sum principal payments. The loan has full
recourse to LREIT, 2668921 Manitoba Ltd. (Manitoba) and Shelter
Canadian Properties Ltd. (Shelter), the parent company of Manitoba.
DBRS Morningstar increased the probability of default to reflect
the continued increasing risk profile for this loan.

For further information on the filing and exposure across the DBRS
Morningstar rated book, please see the December 18, 2019,
commentary titled "The Impact of Strategic Group's Creditor
Protection Filing on CMBS Loans" on the DBRS Morningstar website at
www.dbrsmorningstar.com.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its principal methodology
when determining the ratings assigned to Class C, which deviate
from the lower ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
Morningstar considers a material deviation from a methodology to
exist when there may be a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor or other users of the credit ratings would consider the
material deviation to be a significant factor in evaluating the
ratings. The material deviations are warranted given uncertain
loan-level event risk.

Class XC is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references
multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


IMSCI 2013-3: DBRS Keeps B Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed three classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-3 issued by Institutional
Mortgage Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series 2013-3 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)

All three classes carry a Stable trend.

In addition, DBRS Morningstar has maintained four classes Under
Review with Negative Implication as follows:

-- Class D at BBB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

-- Class F at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

-- Class G at B (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

DBRS Morningstar has also placed Class X, rated at A (sf), Under
Review with Negative Implications. Classes D, E, F, G, and X carry
ratings that do not have trends assigned.

DBRS Morningstar has maintained the Under Review with Negative
Implications designation on the aforementioned classes because of
the uncertainty surrounding the resolution of two loans that
transferred to the special servicer in January 2020. Deerfoot Court
(Prospectus ID#5, 9.0% of the pool) and Airways Business Plaza
(Prospectus ID#12, 6.0% of the pool) transferred to the special
servicer after Strategic Group, a Calgary-based real estate
investment firm, submitted an initial application filing under
Canada's Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The filing affects
entities affiliated with 50 commercial properties in the company's
171-property portfolio, including the collateral properties for the
Deerfoot Court and Airways Business Plaza loans. As a result of the
increased risk that the bottom-rated bonds may experience interest
payment disruption because of this uncertainty, DBRS Morningstar
has placed the rating of Class X Under Review with Negative
Implications.

Given the soft market and declining oil prices, DBRS Morningstar
believes the ultimate sales prices will be stressed beyond the
respective current appraised values. Both loans have recourse to
the borrowing entity and sponsor for the full amount of the
outstanding debt; however, there is substantial uncertainty
surrounding the financial wherewithal of the recourse providers and
actual timeline for the loan resolutions. For further information
on these loans, please see the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which
information has been provided below.

In addition to the assets above, DBRS Morningstar remains concerned
with three loans secured by multifamily properties in Fort
McMurray, Alberta: Lunar and Whimbrel Apartments (Prospectus ID#10,
5.3% of the pool), Snowbird and Skyview Apartments (Prospectus
ID#11, 5.0% of the pool), and Parkland and Gannet Apartments
(Prospectus ID#17, 4.3% of the pool). All three loans have seen
significant performance declines, driven by an extended period of
contraction in the provincial and local economies, which has led to
significant occupancy and rental rate declines for the collateral.
The loans were transferred to the special servicer in October 2016
and again in January 2017 and have since been modified to allow for
an extension of the maturity dates to May 2021 from May 2018.

The remaining rating confirmations reflect the stable performance
of the transaction outside of the previously mentioned loans. At
issuance, the trust was secured by 38 loans at an original trust
balance of $250.0 million. Per the March 2020 remittance, 22 loans
remain in the trust at a current balance of $95.1 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 62.0% since issuance as a
result of loan repayment and scheduled loan amortization.

Class X certificates are interest-only (IO) and reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


IMSCI 2013-4: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-4 issued by Institutional
Mortgage Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series 2013-4 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable, except for Classes F and G, which have
Negative trends.

The Negative trends on Classes F and G reflect DBRS Morningstar's
concerns surrounding two loans in the pool: Nelson Ridge
(Prospectus ID#4; 10.4% of the pool) and Franklin Suites
(Prospectus ID#12; 5.2% of the pool).

Outside of the above-mentioned loans, which have been negatively
affected by the sustained downturn in the oil market and resulting
difficulties for the Fort McMurray economy and larger Alberta
economy, the pool has generally performed in line with DBRS
Morningstar's expectations. At issuance, the transaction consisted
of 33 loans secured by 33 commercial properties at an original
trust balance of $330.4 million. Per the February 2020 remittance,
16 loans remain in the trust at a current balance of $167.5
million, representing a collateral reduction of approximately 49.3%
since issuance due to loan repayment and scheduled amortization.
The top 10 loans (excluding defeasance; 84.1% of the pool) benefit
from healthy amortization over their respective loan terms, with a
weighted-average expected amortization over the life of the loans
of approximately 24.8%. The pool also benefits from defeasance, as
one loan (10.0% of the pool) is fully defeased.

Per the February 2020 remittance, there are six loans (33.6% of the
pool) on the servicer's watchlist, including three loans in the top
10. The second-largest watchlisted loan, Nelson Ridge, is secured
by a 225-unit multifamily property in Fort McMurray. There has been
a significant decline in cash flows since issuance due to the
adverse market conditions in Fort McMurray. The loan was approved
for forbearance in December 2018, with the terms of the loan
modification requiring scheduled principal pay downs to total $4.0
million by June 2020. The property is expected to be sold or
refinanced at the end of the forbearance period in December 2021.
To date, the sponsor has been in compliance with all terms of the
forbearance.

Franklin Suites is secured by a 95-key limited-service hotel in
Fort McMurray, with cash flow difficulties over the last several
years for the same reasons as outlined above for the Nelson Ridge
loan. Both loans do benefit from full recourse to their respective
sponsors; however, given the sustained cash flows well below
issuance expectations and the continued difficulty for the local
economy, DBRS Morningstar believes the overall risks are
significantly increased from issuance. As such, for the purposes of
this review, DBRS Morningstar significantly increased the
probability of default in its analysis to reflect the increased
risk with these loans.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar assigned an investment-grade shadow
rating to Calloway Courtenay (Prospectus ID#1; 15.4% of the pool).
With this review, DBRS Morningstar confirms that the performance of
this loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

DBRS Morningstar materially deviated from its principal methodology
when determining the rating assigned to Class X; the rating
assigned to Class X materially deviates from the lower ratings
implied by the quantitative results. DBRS Morningstar considers a
material deviation from a methodology to exist when there may be a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor or other users of
the credit ratings would consider the material deviation to be a
significant factor in evaluating the rating. The material deviation
is warranted, as consideration was given for actual loan,
transaction, and sector performance where a rating based on the
lowest-rated notional class may not reflect the observed risk.

Class X is an interest-only certificate that references multiple
rated tranches.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


IMSCI 2015-6: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the following rating on the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-6 issued by
Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series
2015-6:

-- Class B to AA (high) (sf) from AA (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also confirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These rating actions reflect the increased credit support resulting
from significant collateral reduction and overall healthy
performance of the transaction since issuance.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 47 fixed-rate loans
secured by 47 commercial and multifamily properties at an original
trust balance of $325.4 million. As of the February 2020
remittance, 42 loans remain in the pool at the current balance of
$237.6 million, representing a collateral reduction of 27.0% since
issuance. DBRS Morningstar expects collateral reduction to continue
at a healthy pace for the life of the deal because all remaining
loans in the pool amortize for the entire loan term.

As of the February 2020 remittance, three loans (6.3% of the pool)
are on the servicer's watchlist, including the sixth-largest loan
Comfort Inn & Suites – Airdrie (4.6% of the pool). DBRS
Morningstar increased the probability of default to reflect the
increased risks applicable to these loans. Many of the loans are
secured by retail properties (24 loans; 48.1% of the pool);
however, in general, those loans benefit from low leverage and
strong amortization, with weighted-average (WA) issuance and
balloon loan-to-value figures of 61.9% and 49.5%, respectively. The
largest five retail loans (32.4% of the pool) reported a WA debt
service coverage ratio of 1.66 times, based on the most recent
financials.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar assigned an investment-grade shadow
rating to three loans: South Hill Shopping Center (7.8% of the
pool), Markham Town Square (5.1% of the pool) and U-Haul SAC 3
Portfolio (6.8% of the pool). With this review, DBRS Morningstar
confirms that the performance of these loans remains consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics.

Class X is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


JC PENNEY: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to C
----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by JCPenney Company, Incorporated to C from CCC-. EJR
also downgraded the rating on commercial paper issued by the
Company to D from C.

JCPenney Company, Incorporated is an American department store
chain with 865 locations in 49 U.S. states and Puerto Rico.



JP MORGAN 2004-PNC1: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on 7 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corporation commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2004-PNC1.

J. P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2004-PNC1

  - Class D 46625M5M7; LT BBBsf Affirmed; prevously at BBBsf

  - Class E 46625M5N5; LT CCCsf Affirmed; prevously at CCCsf

  - Class F 46625M5R6; LT CCsf Affirmed; prevously at CCsf

  - Class G 46625M5S4; LT Csf Affirmed; prevously at Csf

  - Class H 46625M5T2; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

  - Class J 46625M5U9; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

  - Class K 46625M5V7; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

  - Class L 46625M5W5; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

  - Class M 46625M5X3; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

  - Class N 46625M5Y1; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

  - Class P 46625M5Z8; LT Dsf Affirmed; prevously at Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Significant Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced Loans: Loss
expectations remain high given the most recent valuations of the
two largest specially serviced loans/assets (74.1% of the pool).
The largest specially serviced loan, Employers Reinsurance I (59.7%
of the pool), was transferred to special servicing in December 2018
for imminent default due to the property's largest tenant, Swiss Re
(formerly 100% of the net rentable area (NRA); December 2018),
vacating at lease expiration. The loan is secured by a 320,198 sf
office property located in Overland Park, KS. The property is 100%
vacant and per the special servicer is in foreclosure proceedings.
The most recent appraisal indicates an 84% decline since issuance.

The other specially serviced asset, TriCounty Crossing (14.3% of
the pool), is secured by a 146,279 sf retail property located in
Springdale, OH. The asset was transferred to special servicing in
2016 due to the departure of the collateral's largest tenant,
Dick's Sporting Goods (formerly 43% of the NRA). The former Dick's
space remains vacant and the property is currently 57% occupied by
Best Buy (39.9% of the NRA; March 31, 2020) and K&G Men's (17.2% of
the NRA; Dec. 31, 2023). The loan became REO in April 2018. The
most recent appraisal dated May 2019 indicated an 83% decline since
issuance.

Fitch has also identified one loan, Bellechase Commons (2.1% of the
pool), as a Fitch Loan of Concern. The loan is secured by a 24,615
sf retail property located in Lake in the Hills, IL. Per the most
recent rent roll dated December 2019, the property is 100%
occupied. However, approximately 41.5% of the NRA has lease
expirations between 2020 and 2021, including top tenants Marie
Charles Salon & Spa (8.1% of the NRA) and Butcher on the Block
(17.4% of the NRA). Fitch requested leasing updates from the master
servicer, but has not received a response. The loan is fully
amortizing with an expected maturity date in March 2024 and a
current loan per square foot (psf) of $44.

Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2020 remittance, the pool has
been reduced by 95.2% to $52.5 million from $1.097 billion at
issuance. Three loans (9.8% of the pool) are defeased and two loans
(74.1% of the pool) are specially serviced. Three loans (8.4% of
the pool) are fully amortizing with expected maturity dates in
2024. The remaining loans (17.4% of the pool) are amortizing with
anticipated maturity dates in 2022. Interest shortfalls are
currently impacting classes F through NR.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The transaction is highly concentrated
with nine of the original 101 loans remaining. Of the remaining,
non-defeased, performing loans, three loans (14.0% of the pool) are
secured by multifamily properties, including low income (12.8% of
the pool) and senior housing (1.2% of the pool) properties, located
in secondary and tertiary markets. The remaining loan is secured by
a retail property (2.1% of the pool) in Lake in the Hills, IL. Due
to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a
sensitivity analysis which grouped the remaining loans based on
collateral quality and performance and then ranked them by their
perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes defeased loans
(9.8% of the pool), performing loans with higher LTVs and tertiary
market location (14.0% of the pool), loans of concern (2.1% of the
pool) and specially serviced loans/assets (74.1% of the pool). The
rating affirmations reflect this sensitivity analysis.

COVID-19 Exposure: Outside of the defeased loans, two loans (16.3%
of the pool) are secured by retail properties, including the REO
asset Tri-County Crossing (14.3% of the pool). Given the extreme
pool concentration and expected declines related to the COVID-19
pandemic, declines in performance are likely. Fitch will continue
to monitor the loans for further updates.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlook on class D reflects the high loss
expectations associated with the specially serviced loans. Factors
leading to upgrades to the class D certificates, while unlikely,
would only occur with significant improvement in the credit
enhancement, defeasance and/or improved recovery expectations of
the two specially serviced loans/assets. However, upgrades are
unlikely given the significant pool concentration. Factors leading
to downgrades include declines in overall pool performance and/or
higher than expected losses upon disposition of the specially
serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to the classes rated 'CCCsf' and
below would occur as losses as realized.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


JP MORGAN 2020-3: DBRS Assigns B(High) Rating on 2 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-3 (the
Certificates) to be issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-3:

-- $559.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $523.6 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $481.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $481.7 million Class A-3-A at AAA (sf)
-- $481.7 million Class A-3-X at AAA (sf)
-- $361.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.3 million Class A-4-A at AAA (sf)
-- $361.3 million Class A-4-X at AAA (sf)
-- $120.4 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $120.4 million Class A-5-A at AAA (sf)
-- $120.4 million Class A-5-X at AAA (sf)
-- $286.5 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $286.5 million Class A-6-A at AAA (sf)
-- $286.5 million Class A-6-X at AAA (sf)
-- $195.2 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $195.2 million Class A-7-A at AAA (sf)
-- $195.2 million Class A-7-X at AAA (sf)
-- $74.7 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $74.7 million Class A-8-A at AAA (sf)
-- $74.7 million Class A-8-X at AAA (sf)
-- $38.7 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $38.7 million Class A-9-A at AAA (sf)
-- $38.7 million Class A-9-X at AAA (sf)
-- $81.7 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $81.7 million Class A-10-A at AAA (sf)
-- $81.7 million Class A-10-X at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $514.6 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.7 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $559.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $559.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $41.9 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $35.7 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $10.4 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $10.4 million Class B-1-A at AA (sf)
-- $10.4 million Class B-1-X at AA (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-2-A at A (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-2-X at A (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3-A at BBB (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3-X at BBB (sf)
-- $3.6 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.8 million Class B-5 at B (high) (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class B-X at BBB (sf)
-- $1.8 million Class B-5-Y at B (high) (sf)

Classes A-3-X, A-4-X, A-5-X, A-6-X, A-7-X, A-8-X, A-9-X, A-10-X,
A-11-X, A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, B-1-X, B-2-X, B-3-X, and B-X
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-3-X, A-4, A-4-A, A-4-X, A-5, A-5-A,
A-5-X, A-6, A-7, A-7-A, A-7-X, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-12, A-13, A-14,
A-16, A-17, A-X-2, A-X-3, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-X, and B-5-Y are
exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations
of exchange notes as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-3-A, A-4, A-4-A, A-5, A-5-A, A-6, A-6-A, A-7,
A-7-A, A-8, A-8-A, A-9, A-9-A, A-10, A-10-A, A-11, A-12, and A-13
are super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from
additional protection from the senior support certificates (Classes
A-14 and A-15) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Certificates reflects 6.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (high) (sf) ratings reflect
4.25%, 2.80%, 1.55%, 0.95%, and 0.65% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This securitization is a portfolio of first-lien fixed-rate prime
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 806 loans with a total principal
balance of $595,006,943 as of the Cut-Off Date (March 1, 2020).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs)
with original terms to maturity of up to 30 years. Approximately
35.0% of the loans in the pool are conforming mortgage loans
predominantly originated by United Shore Financial Services, LLC
d/b/a United Wholesale Mortgage and Shore Mortgage (USFS),
LoanDepot.com, LLC, LendUS, LLC, Bay Equity, LLC, Guaranteed Rate,
Inc., and Primary Residential Mortgage Inc., which were eligible
for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. JP Morgan Chase Bank
(JPMCB) generally delegates conforming loan underwriting authority
to correspondent lenders and does not subsequently review those
loans. Details on the underwriting of conforming loans can be found
in the Key Probability of Default Drivers section.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are United Shore
Financial Services (USFS, 75.6%), loanDepot.com (12.6%), LendUS
(1.1%), and various other originators that each comprise less than
2.0% of the mortgage loans. Approximately 4.5% of the loans sold to
the mortgage loan seller were acquired by MAXEX Clearing LLC
(MaxEx), which purchased such loans from the related originators or
an unaffiliated third party that directly or indirectly purchased
such loans from the related originators.

Cenlar FSB (Cenlar; 87.1%), NewRez doing business as Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (SMS, 12.5%), and Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc.
(Dovenmuehle; 0.4%) will service or sub-service the mortgage
loans.

Servicing will be transferred from SMS to JPMCB (rated AA with a
Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) on the servicing transfer date
(June 1, 2020, or a later date) as determined by the issuing entity
and JPMCB. For this transaction, the servicing fee payable for
mortgage loans serviced by JPMCB and SMS (which will be
subsequently serviced by JPMCB), is composed of three separate
components: the aggregate base servicing fee, the aggregate
delinquent servicing fee, and the aggregate additional servicing
fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency status of the related
loan and will be paid from interest collections before distribution
to the securities.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the Master Servicer. Citibank
N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will
act as Securities Administrator and Delaware Trustee. JPMCB and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as Custodians. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
(Pentalpha) will serve as the representations and warranties (R&W)
reviewer.

The Seller intends to retain (directly or through a majority-owned
affiliate) a vertical interest in 5% of the principal amount or
notional amount of all the senior and subordinate certificates to
satisfy the credit risk-retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


LAREDO PETROLEUM: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B-
------------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Laredo Petroleum, Incorporated to B- from B+. EJR
also downgraded the rating on commercial paper issued by the
Company to B from A3.

Laredo Petroleum, Incorporated is a company engaged in hydrocarbon
exploration organized in Delaware and headquartered in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. Laredo Petroleum has no connection or association with
Laredo Oil, traded on the over-the-counter market.



MANITOWOC CO: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by The Manitowoc Company, Incorporated to B from B+.
EJR also downgraded the rating on commercial paper issued by the
Company to B from A3.

The Manitowoc Company, Incorporated was founded in 1902 and has
over a 116-year tradition of providing high-quality,
customer-focused products and support services to its markets.
Manitowoc is one of the world's leading providers of engineered
lifting solutions.



MARINER CLO 8: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $22.5MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Mariner CLO 8
Ltd./Mariner CLO 8 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The legal structure of the transaction, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Mariner CLO 8 Ltd./Mariner CLO 8 LLC

  Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A                     AAA (sf)              325.00
  B                     AA (sf)                55.00
  C (deferrable)        A (sf)                 27.50
  D (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)              30.00
  E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)               22.50
  Subordinated notes    NR                     42.85

  NR--Not rated.


MATTEL INC: Egan-Jones Lowers Sr. Unsecured Ratings to B
--------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on March 20, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Mattel, Incorporated to B from B+. EJR also
downgraded the rating on commercial paper issued by the Company to
B from A3.

Mattel, Incorporated is an American multinational toy manufacturing
and entertainment company founded in 1945 with headquarters in El
Segundo, California.



MCAP CMBS 2014-1: DBRS Keeps B Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited maintained the Under Review with Negative Implications
status for three classes of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-1 issued by MCAP CMBS Issuer Corporation,
Series 2014-1 as follows:

-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

-- Class F at BB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

-- Class G at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

DBRS Morningstar also upgraded the following classes:

-- Class C to AAA (sf) from A (high) (sf)

-- Class D to AAA (sf) from BBB (sf)

Classes C and D have a Stable trend, while Classes E, F, and G do
not carry a trend.

DBRS Morningstar also discontinued the ratings on Classes A, B, and
X. Classes A and B have been fully repaid, and DBRS Morningstar has
withdrawn the rating on Class X as the transaction is now winding
down.

The ratings for Classes E, F, and G remain Under Review with
Negative Implications as a result of ongoing concerns surrounding
the resolution for 1121 Centre Street NW loan (Prospectus ID#7,
36.1% of the pool), which is in special servicing. In December
2019, the loan sponsor, Strategic Group LLC (Strategic Group),
submitted an application filing under Canada's Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act (CCAA), which affected the property and 49 others
within the sponsor's 171-property portfolio.

The outlook for this loan, which is secured by an office property
in Calgary, will likely be the subject of additional economic
stress amid the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak that has
pushed oil prices even lower. DBRS Morningstar upgraded Classes C
and D based on the respective classes' in-place credit support and
relative stability of the remaining loans in the transaction as the
deal winds down.

The 1121 Centre Street NW loan is secured by a 62,843 sf office
property in Calgary, which has reported stable historic performance
since issuance; however, recent developments suggest cash flows
will decline in the coming year. The former second-largest tenant,
BGC Engineering Inc. (19.9% of the net rentable area (NRA)),
vacated in June 2018, reducing the property's occupancy temporarily
to 68.0%; however, the occupancy rate has since recovered to 79.4%
per the December 2019 rent roll. While there have been some recent
positive leasing momentum, significant challenges remain marketwide
in regards to falling rental rates and rising vacancy rates, which
will likely drive a longer lease-up period and require significant
capital investment to attract tenants. Several newer tenants at the
property have signed leases at noticeably lower rates, with the
average rental rate dropping to $12.40 psf, compared with $14.17
psf in February 2018. The decline in rental rates combined with
free rent periods for two tenants (representing 14.8% of the NRA)
through June 2021 are factors contributing to the likely depressed
cash flows throughout 2020.

The special servicer has confirmed the application for CCAA
protection was denied, and the court has ordered a receivership for
all affected properties, including 1121 Centre Street NW. The
special servicer has advised that it is in the process of
determining a resolution strategy as of March 2020. Given the sharp
declines in cash flows and the generally difficult market for
office properties from both a tenant-demand and investor-demand
perspective, DBRS Morningstar believes the as-is value has sharply
declined from issuance. Given the current economic environment,
particularly in the face of a relatively new threat in the
coronavirus, the loss severity at resolution could be significant.
The loan has recourse to the borrowing entity (Strategic Group via
Centre Eleven Limited Partnership) and to Riaz Mamdani for the full
amount of the outstanding debt.

The office market in Calgary continues to exhibit prolonged vacancy
rate spikes, reductions in rental rates, and an overall lack of
liquidity. With recent declines in the oil market, market
fundamentals are not likely to rebound in the foreseeable future.

At issuance, the trust was secured by 32 loans at an original trust
balance of $224.0 million. Per the March 2020 remittance, five
loans remain in the trust, with a current balance of $25.4 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 88.7% since issuance because
of loan repayment and scheduled loan amortization. Outside of 1121
Centre Street NW loan, the four remaining loans are performing as
expected, with strong occupancy and cash flow growth since
issuance. The 175 rue de Rotterdam (Prospectus #15, 21.0% of the
pool) and 5498 Boulevard Henri-Bourassa Est (Prospectus #32, 5.2%
of the pool) loans benefit from having strong or investment-grade
tenants, respectively, with leases extending past loan maturity.
The transaction benefits from 89.2% of the pool having some form of
meaningful recourse.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C31: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to CCC
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 13 classes of Morgan
Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, series 2016-C31.

RATING ACTIONS

MSBAM 2016-C31

Class A-1 61766RAU0;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 61766RAV8;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 61766RAX4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 61766RAY2;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 61766RAZ9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 61766RBC9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 61766RAW6; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 61766RBD7;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 61766RBE5;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 61766RAJ5;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 61766RAL0;    LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at BB-sf

Class F 61766RAN6;    LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at B-sf

Class X-A 61766RBA3;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 61766RBB1;  LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class X-D 61766RAA4;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class X-E 61766RAC0;  LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at BB-sf

Class X-F 61766RAE6;  LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades reflect the increased
loss expectations for the remaining pool since Fitch's last rating
action, driven primarily from performance deterioration of the 12
Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 30.5% of the pool), which include
five specially serviced loans (6.2%).

The largest contributor to the increased loss expectations for the
pool is the specially serviced One Stamford Forum loan (3.8%),
which is the eighth largest loan in the pool and is secured by a
504,471-sf office building located in Stamford, CT. The borrower,
One Stamford Realty L.P., and major tenant Purdue Pharma are 100%
owned for the benefit of the Sackler family. Purdue Pharma, which
occupies this property as their U.S. headquarters, is a privately
owned pharmaceutical company that focuses on pain medication,
including OxyContin. At issuance, Purdue Pharma occupied 92% of the
NRA through a direct lease and sublease and had executed a
"wraparound lease" for the remainder of the building beginning in
January 2021 and extending until 2031. The loan transferred to
special servicing on March 15, 2019 for imminent monetary default
following media reports indicating that Purdue Pharma was
considering a bankruptcy filing as a result of approximately 2,700
lawsuits, including 48 by state attorney generals. In September
2019, Purdue Pharma filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and informed
the special servicer that they plan to reject the upcoming
wraparound lease. Per recent media reports, Purdue will downsize
their space to approximately 104,000 sf (20.6% of NRA) on the 9th
and 10th floors. Purdue Pharma subleased a portion of its space at
issuance; however, Fitch's request for an updated list of sublease
tenants remains outstanding. The loan remains current as of the
February 2020 distribution.

Fitch Loans of Concern: In addition to the One Stamford Forum loan,
five (22.5%) other loans in the top 15 are considered FLOCs.

The Hyatt Regency Sarasota loan (5.6%) is secured by a 294-key
full-service hotel located in Sarasota, FL. Property performance
has deteriorated due to increased competition from several new
hotels that opened since issuance. As of the TTM September 2019 STR
report, occupancy, ADR and RevPAR decreased to 57.9%, $170 and $99,
respectively, from 74.6%, $195 and $146 at issuance. RevPAR
penetration decreased to 78.3% as of TTM September 2019 from 101.1%
at issuance. The servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) decreased to 1.35x as of YE 2018 from 1.55x at YE 2017.

The Vintage Park loan (4.8%) is secured by 341,107-sf open-air
anchored shopping center located in Houston, TX. While occupancy
has remained flat at 88% as of the September 2019 rent roll, the
annualized servicer-reported YTD September 2019 NOI fell 11.2%
since YE 2016, primarily due to a significant decline in expense
reimbursements and percentage rent. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR
decreased to 1.17x as of YTD September 2019 from 1.63x at YE 2016.
The loan began amortizing in February 2019. Although average inline
sales at the property increased to $474 psf at YE 2017 from $408
psf at issuance, the Star Cinema Grill (6.9% of NRA) reported lower
sales of $440,038 per screen in YE 2017 from $714,810 per screen at
YE 2016.

The SpringHill Suites - Seattle loan (4.8%) is secured by a 234-key
full service hotel located one mile north of the Seattle CBD. The
servicer-reported TTM September 2019 NOI fell 38.6% below YE 2018
and 49.4% below YE 2017 due to revenue decline. As of the TTM
September 2019 STR report, occupancy, ADR and RevPAR fell to 78.8%,
$157 and $124, respectively, from 83.2%, $176 and $152 at YE 2017.
RevPAR penetration was reported as 82.5% for TTM September 2019.
Per the June 2019 property inspection, the property was undergoing
a total lobby renovation including the removal of the pool and hot
tub. Fitch's request for details on the ongoing renovation remains
outstanding.

The Simon Premium Outlets loan (4.3%) is secured by a portfolio of
three outlet malls located in three different tertiary markets.
Portfolio occupancy decreased to 82.5% as of the September 2019
rent rolls from 89.6% at YE 2017 and 92.8% at YE 2016. YE 2018
total portfolio sales also decreased 2.6% to $190.2 million from
$195.2 million at YE 2017 and 11.9% from issuance when sales
totaled $215.9 million.

The Birmingham Office Portfolio loan (3.1%) is secured by a
portfolio of three suburban office properties totaling 324,741-sf
and located in the Birmingham, AL area. Occupancy fell to 71.1% as
of the December 2019 rent roll from 79.4% at YE 2018 and 83.5% at
issuance. The servicer-reported amortizing NOI DSCR was 1.47x as of
YTD September 2019. Fitch's request for leasing updates remains
outstanding.

The remaining FLOCs outside of the top 15 are secured by a
106,606-sf office property located in Milwaukee, WI (1.1%) that has
experienced cash flow decline following the departure of its second
largest tenant, a specially serviced 375-key limited service hotel
(0.8%) located in Atlanta, GA that has experienced decreased RevPAR
and increased operating expenses, a 171,351-sf retail property
(0.8%) located in Mesa, AZ that has experienced cash flow decline
following the departure of two large tenants, a specially serviced
135-key limited service hotel property (0.6%) located in Lake
Jackson, TX that has experienced significant RevPAR decline
following Hurricane Harvey, a specially serviced 36,589-sf flex/R&D
property (0.5%) located in Albuquerque, NM that has been delinquent
due to payment issues related to its single tenant and a REO
56,724-sf single story suburban office building (0.5%) located in
Hampton, VA that has experienced cash flow declined following the
departure of its second largest tenant.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 3.0% to $925.0 million from $953.2 million at
issuance. No loans have paid off since issuance. One loan (3.0%)
has defeased. There have been no realized losses to date. Five
loans (11.2% of the current pool balance) are full-term
interest-only and seven loans (21.6%) remain in their partial
interest-only periods. The transaction is scheduled to pay down by
13.9% of the original pool balance prior to maturity. Loan
maturities are concentrated in 2026 (93.3%), with limited
maturities scheduled in 2021 (3.1%), 2023 (2.1%) and 2025 (1.5%).

Hotel Concentration: Loans secured by hotel properties represent
14.6% of the pool, including four of the 12 FLOCs and two of the
specially serviced loans. Fitch's base case analysis applied an
additional NOI stress on hotel loans given the expected decline in
travel from the coronavirus pandemic. The Hyatt Regency Sarasota
and SpringHill Suites - Seattle loans can withstand NOI declines of
26% and 38%, respectively, to their reported YE 2018 NOIs before
amortizing DSCR falls below 1.0x.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario that assumed potential outsized losses of 35%
and 75%, respectively, on the current balances of the Hyatt Regency
Sarasota and One Stamford Forum loans while also factoring in the
expected paydown of the transaction from defeased loans. This
scenario contributed to the Negative Rating Outlooks on classes C
and D.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentrations: Loans secured by office properties represent
40.4% of the pool, including eight loans (34.1%) in the top 15.
Loans backed by retail properties represent 34.4% of the pool,
including four (16.6%) loans in the top 15. The seventh largest
loan (4.3%) is secured by a portfolio of three outlet malls
sponsored by Simon Property Group, Inc. The 20th largest loan in
the pool, The Shops at Crystals (1.6%), is a high-end regional mall
in Las Vegas, NV. Property performance has remained stable since
issuance and total mall sales were $1,549 psf for 2019, $1,355 psf
for 2018, $1,459 psf for 2017 and $1,450 for 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through B reflect the
relatively stable performance of the majority of the pool,
increasing credit enhancement and expected continued amortization.
Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. An
upgrade of class B may occur with significant improvement in credit
enhancement and/or defeasance, but would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded beyond 'Asf' if there
is likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
below-investment-grade classes are not expected due to performance
concerns from the specially serviced One Stamford Forum loan, but
may occur in the later years of the transaction should credit
enhancement increase and as the number of FLOCs are reduced.

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes C and D reflect the
uncertainty surrounding the ultimate resolution of the One Stamford
Forum loan and the declining performance of the other FLOCs.
Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the senior classes A-1 through B are not likely due to their
position in the capital structure and the increasing credit
enhancement. The Rating Outlooks on classes C and D may be revised
back to Stable if performance of the FLOCs improves or if the
specially serviced One Stamford Forum loan is resolved with better
recoveries than expected.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to a specially serviced loan secured by an
office tower primarily occupied by Purdue Pharma, an opioid pain
medication manufacturer, which has a negative impact on the credit
profile and is highly relevant to the rating, resulting in the
downgrades to classes E, F, X-E and X-F and Negative Rating
Outlooks on classes C and D.


OAKTOWN RE III: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Class B-1B Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following two Oaktown (OMIR)
transactions:

Oaktown Re II Ltd.

-- Class M-1 at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BB (sf)

Oaktown Re III Ltd.

-- Class M-1A at BBB (sf)
-- Class M-1B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1A at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1B at B (sf)

The above-referenced securities are currently also rated by DBRS,
Inc.'s affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(MCR). In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these securities Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review and that MCR intended to
withdraw its outstanding ratings; such withdrawal will occur on or
about March 31, 2020. In accordance with MCR's engagement letter
covering these securities, upon withdrawal of MCR's outstanding
ratings, the DBRS Morningstar ratings will become the successor
ratings to the withdrawn MCR ratings.

These two OMIR transactions are generally classified as mortgage
insurance (MI) linked-notes transactions.

DBRS Morningstar performed the following rating analysis on the
transactions:

-- Loan-level default probability, loss severity, and expected
loss review;

-- Cash flow analysis to evaluate the form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement;

-- Historical performance analysis as reflected in delinquencies,
cumulative losses, and constant prepayment rates (CPRs);

-- Third-party due diligence sample size review; and
-- Representations and warranties (R&W) framework review.

POOL EXPECTED LOSSES

DBRS Morningstar used its proprietary RMBS Insight 1.3 model to
derive the probability of default on the underlying insured loans
with active insurance policies, loss severities on the insurance
policies, and expected losses for each of the transactions. DBRS
Morningstar recalculated or remapped certain collateral attributes
in its analysis. The size of the pools of insured loans for the
transactions are large and geographically diverse, which generally
suggests a low level of concentration and asset correlation. In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar floored the asset correlation in
accordance with its published principal methodology. The expected
losses for each transaction are generally stepped up from the raw
model results.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

A structural analysis that encompassed 12 cash flow stress
scenarios was performed, which focused on prepayment speeds, timing
of losses, and interest rate stresses.

OPERATIONAL RISK REVIEW

DBRS Morningstar conducted a telephone review of National Mortgage
Insurance Corporation's mortgage insurance platform and believes
the company is an acceptable mortgage loan insurer.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the historical performance of each
transaction, as reflected in delinquencies, cumulative losses, and
CPRs. Overall delinquencies benefitted from robust industry
underwriting practices, strong employment and economic backdrop,
and rising home prices.

THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the sample size for each of the due
diligence review categories, including credit, valuation, and data
integrity. The sample size in the OMIR 2019-1 transaction does not
meet DBRS Morningstar's due diligence criteria threshold. Some
mitigating factors for the lower due diligence sample include the
following: (1) The majority of the underlying insured mortgage
loans for these transactions conform to government-sponsored
enterprise (GSE) guidelines. DBRS Morningstar believes that GSEs
have robust originator and servicer approval and monitoring
processes. (2) The insurer can generally rescind MI claims (subject
to rescission relief). DBRS Morningstar did not review the
loan-level due diligence findings for each of the transactions;
rather, it relied on the analysis done by MCR at the time of
assigning ratings to the transactions on or prior to the closing
dates, as well as the satisfactory performance of the transactions
to date.

R&W FRAMEWORK

The transactions are backed by MI policies, and no loans are
pledged to the trusts. Hence, the insurer will not directly make
any R&W to noteholders regarding the underlying insured mortgage
loans. Some mitigating factors for these transactions are as
follows: (1) The master policy generally gives the insurer the
right to rescind (subject to rescission relief) when there are
material misrepresentation and fraud in the origination of an
underlying insured loan. (2) In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar made
a conservative assumption to not give any benefit for potential
rescissions by the insurer. This assumption resulted in a higher
projected MI claim payout and provides additional credit protection
to the noteholders. (3) The insurer retains risk in the capital
structure, which would align the ceding insurer's interest with
that of investors.

OTHER REVIEWS

DBRS Morningstar notes that a legal analysis, which included but
was not limited to legal opinions and various transaction
documents, was performed by MCR as part of its process of assigning
ratings to each transaction on or prior to their closing dates. For
the purpose of assigning ratings to the transactions, DBRS
Morningstar did not perform additional document reviews unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar also took into consideration the
financial strength of the mortgage insurer in conjunction with the
remaining principal balances of the rated tranches. On the closing
date of each transaction, the insurer established a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account, and deposited an
amount generally covering two months of interest payments on the
rated classes. In case the insurer defaults on paying coverage
premium payments to the issuer, the amount available in this
account will be used to make interest payments to the noteholders.
Certain transaction documents do not require the insurer to cure
any deficient amounts in the premium deposit account post-closing.
For such transactions, the bond ratings may be capped based on the
insurer's financial strength, unless the rated tranches are
expected to pay off shortly and there are no deficiencies in the
premium deposit account.

SUMMARY

The ratings are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application of the
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" published in December 2019 unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related notes.

The ratings for the OMIR classes are being initiated by DBRS
Morningstar as part of the announced analytical integration of
certain U.S. RMBS asset classes (see the November 22, 2019, press
release "DBRS and Morningstar Credit Ratings Confirm GSE CRT and
MI-Linked Notes Asset Class Coverage"). As such, the ratings are
deemed to be solicited DBRS Morningstar ratings.

The ratings assigned to certain securities may differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model, but no such difference
constitutes a material deviation. When assigning the ratings, DBRS
Morningstar takes into account the rating analysis detailed in this
press release and may have made qualitative adjustments for the
analytical considerations not fully captured by the quantitative
model.


RADNOR RE 2018-1: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class B-1 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following three Radnor (RMIR)
transactions:

Radnor Re 2018-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1 at A (sf)
-- Class M-2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BB (sf)

Radnor Re 2019-1 Ltd.

-- Class M-1A at AA (sf)
-- Class M-1B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at B (sf)

Radnor Re 2019-2 Ltd.

-- Class M-1A at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class M-1B at BBB (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BBB (low) (sf)

The above-referenced securities are currently also rated by DBRS,
Inc.'s affiliated rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(MCR). In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these securities Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review and that MCR intended to
withdraw its outstanding ratings; such withdrawal will occur on or
about March 31, 2020. In accordance with MCR's engagement letter
covering these securities, upon withdrawal of MCR's outstanding
ratings, the DBRS Morningstar ratings will become the successor
ratings to the withdrawn MCR ratings.

These three RMIR transactions are generally classified as mortgage
insurance (MI) linked-notes transactions.

DBRS Morningstar performed the following rating analysis on the
transactions:

-- Loan-level default probability, loss severity, and expected
   loss review;

-- Cash flow analysis to evaluate the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement;

-- Historical performance analysis as reflected in delinquencies,
    cumulative losses, and constant prepayment rates (CPRs);

-- Third-party due diligence sample size review; and

-- Representations and warranties (R&W) framework review.

POOL EXPECTED LOSSES

DBRS Morningstar used its proprietary RMBS Insight 1.3 model to
derive the probability of default on the underlying insured loans
with active insurance policies, loss severities on the insurance
policies, and expected losses for each of the transactions. DBRS
Morningstar recalculated or remapped certain collateral attributes
in its analysis. The size of the pools of insured loans for the
transactions are large and geographically diverse, which generally
suggests a low level of concentration and asset correlation. In its
analysis, DBRS Morningstar floored the asset correlation in
accordance with its published principal methodology. The expected
losses for each transaction are generally stepped up from the raw
model results.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

A structural analysis that encompassed 12 cash flow stress
scenarios was performed, which focused on prepayment speeds, timing
of losses, and interest rate stresses.

OPERATIONAL RISK REVIEW

DBRS Morningstar performed an onsite operational risk review of
Essent Guaranty's insurance platform and believes the company is an
acceptable mortgage loan insurer.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the historical performance of each
transaction, as reflected in delinquencies, cumulative losses, and
CPRs. Overall delinquencies benefitted from robust industry
underwriting practices, a strong employment and economic backdrop,
and rising home prices.

THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE

DBRS Morningstar reviewed the sample size for each of the due
diligence review categories, including credit, valuation, and data
integrity. The sample sizes in the RMIR 2019-1 and RMIR 2019-2
transactions do not meet DBRS Morningstar's due diligence criteria
threshold. Some mitigating factors for the lower due diligence
sample include the following: (1) The majority of the underlying
insured mortgage loans for these transactions conform to
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) guidelines. DBRS Morningstar
believes that GSEs have robust originator and servicer approval and
monitoring processes. (2) The insurer can generally rescind MI
claims (subject to rescission relief). DBRS Morningstar did not
review the loan-level due diligence findings for each of the
transactions; rather, it relied on the analysis done by MCR at the
time of assigning ratings to the transactions on or prior to the
closing dates, as well as the satisfactory performance of the
transactions to date.

R&W FRAMEWORK

The transactions are backed by MI policies, and no loans are
pledged to the trusts. Hence, the insurer will not directly make
any R&W to noteholders regarding the underlying insured mortgage
loans. Some mitigating factors for these transactions are as
follows: (1) The master policy generally gives the insurer the
right to rescind (subject to rescission relief) when there is
material misrepresentation and fraud in the origination of an
underlying insured loan. (2) In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar made
a conservative assumption to not give any benefit for potential
rescissions by the insurer. This assumption resulted in a higher
projected MI claim payout and provides additional credit protection
to the noteholders. (3) The insurer retains risk in the capital
structure, which would align the ceding insurer's interest with
that of investors.

OTHER REVIEWS

DBRS Morningstar notes that a legal analysis, which included but
was not limited to legal opinions and various transaction
documents, was performed by MCR as part of its process of assigning
ratings to each transaction on or prior to their closing dates. For
the purpose of assigning ratings to the transactions, DBRS
Morningstar did not perform additional document reviews unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

In its analysis, DBRS Morningstar also took into consideration the
financial strength of the mortgage insurer in conjunction with the
remaining principal balances of the rated tranches. On the closing
date of each transaction, the insurer established a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account, and deposited an
amount generally covering two months of interest payments on the
rated classes. In case the insurer defaults on paying coverage
premium payments to the issuer, the amount available in this
account will be used to make interest payments to the noteholders.
Certain transaction documents do not require the insurer to cure
any deficient amounts in the premium deposit account post-closing.
For such transactions, the bond ratings may be capped based on the
insurer's financial strength, unless the rated tranches are
expected to pay off shortly and there are no deficiencies in the
premium deposit account.

SUMMARY

The ratings are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application of the
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" published in December 2019 unless
otherwise indicated in this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related notes.

The ratings for the RMIR classes are being initiated by DBRS
Morningstar as part of the announced analytical integration of
certain U.S. RMBS asset classes (see the November 22, 2019, press
release "DBRS and Morningstar Credit Ratings Confirm GSE CRT and
MI-Linked Notes Asset Class Coverage"). As such, the ratings are
deemed to be solicited DBRS Morningstar ratings.

The ratings assigned to certain securities may differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model, but no such difference
constitutes a material deviation. When assigning the ratings, DBRS
Morningstar takes into account the rating analysis detailed in this
press release and may have made qualitative adjustments for the
analytical considerations not fully captured by the quantitative
model.


REALT 2015-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed its ratings on the classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-1 issued by Real
Estate Asset Liquidity Trust (REALT) Series 2015-1 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class X at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has generally remained in line with DBRS
Morningstar's expectations since issuance. As of the February 2020
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 19.0% since
issuance, with 40 of the 46 original loans remaining in the pool.

Loans representing 97.8% of the current pool balance are reporting
year-end (YE) 2019 or YE2018 figures, with a weighted-average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.76 times
(x) and 12.7%, respectively. The largest 15 loans represent 77.7%
of the pool and reported YE2019 or YE2018 financials, with a WA
DSCR and debt yield of 1.77x and 12.4%, respectively, representing
a WA net cash flow growth of 18.1% over the DBRS Morningstar net
cash flow figures derived at issuance.

As of the February 2020 remittance, there are two loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 10.9% of the pool, including the
largest loan, Alta Vista Manor Retirement Ottawa (Prospectus ID#1,
9.9% of the pool balance). This loan is secured by a luxury
retirement home located in Ottawa, Ontario, and was placed on the
servicer's watchlist due to a decline in net cash flow as a result
of a decline in revenue that resulted from an occupancy drop for
the property. At YE2017, the property reported an occupancy rate of
68.4%, but occupancy improved to 81.1% as of the March 2019 rent
roll. During this period of depressed occupancy, the YE2017 and
YE2018 DSCRs were reported at 0.81x and 0.28x, respectively.
Despite the low in-place cash flows, DBRS Morningstar believes the
overall risk remains healthy as this loan has full recourse to the
sponsor, Regal Lifestyle Communities, which was acquired by Revera,
Inc. and Welltower (formerly known as Health Care REIT) in June
2015.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar shadow-rated the U-Haul SAC 3
Portfolio loan as investment grade. The loan is secured by a
portfolio of 10 individual loans backed by self-storage properties
across Ontario. With this review, DBRS Morningstar has confirmed
that the performance of the loan remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.

Class X is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.


RR 8 LTD: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $21.25MM Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to RR 8 Ltd./RR 8 LLC's
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversified collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some
government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak around
midyear, and S&P is using this assumption in assessing the economic
and credit implications. In S&P's view, the measures adopted to
contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession. As
the situation evolves, S&P will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  RR 8 Ltd./RR 8 LLC

  Class                Rating     Amount (mil. $)
  X                    AAA (sf)              2.00
  A-1a                 AAA (sf)            300.00
  A-1b                 AAA (sf)             25.00
  A-2a                 AA+ (sf)             35.00
  A-2b (deferrable)    AA (sf)              20.00
  B (deferrable)       A (sf)               30.00
  C (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)            27.50
  D (deferrable)       BB- (sf)             21.25
  Subordinated notes   NR                   40.75

  NR--Not rated.


TGIF FUNDING 2017-1: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on A-2 Notes on Watch Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on nine classes from three
whole business securitizations from Applebee's Funding LLC/IHOP
Funding LLC (Applebee's Funding/IHOP Funding), TGIF Funding LLC
(TGIF), and Planet Fitness Master Issuer LLC (Planet Fitness) on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions are driven by the temporary widespread
elimination of dine-in sales for the casual dining sector and the
temporary system-wide unit closures for fitness clubs in the
personal fitness sector due to the COVID-19 pandemic. S&P expects
severe near-term sales declines for both sectors, driven primarily
by mandated and voluntary closures of sales channels and unit
closures.

Though the pandemic places significant stress on the restaurant and
fitness industries broadly, S&P believes Applebee's Funding/IHOP
Funding, TGIF, and Planet Fitness will face near-term revenue
stress that is particularly severe. While other whole business
concepts have the potential to mitigate revenue declines by relying
on already well-diversified sales channels, these four concepts
currently have greater challenges in this area, in S&P's view.
Applebee's Funding/IHOP Funding and TGIF rely primarily on dine-in
foot traffic, which has been particularly stressed, given
government mandates and voluntary initiatives to temporarily halt
dine-in operations. Similarly, Planet Fitness, which operates
approximately 2,000 fitness centers across the country, has
announced the closure of all units system-wide and curtailment of
dues collection for closed gyms. Both of these situations suggest a
significant forthcoming decline in securitization revenue that will
place significant stress on each transaction.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the rate of
spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak.

"Some government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak in
June or August, and we are using our assumption in assessing the
economic and credit implications. We believe measures to contain
COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession, which could
also negatively affect employment levels or housing markets. As the
situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates
accordingly," S&P said.

APPLEBEE'S FUNDING/IHOP FUNDING

S&P is placing its ratings on Applebee's Funding/IHOP Funding
series 2019-1 notes on CreditWatch negative. The CreditWatch
placement reflects S&P's expectation for a significant decline in
restaurant revenue for the Applebee's and International House of
Pancakes (IHOP) concepts nationwide due to the mandatory and
voluntary cessation of dine-in offerings and the possibility that
it may take some time for dine-in traffic to return to pre-pandemic
levels even after social-distancing guidelines are made less
stringent.

Applebee's Funding/IHOP Funding series 2019-1 is a $1.525 billion
corporate securitization of Dine Brands Global Inc.'s (Dine's)
business, which currently comprises the operations of Applebee's
and IHOP restaurants in all 50 states and 17 countries globally
(though no international revenues are pledged to the transaction).
The securitization is backed by domestic corporate and
franchisee-owned restaurant royalties and fees, though additional
securitization revenue comes from margins from products sold to
franchisees and franchisee lease payments. Although Applebee's and
IHOP restaurants differ in terms of their offerings and branding,
both offer table-service of quality, moderately priced food and
beverages. The brands have undertaken initiatives to increase their
non-dine-in sales mix and there has been some jurisdictional
flexibility to allow for delivery of alcohol. However, both
concepts continue to rely primarily on dine-in traffic.

A significant portion of Dine's stores has temporarily stopped
offering dine-in service due to voluntary restrictions and state
and local mandates. While sales figures for the current quarter
have yet to be released, S&P expects the impact of these
restrictions to be significant. One mitigating factor is potential
growth in off-premise sales, including delivery and take-away
orders. Additionally, Dine's limited exposure to some of the major
urban areas where COVID-19 infection rates are currently the
highest, such as New York City and Seattle, suggests that it could
be poised for a swifter return to full service if other regions
reduce their restrictions sooner.

On March 19, 2020, Dine announced that it drew approximately $223
million of the $225 million available under its series 2019-1
variable funding notes (VFNs). S&P notes that S&P Global Ratings'
rating analysis already assumes VFNs to be fully drawn as of each
transaction's closing date, as noted in its presales, so the draws
are neutral from a rating standpoint. According to the company
press release, this was done as a precautionary measure to increase
the financial flexibility of the company going forward, stating
that the proceeds may be used for general corporate purposes.
Though the draw bolsters liquidity at the level of the
securitization sponsor, it does not strengthen liquidity at the
securitization level directly. Transaction-level liquidity exists
in the form of an interest reserve account sized to three months of
interest and any excess cash proceeds in structure.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement as it learns more
about the severity and duration of COVID-19's impact on Dine Brands
as a whole, as well as the liquidity resources and cash flow
stability of the Applebee's Funding/IHOP Funding series 2019 1
notes.

TGIF

S&P placed its ratings on TGIF's series 2017-1 notes on CreditWatch
negative. The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's expectation for
a significant decline in restaurant revenue for domestic and
international TGIF units, driven not only by mandatory and
voluntary cessation of dine-in offerings, but also by the rating
agency's expectation that consumers may remain hesitant to dine out
even after social-distancing guidelines are made less stringent.

TGIF's series 2017-1 is a $450 million corporate securitization of
TGIF units in 39 U.S. states, Washington D.C., and 57 countries
globally. The securitization is backed primarily by existing and
future franchise agreements and related franchisee royalties and
fees, royalties on existing and future company-owned restaurants,
license revenue, and existing and future intellectual property.

TGIF concepts offers a casual-dining experience offering American
cuisine, bar food, and alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages.
Although TGIF has undertaken initiatives to increase its
non-dine-in sales mix and there has been some jurisdictional
flexibility to allow for the delivery of alcohol, it continues to
rely primarily on dine-in traffic, which represented more than 80%
of store revenue as of March 2020.

TGIF has not yet mandated a system-wide closure of its units in
response to COVID-19, but over 80% of its units have temporarily
stopped offering dine-in service as a result of voluntary
restrictions and state and local mandates. In addition, although
sales figures for the most recent period have yet to be released,
S&P expects the revenue declines to be severe, particularly for
TGIF units located in urban areas and states in which
COVID-19-related limitations on dining-in have been imposed.
Near-term risks to the structure are mitigated by the structure's
internal credit enhancement, which includes both the excess cash
flow to the structure and an interest reserve account sized to
three months of accrued interest. Increased off-premise sales has
the potential to mitigate sales loss.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement as it learns more
about the severity and duration of COVID-19's impact on TGIF brands
as a whole, as well as the liquidity and cash flow stability of
TGIF's series 2017 1 notes.

PLANET FITNESS

S&P is placing its ratings on Planet Fitness's series 2018-1 and
2019-1 notes on CreditWatch negative. The CreditWatch placement
reflects S&P's expectation of a steep temporary decline in
membership dues collections, the securitization's primary source of
revenue. As of March 20, 2020, all company-owned Planet Fitness
gyms throughout the U.S. were temporarily closed, with the
recommendation that franchisee-owned units follow suit. The company
has announced that membership dues, which are automatically billed
and deducted from members' bank accounts, will be not be billed for
gyms that remain closed. This represents a near total, though
temporary, decline in securitization revenue for the affected
months.

Planet Fitness' series 2018-1 and 2019-1 notes are corporate
securitizations totaling $1.275 billion and $550 million,
respectively. The notes are issued from the same master trust and
are backed primarily by royalty revenue from franchisees.
Additional securitized cash flow comes from corporate owned store
profit and synthetic royalties, as well as the profit margin from
fitness equipment sold to franchisees by the franchisor. As of the
series 2019-1 closing date, the transaction was backed by a pool of
1,899 units, 96% of which are owned by franchisees and 97.3% of
which were located in the U.S.

The notes benefit from various liquidity resources, including an
interest reserve account sized to cover three months of accrued
interest. Additionally, in order to bolster the transaction's
liquidity, Planet Fitness waived its management fee for the most
recent collection period and has instructed the transaction trustee
to redirect residual cash flows to the transaction debt service
account, fully funding the upcoming first quarter principal and
interest (P&I) payment and partially funding the second quarter P&I
payment with the remainder. Additionally, on its upcoming
allocation date for the current collection period, Planet Fitness
intends to prefund incremental second quarter P&I with membership
dues that have been collected in mid-March but not yet allocated.
Also, Planet Fitness drew the full $75 million capacity of its VFN
into an special purpose vehicle cash account, whose balance can be
used to fund interest if necessary. S&P notes that Planet Fitness
can withdraw that cash at will; however, it would be unlikely to do
so if the cash is needed to prevent interest shortfalls on the
notes. Finally, cash outside the structure held by Planet Fitness
could be contributed to the structure via manager advances and
retained collection contributions. Until Planet Fitness' gyms are
reopened, and it can resume collecting membership dues, Planet
Fitness' noteholders will be largely dependent on these mentioned
liquidity resources for debt service coverage.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement as we learn more
about the severity and duration of COVID-19's impact on the Planet
Fitness brands as a whole. We will consider the sufficiency of the
transaction's liquidity resources, the expected duration of store
closures, and the percentage of pre-pandemic revenue that will be
restored in expected and stressed scenarios," S&P said.

Ratings List
                                                Rating
Issuer  Series  Maturity   Class           To           From
                  date   
Applebee's Funding LLC/IHOP Funding LLC
         2019-1  6/7/2049    A-1     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

Applebee's Funding LLC/IHOP Funding LLC
         2019-1  6/7/2049    A-2-I  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

Applebee's Funding LLC/IHOP Funding LLC
         2019-1  6/7/2049    A-2-II  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

Planet Fitness Master Issuer LLC
         2018-1  9/5/2048    A-1     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

Planet Fitness Master Issuer LLC
         2018-1  9/6/2048    A-2-I   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

Planet Fitness Master Issuer LLC
         2018-1  9/5/2048    A-2-II  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

Planet Fitness Master Issuer LLC
        2019-1   12/6/2049   A-2     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB (sf)

TGIF Funding LLC
        2017-1   4/30/2047   A-1     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)

TGIF Funding LLC
        2017-1   4/30/2047   A-2     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)


TOWD POINT 2020-2: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Debt 'B(EXP)sf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign ratings and Rating Outlooks to Towd
Point Mortgage Trust 2020-2 (TPMT 2020-2).

TPMT 2020-2

Class A1A1; LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A1A2; LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A1B;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A2;   LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class M1;   LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M2;   LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class B1;   LT BB(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B2;   LT B(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B3;   LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B4;   LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B5;   LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class A1;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A1A;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A2A;  LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class A2AX; LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class A2B;  LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class A2BX; LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class M1A;  LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M1AX; LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M1B;  LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M1BX; LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M2A;  LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class M2AX; LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class M2B;  LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class M2BX; LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A3;   LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class A4;   LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class A5;   LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
7,358 seasoned performing loans (SPLs) and re-performing loans
(RPLs) with a total balance of approximately $1.23 billion, which
includes $90 million, or 7%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the
statistical calculation date. The transaction is expected to close
on May 1, 2020.

Distributions of principal and interest (P&I) and loss allocations
are based on a traditional senior-subordinate, sequential
structure. The sequential-pay structure locks out principal to the
subordinated notes until the most senior notes outstanding are paid
in full. The servicers will not be advancing delinquent monthly
payments of P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, SPLs and RPLs. Of the pool,
5.7% was 30 days delinquent as of the statistical calculation date,
and 19% of loans are current but have had recent delinquencies or
incomplete 24-month pay strings. 75% of the loans have been paying
on time for the past 24 months. Roughly 98% have been modified.

Payment Deferrals related to Coronavirus Expected (Negative): The
coronavirus pandemic and widespread containment efforts in the
United States will result in increased unemployment and cash flow
disruptions. Mortgage payment deferrals will provide immediate
relief to affected borrowers and Fitch expects servicers to broadly
adopt this practice. The missed payments will result in interest
shortfalls that will likely be recovered, the timing of which will
depend on repayment terms; if interest is added to the underlying
balance as a non-interest-bearing amount, repayment will occur at
refinancing, property liquidation, or loan maturity.

To account for the cashflow disruptions, Fitch assumed deferred
payments on 40% of the pool for the first six months of the
transaction at all rating categories with a reversion to its
standard delinquency and liquidation timing curve by month 10. This
assumption is based on observed peak delinquencies for legacy Alt-A
collateral. Because the cash flow waterfall provides for principal
otherwise distributable to the lower rated bonds to pay timely
interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' bonds, the lowest rate classes
will likely experience interest shortfalls to the extent excess
cash flow is insufficient. The excess cash flow in the structure
helped mitigate the impact of this assumption and the increase in
credit enhancement needed was minimal.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC has a
well-established track record in RPL activities and has an "above
average" aggregator assessment from Fitch. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS) will
perform primary and special servicing functions for this
transaction and are rated 'RPS1-' and 'RPS2+', respectively, for
this product type. The benefit of highly rated servicers decreased
Fitch's loss expectations by 115 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating
category. The issuer's retention of at least 5% of the bonds helps
ensure an alignment of interest between issuer and investor.

Low Aggregate Servicing Fee (Mixed): Fitch determined that the
stated aggregate servicing fee of approximately 15bps (SPS
servicing fee of 15bps and SLS servicing fee of 32bps) may be
insufficient to attract subsequent servicers under a period of poor
performance and high delinquencies. To account for the potentially
higher fee needed to obtain a subsequent servicer, Fitch's cash
flow analysis assumed a 45-bp servicing fee.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Negative): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted on 80% of the loan by loan count and focused
on regulatory compliance, pay history and a tax and title lien
search. Of the loans reviewed, the third-party review (TPR) firm's
due diligence review resulted in approximately 3% (by loan count)
of 'C' and 'D' graded loans, meaning the loans had material
violations or lacked documentation to confirm regulatory
compliance.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings. Additionally, the issuer is not
providing R&Ws for second liens and therefore Fitch treated these
as Tier 5. Fitch increased its 'AAAsf' loss expectations by 148bps
to account for a potential increase in defaults and losses arising
from weaknesses in the reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): FirstKey, as rep provider,
will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to breaches prior
to the payment date in May 2021. Thereafter, a reserve fund will be
available to cover amounts due to noteholders for loans identified
as having rep breaches. Amounts on deposit in the reserve fund as
well as the increased level of subordination will be available to
cover additional defaults and losses resulting from rep weaknesses
or breaches occurring on or after the payment date in May 2021.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. P&I advances made on behalf of loans that
become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation
proceeds to the trust. Due to the lack of P&I advancing, the
loan-level loss severity (LS) is less for this transaction than for
those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural
provisions and cash flow priorities, together with increased
subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
that class in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $90 million (7%) of the UPB are
outstanding on 2,280 loans. Fitch included the deferred amounts
when calculating the borrower's loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and
sustainable LTV (sLTV), despite the lower payment and amounts not
being owed during the term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in a
higher probability of default (PD) and LS than if there were no
deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior for these
loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit strategies
(i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to those
borrowers with more equity in the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model-projected 37.2% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivity analysis to determine the stresses
to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated three criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."

The first variation relates to the tax/title review. The tax/title
review was outdated (over six months ago) on 4% of the reviewed
loans by loan count. Approximately 99% of the sample loans were
reviewed within 12 months and the remaining loans were reviewed
more than 12 month ago. Additionally, the servicers are monitoring
the tax and title status as part of standard practice, and will
advance where deemed necessary to keep the first lien positon of
each loan. This variation had no rating impact.

The second variation is that a due diligence compliance and data
integrity review was not completed on approximately 20% of the pool
by loan count. Although 100% due diligence is typically performed
for RPL RMBS, all of the first lien loans (approximately 95% of the
pool) are from a single source. Fitch's sample size criteria for
single originators of seasoned and RPL collateral is 20%. 89% of
the first lien loan received a compliance review.

A criteria variation was applied for the second liens since a
sample was conducted and theses loans are not from a single source.
However, Fitch is comfortable with the lack of a review due to the
100% LS applied to each loan and any adjustments based on due
diligence findings for regulatory compliance exceptions are
primarily applied to the LS. This variation had no rating impact.

The third variation is that a pay history review was completed on
80% of the loans by count and Fitch's criteria looks for a pay
history review to be completed on 100% of the loans and expects the
review to reflect the past 24 months. The pay history review was
conducted in conjunction with the compliance review. As 95% of the
loans (all the first liens) are from a single source, Fitch
believes the 80% sample does not introduce additional operational
risk to the transaction. In addition, the loans are approximately
13.5 years seasoned and 75% of the pool has been paying on time for
the past 24 months. For the loans where a pay history review was
conducted, the results verified what was provided on the loan tape.
Additionally, the pay strings that were provided on the loan tape
were provided by the current servicer where applicable. This
variation had no rating impact.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by WestCor Land Title Insurance Company, Clayton Services
LLC and AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC). The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on regulatory compliance, pay
history, the presence of key documents in the loan file and data
integrity.

Fitch received certifications indicating that due diligence was
conducted in accordance with its published standards for
legal/regulatory compliance. The certifications also stated that
the companies performed their work in accordance with the
independence standards, per Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
The due diligence analysts performing the reviews met Fitch's
criteria of minimum years of experience.

A third-party regulatory compliance review was completed on
approximately 80% of the loans (by loan count) in the transaction
pool. Although 100% due diligence is typically performed for RPL
RMBS, all of the first lien loans (approximately 95% of the pool)
are from a single source. 89% of the first lien loan received a
compliance review. Fitch's sample size criteria for single
originators of seasoned and RPL collateral is 20%. A criteria
variation was applied for the second liens since a diligence review
was conducted only conducted on 29% of these loans by loan count;
however, Fitch is comfortable with the lack of a review due to the
100% LS applied to each loan and any adjustments based on due
diligence findings for regulatory compliance exceptions are
primarily applied to the LS.

About 3% of the reviewed loans (192 loans) were assigned a grade of
'C' or 'D'. The diligence results indicated better operational risk
to prior TPMT transactions as well as other Fitch-reviewed RPL
transactions. Fitch adjusted its loss expectation at the 'AAAsf'
rating stress by 2 bps to reflect these additional risks.

AMC and WestCor were retained to perform an updated tax and title
on 90% of the pool by loan count, 96% by UPB. 100% of the first
lien loans were reviewed and 27% of the 2nd lien loans were
reviewed. While Fitch generally requests a 100% tax and title
search, the loans that did not receive a search are second liens
that do not require a search per Fitch criteria. The tax, title and
lien search identified the loans with outstanding liens and taxes
that could take priority over the subject mortgage. To the extent
that there are outstanding delinquent property taxes (including any
recorded liens resulting from such unpaid property taxes) on the
first-lien mortgage loans, delinquent energy lien installments, HOA
or municipal liens, the servicers will advance those payments to
preserve the trust's interest in the properties. Fitch adjusted its
LS by approximately 19bps at AAAsf to account for this.

Fitch adjusted its loss expectation at the 'AAAsf' level by
approximately 2bps to account for the due diligence findings.
Included in this adjustment were 52 of the 'C' or 'D' graded loans,
due to missing documents that prevented testing for predatory
lending compliance. The inability to test for predatory lending may
expose the trust to potential assignee liability, which creates
added risk for bond investors. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed
a 100% LS for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do
not purchase list of "high cost" or "high risk;" 12 loans were
affected by this approach. For the remaining 40 loans, where the
properties are not located in the states that fall under Freddie
Mac's do not purchase list, the likelihood of all loans being high
cost is low. However, Fitch assumes the trust could potentially
incur notable legal expenses. Fitch increased its loss severity
expectations by 5% for these loans to account for the risk.

Other causes for the remaining 'C' and 'D' grades include missing
final HUD1s that are not subject to predatory lending, missing
state disclosures and other missing compliance-related documents.
Fitch believes these issues do not add material risk to
bondholders, since the statute of limitations has expired. No
adjustment to loss expectations were made for these loans.

681 loans missing modification documents or a signature on
modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended by
an additional three months, in addition to the six-month timeline
extension applied to the entire pool.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).  


WELLS FARGO 2015-C28: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class X-F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C28 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C28 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has generally remained in line with DBRS
Morningstar's expectations since issuance. As of the February 2020
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 9.1% since
issuance with 91 of the original 99 loans remaining in the pool.
One loan, representing 0.4% of the pool, is fully defeased.

Loans representing 99.2% of the pool reported YE2018 financials
with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.87 times (x) and 10.5%, respectively. The 15
largest loans in the pool represent 60.1% of the transaction
balance and all reported YE2018 financials with a WA DSCR and WA
debt yield of 1.93x and 10.3%, respectively, representing a WA cash
flow improvement of 31.4% over the DBRS Morningstar net cash flow
figures derived at issuance.

As of the February 2020 remittance, 15 loans, representing 10.6% of
the pool (including two in the top 15), are on the servicer's
watchlist and four loans, representing 2.9% of the pool, are in
special servicing.

The 3 Beaver Valley Road loan (Prospectus ID#6, 4.2% of the pool)
is secured by a Class A office property in Wilmington, Delaware. At
issuance, the property was occupied by two tenants. The smaller of
the two tenants, Solenis LLC (19.9% of the net rentable area
(NRA)), vacated the subject in January 2020 and paid a $1.9 million
termination fee as part of the move. Additionally, the property's
largest tenant, Farmers Insurance (80.1% of NRA, lease expires
December 2024), has been downsizing and has given notice of plans
to exercise a contraction option that would reduce its footprint by
53,000 square feet (20.1% of NRA) as of January 2022. Leasing
flyers located online by DBRS Morningstar as of early March 2020
showed that space as available for sublease. Given the significant
upcoming decline in occupancy, DBRS Morningstar has placed this
loan on the DBRS Morningstar Hotlist and significantly increased
the loan's probability of default in the analysis for this review.

Washington Square (Prospectus ID#22, 1.2% of the pool) is secured
by a Class A student-housing property located in Schenectady, New
York. The loan transferred to special servicing as of the February
2020 remittance after the loan failed to repay at maturity. The
property services Schenectady County Community College, which has
seen significant enrollment declines over the past three years
coinciding with the property's performance struggles. As of the
YE2018 financials, the loan reported a 0.35x DSCR and an occupancy
rate of 52%. For the purposes of this review, DBRS Morningstar
analyzed this loan with a probability of default of 100%.

Classes X-A, X-E, and X-F are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2017-RC1: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class X-F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on 16 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-RC1, a U.S. CMBS transaction, as follows:

  Class A-1: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3: AAA (sf)
  Class A-4: AAA (sf)
  Class A-SB: AAA (sf)
  Class A-S: AAA (sf)
  Class B: AA (sf)
  Class C: A (sf)
  Class D: BBB- (sf)
  Class E: BB- (sf)
  Class F: B+ (sf)
  Class X-A: AAA (sf)
  Class X-B: A (sf)
  Class X-D: BBB- (sf)
  Class X-E: BB- (sf)
  Class X-F: B+ (sf)

For the affirmations, S&P's expectation of credit enhancement was
in line with the affirmed rating levels.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F
interest-only (IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO
securities, in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be
higher than that of the lowest rated reference class. For example,
the class X-A certificates' notional amount will be equal to the
aggregate certificate balance of the class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and
A-SB certificates.

S&P acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the rate of
spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some government
authorities estimate the pandemic will peak around midyear, and the
rating agency is using this assumption in assessing the economic
and credit implications. In its view, the measures adopted to
contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession. As
the situation evolves, S&P will update its assumptions and
estimates accordingly.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 16, 2020, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $605.8 million, which is 96.9% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 58 loans, of which 15
loans are backed by cooperative housing properties ($47.1 million,
7.8%), down from 60 loans at issuance. Twelve of these loans ($97.1
million, 16.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist and one
($9.4 million, 1.5%) is defeased. The largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist is the Hyatt Place Portfolio ($54.2 million,
9.0%). The loan appears on the watchlist due to a decline in
reported debt service coverage (DSC). The reported DSC as of
September 2019 was 1.15x, down from an underwritten DSC of 1.77x at
issuance. The loan is secured by six limited servicer hotels
located in six states, totaling 754 rooms.

"We calculated a 1.99x S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and
84.3% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, using a 8.05% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate. The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the defeased loan. The top 10 loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $320.9 million (53.0%).
Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers, we calculated an S&P
Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.65x and 93.0%,
respectively, for the top 10 loans," S&P said.

To date, the transaction has not experienced any principal losses.


[*] DBRS Reviews 311 Classes From 33 U.S. RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 311 classes from 33 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 311 classes
reviewed, DBRS Morningstar upgraded 19 ratings, confirmed 291
ratings, and discontinued one rating.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating confirmations reflect asset
performance and credit-support levels that are consistent with the
current ratings. The discontinued rating reflects a full repayment
of principal to bondholders.

The Affected Rating is Available at https://bit.ly/2UuzgKs

The rating actions are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application
of the "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in February
2020.

The pools backing these RMBS transactions consist of prime, Alt-A,
option adjustable-rate mortgage, second-lien, and subprime
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS Morningstar
considers this difference to be a material deviation, but in this
case, the ratings of the subject notes reflect either additional
seasoning being warranted to substantiate a further upgrade or
actual deal or tranche performance not being fully reflected in the
projected cash flows/model output.

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR5, Class 4A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 1A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 1A4

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 1A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 2A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 2A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 3A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, 3A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 4A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 4A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 4A5

-- HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-13, Mortgage Loan
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-13, Class X

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 1-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 2-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 3-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 3-A-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 5-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class T-B-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class A-X

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 1-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 1-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-6

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-8

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-5

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-6

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-8

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-9

-- Lehman XS Trust 2006-5, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-5, Class 2-A4A

-- MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class 1-A-1

-- MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class 7-A-X

-- Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2005-NCA,
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-NCA, Class
B-1

-- Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2005-SL2,
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-SL2, Class
M-2

-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class A-2d

-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class M-1

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-P

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-V

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-1

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-2

Notes: The principal methodologies are the U.S. RMBS Surveillance
Methodology and RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities Model and Rating Methodology.


[*] Fitch Places 35 Tranches from 5 US CMBS Deals on Watch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 35 classes from five U.S. CMBS
multi-borrower borrower transactions on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN). The transactions represent Fitch-rated multi-borrower
transactions with a concentration of hotel properties between 20%
and 25%, and retail in excess of 35%.

MSBAM 2013-C11

Class A-S 61762TAG1; LT AAAsf Rating Watch On AAAsf

Class B 61762TAH9;   LT AA-sf Rating Watch On AA-sf

Class C 61762TAK2;   LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class D 61762TAN6;   LT BBsf Rating Watch On BBsf

Class E 61762TAQ9;   LT Bsf Rating Watch On Bsf

Class F 61762TAS5;   LT CCCsf Rating Watch On CCCsf

Class PST 61762TAJ5; LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

WFCM 2015-SG1

Class B 94989QBA7;   LT AA-sf Rating Watch On AA-sf

Class C 94989QBB5;   LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class D 94989QBD1;   LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

Class E 94989QAL4;   LT BB-sf Rating Watch On BB-sf

Class F 94989QAN0;   LT B-sf Rating Watch On B-sf

Class PEX 94989QBC3; LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class X-E 94989QAA8; LT BB-sf Rating Watch On BB-sf

Class X-F 94989QAC4; LT B-sf Rating Watch On B-sf

DBJPM 2016-C1

Class B 23312LAU2;   LT AA-sf Rating Watch On AA-sf

Class C 23312LAV0;   LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class D 23312LAG3;   LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

Class E 23312LAH1;   LT BB-sf Rating Watch On BB-sf

Class F 23312LAJ7;   LT B-sf Rating Watch On B-sf

Class X-B 23312LAB4; LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class X-C 23312LAC2; LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

Class X-D 23312LAD0; LT BB-sf Rating Watch On BB-sf

WFRBS 2013-C16

Class C 92938EBJ1;   LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class D 92938EBR3;   LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

Class E 92938EBU6;   LT BB-sf Rating Watch On BB-sf

Class F 92938EBX0;   LT B-sf Rating Watch On B-sf

Class PEX 92938EBM4; LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

WFCM 2018-C47

Class C 95002DBX6;    LT A-sf Rating Watch On A-sf

Class D 95002DAC3;    LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

Class E-RR 95002DAE9; LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

Class F-RR 95002DAG4; LT BB+sf Rating Watch On BB+sf

Class G-RR 95002DAJ8; LT BB-sf Rating Watch On BB-sf

Class H-RR 95002DAL3; LT B-sf Rating Watch On B-sf

Class X-D 95002DAA7;  LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Negative Watch reflects the significant economic impact to
hotels and retail from the coronavirus pandemic, due to the recent
and sudden reductions in travel and tourism; temporary property
closures and lack of clarity at this time on the potential length
of the impact. The pandemic has already prompted the closure of
several hotel properties in gateway cities as well as malls,
entertainment venues and individual stores. Fitch expects many of
the properties in the five transactions will experience significant
declines in property-level cash flow in the short term with some
turning negative. Although cash flow is expected to be
significantly disrupted through closures or reduced occupancy, it
is difficult to discern at this time which properties may default
or request relief.

Fitch's analysis focused on current credit enhancement for the deal
relative to the hotel and retail exposure which took into
consideration current loan performance, sponsorship and loans
already considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC). The
concentrations are as follows:

DBJPM 2016-C1: Hotel 21%; Retail 35%. The largest FLOC is the
Sheraton North Houston (4.8%) and second largest FLOC is 600
Broadway (4.7%).

MSBAM 2013-C11: Hotel: 21%; Retail 43%. Three loans in the top 15
totaling 18% are collateralized by hotels; and the largest three
loans (40%) are collateralized by malls Westfield Countryside in
Clearwater, FL, The Mall at Tuttle Crossing in Dublin, OH and
Southdale Center in Edina, MN.

WFRBS 2013-C16: Hotel: 21%; Retail 38%. The largest FLOC is the
Hutton Hotel (5.5%) in Nashville, TN and three loans (12%) in the
top 15 are collateralized by hotels. Three loans (23%) in the top
15 are collateralized by retail: Westfield Mission Valley, Augusta
Mall and Gwinnett Marketfair. In addition, two loans in special
servicing are hotels: Wyoming Hotel Portfolio (2%) and the REO
Holiday Inn & Suites Westway Park in Houston, TX.

WFCM 2015-SG1: Hotel: 22%; Retail: 35%. The two largest loans are
Patrick Henry Mall (9.7%) and Boca Park Marketplace (6.7%); and
largest hotels are Hilton - Harrisburg (4.6%) and DoubleTree DFW
(2.7%). In addition, one of the loans in special servicing is
Hampton Inn & Applebees (1%) in Westhampton, NJ.

WFCM 2018-C47: Hotel 22%; Retail 37%. The largest four loans are
collateralized by hotel and retail properties: Starwood Hotel
Portfolio (7.4%), Aventura Mall (5.3%), Christiana Mall (5.3%) and
Showcase II (4.8%). Three additional loans in the top 15 are
collateralized by hotels: Virginia Beach Hotel Portfolio (4.8%),
Holiday Inn FiDi (3.7%) and Embassy Suites Overland Park (2.0%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN over the next few months once
further information is obtained on the performance impact. Not all
of the classes placed on RWN will be downgraded if the performance
decline is short term. However, downgrades of a category or more
are likely should the economic impact be prolonged and there is a
spike in defaults. If the downturn is not prolonged and hotels and
retail properties return to their prior performance, the classes
may be removed from RWN and affirmed.


[*] Fitch Puts 43 Classes From 6 CMBS Transactions on Watch Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 43 classes from six U.S. CMBS
multi-borrower borrower transactions on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN). The transactions represent Fitch-rated multi-borrower
transactions with a concentration of hotel properties in excess of
25%. The RWN placements impact classes rated 'AAsf' and below.

RATING ACTIONS

Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C16

Class B 61763MAJ9;   LT AA-sf Rating Watch On; previously at AA-sf


Class C 61763MAL4;   LT A-sf Rating Watch On; previously at A-sf

Class D 61763MAR1;   LT BBsf Rating Watch On; previously at BBsf

Class E 61763MAT7;   LT CCCsf Rating Watch On; previously at CCCsf


Class PST 61763MAK6; LT A-sf Rating Watch On; previously at A-sf

Class X-B 61763MAM2; LT AA-sf Rating Watch On; previously at AA-sf


CSAIL 2019-C16

Cl. B 12596WAH7;    LT AA-sf Rating Watch On;  previously AA-sf

Cl. C 12596WAJ3;    LT A-sf Rating Watch On;   previously A-sf

Cl. D 12596WAM6;    LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously BBB-sf

Cl. E-RR 12596WAP9; LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously BBB-sf

Cl. F-RR 12596WAR5; LT BB-sf Rating Watch On;  previously BB-sf

Cl. G-RR 12596WAT1; LT B-sf Rating Watch On;   previously B-sf

Cl. X-B 12596WAF1;  LT A-sf Rating Watch On;   previously A-sf

Cl. X-D 12596WAK0;  LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously BBB-sf

CSAIL 2018-CX12

Cl. B 12595XAY9;    LT AA-sf Rating Watch On;  previously AA-sf

Cl. C 12595XAZ6;    LT A-sf Rating Watch On;   previously A-sf

Cl. D 12595XAC7;    LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously BBB-sf

Cl. E-RR 12595XAE3; LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously BBB-sf

Cl. F-RR 12595XAG8; LT BB-sf Rating Watch On;  previously BB-sf

Cl. G-RR 12595XAJ2; LT B-sf Rating Watch On;   previously B-sf

Cl. X-B 12595XAW3;  LT AA-sf Rating Watch On;  previously AA-sf

Cl. X-D 12595XAA1;  LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously BBB-sf

JPMCC 2011-C5

Cl. B 46636VAM8; LT AAsf Rating Watch On;   previously at AAsf

Cl. C 46636VAP1; LT Asf Rating Watch On;    previously at Asf

Cl. D 46636VAR7; LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously at BBB-sf

Cl. E 46636VAT3; LT BBsf Rating Watch On;   previously at BBsf

Cl. F 46636VAV8; LT Bsf Rating Watch On;    previously at Bsf

Cl. G 46636VAX4; LT CCCsf Rating Watch On;  previously at CCCsf

Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C15

Cl. B 61763KBD5;   LT AAsf Rating Watch On;   previously at AAsf

Cl. C 61763KBF0;   LT Asf Rating Watch On;    previously at Asf

Cl. D 61763KAE4;   LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously at BBB-sf


Cl. E 61763KAG9;   LT BB+sf Rating Watch On;  previously at BB+sf

Cl. F 61763KAJ3;   LT BB-sf Rating Watch On;  previously at BB-sf

Cl. PST 61763KBE3; LT Asf Rating Watch On;    previously at Asf

Cl. X-B 61763KAA2; LT AAsf Rating Watch On;   previously at AAsf

CGCMT 2016-GC37

Cl. B 17290XAW0;   LT AA-sf Rating Watch On;  previously at AA-sf

Cl. C 17290XAX8;   LT A-sf Rating Watch On;   previously at A-sf

Cl. D 17290XAA8;   LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously at BBB-sf


Cl. E 17290XAC4;   LT BB-sf Rating Watch On;  previously at BB-sf

Cl. EC 17290XBA7;  LT A-sf Rating Watch On;   previously at A-sf

Cl. F 17290XAE0;   LT B-sf Rating Watch On;   previously at B-sf

Cl. X-B 17290XAZ3; LT AA-sf Rating Watch On;  previously at AA-sf

Cl. X-D 17290XAL4; LT BBB-sf Rating Watch On; previously at BBB-sf


KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Negative Watch reflects the significant economic impact to
hotels from the coronavirus pandemic, due to the recent and sudden
reductions in travel and tourism and the lack of clarity at this
time on the potential length of the impact. The pandemic has
already prompted the closure of several hotel properties in gateway
cities. Fitch expects many of the properties in the six
transactions will experience significant declines in property-level
cash flow in the short term with some turning negative. However,
over the longer term, Fitch believes there is inherent value in the
assets. Although cash flow is expected to be significantly
disrupted through closures or reduced occupancy, Fitch expects well
capitalized and experienced borrowers are likely to support and
attempt to keep their properties; however, hotels in conduit deals
with already stressed cash flows may default or request relief.

The six U.S. CMBS transactions with classes placed on RWN include
one from the 2019 vintage, one from the 2018 vintage, one from the
2016 vintage, two from the 2014 vintage and one from the 2011
vintage.

Fitch's analysis focused on current credit enhancement for the deal
relative to the hotel exposure and also took into consideration
exposure to other potentially impacted property types including
retail and student housing. As a result all classes rated 'AAsf'
and below have been placed on Negative Watch due to these
concentrations. The concentrations are as follows:

JPMCC 2011-C5: Hotel 33%; Retail 56%. The only hotel exposure is
the number one loan in the pool, The Intercontinental Chicago
(33%).

CSAIL 2019-C16: Hotel: 30%; Retail 26%. The three largest hotels
are the Embassy Suites Seattle Bellevue (5.3%); SWVP Portfolio
(5.1%) and the Hilton Baltimore BWI Airport (5%).

CSAIL 2018-CX12: Hotel: 27%; Retail 37%; Student Housing 2.9%. The
three largest hotels are the Hilton Clearwater Beach Resort & Spa
(9.2%); SIXTY Hotel Beverly Hills (6.0%) and the Hilton Garden Inn
Albuquerque Uptown (2.6%).

CGCMT 2016-GC37: Hotel: 27%; Retail: 20%. The three largest hotels
are the Sheraton Denver Downtown Fee (10.4%); Hilton Orrington
Evanston (5.8%) and the Hotel on Rivington (5.4%).

MSBAM 2014-C16: Hotel 26%; Retail 37%; Student Housing 5%. The
three largest hotel loans are the Marriott Philadelphia Downtown
(5.2%); Hilton San Francisco Financial District (4.7%) and LaConcha
Hotel & Tower (3.6%).

MSBAM 2014-C15: Hotel 25%; Retail 29%. The three largest hotel
loans are LaConcha Hotel & Tower (8.6%); Marriott Philadelphia
Downtown (7.1%) and the JW Marriott and Fairfield Inn & Suites
(4.8%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN over the next few months once
further information is obtained on the performance impact and the
sponsor's plan. Downgrades may not affect every class if the
performance decline is short term. However, downgrades of a
category or more are likely should the economic impact be
prolonged. If the downturn is not prolonged and hotels return to
their prior performance, the classes may be removed from RWN and
affirmed.


[*] S&P Places 25 Ratings on 15 U.S. CLO Transactions on Watch Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on 25 classes from 15 U.S.
CLO transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications. The
actions follow a review of S&P's rated CLOs that have relatively
larger exposures to loans from companies in various energy-related
sectors (oil and gas, consumable fuels, commodities, etc.), and
which also have other CLO performance factors that have reduced the
cushion available to support the current ratings on the CLO
tranches.

S&P Global Ratings is conducting reviews on exploration and
production (E&P) companies and oilfield services companies.

For each transaction, the CLO performance factors examined include
some combination of higher-than-average exposure to loans from
'CCC' rated obligors, reduction in overcollateralization ratios,
decline in portfolio credit quality, and compression of portfolio
weighted average spread. These factors typically have a greater
impact on the subordinated and lower mezzanine CLO notes, leaving
them more vulnerable to distressed market conditions. As such, all
of the affected CLO tranche ratings are in the 'BBB' and below
rating categories.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some
government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak in June or
August, and S&P is using this assumption in assessing the economic
and credit implications of the pandemic. S&P believes measures to
contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession and
could cause a surge of defaults among nonfinancial corporate
borrowers. As the situation evolves, S&P will update its
assumptions and estimates accordingly.

"In light of these macroeconomic events, we will also be reviewing
the ratings on our CLO transactions with larger exposures to other
affected industry categories, and, as rating actions on
speculative-grade corporate loan issuers occur, on CLOs with
material exposure to these negative rating actions," S&P said.

"We typically resolve CreditWatch placements within 90 days after
we complete cash flow analysis and committee review for each of the
affected transactions. We will continue to monitor the transactions
we rate and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
as we deem appropriate," S&P said.

  RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

  Black Diamond CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  D           BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)

  BNPP IP CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  C           BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
  D           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)
  E           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg    CCC (sf)

  CVP CLO 2017-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  E           BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2012-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  C           BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg    BB+ (sf)
  D           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg    CCC (sf)

  Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  D           B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Longfellow Place CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  D-RR        BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
  E-RR        BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)

  Marathon CLO VII Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  C           BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)
  D           B (sf)/Watch Neg      B (sf)

  Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  E           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)
  F           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg   CCC+ (sf)

  Oaktree CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
                     Rating
  Class       To                    From
  CR          BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
  DR          BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)
  
  Oaktree CLO 2015-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  D-R         BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)

  Oaktree CLO 2019-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
  Class       To                    From
  E           BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

  Venture XXI CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  E           BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)
  F           B (sf)/Watch Neg      B (sf)

  WhiteHorse VII Ltd.
                     Rating
  Class       To                    From
  B-2L        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg    BB+ (sf)
  B-3L        B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Zais CLO 1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  D-R         BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)
  E-R         B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

  Zais CLO 8 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  E           BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)


[] S&P Takes Various Actions on 24 U.S. CMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on 60 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from 24 U.S. CMBS transactions.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 150 classes and
discontinued its rating on one class from these transactions.

While COVID-19 will likely have an accelerated effect on
performance declines for properties with retail exposure, the
rating actions do not specifically address the outbreak of the
virus.

"The rating actions followed our review of the 39 retail mall
properties we highlighted in "Shop with Caution – CMBS Mall Loans
Worth Watching," published Jan. 8, 2020. In the report, we noted
declining performance trends within the retail sector, specifically
malls we deemed underperforming due to retailer bankruptcies, store
closure, shifts in consumer shopping preferences, and various
local, regional, or global developments that may have a direct
bearing on mall performance. In general, the 39 malls we identified
each had balances over $20.0 million, were with the special
servicer, or were still performing but showed signs of potential
performance deterioration, based on loan payment status, anchor, or
tenant composition," S&P said.

S&P's approach included re-evaluating each of the 39 malls to
incorporate declining performance in our sustainable S&P Global
Ratings net cash flow (NCF), capitalization rate, and valuation.
S&P used the servicer-provided operating statements for the past
three-plus years (typically, 2015 through June, September, or
December 2019), the most recent available 2019 rent rolls
(generally, September or December 2019); the 2020 borrower's
budgets, if available; and the tenant sales reports for the
trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30 or Dec. 31, 2019, if available.
S&P's property-level analysis included adjusting for expired
tenants, weak anchors, declining rents or occupancy, increasing
expenses, high occupancy costs, or declining in-line sales. The
rating agency visited 22 of the 39 underperforming malls as part of
its review. During these visits, S&P assessed the general feel of
and activity level at the mall, as well as those of some of the
competing properties. The rating agency's analysis incorporates its
general observations and information from its recent property site
visits, where applicable.

"In determining our capitalization rates, we considered mall
in-line sales trends, the cash flow volatility due to declining or
weakening trends within the retail sector, and the overall
perceived increase in the market risk premium for this property
type. As a result, we increased our capitalization rates
significantly to account for these concerns," S&P said.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak.

"Some government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak in
June or August, and we are using this assumption in assessing the
economic and credit implications of the pandemic. We believe
measures to contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into
recession, which could also negatively affect employment levels or
housing markets. As the situation evolves, we will update our
assumptions and estimates accordingly," S&P said.

In the following section, S&P provides additional detail for the
individual single-asset single-borrower (SASB) and large loan
transactions.

CSMC TRUST 2014-USA

S&P lowered its ratings on six classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from CSMC Trust 2014-USA and affirmed its
ratings on three classes from the transaction.

"The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect our reevaluation of the super-regional mall securing the
sole loan in the transaction. Our revised valuation declined 12.1%
since our last review, and at issuance, due primarily to us
applying a higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate and
adjusting our NCF slightly downward," S&P said.

While S&P's credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating levels on classes A-1, A-2, B, C, and D, the rating
agency also qualitatively considered the property's prominence in
its trade area and the borrower's experience and commitment to
improve the property's operating performance. If there are any
reported negative changes in property performance beyond what S&P
has already considered, it may re-visit its analysis and adjust the
ratings as necessary.

"We lowered our rating on class F to 'CCC (sf)' because we believe,
based on our revised S&P Global Ratings loan to value (LTV) of
110.5%, the class is more susceptible to reduce liquidity support
and is vulnerable to an increased risk of default and losses," S&P
said.

"We affirmed our rating on class X-1 and lowered our rating on
class X-2 based on our criteria for rating interest-only (IO)
securities, in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be
higher than that of the lowest-rated reference class. Class X-1's
notional balance references classes A-1 and A-2, and class X-2
references classes B, C, D, E, and F," S&P said.

This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by a
$1.4 billion fixed-rate partial IO loan (as of the March 17, 2020,
trustee remittance report), secured by the borrower's fee and
leasehold interests in a portion (2.64 million sq. ft.) of a 2.82
million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall known as Mall of America in
Bloomington, Minn.

"Our property-level analysis considered the 2.8% decline in
servicer-reported year-end 2018 net operating income (NOI) from
2017, the relatively flat in-line sales ($597 per sq. ft., as
calculated by S&P Global Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF
of $82.4 million, down from $85.2 million at issuance due mainly to
lower revenue and higher expenses. Using a 6.50% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate (up from 6.00% used at issuance), we arrived at
our expected-case value of $1.27 billion," S&P said.

"We toured the property on Feb. 3, 2020, accompanied by
representatives of the sponsor. The property is iconic and one of
the largest malls in the U.S., attracting numerous visitors from
afar. It presented very well, evident by the $500 million invested
in the past decade. We observed that management has been proactive
in understanding the challenges facing tenants and actively seeks
new tenants that are successful in navigating the current retail
landscape," S&P said.

The loan pays annual fixed rate of 4.38% and is IO until April 11,
2020, after which it will pay monthly principal and interest based
on a 30-year amortization schedule through its Sept. 11, 2025,
maturity. S&P's analysis also considered that the borrower is
permitted to incur future mezzanine financing, subject to certain
conditions, including a minimum debt service coverage (DSC) of
1.20x, and a maximum combined LTV of 65.0%. The trust balance has
not incurred any principal losses to date.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 1.43x
for 2019, compared to S&P Global Ratings DSC of 0.98x (after
considering amortizing payments). According to the Sept. 30, 2019,
rent roll, the collateral was 91.2% occupied. The five-largest
tenants made up 37.0% of the collateral net rentable area (NRA). In
addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (4.6%),
2021 (7.8%), 2022 (11.9%), and 2023 (17.1%).

STARWOOD RETAIL PROPERTY TRUST 2014-STAR

S&P lowered its ratings on six classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from Starwood Retail Property Trust
2014-STAR.

"The downgrades reflect our reevaluation of the four malls securing
the sole loan in the transaction. Our revised aggregated valuation
on the four malls declined 40.1% since our last review, which
reflects the continued cash flow declines exhibited at each
property from higher vacancies, tenants renewing their leases at
lower rental rates, tenants signing or renewing their leases at
shorter terms, and our application of a higher weighted average S&P
Global Ratings capitalization rate," S&P said.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating levels on class A, we also qualitatively considered
class A's position within the rated capital structure. Although we
believe the credit risk on class A has increased, we also believe
its senior position in the waterfall somewhat mitigates principal
losses and interest shortfalls concerns; and, as a result, we
opined that the certificates continue to exhibit the credit
characteristics of a low-investment-grade rated security. However,
if there are any reported negative changes in property performance
beyond what we have already considered, we may re-visit our
analysis and adjust the rating as necessary," S&P said.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes C, D, E, and F to 'CCC (sf)'
because it believes, based on its revised S&P aggregated LTV of
169.2%, these classes are more susceptible to reduce liquidity
support and are vulnerable to increase defaults and losses.

This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by a
$681.6 million floating-rate loan (as of the March 16, 2020,
trustee remittance report) secured by the borrowers' fee simple
interest in three regional malls:

-- The Mall at Wellington Green, 719,978 sq. ft. of a 1.26
million-sq.-ft. mall in Wellington, Fla.;

-- Northlake Mall, 539,813 sq. ft. of a 1.07 million-sq.-ft. mall
in Charlotte, N.C.; and

-- The Mall at Partridge Creek, 369,910 sq. ft. of a
626,162-sq.-ft. mall in Clinton Township, Mich., as well as the
borrowers' leasehold interest in MacArthur Center, 514,078 sq. ft.
of a 927,692-sq.-ft. mall in Norfolk, Va.

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the decline in
servicer-reported NOI to $56.5 million (in aggregate) as of
year-end 2018 from $60.5 million in 2017. Using the June 2019 rent
rolls, we derived our combined sustainable NCF of $38.5 million
down from $57.0 million in our last review. Using an S&P Global
Ratings capitalization rate of 9.00% (up from the weighted average
capitalization rate of 7.31% used at last review), we arrived at
our expected-case value of $402.8 million. Our expected-case value
includes a mark-to-market negative value adjustment of $14.5
million for The Mall at Wellington Green because we calculated an
occupancy cost of 17.6% for the in-line tenants, which we marked to
16.0%, based on in-line sales of $438 per sq. ft., as calculated by
S&P Global Ratings.

"We visited three of the four malls securing the loan in February
2020. We did not visit the Northlake Mall because the property's
reported performance has not deteriorated as severely as the other
three malls, and all of the anchor tenants remain opened. Our
general takeaway is that each of the three malls is generally the
second or three alternatives of the malls in the market it serves.
In particular, we considered the long-term viability of The Mall at
Partridge Creek and MacArthur Center continuing to operate as a
retail destination in their respective markets. The Mall at
Partridge Creek, located in Clinton Township, Mich., lost both of
its anchor tenants (Carson's and Nordstrom). The in-line space was
87.5% occupied as of the June 2019 rent roll. We also noted that
the cold weather limited the number of shoppers at the property
during our visit because it is an unenclosed mall. MacArthur
Center, located in downtown Norfolk Va., lost its anchor,
Nordstrom, when the store closed in 2019. The property has another
anchor, Dillard's, occupying about 253,000-sq. ft. During our
property visit, we noted that although the mall is centrally
located in downtown Norfolk, the attached parking garage generated
a significant amount of activity due to many office workers in
downtown Norfolk parking their cars here for a nominal fee and the
lack of public parking in the area. In addition, we noticed more
security presence than we are typically accustomed to due to the
recent criminal disturbances at the property."

The floating-rate loan pays interest at LIBOR plus 2.35% and
matured on Nov. 8, 2019. The reported overall DSC and occupancy for
the six months ended June 30, 2019, were 1.16x and 82.6%,
respectively. The loan, which has a matured performing balloon
payment status, was transferred to the special servicer, Wells
Fargo, on Nov. 8, 2019, due to the borrower's inability to
refinance the loan. According to the special servicer, discussion
with the borrowers on a resolution strategy is ongoing and updated
appraisals have been ordered but not received yet. In addition, S&P
also noted that according to the sponsor's (Starwood Property Trust
Inc.'s) most recent reported financial statements, the sponsor has
written down its equity investments in the four malls to zero.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2014-DSTY

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-DSTY.

"The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect our reevaluation of the retail malls securing the two loans
in the transaction. Our revised valuations, in aggregate, is 26.3%
below our levels at last review due primarily to us applying higher
S&P Global Ratings capitalization rates and lowering our NCF
assumptions.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating levels on classes A and B, we also qualitatively
considered the properties' prominence in their trade area, and the
borrowers' experience and commitment to improve the properties'
operating performance. If there are any reported negative changes
in properties performance beyond what we have already considered,
we may re-visit our analysis and adjust the ratings as necessary.

"We lowered our ratings on the class X-A and X-B IO certificates
based on our criteria for rating IO securities, in which the
ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than that of the
lowest-rated reference class. Class X-A's notional balance
references class A, and class X-B references class B."

This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by two
fixed-rate IO mortgage loans, each secured by a different phase of
the Destiny USA mall in Syracuse, N.Y. The two loans totaled $430.0
million (as of the March 12, 2020, trustee remittance report) and
are not cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted because the
payment-in-lieu-of-tax (PILOT) bond financing underlying Phase I of
the mall restricts the loans from being crossed. To date, the trust
has not incurred any principal losses.

Details on the two loans are as follows:

The Phase I mortgage loan has a $300.0 million trust and whole-loan
balance and is secured by 1.24 million sq. ft. of a 1.51
million-sq.-ft. super regional shopping mall, known as Destiny USA
Phase I, in Syracuse, N.Y. The Phase I borrower is party to a PILOT
agreement under which the borrower makes PILOT payments that
increase each year through the agreement's 2035 expiration in lieu
of paying real estate tax. S&P said, "Our property-level analysis
considered the year-over-year decline in servicer-reported NOI in
2016 (negative 6.9%), 2017 (negative 7.9%), 2018 (negative 13.9%),
and 2019 (negative 6.4%) due primarily to lower occupancy and
revenues, flat expenses, and flat in-line sales ($433 per sq. ft.,
as calculated by S&P Global Ratings). We derived our sustainable
NCF, which considered the reported declining NOI and occupancy, and
the contractual PILOT payment increases, by estimating a
forward-looking PILOT payment of $14.8 million, down from $17.3
million as of our last review. Using a 7.75% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate (up from 6.75% since our last review), we
arrived at our expected-case value of $177.6 million, down 29.4%
since our last review. Our expected case value yielded an S&P
Global Ratings LTV of 168.9% and an S&P Global Ratings DSC of
1.28x. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 1.62x for 2019, and occupancy
for the collateral was 73.4%, according to the Dec. 31, 2019, rent
roll." The five largest tenants comprise 35.0% of the collateral's
total NRA as of the December 2019 rent roll. In addition the NRA
reflects leases that expire in 2020 (3.9%), 2021 (9.8%), 2022
(10.5%), and 2023 (9.9%).

The Phase II mortgage loan has a $130.0 million trust and
whole-loan balance, and it is secured by an 874,200-sq.-ft.
regional shopping mall, known as Destiny USA Phase II, in Syracuse
N.Y. S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the
year-over-year decline in servicer-reported NOI in 2017 (negative
5.0%) and 2018 (negative 9.0%) due primarily to lower occupancy and
revenues, flat expenses, and flat in-line sales ($323 per sq. ft.,
as calculated by S&P Global Ratings). We derived our sustainable
NCF of $10.7 million, down from $11.7 million as of the last
review. Using an S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate of 8.50%
(up from 7.25% in last review), we arrived at our expected-case
value of $126.5 million, down 21.5% since our last review. Our
expected case value yielded an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 102.8% and
an S&P Global Ratings DSC of 2.14x. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of
2.15x for 2019, and occupancy was 72.4%, according to the Dec. 31,
2019, rent roll." Based on the December 2019 rent roll, the five
largest tenants comprise 29.4% of the collateral's total NRA. In
addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (2.5%),
2021 (1.1%), 2022 (12.2%), and 2023 (23.8%).

Both loans pay an annual fixed interest rate of 3.814% and
originally matured on June 6, 2019. The loans, which have current
payment statuses, were transferred to the special servicer, Wells
Fargo, on March 14, 2019, due to imminent monetary default because
the borrowers requested to modify and extend the two loans. The
borrowers indicated that they would not be able to obtain
refinancing proceeds by the maturity date due to declining property
performance coupled with more conservative underwriting standards
for mall loans in today's lending environment. The loans were
modified effective May 31, 2019, and the modification terms
included, among other items, an extension of the loans' maturity
dates to June 6, 2020, with two additional extension options (final
maturity dates in June 2022) that are exercisable upon meeting
certain debt yield tests and depositing $6.0 million upfront into
the excess cash flow reserve account. The loans were placed on the
master servicer's watchlist this month due to its upcoming June
2020 maturity dates.

WFLD 2014-MONT MORTGAGE TRUST

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on three classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from WFLD 2014-MONT Mortgage
Trust and affirmed our rating on one class from the transaction.

"The ratings actions reflect our reevaluation of the retail mall
securing the sole loan in the transaction. Our revised valuation
declined 14.5% since our last review due primarily to applying a
higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate and revising our NCF
downward.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating levels on classes A and B, we also qualitatively
considered the likelihood of the borrower's ability to improve the
property's operating performance via cost efficiency and capital
investment because, unlike other malls with reported performance
deterioration attributable mainly to higher vacancy, and lower
rent, the underlying mall in the transaction has experienced flat
revenue and occupancy offset by higher expenses. If there are any
reported negative changes in property performance beyond what we
have already considered, we may re-visit our analysis and adjust
the ratings as necessary."

This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by a
$350.0 million fixed-rate IO loan (as of the March 12, 2020,
trustee remittance report) secured by the borrower's fee simple
interest in the Westfield Montgomery Mall, a 1.3 million-sq.-ft.
regional mall in Bethesda, Md. Of the mall's total square footage,
835,597 sq. ft. serves as collateral for the loan.

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the
year-over-year decline in servicer-reported NOI: 2018 (negative
2.2%) and 2017 (negative 5.7%); the relatively flat in-line sales
($525 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global Ratings); as well as
the vacancy of the noncollateral former Sears space since 2018. We
derived our sustainable NCF of $30.9 million, down from $33.6
million as of the last review due mainly to higher expenses. Using
an S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate of 7.00% (up from 6.50%
since the last review), we arrived at our expected-case value of
$441.4 million, yielding an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 79.3% and an
S&P Global Ratings DSC of 2.31x.

"We visited the property on Feb. 12, 2020, noting that the mall was
generally well populated, with a variety of shoppers. Our overall
impression of the property was that it appeared to be healthy, with
a diverse mix of both retail and experiential tenants, and a strong
food court."

The IO loan pays an annual fixed interest rate of 3.77% and matures
on Aug. 1, 2024. To date, the trust has not incurred any principal
losses. The master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported a DSC of 2.50x
for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019. According to the Sept.
30, 2019, rent roll, the collateral was 90.5% occupied (excluding
Victoria's Secret and Old Navy, totaling 33,301 sq. ft.). The
five-largest tenants made up 40.7% of the collateral NRA. In
addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (35.2%),
2021 (11.2%), 2022 (5.8%), and 2023 (3.8%).

PALISADES CENTER TRUST 2016-PLSD

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Palisades Center Trust
2016-PLSD.

"The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect our reevaluation of the retail mall securing the sole loan
in the transaction. Our revised valuation declined 23.3% since our
last review due primarily to us revising our NCF downward and
applying a higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating levels on class A, we also qualitatively considered
the borrower's experience and commitment to improve the property's
operating performance. If there are any reported negative changes
in property performance beyond what we have already considered, we
may re-visit our analysis and adjust the rating as necessary.

"We lowered our rating on the class X-NCP IO certificates based on
our criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class. Class X-NCP's notional balance references classes
A, B, C, and D."

This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by a
$388.5 million portion of a $418.5 million, fixed-rate IO loan (as
of the March 13, 2020, trustee remittance report) secured by the
borrower's fee and leasehold interests in a portion (1.9 million
sq. ft.) of a 2.2 million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall and
entertainment center known as Palisades Center in West Nyack, New
York.

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the
year-over-year decline in servicer-reported NOI: 2019 (negative
11.5%), 2018 (negative 6.9%), and 2017 (negative 2.5%); the
relatively flat in-line sales ($454 per sq. ft., as calculated by
S&P Global Ratings); the vacancy of the noncollateral anchor
tenant, Lord & Taylor (120,000 sq. ft.) in January 2020; as well as
the numerous competitors near the mall's trade area. We derived our
sustainable NCF on the whole loan of $34.1 million, down from $38.8
million as of last review due mainly to lower occupancy and lower
rents for some existing tenants. Using an S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate of 7.75% (up from 6.75% since the last review),
we arrived at our expected-case value on the whole loan of $440.6
million, down 23.3% since our last review and yielding an S&P
Global Ratings LTV of 95.0% on the whole loan.

"We visited the property on Feb. 21, 2020, and found it easily
accessible, near a major highway, well maintained, and clean. While
the mall had a good amount of visitors, we noted that the apparel
stores had light foot traffic, as shoppers, predominantly teens and
families, were mainly window shopping and mostly gravitated to the
food court and experiential tenants." In addition, the former
JCPenney space (vacated in June 2017) remained empty.

The whole loan consists of the senior A notes totaling $259.1
million and junior notes B, C, and D totaling $159.4 million that
are subordinate to the A notes. A $30.0 million nontrust companion
note is pari passu in right of payment to the senior trust notes
totaling $229.1 million, and they are senior in right of payment to
the other trust junior notes totaling $159.4 million. The whole
loan pays an annual weighted average fixed rate of 4.19% and is IO
through its April 9, 2021, maturity. In addition, there is $141.5
million in mezzanine debt. The trust balance has not incurred any
principal losses to date.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported a DSC of 2.07x for 2019,
compared to S&P Global Ratings DSC of 1.92x on the whole loan.
According to the Dec. 31, 2019, rent roll, the collateral was 79.3%
occupied, excluding Bed, Bath, and Beyond (45,000 sq. ft.; vacating
June 2020). The five-largest tenants made up 29.0% of the
collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include leases that expire in
2020 (2.8%), 2021 (12.6%), 2022 (4.8%), and 2023 (13.9%).

J.P. MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2014-FL6

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-FL6 and affirmed our
rating on one class from the transaction.

"The rating actions on class D (downgrade) and class C
(affirmation) reflect our reevaluation of the Southland Mall, which
secures the sole remaining loan in the transaction. Our revised
valuation declined 18.4% since our last review due primarily to us
applying a higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate and
revising our NCF slightly downward, based on lower occupancy and
revenue.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was higher than the most
recent rating levels on class C, we also qualitatively considered
that the transaction is 100% exposed to a retail mall loan that
previously defaulted, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the
borrower's ability to refinance the loan upon its May 8, 2020,
maturity."

In addition, class D had $36,925 in accumulated interest shortfalls
that have been outstanding primarily for approximately five
consecutive months. According to the master servicer, the
shortfalls are primarily due to legal fees incurred from the
resignation and replacement of Talmage, as special servicer. S&P
continues to investigate the recoverability, nature, and magnitude
of these expenses and, if warranted, may reassess the impact, if
any, on the rated bond and take further negative rating action
accordingly.

S&P lowered its rating on the class X-EXT IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class. The notional balance on class X-EXT references
classes A, B, C, and D.

This is a large loan transaction that is now solely backed by a
$65.2 million floating-rate IO loan (as of the March 16, 2020,
trustee remittance report) secured by the borrower's fee interests
in a portion (660,736 sq. ft.) of a 984,783-sq.-ft. enclosed
regional mall known as the Southland Mall located approximately 20
miles southwest of Miami in Cutler Bay, Fla.

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the slight
decline in servicer-reported year-end 2018 NOI from 2017 (negative
1.1%), the relatively flat in-line sales ($330 per sq. ft., as
calculated by S&P Global Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF
of $7.4 million, down from $7.8 million at last review due mainly
to lower occupancy and revenue. Using a 9.00% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate (up from 7.75% in the last review), we arrived
at our expected-case value of $81.7 million, yielding an S&P Global
Ratings LTV of 79.8%.

"We visited the property on Feb. 6, 2020, and noted that the mall
was well maintained but was showing its age (it was built in 1972
and renovated in 2005). We noted that a noncollateral anchor, Sears
(179,404 sq. ft.), was vacating in February 2020.

The floating-rate loan pays interest at one-month LIBOR plus a
2.9944% margin. In addition, there are $51.0 million in mezzanine
financing. The trust has not incurred any principal losses to date.
The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC from declining occupancy and higher operating
expenses. The loan currently matures on May 9, 2020, and, according
to the master servicer's comments, it is waiting for the borrower
to formally submit a request to extend the loan. The loan was
previously transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 8, 2018, due
to imminent maturity default. The loan matured on May 9, 2019, and
the borrower was not able to obtain refinancing proceeds. The loan
was modified on June 7, 2019, and returned back to the master
servicer on Sept. 23, 2019. The modification terms included
extending the maturity date to May 9, 2020, with a one-year
extension option to May 9, 2021, subject to certain conditions.

The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported a 0.92x
DSC for 2019. According to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent roll, the
collateral was 74.5% occupied (S&P underwrote to 62.3%, assuming
JCPenney [81,251 sq. ft.] will vacate; November 2022 lease
expiration). The five-largest tenants made up 37.4% of the
collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include leases that expire in
2019-2020 (4.0%), 2021 (6.7%), 2022 (22.8%), and 2023 (6.4%).

BB-UBS TRUST 2012-TFT

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from BB-UBS Trust 2012-TFT and
affirmed our ratings on three classes from the transaction.

"The rating actions on the pooled principal- and interest-paying
classes reflect our reevaluation of the three retail malls securing
the three loans in the transaction. Our revised valuations, in
aggregate, declined 6.5% since the last review due primarily to us
applying higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rates and
lowering our NCF assumptions for two of the three malls.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating level on class A, we also considered the class's
senior position within the capital structure, and the potential for
additional proceeds to the class if any of the loans pay down in
full.

"Our affirmation on the class TE nonpooled certificates reflects
our analysis of the Town East Mall loan. This nonpooled class
derives 100% of its cash flow from a subordinate portion of the
whole loan.

"We lowered our rating on class E to 'CCC (sf)' because we believe,
based on our revised S&P Global Ratings LTV of 116.7% for the
Tucson Mall loan, this class is more susceptible to reduced
liquidity support and is vulnerable to default and losses.

"We affirmed our rating on the class X-A IO certificates based on
our criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class. Class X-A's notional balance references class A."

This is a large loan transaction backed by three uncrossed
fixed-rate IO mortgage loans, all maturing in June 2020. According
to the March 6, 2020, trustee remittance report, the trust had an
aggregate pooled trust balance of $552.9 million and an aggregate
trust balance of $567.7 million, the same as at issuance. The trust
has not incurred any principal losses to date.

Details on the three loans are as follows:

The Tucson Mall loan is the largest loan in the pool, with a trust
balance of $205.5 million (37.2% of the pooled trust balance). In
addition, there is $40.5 million in mezzanine debt. The IO loan
pays fixed interest of 3.57% per year and matures on June 1, 2020.
The loan is secured by 667,561 sq. ft. of a 1.31 million-sq.-ft.
regional mall in Tucson, Ariz. Our analysis considered the
declining servicer-reported NOI in 2018 (negative 10.3%) and 2017
(negative 6.6%) due primarily to lower gross rent and relatively
flat in-line sales ($355 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings). S&P said, "We derived our sustainable NCF of $15.8
million, down from $21.9 million as of the last review. Using an
S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate of 9.00% (up from 7.50% used
in last review), we arrived at our expected-case value of $176.0
million, down 33.6% since our last review. Our expected case value
yielded an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 116.7% and an S&P Global
Ratings DSC of 2.13x. The master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported a
DSC of 2.21x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019, and
occupancy was 73.3% (assuming that the Forever 21's 81,806-sq.-ft.
space is vacant), according to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent roll. The
five-largest tenants comprised 30.8% of the collateral NRA. In
addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (21.7%),
2021 (9.3%), 2022 (9.7%), and 2023 (3.0%). We visited this property
on Jan. 28, 2020, and observed that management has brought in a
number of nontraditional retail tenants and reported in-line sales
is up marginally." However, the property still has several vacant
spaces, and there are portions of the mall that have not been
renovated recently.

The Fashion Place loan is the second-largest loan in the pool, with
a trust balance of $202.0 million (36.5% of the pooled trust
balance). In addition, there is $24.7 million in mezzanine debt.
The loan pays fixed interest of 3.32% per year and matures on June
1, 2020. The loan is secured by 421,206 sq. ft. of a 1.02
million-sq.-ft. mall in Murray, Utah. Our analysis considered the
year-over-year increase in servicer-reported NOI in 2016 (1.8%),
2017 (4.1%), and 2018 (9.6%) due primarily to higher gross rent and
relatively flat in-line sales ($588 per sq. ft., as calculated by
S&P Global Ratings). S&P said, "We derived our sustainable NCF of
$26.0 million, up from $21.8 million as of the last review. Using
an S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate of 6.75% (up from 6.50%
in the last review), we arrived at our expected-case value of
$385.7 million, up 14.9% since our last review. Our expected case
value yielded an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 52.4% and an S&P Global
Ratings DSC of 3.83x. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 4.18x for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019, and occupancy was 96.8%,
according to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent roll." The five-largest
tenants make up 24.6% of the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA
include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (6.5%), 2021 (9.2%), 2022
(14.5%), and 2023 (5.4%).

The Town East Mall loan is the smallest loan in the pool, with a
whole loan balance of $160.2 million. The loan is divided into a
$145.4 million senior pooled trust balance (26.3% of the pooled
trust balance) and a $14.8 million subordinate nonpooled trust
balance that supports the TE raked class. The whole loan pays fixed
interest of 3.57% per year and matures on June 1, 2020. The loan is
secured by 416,516 sq. ft. of 1.23 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Mesquite, Texas. S&P said, "Our analysis considered the somewhat
stable servicer-reported NOI for the last four years and the
relatively flat in-line sales ($478 per sq. ft., as calculated by
S&P Global Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF of $16.1
million, which remains flat from our last review. Using an S&P
Global Ratings capitalization rate of 7.75% (up from 7.25% used in
last review), we arrived at our expected-case value of $207.7
million, down 6.5% since our last review. Our expected case value
yielded an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 70.0% and an S&P Global
Ratings DSC 3.06x on the pooled trust balance." Wells Fargo
reported a DSC of 3.22x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019,
and occupancy was 92.4%, according to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent
roll. The five-largest tenants make up 23.9% of the collateral NRA.
In addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020
(26.9%), 2021 (10.1%), 2022 (18.0%), and 2023 (4.5%).

MSBAM COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2012-CKSV

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from MSBAM Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2012-CKSV and affirmed our ratings on three
classes from the transaction.

"The rating actions on the pooled principal- and interest-paying
classes reflect our reevaluation of the transaction's two retail
mall loans. Our revised valuations, in aggregate, declined 15.3%
since the last review due mainly to us applying higher S&P Global
Ratings capitalization rates and lowering our NCF assumptions for
one of the two malls.

"While our credit enhancement expectation was less than the most
recent rating levels on classes A-1 and A-2, we also considered the
bonds' senior-most position within the capital structure, as well
as the amortization of the Sunvalley Shopping Center loan, which
benefits these bonds. If there are any reported negative changes in
property performance, we may re-visit our analysis and adjust
ratings as necessary.

"We affirmed our rating on the class X-A and lowered our rating on
the class X-B IO certificates based on our criteria for rating IO
securities, in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be
higher than that of the lowest-rated reference class. Class X-A's
notional balance references classes A-1 and A-2, and class X-B
references class B.

"The downgrade on the class CK raked certificates reflects our
reevaluation of the Clackamas Town Center loan. The class CK raked
certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from a subordinate
nonpooled component of the whole loan."

This is a large loan transaction backed by two uncrossed fixed-rate
mortgage loans. According to the March 17, 2020, trustee remittance
report, the trust had an aggregate pooled trust balance of $354.8
million and an aggregate trust balance of $380.0 million, down from
$405.7 million at issuance. The trust has not incurred any
principal losses to date.

Details on the two loans are as follows:

The Clackamas Town Center loan, the larger of the two loans in the
trust, has a $216.0 million whole-loan balance and is divided into
a $190.8 million senior pooled trust component (53.8% of the pooled
trust balance) and a $25.2 million subordinated nonpooled trust
component that supports the class CK raked certificates. The
10-year loan is IO, pays a fixed interest rate of 4.177% per year
and matures in October 2022. The loan is secured by 631,537 sq. ft.
of a 1.41 million-sq.-ft. enclosed two-level regional mall in Happy
Valley, Ore. S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the
relatively stable reported NOI in 2015-2018 and the relatively flat
in-line sales ($483 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF of $24.1 million, which is
unchanged from our last review. Using a 7.75% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate (up from 6.75% used at last review), we arrived
at our expected-case value of $310.6 million, down from $356.7
million at last review." S&P Global Ratings' LTV was 69.5% on the
whole loan balance. The master servicer, KeyBank, reported a
whole-loan DSC of 2.76x for the six months ended June 30, 2019,
compared to S&P Global Ratings' whole-loan DSC of 2.63x. According
to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent roll, the collateral was 89.9%
occupied. The five-largest tenants made up 31.0% of the collateral
NRA. In addition, the NRA include leases that expire in 2019-2020
(12.8%), 2021 (6.0%), 2022 (29.1%), and 2023 (8.9%). Most of the
lease rollover in 2022 are attributable to Century Theatres (70,752
sq. ft.; December 2022 lease expiration), Forever 21 (33,597 sq.
ft.; July 2022), and Barnes & Noble (31,951 sq. ft.; January
2022).

The Sunvalley Shopping Center loan has a trust and whole-loan
balance of $164.0 million. The 10-year loan amortizes on a 30-year
schedule, pays fixed interest of 4.440% per year and matures in
September 2022. The loan is secured by 1.21 million sq. ft. of a
1.45 million-sq.-ft., enclosed two-level regional mall in Concord,
Calif. S&P said, "Our property-level analysis considered the
year-over-year decline in servicer-reported NOI in 2017 (negative
6.7%) and 2018 (negative 19.2%), and the relatively flat in-line
sales ($478 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global Ratings). We
derived our sustainable NCF of $18.5 million, down from $20.9
million as of last review due mainly to lower revenue and higher
expenses. Using an S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate of 7.75%
(up from 6.75% as of the last review), we arrived at our
expected-case value of $238.3 million, down from $291.1 million as
of the last review, yielding an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 68.8%. We
visited the property on Feb. 5, 2020. We observed weak anchor
tenancy (JCPenney, Sears, and Macy's) and an abundance of regional
tenants at the mall. We also noted that the competitor properties
presented very well and looked more modern than the subject."
KeyBank reported a 1.37x DSC for 2019, compared to S&P Global
Ratings' DSC of 1.61x. According to the June 30, 2019, rent roll,
the collateral was 94.4% occupied. The five-largest tenants made up
59.8% of the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include leases
that expire in 2019-2020 (4.3%), 2021 (3.5%), 2022 (5.5%), and 2023
(7.3%).

UBS-BAMLL TRUST 2012-WRM

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from UBS-BAMLL Trust 2012-WRM
and affirmed our ratings on two classes from the transaction.

"The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect our reevaluation of the two retail malls securing the two
uncrossed loans in the transaction. Our revised valuations, in
aggregate, declined 11.6% since our last review due primarily to us
applying higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rates and
lowering our NCF assumptions for one of the two malls.

"We affirmed our rating on the IO class X-A and lowered our rating
on class X-B based on our criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class." Class X-A's notional
balance references class A, and class X-B's notional balance
references classes B, C, D, and E.

This is a large loan transaction backed by two fixed-rate IO
mortgage loans. According to the March 12, 2020, trustee remittance
report, the trust had an aggregated trust balance of $415.0
million, the same as at issuance. The trust has not incurred any
principal losses to date.

Details on the two loans are as follows:

The Westfield Galleria at Roseville loan, the larger of the two
loans, has a $275.0 million trust balance (66.3% of the pooled
trust balance) and is secured by 680,571 sq. ft. of a 1.33
million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Roseville, Calif. The IO loan pays
an annual fixed interest rate of 4.245% and matures in June 2022.
S&P said, "Our analysis considered the stable servicer-reported
operating performance for the past three years and the relatively
flat in-line sales ($664 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF of $32.1 million, which is
unchanged from our last review. Using an S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate of 6.50% (unchanged from our last review), we
arrived at our expected-case value of $489.3 million, which remains
flat as of our last review. Our expected case value yielded an S&P
Global Ratings LTV of 56.2% and an S&P Global Ratings DSC of
2.71x." The master servicer, KeyBank, reported a 3.05x DSC for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019, and occupancy was 85.6%,
according to the Aug. 31, 2019, rent roll (assuming that Forever 21
vacated its 32,789-sq.-ft. space). The five-largest tenants
comprised 20.4% of the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include
leases that expire in 2019-2020 (21.9%), 2021 (19.6%), 2022 (9.0%),
and 2023 (1.3%).

The Westfield MainPlace loan, the smallest loan in the pool, has a
$140.0 million trust balance and is secured by 616,591 sq. ft. of a
1.13 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Santa Ana, Calif. The IO loan
pays an annual fixed interest rate of 4.245% and matures in June
2022. S&P said, "Our analysis considered the declining
servicer-reported NOI in 2018 (negative 21.6%) and 2017 (negative
10.8%) due primarily to lower gross rent and relatively flat
in-line sales ($397 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF of $12.8 million, down
from $16.8 million from our last review. Using an S&P Global
Ratings capitalization rate of 8.50% (up from 7.25% in last
review), we arrived at our expected-case value of $150.7 million,
down 34.8% since our last review. Our expected case value yielded
an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 92.9% and an S&P Global Ratings DSC of
2.13x. KeyBank reported a DSC of 2.54x for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2019, and occupancy was 93.1%, according to the Sept. 30,
2019, rent roll. The five-largest tenants comprised 44.1% of the
collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include leases that expire in
2019-2020 (17.6%), 2021 (8.9%), 2022 (12.5%), and 2023 (2.5%). We
visited the property on Feb. 6, 2020, and we noted that it looked
dated compared to its competitors. We also observed that the
property consisted of a mix of regional and local tenants, which
included a six-screen theater, restaurants, general retail, and
other experiential tenants."

COMM 2012-LTRT

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2012-LTRT and affirmed
our ratings on four classes from the transaction.

"The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect our reevaluation of the two retail malls securing the two
uncrossed loans in the transaction. Our revised valuations, in
aggregate, declined 15.8% since our last review due primarily to us
applying higher S&P Global Ratings capitalization rates and
lowering our NCF assumptions for one of the two malls.

"We affirmed our rating on the class X-A and lowered our rating on
the class X-B IO certificates based on our criteria for rating IO
securities, in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be
higher than that of the lowest-rated reference class." Class X-A's
notional balance references classes A-1 and A-2, and class X-B
references classes B, C, D, and E.

This large loan transaction is backed by two fixed-rate amortizing
balloon mortgage loans. According to the March 6, 2020, trustee
remittance report, the trust had an aggregated trust balance of
$224.7 million, down from $259.0 million at issuance. The trust has
not incurred any principal losses to date.

Details on the two loans are as follows:

The Westroads Mall loan, the larger of the two loans, has a $122.1
million trust balance (54.3% of the trust balance) and is secured
by 540,304 sq. ft. of a 1.07 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Omaha, Neb. The amortizing loan (based on an amortization schedule)
pays an annual fixed interest rate of 4.295% and matures in October
2022. In addition, there is $15.6 million in mezzanine debt. S&P
said, "Our analysis considered the stable servicer-reported
operating performance for the past three years and the relatively
flat in-line sales ($426 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global
Ratings). We derived our sustainable NCF of $15.1 million, which is
unchanged from our last review. Using an S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate of 7.75% (up from 7.06% since our last review),
we arrived at our expected-case value of $194.2 million, down 8.9%
since our last review. Our expected case value yielded an S&P
Global Ratings LTV of 62.9% and an S&P Global Ratings DSC of
1.81x." The master servicer, KeyBank, reported a DSC of 1.92x for
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019, and occupancy was 86.5%
(after assuming Forever 21's 30,796-sq.-ft. space is vacant),
according to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent roll. The five-largest
tenants comprised 41.9% of the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA
include leases that expire in 2019-2020 (12.7%), 2021 (3.1%), 2022
(5.3%), and 2023 (21.7%).

The Oaks Mall loan, the smallest loan in the pool, has a $102.6
million trust balance and is secured by 581,849 sq. ft. of a
906,349-sq.-ft. regional mall in Gainesville, Fla. The amortizing
loan (based on an amortization schedule) pays an annual fixed
interest rate of 4.12% and matures in October 2022. In addition,
there is $19.8 million in mezzanine debt. S&P said, "Our analysis
considered the declining servicer-reported NOI in 2018 (6.7%) due
primarily to lower gross rent and relatively flat in-line sales
($328 per sq. ft., as calculated by S&P Global Ratings). We derived
our sustainable NCF of $11.4 million, down from $12.8 million since
our last review. Using an S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate of
8.50% (up from 7.25% in last review), we arrived at our
expected-case value of $133.7 million, down 24.1% since our last
review. Our expected case value yielded a S&P Global Ratings LTV of
76.8% and an S&P Global Ratings DSC of 1.65x. KeyBank reported a
DSC of 1.54x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2019, and
occupancy was 65.7% (after assuming the JCPenney [133,561 sq. ft.]
and the Forever 21 [28,195-sq.-ft.] spaces are vacant), according
to the Sept. 30, 2019, rent roll. The five-largest tenants
comprised 50.1% of the collateral NRA. In addition, the NRA include
leases that expire in 2019-2020 (7.7%), 2021 (7.6%), 2022 (6.5%),
and 2023 (20.9%). The leases rolling in 2023 are primarily from
JCPenney (January 2023 lease expiration) and Belk (99,806 sq. ft.
February 2023). We visited the mall on Feb. 6, 2020, and we noted
that the former Sears space is now occupied by University of
Florida Health, and Forever 21 may renew its lease when it expires
in 2021. During the property visit, we noted that there are a few
lifestyle centers around the property and they presented better in
comparison to this mall."

CONDUIT TRANSACTIONS

S&P said, "For these transactions, our approach included
re-evaluating each of the underperforming malls referenced in "Shop
with Caution – CMBS Mall Loans Worth Watching," published Jan. 8,
2020, to determine a sustainable S&P Global Ratings NCF,
capitalization rate and valuation, using a similar approach to the
aforementioned analysis. Given the diversity of the transactions,
we primarily focused on the underperforming malls, but where
applicable, our analysis also included a review of the larger loans
in the pool, typically the top 10 loans.

"The downgrades and affirmations on the pooled principal- and
interest-paying classes reflect our expected credit enhancement
levels for the bonds relative to our revised benchmark levels for
the transactions. For some of the reviewed classes, transaction
amortization has improved credit enhancement levels to the point
that ratings upgrades may be indicated. However, our rating
decisions also considered the transactions' remaining exposure to
other collateral loans in the pool (in some cases, a significant
retail exposure) and the potential for adverse selection to occur
among the remaining collateral.

"Conversely, for the COMM 2013-CCRE9 Mortgage Trust and COMM
2012-CCRE4 Mortgage Trust transactions, while the A-M bonds' credit
enhancement levels indicated potential downgrade, we also
considered the bonds' relatively senior position within their
respective capital structures, and the potential for some future
loan paydown, generally benefiting the more senior classes.

"For ratings in the 'CCC' category, we consider the classes to be
vulnerable to nonpayment and to face at least a one-in-two
likelihood of default (in principal or interest). For 'B- (sf)'
ratings, we also considered the classes' vulnerability to
nonpayment, as well as their position within the rated capital
stack.

"The ratings on the exchangeable certificates reflect the lowest
rating of the certificates for which they can be exchanged. The
ratings on the IO certificates are based on our criteria for rating
IO securities."

The downgrades on the class D, E, and F certificates from TIAA
Seasoned Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C4 reflect the classes'
susceptibility to liquidity interruption due to the nonrecoverable
determination on the Algonquin Phase I and II loans. Class F has
experienced interest shortfalls outstanding for four consecutive
months.

"The affirmation on JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2014-C19's class CSQ nonpooled certificates reflects our analysis
of the Centreville Square loan. This nonpooled class derives 100%
of its cash flow from a subordinate portion of the whole loan.

"Finally, we discontinued our rating on class A-2 from GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2013-GCJ12 because the class repaid in full,
according to the March 2020 trustee remittance report.

"Table 1 below provides a description of the credit metrics of the
conduit transactions, such as S&P Global Ratings' LTV and DSC for
the transactions (excluding the defeased and specially serviced
assets). We also include a table displaying each of the
underperforming malls in the conduit transactions and our view of
their credit following our analysis.

"For defaulted malls or loans, we generally estimated losses and
recoveries based on, among other factors, updated appraisal values,
revised market- or property-level information, third-party market
reports, comparable sales, or updated resolution information."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/39coq0G


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Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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