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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 22, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 81

                            Headlines

ARBOR REALTY 2020-FL1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Cl. G Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-1: Fitch Lowers Class B Debt Rating to Csf
BANK 2020-BNK26: DBRS Finalizes B(high) Rating on Class G Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 4 Classes
BELLEMEADE RE 2020-1: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating on 11 Classes

CD 2017-CD4 MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on 2 Tranches
CFCRE 2018-TAN: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class HRR Certs
CFK TRUST 2020-MF2: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on Class F Certs
CIM TRUST 2020-R2: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes B(EXP)
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-P1: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at Bsf

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P3: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at Bsf
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2020-555: DBRS Rates Class G Certs 'B'
COMM 2014-CCRE17: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on 2 Classes
EXANTAS CAPITAL 2020-RSO8: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on G Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2020-1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class M Certs

FREDDIE MAC 2020-HQA2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on 16 Classes
FREDDIE MAC 2020-HQA2: Moody's Assigns B1 Ratings on 11 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2020-3: Moody's Rates Class B-5-Y Certs '(P)B3'
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C4: Moody's Lowers Class G Certs to Caa3
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C12: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. G Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C15: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Cl. F Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
NOMURA ASSET 2005-WF1: Moody's Lowers Class II-A-4 Debt to B1
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2020-3: Fitch Affirms Class B-4 Certs at 'BB-sf'
SG COMMERCIAL 2020-COVE: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating on Cl. F Certs

TIAA SEASONED 2007-4: Fitch Affirms Class E Certs at 'Bsf'
TOWD POINT 2020-MH1: Fitch Gives 'BBsf' Ratings on 5 Tranches
TRINITAS CLO XII: Moody's Rates $11.250MM Class F Notes '(P)B3'
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to 'CCCsf'

WELLS FARGO 2016-BNK1: Fitch Lowers Class X-F Debt Rating to CCC
WELLS FARGO 2018-C43: Fitch Affirms Class F Debt at 'B-sf'
WELLS FARGO 2020-SDAL: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on Class F Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C12: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'CCCsf'
ZAIS CLO 14: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $13.5MM Cl. E Notes

[*] DBRS Takes Actions on 1,083 Classes From 73 U.S. RMBS Deals
[*] DBRS Takes Actions on 28 Ratings From 5 ACAR Transactions
[*] DBRS Takes Actions on 461 Classes From 31 CMBS Transactions
[*] Fitch Puts 15 U.S. CMBS Hotel Deals on Watch Neg. Over Covid-19
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $179MM RMBS Issued 2001-2007


                            *********

ARBOR REALTY 2020-FL1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Cl. G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of commercial mortgage-backed notes issued by Arbor Realty
Commercial Real Estate Notes 2020-FL1, Ltd. (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The initial collateral consists of 31 floating-rate mortgages
secured by 97 mostly transitional properties, with an initial
cutoff balance totaling $640.52 million, including approximately
$27.4 million of non-interest-accruing future funding. The
transaction is a managed vehicle with a 180-day ramp-up period, a
target collateral principal balance of $800.0 million, and a
36-month principal reinvestment period. The subject transaction,
unlike prior deals, also includes an optional note-reprising
provision. For more information, please refer to the Transaction
Structural Features section of the related report.

Most loans are in a period of transition with plans in place to
stabilize and improve the asset value. The Issuer may direct
principal proceeds to acquire a portion of one or more companion
participations without rating agency confirmation (RAC), subject to
the reinvestment and eligibility criteria. The reinvestment and
eligibility requires, among other things, for the underlying
mortgage loan not to be a defaulted mortgage loan or specially
serviced loan, for no event of default to have occurred and/or be
continuing, and for certain note protection tests to be satisfied.
Commercial real estate collateralized loan obligation (CRE
CLO)transactions often allow for principal proceeds to be held in
an account and used to purchase pari passu companion participations
of existing trust assets, instead of being used to pay down bonds.
Typically, if RAC is not required to acquire these participations,
DBRS Morningstar performs a pay down analysis whereby the loans in
the pool with the lowest expected loss (EL) that have no future
funding are assumed to pay off and then all future funding is
brought in, with the pool balance remaining constant. The effect of
this pay down analysis is that the EL migrates to a higher level as
DBRS Morningstar assumes a worst-case scenario where only good
loans pay off, and as a result, the pool loss levels are higher
than they would be on the pool as it stands at closing. The
transaction stipulates a $1.0 million threshold on pari passu
participation acquisitions before RAC is required if a portion of
the underlying loan is already included in the pool.

For the floating-rate loans, DBRS Morningstar used the one-month
Libor index, which is based on the lower of a DBRS Morningstar
stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining fully extended
term of the loans or the strike price of the interest rate cap with
the respective contractual loan spread added to determine a
stressed interest rate over the loan term. When the cutoff balances
were measured against the DBRS Morningstar As-Is Net Cash Flow, 15
loans, comprising 43.2% of the initial pool, had a DBRS Morningstar
As-Is Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.00 times (x), a
threshold indicative of default risk. Additionally, none of the
DBRS Morningstar Stabilized DSCRs are below 1.00x, which is
indicative of elevated refinance risk. The properties are often
transitioning with potential upside in cash flow; however, DBRS
Morningstar does not give full credit to the stabilization if there
are no holdbacks or if other loan structural features in place are
insufficient to support such treatment. Furthermore, even with the
structure provided, DBRS Morningstar generally does not assume the
assets will stabilize above market levels. The transaction has a
sequential-pay structure.

The loans are all secured by multifamily properties. Additionally,
none of the multifamily loans in the pool are currently secured by
a student housing property, which often exhibits higher cash flow
volatility than traditional multifamily properties.

The initial collateral pool is diversified across 13 states and has
a loan Herfindahl score of approximately 23.2. Three of the loans,
representing 14.6% of the initial pool balance, are portfolio loans
that benefit from multiple property pooling. Mortgages backed by
cross-collateralized cash flow streams from multiple properties
typically exhibit lower cash flow volatility.

Twelve loans in the pool, totaling 83.2% of the DBRS Morningstar
sample by cutoff-date pool balance, are backed by a property with a
quality deemed to be Average, Average (+), or Above Average by DBRS
Morningstar. The borrowers of 12 of the floating-rate loans have
purchased Libor rate caps that range between 1.8% and 4.4% to
protect against rising interest rates over the term of the loan.

Twenty-four loans, representing 68.9% of the initial pool balance,
represent acquisition financing. Acquisition financing generally
requires the respective sponsor(s) to contribute material cash
equity as a source of funding in conjunction with the mortgage
loan, resulting in a higher sponsor cost basis in the underlying
collateral.

The pool consists of mostly transitional assets. Given the nature
of the assets, DBRS Morningstar determined a sample size
representing 72.4% of the pool cutoff-date balance. Physical site
inspections were also performed, and each sampled asset received a
business plan score. DBRS Morningstar also notes that when it
visits the markets, it may actually visit properties more than once
to follow the progress (or lack thereof) toward stabilization. The
service is also in constant contact with the borrowers to track
progress.

All of the loans in the pool have floating interest rates, and all
loans are interest-only during the original term with original term
ranges between 12 months and 36 months, creating interest rate
risk. For the floating-rate loans, DBRS Morningstar used the
one-month Libor index, which is based on the lower of a DBRS
Morningstar stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining fully
extended term of the loans or the strike price of the interest rate
cap with the respective contractual loan spread added to determine
a stressed interest rate over the loan term. Additionally, all
loans have extension options, and in order to qualify for these
options, the loans must meet minimum DSCR and loan-to-value (LTV)
requirements.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the current in-place cash flow.
There is a possibility that the sponsors will not execute their
business plans as expected and that the higher stabilized cash flow
will not materialize during the loan term. Failure to execute the
business plan could result in a term default or the inability to
refinance the fully funded loan balance. DBRS Morningstar made
relatively conservative stabilization assumptions and, in each
instance, considered the business plan to be rational and the
future funding amounts to be sufficient to execute such plans. In
addition, DBRS Morningstar analyzed loss given default based on the
as-is LTV, assuming the loan is fully funded.

The pool loss multiples for this transaction are outside the ranges
identified for commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) conduit
transactions, which are representative of a universe comprising
approximately 90.0% of CMBS 2.0-or-later conduit transactions. In
general, CRE CLO transactions are structured with lower leverage
and comprise pools of higher-average EL than typical conduit
transactions, resulting in pool loss multiples that are typically
lower than those for conduits. For that reason, DBRS Morningstar
typically utilizes the multiples indicated by the pool-level
distribution of losses when rating CRE CLO transactions and relies
less on the multiple ranges implied by the CMBS 2.0 conduit
universe. Correspondingly, DBRS Morningstar utilized the multiples
indicated by the pool-level distribution of losses as the basis for
calculating deviations for this transaction.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-1: Fitch Lowers Class B Debt Rating to Csf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on 43 bonds in three U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities 1.0 transactions. Each of
these transactions has only distressed ratings and only one or two
assets remaining.

RATING ACTIONS

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2005-1

Class B 05947UD62; LT Csf Downgrade; previously at CCCsf

Class C 05947UD70; LT Csf Affirmed;  previously at Csf

Class D 05947UD88; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class E 05947UE20; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class F 05947UE38; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class G 05947UE46; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class H 05947UE53; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class J 05947UE61; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class K 05947UE79; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class L 05947UE87; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class M 05947UE95; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class N 05947UF29; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Class O 05947UF37; LT Dsf Affirmed;  previously at Dsf

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR11

Class B 07387MAK5; LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class C 07387MAL3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class D 07387MAM1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class E 07387MAN9; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class F 07387MAP4; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class G 07387MAQ2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class H 07387MAR0; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class J 07387MAS8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class K 07387MAT6; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class L 07387MAU3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class M 07387MAV1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class N 07387MAW9; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class O 07387MAX7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage Securities Trust 2008-C2

Class A-J 46632MCL2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class A-M 46632MCJ7; LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class B 46632MAG5;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class C 46632MAJ9;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class D 46632MAL4;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class E 46632MAN0;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class F 46632MAQ3;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class G 46632MAS9;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class H 46632MAU4;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class J 46632MAW0;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class K 46632MAY6;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class L 46632MBA7;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class M 46632MBC3;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class N 46632MBE9;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class P 46632MBG4;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class Q 46632MBJ8;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class T 46632MBL3;   LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has downgraded class B in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Inc. 2005-1 to 'Csf' RE 90% from 'CCCsf' RE 90% due to a higher
certainty of loss on the remaining asset. The Mall at Stonecrest is
a 1.2 million sf regional mall located in Lithonia, GA, with
404,458 sf serving as collateral for the loan. The loan had
transferred to the special servicer in 2013 and modified twice to
extend the maturity date, among other modifications. The borrower
and special servicer had been discussing an additional modification
which would include an A/B note split; however, the borrower failed
to finalize the terms. The loan is past its latest extended
maturity date in December 2019. The special servicer continues to
discuss a possible modification while dual tracking a foreclosure.
The latest valuation indicates that losses to all remaining classes
are considered probable. All other classes, rated 'Csf' and 'Dsf',
have been affirmed.

Fitch has affirmed all classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2006-PWR11 at their distressed ratings of 'Csf'
and 'Dsf'. The largest remaining asset is the REO Hickory Point
Mall, a 424,700 sf interest in a 824,102 sf regional mall in
Forsyth, IL. Occupancy remains low at approximately 60%. Losses are
expected to impact all remaining classes.

Fitch has affirmed all classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage Trust
2008-C2 at their distressed ratings of 'Csf' and 'Dsf'. The largest
remaining loan is collateralized by two Westin resort hotels: the
487 room Westin La Paloma in Tucson, AZ and the 416 room oceanfront
Westin Hilton Head in Hilton Head, SC. As part of the borrower's
bankruptcy, the loan was modified to a 30 year loan term (maturity
date in 2033) with a 0% interest rate with fixed monthly payments
of $248,000 for this transaction. The transaction is incurring a
monthly modification expense of approximately $258,000 per month,
which is applied as a realized loss each month. Losses from this
expense are expected to impact class AM, currently rated 'Csf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Expected Losses: All of the transactions have high expected
losses, as most of the remaining assets are in special servicing or
have modifications that will cause losses. Each transaction has one
or two assets remaining and all ratings are distressed.

Low Credit Enhancement: Each of the remaining classes has
insufficient credit enhancement to absorb the expected losses. All
ratings are distressed and losses are considered inevitable.

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2005-1: 5; Exposure to
Social Impacts: 5. The transaction has exposure to sustained
structural shift in secular preferences affecting consumer trends,
occupancy trends, etc., and is highly relevant to the ratings.

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR11: 5;
Exposure to Social Impacts: 5. The transaction has exposure to
sustained structural shift in secular preferences affecting
consumer trends, occupancy trends, etc., and is highly relevant to
the ratings.

J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage Securities Trust 2008-C2: 5; Transaction
& Collateral Structure: 5. The transaction has exposure to asset
isolation; resolution/insolvency remoteness; legal structure;
structural mitigants; complex structures which, on an individual
basis, has a significant impact on the ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further downgrades to 'Dsf' are expected as losses are incurred.
Classes currently rated 'Dsf' will remain unchanged as losses have
already been incurred.

Although not expected, factors that could lead to upgrades include
significant improvement in valuations and performance of the
remaining assets.


BANK 2020-BNK26: DBRS Finalizes B(high) Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2020-BNK26 issued by BANK 2020-BNK26 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high)(sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes X-D, X-F, X-G, X-H, D, E, F, G, and
H have been privately placed. The Class A-3-1, Class A-3-2, Class
A-3-X1, Class A-3-X2, Class A-4-1, Class A-4-2, Class A-4-X1, Class
A-4-X2, Class A-S-1, Class A-S-2, Class A-S-X1, and Class A-S-X2
certificates are also offered certificates. Such classes of
certificates, together with the Class A-3, Class A-4, and Class A-S
certificates, constitute the Exchangeable Certificates.

The collateral consists of 75 fixed-rate loans secured by 101
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. DBRS Morningstar analyzed
the conduit pool to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting
the long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. Five loans, representing 23.1% of the pool,
are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS Morningstar. When DBRS
Morningstar measured the cut-off loan balances against the DBRS
Morningstar Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their respective
actual constants, the initial DBRS Morningstar Weighted-average
(WA) Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) for the pool was 2.74 times
(x). The WA DSCR is elevated because 23.1% of the pool is
shadow-rated investment grade and the concentration of low-leverage
residential co-operative loans represents 4.3% of the pool. These
residential co-operative loans have very low loan-level credit
enhancement at the AAA level and near-zero loan-level credit
enhancement at the BBB (low) level. Only three loans in the
pool—The Hub Shopping Center, 18 West 25th Street, and Lockaway
Storage-Boerne—had a DBRS Morningstar Term DSCR below 1.30x, a
threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
The WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of the pool at issuance was 55.3%, and
the pool is scheduled to amortize down to a WA DBRS Morningstar LTV
of 51.9% at maturity. The pool includes 19 loans, representing
24.8% of the pool by allocated loan balance, with issuance LTVs
equal to or higher than 67.1%, a threshold historically indicative
of above-average default frequency.

The transaction includes five loans, representing 23.1% of the
total pool balance, that is shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS
Morningstar, including Bravern Office Commons, 560 Mission Street,
55 Hudson Yards, 1633 Broadway-NY, and Bellagio Hotel and Casino.
Bravern Office Commons exhibits credit characteristics consistent
with a AA (high) shadow rating, 560 Mission Street exhibits credit
characteristics consistent with a AA shadow rating, 55 Hudson Yards
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a BBB shadow
rating, 1633 Broadway-NY exhibits credit characteristics consistent
with a BBB (high) shadow rating, and the Bellagio Hotel and Casino
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a AAA shadow
rating.

Fourteen loans in the pool, representing 4.3% of the transaction,
are backed by residential co-operative loans. Residential
co-operatives tend to have minimal risk, given their low leverage
and a low risk to residents if the co-operative associations
default on their mortgages. The WA DBRS Morningstar LTV for these
loans is 14.5%.

Thirty-three loans, representing 56.3% of the pool, have collateral
located in MSA Group 3, which represents the best-performing group
in terms of historical CMBS default rates among the top 25 MSAs.
MSA Group 3 has a historical default rate of 17.25%, which is
nearly 40% lower than the overall CMBS historical default rate of
approximately 28.00%.

Thirty-five loans, representing 41.7% of the pool by allocated loan
balance, exhibit issuance LTVs of equal to or less than 59.3%, a
threshold historically indicative of relatively low-leverage
financing and generally associated with far below-average default
frequency.

Only four loans had property quality deemed to be Average (-) while
none had property quality deemed Below Average or Poor.
Additionally, 12 loans, representing 33.7% of the pool balance,
exhibited Average (+), Above Average, or Excellent property
quality. One of the top 10 loans, the Bellagio Hotel and Casino, is
secured by collateral that had property quality that DBRS
Morningstar deemed to be Excellent.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
office properties as 11 loans, representing 37.4% of the pool by
allocated loan balance, are secured by this property type. DBRS
Morningstar considers office properties to be a riskier property
type with a generally above-average historical default frequency.
Four of the 11 office loans (Bravern Office Commons, 560 Mission
Street, 55 Hudson Yards, and 1633 Broadway-NY), comprising 20.1% of
the pool balance, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS
Morningstar. Seven office properties, totaling 27.7% of the pool
balance, have DBRS Morningstar DSCRs higher than 2.00x, while the
remaining four office loans, totaling 9.7% of the pool balance,
have DBRS Morningstar DSCRs higher than 1.45x. Five office loans,
representing 59.8% of the office concentration, are secured by
office properties in areas characterized as extremely dense and
desirable urban gateway markets, which have a DBRS Morningstar
Market Rank of 8.

Thirty-five loans, representing 67.8% of the pool by allocated loan
balance, are structured with full-term interest-only (IO) periods.
Of these 35 loans, eight loans, representing 40.2% of the pool by
allocated loan balance, are in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market
Rank of 6, 7, or 8. These markets benefit from increased liquidity
even during times of economic stress. Five of the 35 identified
loans (Bravern Office Commons, 560 Mission Street, 55 Hudson Yards,
1633 Broadway-NY, and Bellagio Hotel and Casino), representing
23.1% of the total pool balance, are shadow-rated investment grade
by DBRS Morningstar.

DBRS Morningstar completed a cash flow review and a cash flow
stability and structural review on 28 of the 75 loans, representing
73.0% of the pool by loan balance. For loans not subject to an NCF
review, DBRS Morningstar applied the average NCF variance of its
respective loan seller.

DBRS Morningstar generally adjusted cash flow to current in-place
rent and, in some instances, applied an additional vacancy or
concession adjustment to account for deteriorating market
conditions or tenants with above-market rent. In most instances,
DBRS Morningstar accepted contractual rent bumps if they were
within 12 months and market levels. Generally, DBRS Morningstar
recognized most expenses based on the higher of historical figures
or the borrower's budgeted figures. Real estate taxes and insurance
premiums were inflated if a current bill was not provided. Capex
was deducted based on the higher of the engineer's inflated
estimates or the DBRS Morningstar standard, according to property
type. Finally, leasing costs were deducted to arrive at the DBRS
Morningstar NCF. If a significant upfront leasing reserve was
established at closing, DBRS Morningstar reduced its recognized
costs. DBRS Morningstar gave credit to tenants not yet in occupancy
if a lease had been signed and the loan was adequately structured
with a reserve, LOC, or holdback earn-out. The DBRS Morningstar
sample had an average NCF variance of -12.8% and ranged from -36.5%
(18 West 25th Street) to -4.7% (Grand Oaks Plaza).

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-F, X-G, and X-H are IO certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 4 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of all classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP28 issued by
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series
2007-TOP28 as follows:

-- Class C at C (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)
-- Class E at C (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)

These classes have ratings that do not carry trends. As of February
2020, these classes continue to maintain an Interest in Arrears
designation.

The rating confirmations reflect the DBRS Morningstar outlook for
the remaining loan in the transaction, which had a balance of $91.6
million as of the February 2020 remittance. The loan is secured by
a regional mall in Charleston, West Virginia, and has been in
special servicing for several years as the loan sponsor, Forest
City, was unable to sell the property or repay the loan at the
September 2017 maturity date.

Based on the servicer's October 2018 valuation for the property, as
well as the foreclosure sale price of $35.0 million when the trust
took the title of the property as of January 2019, DBRS Morningstar
anticipates losses for this loan could flow into Class D,
supporting the rating confirmations at C (sf) for the outstanding
Certificates.

The collateral property has struggled since the loss of both
non-collateral anchors, Sears and Macy's, in 2017 and 2019,
respectively, leaving only one anchor in JCPenney and mall
occupancy at approximately 50%.

Given the loss of a second anchor since the servicer's October 2018
appraisal, DBRS Morningstar expects the as-is value will further
decline when a new valuation is obtained. In the analysis for this
review, DBRS Morningstar assumed a loss in excess of 70% at
liquidation. That scenario suggests losses will be contained to the
Class D and below Certificates; however, given the potential for
further value decline, particularly given the low investor demand
for de-stabilized mall properties in secondary markets, DBRS
Morningstar believes the ultimate resolution could result in losses
that creep into Class C, supporting the C (sf) rating for that
class.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BELLEMEADE RE 2020-1: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating on 11 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series 2020-1 (the Notes) to be
issued by Bellemeade Re 2020-1 Ltd. (BMIR 2020-1 or the Issuer):

-- $276.7 million Class M-1A at A (low) (sf)
-- $201.2 million Class M-1B at BBB (sf)
-- $252.0 million Class M-1C at BB (low) (sf)
-- $252.0 million Class M-1CR at BB (low) (sf)
-- $252.0 million Class M-1CS at BB (low) (sf)
-- $252.0 million Class M-1CI at BB (low) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CA at BB (high) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CAR at BB (high) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CAS at BB (high) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CAI at BB (high) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CB at BB (low) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CBR at BB (low) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CBS at BB (low) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CBI at BB (low) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CRB at BB (low) (sf)
-- $126.0 million Class M-1CSB at BB (low) (sf)
-- $199.0 million Class M-2 at B (low) (sf)
-- $199.0 million Class M-2R at B (low) (sf)
-- $199.0 million Class M-2S at B (low) (sf)
-- $199.0 million Class M-2I at B (low) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2A at B (high) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2AR at B (high) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2AS at B (high) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2AI at B (high) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2B at B (low) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2BR at B (low) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2BS at B (low) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2BI at B (low) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2RB at B (low) (sf)
-- $99.5 million Class M-2SB at B (low) (sf)
-- $28.4 million Class B-1 at B (low) (sf)

Classes M-1C, M-1CR, M-1CS, M-1CI, M-1CAR, M-1CAS, M-1CAI, M-1CBR,
M-1CBS, M-1CBI, M-1CRB, M-1CSB, M-2, M-2R, M-2S, M-2I, M-2AR,
M-2AS, M-2AI, M-2BR, M-2BS, M-2BI, M-2RB, and M-2SB are Related
Combinable and Recombinable Notes (RCR Notes). Classes M-1CI,
M-1CAI, M-1CBI, M-2I, M-2AI, and M-2BI are interest-only RCR
Notes.

The A (low) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (high) (sf), BB (low) (sf), B (high)
(sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 8.250%, 6.250%, 5.125%,
4.000%, 3.125%, and 2.000% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

BMIR 2020-1 is Arch Mortgage Insurance Company's (Arch MI) and
United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company's (UGRIC;
collectively, the ceding insurer) ninth rated mortgage insurance
(MI) linked note transaction. The Notes are backed by reinsurance
premiums, eligible investments, and related account investment
earnings, in each case relating to a pool of MI policies linked to
residential loans. The Notes are exposed to the risk arising from
losses paid by the ceding insurer to settle claims on the
underlying MI policies. As of the Cut-Off Date, the pool of insured
mortgage loans consists of 173,122 fully amortizing first-lien
fixed- and variable-rate mortgage loans that are 100% underwritten
to a full documentation standard with original loan-to-value ratios
less than or equal to 100% that have never been reported to the
ceding insurer as 60 or more days delinquent. The mortgage loans
were originated on or after February 2018.

On the Closing Date, the Issuer will enter into the Reinsurance
Agreement with the ceding insurer. Per the agreement, the ceding
insurer will receive protection for the funded portion of the MI
losses. In exchange for this protection, the ceding insurer will
make premium payments related to the underlying insured mortgage
loans to the Issuer.

The Issuer is expected to use the proceeds from the sale of the
Notes to purchase certain eligible investments that will be held in
the reinsurance trust account. The eligible investments are
restricted to AAA or equivalently rated U.S. Treasury money-market
funds and securities. Unlike other residential mortgage-backed
security transactions, cash flow from the underlying loans will not
be used to make any payments; rather, in MI-linked note (MILN)
transactions, a portion of the eligible investments held in the
reinsurance trust account will be liquidated to make principal
payments to the noteholders and to make loss payments to the ceding
insurer when claims are settled with respect to the MI policy.

The Issuer will use the investment earnings on the eligible
investments, together with the ceding insurer's premium payments,
to pay interest to the noteholders.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
a reduction in aggregate exposed principal balance on the
underlying MI policy. The subordinate Notes will be allocated their
pro-rata share of available principal funds if performance tests
are satisfied. The minimum credit enhancement test—one of the two
performance tests—has been set to fail at the Closing Date,
thereby locking out the rated classes from initially receiving any
principal payments until the senior credit enhancement percentage
grows to 12.0% from 11.0%. Interest payments are funded via (1)
premium payments that the ceding insurer must make under the
Reinsurance Agreement and (2) earnings on eligible investments.

On the Closing Date, the ceding insurer will establish a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account. In case of the
ceding insurer's default in paying coverage premium payments to the
Issuer, the amount available in this account will be used to make
interest payments to the noteholders. Unlike prior rated-MILN
transactions, the premium deposit account will not be funded at
closing. The ceding insurer will make a deposit into this account
up to the applicable target balance only when one of the Premium
Deposit Events occurs.

The Notes are scheduled to mature on the payment date in March 2030
but will be subject to early redemption at the option of the ceding
insurer, either (1) for a 10% clean-up call or (2) on or following
the payment date in March 2027, among others. The Notes are also
subject to mandatory redemption before the scheduled maturity date
upon the termination of the Reinsurance Agreement.

The ceding insurers of the transaction are Arch MI and UGRIC. The
Bank of New York Mellon (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by
DBRS Morningstar) will act as the Indenture Trustee, Paying Agent,
Note Registrar, and Reinsurance Trustee.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

-- Agency-eligible loans,
-- High-quality credit and loan attributes,
-- MI termination,
-- A well-diversified pool, and
-- Alignment of interest.

The transaction also includes the following challenges:

-- Counterparty exposure,
-- A weak representation and warranties framework,
-- Limited third-party due diligence, and
-- Eligible investment losses.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CD 2017-CD4 MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of CD 2017-CD4 Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-CD4.

RATING ACTIONS

CD 2017-CD4

Class A-1 12515DAM6;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 12515DAN4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 12515DAQ7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 12515DAR5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-M 12515DAT1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 12515DAP9; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 12515DAU8;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 12515DAV6;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 12515DAF1;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 12515DAG9;    LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class F 12515DAH7;    LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

Class V-A 12515DAW4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class V-BC 12515DBU7; LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class V-D 12515DAZ7;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class X-A 12515DAS3;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 12515DAA2;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-D 12515DAB0;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class X-E 12515DAC8;  LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class X-F 12515DAD6;  LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance and loss expectations with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. There is one
(2.2%) performing specially serviced loan and no delinquent loans
since issuance. Fitch has designated two loans (4.8% of the pool)
as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs).

Specially Serviced Loan/Fitch Loans of Concern: The 12th largest
loan and the only specially serviced loan is Hamilton Crossing
(2.2% of the pool), is secured by a 590,917 sf office complex
located in Carmel, IN. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in July 2019 for a non-monetary default after the largest
tenant, ADESA (previously 30% of NRA), vacated at its lease
expiration in July 2019. Property occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2019
was 57%, down from 84% at YE 2018 and 89% at YE 2017. However, the
special servicer is currently in negotiations with a large tenant,
which would improve occupancy to 72%. The loan remains current.

The 10th largest loan, Marriott Spartanburg (2.6%), is secured by
full service hotel with 247 rooms located in Spartanburg, SC. The
September 2019 NOI debt service coverage ratio declined to 0.98x
from 1.50x at YE 2018 and 1.89x at YE 2017 due to a decrease in
room revenue and an increase in expenses, primarily Advertising &
Marketing and Franchise Fees. The hotel has faced new competition
with the opening of the first new hotel in Spartanburg's CBD since
2004. A 114 room AC Marriott Hotel opened in December 2017 within a
few blocks of the Marriott Spartanburg. Marriott provided a reduced
3% franchise fee from 2017 through April 2018 as an accommodation
for the competition that would negatively impact Marriott
Spartanburg.

Exposure to COVID-19: Fitch's base case analysis applied an
additional stress on reported NOI for all hotels due to the
anticipated immediate performance decline considering the decrease
in travel. Hotels comprise 20.9% of the pool including four loans
in the top 20 (18.3%). As a result, classes F and X-F were revised
to Negative Outlook.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the March 2020
remittance, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down by 1.4%
to $888.1 million from $900.5 million at issuance. All of the
original 47 loans remain in the pool. Ten loans (28.8% of the pool)
are IO for the full loan term, including four loans (22.3%) in the
top 15. Ten loans (25.3%) have remaining partial-term IO periods
and the remaining loans are amortizing (45.9%). Based on the
scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is only expected to be
reduced by 9.9%. No loans are defeased.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION

High Office and Hotel Loan Concentration: Loans backed by office
properties represent 42.1% of the pool, including 37.3% in the top
15. Hotel properties represent 20.9%, including 18.3% in the top
20. Fitch is monitoring the performance of the hotel properties
given the Negative Outlook and expectation that there will be a
significant negative impact on performance given the reduction in
travel.

Single-Tenant Concentration: Four loans among the largest 20 are
secured by single-tenant properties (14.3% of the pool). Moffett
Place Google (8.4%), Malibu Vista (2.0%), Alvogen Pharma US (2.0%),
and SG360 (1.9%) are secured by single-tenant properties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through E reflect the overall
stable performance of the pool and expected continued amortization.
The Negative Outlooks on class F and X-F reflect concerns over
hotel properties due to expected decline in travel.

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of classes B through D may occur with significant improvement in CE
and/or defeasance but would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood for
interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the below-investment grade rated
classes are not likely given the concerns surrounding the Hamilton
Crossing loan, Marriott Spartanburg loan, and hotel concentration
but may occur in the later years of the transaction should credit
enhancement increase and there are minimal FLOCs.

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Classes E
and F could be downgraded if additional loans become FLOCs,
including the hotels and other assets potentially impacted by
COVID-19. Downgrades to the senior classes A-1 through D are not
likely due to the position in the capital structure and stable
performance of the majority of the pool but are possible with
significant pool performance decline.


CFCRE 2018-TAN: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class HRR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-TAN (the
Certificates) issued by CFCRE 2018-TAN:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable. The ratings have been removed from Under
Review with Developing Implications, where they were placed on
November 14, 2019.

As of the February 2020 remittance report, Class HRR had an
outstanding shortfall of $33,686. The servicer has advised that the
shortfall is the result of interest that has accrued on
administrative expenses incurred by the service over the life of
the deal. Although there are no active plans to cure the shortfall,
which may continue to accumulate over time, interest is contained
to the risk retention piece held by the issuer and as such, is not
considered credit impairment to the Trust.

On March 1, 2020, DBRS Morningstar finalized its "North American
Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings Methodology" (the NA SASB
Methodology), which presents the criteria for which ratings are
assigned to and/or monitored for North American
single-asset/single-borrower (NA SASB) transactions, large
concentrated pools, rake certificates, ground lease transactions,
and credit tenant lease transactions.

Prior to the finalization of the NA SASB Methodology, the DBRS
Morningstar ratings for the subject transaction and all other DBRS
Morningstar-rated transactions subject to the methodology in
question were previously placed Under Review with Developing
Implications, as the proposed methodology changes were material.

The subject transaction is one of four NA SASB transactions (24
classes of certificates) publicly rated by both Morningstar Credit
Ratings, LLC (MCR) and DBRS Morningstar. As noted in the March 1,
2020 press release, as part of the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously placed its outstanding ratings
on NA SASB transactions Under Review – Analytical Integration. In
conjunction with these rating actions by DBRS Morningstar for the
subject transaction, the MCR ratings will be withdrawn.

The subject rating actions are the result of the application of the
NA SASB Methodology in conjunction with the "North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology," as applicable. Qualitative adjustments
were made to the final loan-to-value (LTV) Sizing Benchmarks used
for this rating analysis.

The collateral for this transaction is the Aruba Marriott Resort, a
411-key upscale beachfront resort located in Aruba. Included in the
collateral is the Stellaris Casino, the largest casino on the
island. The subject loan consists of a $135.0 million senior note
and a $60.0 million subordinated note (Note B), both of which are
assets of the Trust. The underlying loan is interest-only (IO)
throughout its five-year term and is sponsored by a joint venture
between DLJ Real Estate Investment Partners and MetaCorp
International. The hotel has been managed by an affiliate of
Marriott International since it opened in 1995, and the current
management agreement runs through 2025 with four consecutive
10-year extension options thereafter.

In the analysis for these rating actions, the DBRS Morningstar net
cash flow (NCF) figure of $26.2 million derived at issuance was
accepted and a cap rate of 10.5% was applied, resulting in a DBRS
Morningstar Value of $249.4 million, a variance of -20.8% from the
appraised value at issuance of $315.0 million. The DBRS Morningstar
Value, including Note B held in the trust, implies an LTV of 78.2%,
as compared with the LTV on the issuance appraised value of 61.9%.

The cap rate applied is at the higher end of the range of DBRS
Morningstar Cap Rate Ranges for lodging properties, reflective of
high competition for comparable properties within the Caribbean
hotel market, as well as the subject's relative location, quality,
and condition relative to the larger competitive set. Consideration
was also given to the leasehold structure, sovereign risk
associated with the Aruba government (currently investment grade
rated), as well as the heavy reliance on both international tourism
and gaming demand drivers.

The international tourism reliance factor is particularly
noteworthy given the global travel disruptions currently underway
amid the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. If the
coronavirus outbreak and related travel restrictions and
cancellation trends observed thus far extend for the moderate to
long term, DBRS Morningstar notes the subject will likely see a
significant cash flow drop in the coming months.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar noted over $51.0 million ($126,192
per key) of capital investment since 2010 in improvements for the
subject property, including approximately $17.6 million ($42,822
per key) spent between 2016 and 2018 to update guest rooms, paint
the exterior facade, expand the fitness center, and update
restaurants. According to the servicer, as of the trailing 12
months (T-12) ending in September 2019, the subject reported an
occupancy rate, average daily rate (ADR), and revenue per available
room (RevPAR) of 88.0%, $462, and $407, respectively, compared with
the previous year's figures of 85.8%, $426.28, and $365.54,
respectively. Based on the RevPAR trends, the sponsor's commitment
to updating the property has been successful in increasing room
rates and traffic alike. The property performs well within the
market and reported an overall RevPAR penetration of 156.9% as of
the September 2019 Smith Travel Research report.

Aruba's credit rating continues to exhibit investment-grade
characteristics, primarily benefiting from its long-standing
institutional relationship with the Kingdom of the Netherlands
(rated AAA with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) and its
relatively high per-capita income in the Caribbean region. Key
challenges include weak growth prospects, limited economic
diversification, and relatively high debt levels for a small island
economy, which have recently increased with recovering spending
following Hurricane Dorian in August 2019. Aruba's economy also has
negative exposure to the current turmoil in Venezuela, which has
led to a reduction in tourist arrivals from Venezuela. The
Sovereign Rating team at DBRS Morningstar also noted particular
challenges amid the coronavirus outbreak given Aruba's heavy
reliance on tourism.

The DBRS Morningstar NCF figure applied as part of the analysis
represents a -8.1% variance to the Issuer's NCF, primarily driven
by lower occupancy and casino revenue assumed by DBRS Morningstar.
The issuer assumed an occupancy rate of 85.0%, while DBRS
Morningstar used an 80.0% occupancy rate, below the competitive
set's rate of 84.9% as of September 2019, and the subject's T-12
ending September 2019 rate of 88.0%. For casino revenue, DBRS
Morningstar concluded to a figure at 26.9% of total revenue, which
is lower than the Issuer's figure of 27.2%.

The servicer reported a Q3 2019 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 2.97 times (x), up from the YE2018 figure of 2.64x. The T-12
figure reported by the servicer, reflects a +33.1% variance over
the DBRS Morningstar NCF figure, primarily a factor of higher
occupancy and ADR rates, as room revenue increased 32.2% ($15.0
million), and increased other income (primarily casino income),
which has increased 23.4% ($6.4 million).

While performance is currently exceeding the DBRS Morningstar
expectations at issuance, hotels typically exhibit higher cash flow
volatility, particularly amid events like the ongoing coronavirus
outbreak. If the outbreak's impact on global travel continues to
escalate and extends into a longer-term, significant cash flow
declines at the subject and other hotel properties around the world
can be expected, at least temporarily. DBRS Morningstar notes the
subject property benefits from a dedicated sponsor who has
continued to invest in improvements for the property over the last
several years, as well as the longer-term viability of the property
and larger Caribbean hotel market in continuing to draw
international travelers once the coronavirus effects begin to
diminish.

Class X is an IO certificate that references a single rated tranche
or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



CFK TRUST 2020-MF2: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by CFK Trust 2020-MF2,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-MF2:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. X* Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to a portfolio of 17
multifamily properties, 9 mixed-use properties with multifamily and
retail and 1 mixed-use property with office and retail located in
the boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn in New York. Its ratings are
based on the credit quality of the loan and the strength of the
securitization structure.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, it also considers a
range of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural
and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The whole loan first mortgage balance of $324,000,000 represents a
Moody's LTV of 127.8%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is
1.69X and Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 0.63X.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's weighted
average property quality grade is 1.00.

Positive features of the transaction include the property type,
multiple property pooling, strong locations, and capital
investment. Offsetting these strengths are high Moody's LTV, lack
of asset diversification, property age, amount of rent
stabilized/controlled multifamily units, and credit negative legal
features.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


CIM TRUST 2020-R2: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes B(EXP)
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed notes
to be issued by CIM Trust 2020-R2 (CIM 2020-R2).

RATING ACTIONS

CIM Trust 2020-R2

Class A-IO-S; LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class A1;     LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A1-A;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A1-B;   LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class A1-IO;  LT AAA(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class B1;     LT BB(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class B2;     LT B(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B3;     LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class C;      LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class M1;     LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

Class M1-IO;  LT AA(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

Class M2;     LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M2-IO;  LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class M3;     LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class M3-IO;  LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class PRA;    LT NR(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
2,250 seasoned performing loans (SPLs) and re-performing loans
(RPLs) with a total balance of approximately $492.3 million, which
includes $41.5million, or 8%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the cut-off
date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, seasoned performing and RPLs.
Of the pool, 1.5% was 30 days delinquent as of the cut-off date,
and 15.6% of loans are current but have had recent delinquencies or
incomplete pay strings. 83% of the loans are seasoned over 24
months and have been paying on time for the past 24 months. Roughly
95% have been modified.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Chimera has actively purchased
re-performing loans (RPLs) over the past 12 years and is assessed
as an 'Average' aggregator by Fitch. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. (SPS) is the named servicer for the transaction and is
responsible for primary and special servicing functions. Fitch
views SPS as a strong servicer of RPLs and is rated 'RPS1-'. High
rated servicers receive a credit in Fitch's loss model which helped
decrease the loss expectations for the pool by 223 bps at the
'AAAsf' rating stress. Issuer retention of at least 5% of the bonds
also helps ensure an alignment of interest between both the issuer
and investor.

Adequate Servicing Fee (Neutral): Fitch determined that the stated
servicing fee (including the excess servicing fee strip) of
approximately 50 bps is sufficient to attract subsequent servicers
even under a period of poor performance and high delinquencies. The
stated 50 bps was more than sufficient to cover Fitch's stressed
servicing fee for this transaction of 35 bps.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Neutral): Third-party due diligence was
performed on 100% of the pool by SitusAMC, which is assessed by
Fitch as an 'Acceptable - Tier 1' TPR firm. The results of the
review indicate moderate operational risk with approximately 8% of
the loans assigned a 'C' or 'D' grade. 4.6% of the pool was graded
'D' for missing or estimated final HUD-1 documents yet is subject
to testing for compliance with predatory lending regulations. Fitch
applied loss severity adjustments for these loans due to exposure
additional assignee liability which was


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-P1: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2015-P1.

CGCMT 2015-P1

Class A-2 17324DAR5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 17324DAS3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 17324DAT1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 17324DAU8; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-AB 17324DAV6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 17324DAW4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B 17324DAX2; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously at AA-sf

Class C 17324DAY0; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class D 17324DAA2; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 17324DAE4 LT BBsf Affirmed; previously at BBsf

Class F 17324DAG9; LT Bsf Affirmed; previously at Bsf

Class PEZ 17324DAZ7; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class X-A 17324DBA1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 17324DBB9; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously at AA-sf

Class X-D 17324DAL8; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: Performance and loss
expectations for the majority of the pool have remained generally
stable since issuance. There have been no specially serviced loans
since issuance. Fitch has identified four loans (16.2% of pool) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, including two (14.1%) in the top 15.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC is the Kaiser Center loan
(8.8%), which is secured by an 821,000 sf office building located
in Oakland, CA. The loan has been designated as a FLOC due to the
expectation that the largest tenant, Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART;
45% of NRA) will vacate the property at lease expiry in July 2021.
While BART has two five-year renewal options, the tenant's in-place
rents are reported to increase significantly during the renewal
periods. BART currently pays a base rent that is approximately 38%
below the current market rent for the CBD office submarket. In an
effort to control leasing costs, in September 2019, the BART Board
of Directors approved the purchase and renovation of a new
headquarters in downtown Oakland. Additionally, the fourth largest
tenant, Kaiser Health Foundation (12% of NRA) is planning to
construct a new headquarters to consolidate operations, which is
expected to be completed in 2023. Kaiser's current lease at the
property runs through February 2024. The property was 98% occupied
as of the September 2019 rent roll. Occupancy is expected to
decline to 53% when BART vacates the property in July 2021.

The second largest FLOC is the University Town Centre loan (5.3%),
which is secured by an approximately 388,000 sf retail property
located in Morgantown, WV, less than four miles from West Virginia
University. The loan was flagged due to significant upcoming
rollover. Roughly 57% of the NRA has leases scheduled to expire by
2021; including three of the five largest tenants, Dick's Sporting
Goods (12% of NRA, expires Jan. 31, 2021), Regal Cinemas (10%,
expires Oct. 31, 2020), and Best Buy (8%, expires Jan. 31, 2021).
Performance remains strong however, as the property was 100%
occupied as of the November 2019 rent roll.

The 240 N Ashland (1.2%) loan is secured by an approximately 80,000
sf office property located in Chicago, IL. The property is
currently 89% occupied, but all of the tenants in occupancy have
leases scheduled to roll during 2020. Fitch has an outstanding
inquiry to the servicer for an update on the status of these
leases. The loan is being cash managed due to a trigger associated
with the upcoming rollover.

The fourth FLOC is Best Plaza (0.9%), which is secured by an
approximately 98,000 sf retail property located in Torrance, CA.
The property's former largest tenant, Babies R Us (39% of NRA; 30%
of total base rent) closed in June 2018 following the Toys R Us
bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. The space was temporarily
backfilled by Z-Gallerie from November 2018 to February 2019,
boosting YE 2018 occupancy to 98%. Jo-Ann stores also occupied the
space on a three-month lease from July 2019 to October 2019, but
has since vacated. Occupancy is expected to have fallen to a
current level of 55% following the loss of Jo-Ann. The borrower has
notified the master servicer that they are currently seeking city
approval to modify the building, in order to put a climbing
business in the vacant space. The loan matures in June 2020.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has increased
since the last rating action from loan payoffs and continued
amortization. Since Fitch's last rating action, the $43.7 million
US StorageMart Portfolio was repaid prior to its scheduled April
2020 maturity date. As of the February 2020 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance had paid down by 7.1% to $1.02
billion from $1.018 billion from $1.096 billion at issuance. Four
loans (16.8% of pool) are full-term IO and eight loans (33.2%) are
partial IO and have yet to begin amortizing. Four loans (3.8%) have
been defeased.

Alternative Loss Consideration: In addition to modeling a base case
loss, Fitch applied a 25% loss severity on the current balance of
the University Town Centre loan to reflect the potential for
outsized losses given the significant upcoming rollover and its
college town location. The property is located in close proximity
to West Virginia University and Fitch has concerns about the
performance of the property, particularly for several large rolling
tenants, as students are sent home following the COVID-19 outbreak.
However, this sensitivity scenario did not impact any of the
ratings or Rating Outlooks.

COVID-19 Exposure: There are four non-defeased loans (19.2%) in the
transaction that are secured by hotel properties, including three
in the top 15 (18.2%). Fitch's base case analysis applied an
additional NOI stress on the hotels given the expected decline in
travel from the COVID-19 pandemic. The additional stress did not
impact the ratings or outlooks.

Pool and Loan Concentrations: The largest 10 loans in the
transaction represent 63% of the current pool balance.
Additionally, loans secured by retail properties represent 24.9% of
the pool by balance, including three of the top 15 loans (14.8%).
The 16th largest loan in the pool is secured by Alderwood Mall
(2%), a regional mall in Lynwood, WA, which has exposure to Macy's
and JCPenney as non-collateral anchors. The non-collateral Sears at
Alderwood Mall closed in March 2017, the space was demolished and
is currently being replaced by two six-story multifamily apartment
buildings with retail on the ground floor.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks reflect the overall stable performance
of the pool and expected continued amortization. There are no
specially serviced loans in the pool. Factors that lead to upgrades
would include stable to improved asset performance coupled with
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to classes B through D are
possible as credit enhancement improves, but may be limited due to
potential performance volatility, given hotel concentration
(19.2%), including three (18.2%) in the top 15, amongst other
factors. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is
likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
below-investment-grade rated classes are not likely given the
limited improvement in CE and sensitivity to concentrations, as
well as concerns with some of the larger FLOCs, but may occur in
the later years of the transaction should CE continue to increase
and as the number of FLOCs is reduced.

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the senior classes are unlikely given the overall stable
performance for a majority of pool and their position in the
capital structure. Downgrades to the below-investment-grade classes
are possible should performance, specifically of the Kaiser Center
and University Town Centre loans, deteriorate further and/or as
additional loans transfer to special servicing.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction and also serves as
the backup advancing agent. Fitch's Issuer Default Rating for
Deutsche Bank is currently 'BBB'/'F2'/Outlook Stable. Fitch relies
on the Master Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., a division of Wells
Fargo & Company (A+/F1/Stable), which is currently the primary
advancing agent, as a direct counterparty. Fitch affirmed the
ratings on Dec. 16, 2019.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P3: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust CGCMT 2016-P3 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

CGCMT 2016-P3

Class A-2 29429CAB1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 29429CAC9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 29429CAD7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-AB 29429CAE5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 29429CAF2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B 29429CAG0; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously at AA-sf

Class C 29429CAH8; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class D 29429CAM7; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 29429CAP0; LT BBsf Affirmed; previously at BBsf

Class EC 29429CAL9; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class F 29429CAR6; LT Bsf Affirmed; previously at Bsf

Class X-A 29429CAJ4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 29429CAK1; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously at AA-sf

Class X-D 29429CAV7; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. The class A-S, class
B and class C certificates may be exchanged for class EC
certificates, and class EC certificates may be exchanged for the
class A-S, class B and class C certificates. Fitch does not rate
the class G certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced/FLOCs: Although loss
expectations have increased, the affirmations reflect continued
amortization, paydown and overall stable performance of the
majority of the underlying pool. Two loans (8.1%) have been
transferred to special servicing since Fitch's last rating action.
Seven loans (22%) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs)
including two loans (15.5%) in the top 15 for vacancy issues.

The largest FLOC is the Empire Mall (8.9%), the largest loan in the
transaction. The loan is secured by a 1,124,178 sf superregional
mall located in Sioux Falls, SD. At Fitch's last rating action, the
property's occupancy had declined to 75.5% as of September 2018 due
to the loss of anchor tenants, Younkers and Sears, and large tenant
Toys"R"Us. Dillards was reportedly in lease negotiations to
backfill 100,000 sf of vacant Younkers space and was expected to
open late Fall 2019; however, this has been delayed. Additionally,
Scandinavian Designs (upscale furniture store) has opened in the
former Toys"R"Us space. Fitch has requested an update on vacant
space and status of prospective tenants from the master servicer.
The mall has also experienced fluctuating in-line and anchor sales
in addition to new retail competition directly north of subject.
The most recent reported in-line sales as of trailing 12-month
(TTM) October 2019) were $416 per square foot (psf) compared to
$422 psf (TTM October 2018); $406 psf (YE 2017); and $436 psf (TTM
September 2015). Anchors JC Penney and Macy's reported (TTM October
2019) sales of $143 in line with (TTM October 2018) sales of $142
psf and $146 (TTM October 2019) compared to $115 (TTM October
2018); respectively. The mall which operated by Simon Property
group is now closed until the end of March due to COVID-19. The
loan matures in December 2025.

The largest specially serviced loan and FLOC, 600 Broadway (6.6%)
and is secured by a 77,280 sf retail property located on the corner
of Houston and Broadway in New York's SoHo neighborhood. The loan
was transferred to special servicing twice during the past year.
The loan first transferred in April 2019 and returned to the master
servicer in July 2019 after being modified. The modification
allowed Abercrombie & Fitch (60.8% NRA) to go dark in exchange for
an $8 million go-dark fee and a switch to amortizing loan payments.
The loan transferred to the special servicer a second time in
December 2019 for a second modification that would allow the
borrower to re-tenant the vacant 24-Hour Fitness space. The
borrower is currently in negotiations with a prospective tenant to
lease approximately 35,000 sf. The property is currently 100%
vacant after both 24-Hour Fitness and Abercrombie & Fitch went dark
in the spring and summer of 2019. Despite being 100% vacant, the
property is 100% leased with 24-Hour Fitness's lease expiring in
December 2023 and Abercrombie & Fitch's lease expiring in May
2028.

The second specially serviced loan and FLOC, 725 8th Avenue (1.5%),
was transferred to special servicing in August 2019 due to payment
default. The property is a 4,773 sf single tenant retail property
located in New York City and was 100% leased to Wahlburgers at
issuance. However, the tenant never took occupancy as expected and
the property is 100% vacant. Per the special servicer, legal
counsel has been engaged and the debt formally demanded. The
borrower indicated the single tenant is in default under its lease
and has initiated litigation against tenant. Additionally, the
borrower indicated it would likely put forth a workout proposal of
some kind, but nothing has been received by the special servicer to
date. A foreclosure complaint was filed in October 2019. The
special servicer is continuing to pursue rights and remedies and is
considering marketing the loan for sale.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 7%
to $717.2 million from $771.0 million at issuance. Since Fitch's
last rating action, the tenth largest loan, One Court Square
(previously 5.2% of the pool) prepaid with yield maintenance. The
pool is scheduled to amortize by 6.8% of the initial pool balance
prior to maturity. Ten loans (38.4%) are full-term interest-only
and thirteen loans (39.1%) remain in partial-interest-only periods.
The remaining 13 loans (22.4%) are amortizing balloon loans with
terms of five to 10 years. One loan (0.3% of the pool) has defeased
since Fitch's last rating action. Loan maturities are concentrated
in 2026 (74.7%), with limited maturities scheduled in 2021 (7.7%),
and 2025 (17.7%).

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed a sensitivity test
which assumed losses on two FLOCs: Empire Mall and 600 Broadway.
This sensitivity scenario addressed concerns with potential
continued performance declines given anchor vacancy and turnover,
as well as declining in-line and anchor sales (Empire Mall) and
losses assumed on both loans were 25% and 35%; this additional
sensitivity analysis contributed to the Negative Outlooks on
classes E and F.

Coronavirus Exposure: Hotels comprise 21.5% of the pool, including
three (16.1%) loans in the top 15. Fitch is monitoring the
performance of these assets given the negative outlook and
expectation that hotel performance will be significantly impacted
by a reduction in travel. Fitch's base case analysis applied an
additional NOI stress on hotels due to the expected decline in
travel from the coronavirus pandemic. This additional stress did
not impact the ratings. The weighted-average debt-service coverage
ratio (WADSCR) for all hotel loans in the pool is 2.69x. The second
largest loan, Marriott Midwest Portfolio (7.7% of the pool), could
withstand over a 64% decline in net operating income (NOI) as of
TTM June 2019 on an actual debt-service basis before falling below
1.0x coverage.

New York City Concentration: Seven loans (34.5% of the pool) are
secured by properties located in the New York MSA, including five
of the top 10, Nyack College NYC, 600 Broadway, 79 Madison Avenue,
5 Penn Plaza, and 225 Liberty Street are located in Manhattan.

Pool Concentrations: The largest 10 loans comprise 64.1% of the
pool by balance. The pool has a diverse mix of property types, with
office as the largest at 32%, followed by retail at 25.8%, hotels
at 21.5%, and industrial/warehouse at 12.1%. There are 10 loans
secured by retail properties, including the largest loan in the
pool (8.9% of the pool). The retail element of the pool consists of
one regional mall (largest loan in the pool 8.9%), and a mix of
unanchored and anchored shopping centers.

Pari Passu Loans: Approximately 56.6% of the pool, including nine
of the top 10 loans, consists of loans with pari passu
participations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks for classes A-2 thru X-D reflect
continued amortization, paydown and overall stable performance of
the majority of the underlying pool. Rating upgrades, although
unlikely in the near term, could occur with improved pool
performance and increased credit enhancement from additional
paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades of classes B through F may
occur with significant improvement in credit enhancement and/or
defeasance but would be limited based on sensitivity to
concentrations or the potential for future concentration. Classes
would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood for
interest shortfalls.

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. While
currently not expected, classes E and F could be downgraded if
performance of the specially serviced loans, 600 Broadway and 725
8th Avenue or the larger FLOCs continue to further deteriorate,
although the investment-grade classes can withstand a 35% loss on
600 Broadway and a 25% loss on Empire Mall. Downgrades to the
senior classes A-2 through D are not likely due to the position in
the capital structure and stable performance of the majority of the
pool.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2020-555: DBRS Rates Class G Certs 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-555 issued by
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2020-555:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class D at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All classes will be privately placed. The Class X balance is
notional. All trends are Stable.

Our affiliate rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR),
assigned preliminary ratings on these certificates on February 18,
2020. In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these certificates Under
Review–Analytical Integration Review. Upon issuance of DBRS
Morningstar's final ratings on these certificates, MCR has today
withdrawn its outstanding preliminary ratings. In accordance with
MCR's engagement letter covering this transaction, upon withdrawal
of MCR's outstanding preliminary ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
final ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn
preliminary MCR ratings.

The subject is a recently built, 52-story 598-unit luxury apartment
building with a charter school and a small amount of ground-floor
retail space situated at the corner of 10th Avenue from 40th Street
to 41st Street on the west side of Midtown Manhattan. The
collateral is the leasehold interest in the building. The total
unit count includes 447 market-rate apartments, 150 affordable
apartments, and one manager unit. Opened in 2016 and completed in
2017, the property is one of several new residential towers in the
area just northeast of Hudson Yards, an important area of Manhattan
that has had substantial redevelopment over the past decade. The
property has an amenity package in line with the local market,
including two swimming pools, two gyms, a large social room with
catering kitchen, a children's room, a game room with arcade
machines and a bowling alley, a pet grooming service, and
magnificent views especially from the higher floors. The developer
and owner is Extell Development Company (Extell), which is owned by
Gary Barnett. Extell has developed more than 20 million square feet
of mostly residential real estate since its founding in 1989.

The property's first tenants were signed in November 2016. Leasing
the market unit was slow for the first three months, then picked up
significantly with at least 15 leases signed each month for nine
consecutive months from February through October 2017. After a lull
in activity through the winter, 73 market-rate leases were signed
from May through August 2018, bringing occupancy to 83% in fewer
than two years. Over the next 13 months, new lease signings brought
market-rate occupancy up to 96.4% and overall occupancy to 97.2% by
September 2019. An updated February 2020 rent roll showed that
overall occupancy had dropped to 93.8% and market-rate occupancy to
92.2%.

The appraisal identified specifics with respect to the Section
421-A regulations which govern affordable housing requirements. Of
the property's 150 affordable units, at least 60 must be for up to
40% of Area Median Income (AMI), 60 for up to 60% of AMI, and 30
for up to 120% of AMI. AMI is defined as the median household
income for the region which, for New York City in 2019, was
$96,100.

When the property began to lease up in the fourth quarter of 2016,
New York City rent laws required all buildings subject to the
regulations of Section 421-A to adhere to rent stabilization. Under
rent stabilization, rent increases are limited to a percentage
determined each year by the Rent Guidelines Board (the Board). The
Board considers also considers landlord expenses for individual
apartment improvements or major capital improvements (MCIs) to
determine how much rents will be allowed to increase.

New laws governing rent increases went into effect on June 14,
2019. Under the new guidelines established by The Housing Stability
and Tenant Protection Act of 2019, allowed rent increases for MCIs
reduced to 2% from 6%. Previously, a landlord could deregulate a
vacated apartment for which the rent exceeded $2,700 per month or
increase the rent for a vacated regulated apartment by 20% between
tenants; the new laws no longer permit either practice. At renewal,
tenants must also be offered preferential rent (or stabilized rent)
as opposed to maximum legal rent. The maximum legal stabilized rent
can be charged only to a new tenant.

DBRS Morningstar's ratings reflect, in part, its positive view of
urban high-rise multifamily properties generally and the quality
and amenities of 555 10th Avenue specifically, as well as the
property's location in one of the nation's best apartment markets,
which is also the nation's financial center and one of its top
employment and cultural centers. The leasehold cap rate of 5.85%
DBRS Morningstar used to determine the property's sustainable value
and the positive qualitative adjustments DBRS Morningstar applied
in its LTV Benchmark Tool for this transaction reflect DBRS
Morningstar's view of some of the property's key strengths.

In DBRS Morningstar's analysis of the property's submarket, it
considered the extent of ongoing new apartment construction units
and the potential effects on the property's performance and ability
to generate sustainable cash flow. The Midtown West submarket has
been adding new apartment buildings at a moderate pace but has not
seen a dramatic difference in vacancy, which has ranged from 4.5%
to 6.0% over the past three years. The Reis, Inc. forecast
anticipates the delivery of slightly more than 3,000 units through
2023, or about 9% of current inventory, while vacancy heads lower
to 2.5%. DBRS Morningstar accounted for the potential effects of
new supply in DBRS Morningstar's concluded vacancy loss and
concessions, which total 10.3% of DBRS Morningstar's concluded
gross potential rent from apartments.

The property's amenities and desirable location in a top-tier
market that continues to attract high-skilled labor and major
employers, as well as the experienced sponsor, mitigate the risks
of new construction in the submarket.

The loan metrics for the mortgage loan of $400.0 million are
adequate and suggest a fairly low risk of a term default. DBRS
Morningstar's net cash flow coverage on an interest-only (IO) basis
is 1.76 times (x) on the senior debt and 1.15x on the combined
senior and mezzanine notes. The mortgage loan is 92.8% of DBRS
Morningstar's sustainable value of $430.8 million, which is 51.3%
lower than the as-is appraised value.

Class X-A is an IO certificate that references a single rated
tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2014-CCRE17: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on 2 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of COMM
2014-CCRE17 Mortgage Trust.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2014-CCRE17

Class A-4 12631DBA0;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 12631DBB8;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-M 12631DBD4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 12631DAZ6; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 12631DBE2;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 12631DBG7;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 12631DAG8;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 12631DAJ2;    LT BBsf Affirmed;   previously at BBsf

Class F 12631DAL7;    LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

Class PEZ 12631DBF9;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-A 12631DBC6;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 12631DAA1;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-C 12631DAC7;  LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The affirmations and Rating Outlook
revisions for classes D and E to Stable from Negative reflect
increased credit enhancement since Fitch's last rating action due
to loan payoffs and continued amortization. Three loans, including
the specially serviced Brookwood on the Green loan, were repaid in
full and the REO Gander Mountain Dothan asset was liquidated at
better recoveries than expected since the last rating action. As of
the February 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance had been paid down by 19.1% to $963.6 million from $1.2
billion at issuance; realized losses to date have been de minimis,
totaling 0.1% of the original pool balance. Eight loans (7.8% of
pool) have been defeased. Three loans (29.6%) are full-term
interest only; the remainder (70.4%) are currently amortizing.

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall pool performance and loss
expectations have remained stable since the last rating action.
Fitch has designated nine loans (20.7% of pool) as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs), including three of the top 15 loans (15.3%) and
one specially serviced loan (1%) outside of the top 15.

Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC): The largest FLOC, the Cottonwood
Mall in Albuquerque, NM (9.9% of pool), suffers from superior
competition in the local area, has reported low in-line tenant
sales since issuance and faces moderate upcoming lease rollover.
The non-collateral Sears store at the property closed in fall 2018
and is currently being marketed for sale. Overall mall occupancy
has improved after the former non-collateral Macy's store was
recently redeveloped into two home furnishings stores (Mor
Furniture for Less and HomeLife Furniture) and a Hobby Lobby
store.

The next largest FLOC, Northeast Ohio Multifamily Portfolio (3%),
is secured by a portfolio of three multifamily properties in the
Cleveland and Akron, OH markets. The portfolio has been
experiencing declining cash flow since issuance as rental and
occupancy rates at the underlying properties fall significantly
below their submarket averages.

The third largest FLOC, Crowne Plaza Houston River Oaks (2.5%), is
secured by a hotel property in Houston, TX that has experienced
significant cash flow declines since issuance as a result of lower
occupancy and ADR due to softness in the overall market. The other
non-specially serviced FLOCs outside of the top 15 (4.3%) were
flagged for declines in occupancy and/or cash flow.

Specially Serviced Loan: The Kunkel Portfolio loan (1% of pool),
which is secured by a portfolio consisting of three office
properties and one mixed-use residential/retail property located in
downtown Evansville, IN, had transferred to special servicing in
June 2017 for payment default. Portfolio occupancy plummeted to 64%
as of November 2019 from 85% at issuance. The borrower has also
refused to comply with the cash management agreement provisions in
the loan documents. A receiver was appointed in December 2018 and
the borrower has agreed to a consented foreclosure judgment and
provided cash payment for a release under the loan documents. The
special servicer has closed the settlement and is working to
complete the foreclosure.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch's analysis included an
additional sensitivity scenario, which applied a potential outsized
loss of 50% on the maturity balance of the Cottonwood Mall loan to
reflect refinance concerns due to the low in-line tenant sales, the
superior market competition and the still-vacant non-collateral
Sears anchor. The Rating Outlooks reflect this sensitivity
analysis.

Pool Concentrations: Loans secured by retail properties represent
34.2% of the current pool balance and include three of the top 15
loans (27.4%). The regional mall exposure is limited to the third
largest loan, Cottonwood Mall (9.9%), a super-regional mall in
Albuquerque, NM with exposure to JCPenney as a non-collateral
anchor. Loans secured by hotel properties comprise 13.7% of the
pool, all four of which are among the top 15 loans.

Upcoming maturities include one loan (1.3%) in April 2021, four
loans (2.8%) in 2023 and the remaining 44 loans (95.9%) in 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB through E, X-A and X-B
reflect increasing credit enhancement and expected continued
paydown. Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to classes B through D may occur with significant
improvement in credit enhancement and/or defeasance but would be
limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for
future concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
below-investment-grade-rated classes are not likely given the
concerns surrounding the Cottonwood Mall and Crowne Plaza Houston
River Oaks loans, but may occur in the later years of the
transaction should credit enhancement increase and as the number of
FLOCs are reduced.

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes F and X-C reflect
additional sensitivity analysis and potential downgrade concerns
should performance of the FLOCs, primarily the Cottonwood Mall and
Crowne Plaza Houston River Oaks loans, continue to deteriorate.
Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool-level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades
to the senior classes A-SB through C are not likely due to the
position in the capital structure and the high credit enhancement
or defeasance. Should the specially serviced Kunkel Portfolio loan
get resolved and the performance of the Cottonwood Mall and Crowne
Plaza Houston River Oaks loans improve substantially, the Negative
Rating Outlook on class F may be revised to Stable.


EXANTAS CAPITAL 2020-RSO8: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes (the Notes) issued by Exantas Capital Corp.
2020-RSO8, Ltd. (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes F and G will be privately placed.

The initial collateral consists of 32 floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 35 transitional properties totaling $522.6 million (93%
of the total fully funded balance), excluding $36.9 million of
remaining future funding commitments. The asset classes in the pool
are office properties (15.0%), multifamily properties (76.6%),
manufactured housing properties (3.1%), self-storage (2.6%), and a
limited-service hotel (2.7%). The loans are mostly secured by
cash-flowing assets, most of which are in a period of transition
with plans to stabilize and improve the asset value. Of these
loans, 28 have remaining future funding participations totaling
$36.9 million, which the Issuer may acquire in the future. The
Issuer may direct principal proceeds to acquire a portion of one or
more companion participations without rating agency confirmation
(RAC), subject to the Replenishment Criteria. The Replenishment
Criteria requires, among other things, for the underlying mortgage
loan not to be a defaulted mortgage loan or specially serviced
loan, for no event of default to have occurred or been continuing,
and for certain note protection tests to be satisfied. Commercial
real estate collateralized loan obligation (CRE CLO) transactions
often allow for principal prepayment proceeds to be held in an
account and used to purchase pari passu companion participation of
existing trust assets instead of being used to pay down bonds.
Typically, if a RAC is not required to acquire these
participations, DBRS Morningstar performs a pay down analysis
whereby it assumes the loans in the pool with the lowest expected
loss (EL) that have no future funding pay off, and then all future
funding is brought in, with the pool balance staying constant. The
effect of this pay down analysis is that the EL migrates to a
higher level, as DBRS Morningstar assumes a worst-case scenario
where only good loans pay off. As a result, the pool loss levels
are higher than they would be on the pool as it stands at closing.

Given the floating-rate nature of the loans, the index DBRS
Morningstar used (one-month Libor) was the lower of DBRS
Morningstar's stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining
fully extended term of the loans and the strike price of the
interest-rate cap with the respective contractual loan spread added
to determine a stressed interest rate over the loan term. When
measuring the cutoff date balances against the DBRS Morningstar
As-Is net cash flow, 25 loans, representing 78.2% of the mortgage
loan cutoff date balance, had a DBRS Morningstar As-Is debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.00 times (x), a threshold indicative
of default risk. Additionally, the DBRS Morningstar Stabilized DSCR
for 15 loans, comprising 50.5% of the initial pool balance, is
below 1.00x, which indicates elevated refinance risk. The
properties are often transitioning with potential upside in cash
flow; however, DBRS Morningstar does not give full credit to the
stabilization if there are no holdbacks or if the other loan
structural features are insufficient to support such treatment.
Furthermore, even if the structure is acceptable, DBRS Morningstar
generally does not assume the assets will stabilize above market
levels. The transaction will have a sequential-pay structure.

The pool benefits from relatively strong diversity for a CRE CLO,
with a Herfindahl score of 22.3. Texas, Georgia, Florida, South
Carolina, Nevada, and California have the largest percentages of
property concentrations, with 18.3%, 16.6%, 11.1%, 10.8%, 7.8%, and
7.7%, respectively.

Twenty-six loans, comprising 75.9% of the initial trust balance,
represent acquisition financing wherein sponsors contributed
material cash equity as a source of funding in conjunction with the
mortgage loan. Cash equity infusions from a sponsor in a
transaction typically result in the lender and borrower have a
greater alignment of interests, especially compared with a
refinancing scenario where the sponsor may be withdrawing equity
from the transaction.

The pool benefits from a high multifamily concentration as 24
loans, representing 76.6% of the pool, are secured by multifamily
properties. Historically, multifamily properties have defaulted at
much lower rates than the overall commercial mortgage-backed
security universe.

DBRS Morningstar sampled and visited 18 of the 32 loans in the
pool, representing 75.1% of the pool by allocated cutoff loan
balance. DBRS Morningstar met with the on-site property manager,
leasing agent, or representative of the borrowing entity for 14
loans, comprising 68.3% of the initial pool balance.

The pool consists of mostly transitional assets. DBRS Morningstar
performed physical site inspections, including management meetings.
Also, when DBRS Morningstar analysts visit the markets, they may
actually visit properties more than once to follow the progress (or
lack thereof) toward stabilization. The service is also in constant
contact with the borrowers to track progress.

All loans in the pool have floating interest rates and are
interest-only during the initial loan term, which ranges from 36
months to 48 months, creating interest-rate risk.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the current in-place cash flow.
There is a possibility that the sponsors will not execute their
business plans as expected and that the higher stabilized cash flow
will not materialize during the loan term. Failure to execute the
business plan could result in a term default or the inability to
refinance the fully funded loan balance. DBRS Morningstar made
relatively conservative stabilization assumptions and, in each
instance, considered the business plan to be rational and the
future funding amounts to be sufficient to execute such plans. In
addition, DBRS Morningstar analyzes loss given default based on the
as-is loan-to-value ratio, assuming the loan is fully funded.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


FREDDIE MAC 2020-1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class M Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional rating on the following
Mortgage-Backed Security, Series 2020-1 (the Certificate) issued by
Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2020-1 (the
Trust):

-- $58.8 million Class M at B (low) (sf)

The B (low) (sf) rating on the Certificate reflects 6.35% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the pool.

Other than the specified class above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned,
reperforming first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the certificates, which are backed by 10,992 loans with
a total principal balance of $1,865,280,631 as of the Cut-Off Date
(January 31, 2020).

The mortgage loans were either purchased by Freddie Mac from
securitized Freddie Mac Participation Certificates or retained by
Freddie Mac in whole-loan form since their acquisition. The loans
are currently held in Freddie Mac's retained portfolio and will be
deposited into the Trust on the Closing Date.

The loans are approximately 141 months seasoned and have all been
modified. Each mortgage loan was modified under either
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) or GSE non-HAMP modification programs. Within the
pool, 3,851 mortgages have forborne principal amounts as a result
of modification, which equates to 10.0% of the total unpaid
principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. For 69.6% of the modified
loans, the modifications happened more than two years ago.

The loans are all current as of the Cut-Off Date. Furthermore,
41.4% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent
for at least the past 24 months under the Mortgage Bankers
Association delinquency methods. DBRS Morningstar assumed that all
loans within the pool are exempt from the Qualified Mortgage rules
because of their eligibility to be purchased by Freddie Mac.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC. The servicer will not be advancing any delinquent principal or
interest on any mortgages; however, the servicer is obligated to
advance to third parties any amounts necessary for the preservation
of mortgaged properties or real estate owned properties the Trust
acquires through foreclosure or a loss mitigation process.

Freddie Mac will serve as the Sponsor, Seller, and Trustee of the
transaction as well as Guarantor of the senior certificates (Class
HAW, Class HA, Class HA-IO, Class HBW, Class HB, Class HB-IO, Class
HTW, Class HT, Class HT-IO, Class HV, Class HZ, Class MAW, Class
MA, Class MAU, Class MA-IO, Class MBW, Class MB, Class MBU, Class
MB-IO, Class MC, Class MTW, Class MT, Class MT-IO, Class MTU, Class
MV, Class MZ, Class M55D, Class M55E, Class M55G, and Class M55I;
collectively, the Guaranteed Certificates). Wilmington Trust
National Association (Wilmington Trust; rated AA (low) with a
Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will serve as Trust Agent. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar)
will serve as the Custodian for the Trust. U.S. Bank National
Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will serve as the Securities Administrator for the
Trust and will also act as Paying Agent, Registrar, Transfer Agent,
and Authenticating Agent.

Freddie Mac, as the Seller, will make certain representations and
warranties (R&W) with respect to the mortgage loans. Freddie Mac
will be the only party from which the Trust may seek
indemnification (or, in certain cases, a repurchase) as a result of
a breach of R&Ws. If a breach review trigger occurs during the
warranty period, the Trust Agent, Wilmington Trust, will be
responsible for enforcing R&Ws. The warranty period will only be
effective through March 9, 2023 (approximately three years from the
Closing Date), for substantially all R&Ws other than the real
estate mortgage investment conduit R&W, which will not expire.

The mortgage loans will be divided into three loan groups: Group H,
Group M, and Group M55. The Group H loans (3.2% of the pool) were
subject to step-rate modifications and had not yet reached their
final step rate as of December 31, 2019. As of the Cut-Off Date,
the borrower, while still current, has not made any payments
accrued at such final step rate. Group M loans (88.5% of the pool)
and Group M55 loans (8.3% of the pool) were subject to either
fixed-rate modifications or step-rate modifications that have
reached their final step rates and, as of the Cut-Off Date, the
borrowers have made at least one payment after such mortgage loans
reached their respective final step rates. Each Group M loan has a
mortgage interest rate less than or equal to 5.5% and has no
forbearance or may have forbearance and any mortgage interest rate.
Each Group M55 loan has a mortgage interest rate greater than 5.5%
and has no forbearance.

Principal and interest (P&I) on the Guaranteed Certificates will be
guaranteed by Freddie Mac. The Guaranteed Certificates will be
backed by collateral from each group, respectively. The remaining
certificates (including the subordinate, non-guaranteed,
interest-only mortgage insurance, and residual certificates) will
be cross-collateralized among the three groups.

The transaction employs a pro-rata pay cash flow structure among
the senior group certificates with a sequential-pay feature among
the subordinate certificates. Certain principal proceeds can be
used to cover interest shortfalls on the rated Class M
certificates. Senior classes benefit from guaranteed P&I payments
by the Guarantor, Freddie Mac; however, such guaranteed amounts, if
paid, will be reimbursed to Freddie Mac from the P&I collections
prior to any allocation to the subordinate certificates. The senior
principal distribution amounts vary subject to the satisfaction of
a step-down test. Realized losses are allocated sequentially in
reverse order.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


FREDDIE MAC 2020-HQA2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on 16 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates Freddie Mac's STACR REMIC Trust 2020-HQA2 (STACR
2020-HQA2).

RATING ACTIONS

Structured Agency Credit Risk REMIC Trust 2020-HQA2

Class A-H;   LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1;   LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1A;  LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1AH; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1AI; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1AR; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1B;  LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-1BH; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2;   LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2A;  LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2AH; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2AI; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2AR; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2B;  LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-2BH; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class B-3H;  LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class M-1;   LT BBB-sf New Rating; previously at BBB-(EXP)sf

Class M-1H;  LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class M-2;   LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2A;  LT BBsf New Rating;   previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class M-2AH; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class M-2AI; LT BBsf New Rating;   previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class M-2AR; LT BBsf New Rating;   previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class M-2AS; LT BBsf New Rating;   previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class M-2AT; LT BBsf New Rating;   previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class M-2AU; LT BBsf New Rating;   previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class M-2B;  LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2BH; LT NRsf New Rating;   previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class M-2BI; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2BR; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2BS; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2BT; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2BU; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2I;  LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2R;  LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2RB; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2S;  LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2SB; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2T;  LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2TB; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2U;  LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

Class M-2UB; LT Bsf New Rating;    previously at B(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch rates the M-1, M-2A and M-2B notes, along with their
corresponding modifications and combinations (MACR) notes, for
Freddie Mac's Structured Agency Credit Risk REMIC Trust 2020-HQA2.
This is Freddie Mac's sixth risk transfer transaction in which the
notes are not general, senior unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac
but are issued as a REMIC from a bankruptcy-remote trust.

However, similar to prior transactions, the notes are still subject
to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held in various Freddie
Mac-guaranteed MBS. The switch in transaction structure is to
expand the investor base, align tax treatment and better align the
program with other mortgage-related securities as well as to reduce
counterparty exposure to Freddie Mac.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality loans securitized by Freddie Mac
between July 1, 2019 and Sept. 30, 2019. The reference pool will
consist of loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 80%
and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference pool's
collateral characteristics are similar to recent STACR transactions
and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

Home Possible Exposure (Negative): Approximately 22% of the
reference pool was originated under Freddie Mac's Home Possible
program, which is in line with the two most recent Fitch-rated
STACR transactions. The Home Possible program targets low- to
moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost or
underrepresented communities and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
Home Possible loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV
and property value), which is reflected in increased CE.

30-Year Legal Maturity (Negative): The M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1A, B-1B,
B-2A and B-2B notes have a 30-year legal final maturity, similar to
STACR 2020-HQA1. Thus, life-of-loan losses on the reference pool
will pass through to noteholders. As a result, Fitch did not apply
a maturity credit to reduce its default expectations.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 99.8% of
the loans are covered either by borrower paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI), lender paid MI (LPMI) or investor paid mortgage insurance.
While the Freddie Mac guarantee allows credit for MI, Fitch applied
a haircut to the amount of BPMI available due to the automatic
termination provision as required by the Homeowners Protection Act,
when the loan balance scheduled to reach 78%. LPMI does not
automatically terminate and remains for the life of the loan.

Very Low Operational Risk (Positive): Fitch believes this
transaction has very low operational risk. Freddie Mac is an
industry leader in residential mortgage activities and assessed as
an 'Above Average' aggregator by Fitch. The agency maintains strong
seller oversight and implements a comprehensive risk management
framework on its acquisition processes. While multiple
counterparties are performing primary servicing functions for the
loans in the reference pool, Freddie Mac has robust servicer
oversight to mitigate servicer disruption risk.

Production Sample and Limited Size of Third-Party Due Diligence
(Neutral): Third party due diligence was conducted on a sample of
the reference pool by Adfitech, Inc., which is assessed by Fitch as
an 'Acceptable - Tier 2' third-party review (TPR) firm. The review
included a sample of loans selected from a population of loans that
were subject to Freddie Mac's post-purchase quality control (QC)
review. Freddie Mac recently transitioned to a due diligence
process to review ongoing loan production compared to previously
selecting loans to review per CRT issuance. This is the first
transaction rated by Fitch that incorporates this new due diligence
process. While the review does not cover 100% of loans in the pool,
the sampling methodology and review scope for the due diligence is
consistent with Fitch criteria and prior Freddie Mac-issued CRT
transactions. The due diligence results support Fitch's opinion of
Freddie Mac as an 'Above Average' aggregator. Fitch did not apply
loss adjustments based on the results.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from solid alignment of
interests. Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 4.00% of
loss protection, as well as a minimum of 5% of the M-1, M-2A, M-2B,
B-1A, B-1B, B-2A and B-2B reference tranches, and 100% of the
first-loss B-3H reference tranche. Initially, Freddie Mac will
retain an approximately 28% vertical slice/interest through the
M-1H, M-2AH, M-2BH, B-1AH, B-1BH, B-2AH and B-2BH reference
tranches.

REMIC Structure (Neutral): This is Freddie Mac's sixth credit risk
transfer transaction issued as a real estate mortgage investment
conduit (REMIC). This limits the transaction's dependency on
Freddie Mac for payments of principal and interest, helping
mitigate potential rating caps in the event of a downgrade of the
government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) counterparty rating. Under
the current structure, Freddie Mac still acts as a final backstop
with regard to payments of LIBOR on the bonds as well as potential
investment losses of principal. As a result, ratings may still be
limited in the future by Freddie Mac's rating but to a lesser
extent than in previous transactions, as there are now other
recourses for investors for payments.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the GSE's assets are less than its obligations for longer than
60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Freddie Mac if it is
determined that such action would promote an orderly administration
of the GSE's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Freddie Mac, as reflected in its current rating
of the GSE. However, if, at some point, Fitch views the support as
reduced and receivership likely, the rating of Freddie Mac could be
downgraded, and ratings on the M-1, M-2A and M-2B notes, along with
their corresponding MACR notes, could be affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to, or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Two sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected MVD. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


FREDDIE MAC 2020-HQA2: Moody's Assigns B1 Ratings on 11 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to 23 classes
of credit risk transfer notes issued by Freddie Mac STACR REMIC
Trust 2020-HQA2. The ratings range from Baa1 (sf) to B1 (sf).

Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2020-HQA2 is the second transaction
of 2020 in the HQA series issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation to share the credit risk on a reference pool of
mortgages with the capital markets. The transaction is structured
as a real estate mortgage investment conduit.

The notes in STACR 2020-HQA2 receive principal payments as the
loans in the reference pool amortize or prepay. Principal payments
to the notes are paid from assets in the trust account established
from proceeds of the notes issuance. Interest payments to the notes
are paid from a combination of investment income from trust assets,
an asset of the trust known as the interest-only (IO) Q-REMIC
interest, and Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac is responsible to cover (1)
any interest owed on the notes not covered by the investment income
from the trust assets and the yield on the IO Q-REMIC interest and
(2) to reimburse the trust for any investment losses from sales of
the trust assets.

Investors have no recourse to the underlying reference pool. The
credit risk exposure of the notes depends on the actual realized
losses and modification losses incurred by the reference pool.
Freddie Mac is obligated to pay off the notes in March 2050 if any
balances remain outstanding.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2020-HQA2

Cl. M-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AI*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AR, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AS, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AT, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2AU, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2B, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BI*, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BR, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BS, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BT, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2BU, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2I*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2R, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2RB, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2S, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2SB, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2T, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2TB, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2U, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2UB, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.95%
and reaches 5.51% at a Aaa stress level.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) GSE model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included, but were not limited to,
qualitative adjustments for origination quality and third-party
review (TPR) scope.

Collateral Description

The reference pool consists of over one-hundred thirty three
thousand prime, fixed-rate, one- to four-unit, first-lien
conforming mortgage loans acquired by Freddie Mac. The loans were
originated on or after January 1, 2015 with a weighted average
seasoning of six months. Each of the loans in the reference pool
had a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination that was greater
than 80% and less than or equal to 97%. 21.8% of the pool are loans
underwritten through Freddie Mac's Home Possible program and 98.8%
of loans in the pool are covered by mortgage insurance.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's considers Freddie Mac's overall seller management and
aggregation practices to be adequate and Moody's did not apply a
separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation quality.

Underwriting

Freddie Mac uses a delegated underwriting process to purchase
loans. Sellers are required to represent and warrant that loans are
made in accordance with negotiated terms or Freddie Mac's guide.
Numerous checks in the selling system ensures that loans with the
correct characteristics are delivered to Freddie Mac. Sellers are
required to cure, make an indemnification payment or repurchase the
loans if a material underwriting defect is discovered subject to
certain limits. In certain cases, Freddie Mac may elect to waive
the enforcements of the repurchase if an alternative such as an
indemnification payment is provided.

Quality control

Freddie Mac monitors each seller's risk exposure both on an
aggregated basis as well as by product lines. A surveillance team
reviews sellers' financials at least on an annual basis, monitors
exposure limits, risk ratings, lenders QC reports and internal
audit results and may adjust credit limits, require additional
loan/operational reviews or put the seller on a watch list, as
needed.

Home Possible loans: Approximately 21.8% of the loans by Cut-off
Date Balance were originated under the Home Possible program. The
program is designed to make responsible homeownership accessible to
more first-time homebuyers and other qualified borrowers, offer
mortgages requiring low down payments for low- to moderate-income
homebuyers or buyers in high-cost or underserved communities, and,
in certain circumstances, allow for lower than standard mortgage
insurance coverage. Home Possible loans in STACR 2020-HQA2's
reference pool have a WA FICO of 745 and WA LTV of 93.8%, versus WA
FICO of 752 and WA LTV of 91.6% for the rest of the loans in the
pool. While key characteristics such as lower FICO, higher LTV and
lower MI coverage requirement are captured by the MILAN model,
Moody's applied an additional adjustment to loss levels for Home
Possible loans to address additional risks due to less stringent
underwriting including flexible source of funds and lower risk
adjusted pricing.

Enhanced Relief Refinance (ERR)

At the direction of FHFA and in coordination with Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac introduced a high LTV ratio refinance program for
mortgage loans originated on or after October 1, 2017, designed to
offer refinance opportunities to borrowers with existing Freddie
Mac mortgage loans who are current in their mortgage payments by
refinancing into a mortgage with lower monthly payment through
various options including rate reduction or maturity extension.

The mortgage loan being refinanced has to meet certain
qualifications for ERR, including (i) be a first-lien, conventional
mortgage loan owned or securitized by Freddie Mac; (ii) originated
or after Oct. 1, 2017; (iii) have been originated at least 15
months prior to the refinance note date; (iv) have had no 30-day
delinquency in the immediately preceding six months, and no more
than one 30-day delinquency in the immediately preceding 12 months;
and (v) has a minimum LTV ratio of 97.01% (for primary residence 1
unit).

STACR 2020-HQA2's reference pool does not include ERR loans at
closing, however, transaction documents allow for the replacement
of loans in the reference pool with ERR loans in the future. The
replacement will not constitute a prepayment on the replaced loan,
credit event or a modification event.

Moody's made no adjustment to the existence of the ERR program in
particular. Moody's believes the ERR program is overall beneficial
to loans in the pool, especially during an economic downturn when
negative equity borrowers may have limited refinancing
opportunities. However, given that ERR loans are likely to have
extended maturities and slower prepayment than the rest of the
loans in the pool, the reference pool is at the risk of higher
concentration of high LTV loans at the tail end of the
transaction's life if a significant portion of loans refinance into
ERR. We'll monitor ERR loans in the reference pool and may make an
additional adjustment if the proportion of ERR loans become
substantial after transaction closing.

Servicing arrangement

As master servicer, Freddie Mac has strong servicer oversight and
monitoring processes. Generally, Freddie Mac does not itself
conduct servicing activities. When a mortgage loan is sold to
Freddie Mac, the seller enters into an agreement to service the
mortgage loan for Freddie Mac in accordance with a comprehensive
servicing guide for servicers to follow. Freddie Mac monitors
primary servicer performance and compliance through its Servicer
Success Program, scorecard and servicing quality assurance group.
Freddie Mac also reviews individual loan files to identify
servicing performance gaps and trends.

Moody's considers the servicing arrangement to be adequate and
Moody's did not make any adjustments to its loss levels based on
Freddie Mac's servicer management.

Third-party Review

Moody's considers the scope of the TPR based on Freddie Mac's
acquisition and QC framework to be adequate. Moody's assessed an
adjustment to loss at a Aaa stress level due to lack of compliance
review on TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations.

The results and scope of the pre-securitization third-party,
loan-level review (due diligence) suggest a heavier reliance on
sellers' representations and warranties (R&Ws) compared with
private label securitizations. The scope of the TPR, for example,
is weaker because the sample size is small (only 0.35% of the total
loans in the reference pool). To the extent that the TPR firm
classifies certain credit or valuation discrepancies as 'findings',
Freddie Mac will review and may provide rebuttals to those
findings, which could result in the change of event grades by the
review firm.

The third-party due diligence scope focuses on the following:

Compliance: The diligence firm reviewed 333 loans for compliance
with federal, state and local high cost Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA) regulations (297 loans were reviewed for
compliance plus 36 loans were reviewed for both credit/valuation
and compliance). None were deemed to be noncompliant.

Appraisals: The third-party diligence provider also reviewed
property valuation on 999 loans in the sample pool (963 loans were
reviewed for credit/valuation plus 36 loans were reviewed for both
credit/valuation and compliance). Six loans received final
valuation grades of "C". The third-party diligence provider was not
able to obtain property appraisal risk reviews on 2 mortgage loans
due to properties located in Guam. The remaining 4 loans had
Appraisal Desktop with Inspections (ADI) which did not support the
original appraised value within the 10% tolerance.

Credit: The third-party diligence provider reviewed credit on 999
loans in the sample pool. Four loans had final grades of "D" and 13
loans had final grades of "C" due to underwriting defects. These
loans were removed from the reference pool. The results were
consistent with prior STACR transactions Moody's rated.

Data integrity: The third-party review firm analyzed the sample
pool for data calculation and comparison to the imaged file
documents. The review revealed 54 data discrepancies on 51 loans,
with 21 discrepancies related to DTI and 18 discrepancies related
to first time home buyers.

Unlike private label RMBS transactions, a review of TRID violation
was not part of Freddie Mac's due diligence scope. A lack of
transparency regarding how many loans in the transaction contain
material violations of the TRID rule is a credit negative. However,
since Moody's expects overall losses on STACR transactions owing to
TRID violations to be fairly minimal, Moody's only made a slight
qualitative adjustment to losses under a Aaa scenario. Furthermore,
lender R&Ws and the GSEs' ability to remove defective loans from
the transactions will likely mitigate some of aforementioned
concerns.

Reps & Warranties Framework

Freddie Mac is not providing loan level (R&Ws for this transaction
because the notes are a direct obligation of Freddie Mac. The
reference obligations are subject to R&Ws made by the sellers. As
such, Freddie Mac commands robust R&Ws from its seller/servicers
pertaining to all facets of the loan, including but not limited to
compliance with laws, compliance with all underwriting guidelines,
enforceability, good property condition and appraisal procedures.
Freddie Mac will be responsible for enforcing the R&Ws made by the
sellers/lenders in the reference pool. To the extent that Freddie
Mac discovers a confirmed underwriting defect or a major servicing
defect, the respective loan will be removed from the reference
pool. Since Freddie Mac retains a significant portion of the risk
in the transaction, it will likely take necessary steps to address
any breaches of R&Ws. For example, Freddie Mac undertakes quality
control reviews and servicing quality assurance reviews of small
samples of the mortgage loans that sellers deliver to Freddie Mac.
These processes are intended to determine, among other things, the
accuracy of the R&Ws made by the sellers in respect of the mortgage
loans that are sold to Freddie Mac. Moody's made no adjustments to
the transaction regarding the R&W framework.

The Notes

Moody's refers to the M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1A, B-1B, B-2A and B-2B
notes as the original notes, and the M-2, M-2R, M-2S, M-2T, M-2U,
M-2I, M-2AR, M-2AS, M-2AT, M-2AU, M-2AI, M-2BR, M-2BS, M-2BT,
M-2BU, M-2BI, M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB, M-2UB, B-1, B-2, B-1AR, B-1AI,
B-2AR and B-2AI notes as the Modifiable and Combinable REMICs
(MACR) notes; together Moody's refers to them as the notes.

The M-2 notes can be exchanged for M-2A and M-2B notes, M-2R and
M-2I notes, M-2S and M-2I, M-2T and M-2I, and M-2U and M-2I notes.

The M-2A notes can be exchanged for M-2AR and M-2AI notes, M-2AS
and M-2AI notes, M-2AT and M-2AI, and M-2AU and M-2AI notes.

The M-2B notes can be exchanged for M-2BR and M-2BI notes, M-2BS
and M-2BI notes, M-2BT and M-2BI notes, and M-2BU and M-2BI notes.

Classes M-2I , M-2AI, M-2BI, B-1AI and B-2AI are interest only
tranches referencing to the notional balances of Classes M-2, M-2A,
M-2B, B-1A and B-2A, respectively.

Classes M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB and M-2UB are each an exchangeable for
two classes that are initially offered at closing. Its ratings of
M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB and M-2UB reference the rating of Class M-2B
only, disregarding the rating of M-2AI. This is the case because
Class M-2AI's cash flow represents an insignificant portion of the
overall promise. In the event Class M-2B gets written down through
losses and Class M-2AI is still outstanding, Moody's would continue
to rate Classes M-2RB, M-2SB, M-2TB and M-2UB consistent with Class
M-2B's last outstanding rating so long as Classes M-2RB, M-2SB,
M-2TB and M-2UB are still outstanding.

Transaction Structure

Credit enhancement in this transaction is comprised of
subordination provided by mezzanine and junior tranches. Realized
losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order starting with
the Class B-3H reference tranche.

Interest due on the notes is determined by the outstanding
principal balance and the interest rate of the notes. The interest
payment amount is the interest accrual amount of a class of notes
minus any modification loss amount allocated to such class on each
payment date, plus any modification gain amount. The modification
loss and gain amounts are calculated by taking the respective
positive and negative difference between the original accrual rate
of the loans, multiplied by the unpaid balance of the loans, and
the current accrual rate of the loans, multiplied by the interest
bearing unpaid balance.

So long as the senior reference tranche is outstanding, and no
performance trigger event occurs, the transaction structure
allocates principal payments on a pro-rata basis between the senior
and non-senior reference tranches. Principal is then allocated
sequentially amongst the non-senior tranches.

The STACR 2020-HQA2 transaction allows for principal distribution
to subordinate notes by the supplemental subordinate reduction
amount even if performance triggers fail. The supplemental
subordinate reduction amount equals the excess of the offered
reference tranche percentage over 6.15%. The distribution of the
supplemental subordinated reduction amount would reduce principal
balances of the offered reference tranche and correspondingly limit
the credit enhancement of class A note to be always below 6.15%
plus the note balance of B-3H. This feature is beneficial to the
offered certificates.

Credit Events and Modification Events

Reference tranche write-downs occur as a result of loan level
credit events. A credit event with respect to any loan means any of
the following events: (i) a short sale with respect to the related
mortgaged property is settled, (ii) a related seriously delinquent
mortgage note is sold prior to foreclosure, (iii) the mortgaged
property that secured the related mortgage note is sold to a third
party at a foreclosure sale, (iv) an REO disposition occurs, or (v)
the related mortgage note is charged-off. As a result, the
frequency of credit events will be the same as actual loan default
frequency, and losses will impact the notes similar to that of a
typical RMBS deal.

Loans that experience credit events that are subsequently found to
have an underwriting defect, a major servicing defect or are deemed
ineligible will be subject to a reverse credit event. Reference
tranche balances will be written up for all reverse credit events
in sequential order, beginning with the most senior tranche that
has been subject to a previous write-down. In addition, the amount
of the tranche write-up will be treated as an additional principal
recovery and will be paid to noteholders in accordance with the
cash flow waterfall.

If a loan experiences a forbearance or mortgage rate modification,
the difference between the original mortgage rate and the current
mortgage rate will be allocated to the reference tranches as a
modification loss. The Class B-3H reference tranche, which
represents 0.10% of the pool, will absorb modification losses
first. The final coupons on the notes will have an impact on the
amount of interest available to absorb modification losses from the
reference pool.

Tail Risk

Similar to prior STACR transactions, the initial subordination
level of 4.00% is lower than the deal's minimum credit enhancement
trigger level of 4.25%. The transaction begins by failing the
minimum credit enhancement test, leaving the subordinate tranches
locked out of unscheduled principal payments until the deal builds
an additional 0.25% subordination. STACR 2020-HQA2 does not have a
subordination floor. This is mitigated by the sequential principal
payment structure of the deal, which ensures that the credit
enhancement of the subordinate tranches is not eroded early in the
life of the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in October 2019. The methodologies
used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in October 2019
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in February 2019.


JP MORGAN 2020-3: Moody's Rates Class B-5-Y Certs '(P)B3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 51
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by J.P.
Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-3. The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to
(P)B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 806 25-year, 29-year, or 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$595,006,943 as of the March 1, 2020 cut-off date. Similar to prior
JPMMT transactions, JPMMT 2020-3 includes agency-eligible mortgage
loans (approximately 35.0% by loan balance) underwritten to the
government sponsored enterprises guidelines in addition to prime
jumbo non-agency eligible mortgages purchased by J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Acquisition Corp. (JPMMAC), the sponsor and mortgage loan
seller, from various originators and aggregators. United Shore
Financial Services, LLC d/b/a United Wholesale Mortgage and Shore
Mortgage (United Shore) and loanDepot.com LLC (loanDepot)
originated approximately 75.6% and 12.6% respectively of the
mortgage loans (by balance) in the pool. All other originators
accounted for less than 10% of the pool by balance. With respect to
the mortgage loans, each originator or the aggregator, as
applicable, made a representation and warranty that the mortgage
loan constitutes a qualified mortgage (QM) under the qualified
mortgage rule.

NewRez LLC f/k/a New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (Shellpoint) will service about 12.5% of the mortgage
loans on behalf of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMCB), loanDepot
will service about 11.5% (subserviced by Cenlar, FSB), United Shore
will service about 75.6% (subserviced by Cenlar, FSB) and
Guaranteed Rate, Inc. will service about 0.4% (subserviced by
Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc.). Shellpoint will act as interim
servicer for the JPMCB mortgage loans from the closing date until
the servicing transfer date, which is expected to occur on or about
June 1, 2020 (but which may occur after such date). After the
servicing transfer date, these mortgage loans will be serviced by
JPMCB. The servicing fee for loans serviced by JPMCB (and
Shellpoint, until the servicing transfer date), loanDepot.com,
Guaranteed Rate, Inc. and United Shore will be based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $40 per loan and
additional fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans
Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the master servicer
and Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) will be the securities administrator
and Delaware trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a typical
shifting interest structure that benefits from senior and
subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11-X*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2*, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-3*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4*, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1-X*, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-X*, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-X*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-X*, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.61%
and reaches 6.29% at a stress level consistent with its Aaa
ratings.

It calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's Individual
Loan Analysis model based on the loan-level collateral information
as of the cut-off date. Loan-level adjustments to the model results
included, but were not limited to, adjustments for origination
quality and the financial strength of the representation & warranty
(R&W) providers.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2020-3 is a securitization of a pool of 806 25-year, 29-year,
or 30-year, fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total
balance of $595,006,943 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted
average remaining term to maturity of 358 months, and a WA
seasoning of 2 months. The WA current FICO score is 763 and the WA
original combined loan-to-value ratio is 70.5%. The characteristics
of the loans underlying the pool are generally comparable to those
of other JPMMT transactions backed by prime mortgage loans that it
has rated.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's considers JPMMAC's aggregation platform to be adequate and
it did not apply a separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation
quality. In addition to reviewing JPMMAC as an aggregator, it has
also reviewed the originator(s) contributing a significant
percentage of the collateral pool (above 10%). As such, for United
Shore, it reviewed United Shore's underwriting guidelines and its
policies and documentation (where available). Additionally, Moody's
increased its base case and Aaa loss expectations for certain
originators of non-conforming loans where it does not have clear
insight into the underwriting practices, quality control and credit
risk management. Moody's did not make an adjustment for
GSE-eligible loans, since those loans were underwritten in
accordance with GSE guidelines. In addition, it reviewed the loan
performance for some of these originators. It viewed the loan
performance as comparable to the GSE loans due to consistently low
delinquencies, early payment defaults and repurchase requests.
United Shore and LoanDepot originated approximately 44.1% and 10.2%
of the non-conforming mortgage loans (by balance) in the pool,
respectively. All other originators accounted for less than 10% of
the non-conforming mortgage loans by balance.

United Shore (originator): Loans originated by United Shore have
been included in several prime jumbo securitizations that Moody's
has rated. United Shore originated approximately 75.6% of the
mortgage loans by pool balance (compared with about 51.8% by pool
balance in JPMMT 2020-2, 56.6% by pool balance in JPMMT 2020-1 and
86.9% by pool balance in JPMMT 2019-9). The majority of these loans
were originated under United Shore's High Balance Nationwide
program which are processed using the Desktop Underwriter (DU)
automated underwriting system, and are therefore underwritten to
Fannie Mae guidelines. The loans receive a DU Approve Ineligible
feedback due to the loan amount only. Moody's made a negative
origination adjustment (i.e. it increased its loss expectations)
for United Shore's loans due mostly to 1) the lack of statistically
significant program specific loan performance data and 2) the fact
that United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program is unique and
fairly new and no performance history has been provided to Moody's
on these loans. Under this program, the origination criteria rely
on the use of GSE tools (DU/LP) for prime-jumbo non-conforming
loans, subject to Qualified Mortgage (QM) overlays. More time is
needed to assess United Shore's ability to consistently produce
high-quality prime jumbo residential mortgage loans under this
program.

Moody's considera LoanDepot an adequate originator of prime jumbo
loans. As a result, it did not make any adjustments to its loss
levels for these loans.

Servicing Arrangement

It considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to be
adequate given the strong servicing arrangement of the servicers,
as well as the presence of a strong master servicer to oversee the
servicers. The servicers are contractually obligated to the issuing
entity to service the related mortgage loans. However, the
servicers may perform their servicing obligations through
sub-servicers. In this transaction, Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc. rated B2) will act as the master
servicer. The servicers are required to advance principal and
interest on the mortgage loans. To the extent that the servicers
are unable to do so, the master servicer will be obligated to make
such advances. In the event that the master servicer, Nationstar,
is unable to make such advances, the securities administrator,
Citibank (rated Aa3) will be obligated to do so to the extent such
advance is determined by the securities administrator to be
recoverable.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for loans serviced by United Shore, Shellpoint,
JPMCB, LoanDepot, United Shore and Guaranteed rate will be based on
a step-up incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $40
per loan and additional fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted
loans. Shellpoint will act as interim servicer for the JPMCB
mortgage loans until the servicing transfer date, June 1, 2020 or
such later date as determined by the issuing entity and JPMCB.

The servicing fee framework is comparable to other recent JPMMT
transactions backed by prime mortgage loans that it has rated.
However, while this fee structure is common in non-performing
mortgage securitizations, it is relatively new to rated prime
mortgage securitizations which typically incorporate a flat 25
basis point servicing fee rate structure. By establishing a base
servicing fee for performing loans that increases with the
delinquency of loans, the fee-for-service structure aligns monetary
incentives to the servicer with the costs of the servicer. The
servicer receives higher fees for labor-intensive activities that
are associated with servicing delinquent loans, including loss
mitigation, than they receive for servicing a performing loan,
which is less labor-intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is
reasonable and adequate for this transaction because it better
aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance.
Furthermore, higher fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make
the transfer of these loans to another servicer easier, should that
become necessary. By contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a
servicer can take actions, such as modifications and prolonged
workouts, that increase the value of its mortgage servicing
rights.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $40 for all performing loans and increases according to a
pre-determined delinquent and incentive servicing fee schedule. The
delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from the
available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-Party Review

Four third party review firms, AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), Clayton
Services LLC (Clayton), Inglet Blair LLC (IB) and Opus Capital
Markets Consultants, LLC (Opus) (collectively, TPR firms) verified
the accuracy of the loan-level information that it received from
the sponsor. These firms conducted detailed credit, valuation,
regulatory compliance and data integrity reviews on 100% of the
mortgage pool. The TPR results indicated compliance with the
originators' underwriting guidelines for majority of loans, no
material compliance issues, and no appraisal defects. Overall, the
loans that had exceptions to the originators' underwriting
guidelines had strong documented compensating factors such as low
DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment
histories. The TPR firms also identified minor compliance
exceptions for reasons such as inadequate RESPA disclosures (which
do not have assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA Integrated
Disclosure violations related to fees that were out of variance but
then were cured and disclosed.

The property valuation review consisted of reviewing the valuation
materials utilized at origination to ensure the appraisal report
was complete and in conformity with the underwriting guidelines.
The TPR firms also reviewed each loan to determine whether a
third-party valuation product was required and if required, that
the third-party product value was compared to the original
appraised value to identify a value variance. In some cases, if a
variance of more than 10% was noted, the TPR firms ensured any
required secondary valuation product was ordered and reviewed. The
property valuation portion of the TPR was conducted using, among
other methods, a field review, a third-party collateral desk
appraisal (CDA), field review, automated valuation model (AVM) or a
Collateral Underwriter (CU) risk score. In some cases, a CDA, BPO
or AVM was not provided because these loans were originated under
United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program (i.e. non-conforming
loans underwritten using Fannie Mae's Desktop Underwriter Program)
and had a CU risk score less than or equal to 2.5. Moody's consider
the use of CU risk score for non-conforming loans to be credit
negative due to (1) the lack of human intervention which increases
the likelihood of missing emerging risk trends, (2) the limited
track record of the software and limited transparency into the
model and (3) GSE focus on non-jumbo loans which may lower
reliability on jumbo loan appraisals. It did not apply an
adjustment to the loss for such loans since the statistically
significant sample size and valuation results of the loans that
were reviewed using a CDA or a field review (which it considers to
be a more accurate third-party valuation product) were sufficient.

R&W Framework

JPMMT 2020-3's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance. Its
review of the R&W framework considers the financial strength of the
R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets) and
enforcement mechanisms. The R&W providers vary in financial
strength. The creditworthiness of the R&W provider determines the
probability that the R&W provider will be available and have the
financial strength to repurchase defective loans upon identifying a
breach. An investment grade rated R&W provider lends substantial
strength to its R&Ws. Moody's analyzes the impact of less
creditworthy R&W providers case by case, in conjunction with other
aspects of the transaction.

Moody's made no adjustments to the loans for which JPMCB (Aa2), its
affiliate, JPMMAC provided R&Ws since they are highly rated and/or
financially stable entities. In contrast, the rest of the R&W
providers are unrated and/or financially weaker entities. Moody's
applied an adjustment to the loans for which these entities
provided R&Ws. JPMMAC will make the mortgage loan representations
and warranties with respect to mortgage loans originated by certain
originators (approx. 2% by loan balance). For loans that JPMMAC
acquired via the MAXEX Clearing LLC (MaxEx) platform, MaxEx under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MaxEx to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in other
JPMMT transactions.

No other party will backstop or be responsible for backstopping any
R&W providers who may become financially incapable of repurchasing
mortgage loans. With respect to the mortgage loan R&Ws made by such
originators or the aggregator, as applicable, as of a date prior to
the closing date, JPMMAC will make a "gap" representation covering
the period from the date as of which such R&W is made by such
originator or the aggregator, as applicable, to the cut-off date or
closing date, as applicable. Additionally, no party will be
required to repurchase or substitute any mortgage loan until such
loan has gone through the review process.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction Delaware trustee is Citibank. The custodian's
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by Citibank.
Nationstar, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, servicer termination and for the appointment of any
successor servicer. In addition, Nationstar is committed to act as
successor if no other successor servicer can be found. The master
servicer is required to advance principal and interest if the
servicer fails to do so. If the master servicer fails to make the
required advance, the securities administrator is obligated to make
such advance.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.75% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. The
subordinate bonds benefit from a floor as well. When the total
current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus the aggregate
balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior to it amount to
less than 0.65% of the original pool balance, those tranches that
are junior to it do not receive principal distributions. The
principal those tranches would have received is directed to pay
more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

In addition, until the aggregate class principal amount of the
senior certificates (other than the interest only certificates) is
reduced to zero, if on any distribution date, the aggregate
subordinate percentage for such distribution date drops below 6.00%
of current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will
include all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero.

Moody's calculates the credit neutral floors for a given target
rating as shown in its principal methodology. The senior
subordination floor is equal to an amount which is the sum of the
balance of the six largest loans at closing multiplied by the
higher of their corresponding MILAN Aaa severity or a 35% severity.
The credit neutral floor for Aaa rating is $4,462,552. The senior
subordination floor of 0.75% and subordinate floor of 0.65% are
consistent with the credit neutral floors for the assigned
ratings.

Transaction Structure

The transaction has a shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds (other than the
Class A-R Certificates) is based on the net WAC as reduced by the
sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and (ii) the capped trust
expense rate. In the event that there is a small number of loans
remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate can be reduced to
zero.

The Class A-11 Certificates will have a pass-through rate that will
vary directly with the rate of one-month LIBOR and the Class A-11-X
Certificates will have a pass-through rate that will vary inversely
with the rate of one-month LIBOR. If the securities administrator
notifies the depositor that it cannot determine one-month LIBOR in
accordance with the methods prescribed in the sale and servicing
agreement and a benchmark transition event has not yet occurred,
one-month LIBOR for such accrual period will be one-month LIBOR as
calculated for the immediately preceding accrual period. Following
the occurrence of a benchmark transition event, a benchmark other
than one-month LIBOR will be selected for purposes of calculating
the pass-through rate on the class A-11 certificates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in October 2019. The methodologies
used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in October 2019
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in February 2019.

The credit rating for J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-3 was
assigned accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled
"Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework,"
dated October 2019. Please note that on December 9, 2019, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology to expand the
scope to include private label non-prime first-lien mortgage loans
originated during or after 2009. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating on J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Trust 2020-3 will not be affected.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C4: Moody's Lowers Class G Certs to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on six classes, and
downgraded the ratings on five classes in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2012-C4, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2012-C4, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2019
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on four P&I classes, Class D, Class E, Class F and
Class G, were downgraded primarily due to the decline in
performance and upcoming refinance risk of the largest loan in the
pool, The Shoppes at Buckland Hills.

The rating on one IO class (Class X-A) was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on one IO class (Class X-B) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $724 million
from $1.099 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by thirty mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 15.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 64.5% of the pool. One loan, constituting
7.9% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Seven loans, constituting 17.4% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 23.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $7.9 million (for a loss severity of
42%). There are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 18.6% of the pool. The largest
troubled loan is The Shoppes at Buckland Hills Loan, which is
further discussed. The second largest troubled loan is the Hilton
Springfield loan (3.0% of the pool), which is secured by 245-room
limited service hotel located in Springfield, Virginia. The loan is
on the watchlist due to low DSCR primarily as a result of decreased
room revenue. There has been an increase in competition since
securitization. For the trailing twelve month period ending June
2019, the occupancy and RevPAR were 62% and $84.17, respectively.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and partial year 2019 operating results for 88% of the pool
(excluding defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
80%, compared to 98% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
16.8% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.54X and 1.35X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.17X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the ELS Portfolio
Loan ($57.5 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of eight manufactured housing communities located in
Florida (2), Nevada (2), Virginia (1), Arizona (1), California (1),
and Massachusetts (1). The sponsor, Equity Lifestyle Properties, is
a Chicago-based, self-administered, self-managed REIT. The
portfolio was 90% leased as of September 2019, compared to 85% at
the prior review. The portfolio's net operating income (NOI) has
continued to improve since securitization. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and 1.88X,
respectively, compared to aa2 (scca.pd) and 1.85X at the last
review.

The top three non-defeased loans represent 30.4% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is The Shoppes at Buckland Hills Loan
($113.3 million -- 15.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
535,000 square feet (SF) component of a 1.1 million SF regional
mall located in the Buckland Hills section of Manchester,
Connecticut, approximately 10 miles north of Hartford. The mall was
originally built in 1990 and subsequently renovated and expanded in
2003. The property's anchors include traditional department stores
Macy's, Macy's Mens & Home, JCPenney and Sears, as well as Dick's
Sporting Goods (only Dick's is included as part of the collateral).
The property's trade area covers the northeastern suburbs of
Hartford and parts of the north-central part of Connecticut. The
property competes with a number of regional malls and power
centers, including the Westfarms Mall, the dominant regional mall
in the Hartford MSA. As of September 2019, the collateral component
of the property was 94.5% leased, with inline occupancy of 77%.
Performance of the property has trended down since securitization.
The property's 2018 net operating income (NOI) was approximately
14% lower than securitization levels as a result of declining
revenue. Inline tenant sales have also declined since
securitization. The loan matures in March 2022 and regional mall
may face higher refinance risk as compared to other major property
types. The loan has amortized approximately 13%, however, due to
the declining performance and upcoming refinance risk, Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the GPB Portfolio I Loan ($54.4 million
-- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by an eleven property retail
portfolio located across two states: Massachusetts (10) and New
Jersey (1). The portfolio was 99% leased as of September 2019,
unchanged from the prior review. The loan has amortized 12% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.29X,
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.27X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 9 MetroTech Center Loan ($52.1
million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in a nine-story, single-tenant office building located in
the CBD of Brooklyn, New York. The property was built-to-suit for
the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) in 1996 and serves as the
department's headquarters and the city emergency command center. In
addition to approximately 317,000 SF of office space, the building
also contains a two-story, below-grade, 137 space parking garage.
The FDNY lease commenced in October 1997 and featured a 20-year
term, with one, 10-year extension option exercisable. The FDNY
exercised this option and extended their lease through October
2028. Due to the single tenant concentration, Moody's value
incorporates a lit/dark analysis due to the single tenant exposure.
The loan has amortized 17% securitization and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 90% and
1.13X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C12: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2013-C12 (MSBAM 2013-C12).

RATING ACTIONS

MSBAM 2013-C12

Class A-3 61762XAT4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 61762XAU1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 61762XAW7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 61762XAS6; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 61762XAX5;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 61762XAZ0;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 61762XAC1;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 61762XAE7;    LT BB+sf Affirmed;  previously at BB+sf

Class F 61762XAG2;    LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class G 61762XAJ6;    LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

Class PST 61762XAY3;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-A 61762XAV9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) has increased
since issuance due to loan payoffs, continued scheduled
amortization and defeasance. As of the February 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by
27.1% to $930.6 million from $1.28 billion at issuance and by 2.7%
since the last rating action. Seven loans (8.5%) are fully
defeased, up from three loans (2.6%) at the last rating action. Six
loans (6.9%) are full-term IO; all other remaining loans (93.1%)
are currently amortizing. Loan maturities are concentrated in 2023
(98.9%), with only one loan maturing in 2020 (0.7%) and one in 2033
(0.4%).

Increased Loss Expectations: The overall performance of the
majority of the pool remains relatively stable; however, current
loss expectations have increased since issuance due to performance
concerns related to the six Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 23.3% of
the pool), which include one specially serviced loan (2.9%).

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC, 15 MetroTech Center (8.3%
of the pool), is secured by the leasehold interest in a 649,492-sf
office property located in downtown Brooklyn, NY. Fitch Ratings
expects the largest tenant, Anthem, Inc. (60.5% of net rentable
area [NRA]), to vacate upon its June 2020 lease expiration; Anthem
currently subleases all of its space. Per the servicer and recent
media reports, two sublease tenants have signed direct leases —
Magellan Health Inc. (5.7%) for its current space and Slate for the
eighth floor (3.5%), commencing upon Anthem's lease expiration.
Fitch will continue to monitor the leasing of the remaining Anthem
spaces. As of February 2020, leasing reserves totaled approximately
$36.2 million. The servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was 1.84x as of YTD September 2019.

The second largest FLOC, Westfield Countryside (5.7%), is secured
by a 464,836-sf collateral portion of a 1.26 million sf regional
mall located in Clearwater, FL. Total mall occupancy fell to 82.1%
after the non-collateral anchor Sears closed in July 2018. The box
is owned by Seritage Growth Properties. Sears had previously
downsized its space to accommodate a 37,000-sf Whole Foods, but the
majority of the Sears space currently remains vacant. Per the
September 2019 rent roll, the collateral was 91.7% occupied,
relatively unchanged from YE 2018. The mall also faces significant
nearby competition from three other malls within a 15-mile radius.
The servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 1.57x as of YTD September 2019.
In-line sales of $397 psf as of TTM September 2019 have remained
flat since issuance. The loan began amortizing in July 2018.

The third largest FLOC, Rolling Valley Mall (4.0%), is secured by a
237,214-sf grocery-anchored retail property located in Burke, VA.
The property was 98.8% leased, but only 78% physically occupied.
Per recent media reports, the grocery anchor tenant, Shoppers Food
Warehouse (20.8% of NRA), recently sold its store to German
discount supermarket chain, Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG, in January
2020. The store remains closed to date. Fitch's inquiry to the
servicer on the grocery store's expected reopening date and lease
terms remains outstanding.

The fourth largest FLOC, the specially serviced Deer Springs Town
Center loan (2.9%), is secured by a 184,403-sf anchored retail
center located in North Las Vegas, NV. The loan transferred to
special servicing in October 2018 following the bankruptcy and
closure of Toys "R" Us (35.6% of NRA) and has been delinquent since
June 2019. Per the servicer, the borrower has a letter of intent
with a gym tenant for a 40,000 sf portion of the former Toys "R" Us
space. Major tenants, Ross Dress for Less (16.4%), PetSmart (14.9%)
and Staples (11.1%), have also recently renewed their leases
expiring in 2019 and 2020 for additional five-year terms.

The remaining two FLOCs (combined, 2.3%) are secured by student
housing properties in Grand Forks, ND that have experienced cash
flow decline since issuance.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity analysis that assumed a potential outsized loss of 25%
on the balloon balance of the Westfield Countryside loan (5.7%) due
to refinance concerns stemming from the property's declining cash
flow, significant nearby competition and existing vacancy for the
majority of the former Sears anchor box. The Negative Rating
Outlook on class G reflects this scenario.

High Retail Concentration and Regional Mall/Outlet Exposure: Retail
properties represent the largest property type concentration at
55.0% of the pool, including nine of the top 15 loans (44.3%). The
majority of the retail exposure is from three of the top five
loans, including Merrimack Premium Outlets (12.8%), an outlet
center located in Merrimack, NH; City Creek Center (8.1%), a
lifestyle center located in Salt Lake City, UT; and Westfield
Countryside (5.7%), a regional mall located in Clearwater, FL. Both
the Merrimack Premium Outlets and City Creek Center have exhibited
healthy in-line sales. Eleven loans (19.9%) are secured by anchored
community or power centers.

The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to a mall that is underperforming as a result of
changing consumer preferences to shopping. This has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the rating,
resulting in the Negative Outlook on class G.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-SB through F reflect the
relatively stable performance of the majority of the pool,
increasing credit enhancement and expected continued amortization.
Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of classes B through D may occur with significant improvement in
credit enhancement and/or defeasance, but would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded beyond 'Asf' if there
is a likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
below-investment-grade classes are not expected due to performance
concerns from the Westfield Countryside and specially serviced Deer
Springs Town Center loans, but may occur in the later years of the
transaction should credit enhancement increase and as the number of
FLOCs are reduced.

The Negative Rating Outlook on class G reflects the additional
sensitivity analysis on the Westfield Countryside loan. Factors
that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level losses
from underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the
senior classes A-SB through F are not likely due to their position
in the capital structure and the increasing credit enhancement and
defeasance. The Rating Outlook on class G may be revised back to
Stable if the Westfield Countryside loan experiences improved
performance and the specially serviced Deer Springs Town Center
loan is resolved with better recoveries than expected.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C15: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed twelve classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C15.

RATING ACTIONS

Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C15

Class A-3 61763KAZ7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 61763KBA1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 61763KBC7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 61763KAY0; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 61763KBD5;    LT AAsf Affirmed;   previously at AAsf

Class C 61763KBF0;    LT Asf Affirmed;    previously at Asf

Class D 61763KAE4;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 61763KAG9;    LT BB+sf Affirmed;  previously at BB+sf

Class F 61763KAJ3;    LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class PST 61763KBE3;  LT Asf Affirmed;    previously at Asf

Class X-A 61763KBB9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 61763KAA2;  LT AAsf Affirmed;   previously at AAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Overall Loss Expectations: Fitch's base case losses remain
stable since issuance as the result of the underlying pool
performing in-line or better than expectations at issuance. The
pool has five loans (4.8%) that are considered Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOC) including one loan in the top 15 for concentrated
tenant rollover. There are seven loans (4.4%) on the servicer's
watchlist for high vacancy, poor performance and deferred
maintenance. All loans are current and no loans are in special
servicing.

Improved Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has improved since
issuance, primarily due to loan amortization and payoffs. As of the
February 2020 distribution period, the pool has paid down by 16.5%
since issuance, to $900.5 million from $1.1 billion. Seven loans
totaling approximately $105 million paid in 2018 or 2019 at or
before their respective maturity dates. The remaining pool matures
in 2023 or 2024. Of the remaining pool balance, 79% was amortizing,
and four loans totaling 6.2% of the pool balance were defeased.

Additional Loss Considerations: Fitch applied additional loss
assumptions on three loans in the top 15: Aspen Heights —
Harrisonburg (3.3%), Northway Mall (2.3%) and The Pointe at Western
(1.8%). Stressed loss assumptions on Aspen Heights and the Pointe
at Western were 25% and based on the potential for performance
volatility given that both are collateralized by student housing
properties. The stressed loss assumption on Northway Mall was 50%
and although this property is not a traditional mall, approximately
32% of the NRA's leases expire in 2021. In addition, an independent
stress was performed, which assumed an additional 100 bps to Fitch
stressed cap rates, as well as an additional 10% haircut to Fitch's
stressed cash flows. Neither stress scenario affected Fitch's
recommendation to affirm the ratings.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Northway Mall (2.3%) is a 353,440-sf power
center located in Colonie, NY. Jo-Ann Store (NRA 12.9%), Buy Buy
Baby (NRA 10.5%) and Marshalls (NRA 8.5%) leases are scheduled to
expire in January 2021. Jo-Ann Stores, Buy Buy Baby and Marshalls
have been at the subject since 2000, 2010 and 1989, respectively;
additionally, the property has remained 100% occupied since
issuance. Fitch inquired to the master servicer for updates
regarding any leasing activity for Jo-Ann Stores, Buy Buy Baby and
Marshalls, but has not received a response.

The remaining four FLOCs individually account for less than 1.00%
of the total pool balance and collectively account for 2.5% of the
total pool balance.

Hotel Exposure: As of the March 2020 distribution Period, six
properties comprising 25.0% of aggregate pool balance have been
classified as lodging property types. The largest lodging property,
La Concha Hotel & Tower (8.6%), is a 483-key, full service hotel in
San Juan, Puerto Rico in the Condado resort area. The property
consists of two buildings, La Concha Hotel and La Concha Tower. The
borrower has stated that there was no damage from the recent
earthquake and that the resort is fully operational and all
restaurants are working regular hours.

Fitch is monitoring the performance of this asset, as well as the
other hotels in the pool given the current concerns with potential
reduction in travel due to COVID-19.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks reflect the stable performance of the
majority of the pool. Factors that could lead to upgrades include
stable to improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or
defeasance. Upgrades to B through D may occur with significant
improved credit enhancement but may be limited due to potential
performance volatility given the concentration of hotels (25%),
including La Concha Hotel & Tower, as well as student housing
properties (5.5%). Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there is likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
below-investment-grade rated classes are not likely given the
limited improved credit enhancement and sensitivity to
concentrations, as well as concerns with the FLOC Northway Mall,
but may occur in the later years of the transaction should credit
enhancement increase and there are minimal FLOCs.

Factors that could lead to downgrades include an increase in
expected pool level losses from underperforming or specially
serviced loans. While currently not expected, classes D and E could
be downgraded if additional loans become FLOCs. Downgrades to the
senior classes A-SB through D are not likely due to the position in
the capital structure and stable performance of the majority of the
pool.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed 15 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust Series 2017-C33 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

RATING ACTIONS

MSBAM 2017-C33

Class A-1 61767CAQ1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 61767CAR9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 61767CAT5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 61767CAU2;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 61767CAV0;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 61767CAY4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 61767CAS7; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 61767CAZ1;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 61767CBA5;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 61767CAC2;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 61767CAE8;    LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf

Class F 61767CAG3;    LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf

Class X-A 61767CAW8;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 61767CAX6;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-D 61767CAA6;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance and loss expectations with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. There are no
specially serviced or delinquent loans.

There is one Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC) in the pool. The Tops
Portfolio loan (approximately 1% of the pool), is secured by three
grocery anchored retail properties near Buffalo, NY. In February of
2018, Tops Markets, the anchor tenant accounting for approximately
69% of the portfolio GLA, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in order
to eliminate a substantial portion of debt from the company's
balance sheet. The company emerged from bankruptcy in November 2018
after having reduced its debt by $445 million. Ten stores were
closed during the restructuring period, but none of the properties
within the portfolio were affected. The loan is currently being
cash managed. As of YE 2018, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
was 1.23x and occupancy was 94%.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the February 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 1.88% to $689.4 million from $702.6 million at issuance. All
original 44 loans remain in the pool. Based on the scheduled
balance at maturity, the pool will pay down by 11.4%, which is
above the 2017 average of 7.9%. There are six (27%) full-term IO
loans, 20 (27%) balloon loans, and 18 (46%) partial IO loans.
Fitch-rated transactions in 2017 had an average full-term, IO
percentage of 46.1% and a partial IO percentage of 28.7%.

Hotel Exposure: Loans backed by hotel properties comprise
approximately 13% of the deal. Hotels are expected to be the first
property type affected by the coronavirus due to reduced tourism
and travel, and a slowdown in economic activity. The largest loan
in the pool is the Hyatt Regency Austin (8.7% of the pool). The
subject is a 16-story, full service hotel located in Austin, TX.
The property contains 448 rooms, including 225 king rooms, 205
queen rooms and 18 suites. Amenities include two restaurants, a
Starbucks, a sushi bar, a market pantry, an outdoor pool, a fitness
center, a business center and nine meeting rooms totaling
approximately 33,080 sf of meeting space. As of December 2019,
occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR, were 86%, $221, and $189, respectively.
The penetration rates for the occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR, were
107.6%, 92.8%, and 99.8%, respectively. Fitch will continue to
monitor the impact of reduced travel on the hotel industry.

Additional Debt: Seven loans (32% of the pool) have pari passu debt
held outside of the trust. Of these seven loans, the trust holds
the controlling note of three loans and the non-controlling notes
of four loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable given the
generally stable performance of the transaction since issuance.
Fitch is monitoring the impact of reduced travel and lower economic
activity on all transactions, especially those with significant
hotel exposure.

Factors that would lead to upgrades include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.

Factors that could lead to downgrades would include a decline in
property level performance or the transfer of loans to special
servicing with expected losses.


NOMURA ASSET 2005-WF1: Moody's Lowers Class II-A-4 Debt to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of one tranche, and
downgraded the rating of four tranches, from 3 RMBS transactions,
backed by Subprime, Alt-A and Scratch and dent loans.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2018
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2018
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-SD1

Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2016
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. IA-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2018 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade is primarily due to improved underlying
collateral performance and increased credit enhancement available
to the bond. The rating downgrades are primarily due to outstanding
interest shortfalls on the bonds. Bear Stearns Asset Backed
Securities Trust 2005-SD1 Cl. I-M-2 and Cl. I-M-3 outstanding
interest shortfalls are not expected to be recouped as the bonds
have weak structural mechanisms to reimburse accrued interest.
Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan Trust, Series
2005-WF1 Cl. II-A-4 and Cl. II-A-5 have had outstanding interest
shortfalls since June 2018, which have been increasing overtime. As
of February 2020 remit, the shortfalls on Cl. II-A-4 and Cl. II-A-5
are approximately 1% and 0.02% respectively; while these group II
bonds benefit from cross collateralization from group I, the
recoupment of such shortfalls will not be imminent. The actions
also reflect the recent performance as well as Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.5% in February 2020 from 3.8% in
February 2019. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 3.9% for the 2020 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2020. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2020-3: Fitch Affirms Class B-4 Certs at 'BB-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust
2020-3.

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2020-3

Class A-1; LT AAAsf New Rating
  
Class A-10; LT AAAsf New Rating
  
Class A-11; LT AAAsf New Rating

Class A-12; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-13; LT AAAsf New Rating   

Class A-14; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-15; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-16; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-17; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-18; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-19; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-2; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-20; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-21; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-22; LT AAAsf New Rating

Class A-23; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-24; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-3; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-4; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-5; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-6; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-7; LT AAAsf New Rating

Class A-8; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-9; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO1; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO10; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO11; LT AAAsf New Rating

Class A-IO12; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO13; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO14; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO15; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO16; LT AAAsf New Rating

Class A-IO17; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO18; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO19; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO2; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO20; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO21; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO22; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO23; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO24; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO25; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO26; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO3; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO4; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO5; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO6; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO7; LT AAAsf New Rating  

Class A-IO8; LT AAAsf New Rating

Class A-IO9; LT AAAsf New Rating   

Class B-1; LT AA-sf New Rating  

Class B-2; LT A-sf New Rating  

Class B-3; LT BBB-sf New Rating  

Class B-4; LT BB-sf New Rating  

Class B-5; LT NRsf New Rating  

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed certificates
issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2020-3. The certificates are
supported by 764 loans with a total balance of approximately
$626.44 million as of the closing date. The pool consists of prime
fixed-rate mortgages acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corp. from various mortgage originators. Distributions of principal
and interest and loss allocations are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of very
high-quality 30-year and 25-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing
loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles, relatively low
leverage and large liquid reserves. The pool has a weighted average
original model FICO score of 775 and an original WA combined loan
to value ratio of 68%. All the loans in the pool consist of Safe
Harbor Qualified Mortgages.

Interest Reduction Risk (Negative): The transaction incorporates a
structural feature unique to Redwood's program for loans more than
120 days delinquent (a stop-advance loan). Unpaid interest on
stop-advance loans reduces the amount of interest that is
contractually due to bondholders in reverse-sequential order. While
this feature helps limit cash flow leakage to subordinate bonds, it
can result in interest reductions to rated bonds in high-stress
scenarios.

Prioritization of Principal Payments (Positive): The limited
advancing leads to lower loss severities than a full advancing
structure. The unique stop-advance structural feature reduces
interest payments to subordinate bonds, but allows for greater
principal recovery than a traditional structure. Furthermore, while
traditional structures determine senior principal distributions by
comparing the senior bond size to the collateral balance, this
transaction structure compares the senior balance to the collateral
balance less any stop-advance loans. In a period of increased
delinquencies, this will result in a larger amount of principal
paid to the senior bonds relative to a traditional structure.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): The operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Redwood is assessed as an
'Above Average' aggregator. The aggregator has a robust sourcing
strategy, and maintains experienced senior management and staff,
strong risk management and corporate governance controls, and a
robust due diligence process. Primary and master servicing
functions will be performed by entities rated 'RPS2' and 'RMS2+',
respectively.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party due
diligence was performed on 60% of loans in the transaction. The
percentage of reviewed loans is lower for this transaction due to
the high concentration of loans from First Republic Bank; Redwood
generally samples loans from this originator for due diligence as
it is an established lender in the market and has a strong seller
relationship with Redwood. However, the sampling methodology and
due diligence review scope is consistent with Fitch criteria and
the results are in line with prior RMBS issued by Redwood. Fitch
applied a credit for the percentage of loan level due diligence,
which reduced the 'AAAsf' loss expectation by 9 bps.

Top Tier Representation and Warranty Framework (Neutral): The
loan-level representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
framework is consistent with Fitch's Tier 1, the highest possible.
Fitch applied a neutral treatment at the 'AAAsf' rating category as
a result of the Tier 1 framework and the internal credit opinion
supporting the repurchase obligations of the ultimate R&W
backstop.

Credit Enhancement Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which
arises as the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a
subordination floor of 0.75% of the original balance will be
maintained for the certificates. The floor is more than sufficient
to protect against the five largest loans defaulting at Fitch's
'AAAsf' average loss severity of 43.20%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines than
assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are only
an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or
may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Three
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 2.4%. As shown in the table included in the presale
report, the analysis indicates that some potential rating migration
exists with higher MVDs compared with the model projection.

Additionally, the defined rating sensitivities determine the
stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category,
to non-investment grade and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E as prepared by
Clayton Services, LLC, SitusAMC, Opus Capital Markets Consultants
and Edge Mortgage Advisory Company. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on credit, compliance and valuation.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions. Fitch believes
the overall results of the review generally reflected strong
underwriting controls.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


SG COMMERCIAL 2020-COVE: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the following classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-COVE issued by SG
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2020-COVE:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X at BBB (sf)

All classes will be privately placed. The Class X balance is
notional. All trends are Stable.

Our affiliate rating agency, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (MCR),
assigned preliminary ratings on these certificates on February 18,
2020. In connection with the ongoing consolidation of DBRS
Morningstar and MCR, MCR previously announced that it had placed
its outstanding ratings of these certificates Under
Review-Analytical Integration Review. Upon issuance of DBRS
Morningstar's final ratings on these certificates, MCR has today
withdrawn its outstanding preliminary ratings. In accordance with
MCR's engagement letter covering this transaction, upon withdrawal
of MCR's outstanding preliminary ratings, the DBRS Morningstar
final ratings will become the successor ratings to the withdrawn
preliminary MCR ratings.

The loan is secured by a 283-unit, Class A luxury multifamily
property built in 1967 along the waterfront in Tiburon, California,
across the bay from San Francisco. The property consists of 33 two-
and three-story apartment buildings and a single-story
clubhouse/management office building. There are 428 designated
parking spaces and an additional 63 spaces of street parking is
available for a total of 1.7 spaces per unit. Each unit has at
least one designated parking space. The collateral spans 20.12
acres, however, a portion of the property includes some submerged
land/tidal area and the appraisal estimates that the approximate
usable land area is 13.61 acres, noting that portions of some
buildings were constructed on piers that are in the submerged
land/tidal area. Because it is in a flood zone, flood insurance is
required for the entire property. The property has been extensively
renovated with 272 units and the clubhouse/management building was
renovated between 2014 and 2016 at a total cost of $39.31 million,
or $138,895 per unit. The remaining 11 units, all three- and
four-bedrooms units, were renovated in 2017 and 2018 with high-end,
condominium-quality luxury finishes for $11.08 million, or $39,146
per unit, and are known as the Pointe Homes. Unit amenities include
open-concept kitchen and living room areas, an upgraded kitchen
package with stainless-steel Bertazzoni range and microwave, Fisher
& Paykel refrigerator, GE dishwasher, and in-unit washer dryer,
quartz countertops, and a wood-burning fireplace. Floor finishes
include carpet, wood plank, and tile, depending on the room. The
Pointe Homes have custom cabinetry, indoor-outdoor fireplaces, and
floor-to-ceiling operable glass doors along with custom-designed
closets. Many units have a view of Richardson Bay and some units,
including the Pointe Homes, have San Francisco city views. The
property has 20 different floor plans and all units have private
patios or balconies. Some units have vaulted ceilings wine
refrigerators and a separate storage unit.

The Cove at Tiberon apartments offers an attractive lifestyle
option for renters in San Francisco's robust multifamily market.
Located just across the Golden Gate Bridge from San Francisco, the
luxury waterfront apartments are accessible by automobile or nearby
ferry to San Francisco's downtown area and many units have
beautiful city views. On-site amenities, which include a 52+-slip
marina, a private beach, and both indoor and outdoor pools and
spas, take advantage of the property's location on the northern end
of San Francisco Bay. Recent high-end renovations to the units and
amenities, as well as services that allow for easy enjoyment of the
property's desirable location, should continue to attract tenants
seeking an active lifestyle in the Bay area's top-tier apartment
market. The garden-style property offers residents 20 different
floor plan configurations, ranging in size from one to four
bedrooms, which allows The Cove at Tiburon to accommodate active
singles as well as families who are drawn to the area's highly
sought-after school district in Marin County.

Marin County is also famous for its restrictive development
regulations. As early as the late 1960s, Marin activists have
sought to restrain growth for the sake of the environment.
Currently, almost 85% of the county is off-limits to development,
resulting in limited new supply and a perennially low vacancy rate
among the county's multifamily apartments. Reis, Inc. (Reis)
reports that the South Marin residential submarket is the smallest
of the 11 San Francisco neighborhoods and minimal new apartment
development has kept historic vacancy rates below 5% since 2004.
Reis projects South Marin's vacancy rate to be around 3.8% by 2024
after 134 new units are expected to be added in 2023, a 1.8%
increase to the current inventory of 7,422 units. Class A units,
like The Cove at Tiberon, number only 4,059, according to Reis.

The sponsor has invested $50.4 million ($178,042 per unit) in
capital improvements since acquiring the property in 2013. In
addition to extensive exterior and common-area renovations, all
apartment units were reconfigured and extensively renovated with
updated, high-end finishes. Post-renovation, average rents at the
property increased 83.2% from a property-wide average of $2.62 per
square foot (psf) in 2014 to $4.80 psf average in-place rents at
all non-Pointe Place units.

Amenities at the Cove include an approximately 52- to 55-boat slip
marina programmed with the assistance of a Coast Guard licensed
captain, a sunset deck, three pools (two outdoor and one indoor),
two hot tubs, as well as a clubhouse with a business center and
fitness center. The recently completed renovations also provide for
lifestyle amenities including move-in assistance, dry cleaning,
towel service at the pool, the ability for residents to book
sailing trips through the boat slip marina, complimentary use of
kayaks and paddleboards, adult fitness camp, and yoga in the
clubhouse. The Cove at Tiburon is located directly on the
waterfront in south Marin County and many units have unobstructed
views of the San Francisco skyline. Comparable new supply is
severely constrained because it is difficult to obtain approval
from local authorities for development and construction,
particularly in proximity to protected wetlands. To protect the
borrower from any future liability stemming from the property's
location adjacent to wetlands, the lender required environmental
insurance policy.

While the property's use is conforming, the property is legally
nonconforming with respect to parking. Because of changes in the
zoning ordinance subsequent to its development in 1963, existing
parking at the property is deficient by 51 parking spaces. The
borrower is not required to alter the current structure to comply
with existing or new laws; however, the borrower may not be able to
rebuild the premises as is in the event of a substantial casualty
loss. As a mitigant, the borrower must obtain law and ordinance
coverage for the property

The loan is structured with a recycled special-purpose entity
(SPE). The borrower has given backward-looking representation, from
the date of the SPE's formation, that it does not carry any prior
liabilities. Additionally, if the borrower's SPE representations
are breached, this triggers a guarantee from the sponsor.

The DBRS Morningstar loan-to-value ratio is significant at 102.8%.
The high leverage point, combined with the lack of scheduled
amortization, could result in potentially elevated refinance risk
at loan maturity.

Class X is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TIAA SEASONED 2007-4: Fitch Affirms Class E Certs at 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of TIAA Seasoned Commercial
Mortgage Trust, series 2007-C4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

TIAA Seasoned Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C4

  - Class B 87246AAF5; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class C 87246AAG3; LT Asf Affirmed

  - Class D 87246AAH1; LT BBBsf Affirmed

  - Class E 87246AAJ7; LT Bsf Affirmed

  - Class F 87246AAK4; LT CCCsf Affirmed

  - Class G 87246AAM0; LT CCsf Affirmed

  - Class H 87246AAN8; LT Csf Affirmed

  - Class J 87246AAP3; LT Csf Affirmed

  - Class K 87246AAQ1; LT Csf Affirmed
  
  - Class L 87246AAR9; LT Csf Affirmed

  - Class M 87246AAS7; LT Dsf Affirmed

  - Class N 87246AAT5; LT Dsf Affirmed

  - Class P 87246AAU2; LT Dsf Affirmed

  - Class Q 87246AAV0; LT Dsf Affirmed

  - Class S 87246AAW8; LT Dsf Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced Assets: Since Fitch's
last rating action, three loans (previously 16.0% of the pool) have
paid in full, reducing classes A-J and B. All three loans paid
ahead of their respective maturity dates. The two largest assets,
Algonquin Commons Phase I & Phase II (55.4% of the pool), were
transferred to special servicing in August 2009 for imminent
default due to cash flow issues stemming from prior tenant
bankruptcies, reduced tenant sales and lower rents. The loan was
subsequently modified in July 2010 while with the special servicer,
which included an extension of the interest only periods. However,
the loans were transferred back to the special servicer in June
2012 for payment default.

The properties are secured by two phases of an anchored retail
center located in Algonquin, IL. Phase I contains 418,451 square
feet (sf), built in 2003, and is anchored by Dick's Sporting Goods
(65,000 sf or 16% of gross leasable area [GLA]). Phase II has
146,339 sf, built in 2005, and largest tenants include Art Van
Furniture (30.7%; lease expiry in July 2021), Ross Dress for Less
(21.6%; lease expiry in January 2022) and Nordstrom Rack (16%;
lease expiry in October 2026). As of the December 2019 rent rolls,
total occupancy was reported at 82.5%. The special servicer filed a
motion for judgment of foreclosure in March 2018. Based on the
total exposure of the assets and the most recent valuations from
the special servicer, significant losses are expected to be
incurred upon liquidation.

Of the remaining non-specially serviced or non-defeased loans, the
largest loan, University Commons (24.5% of the pool), is secured by
a 173,922 square foot (sf) retail center located in Boca Raton, FL.
The collateral is anchored by a Whole Foods, Nordstrom Rack, Barnes
& Noble and Bed Bath & Beyond. Three of the top tenants have lease
expirations in 2020 and 2021, including Nordstrom Rack (2020),
Whole Foods (2021) and Barnes & Noble (2021). Per the master
servicer, Nordstrom Rack has renewed its lease through 2025 and
Whole Foods and Barnes & Noble are expected to exercise their
respective 5-year extension options. Both 2021 lease expirations
are approximately 5 months after the loan's 2021 maturity date.
Fitch applied a 25% loss severity to address the potential
refinance concerns and rollover concerns.

The second largest loan, Northport VII & VIII (2.2% of the NRA), is
secured by a 100,662 sf industrial center and retail center located
in Tampa, FL. The property's third largest tenant, DAL-TILE
Distribution (15.6% of the NRA) has a lease expiration in April
2020. Additionally, the fourth largest tenant, CVS (10.7% of the
NRA), has a lease expiration in 2021. Per the master servicer,
DAL-TILE has not indicated whether they intend on renewing, but
noted they often exercise extension options at the last minute. The
loan is fully amortizing, has a current Fitch loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) of 38% and matures Nov. 10, 2024. Fitch applied a 25% loss
severity in its sensitivity analysis to address the potential
rollover concerns; however, given the low leverage and fully
amortizing nature of the loan, losses are likely to be limited.

The remaining loan, 900 West 23rd Street Apartments (1.2% of the
pool), is secured by a 52-unit multifamily property located in
Austin, TX. The property has had strong performance since issuance.
Property occupancy as of September 2019 remained at 98%. The loan
is lowly levered, fully amortizing and has an expected maturity
date in 2023.

Increasing Credit Enhancement; Upcoming Maturities: Of the
remaining non-specially serviced loans, three loans (16.6% of the
pool) are defeased. Three loans (33.0% of the pool) have maturity
dates in 2021; the remainder of the non-specially serviced loans
are amortizing and have maturity dates in 2023 and 2024. As of the
Feb. 2020 remittance, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced
by 93.0% to $145 million from $2.09 billion at issuance. There are
interest shortfalls in the amount of $20.7 million affecting
classes F through T.

Increasing Pool Concentration: The deal is highly concentrated with
seven of the original 155 loans remaining. Three loans (16.0% of
the pool) are defeased and two loans (55.4% of the pool) are in
special servicing. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool,
Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining
loans based on collateral quality and performance and then ranked
them by their perceived likelihood of repayment. Based on this
sensitivity, the investment grade classes are reliant on the
continued performance of the fully amortizing and lower Fitch
stressed LTV loans in addition to the defeased collateral. The
non-investment grade classes would be dependent on the FLOCs and
specially serviced loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could lead to downgrades would be an increase in loss
expectations from underperforming or specially serviced loans. The
Negative Outlooks on classes D and E reflect the potential for
downgrades should the performance of the Fitch Loans of Concern
further deteriorate, particularly if the University Commons
Shopping Center not be able to refinance at maturity and/or if
losses on the specially serviced assets are higher than expected.
The Stable Outlooks on classes B and C represent sufficient credit
enhancement, continued amortization and stable performance of the
remaining, non-defeased loans. Factors that contribute to upgrades
would be stable to improved performance as well as an increase in
credit enhancement through pay down or defeasance. Upgrades are
unlikely given the concentrated nature of the pool, but are
possible with additional defeasance and better than expected
recoveries on the two specially serviced assets.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


TOWD POINT 2020-MH1: Fitch Gives 'BBsf' Ratings on 5 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2020-MH1:

TPMT 2020-MH1

  - Class A1 LT AAAsf New Rating

  - Class A1A LT AAAsf New Rating

  - Class A1AX LT AAAsf New Rating

  - Class A2 LT AAsf New Rating

  - Class A2A LT AAsf New Rating

  - Class A2AX LT AAsf New Rating

  - Class A2B LT AAsf New Rating

  - Class A2BX LT AAsf New Rating

  - Class A3 LT AAsf New Rating

  - Class A4 LT Asf New Rating

  - Class A5 LT BBBsf New Rating

  - Class B1 LT BBsf New Rating

  - Class B1A LT BBsf New Rating

  - Class B1AX LT BBsf New Rating

  - Class B1B LT BBsf New Rating

  - Class B1BX LT BBsf New Rating

  - Class B2 LT Bsf New Rating

  - Class B2A LT Bsf New Rating

  - Class B2AX LT Bsf New Rating

  - Class B2B LT Bsf New Rating

  - Class B2BX LT Bsf New Rating

  - Class B3 LT NRsf New Rating

  - Class B3A LT NRsf New Rating

  - Class B3AX LT NRsf New Rating
  
  - Class B3B LT NRsf New Rating

  - Class B3BX LT NRsf New Rating

  - Class M1 LT Asf New Rating

  - Class M1A LT Asf New Rating

  - Class M1AX LT Asf New Rating

  - Class M1B LT Asf New Rating

  - Class M1BX LT Asf New Rating

  - Class M2 LT BBBsf New Rating

  - Class M2A LT BBBsf New Rating

  - Class M2AX LT BBBsf New Rating

  - Class M2B LT BBBsf New Rating

  - Class M2BX LT BBBsf New Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

This is the second transaction issued by FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
backed by loans secured by manufactured homes and is the second
post-crisis MH transaction rated by Fitch. The transaction is
expected to close on March 10, 2020. The collateral pool is backed
by 12,555 seasoned MH loans, all of which are current using OTS
methodology as of the cut-off date. The pool totals $507.1 million,
which includes $140,753, or 0.03%, of non-interest-bearing deferred
principal amounts.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a traditional senior-subordinate, sequential-pay
structure. The sequential-pay structure locks out principal to the
subordinated notes until the most senior notes outstanding are paid
in full. The servicer will not be advancing delinquent monthly
payments of P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Manufactured Housing Loans (Negative): The transaction is backed by
100% seasoned MH loans, 98% of which are secured by chattel and 2%
by land-home. MH loans typically experience higher default rates
and lower recoveries than site-built residential home loans.
Fitch's loan-level loss model developed specifically for MH loans
is based on the historical observations of more than 1.0 million MH
loans originated from 1993-2002, with performance tracked through
2018.

Significant Seasoning (Positive): Fitch views the significant
seasoning, short remaining lives and current OTS payment status as
the key mitigating factors to the pool's credit risk. On average,
the pool is approximately 9.5 years seasoned. The loans are
amortizing and scheduled to pay in full in approximately 12 years,
on average.

All Loans OTS Current (Positive): 100% of the loans are OTS
current. Fitch received a minimum of 36-month pay strings for all
the loans in the pool. None of the loans are currently OTS
delinquent and only 4.3% have experienced a delinquency in the past
36 months. 95.7% of the pool has been clean for 36 months and,
therefore, received a PD credit to reflect the clean payment
histories. 5.6% of the loans have been modified by means of a
deferral, extension or other modification. The average time since
loss mitigation is approximately three years.

Credit Attributes (Positive): Borrowers in the pool have a weighted
average model FICO score of 722. Of the pool, 98% comprises loans
backed by chattel properties (secured with the structure only) and
the remaining 2% consist of land-home MH. Of the MH units, 86% are
double- or multi-wide. Double- and multi-wide units also have lower
observed defaults than single-wide units. Approximately 94% of the
loans are fixed rate. Additionally, 59% of the loans have 15- or
20-year terms, which also have lower observed default rates.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Negative): A third-party due diligence
review was performed by AMC Mortgage Consultants (Acceptable - Tier
1) on approximately 20% of the pool by loan count / 26% by unpaid
principal balance. The 20% due diligence sample meets Fitch's
criteria as a majority of the loans are non-real estate (chattel)
loans where the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and other
anti-predatory statutes do not apply. Additionally, the loans are
primarily from a single source. The results of the review showed
approximately 27% of the sample was assigned a 'C' or 'D' overall
grade.

A pay history review was conducted on 20% by loan count/27% by UPB
and all of the land-home loans received a tax and title review.
Fitch increased its expected losses by approximately 25bps to
account for loans missing a certificate of title or UCC or is still
pending. The adjustment is intended to account for delays in
repossession due to missing titles and UCCs.

Sequential-Pay Structure with Significant Express Spread
(Positive): The transaction's cash flow is based on a
sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes do not
receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in full.
Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order. Notably, express
spread will be used to pay down the notes. The structure has a
notable amount of excess spread, which is causing the deal's
initial subordination to be lower than Fitch's expected losses.

Short Remaining Life of Notes (Positive): The notes in this
transaction have short remaining lives and pay down quickly. In a
base case stress scenario, the 'AAAsf' class pays in full in less
than nine years, even when assuming a 5% constant prepayment rate,
which is significantly less than for other seasoned or
re-performing loan transactions.

Realized Loss and Writedown Feature (Positive): Loans delinquent
for 150 days or more under the OTS method will be considered a
realized loss and, therefore, will result in a write-down of the
most subordinated classes beginning with class B3. The feature adds
certainty to liquidation timelines and reduces bond interest to
subordinate bonds expected to be written down. This increases the
cash flow available for more senior classes. As less than 100% loss
severity is assumed, subsequent recoveries recouped after the
writedown at 150 days delinquent will be distributed to bondholders
as principal.

Moderate Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is considered
to be moderate for this transaction. The primary mitigating factors
for operational risk is the loan seasoning of 9.5 years and clean
payment histories as well as the due diligence results which
indicate low risk of loss due to the findings. Additionally,
FirstKey has a well-established track record acquiring
re-performing loan portfolios and has an 'above average' aggregator
assessment from Fitch. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. will
perform primary servicing functions for this transaction and is
rated as an RPS1- servicer. The issuer expects to retain at least
5% of the bonds helps to ensure an alignment of interest between
issuer and investor.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement mechanism construct for
this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views as a
Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers and
the exclusion of certain reps. After a threshold event (which
occurs when realized loss exceeds the class principal balance of
the B1, B2 and B3 notes), reviews for identifying breaches will be
conducted on loans that experience a realized loss of $10,000 or
more. To account for the Tier 2 framework, Fitch increased its base
case loss expectations by roughly 65bps to reflect a potential
increase in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses in the
reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): FirstKey, as rep provider,
will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to breaches prior
to the payment date in March 2021, with the exception of the REMIC
rep for which the obligation does not sunset. Thereafter, a reserve
fund will be available to cover amounts due to noteholders for
loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts on deposit in the
reserve fund, as well as the increased level of subordination, will
be available to cover additional defaults and losses resulting from
rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or after the payment date
in March 2021.

Aggregate Servicing Fee (Positive): The SPS servicing compensation
cap rate is 40bps and the aggregate servicing fee rate (the total
servicing fee taken out of the deal) is 100bps. Fitch views the
aggregate servicing fee of 100bps as sufficient to service MH
loans, and the structure was tested assuming this fee.
Additionally, should a replacement servicer be needed, the
transaction documents allow for the indenture trustee to negotiate
a fee above the stated aggregate servicing fee.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to additional losses. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or that may be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted a sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to additional losses of 5%, 10% and 15%. The analysis
indicates there is some potential rating migration with an increase
in loss.

Fitch also conducted a sensitivity analysis to determine what
increase in losses would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated three criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."

The first variation relates updated property values, which Fitch
typically expects to review for loans seasoned over 24 months.
Updated property values are not applicable for MH transactions.
Liquidation records of MHs show that, unlike conventional
site-built homes whose value generally appreciates over time, both
chattel and land-home MHs are depreciating assets. Due to the fact
that valuations on aged MH units is less reliable and economically
infeasible and MH loan borrowers' behavior is believed to be less
driven by equity incentives, Fitch does not look for updated
property values but, instead, relies on loan seasoning, payment
history and structure age to adjust for seasoned MH loan loss
estimation. There was no rating impact due to this variation.

The second variation is that the tax and title review for a portion
of the loans was outdated per Fitch's criteria. Per criteria, an
updated tax and title search is expected to be completed within six
months of the deal's cutoff date. 100% of the land home loans
received a tax and title search; however, for approximately 40% of
the reviewed loans, the review was completed outside the six-month
window. Roughly 94% of the loans reviewed outside the six-month
timeframe were generally completed within 13 months of the cutoff
date. Of the loans with an outdated review, all are currently
current and approximately 92% have been clean for the past 12
months. Additionally, the servicers are monitoring the tax and
title status as part of standard practice and the servicer will
advance where deemed necessary to keep the first lien positon of
each loan. There was no rating impact due to this variation.

The third variation relates to Fitch's assessment of the
transaction's R&W framework. While application of Fitch's R&W
scorecard matrix as published in its U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria
would have categorized this R&W framework as a Tier 3 due to the
20% due diligence sample size, the framework was assessed as Tier
2. The sample size meets Fitch's criteria for seasoned MH
collateral primarily from a single source, and the results provided
sufficient confidence to assess potential operational risk. In
addition, the loans are over nine years seasoned and most of the
compliance issues identified from the sample are past the statute
of limitations. The very clean pay histories also point to low risk
from a sampling due diligence. Application of the variation and
Fitch's treatment resulted in a one notch rating impact.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

A third-party regulatory compliance review was completed on a
random sample of approximately 20% by loan count and 26% by UPB of
the loans in the transaction pool. The due diligence sample size
and scope were determined by the TPR firm (AMC / Tier 1). The
sample size for compliance meets Fitch criteria for seasoned RMBS.
The non-reviewed loans in the pool primarily consisted of loans on
chattel properties primarily from a single source where HOEPA and
other anti-predatory statutes did not apply.

The regulatory compliance review covered applicable federal, state
and local high-cost and/or anti-predatory laws as well as TILA and
RESPA where applicable. Of the loans reviewed, 25.6% (646 loans)
received a 'C' grade. Many of the 'C' grade loans were due to
credit exceptions such as missing installation date, missing
manufacture date, missing final 1003 forms, and missing MH
model/make. The loans graded 'D' were generally due to missing
final HUD1's that are not subject to predatory lending because they
were purchase loans, missing state disclosures, and other
compliance related missing documents. Fitch believes these issues
do not add material risk to bondholders since the statute of
limitations has expired. None of the exceptions warranted a loss
adjustment due to the age of the loans and bond write-down feature
for 150-day delinquent loans.

A tax, title and lien search were performed on 100% of the
land-home loans, plus a small sampling of chattel properties - a
total of 2% by loan count/3% by UPB. Fitch accounted for the unpaid
taxes in the LS, which was increased by approximately 2bps.
Additionally, the servicer is monitoring the tax and title status
as part of standard practice and will advance unpaid taxes to
maintain the first lien positon of each loan.

Chattel properties require either a certificate of title or UCC-1
filing (depending on the state) included in the loan file and
delivered to the custodian, to show perfection of security interest
in the loans. For approximately 5.5% of the pool by loan count
(4.6% by UPB) the certificate of title or UCC-1 was missing or the
custodian was still pending receipt. There is concern that if these
units need to be repossessed or if the borrower stops paying, there
will be no recovery. To address this risk, Fitch assumed no
recovery (100% LS) on these loans, which resulted in an
approximately 20bp increase to Fitch's expected loss.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).  


TRINITAS CLO XII: Moody's Rates $11.250MM Class F Notes '(P)B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of notes to be issued by Trinitas CLO XII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$290,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class A-2
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class
B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$28,450,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2033 (the "Class B-2
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$23,850,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$30,200,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$23,750,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

US$11,250,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2033 (the
"Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E
Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on its methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Trinitas XII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible principal investments, up to 7.5%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and up to 2.5% of
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

Trinitas Capital Management, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C29 as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2018 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2018 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2018 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IO*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the three P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 68.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 62.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 8.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 78% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 18, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $66 million
from $3.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 6% to
37% of the pool. One loan, constituting 6% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three, compared to seven at Moody's last
review.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $251 million (for an average loss
severity of 44.2%). Three loans, constituting 78% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Boulder Crossing Shopping Center Loan ($21.0 million --
36.6% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery anchored retail
center located in Las Vegas, Nevada, located about seven miles east
of the Las Vegas strip. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer in November 2016 after it failed to pay off on the
November 11, 2016 maturity date. The loan became real estate owned
(REO) in October 2017. The property was listed for sale in the
February 2018 General 2 Auction and failed to trade. The special
servicer does not have disposition plans at this time. The property
was 100% leased as of September 2019, compared to 82% leased as of
June 2018.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Chestnut Run Loan
($16.6 million -- 28.8% of the pool), which is secured by an office
property located in Wilmington, Delaware about five miles from the
city center. The property was constructed in 2002. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2013 and has been REO
since March 2017. The special servicer does not have disposition
plans at this time. This loan was deemed non-recoverable by the
master servicer. The property was 100% leased as of November 2019,
compared to 50% in June 2018.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the SHPS Building Loan
($7.5 million -- 13.0% of the pool), which is secured by an office
property located in Scottsdale, Arizona. The property was
constructed in 2005. The loan transferred to special servicing in
November 2016 and has been REO since June 2017. The property was
100% leased as of December 2019, the same as June 2018.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $39.5 million loss (88% expected
loss on average) from the specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2019 operating results for 100% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

There is only one conduit loan remaining in the pool which
represents 15.7% of the pool balance. The loan is the 100 Carillon
Parkway Loan ($9 million -- 15.7% of the pool), which is secured by
an office property located in Saint Petersburg, Florida roughly 14
miles from downtown Tampa, Florida. The property was 99% leased as
of September 2019, the same as at last review. The loan passed its
ARD in November 2016 and the final maturity date is in 2036.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.93X, respectively,
compared to 99% and 1.06X at the last review.


WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to 'CCCsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 13 classes of Wells
Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2013-LC12. In addition, the Rating Outlook on
one class was revised to Negative from Stable.

WFCM 2013-LC12

  - Class A-1 94988QAA9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-2 94988QAC5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-3 94988QAE1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-3FL 94988QBG5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-3FX 94988QBQ3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-4 94988QAG6; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-S 94988QAN1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class A-SB 94988QAL5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

  - Class B 94988QAQ4; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously at AA-sf

  - Class C 94988QAS0; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

  - Class D 94988QAU5; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

  - Class E 94988QAW1; LT Bsf Downgrade; previously at BBsf

  - Class F 94988QAY7; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at Bsf

  - Class PEX 94988QBJ9; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

  - Class X-A 94988QBC4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations; High Regional Mall Exposure: The
downgrades to classes E and F reflect the increased loss
expectations for the remaining pool since Fitch's last rating
action, driven primarily by performance deterioration of the Fitch
Loans of Concern. Fitch has designated six loans (21.1% of the
pool) as FLOCs, including three regional mall loans (19.1%) in the
top five. Additionally, four loans (2.5%) are in special servicing.
Each specially serviced loan comprises less than 1% of the pool and
is secured by a hotel property. Minimal losses and interest
shortfalls are currently affecting class G.

FLOCs: The largest FLOC, Carolina Place (6.7%), secured by 694,983
sf of a 1.2 million-sf regional mall in Pineville, NC,
approximately 10 miles southwest of the Charlotte CBD, was
designated a FLOC due to near-term rollover concerns, Sears
vacating in January 2019 and market competition. White Marsh Mall
(6.4%), secured by 702,317 sf of a 1.2 million-sf regional mall in
Baltimore, MD, was designated a FLOC due to non-collateral Sears
recently announcing store closure, declining tenant sales and
significant market competition. Rimrock Mall (6%), secured by
428,661 sf of a 586,446 sf regional mall in Billings MT, was
designated a FLOC due to collateral anchor Herberger's vacating,
near-term rollover concerns, low in-line tenant sales and its
tertiary market location. Three additional non-specially serviced
loans (2%), each less than 1% of the pool, were also designated
FLOCs due to significant occupancy declines and/or performance
concerns.

Specially Serviced Loans: The largest specially serviced loan,
Crowne Plaza Madison (0.8%), secured by a 226-key, full-service
hotel property in Madison, WI, transferred to special servicing in
March 2017 for imminent maturity default and matured without
repayment in September 2017. The property experienced cash flow
declines driven by low occupancy and excessive deferred maintenance
costs. The lender filed foreclosure, and the property become REO in
March 2019. All items on the brand deficiency list have been
completed, and the property is in contract with an expected closing
date in the first quarter of 2020.

Slight Increase in Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 11.4% to $1.249 billion from $1.409 billion at issuance.
Eleven loans (7.3%) are fully defeased.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario on White Marsh Mall (6.4%) and Rimrock Mall
(6%), which assumed potential outsized losses of 25% and 40% on the
loans' maturity balances, respectively, while also factoring in the
expected paydown of the transaction from defeased loans. This
additional sensitivity scenario took into consideration refinance
concerns based on near-term rollover risks, anchor vacancies,
declining/low tenant sales, significant market competition and/or
tertiary market locations. The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes
D and E reflect this analysis.

Pool/Maturity Concentrations: The top 10 loans comprise 57.8% of
the pool. The remaining loan maturities are concentrated in 2023
(92.2%). The largest loan, Cumberland Mall (7.2%), is secured by
541,527 sf of a 1.0 million-sf regional mall in Atlanta, GA.
Performance at the mall has improved since issuance, primarily due
to increases in revenue outpacing increases in expenses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through C reflect the
relatively stable performance of the majority of the remaining
pool, increasing credit enhancement and expected continued
amortization. Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.
Ratings upgrades of classes B through F, although unlikely due to
sensitivity of pool concentrations, may occur with improved pool
performance and additional paydown. Classes would not be upgraded
above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls.
Upgrades to the below-investment-grade rated classes are not likely
given the concerns surrounding the White Marsh Mall and Rimrock
Mall loans, but may occur in the later years of the transaction
should credit enhancement increase and there are minimal FLOCs.

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D and E reflect refinance
concerns and additional sensitivity analysis performed on the
regional mall FLOCs, White Marsh Mall and Rimrock Mall. These
classes could be downgraded should performance of the regional
malls further decline and/or if these loans fail to pay at
maturity. Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the senior classes A-1 through C are not likely due
to the position in the capital structure and the high credit
enhancement or defeasance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

WFCM 2013-LC12 has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to sustained structural shift in secular
preferences affecting consumer trends, occupancy trends, etc.
which, in combination with other factors, affects the rating.

Except for the matters discussed, the highest level of ESG credit
relevance, if present, is a score of 3 - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity(ies),
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity(ies).


WELLS FARGO 2016-BNK1: Fitch Lowers Class X-F Debt Rating to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six and affirmed nine classes of Wells
Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-BNK1 commercial mortgage pass
through certificates.

WFCM 2016-BNK1

Class A-1 95000GAW4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-2 95000GAX2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 95000GAY0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 95000GBA1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 95000GAZ7; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B 95000GBD5; LT AA-sf Affirmed; previously at AA-sf

Class C 95000GBE3; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class D 95000GAJ3; LT Bsf Downgrade; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 95000GAL8; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at BB-sf

Class F 95000GAN4; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at B-sf

Class X-A 95000GBB9; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 95000GBC7; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class X-D 95000GAA2; LT Bsf Downgrade; previously at BBB-sf

Class X-E 95000GAC8; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at BB-sf

Class X-F 95000GAE4; LT CCCsf Downgrade; previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Significant Increase in Loss Expectations: Fitch has downgraded six
classes and revised the Rating Outlooks on three classes due to
higher loss expectations and increasing certainty of losses on the
largest specially serviced loan, One Stamford Forum (7.8%). Four
loans (13.9%) have been designated Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs)
including two loans (8.2%) in special servicing.

The third largest loan in the pool, One Stamford Forum, is a
504,471 sf office building in Stamford, CT, where the borrower, One
Stamford Realty L.P., and major tenant Purdue Pharma, are 100%
owned for the benefit of the Sackler family. Purdue Pharma, which
occupies this property as their U.S. headquarters, is a privately
owned pharmaceutical company that focuses on pain medication,
including OxyContin. At issuance, Purdue Pharma occupied 92% of the
NRA through a direct lease and sublease, and had executed a
"wraparound lease" for the remainder of the building beginning in
January 2021 and extending until 2031. The loan transferred to
special servicing on March 15, 2019 for imminent monetary default
when Purdue Pharma consulted restructuring experts and considered
filing bankruptcy as a result of approximately 1,900 lawsuits,
including 36 by state attorney generals. In September 2019, Purdue
Pharma filed chapter 11 bankruptcy. They have also indicated to the
special servicer that they plan to reject the wraparound lease
effective January 2021. Media reports indicate that Purdue will
downsize their space to approximately 104,000 sf (20.6% of NRA) on
the 9th and 10th floors. Purdue Pharma was subleasing a portion of
its space to other tenants at issuance, and it is possible that any
subtenants still in place will sign direct leases with the
borrower. However, Fitch has not been provided any updated
information about subtenants and it is possible that the property
could be 80% vacant in January 2021.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch's analysis included an
outsized 75% loss to the current balance of One Stamford Forum in
order to determine the impact on the pool. Due to this stressed
scenario, Fitch revised Outlooks on classes B, X-B, and C. Fitch
downgraded classes D, X-D, E, X-E, F, and X-F as result of losses
modeled in the base case analysis.

Exposure to Coronavirus: Fitch's base case analysis applied an
additional stress on reported NOI for all hotels due to the
anticipated immediate performance decline considering the decrease
in travel. Loans collateralized by hotel properties account for
15.3% of the pool, including two loans (11.1%) in the top 15. The
additional stress had no impact on the ratings.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Including One Stamford Forum, four loans
(13.9%) are designated as FLOCs. The second largest FLOC is Simon
Premium Outlets (4.1%), a portfolio of three outlet malls in
tertiary locations. Portfolio occupancy has declined to 81% at 3Q19
compared to 93% at YE 2016. Total portfolio sales at YE 2018
declined 2.6% to $190.2 million compared to $195.2 million at YE
2017. YE 2018 sales were 11.9% lower than issuance when sales
totaled $215.9 million.

Smaller FLOCs include a shopping center in Louisville, KY where the
grocery anchor went dark and was re-tenanted with weaker,
non-traditional anchors and an REO retail asset where Shopko, the
single tenant, terminated the lease in bankruptcy, leaving the
asset 100% vacant.

Retail Concentration: Loans collateralized by retail properties
account for 26% of the pool including one regional mall (9.4%) and
a portfolio of three outlet malls in tertiary locations (4.1%). The
largest loan in the pool is The Shops at Crystals (9.4%), a
high-end regional mall in Las Vegas, NV. Property performance has
remained stable since issuance and total mall sales were $1,549 for
2019, $1,355 psf for 2018, $1,459 psf for 2017, $1,450 for 2016,
and $1,330 psf at YE 2020

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 2.78% to $846.4 million from $870.6 million at issuance.
Twelve loans (38.5% of the current pool balance) are full-term
interest only and 10 loans (29.4%) are partial-term interest-only,
nine of which (22.3%) have begun amortizing. There are no defeased
loans and interest shortfalls are currently impacting classes G and
RRI.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through A-S reflect the overall
stable performance of the pool and expected continued amortization.
The Negative Outlooks on classes B, C, D, X-B, and X-D reflect the
additional sensitivity analysis and potential downgrade concerns
should the performance of One Stamford Forum or other FLOCs
continue to deteriorate.

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades
of classes B and C may occur with significant improvement in credit
enhancement and/or defeasance but would be limited as long as One
Stamford Forum remains in special servicing or it realizes a
significant loss. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there were likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the
below-investment grade rated classes are not likely given the
concerns surrounding One Stamford Forum and Simon Premium Outlets
but may occur in the later years of the transaction should credit
enhancement increase and there are minimal FLOCs.

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool level
losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans,
specifically One Stamford Forum. Downgrades to the senior classes,
A-1 through A-S are not likely due to the position in the capital
structure and stable performance of the majority of the pool but
are possible with significant performance decline or if One
Stamford Forum realizes a substantial loss. Downgrades to classes B
and C are possible if the performance of One Stamford Forum were to
continue to decline or additional loans transferred to the special
servicer. Further downgrades to the class D could occur if
additional loans become FLOCs and loss expectations increase.
Downgrades to classes E and F would occur as realized losses on One
Stamford Forum become imminent.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


WELLS FARGO 2018-C43: Fitch Affirms Class F Debt at 'B-sf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2018-C43 as follows:

WFCM 2018-C43

  - Class A-1 95001LAQ5; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class A-2 95001LAR3; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class A-3 95001LAT9; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class A-4 95001LAU6; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class A-S 95001LAX0; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class A-SB 95001LAS1; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class B 95001LAY8; LT AA-sf Affirmed

  - Class C 95001LAZ5; LT A-sf Affirmed

  - Class D 95001LAC6; LT BBB-sf Affirmed

  - Class E 95001LAE2; LT BB-sf Affirmed

  - Class F 95001LAG7; LT B-sf Affirmed

  - Class X-A 95001LAV4; LT AAAsf Affirmed

  - Class X-B 95001LAW2; LT A-sf Affirmed

  - Class X-D 95001LAA0; LT BBB-sf Affirmed

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall pool performance has remained in
line with issuance expectations; therefore, modeled loss
expectations are stable compared to issuance. The pool has two
loans (6.0%), including one loan in the Top 15, designated as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOC). As of the March 2019 Distribution Period,
there were 10 loans (7.0%) on the servicer's watchlist for deferred
maintenance, increased vacancy and seasonality. Since issuance, no
loans have transferred to special servicing.

Minimal Change in Credit Enhancement: There have been no loan
payoffs, no defeasance and minimal amortization; therefore, there
has been minimal change in credit enhancement since issuance. As of
the March 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has
been reduced by 0.78% to $716.5 million from $722.4 million at
issuance. Eleven loans totaling 32.5% of the pool are full-term
interest-only; an additional 25 loans totaling approximately 39.7%
of the pool were partial-term interest-only. At issuance, based on
the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will pay down by 9.8%,
which is higher than the 2017 average of 7.9% and lower than the
2016 average of 10.4%.

High Single-Tenant Exposure: At issuance, 13 loans representing
34.0% of the pool are designated full or partial single-tenant
properties by Fitch, including seven of the top 10 loans. The
pool's single tenant concentration is above the 2017 vintage and
2016 vintage averages of 19.3% and 15.7%, respectively.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Southpoint Office Center (5.2%) is
collateralized by a 366,808 sf suburban office property located in
the Bloomington, MN. Subject occupancy has fallen to 86% as of
September 2019 from 90% at year-end 2018 as a result of UMB
Financial Corporation (NRA 4.9%) vacating ahead of lease expiration
in May 2019. Additionally, Wells Fargo NA (NRA 18.2%) and Health
Fitness's (NRA 8.2%) leases are scheduled to expire in October 2020
and May 2020, respectively. Fitch has requested an update regarding
any leasing activity for Wells Fargo, Health Fitness and the space
formerly occupied by UMB Financial Corporation and has not received
a response.

Holiday Inn Express - Waldorf (.9%) is collateralized by a 91-unit
lodging property located in Waldorf, MD. As of YE 2018 subject
occupancy and NCF DSCR fell to 69.3% and .57x, respectively,
compared to underwritten occupancy and NCF DSCR of 77.8% and 1.70x,
respectfully. Fitch has requested a recent STR report from the
servicer and has not received a response.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable given the
relatively stable performance of the transaction since issuance.
Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until
a material economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's
overall portfolio level metrics.

Factors that would lead to upgrades include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance.

Factors that lead to downgrades would include an increase in pool
level losses from underperforming and/or specially serviced loans.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).


WELLS FARGO 2020-SDAL: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2020-SDAL, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2020-SDAL:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to one property, the
Sheraton Dallas Hotel. Its ratings are based on the credit quality
of the loan and the strength of the securitization structure.

The Property is a full-service hotel centrally located in the
Dallas CBD and features 1,840 guestrooms situated within three
towers ranging from 28 to 42 stories. The Property offers
approximately 220,000 SF of meeting space, six food and beverage
outlets, and additional amenities including an outdoor pool,
24-hour fitness center, business center, Sheraton Club Lounge
(Sheraton's members only club), valet parking and gift shop. The
Property appeared in very good condition during its site visit as
the improvements have received significant investment of
approximately $184.4 million ($100,199/key) since 2008. Of this
investment, approximately $75.9 million was spent between 2008 and
2009 (brand conversion) and $76.5 million invested between 2018 and
2019 (primarily in guestroom and meeting/event space renovations).

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS
methodology. The rating approach for securities backed by a single
loan compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying collateral
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $275,0000,000 represents a Moody's
LTV of 126.5%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 2.14X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 0.96X.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The Property's quality
grade is 2.75.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: asset quality, recent
renovations, strong forward bookings and an experienced and
committed sponsor.

Notable credit challenges of the transaction include: future
supply, lack of diversity for this single asset transaction,
property type volatility, floating rate/interest-only mortgage loan
profile, and certain credit negative legal features.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from its
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C12: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'CCCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 12 classes of WFRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-C12.

WFRBS 2013-C12

Class A-3 92937FAC5; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3FL 92937FAQ4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3FX 92937FAS0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 92937FAD3; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 92937FAF8; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 92937FAE1; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B 92937FAG6; LT AAsf Upgrade; previously at AA-sf

Class C 92937FAH4; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

Class D 92937FAU5; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 92937FAW1; LT BBsf Affirmed; previously at BBsf

Class F 92937FAY7; LT CCCsf Affirmed; previously at CCCsf

Class X-A 92937FAJ0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 92937FAL5; LT A-sf Affirmed; previously at A-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Decreased Loss Expectations/Studio Green Apartments: The upgrade to
class B reflects decreased loss expectations. The Studio Green
Apartments loan, which was secured by a 665-unit (1,074 bed)
student housing complex in Newark, DE, had been in special
servicing for imminent default. Fitch expected significant losses
due to low occupancy and deteriorating conditions at the property.
However, the loan was paid in full without any losses.
Additionally, overall loss expectations have decreased due to the
improved performance of several loans, and performance for the
majority of the pool remains generally stable.

Continued Paydown/Increase in Credit Enhancement and Defeasance:
The transaction balance has been reduced by 31.4% since issuance.
Since Fitch's last rating action, six loans (including the Studio
Green Apartment loan) were paid in full resulting in approximately
$96 million in paydown to the transaction. In addition, defeased
collateral has increased 11% and accounts for 14.1% of the pool.

Fitch Loan of Concern: Fitch has designated two loans (4%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs). The largest FLOC is Victoria Mall (3.4%).
The loan is secured by a 679,502 sf (448,935 sf collateral)
enclosed regional mall located in Victoria, TX, approximately 90
miles southeast of San Antonio and 100 miles southwest of Houston.
The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney (noncollateral), Dillard's (two
noncollateral stores), Cinemark Theater (9.7% of the NRA), and a
dark Sears (18.4% of NRA), whose lease runs through October 2030.
As of September 2019, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
reported to be 2.44x and according to the September 2019 rent roll,
total mall occupancy was 81%. Comparable in-line sales were
reported to be $287 psf for TTM ending September 2019 compared to
$302 psf for the TTM ending March 2018 and $367 psf at issuance.
Fitch has concerns with the mall due to its declining in-line
sales, the vacant Sears, and its tertiary location. Fitch also
remains concerned with the refinancability of the loan as it
matures in January 2023.

The second FLOC (0.6%) is secured by a 69,835 sf retail property
located in Texas City, TX. The loan has been on the servicer's
watchlist for low DSCR and occupancy, which were reported to be
0.96x and 59%, respectively, as of September 2019.

Hotel Exposure: There are five non-defeased loans (19.2%) in the
transaction that are secured by hotel properties, including three
in the top 15 (17.4%). The largest loan in the pool is the Grand
Beach Hotel loan (13.7%). It is secured by a 424-room, 20-story,
full-service oceanfront hotel located in Miami Beach, Florida.
While all of the loans secured by hotels remain current, Fitch's
base case analysis applied an additional NOI stress on hotels given
the expected decline in travel from the coronavirus pandemic and
COVID-19, the disease it causes.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch applied a 75% loss severity
as an alternative sensitivity scenario on the Victoria Mall loan to
reflect the potential for outsized losses given the declining
sales, vacant anchor, tertiary location and upcoming maturity. In
addition, Fitch applied a 25% loss severity to the Grand Beach
Hotel loan to account for the expected impact on the hotel sector
from COVID-19. This sensitivity analysis contributed to the
Negative Rating Outlook for class E and the affirmation of class
F.

Co-Op Collateral: There are 15 loans (3.8% of the pool) that are
secured by co-op properties, all of which matured in the second and
third quarter of 2021. These co-op loans generally have very low
leverage statistics. At issuance, the co-op loans within the
transaction had an average Fitch DSCR and loan-to-value of 3.74x
and 37.8%, respectively.

ESG - The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure
to Social Impacts due to a mall that is underperforming as a result
of changing consumer preference to shopping, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the
ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for classes A-3 through D remain Stable due to
overall stable collateral performance. Factors that could lead to
upgrades for these classes would include stable to improved asset
performance in addition to paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades of
classes E and F are not likely given the concerns surrounding the
Victoria Mall and the hotel concentration within the pool, but may
occur in the later years of the transaction should credit
enhancement increase and there are minimal FLOCs. Classes would not
be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood of interest
shortfalls.

Downgrades to the senior classes A-3 through A-S are not likely due
to the position in the capital structure and the high credit
enhancement. Downgrades to classes B through E are possible if
performance of the Victoria Mall declines or if the loan transfers
to special servicing prior to the loan maturity. Further downgrades
to class F will occur as losses are realized.

For additional information of Fitch's original sensitivity
analysis, see the transaction's presale report.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The transaction has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to a mall that is underperforming as a result of
changing consumer preference to shopping, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the ratings.


ZAIS CLO 14: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $13.5MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by ZAIS CLO 14, Limited.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$154,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$39,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$13,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the
Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on its methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Zais 14 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be 100%
ramped as of the closing date.

ZAIS Leveraged Loan Master Manager, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's two year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $300,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2684

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


[*] DBRS Takes Actions on 1,083 Classes From 73 U.S. RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 1,083 classes from 73 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 1,083 classes
reviewed, DBRS Morningstar upgraded 33 ratings; downgraded 11
ratings; confirmed 1,020 ratings; and discontinued 19 ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating downgrades reflect the unlikely
recovery of the bonds' principal loss amount or the transactions'
negative trend in loss activity. The rating confirmations reflect
asset performance and credit-support levels that are consistent
with the current ratings. The discontinued ratings reflect the
transactions exercising their cleanup call option or the full
repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are a result of DBRS Morningstar's application
of the "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in February
2020.

The pools backing these RMBS transactions consist of prime,
subprime, Alt-A, seasoned, reperforming, and ReREMIC collateral.

The Affected Ratings Are Available at https://bit.ly/2QmJPOk

The ratings assigned to the securities below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS Morningstar
considers this difference to be a material deviation, but in this
case, the ratings of the subject notes reflect either additional
seasoning being warranted to substantiate a further upgrade or
actual deal or tranche performance not being fully reflected in the
projected cash flows/model output.

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FF1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF1, Class M-1

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FF1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF1, Class M-2

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF9, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9, Class A1

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF9, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9, Class A4

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF9, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9, Class M1

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-FF2, Class A4

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-FF2, Class M1

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FF8, Class I-A1

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FF8, Class II-A3

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FF8, Class II-A4

-- Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2, Home Equity Loan
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2005-2, Class AF-4

-- Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2, Home Equity Loan
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2005-2, Class AF-5

-- Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2, Home Equity Loan
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2005-2, Class AF-6

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-NC2,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC2, Class A-3

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC2,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC2, Class A-1

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-3 Trust,
Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3, Class A-3

-- CIM Trust 2019-INV1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2019-INV1, Class B-2

-- CIM Trust 2019-INV1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2019-INV1, Class B-IO2

-- CIM Trust 2019-INV1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2019-INV1, Class B-2A

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-2, Class B-4

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-2, Class B-5

-- GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-PJ1, Class B-2

-- GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-PJ1, Class B-3

-- GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-PJ1, Class B-5

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-4, Class B-5

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-2, Class B-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-2, Class B-5

-- Mello Mortgage Capital Acceptance 2018-MTG1, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-MTG1, Class B5

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-3, Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-3, Class A9

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-3, Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-3, Class A13

-- CSMC Series 2010-9R, CSMC Series 2010-9R, Class 49-A-4

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7, Class 7-A-1-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7, Class 7-A-1-2

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7, Class 7-A-2-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7, Class 7-A-2-2

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-9, Class 5-A-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-9, Class 5-A-2-2

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-9, Class 5-A-3

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE3, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE3, Class A-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC1, Class A-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC1, Class A-2D

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC2, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC2, Class A-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE2, Class M-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE2, Class M-2

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE4, Class M-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE4, Class M-2

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AHL1, Class A-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AHL1, Class A-2C

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AHL1, Class M-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FS1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FS1, Class II-A1A

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2007-SHL1,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SHL1, Class
M-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-WFHE1, Class M-2

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-WFHE1, Class M-3

-- DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005 AR6, Class 2A-1A

-- DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005 AR6, Class 2A-1C

-- DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005 AR6, Class M-1

-- DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005 AR6, Class M-2


[*] DBRS Takes Actions on 28 Ratings From 5 ACAR Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. took rating actions on 28 outstanding ratings from five
American Credit Acceptance Receivables transactions. Of the rated
classes reviewed, nine were upgraded, four were discontinued due to
repayment, and 15 were confirmed. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS Morningstar's expected losses
at their new respective rating levels. For the notes that were
confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS Morningstar's expected losses
at their current respective rating levels.

The Affected Ratings Are Available at https://bit.ly/3b3yV7Q

The ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
performance.


[*] DBRS Takes Actions on 461 Classes From 31 CMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. took rating actions, as part of its surveillance review,
on 461 classes from 31 commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS)
conduit transactions from 2014 and 2019 vintages, as well as one
Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates transaction
associated with Impact Funding Affordable Multifamily Housing
Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-1.

Of the 461 classes reviewed, DBRS Morningstar confirmed 443 of the
classes with Stable trends, confirmed 15 classes with Negative
trends, and discontinued one class due to a repayment with the most
recent remittance report. The rating confirmations reflect the
overall performance of the respective transactions, which has
generally remained in line with DBRS Morningstar expectations since
issuance. In addition, the asset performance and credit-support
levels are consistent with the current ratings.

Classes assigned Negative trends reflect DBRS Morningstar's
concerns surrounding pivotal loans, loans on the watchlist, and/or
loans in special servicing within the respective transactions.

In addition, DBRS Morningstar upgraded two classes with Stable
trends. The rating upgrades reflect the generally positive
performance trends for the underlying loans and increased credit
support for the bonds, which is sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels.

A summary of the rating actions, along with the rating action for
each class, can be found by clicking the following link: CMBS 2014
& 2019 Conduit Transactions.

Outstanding nondefeased loans that were shadow-rated investment
grade by DBRS Morningstar at issuance have generally been
maintained with this review as DBRS Morningstar has confirmed
performance remains stable from issuance.

Classes that are interest-only (IO) certificates reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The Affected Ratings Are Available at https://bit.ly/2TWt9PX


[*] Fitch Puts 15 U.S. CMBS Hotel Deals on Watch Neg. Over Covid-19
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 81 classes from 15 U.S. CMBS single
borrower transactions on Rating Watch Negative. The 15 transactions
represent the entire portfolio of Fitch-rated single borrower hotel
transactions.

BX Trust 2018-BILT

Class A 05606JAA3; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 05606JAG0; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 05606JAJ4; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 05606JAL9; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class E 05606JAN5; LT BB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class F 05606JAQ8; LT B-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 05606JAC9; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-EXT 05606JAE5; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

MSC 2018-SUN

Class A 61691MAA5; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 61691MAG2; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class C 61691MAJ6; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 61691MAL1; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 61691MAC1; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-EXT 61691MAE7; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

BAMLL 2018-DSNY

Class A 054967AA2; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 054967AG9; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 054967AJ3; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class D 054967AL8; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 054967AC8; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-EXT 054967AE4; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2019-BOCA

Class A 36256QAA5; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 36256QAC1; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative   

Class C 36256QAE7; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 36256QAG2; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative   

BLFD Trust 2019-DPLO

Class A 054970AA6; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 054970AG3; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 054970AJ7; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 054970AL2; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

GSMS 2018-LUAU

Class A 36256AAA0; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

WFCM 2019-JWDR

Class A 95002NAA5; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class B 95002NAG2; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 95002NAJ6; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 95002NAL1; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class E 95002NAN7; LT BB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class F 95002NAQ0; LT B-sf; on Rating Watch Negative   

Motel 6 Trust 2017-MTL6

Class Class A 61975FAA7; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class Class B 61975FAG4; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

BX Trust 2018-GW

Class A 12433UAA3; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 12433UAG0; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 12433UAJ4; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class D 12433UAL9; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 12433UAC9; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class X-EXT 12433UAE5; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

DBWF 2018-GLKS

Class A 23307GAA4; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 23307GAG1; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 23307GAJ5; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 23307GAL0; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class E 23307GAN6; LT BB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class F 23307GAQ9; LT B-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2018-HULA

Class A 36259AAA7; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 36259AAJ8; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 36259AAL3; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 36259AAN9; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 36259AAC3; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class X-FP 36259AAE9; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class X-NCP 36259AAG4; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

JPMCC 2018-LAQ

Class A 46649VAA9; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 46649VAG6; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 46649VAJ0; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 46649VAL5; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class E 46649VAN1; LT BBsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class HRR 46649VAQ4; LT BB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 46649VAC5; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-EXT 46649VAE1; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

CGCMT 2018-TBR

Class A 17326MAA0; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 17326MAG7; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 17326MAJ1; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 17326MAL6; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class X-CP 17326MAC6; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-NCP 17326MAE2; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative

Margaritaville Beach Resort Trust 2019-MARG

Class A 56658LAA8; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative   

Class B 56658LAG5; LT AA-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class C 56658LAJ9; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class D 56658LAL4; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-CP 56658LAC4; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class X-EXT 56658LAE0; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

Hilton Orlando Trust 2018-ORL

Class A 432885AA9; LT AAAsf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class B 432885AG6; LT AAsf; on Rating Watch Negative

Class C 432885AJ0; LT A-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class D 432885AL5; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative  

Class X-EXT 432885AE1; LT BBB-sf; on Rating Watch Negative

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Negative Watch reflects the significant economic impact to
hotels from the coronavirus pandemic, due to the recent and sudden
reductions in travel and tourism and the lack of clarity at this
time on the potential length of the impact. The pandemic has
already prompted the closure of several hotel properties in gateway
cities. Fitch expects many of the hotels in the 15 transactions
will experience significant declines in property-level cash flow in
the short term with some turning negative. However, over the longer
term, Fitch believes there is inherent value in the assets.

The transactions placed on Negative Watch include four from the
2019 vintage, 10 from the 2018 vintage and one from the 2017
vintage. These transactions are secured by non-recourse loans, 13
of which are secured by an individual hotel property located in
Florida (six deals), Hawaii (four), Arizona (two) and California
(one), and two are secured by multiple Motel 6 and La Quinta
hotels.

Although cash flow is expected to be significantly disrupted
through closures or reduced occupancy, Fitch expects borrowers are
likely to support and attempt to keep their properties. Fitch
performed a breakeven analysis on the hotels in the 15 transactions
to determine how much current net cash flow (NCF) can decline for
the trust debt service coverage (DSCR) to drop below 1.0x. Fourteen
of the transactions are floating rate and tied to one-month LIBOR.
Borrowers of these floating rate loans will likely see reduced debt
service obligations given the expectation for a continued low
interest rate environment. Based on Fitch's assumption of LIBOR at
1.50% and using the weighted average spread, the hotels can
withstand NCF declines ranging between 47% to 84% from the most
recent servicer-reported NCF (generally trailing-twelve-month
September 2019) before NCF DSCR falls below 1.0x. For the one fixed
rate transaction, the YE 2019 NCF (based on borrower financials
provided to Fitch) can withstand a 66% decline before NCF DSCR
falls below 1.0x.

Eleven transactions have 2020 maturities though all eleven have the
ability to extend the loan and none need to fulfill a performance
hurdle in order to exercise their next extension option.

In the next few days, Fitch will review its U.S. CMBS multiborrower
transactions that have hotel concentrations greater than 25%. Fitch
will focus on current credit enhancement for the deal relative to
the hotel exposure. Fitch will be assuming significant near-term
cash flow declines for the hotels and review the depth and
experience of the hotel ownership.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch expects to resolve the Negative Watch over the next few
months, once further information is obtained on the performance
impact and the sponsor's plan. Downgrades may not affect every
class if the performance decline is short term. However, downgrades
of a category or more are likely should the economic impact be
prolonged.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $179MM RMBS Issued 2001-2007
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 13, 2020, upgraded the rating
of three tranches from two transactions and downgraded nine
tranches from two transactions backed by Alt A and Subprime loans.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-FRE1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-9

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-X*, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-18

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2017
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2017
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-PP, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2017
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-X*, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-4

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance and Moody's
updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The rating
upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related pools
and an increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.
Upgraded bonds have also benefited from the failure of performance
triggers that divert principal payments from subordinate bonds to
the senior bonds. The rating downgrades are due to weaker
performance of the underlying collateral and erosion of credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in rating all deals except
interest-only classes was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in February 2019. The methodologies used in rating
interest-only classes were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in February 2019 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.6% in January 2020 from 4% in
January 2019. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.8% to 4.2% for the 2020 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2020. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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