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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 2, 2020, Vol. 24, No. 32

                            Headlines

AASET 2020-1: Fitch Assigns BB(EXP) Rating on Class C Debt
AMERICAN CREDIT 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating to F Notes
ANGEL OAK 2020-1: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating to Class B-2 Certs
ANTARES CLO 2019-2: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
BBCMS 2020-C6: DBRS Assigns Prov. B(low) Rating on 2 Classes

BBCMS MORTGAGE 2020-C6: Fitch to Rate $8.7MM Class H-RR Certs 'B-'
BDS LTD 2020-FL5: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 2 Debt Classes
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
COMM 2012-CCRE5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certs

COMM 2013-CCRE10: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class E Debt
COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Debt
COMM 2014-LC17: Fitch Affirms CCsf Rating on 2 Tranches
COMM 2014-UBS6: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to B-
DT AUTO 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes

EAGLE RE 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B(low) Rating on 3 Classes
FAT BRANDS 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on 2 Note Classes
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-4: S&P Affirms BB-(sf) Class E Notes Rating
FREDDIE MAC 2020-DNA1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating to Cl. B-1B Notes
FREED ABS 2020-1: Moody's Rates $48.420MM Class C Notes Ba3

GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: DBRS Lowers Class D Certs Rating to D
GLS AUTO 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to Cl. D Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Class F Certs to C(sf)
GS MORTGAGE 2020-GC45: Fitch Rates $12.9MM Cl. G-RR Certs B-sf
GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ1: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
JP MORGAN 2013-C15: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
JP MORGAN 2016-FL8: S&P Cuts Class C Certs Rating to 'D (sf)'
JP MORGAN 2020-LTV1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on 2 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2020-MKST: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on Class F Certs

MEDALIST PARTNERS VI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating to D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Cuts Class IO Certs to Ca(sf)
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ12: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Cl. F Certs
MOUNTAIN VIEW XV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2020-RPL1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B-2 Notes

NEWSTAR FAIRFIELD: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class D-N Debt
OBX TRUST 2020-INV1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
OHA LOAN 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to E-R Notes
RCKT MORTGAGE 2020-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
RMF BUYOUT 2020-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class M4 Debt

SCF EQUIPMENT 2017-1: Moody's Raises Class D Notes to Ba1
TICP CLO XV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
TOWD POINT 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on 3 Note Classes
TRAPEZA CDO IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Tranches to B3
VERUS SECURITIZATION 2020-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating to B-2 Certs

VITALITY RE XI: S&P Assigns 'BB+(sf)' Rating to Class B Notes
WELLS FARGO 2019-2: Moody's Upgrades Class B-4 Debt to Ba1
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C3: Moody's Lowers Class F Certs to C(sf)
YORK CLO-7: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to $18MM Class E Notes
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 122 Classes From 35 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 158 Classes From 47 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 97 Classes From 24 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

AASET 2020-1: Fitch Assigns BB(EXP) Rating on Class C Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned expected ratings to AASET 2020-1 Trust.

RATING ACTIONS

AASET 2020-1 Trust

Class A; LT A(EXP)sf;   Expected Rating

Class B; LT BBB(EXP)sf; Expected Rating

Class C; LT BB(EXP)sf;  Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch expects to rate the aircraft operating lease ABS secured
notes issued by AASET 2020-1 Trust. AASET 2020-1 expects to use
proceeds of the initial notes to acquire all the aircraft-owning
entity series A, B and C notes (initial series A, B and C AOE
notes) issued by AASET 2020-1 US Ltd. and AASET 2020-1
International Ltd., collectively, the AOE issuers.

The notes will be secured by lease payments and disposition
proceeds on a pool of 28 mid- to end-of-life aircraft purchased
from certain funds, managed by subsidiaries of Carlyle Aviation
Partners Ltd. collectively with its affiliates. Carlyle Aviation
Management Limited, an indirect subsidiary of CAP, will be the
servicer. This is the sixth public, Fitch-rated AASET transaction,
and the ninth issued since 2014 and serviced by CAML. Fitch does
not rate CAP or CAML.

The timeframe of remedial actions for the liquidity facility is
longer than outlined in Fitch's counterparty criteria, but this is
deemed to be immaterial under primary scenarios.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Asset Quality — Mostly Liquid Narrowbody: The pool
comprises mostly narrowbody aircraft (85.0%), including 10 B737-800
(32.8%) and six A320-200s (25.5%). The weighted average (WA) age is
15.2 years, which is at the older end of the range for recent peer
transactions, but consistent with 2019-1 (15.8 years) and older
than 2019-2 (11.9 years). Widebody aircraft total 15.0%, in line
with 2019-2 (15.7%) and lower than 2019-1 (29.4%).

Lease Term and Maturity Schedule — Neutral: The WA remaining
lease term is 3.4 years, in line with prior AASET transactions. One
lease matures in 2020 (5.3%), 10 in 2021 (31.4%), six in 2022
(21.1%), and two in 2023 (7.5%). From 2020-2023, 19 leases mature
(65.4%), which is lower than 2019-2 but in line with 2019-1, during
the first four-year period after closing.

Asset Value and Lease Rate Volatility: Fitch derives assumed
initial aircraft values from various appraisal sources and employs
future aircraft value and disposition stresses in its analysis.
These take into account aircraft age and marketability to simulate
the decline in values and lease rates expected to occur over the
course of multiple aviation market downturns.

Operational and Servicing Risk — Adequate Servicing Capability:
Fitch believes Carlyle Aviation Partners (parent: The Carlyle Group
is rated BBB+/Stable) has the ability to collect lease payments,
remarket and repossess aircraft in an event of lessee default and
procure maintenance to retain values and ensure stable performance.
This is evidenced by the experience of their team, the servicing of
their managed fleet, and prior securitization performance.

Lessee Credit Risk — Weak Credits: Fitch's 'CCC' assumed lessee
concentration totals 60.4%, significantly higher relative to 2019-2
and 2019-1 (14.5% and 47.5%, respectively). Most of the 18 lessees
are either unrated or speculative-grade credits, typical of
aircraft ABS. Unrated or speculative airlines are assumed to
perform consistent with either a 'B' or 'CCC' Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to reflect default risk in the pool. Ratings were further
stressed during future assumed recessions and once an aircraft
reaches Tier 3 classification.

Country Credit Risk — Diversified: The largest country
concentration is the U.S. (IDR of AAA/Stable) with seven aircraft
(15.5%), followed by India (10.6%) and then Thailand (9.1%). The
top five countries total 49.0%, down from 2019-2 (64.4%) and 2019-1
(59.6%), with 15.5% of lessees concentrated in Developed North
America. There is a higher concentration in Emerging APAC (34.3%)
versus 2019-2 (25.5%) and 2019-1 (3.6%); however, this reflects the
industry's growth in the region in recent years.

Transaction Structure — Consistent: Credit enhancement (CE)
comprises overcollateralization (OC), a liquidity facility and a
cash reserve. The initial loan to value (LTV) ratios for series A,
B and C notes are 66.5%, 78.0% and 83.5%, respectively, based on
the average of the maintenance-adjusted base values (MABVs). These
levels are consistent with prior AASET transactions.

Adequate Structural Protections: Each series of notes makes full
payment of interest and principal in the primary scenarios,
commensurate with their ratings after applying Fitch's stressed
asset and liability assumptions. Fitch has also created multiple
alternative cash flows to evaluate the structural sensitivity to
different scenarios, as detailed in the Rating Sensitivities
section.

Aviation Market Cyclicality: The commercial aviation has exhibited
significant cyclicality tied to the health of the overall global
economy. This cyclicality can produce increased lessee defaults,
lower demand for off-lease aircraft, and deterioration in lease
rates and asset values. Fitch stresses asset values, utilization
levels, lease rates and default probability during assumed market
down cycles to account for this risk.

Rating Cap of 'Asf': Fitch limits aircraft operating lease ratings
to a maximum cap of 'Asf' due to the factors discussed and the
potential volatility they produce.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The performance of aircraft operating lease securitizations can be
affected by various factors, which, in turn, could have an impact
on the assigned ratings. Fitch conducted multiple rating
sensitivity analyses to evaluate the impact of changes to a number
of the variables in the analysis. As stated, these sensitivity
scenarios were also considered in determining Fitch's expected
ratings.

Technological Cliff Stress Scenario

All aircraft in the pool face replacement programs over the next
decade. Fitch believes the current generation aircraft in the pool
remain well insulated due to large operator bases and long lead
times for full replacement. This scenario simulates a drop in
demand (and associated values). The first recession was assumed to
occur two years following close and all recessionary value decline
stresses were increased by 10% at each rating category. Fitch
additionally utilized a 25% residual assumption rather than the
base level of 50% to stress end-of-life proceeds for each asset in
the pool. Lease rates drop under this scenario, and aircraft are
sold for scrap at end of useful lives.

Under this scenario, all series fail at all rating scenarios. As a
result, such a scenario could result in multiple categories of
downgrades for each series of notes. This is the most stressful
sensitivity to this transaction because of the heavier reliance of
residual proceeds.

LRF Stress Scenarios

Fitch ran a sensitivity scenario that capped LRFs for all aircraft.
Fitch capped all leases at a 1.13% LRF. This is the
criteria-assumed LRF at age 11. After this point, leases in prior
pools have fallen notably below Fitch's curve. While the curve
normally increases and is then capped at 1.65% in runs under these
scenarios, no lease will be executed at a LRF above 1.13%.

Under this scenario, series A and B pass one level below their
rating category, at 'BBBsf' and 'BBsf' stress level, respectively.
The series C notes pass at the 'Bsf' level but fail at all rating
scenarios. This could result in the downgrade of the series A, B
and C notes by up to one or more rating category each.

'CCC' Unrated Lessee Assumption Stress Scenario

Airlines across the globe are generally viewed as speculative
grade. While Fitch gives credit to available ratings of the initial
lessees in the pool, assumptions must be made for the unrated
lessees in the pool, as well as all future unknown lessees. While
Fitch typically utilizes a 'B' assumption for most unrated lessees
with some assumed to be 'CCC', Fitch evaluated a scenario in which
all unrated airlines are assumed to carry a 'CCC' rating. This
scenario mimics a prolonged recessionary environment in which
airlines are susceptible to an increased likelihood of default.
This would subject the aircraft pool to increased downtime and
expenses, as repossession and remarketing events would increase.

Under this scenario, series A and series B notes pass at their
respective ratings of 'Asf' and 'BBBsf'. Series C notes pass one
category below their recommended ratings at 'Bsf'. Approximately
60% of the unrated lessees are assumed at 'CCC' under the primary
scenarios. Therefore, much of the stress is already captured.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating to F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to American
Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2020-1's asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 30,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 65.45%, 58.84%, 48.74%,
40.15%, 35.69%, and 33.16% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
E, and F notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
(including excess spread). These credit support levels provide more
than 2.35x, 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.37x, 1.20x, and 1.10x coverage of S&P's
expected net loss range of 27.25%-28.25% for the class A, B, C, D,
E, and F notes, respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates
under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that the rating
agency believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
ratings. The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, S&P's ratings on the class A, B,
and C notes would not be lowered from its preliminary 'AAA (sf)',
'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively, during the first
year; the rating on the class D notes would remain within two
rating categories of S&P's preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating during the
first year; and the ratings on the class E and F notes would remain
within two rating categories of the preliminary 'BB- (sf)' and 'B
(sf)' ratings, respectively, in the first year, though the notes
are expected to default by their legal final maturity date with
approximately 55.7%-84.5% and 0% of principal repayment,
respectively. These potential rating movements are within the
limits specified in S&P's credit stability criteria.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction.

-- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

-- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures.

-- The transaction's legal structure.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2020-1

  Class       Rating       Amount (mil. $)(i)
  A           AAA (sf)                 143.91
  B           AA (sf)                   40.17
  C           A (sf)                    73.12
  D           BBB (sf)                  57.33
  E           BB- (sf)                  28.08
  F           B (sf)                    18.92

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


ANGEL OAK 2020-1: S&P Assigns B (sf) Rating to Class B-2 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage Trust
2020-1's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by U.S. residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;

-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;

-- The transaction's representation and warranty (R&W) framework;
and

-- The mortgage originators.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Angel Oak Mortgage Trust 2020-1

  Class       Rating(i)               Amount ($)
  A-1         AAA (sf)               228,480,000
  A-2         AA (sf)                 23,994,000
  A-3         A (sf)                  47,809,000
  M-1         BBB- (sf)               25,247,000
  B-1         BB (sf)                 12,714,000
  B-2         B (sf)                  12,534,000
  B-3         NR                       7,341,120
  A-IO-S      NR                        Notional(ii)
  XS          NR                        Notional(ii)
  R           NR                             N/A

(i)The collateral and structural information in this report
reflects the term sheet dated Jan. 14, 2020. The ratings address
the ultimate payment of interest and principal.
(ii)The notional amount equals to the aggregate scheduled principal
balance of mortgage loans.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


ANTARES CLO 2019-2: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Antares CLO 2019-2
Ltd.'s fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily middle
market speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Antares CLO 2019-2 Ltd.

  Class                     Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1A                      AAA (sf)              200.00
  A-1B                      AAA (sf)               30.00
  A-2                       NR                      7.00
  B                         AA (sf)                38.90
  C (deferrable)            A (sf)                 30.00
  D (deferrable)            BBB- (sf)              22.10
  E (deferrable)            BB- (sf)               24.00
  Subordinated notes        NR                     48.80
  NR--Not rated.


BBCMS 2020-C6: DBRS Assigns Prov. B(low) Rating on 2 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-C6 to be
issued by BBCMS 2020-C6 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at BB (sf)
-- Class H-RR at B (high) (sf)
-- Class J-RR at B (low) (sf)
-- Class F5T-A at A (low) (sf)
-- Class F5T-B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F5T-C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F5T-D at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes X-D, D, E, F-RR, G-RR, H-RR, and
J-RR will be privately placed.

DBRS Morningstar subsequently placed the provisional ratings
assigned to Classes F5T-A, F5T-B, F5T-C, and F5T-D Under Review
with Developing Implications because of the request for comment
(RFC) on the "North American Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Ratings
Methodology" on November 14, 2019. If the updated methodology is
adopted following RFC, there will likely be no rating impact on the
provisional ratings assigned to this transaction. For more
information, please see the press release, "DBRS Morningstar
Requests Comments on North American Single-Asset/Single-Borrower
Ratings Methodology."

The transaction consists of 45 fixed-rate loans secured by 118
commercial and multifamily properties. Two separate groups of loans
are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into separate crossed
groups, one of which has five loans and the second of which has two
loans. The DBRS Morningstar analysis of this transaction
incorporates these groups of loans as separate portfolios,
resulting in a modified loan count of 40, and the loan number
referenced within this report reflects this total. The transaction
is of a sequential-pay pass-through structure. Five loans,
representing 30.8% of the pool, are shadow-rated investment grade
by DBRS Morningstar. The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the
provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of loan
default within the term and its liquidity at maturity. When the
cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS Morningstar
Stabilized Net Cash Flow and their respective actual constants, the
initial DBRS Morningstar Weighted-Average (WA) Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of the pool was 2.53 times (x). None of the
loans had a DBRS Morningstar DSCR below 1.32x, a threshold
indicative of a higher likelihood of midterm default. The pool
additionally includes 14 loans, comprising a combined 14.8% of the
pool balance, with a DBRS Morningstar Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio in
excess of 67.1%, a threshold generally indicative of above-average
default frequency. The WA DBRS Morningstar LTV of the pool at
issuance was 56.9%, and the pool is scheduled to amortize down to a
DBRS Morningstar WA LTV of 53.6% at maturity. These credit metrics
are based on A-note balances.

Five of the loans—Parkmerced, 650 Madison Avenue, Kings Plaza, F5
Tower, and Bellagio Hotel and Casino—exhibit credit
characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings.
Combined, these loans represent 30.8% of the pool. Bellagio Hotel
and Casino have credit characteristics consistent with an AAA
shadow rating, while Parkmerced has credit characteristics
consistent with AA (high), F5 Tower has credit characteristics
consistent with A (high), and 650 Madison Avenue and Kings Plaza
have credit characteristics consistent with BBB (low).

The term default risk is low, as indicated by a strong DBRS
Morningstar DSCR of 2.53x. Only five loans, representing 6.9% of
the allocated loan balance, have a DBRS Morningstar DSCR less than
1.50x. Even with the exclusion of the shadow-rated loans,
representing 30.8% of the pool, the deal exhibits a very favorable
DBRS Morningstar DSCR of 1.96x. Additionally, 11 loans,
representing a combined 40.0% of the pool by allocated loan
balance, exhibit issuance LTVs of less than 59.3%, a threshold
historically indicative of relatively low-leverage financing and
generally associated with below-average default frequency.

The pool exhibits heavy leverage barbelling. While the pool has 11
loans, comprising 40.0% of the pool balance, with an issuance LTV
lower than 59.3%, a threshold historically indicative of relatively
low-leverage financing and generally associated with below-average
default frequency, there are also 10 loans, comprising 13.1% of the
pool balance, with an issuance LTV higher than 67.1%, a threshold
historically indicative of relatively high-leverage financing and
generally associated with above-average default frequency. The WA
expected loss of the pool's investment-grade component was
approximately 0.5%, while the WA expected loss of the pool's
conduit component was substantially higher at over 2.4%, further
illustrating the barbell nature of the transaction. The WA DBRS
Morningstar DSCR exhibited by the loans that were identified as
representing relatively high-leverage financing was 1.67x.
Additionally, no loans exhibited a DBRS Morningstar Issuance DSCR
of less than 1.32x, a threshold generally associated with
above-average default frequency.

Twenty-one loans, representing a combined 69.8% of the pool by
allocated loan balance, are structured with full-term interest-only
(IO) periods. An additional nine loans, representing 21.4% of the
pool, have partial IO periods ranging from 12 months to 60 months.
Expected amortization for the pool is only 4.8%, which is less than
recent conduit securitizations. Of the 21 loans structured with
full-term IO periods, nine loans, representing 30.7% of the pool by
allocated loan balance, are located in areas with a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of 6, 7, or 8. These markets benefit from
increased liquidity even during times of economic stress.
Additionally, three of the 21 identified loans, representing 17.0%
of the total pool balance, are shadow-rated investment grade by
DBRS Morningstar: 650 Madison Avenue, F5 Tower, and Bellagio Hotel
and Casino.

The pool features a relatively high concentration of loans secured
by properties located in less favorable suburban market areas, as
evidenced by 18 loans, representing 29.1% of the pool balance,
being secured by properties located in areas with a DBRS
Morningstar Market Rank of either 3 or 4. An additional eight
loans, totaling 19.2% of the pool balance, are secured by
properties located in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of
either 1 or 2, which are typically considered more rural or
tertiary in nature. Seventeen of the identified loans, representing
21.2% of the pool balance, that are secured by properties located
in areas with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 1, 2, 3, or 4 will
amortize over the loan term, which can reduce risk over time. The
average expected amortization of these loans is 21.2%, which is
notably higher than the pool's total WA expected amortization of
4.8%.

Classes X-A, X-B, and X-D are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BBCMS MORTGAGE 2020-C6: Fitch to Rate $8.7MM Class H-RR Certs 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a presale report on BBCMS Mortgage Trust
2020-C6, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2020-C6.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $14,352,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $88,400,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,810,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $115,000,000a class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $371,300,000a class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $615,862,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,392,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,092,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $177,060,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,097,000 class D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17,596,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29,693,000b class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,798,000d class F-RR 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,198,000d class G-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $8,798,000d class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $9,897,000d class J-RR;

  -- $16,497,147bd class NR-RR;

  -- $24,200,000c class VRR Interest.

  -- The transaction includes five classes of non-offered, loan
specific certificates (non-pooled rake classes) related to the
companion loan of F5 Tower. Classes F5T-A, F5T-B, F5T-C, F5T-D and
F5T-VRR Interest are all not rated by Fitch.

(a) The initial certificate balances of class A-3 and A-4 are
unknown and expected to be $486,300,000 in aggregate, subject to a
5% variance. The certificate balances will be determined based on
the final pricing of those classes of certificates. The expected
class A-3 balance range is $0 to $230,000,000, and the expected
class A-4 balance range is $256,300,000 to $486,300,000. In the
event that the balance of A-4 is $486,300,00, class A-3 will be
removed from the transaction and class A-4 will be renamed class
A-3

(b) Notional amount and interest only.

(c) Vertical credit-risk retention interest.

(d) Horizontal credit-risk retention interest.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 24, 2020.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 45 loans secured by 118
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$904,003,147 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc., Societe Generale
Financial Corporation and Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 72.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87.2% of the pool, and asset
summary reviews on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 98.2% is
better than the 2019 and 2018 averages of 103.0% and 102.0%,
respectively, for other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.
Additionally, the pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.27x is better than the 2019 and 2018 averages of 1.26x and
1.22x, respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion
loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.25x and 111.1%,
respectively.

Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans, representing 30.8% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions. This is significantly above
the 2019 and 2018 averages of 14.2% and 13.6%, respectively.
Parkmerced (7.2% of the pool) received a credit opinion of
'BBB+sf*' on a stand-alone basis. Kings Plaza (6.6%) received a
credit opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone basis. 650 Madison
(6.6%), F5 Tower (5.5%) and Bellagio Hotel and Casino (4.8%) each
received stand-alone credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*'.

Limited Amortization: 25 loans (69.8% of the pool) are full-term
interest-only loans, and 10 loans (21.4%) are partial
interest-only. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool
will pay down by only 4.8%, which is less than the 2019 and 2018
averages of 5.9% and 7.2%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.2% below
the most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI
was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during
this period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
BBCMS 2020-C6 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the transaction, either due
to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the
transaction.


BDS LTD 2020-FL5: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings of the following
classes of notes (the Notes) issued by BDS 2020-FL5 Ltd. (the
Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B as AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes F and G are privately placed.

The initial collateral consists of 24 floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 26 mostly transitional real estate properties, with a
cut-off pool balance of approximately $492.2 million. During the
ramp-up period, the Issuer plans to acquire up to $57.8 million of
additional mortgage assets (the Ramp loans) using the proceeds from
the sale of the Notes, the Senior Preferred Shares, and the Junior
Preferred Shares that will comprise the remainder of the initial
portfolio of mortgage assets. The loans in the initial pool are
mostly secured by cash-flowing assets, most of which are in a
period of transition with plans to stabilize and improve the asset
value. The transaction has a two-year Reinvestment Period
(including a six-month ramp-up acquisition period) that is expected
to expire in February 2022. Reinvestment is subject to Eligibility
Criteria, which includes a rating agency condition by DBRS
Morningstar for funded companion participations that are being
acquired for more than $1.5 million and for any other mortgaged
assets. Additionally, DBRS Morningstar assessed the Ramp loans
using a worst-case pool construct, and as a result, the Ramp loans
have enhancement higher than the loan pool average.

The loans are generally secured by traditional property types
(i.e., retail, multifamily, and office) with only three loans,
comprising 10.7% of the cut-off date pool balance, secured by
hospitality properties. Additionally, only one of the multifamily
loans in the pool is secured by a student housing property, which
often exhibits higher cash flow volatility than traditional
multifamily properties. Only one loan, comprising 8.9% of the
initial pool balance, is secured by a property located in an area
with a DBRS Morningstar market rank of two or lower. Areas with a
DBRS Morningstar market rank of two or lower are generally
considered to be tertiary or rural markets. Additionally, four
loans, representing 14.7% of the initial pool balance, are secured
by properties located in areas with a DBRS Morningstar market rank
of six or higher. Areas with a DBRS Morningstar market rank of six
or higher are generally characterized as urbanized locations. These
markets benefit from increased liquidity that is driven by
consistently strong investor demand; therefore, such markets tend
to benefit from lower default frequencies than less dense suburban,
tertiary, and rural markets. Areas with a DBRS Morningstar market
rank of seven or eight are especially densely urbanized and benefit
from significantly elevated liquidity; three loans, comprising
12.4% of the initial pool balance, are secured by properties
located in such areas.

The pool generally consists of transitional assets. Given the
nature of the assets, DBRS Morningstar determined a sample size
representing 88.2% of the cut-off date pool balance. This is higher
than the typical sample size for a traditional conduit commercial
mortgage-backed security (CMBS) transaction. Physical site
inspections were also performed, including management meetings.
DBRS Morningstar also notes that in the future when DBRS
Morningstar visits the markets, it may visit properties more than
once to follow the progress (or lack thereof) toward stabilization.
The service is also in constant contact with the borrowers to track
progress. Based on the initial pool balances, the overall
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Morningstar As-Is Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (DSCR) of 0.89 times (x) and WA Issuance Loan-to-Value (LTV)
of 83.6% are generally reflective of high-leverage financing. The
assets are generally well-positioned to stabilize, and any realized
cash flow growth would help to offset a rise in interest rates and
improve the overall debt yield of the loans. The DBRS Morningstar
As-Is DSCR at issuance does not consider the sponsor's business
plan, as the DBRS Morningstar, As-Is Net Cash Flow (NCF) was
generally based on the most recent annualized period. The sponsor's
business plan could have an immediate impact on the underlying
asset performance that the DBRS Morningstar As-Is NCF is not
accounting for. Furthermore, when measured against the DBRS
Morningstar Stabilized NCF, the WA DBRS Morningstar As-Stabilized
DSCR is estimated to improve to 1.32x, suggesting the properties
are likely to have improved NCFs once the sponsor's business plan
has been implemented.

DBRS Morningstar has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow
that is, in some instances, above the current in-place cash flow.
There is a possibility that the sponsor will not execute its
business plans as expected and that the higher stabilized cash flow
will not materialize during the loan term. Failure to execute the
business plan could result in a term default or the inability to
refinance the fully funded loan balance. DBRS Morningstar made
relatively conservative stabilization assumptions, and the modeled
probability of default for each loan is influenced by the perceived
risk of execution based on a business plan score. In addition, DBRS
Morningstar analyzes LGD based on the as-is LTV assuming the loan
is fully funded.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 2 Debt Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR18
issued by Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2007-PWR18 as follows:

-- Class B at BBB (sf)
-- Class C at C (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)

The trend on Class B remains Stable, while Class C and Class D have
ratings that do not carry trends. Class D continues to carry an
Interest in Arrears designation, as interest shortfalls remain
outstanding with the January 2020 remittance.

The rating confirmations reflect the performance outlook of the
remaining loan in the pool, Prospectus ID#6 – Marriott Houston
Westchase, which has an outstanding balance of $69.9 million as of
the January 2020 remittance. At issuance, the transaction consisted
of 186 loans with an original balance of $2.5 billion. The pool
composition has remained unchanged in the past 12 months with a
collateral reduction of 97.2% since issuance as a result of
successful loan repayments as well as realized losses and recovered
proceeds from loans liquidated from the pool.

The remaining loan, Marriott Houston Westchase, is a 600-room
full-service hotel located in Houston, Texas. The loan transferred
to special servicing in March 2019 due to a request from the
Borrower to modify the existing loan documents. As of the January
2020 servicer commentary, the modification request has been
completed, which extended the maturity date to June 2023 from June
2021, coupled with the establishment of a new Property Improvement
Plan Reserve. The loan previously transferred to special servicing
in July 2017 due to imminent default as the borrower stated it
would not have been to refinance the loan at the original November
2017 maturity date. The special servicer approved a loan
modification in June 2018, extending the maturity date to June
2021, and the loan returned to the master servicer in November
2018. As part of the maturity extension, the sponsor paid down the
principal balance by $1.8 million (2.5% of the outstanding
principal balance at the time).

In addition, the sponsor completed a $20.0 million improvement
project at the subject in 2017, which was mandated by the
franchisor and consisted of a full renovation to all guestrooms and
corridors, as well as a conversion of the hotel bar to the newly
dubbed M Club Lounge. The hotel's performance has been down for
several years since the downturn in the energy markets, which led
to a general disruption in the local Houston economy and
difficulties for commercial real estate, particularly office and
hotel properties. The most recently reported trailing six months
ending June 2019 financial statement showed improvement as the debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.09 times (x) compared with the
year-end (YE) 2018 DSCR of 0.74x and YE2017 DSCR of 0.95x. Revenue
per available room and the occupancy rate were reported at $83.02
and 69.5%, respectively, as of the trailing 12 months (T-12) ending
September 2019 Smith Travel Research report. These results are
indicative of year-over-year growth of 0.2% and 3.5%, respectively.
DBRS Morningstar expects the DSCR to remain stable with a full T-12
reporting cycle.

As of the January 2020 remittance, the loan had an outstanding
principal balance of $69.9 million, with current advances
outstanding of $44,047. The current exposure of approximately
$116,490 per key is considered high given the low DSCR and general
market difficulties, supporting the rating confirmations for the
remaining classes. DBRS Morningstar considered a stressed cap rate
and the in-place annualized Q2 2019 net cash flow, to determine a
stressed DBRS Morningstar property value. Based on the DBRS
Morningstar stressed value, DBRS Morningstar expects Class B to
ultimately be fully repaid when the asset is refinanced or
liquidated. Class B has a remaining balance of $23.3 million as of
the January 2020 remittance, representative of the exposure of just
under $39,000 per key on the collateral.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on nine classes in CFCRE Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2011-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2011-C2, as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Affirmed B1
(sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded due to an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization, as
well as an increase in defeasance. The deal has paid down 7% since
Moody's last review and defeasance increased to 37% of the pool
from 11% at last review.

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 17, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 56% to $337.2
million from $774.1 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 26% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 54% of the pool. Twelve loans,
constituting 37% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, compared to 9 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 12%). There are no loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $10.4 million (a 39% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans. The largest troubled loan is secured by
a regional mall in Hanford, California which is discussed further.
The second troubled loan is secured by a mixed use
(retail/multifamily) property in Dearborn, Michigan which is
experiencing low DSCR as a result of a decline in occupancy since
securitization.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results, and full or
partial year 2019 operating results for 95% of the pool (excluding
specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 84%, compared to 78% at Moody's last review. Moody's
conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 20% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.58X and 1.40X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 38% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall Loan ($86.4 million --
25.6% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$134.9 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
635,769 square foot (SF) portion of a 1.2 million SF regional mall
located in Grandville, Michigan. The property was built in 2000 and
is anchored by Macy's, Sears, Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting
Goods and Celebration Cinemas. The property contains one vacant
anchor space (150,081 SF), a former Younkers that vacated in 2018
as a result of Bon-Ton's bankruptcy. Only Dick's and Celebration
Cinemas are part of the collateral. As of March 2019, the inline
space was 87% leased, compared to 91% at the last review. The
property's 2018 net operating income was 18% above underwritten
levels, however, it has declined 6% from year-end 2016. The loan
sponsor, Brookfield Properties, purchased the vacant anchor box
(former Younkers) for $4.4 million in 2019. The loan has amortized
approximately 13% since securitization. While the property benefits
from stable performance and high in-place DSCR (NOI DSCR was 2.07X
in 2018), the loan matures in June 2021 and regional malls may face
higher refinancing risk as compared to other major property types.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.34X, respectively,
compared to 76% and 1.39X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Hanford Mall Loan ($22.8 million --
6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 331,080 SF portion within
a 488,833 SF enclosed regional mall located in Hanford, California.
At securitization the mall was anchored by Sears, J.C. Penney,
Forever 21 (non-collateral), and Kohl's (non-collateral). However,
Forever 21 vacated in 2016 and Sears vacated in 2018. As of
September 2019, the collateral space was 92% leased, however,
excluding Sears the collateral occupancy would be 65%. The former
Forever 21 box (non-collateral) is reportedly being renovated by
its owner, who is dividing the former 80,000 SF space into four
tenant spots. The new tenants would include a new trampoline gym,
Urban Air, a new 10,000 SF Boot Barn, and an additional 20,000 SF
tenant. The property is located in a tertiary market and
performance has declined since securitization as a result of lower
rental revenues. The loan has amortized 10.5% since securitization
and matures in December 2021. Due to the decline in the
collateral's performance and loan DSCR, Moody's has identified this
as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the Marketplace at Santee Loan ($19.8
million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 71,000 SF
retail property located in Santee, California. The property was
built in 2008 and is 100% leased as of September 2019, unchanged
from 2018 and compared to 90% at securitization. The largest
tenant, Sprouts farmers market, represents 41% of the NRA. The
property is located in a busy retail corridor and is surrounded by
several shadow anchors. The loan has amortized 12.8% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and
0.97X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.95X at the last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on thirteen classes
in COMM 2012-CCRE5 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE5:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. PEZ**, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

** Reflects Exchangeable Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on interest-only classes were affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ, was affirmed due to
the credit quality of the referenced exchangeable classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The principal methodology used in
rating exchangeable classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Repackaged Securities" published in March 2019. The methodologies
used in rating interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 10, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $848.6
million from $1.13 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 46 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 53.8% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
10.6% of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit
assessments. Eleven loans, constituting almost 20.7% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same as at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 4.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2019 operating results for 66% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 96%, compared to 97% at the last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 15% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.60X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.60X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 200
Varick Street Loan ($59.7 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 12-story, 430,000 square foot (SF) office property
located in lower Manhattan, NY. As of November 2019, the property
was 99% occupied, essentially unchanged since the last review. The
property's occupancy has remained roughly the same for a number of
years and performance has been stable. The loan has amortized by
14.7% since securitization. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.76X, respectively,
compared to aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.70X at the last review.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Ritz-Carlton South Beach Loan ($29.8 million -- 3.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a beachfront land parcel in Miami Beach,
Florida. The land is subject to a long-term ground lease which is
set to expire in 2128. The improvements include a 375-room luxury
hotel. Moody's considered the value of the ground and the
improvements when assessing the risk of the loan. Moody's
structured credit assessment is aaa (sca.pd), unchanged since
securitization.

The top three conduit loans represent 23.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Eastview Mall and Commons Loan ($90.0
million -- 10.6% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion in $210 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by
a 725,000 SF portion of a 1.4 million super-regional mall and an
86,000 SF portion of a 341,000 SF adjacent retail power center. The
property is located in Victor, New York, approximately 15 miles
southeast of Rochester. The Eastview Mall's non-collateral anchors
include Macy's, Von Maur, JC Penney, and Lord & Taylor. The total
mall, including the non-collateral anchors, was 93% leased as of
September 2019 with an inline occupancy at 81%. One non-collateral
anchor, Sears, vacated in 2018 but is reported to be backfilled by
a Dicks Sporting Goods. The property's net operating income (NOI)
has declined below securitization levels due to lower base rent and
higher expenses. However, the property's performance has been
stable over the past three years and the mall is considered the
dominant mall in the area. The Eastview Commons portion is a power
center. The non-collateral anchors at the power center include
Target & Home Depot. The loan is interest only for entire 10 years
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 116% and 0.86X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Metroplex Loan ($56.2 million --
6.6% of the pool), which is secured by an 18 story, 404,000 SF
office property in the Mid-Wilshire office submarket of Los
Angeles, California. As of June 2019, the property was 98%
occupied, compared to 90% as of April 2018 and 91% in December
2017. A cash flow sweep was triggered due to the largest tenant
County of Los Angeles (28% of NRA) right's to terminate the lease.
The lease originally expired in May 2019, but was extended by 6
months and the tenant currently remains in-place. The loan has
amortized 12.8% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 106% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.91X
at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Widener Building Loan ($51.2 million
-- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by an 18-story multi-tenant
Class B office building located in Philadelphia, PA. The building
has approximately 423,000 SF of office space with 32,000 SF of
ground floor retail space. The property was 91% occupied as of June
2019, the same as of December 2018 and compared to 100% in December
2017. The property's reported 2018 NOI is inline with
securitization levels due to both an increase in revenue and
operating expenses since 2012. The largest tenant is Philadelphia
Municipal Authority, 44% of NRA, with a lease expiration in January
2026. The loan has amortized 13.5% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to
97% and 1.01X at the last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE10: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed the ratings of 12 classes in COMM 2013-CCRE10 Mortgage
Trust as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. PEZ**, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2019
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Class

**Reflects Exchangeable Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are driven by the correction of an error. In the
prior rating action on Class PEZ on December 22, 2019, Moody's did
not account for upgrades of other classes in the transaction to
which this bond is linked.

Class PEZ -- an exchangeable security whose rating is determined
based on the credit quality of the exchangeable classes to which it
is linked, Class A-M, Class B and Class C -- should have been
upgraded in the prior rating action based on the December 22, 2019
upgrades of Class B to Aa2 (sf) from Aa3 (sf) and Class C to A2
(sf) from A3 (sf). This error has been corrected, and the upgrade
action on Class PEZ reflects the correct linkages for this bond.

The ratings on 11 P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, was affirmed based on the credit
quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current pooled balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The principal methodology used in
rating the exchangeable classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Repackaged Securities" published in March 2019. The methodologies
used in rating interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 10, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $804.0
million from $1.01 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 48 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 54.2% of the pool. One loan, constituting
12.4% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Eleven loans, constituting 18.7% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same as at Moody's last review.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a realized
loss of $17.2 million (for a loss severity of 99.8%). There are
currently no loans in special servicing.

Eight loans, constituting 15.9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2019 operating results for 81% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 89%, the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 15% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 1.22X,
respectively, the same as at the last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the
agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the One Wilshire
Loan ($100.0 million -- 12.4% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu portion of a $180.0 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 663,000 square-foot (SF) Class A office building and
colocation center in Los Angeles, California. The building operated
as a traditional office building until 1992, when the building was
converted to a telecommunication building through installation of
infrastructure necessary to attract telecommunication companies.
The building is recognized as the primary communications hub
connecting North America and Asia, the most significant point of
interconnection in the western United States, and of one the top
three network interconnections points in the world. The property
was 90% leased as of September 2019, compared to 86% leased as of
December 2017 and 92% at securitization. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and 1.59X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 17.6% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the RHP Portfolio IV Loan ($51.0 million --
6.3% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of five
manufactured housing communities located across four states:
Florida (2), Kansas (1), New York (1), and Utah (1). The property
was acquired by the sponsor in 2013 as part of a 35-property
portfolio. The sponsor, RHP Properties, is one of the largest
operators of manufactured housing communities in the United States.
The portfolio was 93% leased as of September 2019, compared to 88%
leased as of December 2017 and 83% at securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
107% and 0.92X at last review.

The second largest loan is the RHP Portfolio V Loan ($49.6 million
-- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of seven
manufactured housing communities located across four states:
Florida (2), Kansas (1), New York (1), and Utah (3). The property
was acquired by the sponsor in 2013 as part of a 35-property
portfolio. The sponsor is also RHP Properties. The portfolio was
78% leased as of September 2019, the same as in December 2017 and
79% at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and
0.93X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Brighton Town Square Loan ($40.7
million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 328,000 SF
mixed-use power center located in Brighton, Michigan, approximately
20 miles north of Ann Arbor and 45 miles northwest of Detroit. The
property is comprised of a 236,000 SF retail component and 91,500
SF office component. Major tenants at the property include Home
Depot, MJR Theatre, and the University of Michigan, which operates
a medical office at the property. Other major tenants include
Staples, Party City, and KeyBank. The collateral is also
shadow-anchored by a Target. The property was 99% leased as of
September 2019, the same in December 2017 and 93% at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 1.05X,
respectively, the same as at last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed 11 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE13 Mortgage Trust.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2013-CCRE13

Class A-3 12630BAZ1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 12630BBA5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-M 12630BBC1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 12630BAY4; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 12630BBD9;    LT AAsf Affirmed;   previously at AAsf

Class C 12630BBF4;    LT Asf Affirmed;    previously at Asf

Class D 12630BAE8;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 12630BAG3;    LT BBsf Affirmed;   previously at BBsf

Class F 12630BAJ7;    LT Bsf Affirmed;    previously at Bsf

Class PEZ 12630BBE7;  LT Asf Affirmed;    previously at Asf

Class X-A 12630BBB3;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Decreasing Loss Expectations: Loss expectations have decreased
primarily due to the payment in full of the specially serviced
Abbotts Square loan in August 2019, additional defeasance and the
improved performance of two loans previously designated as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs) in Fitch's last rating action. Hampton Inn
Pittsburgh Airport (1.2%) reported improved RevPAR and NOI debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of $83 and 1.59x, respectively, as of
TTM September 2019, compared with $73 and 1.11x as of YE 2017, and
continues to outperform its competitive set with a RevPAR
penetration of 129.2%. Stonegate Village Apartments (1.0%) also
stabilized following a change in management and reported improved
occupancy and NOI DSCR of 93% and 1.43x, respectively, as of YTD
September 2019, compared with 60% and 0.29x as of YE 2017.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated three loans (12.2%) as
FLOCs in this review. The largest FLOC, 175 West Jackson (10.4%),
is secured by a 1.5 million-sf office property located in the
Chicago CBD. The loan was returned to the master servicer in August
2018 after being assumed by a Brookfield-related entity. Occupancy
at the property has declined substantially since issuance, and the
prior borrower was unwilling to contribute additional capital
toward re-leasing and renovating the property. Since acquiring the
asset, the new sponsor has increased occupancy to 64.9% as of the
September 2019 rent roll from 60.9% at YE 2018 and continues to
work diligently to lease up and stabilize the asset.

The remaining FLOCs are secured by a 51,407-sf office property
located in Redondo Beach, CA (1.3%) that has a high proportion of
month-to-month and rolling leases and a 28,450-sf convenience
center property located in Fort Worth, TX (0.8%) that that has
experienced occupancy and cash flow decline.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the January 2020 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance paid down by 25.2% to
$826.7 million from $1.125 billion at issuance and 4.2% since
Fitch's last rating action. Only one loan, the specially serviced
Abbotts Square, has disposed since Fitch's last rating action with
no realized losses to the trust. Twelve loans totaling 20.2% of the
pool are partially or fully defeased. There are no specially
serviced or delinquent loans. Two loans (16.8%) are full-term
interest-only and the remainder of the pool is currently
amortizing. The entire remaining pool matures in 2023. The
non-rated Class G has been impacted by $6.5 million in realized
losses and $49,614 in interest shortfalls to date.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentration: The pool has become increasingly concentrated
by loan count and property type. Forty-three loans remain of the
original 57 at issuance. The top five non-defeased loans account
for 50.5% of the pool and the top 10 non-defeased loans account for
62.2% of the pool. Additionally, loans secured by hotel properties
account for 29.9% of loans in the pool when excluding defeased
loans.

Credit Opinion Loan: Fitch assigned an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'AAsf*' on a stand-alone basis to the largest loan in
the pool, 60 Hudson Street (15.1%), at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Positive Rating Outlook on class B and Stable Rating Outlooks
on the remaining classes reflect decreased loss expectations
following the improved performance of two former FLOCs and
increased credit enhancement from the payoff of the Abbott Square
loan, increased defeasance and scheduled amortization. Upgrades may
be possible with continued paydown, defeasance or improved
performance from the FLOCs. Downgrades, though unlikely, may occur
should the FLOCs decline further or transfer to special servicing.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the transaction, either due
to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the
transaction.


COMM 2014-LC17: Fitch Affirms CCsf Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed 17 classes for Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2014-LC17 Mortgage Trust.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2014-LC17

Class A-2 12592MBF6;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 12592MBH2;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 12592MBJ8;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 12592MBK5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-M 12592MBM1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 12592MBG4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B 12592MBN9;    LT AAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAsf

Class C 12592MBQ2;    LT Asf Affirmed;   previously at Asf

Class D 12592MAN0;    LT BBsf Affirmed;  previously at BBsf

Class E 12592MAQ3;    LT CCCsf Affirmed; previously at CCCsf

Class F 12592MAS9;    LT CCsf Affirmed;  previously at CCsf

Class PEZ 12592MBP4;  LT Asf Affirmed;   previously at Asf

Class X-A 12592MBL3;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 12592MAA8;  LT AAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAsf

Class X-C 12592MAC4;  LT BBsf Affirmed;  previously at BBsf

Class X-D 12592MAE0;  LT CCCsf Affirmed; previously at CCCsf

Class X-E 12592MAG5;  LT CCsf Affirmed;  previously at CCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations: Fitch's modeled base case losses remain
higher than issuance. Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) consist of 14
loans (15.3% of pool), which includes two loans in the top 15
(5.3%) and six specially serviced loans/assets (5.9%), all of which
have performed below expectation from issuance. The imminent
expected losses result from the specially serviced assets.

Since Fitch's prior rating action in 2019, the specially serviced
loan Cincinnati Portfolio Pool B disposed for a $5.7 million loss,
which was slightly less than expectations. There have been a total
of $19.1 million in realized losses. There are 13 loans on the
servicer's watchlist (12.0%) for high vacancy, impending tenant
departures, poor performance and fire damage.

Increased Credit Enhancement to Senior Classes: As of the January
2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
paid down by 23.8% to $941.3 million from $1.235 billion at
issuance and 7.2% since Fitch's last rating action. Eight loans
have paid off totaling $186.6 million since the last rating action,
including two FLOCs: SRC Multifamily Portfolio 2 and SRC
Multifamily Portfolio 3, which both paid at their maturities in
August 2019. Seven loans (5.9% of current pool) are fully defeased,
including one loan in the top 15 (2.3%).

Alternative Loss Scenario: A sensitivity scenario was applied to
test the stability of the ratings and outlooks. In this stress
scenario, Fitch applied 100 bps to the stressed cap rates as well
as a total 10% NOI haircut to all of the base case cap rates and
NOI stresses in the pool. In addition, the defeased loans were
assumed to pay in full. The Negative Rating Outlook on class D
reflects this sensitivity scenario, as well as the 5.9% of the pool
in special servicing.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest non-specially serviced FLOC is
50 Crosby Drive (3.45%), a four-story, 261,961-sf office building
located in Bedford, MA. According to the master servicer, the sole
tenant, Oracle, has exercised their early termination option and
will be vacating the subject mid-2020.

The largest specially serviced asset is World Houston Plaza (1.5%),
an office property located in Houston, TX. The loan transferred to
the special servicer in June 2017 for imminent default. Weatherford
U.S. was previously the largest tenant, occupying 50.5% of the NRA
on a lease that expired in May 2017. The asset became REO in
January. 2018. The property occupancy is approximately 26%
following the departure of a tenant in October 2018. Fitch expects
significant losses.

Five other loans are in special servicing: 1401/1405/1621 Holdings
(1.4%), three crossed medical office buildings located in
Allentown, PA; Georgia Multifamily Portfolio (1.1%), a three
property portfolio; Smithfield Holdings (0.9%), an office property
in East Strousberg, PA; Peru Retail Center (0.6%) in Peru, IL; and
Grayson Bodyplex (.3%) in Grayson, GA. All but Grayson Bodyplex are
delinquent and losses are expected based on update appraisal
values.

The three FLOCs outside the top 15 that have not transferred to
special servicing include Triangle Plaza (1.6%), Paradise Valley
(1.5%) and Satellite Office Portfolio (1.3%). Each of these
properties have had occupancy issues due to departing or downsizing
tenants.

The remaining seven FLOCs individually account for less than 1.00%
of total pool balance and collectively account for 3.3% of total
pool balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class D reflects concerns with potential
losses from the FLOCs including the loans in special servicing. If
expected losses increase, downgrades are possible. Downgrades to
the distressed classes E and F, and X-D and X-E are possible as
losses are realized or if expected losses increase. Future upgrades
to the senior classes are possible with increased credit
enhancement and stable overall pool performance and expected
losses; however, may be limited due to the larger FLOCs.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the transaction, either due
to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
transaction.

COMM 2014-LC17 currently has ESG Relevance Scores of 3 or below.


COMM 2014-UBS6: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to B-
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded two classes and affirmed 14 classes of
COMM 2014-UBS6 Mortgage Trust pass-through certificates, which were
issued by Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.

RATING ACTIONS

COMM 2014-UBS6

Class A-2 12592PBB8;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-3 12592PBC6;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-4 12592PBE2;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 12592PBF9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-M 12592PBH5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 12592PBD4; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 12592PBJ1;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class C 12592PBL6;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class D 12592PAJ2;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 12592PAL7;    LT BB+sf Affirmed;  previously at BB+sf

Class F 12592PAN3;    LT B-sf Downgrade;  previously at BB-sf

Class PEZ 12592PBK8;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf

Class X-A 12592PBG7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 12592PAA1;  LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

Class X-C 12592PAC7;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class X-D 12592PAE3;  LT B-sf Downgrade;  previously at BB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrade to class F and the
interest-only class X-D, and the Negative Outlooks for classes E
and F and the interest-only class X-D reflect an increase in loss
expectations since Fitch's prior rating action. The majority of the
pool continues to exhibit stable performance. However, four loans
are in special servicing. The increase in loss expectations is
mainly attributed to the University Village loan (3.6%), which
transferred to special servicing in July 2019 for imminent default.
The loan is secured by a 1,164-bed student housing complex located
in Tuscaloosa, AL, approximately two miles from the University of
Alabama campus.

Occupancy declined to 57% for the 2015-16 school year from 94% at
issuance. Occupancy improved to 99% as of September 2018 but
dropped again to 30% as of August 2019. According to local media
reports, a number of crime incidents have been reported at the
property since December 2018 that have negatively affected leasing
demand. The servicer reports that a receiver is in place to
stabilize the property and improve the negative image through a
rebranding effort. Given the drop in occupancy and the negative
image within the market, Fitch expects significant losses for the
loan.

Increased Credit Enhancement: The rating affirmations for the
senior classes reflect increased credit enhancement due to loan
payoffs and continued amortization. As of the January 2020
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 7.1% to $1.11 billion from $1.30 billion at issuance. Since
Fitch's last rating action, five loans totaling roughly $40 million
were repaid between October and November of 2019 at their scheduled
maturity dates. Eleven loans (8.3%) have been defeased. The
majority of the pool (85.1% of pool) is currently amortizing. Four
loans (14.9%) are full-term interest only. There has been $18.1
million in realized losses to date, which were the result of the
disposition of the Black Gold Suites Hotel Portfolio in January
2019 and Cray Plaza in January 2020. Losses from the Cray Plaza
were higher than Fitch's expectations.

Alternative Loss Considerations: In addition to modeling a base
case loss, Fitch applied a 75% loss severity to the current balance
of the University Village loan due to the significant performance
decline and uncertainty of losses. In addition, a 25% loss severity
was applied to the maturity balance of the Larkridge Shopping
Center loan to reflect the potential for outsized losses given the
vacant anchor box, near-term lease expiration of Dick's and
exposure to a weak non-collateral anchor (Sears Grand). The
sensitivity scenario also factored in defeased loans. This
sensitivity analysis contributed to the Negative Rating Outlooks on
classes E and F and the interest-only class X-D.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for class E has been revised to Negative and the
Rating Outlooks for class F and the interest-only class X-D remain
Negative due to the transfer of the University Village loan to
special servicing and overall increase in loss expectations.
Sustained underperformance coupled with value declines of the
specially serviced loans may warrant a downgrade; conversely, the
Rating Outlooks may be revised to Stable should asset-level
performance revert to levels seen at issuance. Rating Outlooks for
A-2 through D remain Stable due to increases in credit enhancement
from amortization and loan payoffs in 2019. Downgrades are possible
with significant performance decline. Upgrades, while not likely in
the near term, are possible with overall improved pool
performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the transaction, either due
to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
transaction.


DT AUTO 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Notes to be issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2020-1 (DTAOT 2020-1 or
the Issuer):

-- $203,750,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $52,500,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $75,000,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $67,500,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $34,250,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS Morningstar's review of
the following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings, and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- DTAOT 2020-1 provides for Class A, B, C, D, and E coverage
multiples slightly below the DBRS Morningstar range of multiples
set forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS Morningstar
believes that this is warranted, given the magnitude of expected
loss and structural features of the transaction.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of the provided historical static
pool data for DriveTime Automotive Group, Inc. (DriveTime)
originations and the performance of the DriveTime auto loan
portfolio.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with DriveTime,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and consistency with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for
U.S. Structured Finance."

The DTAOT 2020-1 transaction represents a securitization of a
portfolio of motor vehicle retail installment sales contracts
originated by DriveTime Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator).
The Originator is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of DriveTime.
DriveTime is a leading used vehicle retailer in the United States
that focuses primarily on the sale and financing of vehicles to the
subprime market.

The provisional rating on the Class A Notes reflects 60.75% of
initial hard credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes
in the pool, the Reserve Account (1.50%), and
over-collateralization (13.40%). The ratings on Class B, C, D, and
E Notes reflect 50.25%, 35.25%, 21.75%, and 14.90% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


EAGLE RE 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B(low) Rating on 3 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Insurance-Linked Notes, Series 2020-1 (the Notes) to be
issued by Eagle Re 2020-1 Ltd. (EMIR 2020-1 or the Issuer):

-- $83.9 million Class M-1A at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $133.2 million Class M-1B at BB (high) (sf)
-- $88.8 million Class M-1C at BB (low) (sf)
-- $157.9 million Class M-2 at B (low) (sf)
-- $52.6 million Class M-2A at B (high) (sf)
-- $52.6 million Class M-2B at B (sf)
-- $52.6 million Class M-2C at B (low) (sf)
-- $24.7 million Class B-1 at B (low) (sf)

The BBB (low) (sf), BB (high) (sf), BB (low) (sf), B (high) (sf), B
(sf), and B (low) (sf) ratings reflect 6.15%, 4.80%, 3.90%, 3.37%,
2.83%, and 2.05% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

EMIR 2020-1 is Radian Guaranty Inc.'s (Radian Guaranty or the
ceding insurer) third-rated mortgage insurance (MI)-linked note
transaction. The Notes are backed by reinsurance premiums, eligible
investments, and related account investment earnings, in each case
relating to a pool of MI policies linked to residential loans. The
Notes are exposed to the risk arising from losses paid by the
ceding insurer to settle claims on the underlying MI policies. As
of the Cutoff Date, the pool of insured mortgage loans consists of
156,065 fully amortizing first-lien fixed- and variable-rate
mortgage loans, 100% underwritten to a full documentation standard
with original loan-to-value ratios less than or equal to 97%, that
have never been reported as 60 or more days delinquent. The
mortgage loans were originated on or after October 2018 with the
associated MI policies effective on or after January 2019.

On the Closing Date, the Issuer will enter into the Reinsurance
Agreement with the ceding insurer. As per the agreement, the ceding
insurer will get protection for the funded portion (100.0%) of the
MI losses. In exchange for this protection, the ceding insurer will
make premium payments related to the underlying insured mortgage
loans to the Issuer.

The Issuer is expected to use the proceeds from the sale of the
Notes to purchase certain eligible investments that will be held in
the reinsurance trust account. The eligible investments are
restricted to AAA- or equivalent-rated U.S. Treasury money-market
funds and securities. Unlike other residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) transactions, cash flow from the underlying loans
will not be used to make any payments; rather, in MI-linked Notes
transactions, a portion of the eligible investments held in the
reinsurance trust account will be liquidated to make principal
payments to the noteholders and to make loss payments to the ceding
insurer when claims are settled with respect to the MI policy.

The Issuer will use the investment earnings on the eligible
investments, together with the ceding insurer's premium payments,
to pay interest to the noteholders.

The calculation of principal payments to the Notes will be based on
a reduction in aggregate exposed principal balance on the
underlying MI policy. The subordinate notes will be allocated their
pro-rata share of available principal funds if performance tests
are satisfied. The minimum credit enhancement test—one of the two
performance tests—has been set to fail at the Closing Date, thus
locking out the rated classes from initially receiving any
principal payments until the senior credit enhancement percentage
grows to 8.0% from 7.0%. Interest payments are funded via (1)
premium payments that the ceding insurer must make under the
reinsurance agreement and (2) earnings on eligible investments.

On the Closing Date, the ceding insurer will establish a cash and
securities account, the premium deposit account, and deposit an
amount that covers 70 days of interest payments to be made to the
noteholders. The calculation of the initial deposit amount also
takes into account any potential investment income that may be
earned on eligible investments held in the trust account. In case
of the ceding insurer's default in paying coverage premium payments
to the Issuer, the amount available in this account will be used to
make interest payments to the noteholders. The presence of this
account mitigates certain counterparty exposure that the trust has
to the ceding insurer. On each payment date, if the amount
available in the premium deposit account is less than the target
premium amount, and the ceding insurer's average financial strength
rating is lower than the highest rating assigned to the Notes, then
the ceding insurer must fund the premium deposit account up to its
target amount.

The Notes are scheduled to mature on the payment date in January
2030 but will be subject to early redemption at the option of the
ceding insurer, either (1) for a 10% clean-up call or (2) on or
following the payment date in January 2027, among others. The Notes
are also subject to mandatory redemption before the scheduled
maturity date upon the termination of the Reinsurance Agreement.

The ceding insurer of the transaction is Radian Guaranty. The Bank
of New York Mellon (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS
Morningstar) will act as the Indenture Trustee, Paying Agent, Note
Registrar, and Reinsurance Trustee.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

-- Agency eligible loans
-- High-quality credit and loan attributes
-- MI termination
-- Well-diversified pool
-- Alignment of interest

The transaction also includes the following challenges:

-- Counterparty exposure
-- Representation and warranties framework
-- Limited third-party due diligence
-- Eligible investment losses

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


FAT BRANDS 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following notes (the
Notes) to be issued by FAT Brands Royalty I, LLC (the Issuer):

-- $1,000,000 Series 2020-1, Class A-1 Notes at BB (sf)
-- $19,000,000 Series 2020-1, Class A-2 Notes at BB (sf)
-- $1,000,000, Series 2020-1, Class B-1 Notes at B (sf)
-- $19,000,000 Series 2020-1, Class B-2 Notes at B (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS Morningstar
of the following analytical considerations:

-- Relatively short repayment window for the Notes with a shorter
forecast performance period and higher visibility into the
viability of brands managed by FAT Brands Inc. (FAT Brands or the
Company).

-- The ultimate payment of interest and principal on classes of
Notes referenced above in accordance with transaction documents.

-- The Company's track record of consistent financial performance
with systemwide sales, revenues, average unit volume (AUV), and
store count steadily growing over the past five years.

-- FAT Brands' market position, with approximately 400 stores
nationwide and 200 stores planned over the next five years. Despite
low barriers to entry in the restaurant industry, FAT Brands'
market position and brand diversity, combined with its history of
rapid positive growth, support its long-term financial prospects.
FAT Brands currently has more stores than three of its closest
competitors (Shake Shack, Habit, and Smashburger).

-- DBRS Morningstar's operational review of FAT Brands as the
manager. After an on-site meeting at the Company's headquarters and
a review of Company-provided and publicly available information,
DBRS Morningstar believes that FAT Brands is an acceptable manager
of franchisee restaurants.

-- Credit review of the Company by DBRS Morningstar.

-- This transaction is secured by 100% ownership of the equity
interests in the subsidiaries of FAT Brands (Subsidiary
Franchisors) and all of the Issuer's right, title, and interest in
and to such. Each Subsidiary Franchisor is a party to various
franchise agreements, development agreements, and other
collaborative agreements with franchisees who are granted the right
to develop and operate fast-casual restaurants in a designated
location and a license to use the proprietary marks of such
Subsidiary Franchisor in conformity with such Subsidiary
Franchisor's branding and marketing requirements. The cash flow for
the securitization comes primarily from the royalties and initial
upfront fees charged to franchisees.

-- Assumptions on AUV growth in the cash flow scenarios and
weighted-average royalty fees kept flat across all brands.

-- The structural features of the transaction, such as relatively
moderate leverage, the cash reserve accounts, the cash sweep
mechanism, and the rapid amortization triggers, which help to
accelerate the paydown of the Note balance upon deterioration in
the business environment.

-- Legal analysis of the structure, including separation of the
assets from the operating company, non-consolidation, and
true-contribution opinions.

-- Under various cash flow scenarios, the Notes would be repaid in
accordance with the transaction's terms, even if business
performance deteriorates.

-- The structuring consultant intends to issue security tokens to
all investors and record this transaction on the Ethereum
blockchain. Any security tokens issued in this transaction will
serve as digital representations of respective owners in all four
classes of Notes. This use of blockchain and distributed ledger
technology will only occur outside of and parallel to this
transaction and will not govern actual ownership of the Notes. The
underlying documentation for this transaction will govern all
aspects of the Notes and reference is made to the transaction
documents for the terms and conditions thereof.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-4: S&P Affirms BB-(sf) Class E Notes Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on 21 classes from eight
Flagship Credit Auto Trust (FCAT) transactions. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 classes from six Flagship Credit
Auto Trust series.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of collateral performance to
date and its expectations regarding future collateral performance,
as well as each transaction's structure and credit enhancement.
Additionally, S&P incorporated secondary credit factors, including
credit stability, payment priorities under various scenarios, and
sector- and issuer-specific analysis. Considering all of these
factors, S&P believes the creditworthiness of the notes remains
consistent with the raised and affirmed ratings.

FCAT 2015-2, 2017-2, 2017-3, and 2017-4 are performing better than
S&P had initially expected. As a result, S&P lowered its loss
expectations on these transactions. In addition, the rating agency
maintained its loss expectations on FCAT 2015-3, 2016-1, 2018-1,
and 2018-4, which are performing in line with its initial
expectations.

  Table 1
  Collateral Performance (%)
  As of the January 2020 distribution date

                              Pool    Current    60+ day
  Series                Mo.   factor        CNL    delinq.
  FCAT 2015-2            53    12.30      11.99       7.37
  FCAT 2015-3            50    15.57      11.80       6.62
  FCAT 2016-1            47    18.61      11.21       6.15
  FCAT 2017-2            31    38.76       7.36       5.27
  FCAT 2017-3            29    44.29       6.52       4.65
  FCAT 2017-4            25    48.21       6.15       5.35
  FCAT 2018-1            23    53.06       5.58       4.29
  FCAT 2018-4            14    72.61       3.06       5.42

  Mo.--Month.
  CNL--Cumulative net loss.
  Delinq.--Delinquencies.
  FCAT--Flagship Credit Auto Trust.

  Table 2
  CNL Expectations (%)

                                         Former           Revised
                     Original          lifetime          lifetime
                     lifetime       CNL exp.(i)          CNL exp.
  Series             CNL exp.      (March 2019)       (Jan. 2020)
  FCAT 2015-2     11.25-11.75       12.25-12.75       Up to 12.50
  FCAT 2015-3     11.25-11.75       12.75-13.25       12.75-13.25
  FCAT 2016-1     11.75-12.25       12.75-13.25       12.75-13.25
  FCAT 2017-2     12.80-13.30       12.25-12.75       12.00-12.50
  FCAT 2017-3     12.75-13.25       12.50-13.00       12.25-12.75
  FCAT 2017-4     12.75-13.25       12.75-13.25       12.50-13.00
  FCAT 2018-1     12.75-13.25       12.75-13.25       12.75-13.25
  FCAT 2018-4     12.25-12.75               N/A       12.25-12.75

  (i)Series 2015-2, 2015-3, and 2016-1 were last revised in
  November 2018.
  CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations.
  FCAT--Flagship Credit Auto Trust.
  N/A--Not Applicable.

Each transaction contains a sequential principal payment structure
in which the notes are paid principal by seniority. Each also has
credit enhancement in the form of a non-amortizing reserve account,
overcollateralization (O/C), subordination for the higher-rated
tranches, and excess spread. Each transaction's reserve account
amount is at its specified target level. With the exception of FCAT
2016-1, each of the FCAT transactions' O/C is at its specified
target. The FCAT 2016-1 transaction's O/C amount is approximately
0.1% below the specified target. However, its O/C and overall hard
credit enhancement continue to grow as a percentage of the
amortizing pool balance.

In addition, since the transactions closed, the credit support for
each series has increased as a percentage of the amortizing pool
balance. The raised and affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that
the total credit support as a percentage of the amortizing pool
balance, compared with its expected remaining losses, is
commensurate with each raised or affirmed rating.

  Table 3
  Hard Credit Support (%)
  As of the January 2020 distribution date

                               Total hard      Current total hard
                           credit support          credit support
  Series         Class     at issuance(i)       (% of current)(i)
  FCAT 2015-2    C                   8.90                   71.00
  FCAT 2015-2    D                   2.50                   18.95
  FCAT 2015-3    C                   9.90                   61.19
  FCAT 2015-3    D                   3.50                   20.09
  FCAT 2016-1    B                  19.85                  101.40
  FCAT 2016-1    C                   9.95                   48.21
  FCAT 2016-1    D                   4.75                   20.26
  FCAT 2017-2    B                  31.75                   81.13
  FCAT 2017-2    C                  20.25                   51.47
  FCAT 2017-2    D                  11.00                   27.60
  FCAT 2017-2    E                   5.50                   13.41
  FCAT 2017-3    A                  46.00                  103.51
  FCAT 2017-3    B                  31.75                   71.57
  FCAT 2017-3    C                  20.25                   45.80
  FCAT 2017-3    D                  11.00                   25.06
  FCAT 2017-3    E                   5.50                   12.73
  FCAT 2017-4    A                  42.00                   88.11
  FCAT 2017-4    B                  31.75                   66.85
  FCAT 2017-4    C                  20.25                   42.99
  FCAT 2017-4    D                  11.00                   23.81
  FCAT 2017-4    E                   5.50                   12.40
  FCAT 2018-1    A                  42.01                   81.93
  FCAT 2018-1    B                  31.01                   61.20
  FCAT 2018-1    C                  19.01                   38.58
  FCAT 2018-1    D                  10.00                   21.61
  FCAT 2018-1    E                   4.25                   10.77
  FCAT 2018-4    A                  37.40                   57.33
  FCAT 2018-4    B                  28.90                   45.63
  FCAT 2018-4    C                  17.65                   30.13
  FCAT 2018-4    D                   8.55                   17.60
  FCAT 2018-4    E                   1.85                    8.38

(i)Calculated as a percentage of the total gross receivable pool
balance, consisting of a reserve account, overcollateralization,
and, if applicable, subordination.
FCAT--Flagship Credit Auto Trust.

S&P incorporated an analysis of the current hard credit enhancement
compared to the remaining expected cumulative net losses for those
classes in which hard credit enhancement alone--without credit to
the expected excess spread--was sufficient, in S&P's opinion, to
upgrade the notes to, or affirm at, 'AAA (sf)'. For the other
classes, S&P incorporated a cash flow analysis to assess the loss
coverage level, giving credit to excess spread. S&P's various cash
flow scenarios included forward-looking assumptions on recoveries,
the timing of losses, and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that
it believes are appropriate given each transaction's performance to
date.

S&P also conducted sensitivity analyses to determine the impact
that a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would have on its ratings
if losses began trending higher than its revised base-case loss
expectations. S&P's results showed that all of the classes have
adequate credit enhancement at the raised or affirmed rating
levels.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in our view, to cover our cumulative net loss
expectations under our stress scenarios for each of the rated
classes," S&P said.

  RATINGS RAISED
  Flagship Credit Auto Trust
                                  Rating
  Series      Class          To            From
  2015-2      D              AAA (sf)      BBB- (sf)
  2015-3      C              AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
  2015-3      D              A (sf)        BBB- (sf)
  2016-1      C              AAA (sf)      A+ (sf)
  2016-1      D              A- (sf)       BB+ (sf)
  2017-2      B              AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
  2017-2      C              AAA (sf)      AA (sf)
  2017-2      D              A (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
  2017-2      E              BB+ (sf)      BB (sf)
  2017-3      B              AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
  2017-3      C              AAA (sf)      AA- (sf)
  2017-3      D              A- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
  2017-4      B              AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
  2017-4      C              AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
  2017-4      D              A- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
  2018-1      B              AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
  2018-1      C              AA (sf)       A+ (sf)
  2018-1      D              BBB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
  2018-4      B              AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
  2018-4      C              AA- (sf)      A (sf)
  2018-4      D              BBB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED
  Flagship Credit Auto Trust

  Series      Class          Rating
  2015-2      C              AAA (sf)
  2016-1      B              AAA (sf)
  2017-3      A              AAA (sf)
  2017-3      E              BB (sf)
  2017-4      A              AAA (sf)
  2017-4      E              BB (sf)
  2018-1      A              AAA (sf)
  2018-1      E              BB- (sf)
  2018-4      A              AAA (sf)
  2018-4      E              BB- (sf)


FREDDIE MAC 2020-DNA1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating to Cl. B-1B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Freddie Mac STACR REMIC
Trust 2020-DNA1's notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by fully amortizing, first-lien, fixed-rate
residential mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family
residences, planned-unit developments, condominiums, cooperatives,
and manufactured housing to prime borrowers.

The ratings reflect:

-- The credit enhancement provided by the subordinated reference
tranches, as well as the associated structural deal mechanics;

-- The credit quality of the collateral included in the reference
pool;

-- A REMIC structure that reduces the counterparty exposure to
Freddie Mac for periodic principal and interest payments but, at
the same time, pledges the support of Freddie Mac (a highly rated
counterparty) to cover shortfalls, if any, on interest payments and
to make up for any investment losses;

-- The issuer's aggregation experience and the alignment of
interests between the issuer and noteholders in the deal's
performance, which in S&P's view, enhances the notes' strength;
and

-- The enhanced credit risk management and quality control
processes Freddie Mac uses in conjunction with the underlying
representations and warranties framework.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2020-DNA1

  Class       Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-H(i)      NR            28,529,197,862
  M-1         BBB+ (sf)        212,000,000
  M-1H(i)     NR                84,407,251
  M-2         BB- (sf)         350,000,000
  M-2R        BB- (sf)         350,000,000
  M-2S        BB- (sf)         350,000,000
  M-2T        BB- (sf)         350,000,000
  M-2U        BB- (sf)         350,000,000
  M-2I        BB- (sf)         350,000,000
  M-2A        BBB (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2AR       BBB (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2AS       BBB (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2AT       BBB (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2AU       BBB (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2AI       BBB (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2AH(i)    NR                69,535,981
  M-2B        BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2BR       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2BS       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2BT       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2BU       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2BI       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2RB       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2SB       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2TB       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2UB       BB- (sf)         175,000,000
  M-2BH(i)    NR                69,535,981
  B-1         B (sf)           106,000,000
  B-1A        B+ (sf)           53,000,000
  B-1AR       B+ (sf)           53,000,000
  B-1AI       B+ (sf)           53,000,000
  B-1AH(i)    NR                21,101,813
  B-1B        B (sf)            53,000,000
  B-1BH(i)    NR                21,101,813
  B-2         NR               126,000,000
  B-2A        NR                63,000,000
  B-2AR       NR                63,000,000
  B-2AI       NR                63,000,000
  B-2AH(i)    NR                11,101,813
  B-2B        NR                63,000,000
  B-2BH(i)    NR                11,101,813
  B-3H(i)     NR                29,640,725

(i)Reference tranche only and will not have corresponding notes.
Freddie Mac retains the risk of each of these tranches.
NR--Not rated.


FREED ABS 2020-1: Moody's Rates $48.420MM Class C Notes Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to notes
issued by FREED ABS Trust 2020-1. The collateral backing FREED
2020-1 notes consists of a pool of unsecured consumer installment
loans originated by Cross River Bank, a New Jersey state-chartered
commercial bank, through a loan program established by Freedom
Financial Asset Management, LLC, who also acts as the servicer of
the loans.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: FREED ABS Trust 2020-1

$247,000,000, 2.52%, Class A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A3
(sf)

$45,350,000, 3.06%, Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

$48,420,000, 4.37%, Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital structure
and relatively fast amortization of the assets, and the experience
and expertise of FFAM as servicer and the back-up servicing
arrangement with Wilmington Trust, National Association (Wilmington
Trust, long-term counterparty risk assessment of A1(cr)).

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the FREED 2020-1
pool is 15.0% down from 15.6% in the prior pool due to stronger
collateral composition. Moody's based its cumulative net loss
expectation on an analysis of the credit quality of the underlying
collateral; the historical performance of similar collateral,
including managed portfolio performance; the ability of FFAM to
perform the servicing functions and Wilmington Trust to perform the
backup servicing functions; and current expectations for the
macroeconomic environment during the life of the transaction.

At closing the Class A, Class B and Class C notes will benefit from
40.05%, 28.95% and 17.10% of hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Hard credit enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization, a reserve account and subordination, except
for the Class C notes, which do not benefit from subordination. The
notes may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in March
2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if pool losses are lower than
expected and levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such as the one in
this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a percentage of the
collateral balance as collections pay down senior notes. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of better than
expected improvements in the economy, changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments. In addition, greater certainty
concerning the legal and regulatory risks facing this transaction
could lead to lower loss volatility assumptions, and thus lead to
an upgrade of the notes.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if pool losses
exceed its expectations and levels of credit enhancement are
consistent with lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if
excess spread is not sufficient to cover losses in a given month.
Moody's expectation of pool losses may increase, for example, due
to performance deterioration stemming from a downturn in the US
economy, deficient servicing, errors on the part of transaction
parties, inadequate transaction governance or fraud. In addition,
the legal and regulatory risks including the ones stemming from the
bank partner model that FFAM utilizes could expose the pool to
increased losses. For example, a successful legal challenge
asserting that Cross River Bank is not the true lender of the loans
in FREED 2020-1 or that state usury laws applied upon Cross River
Bank's sale of the loans could also lead to a downgrade of the
notes.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: DBRS Lowers Class D Certs Rating to D
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded its rating on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C1, Class D issued by GE
Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Series 2005-C1 to D (sf) from C
(sf).

DBRS Morningstar also discontinued and withdrew its ratings on
classes E, F, and G as a result of realized losses that affected
all remaining classes in the transaction, including the Class D,
according to the January 2020 remittance. The realized losses
incurred to Classes E, F, and G reduced the principal balances to
zero.

This effectively concludes DBRS Morningstar's surveillance of the
transaction as DBRS Morningstar will discontinue the ratings
assigned to the outstanding classes in 30 business days.

Notes: The principal methodology is North American CMBS
Surveillance Methodology, which can be found on www.dbrs.com under
Methodologies & Criteria. For a list of the
structured-finance-related methodologies that may be used during
the rating process, please see the DBRS Morningstar Global
Structured Finance Related Methodologies document, which can be
found on www.dbrs.com in the Commentary tab under Regulatory
Affairs. Please note that not every related methodology listed
under a principal structured finance asset class methodology may be
used to rate or monitor individual structured finance or debt
obligation.


GLS AUTO 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to GLS Auto
Receivables Issuer Trust 2020-1's automobile receivables-backed
notes series 2020-1.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
lease receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 24,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 49.1%, 40.2%, 32.0%, and
25.4% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including
excess spread). These credit support levels provide coverage of
approximately 2.55x, 2.05x, 1.60x, and 1.25x S&P's 18.50%-19.50%
expected cumulative net loss for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
respectively.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.60x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, the
ratings on the class A and B notes will remain within one rating
category of the assigned preliminary 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)'
ratings, respectively, during the first year; and the rating on the
class C notes will remain within two rating categories of the
assigned preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating. The class D notes will
remain within two rating categories of the assigned preliminary
'BB- (sf)' rating during the first year, but will eventually
default under the 'BBB' stress scenario. These rating movements are
within the limits specified by S&P's credit stability criteria.
S&P's analysis of over six years of origination static pool data
and securitization performance data on Global Lending Services
LLC's (GLS') eight Rule 144A securitizations.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction, including the representation in
the transaction documents that all contracts in the pool have made
a least one payment.

-- The notes' underlying credit enhancement in the form of
subordination, overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess
spread for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made to the notes
under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which its
believe are appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust 2020-1

  Class   Rating(i)       Amount (mil. $)
  A       AA (sf)                  266.21
  B       A (sf)                    66.27
  C       BBB (sf)                  53.37
  D       BB- (sf)                  46.15

  (i)The interest rates and actual sizes of these tranches will be
determined on the pricing date.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Class F Certs to C(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the rating on one class in Greenwich Capital Commercial
Funding Corp., 2005-GG3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-GG3 as follows:

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 23, 2019 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. XC*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 23, 2019 Affirmed C
(sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. F was downgraded due to higher realized losses as
a result of recently liquidated loans. Cl. F has now experienced a
74% realized loss based on its original balance.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 6.4% of the original pooled balance, compared to 5.8%
at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in realized losses or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 10, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by over 99% to $9.5
million from $3.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan, representing 100% of the pool.
The sole remaining loan, constituting 100% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Thirty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $231 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%).

The remaining defeased loan is fully amortizing, has amortized over
63% since securitization and has a final maturity date in August
2024.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-GC45: Fitch Rates $12.9MM Cl. G-RR Certs B-sf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned the following ratings and Rating Outlooks to
the GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2020-GC45 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2020-GC45:

  -- $19,471,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $86,299,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,119,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $250,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $496,198,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $38,461,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,050,375,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $64,539,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $146,827,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $64,539,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48,405,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,656,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50,018,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,362,000b class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25,815,000bc class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,908,000bc class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $38,724,196bc class H-RR;

  -- $37,867,000bd class VRR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.

(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(c) Horizontal credit-risk retention interest.

(d) Vertical credit-risk retention interest.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Jan. 6, 2020, the
balances for class A-4 and class A-5 were finalized. At the time
that the expected ratings were assigned, the exact initial
certificate balances of class A-4 and class A-5 were unknown and
expected to be approximately $746,198,000 in aggregate. The final
class balances for class A-4 and class A-5 are $250,000,000 and
$496,198,000, respectively. Additionally, the class X-B certificate
balance decreased from $112,944,000 to $64,539,000, as it now
references the related class B certificates. Fitch's rating on
class X-B has been updated to 'AA-sf' to reflect the rating on
class B. The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal
structure.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 52 loans secured by 152
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,328,651,197 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities, Citi Real Estate
Funding Inc., and German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 66.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.6% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch leverage is lower than other
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch
DSCR of 1.32x is higher than the 2019 and 2018 averages of 1.26x
and 1.22x, respectively. Additionally, the pool's Fitch LTV of
95.3% is lower than the 2019 and 2018 averages of 103.0% and
102.0%, respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion
loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.26x and 109.4%,
respectively.

Credit Opinion Loans: Eight loans, representing 31.1% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions. This is significantly above
the 2019 and 2018 averages of 14.2% and 13.6%, respectively. Five
loans including 1633 Broadway (4.5% of the pool), Starwood Class A
Industrial Portfolio 1 (4.5%), Bellagio Hotel and Casino (4.5%),
650 Madison Avenue (3.8%), and 510 East 14th St (2.6%) received
stand-alone credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*'. Parkmerced (2.8%)
received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB+sf*', 560 Mission
Street (4.5%) received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'AA-sf*',
and Southcenter Mall (4.5%), received a stand-alone credit opinion
of 'AAAsf*'.

Low Hotel Exposure. The pool has a lower than average exposure to
hotel properties, which, at 9.26% of the pool, is lower than the
2019 and 2018 average concentrations of 12.0% and 14.7%,
respectively. Loans secured by hotel properties have a higher
probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model. The largest
property type concentration is retail at 30.6%, followed by office
at 27.8% and multifamily at 15.8%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.8% below
the most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI
was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during
this period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the GSMS
2020-GC45 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-PJ1 (the
Certificates) to be issued by GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust
2020-PJ1 (GSMBS 2020-PJ1):

-- $381.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $381.5 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.2 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.2 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $286.1 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $286.1 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $95.4 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $95.4 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $421.7 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $421.7 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $421.7 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.2 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $286.1 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $95.4 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $381.5 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $5.8 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $9.0 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $6.3 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.1 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $898.0 thousand Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-3, A-X-5, A-X-7, and A-X-8 are interest-only
certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6, A-8, A-9, A-10, and A-X-8 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7, and A-8 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
the senior support certificates (Classes A-3 and A-4) with respect
to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect 6.05% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the pool. The
AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings reflect
4.75%, 2.75%, 1.35%, 0.65%, and 0.45% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

GSMBS 2020-PJ1 is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien
fixed-rate prime residential mortgages funded by the issuance of
the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by 643 loans with a
total principal balance of $448,804,647 as of the Cut-Off Date
(January 1, 2020).

The originators for the mortgage pool are HomeBridge Financial
Services, Inc. (19.9%), loanDepot.com, LLC (18.1%), Guaranteed
Rate, Inc. (16.3%), and various other originators, each comprising
less than 15.0% of the mortgage loans. Goldman Sachs Mortgage
Company is the Sponsor and the Mortgage Loan Seller of the
transaction. For certain originators, the related loans (16.4%)
were sold to MAXEX Clearing LLC and were subsequently acquired by
the Mortgage Loan Seller.

NewRez LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, will
service all mortgage loans within the pool. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) will act as the
Master Servicer, Securities Administrator, and Custodian. U.S. Bank
Trust National Association will serve as Delaware Trustee.
Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will serve as the representations and
warranties (R&W) File Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years and a
weighted-average loan age of five months. Approximately 51.7% of
the pool is conforming, high-balance mortgage loans that were
underwritten using an automated underwriting system designated by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and were eligible for purchase by such
agencies. The remaining 48.3% of the pool are traditional,
nonagency, prime jumbo mortgage loans. Details on the underwriting
of conforming loans can be found in the Key Probability of Default
Drivers section in the related rating report.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality credit attributes, well-qualified borrowers, and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

This transaction employs an R&W framework that contains certain
weaknesses, such as materiality factors, knowledge qualifiers, and
sunset provisions that allow for certain R&Ws to expire within
three to five years after the Closing Date. To capture the
perceived weaknesses in the R&W framework, DBRS Morningstar reduced
the originator scores in this pool. A lower originator score
results in increased default and loss assumptions and provides
additional cushions for the rated securities.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GS MORTGAGE 2020-PJ1: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned the following ratings to the residential
mortgage-backed certificates issued by GS Mortgage-Backed
Securities Trust 2020-PJ1:

RATING ACTIONS

GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2020-PJ1

Class A-1;    LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-10;   LT AA+sf New Rating; previously at AA+(EXP)sf

Class A-2;    LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-3;    LT AA+sf New Rating; previously at AA+(EXP)sf

Class A-4;    LT AA+sf New Rating; previously at AA+(EXP)sf

Class A-5;    LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-6;    LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-7;    LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-8;    LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-9;    LT AA+sf New Rating; previously at AA+(EXP)sf

Class A-IO-S; LT NRsf New Rating;  previously at NR(EXP)sf

Class A-X-1;  LT AA+sf New Rating; previously at AA+(EXP)sf

Class A-X-3;  LT AA+sf New Rating; previously at AA+(EXP)sf

Class A-X-5;  LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-X-7;  LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class A-X-8;  LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class B-1;    LT AAsf New Rating;  previously at AA(EXP)sf

Class B-2;    LT Asf New Rating;   previously at A(EXP)sf

Class B-3;    LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

Class B-4;    LT BBsf New Rating;  previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class B-5;    LT Bsf New Rating;   previously at B(EXP)sf

Class B-6;    LT NRsf New Rating;  previously at NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 643 conforming and non-conforming
loans with a total balance of approximately $448.80 million as of
the cutoff date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists
primarily of 30-year FRM fully amortizing loans seasoned
approximately five months in aggregate. Generally, all of the loans
were originated through the sellers' retail channels. The borrowers
in this pool have strong credit profiles (760 model FICO) and
relatively low leverage (72.5% sLTV). The collateral is a mix of
conforming agency eligible loans (51.7%) and non-conforming prime
jumbo loans (48.3%). The 379 conforming loans have an average
balance of $612,545, compared to a balance of $820,645 for the
non-conforming loans. The conforming loans have a slightly lower
FICO (758 vs. 761), but a lower CLTV (69.1 vs. 73.6).

Shifting Interest Deal Structure (Negative): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. While there is
only minimal leakage to the subordinate bonds early on in the
transaction, the structure is more vulnerable to defaults occurring
later on in the life of the deal compared to a sequential or
modified sequential structure. To help mitigate tail risk, which
arises as the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a
subordination floor of 1.15% of the original balance will be
maintained for the senior certificates and a subordination floor of
0.75% of the original balance will be maintained for the
subordinate certificates.

Representation Framework (Negative): The loan-level representation,
warranty, and enforcement (RW&E) framework are consistent with Tier
2 quality. Fitch increased its loss expectations by 48 bps at the
'AAAsf' rating category as a result of the Tier 2 framework and the
underlying sellers supporting the repurchase obligations of the
RW&E providers. The Tier 2 framework was driven by the inclusion of
knowledge qualifiers without a clawback provision and the narrow
testing construct, which limits the breach reviewers' ability to
identify or respond to issues not fully anticipated at closing.

Low Operational Risk (Neutral): Operational risk is well controlled
for in this transaction. Goldman Sachs is assessed as an 'Above
Average' aggregator by Fitch due to its robust sourcing strategy
and seller oversight, experienced senior management and staff,
strong risk management and corporate governance controls. Primary
and master servicing responsibilities are performed by Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint), which is rated 'RPS2-' by Fitch.

Due Diligence Review Results (Positive): Third-party due diligence
was performed on 100% of loans in the transaction. Due diligence
was performed by AMC, Clayton, and Digital Risk, which are assessed
by Fitch as 'Acceptable - Tier 1', 'Acceptable - Tier 1' and
'Acceptable - Tier 2', respectively. The review scope is consistent
with Fitch criteria, and the results are generally similar to prior
prime RMBS transactions. Credit exceptions were supported by strong
mitigating factors and compliance exceptions were primarily cured
with subsequent documentation. Fitch applied a credit for the high
percentage of loan-level due diligence, which reduced the 'AAAsf'
loss expectation by 28 bps.

Geographic Concentration (Negative): Almost 49% of the pool is
concentrated in California. The largest MSA concentration is in the
Los Angeles MSA (24.7%) followed by the New York MSA (8.9%) and San
Francisco MSA (8.9%). The top three MSAs account for approximately
42.5% of the pool. This resulted in an increase of 29 bps at the
'AAAsf' expected loss.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 6.5%. As shown in the table included in the presale
report, the analysis indicates that some potential rating migration
exists with higher MVDs compared with the model projection.

Additionally, the defined rating sensitivities determine the
stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category,
to non-investment grade and to 'CCCsf'.

CRITERIA VARIATION

The analysis included one criterion variation from Fitch's "U.S.
RMBS Rating Criteria." Per its criteria, Fitch looks to have an
outstanding operational assessment on any originator contributing
more than 15% to a pool. While Fitch held an abbreviated call with
Homebridge, loanDepot and Guaranteed Rate either have an expired
review or have not previously been assessed by Fitch. Despite this,
there is no impact on the ratings based on the minor amount they
are over the threshold, the strong credit quality of the pool and
the 'Above Average' aggregator assessment of Goldman Sachs.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Clayton Services, AMCSitus Diligence, LLC. and Digital
Risk. The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused
on credit, compliance, and valuation. Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and it did not have an effect on
Fitch's analysis or conclusions. Fitch believes the overall results
of the review generally reflected strong underwriting controls.


JP MORGAN 2013-C15: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed 11 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates series 2013-C15.

RATING ACTIONS

JPMBB 2013-C15

Class A-4 46640NAD0;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-5 46640NAE8;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-S 46640NAJ7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class A-SB 46640NAF5; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class B 46640NAK4;    LT AAsf Affirmed;   previously at AAsf

Class C 46640NAL2;    LT Asf Affirmed;    previously at Asf

Class D 46640NAP3;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E 46640NAR9;    LT BBsf Affirmed;   previously at BBsf

Class F 46640NAT5;    LT Bsf Affirmed;    previously at Bsf

Class X-A 46640NAG3;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

Class X-B 46640NAH1;  LT AAsf Affirmed;   previously at AAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement and Defeasance: The Rating Outlook
revisions to Positive on classes B, C and X-B, and the affirmations
of all classes, are due to increased credit enhancement following
continued paydown from amortization and loan payoffs. As of the
January 2020 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 40.9% to $705 million from $1.19
billion at issuance. Seventeen loans have paid off since issuance,
including the large Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC), Hulen Mall,
formerly $82.2 million. Two loans, approximately 15% of the pool
are full-term, interest only, including the second largest loan,
1615 L Street (14.2%). All of the partial-term, interest only loans
(22.7%) are now amortizing. Nine loans (11.2%) are fully defeased
up from four loans (4.3%) at the prior review, including the 8th,
9th, and 15th largest loans. There have been no realized losses to
date.

Stable Performance of Remaining Pool: The performance and loss
expectation for the remaining pool has remained relatively stable
since issuance. As of the January 2020 remittance report, there was
one (1.2% of the pool) specially serviced loan and six loans (25.7%
of pool) that were flagged as FLOCs, including two loans in the top
three (21.4%), due to declining occupancy and upcoming rollover
concerns. Both loans were previously not flagged as FLOCs.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC, 1615 L Street (14.2% of
the pool), is secured by a 417,383 sf office building located in
downtown Washington, DC, four blocks from the White House. The
property was built in 1984 and renovated in 2009. The property's
top tenant, Cardinia Real Estate (21.8% of the NRA), has
approximately 63k sf (15.1% of the NRA) expiring in September 2020
and per the master servicer, the tenant has indicated they will not
renew a portion (approximately 43k sf) of their space. The
departure will cause property occupancy to decrease to 83.8% from
94.1% as of Sept. 30, 2019, 98.6% at YE 2018, and 96.1% at YE 2017.
As part of Fitch's base case scenario, Fitch applied a 15% haircut
to the NOI to adjust for the departure and expected declines in
performance.

The second largest FLOC, Briarcliff Office Portfolio (7.2% of the
NRA) is secured by a portfolio of four office buildings and one day
care center totaling 417,512-sf located in Kansas City, MO.
Occupancy has dropped to 81.5% as of Sept. 2019 after consistently
being around 95% since 2014. NOI DSCR is 1.15x as Sept. 2019 down
from 1.36x at YE2018 and 1.45 at YE 2017. Per the borrower, there
is ongoing litigation related to a failed retaining wall which has
increased expenses in 2019.

The third largest FLOC, McKee Place Apartments (1.4%), is secured
by a 114 unit multifamily property located in Pittsburgh, PA. The
property was originally built in 1920 and was renovated in 2012.
Occupancy at the property has remained strong at 95% as of
September 2019 compared to 93% at YE 2018 and 96% at YE 2017 but
NOI DSCR has dropped to 1.32x as of Sept. 2019 from 1.83x at
YE2018. According to the servicer the drop in DSCR is due to
several tenants owing back rent and the property also has some
deferred maintenance.

The fourth largest FLOC and specially serviced loan, Marriott
Spring Hill Suites Vernal (1.2%), is secured by a 97-key limited
service hotel located in Vernal, UT that suffered performance
declines due to volatility in the oil and gas sector. The loan
transferred to the Special Servicer in September 2019 due to
imminent monetary default and the borrower became delinquent as of
November 2019.The NOI DSCR has been consistently below 1.0x since
2015 and as of TTM June 2019 it was 0.64x with a 58% occupancy.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch's analysis included an
additional sensitivity scenario to further support the positive
outlooks to classes B, C, and interest-only class X-B that factored
in the paydown of the defeased loans and included additional
stresses to the cap rate (100 bps over Fitch standard stressed cap
rates), NOI (10% additional haircut), and probability of default
(10%) that was applied to the performing loans in the pool. Fitch's
Rating Outlook Positives reflect this additional sensitivity
scenario.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

High Retail and Office Concentration: Retail properties constitute
32.2% of the pool, including five of the top 15 loans. The largest
loan in the pool is secured by Miracle Mile Shops (15.3%), a
448,835 sf enclosed regional mall located along the Las Vegas
Strip. Additionally, loans backed by office properties represent
38.5% of the pool, including five loans (32.7%) in the top 15.

Longer Term Maturities: The majority of the remaining pool matures
in 2023 (98.2%), with limited loan maturities scheduled in 2020
(1.8%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The revision of the Outlook on class B, C, and X-B to Positive
reflects the increased credit enhancement from paydown and
defeasance. The classes may be upgraded if larger FLOCs stabilize
and continue to perform in 2020. The Outlooks on classes A-1
through A-S, classes D through F, and the interest-only class X-A
is stable due to overall stable performance and expected continued
amortization. Downgrades to classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline related to the mentioned FLOCs, or any
other loans in the pool.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the transaction, either due
to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
transaction.


JP MORGAN 2016-FL8: S&P Cuts Class C Certs Rating to 'D (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class C
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-FL8, a U.S. CMBS
transaction, and subsequently withdrew the rating. In addition, S&P
discontinued its ratings on classes A, B, and X from the same
transaction.

The downgrade on class C to 'D (sf)' reflects $25,000 in principal
losses incurred by the class. According to the special servicer,
LNR Partners LLC, the amount is related to a holdback for the deal
in association with the specially serviced Normandy Portfolio loan,
which was the sole remaining loan in the trust. The sole loan
totalling $23.4 million was liquidated as of the Jan. 15, 2020,
trustee remittance report. Consequently, class C experienced a loss
of $25,000, representing 0.22% of its $11.4 million original
principal balance.

S&P subsequently withdrew its rating on class C because the
principal balance was reduced to zero and the transaction has wound
down.

In addition, S&P discontinued its ratings on classes A, B, and X
following their full repayment or reduction in notional balance to
zero, as detailed in the January 2020 trustee remittance report.

  RATING LOWERED AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWN
  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-FL8
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
  Class     To       Interim     From
  C         NR       D (sf)      B+ (sf)

  RATINGS DISCONTINUED
  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-FL8
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
  Class        To        From
  A            NR        BBB- (sf)
  B            NR        BB- (sf)
  X            NR        BBB- (sf)



JP MORGAN 2020-LTV1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to 34 classes
of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Trust 2020-LTV1. The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B3
(sf).

The certificates are backed by 645, 30-year, fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of $430,287,416 as
of the January 1st, 2020 cut-off date. GSE-eligible loans comprise
only 3.09% of the pool balance. All the loans are subject to the
Qualified Mortgage and Ability-to-Repay rules and are categorized
as either QM-Safe Harbor, QM-Agency Safe Harbor and QM - Rebuttable
Presumption.

JPMMT 2020-LTV1 is the fifth JPMMT transaction with the LTV
designation. The weighted average (WA) loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
the mortgage pool is approximately 88.7%, which is in line with
those of the other JPMMT LTV transactions, but higher than other
prior JPMMT transactions with WA LTVs of about 70% on average. All
loans have LTVs of between 80% and 90%, and about 85.4% of the
loans by balance have LTVs greater than 85%. None of the loans in
the pool have mortgage insurance. The other credit characteristics
of the loans in the pool are generally comparable to that of recent
JPMMT transactions.

United Shore Financial Services, LLC d/b/a United Wholesale
Mortgage and Shore Mortgage (United Shore) originated 67.1% of the
mortgage loans by balance, loanDepot.com, LLC originated 18.1% of
the mortgage loans by balance, and SoFi Lending Corp. originated
7.4% of the mortgage loans by balance. The remaining originators
each account for less than 3.0% of the aggregate principal balance
of the loans in the pool. About 64.7% of the mortgage pool was
originated under United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program, in
which, using the Desktop Underwriter (DU) automated underwriting
system, loans are underwritten to Fannie Mae guidelines with
overlays. The loans receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due to
the loan amount exceeding the GSE limit for certain markets.

At closing, United Shore will service approximately 48.4% of the
pool and Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will service 39.1% of the
pool. With respect to the Mortgage Loans serviced by United Shore,
Cenlar FSB, will act as the subservicer. A subservicer performs
substantially all of the servicing obligations (other than
advancing obligations) for certain of the mortgage loans under a
subservicing agreement with the related servicer. The servicing fee
for loans serviced by Shellpoint, United Shore and loanDepot will
be based on a step-up incentive fee structure with a $40 base
servicing fee and additional fees for servicing delinquent and
defaulted loans. Shellpoint will be an interim servicer from the
closing date until the servicing transfer date, which is expected
to occur on or about April 1st, 2020 (or such later date as
determined by the issuing entity and JPMCB). After the servicing
transfer date, JPMCB will assume servicing responsibilities for the
mortgage loans previously serviced by Shellpoint.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will be the master servicer and Citibank,
N.A. will be the securities administrator and Delaware trustee.
Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the representations and
warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of principal and interest
and loss allocations are based on a typical shifting interest
structure that benefits from senior and subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2020-LTV1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2-A, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5-Y, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 2.04%
and reaches 14.74% at a stress level consistent with its Aaa
ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis model based on the loan-level collateral
information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level adjustments to the
model results included, but were not limited to, adjustments for
origination quality, third-party review (TPR) scope and results,
and the financial strength of the representation & warranty (R&W)
provider.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2020-LTV1 is a securitization of a pool of 645 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$430,287,416 as of the cut-off date, with a WA remaining term to
maturity of 356 months and a WA seasoning of 4 months. The WA
current FICO score of the borrowers in the pool is 761. The WA LTV
ratio of the mortgage pool is 88.7%, which is in line with those of
the other JPMMT LTV transactions, but higher than those of previous
JPMMT transactions which had WA LTVs of about 78.6% on average. All
loans have LTVs of between 80% and 90%, and about 85.4% of the
loans by balance have LTVs greater than 85%. None of the loans in
the pool have mortgage insurance. The WA mortgage rate of the pool
is 4.5%. The mortgage loans in the pool were originated mostly in
California (34.8% by loan balance).

United Shore Financial Services (United Shore) originated 67.1% of
the mortgage loans by balance, loanDepot.com, LLC originated 18.1%
of the mortgage loans by balance, and SoFi Lending Corp. originated
7.4% of the mortgage loans by balance. The remaining originators
each account for less than 3.0% of the aggregate principal balance
of the loans in the pool. About 64.7% of the mortgage pool was
originated under United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program, in
which, using the Desktop Underwriter (DU) automated underwriting
system, loans are underwritten to Fannie Mae guidelines with
overlays. The loans receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due to
the loan amount exceeding the GSE limit for certain markets.

Aggregation/Origination Quality

Moody's considers J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. (JPMMAC)'s
aggregation platform to be adequate and Moody's did not apply a
separate loss-level adjustment for aggregation quality. In addition
to reviewing JPMMAC as an aggregator, Moody's has also reviewed the
originators contributing a significant percentage of the collateral
pool (above 10%). For these originators, Moody's reviewed their
underwriting guidelines and their policies and documentation (where
available). Moody's increased its base case and Aaa loss
expectations for certain originators of non-conforming loans where
Moody's does not have clear insight into the underwriting
practices, quality control and credit risk management. Moody's did
not make an adjustment for GSE-eligible loans, regardless of the
originator, since those loans were underwritten in accordance with
GSE guidelines.

United Shore: Its originator quality analysis generally consists of
a review of the originator's past loan performance, and its
policies and practices, which could affect future loan performance.
While USFS' guidelines are generally in line with its credit
neutral criteria, Moody's considers the origination quality of
United Shore to be relatively weaker than that of peers due to lack
of loan performance information by product type and information
related to United Shore's quality control policies and procedures
with reference to how they evaluate a borrower's ability and
willingness to repay the loan, and assess the collateral value,
particularly with respect to its High Balance Nationwide program.
The loans originated by United Shore were mostly underwritten in
accordance with Fannie Mae guidelines through DU (High Balance
Nationwide program) with overlays and a few were underwritten to
their prime jumbo guidelines. Moody's notes that United Shore
originated loans have been included in several prime jumbo
securitizations that Moody's has rated. Performance of prime jumbo
securitizations to date shows minimal delinquencies and even less
cumulative losses. United Shore's guidelines are generally in line
with its credit neutral criteria. All prime jumbo loans must be
manually underwritten and fully documented, and no streamline
documentation or documentation waivers based on agency AUS
decisions are permitted. United Shore has overlays for loan amount,
income and employment. Underwriting guidelines require adherence to
CFPB rules for ATR.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate given the strong servicing arrangement of the
servicers, as well as the presence of a strong master servicer to
oversee the servicers. The servicers are contractually obligated to
the issuing entity to service the related mortgage loans. However,
the servicers may perform their servicing obligations through
sub-servicers. In this transaction, Nationstar (rated B2) will act
as the master servicer. The servicers are required to advance
principal and interest on the mortgage loans. To the extent that
the servicers are unable to do so, the master servicer will be
obligated to make such advances. In the event that the master
servicer, Nationstar, is unable to make such advances, the
securities administrator, Citibank (rated Aa3) will be obligated to
do so to the extent such advance is determined by the securities
administrator to be recoverable.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee will be based on a step-up incentive fee
structure with a monthly base fee of $40 per loan and additional
fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans. The incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base servicing fee of $40 for
all performing loans and increases according to a pre-determined
delinquent and incentive servicing fee schedule. The delinquent and
incentive servicing fees will be deducted from the available
distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. Shellpoint will act as
interim servicer for the JPMCB mortgage loans until the servicing
transfer date.

The servicing fee framework is comparable to other recent JPMMT
transactions backed by prime mortgage loans that Moody's has rated.
However, while this fee structure is common in non-performing
mortgage securitizations, it is relatively new to rated prime
mortgage securitizations which typically incorporate a flat 25
basis point servicing fee rate structure. By establishing a base
servicing fee for performing loans that increases with the
delinquency of loans, the fee-for-service structure aligns monetary
incentives to the servicer with the costs of the servicer. The
servicer receives higher fees for labor-intensive activities that
are associated with servicing delinquent loans, including loss
mitigation, than they receive for servicing a performing loan,
which is less labor-intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is
reasonable and adequate for this transaction because it better
aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance.
Furthermore, higher fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make
the transfer of these loans to another servicer easier, should that
become necessary. By contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a
servicer can take actions, such as modifications and prolonged
workouts, that increase the value of its mortgage servicing rights.
The transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event
of a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-party Review

Three third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, regulatory compliance,
property valuation and data integrity reviews on 100% of the
mortgage pool.

The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for the majority of loans, no material
compliance issues, and no appraisal defects. The loans that had
exceptions to the originators' underwriting guidelines had strong
documented compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high
reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms
also identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure violations related to fees
that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed.
Besides the adjustment for loans for which the only third-party
valuation check was an AVM or a CU risk score for prime jumbo
non-conforming loans, Moody's did not make any adjustments to its
expected or Aaa loss levels due to the TPR results.

The TPR firms compared third-party valuation products to the
original appraisals. Property valuation was conducted using, among
other things, a field review, a third-party collateral desk
appraisal (CDA), broker price opinion (BPO), automated valuation
model (AVM) or a Collateral Underwriter (CU) risk score. In some
cases, for loans that had a CU risk score of 2.5 or less, a
third-party valuation product was not ordered. Of note, Moody's
considers the use of only a CU risk score for non-conforming loans
to be credit negative due to (1) the lack of human intervention
which increases the likelihood of missing emerging risk trends, (2)
the limited track record of the software and limited transparency
into the model and (3) GSE focus on non-jumbo loans which may lower
reliability on jumbo loan appraisals. Moody's applied an adjustment
to the loss for such loans since the sample size and valuation
result of the loans that were reviewed using a third-party
valuation product such as a CDA and field review (excluding AVMs)
were insufficient. In addition, there were loans for which the
original appraisal was evaluated using only an AVM. Moody's applied
an adjustment to the loss for such loans, since Moody's considers
AVM valuations to be less accurate than desk reviews and field
reviews due to inherent data limitations that could adversely
impact the reliability of AVM results. Besides the adjustment for
loans for which the only third-party valuation check was an AVM or
a CU risk score for prime jumbo non-conforming loans, Moody's did
not make any other adjustments to its loss levels for appraisal
quality issues.

Reps & Warranties

JPMMT 2020-LTV1's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
the costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Its review of the R&W framework considers the financial strength of
the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets)
and enforcement mechanisms. The R&W providers vary in financial
strength. The creditworthiness of the R&W provider determines the
probability that the R&W provider will be available and have the
financial strength to repurchase defective loans upon identifying a
breach. An investment grade rated R&W provider lends substantial
strength to its R&Ws. Moody's analyze the impact of less
creditworthy R&W providers case by case, in conjunction with other
aspects of the transaction.

Moody's made no adjustments to the loans for which JPMCB (JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., Aa2), its affiliate, JPMMAC provided R&Ws since
they are highly rated and/or financially stable entities.
Furthermore, the R&W provider, Quicken Loans Inc. (Quicken), is
rated Ba1, has a strong credit profile and is a financially stable
entity. However, Moody's applied an adjustment to its expected
losses to account for the risk that Quicken may be unable to
repurchase defective loans in a stressed economic environment in
which a substantial portion of the loans breach the R&Ws, given
that it is a non-bank entity with a monoline business (mortgage
origination and servicing) that is highly correlated with the
economy. Moody's tempered this adjustment by taking into account
Quicken's relative financial strength and the strong TPR results
which suggest a lower probability that poorly performing mortgage
loans will be found defective following review by the independent
reviewer.

In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers are unrated and/or
financially weaker entities. Moody's applied an adjustment to the
loans for which these entities provided R&Ws. JPMMAC will make the
mortgage loan representations and warranties with respect to
mortgage loans originated by certain originators (approx. 1.5% by
loan balance). For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MAXEX
Clearing LLC (MaxEx) platform, MaxEx under the assignment,
assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC, will make the
R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MaxEx to JPMMAC and assigned to the
trust are in line with the R&Ws found in other JPMMT transactions.

No other party will backstop or be responsible for backstopping any
R&W providers who may become financially incapable of repurchasing
mortgage loans. With respect to the R&Ws made by such originators
or the aggregator, as applicable, as of a date prior to the closing
date, JPMMAC will make a "gap" representation covering the period
from the date as of which such R&W is made by such originator or
the aggregator, as applicable, to the cut-off date or closing date,
as applicable. Additionally, no party will be required to
repurchase or substitute any mortgage loan until such loan has gone
through the review process.

Additional Counterparties

The Delaware trustee and securities administrator is Citibank. The
custodian is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. As master servicer, Nationstar
is responsible for servicer oversight, the termination of servicers
and the appointment of successor servicers. Nationstar is committed
to act as successor servicer if no other successor servicer can be
engaged.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero, i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

The Class A-11 Certificates will have a pass-through rate that will
vary directly with the rate of one-month LIBOR and the Class A-11-X
Certificates will have a pass-through rate that will vary inversely
with the rate of one-month LIBOR. If the securities administrator
notifies the depositor that it cannot determine one-month LIBOR in
accordance with the methods prescribed in the sale and servicing
agreement and a benchmark transition event has not yet occurred,
one-month LIBOR for such accrual period will be one-month LIBOR as
calculated for the immediately preceding accrual period. Following
the occurrence of a benchmark transition event, a benchmark other
than one-month LIBOR will be selected for purposes of calculating
the pass-through rate on the class A-11 certificates.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance,
and a subordination lock-out amount of 1.00% of the closing pool
balance. The floors are consistent with the credit neutral floors
for the assigned ratings according to its methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
October 2019.


JP MORGAN 2020-MKST: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2020-MKST Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2020-MKST:

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. X-CP*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage secured by the borrower's fee
interest in 1500 Market Street, an approximately 1.8 million SF,
Class A, office property in downtown Philadelphia, PA. The property
is comprised of a 36-story tower and a 43-story tower connected by
a three-story atrium that includes 83,820 SF of retail space. Its
ratings are based on the credit quality of the loans and the
strength of the securitization structure.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $390,000,000, including a non-trust
note for pari passu future funding to be advanced in connection
with lender approved capital expenditures and leasing expenses,
represents a Moody's LTV of 144.7%. The Moody's first mortgage
Actual DSCR is 1.13X and Moody's first mortgage Stressed DSCR is
0.67X.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The subject's property
quality grade is 1.50, reflecting the high quality of this asset.

Positive features of the transaction include the property's
location, tenancy, recent capital investment, operating
performance, recent tightening of vacancy in submarket and
sponsorship. Offsetting these strengths are high Moody's LTV,
projected declines in occupancy, floating rate, interest only loan
profile, the lack of asset diversification, and certain credit
negative loan structure and legal features.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: the property's
location; tenancy; recent capital investment; operating
performance; recent tightening of vacancy in submarket; and
sponsorship.

Notable credit challenges of the transaction include: high Moody's
LTV; projected declines in occupancy; floating rate and interest
only loan profile; the lack of asset diversification; and certain
credit negative loan structure and legal features.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from its
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


MEDALIST PARTNERS VI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating to D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Medalist
Partners Corporate Finance CLO VI Ltd./Meda list Partners Corporate
Finance CLO VI LLC's floating-rate debt.

The debt issuance is a CLO securitization backed by the
diversification of the collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 24,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated debt through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The legal structure of the transaction, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Medalist Partners Corporate Finance CLO VI Ltd./Medalist
  Partners Corporate Finance CLO VI LLC

  Class                 Rating     Amount (mil. $)
  X                     AAA (sf)              3.00
  A loans(i)            AA (sf)             228.00
  B (deferrable)        A (sf)               18.00
  C (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)            15.00
  D (deferrable)        BB- (sf)             12.00
  Subordinated notes    NR                   29.90

(i)The class A loans will not be exchangeable or convertible into
any notes and the notes will not be exchangeable or convertible
into class A loans at any time.
NR--Not rated.



MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Cuts Class IO Certs to Ca(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the rating on one interest-only class in Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors, Inc. 1998-C1-CTL, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-C1-CTL:

Cl. A-PO, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. IO*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2019
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the principal only class, Cl. A-PO, was affirmed due
to the sufficiency of the class's credit support and the pool's
share of defeasance.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. IO, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease deals are primarily based on the
senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of
the tenants leasing the real estate collateral supporting the
bonds. Other factors that are also considered are Moody's dark
value of the collateral (value based on the property being vacant
or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's
default and the rating of the residual insurance provider, if
applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the ratings
include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a lower
loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was " Moody's Approach to Rating Credit
Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease Financings" published in November
2018. The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable
Lease Financings" published in November 2018 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities"
published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 16, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96.8% to $20.1
million from $630 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 33% of the pool. Eight of the loans are CTL loans secured by
properties leased to four corporate credits. Five loans,
representing 47.6% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Two loans, constituting 4.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are currently three loans in special servicing, representing
8.9% of the pool. The loans were transferred to special servicing
in November and December 2019 due to imminent maturity default. The
loans are secured by the single tenant retail properties leased to
Rite Aid and have each already amortized by 78% since
securitization.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $35 million (for an average loss
severity of 56%).

The pool's largest non-defeased exposures are: Georgia Power
Company ($6.6 million -- 33.1% of the pool; senior unsecured
rating: Baa1 -- stable outlook), Kroger Co. (The) ($2.1 million --
10.3% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: Baa1 -- stable
outlook), and Rite Aid Corporation ($1.8 million -- 8.9% of the
pool; senior unsecured rating: Caa2/Caa3 -- negative outlook). The
bottom-dollar WARF for this pool is 839. WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of default probability.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ12: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed 11 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ12.

RATING ACTIONS

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ12

Class F 61755BAP9; LT Csf Affirmed; previously at Csf

Class G 61755BAQ7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class H 61755BAR5; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class J 61755BAS3; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class K 61755BAT1; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class L 61755BAU8; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class M 61755BAV6; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class N 61755BAW4; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class O 61755BAX2; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class P 61755BAY0; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

Class Q 61755BAZ7; LT Dsf Affirmed; previously at Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations: The rating affirmations reflect the
continued high certainty of losses on the remaining REO assets,
which comprise 84.5% of the pool. Default of class F is considered
inevitable.

The remaining pool is highly concentrated and adversely selected.
Two of the three remaining loans/assets are REO (84.5%). The sole
non-specially serviced loan (15.5%) is secured by an unanchored
retail property located in the secondary market of New London, CT
and matures in June 2022.

REO Assets: The largest asset, Somerset Crossing (75.9% of pool),
is a shopping center located in Gainesville, VA. The loan
transferred to special servicing in September of 2016 for imminent
maturity default and the asset became REO in June 2017. The grocery
anchor tenant, Shoppers Food Warehouse (64.4% of total net rentable
area) went dark in 2011 and a replacement tenant was never found.
According to the special servicer, the asset manager completed a
buyout with the former grocery anchor for $3.2 million and is
currently working to re-lease the space. As of the December 2019
rent roll, the property was only 22.4% occupied, compared with
90.4% leased and 26% physically occupied in December 2018. The
special servicer has no current disposition plans as the property
is not being marketed for sale.

The Staples - Naperville asset (8.6%) is a single-tenant retail
property located in Naperville, IL that is 100% occupied by Staples
on a lease through March 2024. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2015 for imminent default and the asset became
REO in February 2018. According to the special servicer, the
property was marketed for sale and is currently pending contract
for $2.8 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Upgrades are not likely due to the high concentration of REO
assets. Class F is subject to further downgrades as additional
losses are realized.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the transaction, either due
to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
transaction.


MOUNTAIN VIEW XV: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Mountain View CLO XV
Ltd.'s fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Mountain View CLO XV Ltd.

  Class                         Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                           AAA (sf)              244.00
  A-2                           AAA (sf)               12.00
  B-1                           AA (sf)                34.00
  B-2                           AA (sf)                14.00
  C (deferrable)                A (sf)                 20.00
  D (deferrable)                BBB- (sf)              23.80
  E (deferrable)                BB- (sf)               20.20
  Class A subordinated notes    NR                     28.80
  Class B subordinated notes    NR                      9.60

  NR--Not rated.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2020-RPL1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to 8 classes
of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan 2020-RPL1. The
NRMLT 2020-RPL1 transaction is a $1,188.8 million securitization of
6,884 first lien, seasoned performing and re-performing mortgage
loans with weighted average seasoning of 157 months, a weighted
average updated LTV ratio of 72.6% and a weighted average non-zero
updated FICO score of 611. Approximately 93.0% of the loans by
unpaid principal balance have been previously modified and about
99.5% are fixed-rate mortgages including 3% step rate loans. Based
on MBA methodology, approximately 0.1% of the loans by unpaid
principal balance have been continuously current for the last 24
months. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Fay Servicing LLC and Mr.
Cooper Group Inc. will act as the primary servicers on 92.6%, 7.2%
and 0.2% of the loans by unpaid principal balance, respectively.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as master servicer and successor
servicer.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2020-RPL1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Its losses on the collateral pool equal 12.0% in an expected case
and 36.0% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa ratings.
Moody's based its expected losses for the pool on its estimates of
(1) the default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and (2)
the principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. The final
expected losses for the pool reflect the third-party review (TPR)
findings and its assessment of the representations and warranties
(R&Ws) framework for this transaction. This pool contains a portion
of 30 days OTS delinquent mortgage loans as of the cut-off date.
Additionally, the transaction contains sale provision, the exercise
of which is subject to potential conflicts of interest. Moody's
took this into consideration when calculating the expected losses.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to its surveillance approach. Under this approach, Moody's
applies expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool. Its assumptions for the expected annual
delinquency rate and CPR are based on the observed performance of
agency-eligible seasoned modified and non-modified loans and the
collateral attributes of the pool including the percentage of loans
that were delinquent in the past 36 months. Its expected loss
severity rate is based on the observed loss severity performance of
seasoned modified and non-modified loans. For this pool, Moody's
used default burnout assumptions similar to those detailed in its
"US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated
pre-2005. Moody's then aggregated the delinquencies and converted
them to losses by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency
and loss severity assumptions. Since the overall profile of this
pool is more similar to RPL pools, Moody's applied similar RPL loss
assumptions to this pool to derive collateral losses.

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2020-RPL1 is a securitization of 6,884 seasoned performing
and re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor VIII LLC, acquired mostly via whole loan purchase.
Approximately 93.0% of the loans had previously been modified,
99.5% are fixed-rate mortgage loans, which includes 3.6% fixed
step-rate mortgage loans and 0.5% are adjustable-rate mortgage
loans. Approximately 2.5% of the pool is 30 days OTS delinquent as
of the cut-off date and Moody's incorporated this delinquency in
its analysis.

The updated value of properties in this pool were provided by a
third-party firm using a home data index (HDI), Automated Valuation
Model (AVM) or an updated broker price opinion (BPO). BPOs were
provided for 6,450 loans accounting for approximately 97.4% of the
aggregate pool balance, AVMs were provided for 1 loan and HDIs were
provided for the remaining 433 loans. In its analysis, Moody's
calculated LTV ratios using the BPO in all cases where it is
available and applied a haircut to HDIs or AVMs in cases where a
BPO is not available. The weighted average updated LTV ratio on the
collateral is 72.6%.

Third-Party Review (TPR) and Representations & Warranties (R&W)

One third party due diligence provider, AMC, conducted a compliance
review on 7,585 mortgage loans, data capture on 7,585 mortgage
loans and payment history review on an initial population of 7,571
mortgage loans which included all but 78 mortgage loans in the
pool. The regulatory compliance review consisted of a review of
compliance with the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as
implemented by Regulation Z, the federal Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA) as implemented by Regulation X, the
disclosure requirements and prohibitions of Section 50(a)(6),
Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations, federal and state specific late charge
and prepayment penalty regulations, and document review.

AMC found that 6,321 out of the initial population of 7,585 loans
had compliance exceptions with 773 loans receiving a rating agency
exception grade of C or D. Based on its analysis of the TPR
reports, Moody's determined that a portion of the loans with some
cited violations are at enhanced risk of having violated TILA
through an under-disclosure of the finance charges or other
disclosure deficiencies. Although the TPR report indicated that the
statute of limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has
already passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in
defense against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win
damages that can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds.
Such damages include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers'
legal fees and other actual damages. Moody's increased its losses
for these loans to account for the risk of such damages.

AMC conducted a title review on 7,571 loans in the preliminary due
diligence population pool in order to confirm the first lien
position of the related mortgages. There were 346 mortgage loans
that were determined to have critical findings based on the scope
of reviews set forth herein. Of these mortgage loans, 282 mortgage
loans had a senior lien encumbrance recorded after the recordation
of the subject mortgage and could not be mitigated by reviewing
schedule B of the related title policy. 35 mortgage loans had a
senior lien encumbrance recorded after the recordation of the
subject mortgage, which could not be mitigated by reviewing
schedule B of the related title policy, and also had a senior lien
encumbrance recorded before the recordation of the subject mortgage
for which the related title policy did not cite the encumbrance on
Schedule B. The remaining 444 first lien mortgage loans had a
senior lien encumbrance recorded before the recordation of the
subject mortgage, however for these mortgage loans did not cite the
encumbrance on Schedule B of the related title policy. AMC
determined from a review of the current owner's title search there
were no critical exceptions on the remaining 6,746 mortgage loans.
The sponsor makes a representation as to the validity and
enforceability of the mortgage loan as first lien on the related
property, except in the case of specified encumbrances as listed in
the offering document. Moody's considers this representation to be
a strong mitigating factor to the critical findings of the title
and lien review.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor VIII LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files. To the extent that the master
servicer, related servicer or depositor has actual knowledge, or a
responsible officer of the Indenture Trustee has received written
notice, of a defective or missing mortgage loan document or a
breach of a representation or warranty regarding the completeness
of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the mortgage loan
documents, and such missing document, defect or breach is
preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization against the
related mortgaged property through foreclosure or similar loss
mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title claim under the
related title insurance policy, the party with such actual
knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the seller, indenture trustee,
depositor, master servicer and related servicer. Upon notification
of a missing or defective mortgage loan file, the seller will have
120 days from the date it receives such notification to deliver the
missing document or otherwise cure the defect or breach. If it is
unable to do so, the seller will be obligated to replace or
repurchase the mortgage loan.

Similar to the NRMLT 2019-RPL3 deal, the seller's obligation to
cure or repurchase any mortgage loan for which a material breach of
the R&Ws (other than those with respect to the REMIC reps) has
occurred is in effect for only twelve months after closing, after
which the only recourse available to noteholders upon the
occurrence of a material breach of the R&Ws will be funds in the
breach reserve account. The breach reserve account will have a
balance of $0 at closing and, for each payment date, will build to
a target of the sum of (i) 0.375% of the Class A-1 note balance,
(ii) 0.250% of the Class A-2 note balance, (iii) 0.125% of the
Class M-1 note balance, and (iv) 0.050% and the Class M-2 note
balance immediately prior to each payment date. The initial target
amount on the closing date will be $3,128,070. Moody's took the R&W
sunset provision into consideration in determining its expected
loss on the pool.

Trustee, Custodians, Paying Agent, Servicers, Master Servicer, and
Successor Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A, U.S. Bank National Association, and Deutsche Bank
National Trust Company. The paying agent and cash management
functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A. In addition,
Nationstar, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers, and the appointment of
successor servicers. Having Nationstar as a master servicer
mitigates servicing-related risk due to the performance oversight
that it will provide. Nationstar will serve as the designated
successor servicer for each of the servicers other than
Nationstar.

Shellpoint, Fay and Mr. Cooper will act as the primary servicers on
92.6%, 7.2% and 0.2% of the loans by unpaid principal balance,
respectively. Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement
to be adequate.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a sequential priority of
payments, in which a given class of notes can only receive
principal payments once all the classes of notes above it have been
paid off. Losses will be applied in reverse order of priority.
Monthly available excess spread can be used to pay principal on the
notes sequentially.

Moody's coded the transaction cash flows using its proprietary
cashflow tool. To assess the final ratings on the notes, Moody's
ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios. The scenarios
encompass six loss levels, four loss timing curves, and four
prepayment curves.

Other Considerations

The transaction contains a mortgage loan sale provision, the
exercise of which is subject to potential conflicts of interest.
The servicers in the transaction may sell mortgage loans that
become 60 or more days delinquent according to the MBA methodology
to any party in the secondary market in an arms-length transaction
and at a fair market value. For such sale to take place, the
related servicer must determine, in its reasonable commercial
judgment, that such sale would maximize proceeds on a present value
basis. If the sponsor or any of its subsidiaries is the purchaser,
the related servicer must obtain at least two additional
independent bids. The transaction documents provide little detail
on the method of receipt of bids and there is no set minimum sale
price. Such lack of detail creates a risk that the independent bids
could be weak bids from purchasers that do not actively participate
in the market. Furthermore, the transaction documents provide
little detail regarding how servicers should conduct present value
calculations when determining if a note sale should be pursued. The
servicer in the transaction, Nationstar, has a commercial
relationship with the sponsor outside of the transaction. These
business arrangements could lead to conflicts of interest. Moody's
took this into account and adjusted its losses accordingly.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the indenture trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believes that NRMLT
2020-RPL1 is adequately protected against such risk primarily
because the loans in this transaction are highly seasoned. Although
some loans in the pool were previously delinquent and modified, the
loans all have a substantial history of payment performance. This
includes payment performance during the recent recession. As such,
if loans in the pool were materially defective, such issues would
likely have been discovered prior to the securitization.
Furthermore, third-party due diligence was conducted on all but 78
loans in the securitization pool for issues such as title and
compliance on all the loans. As such, Moody's did not apply
adjustments in this transaction to account for indemnification
payment risk.

In addition, prior to closing, the collateral pool has
approximately $4,761,655 of unreimbursed servicing advances such as
taxes and insurance. The mortgage borrower is responsible for
reimbursing the servicer for the pre-existing servicing advances.
The servicer may choose to set the pre-existing advances as escrow
to be repaid by the borrower as part of monthly mortgage payments.
However, in the event the borrower defaults on the mortgage prior
to fully repaying the pre-existing servicing advances, the servicer
will recoup the outstanding amount of pre-existing advances from
the loan liquidation proceeds. The amount of pre-existing servicing
advances represents approximately 0.4% of total pool balance. As
borrowers make monthly mortgage payments, this amount would likely
decrease. Moreover, its loan loss severity assumption incorporates
reimbursement of servicing advances from liquidation proceeds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from its original expectations
as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above its original expectations as
a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


NEWSTAR FAIRFIELD: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class D-N Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 20 tranches from 10 collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs) and one class of combination securities issued
by Monroe Capital MML CLO VI, Ltd.

RATING ACTIONS

Monroe Capital MML CLO VI, Ltd.

Class A 61034HAA2;    LT  AAAsf Affirmed; previously AAAsf

Combination Notes
61034LAE5;            LT  BBBsf Affirmed; previously BBBsf

Golub Capital Partners CLO 36(M), Ltd.

Class A 38175BAA2;    LT  AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Ivy Hill Middle Market Credit Fund XIV, Ltd

Class A-1 46603VAA3;   LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Maranon Loan Funding 2019-1, Ltd.

Class A-1L 56577HAE7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf
Class A-1a 56577HAA5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf
Class A-1b 56577HAC1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf
Class A-2a1 56577HAG2; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf
Class A-2a2 56577HAQ0; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Maranon Loan Funding 2018-1, Ltd.

Class A-1 56577DAA4;   LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf
Class A-2 56577DAJ5;   LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

NewStar Arlington Senior Loan Program LLC

Class A-R 65251PAY9;   LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Antares CLO 2018-1 Ltd.

Class A 03665MAA9;     LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

First Eagle Berkeley Fund CLO LLC
(fka NewStar Berkeley Fund CLO LLC)

Class A-R 65251XAN6;   LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Golub Capital Partners CLO 16(M)-R Ltd.

Class A-1-R 38172XAG4; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Newstar Fairfield Fund CLO, Ltd.
(F/K/A Fifth Street SLF II, Ltd.)

Class A-1-N 65252BAA1; LT AAAsf  Affirmed; previously at AAAsf
Class A-2-N 65252BAC7; LT AAsf   Affirmed; previously at AAsf
Class B-1-N 65252BAE3; LT A-sf   Affirmed; previously at A-sf
Class B-2-N 65252BAJ2; LT A-sf   Affirmed; previously at A-sf
Class C-N 65252BAG8;   LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf
Class D-N 65252CAA9;   LT BB-sf  Affirmed; previously at BB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Portfolio management of each transaction was evaluated through
reviewing major drivers of par gain and loss and changes in
portfolio composition since Fitch's last rating action. Asset
credit quality, asset security, and portfolio composition are
captured in rating default rate (RDR) and rating loss rate (RLR)
produced by Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model (PCM). PCM output, based
on the current portfolio composition, was compared with the PCM
output corresponding to the Fitch stressed portfolio (FSP) at the
initial rating assignment, as well as to the rated notes' current
credit enhancement (CE) levels. Sufficient cushions still remain as
RLR, plus losses to date, for each CLO in this review is lower than
the RLR modeled for its respective FSP. Given the amount of
cushions available on these transactions, no updated cash flow
modeling was conducted for this review.

The affirmation of the combination securities is based on the
stable performance of the underlying CLO, Monroe MML VI. Over the
first six payment dates, the combination note has deleveraged by
12.3% of the original balance.

The Stable Outlooks on all classes of notes reflect Fitch's
expectation that the classes have sufficient levels of credit
protection to withstand potential deterioration in credit quality
of the portfolios in stress scenarios commensurate with such
class's rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating of the notes may be sensitive to the following: asset
defaults, significant credit migration and lower than historically
observed recoveries for defaulted assets. Fitch conducted rating
sensitivity analysis on the closing date of each CLO, incorporating
increased levels of defaults and reduced levels of recovery rates
among other sensitivities.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.


OBX TRUST 2020-INV1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to 29 classes
of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by OBX 2020-INV1
Trust. The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

OBX 2020-INV1, the first rated issue from Onslow Bay Financial LLC
in 2020, is a prime RMBS securitization of fixed-rate,
agency-eligible mortgage loans secured by first liens on non-owner
occupied residential properties with original terms to maturity of
30 years. All of the loans are underwritten in accordance with
Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae underwriting guidelines, which take into
consideration, among other factors, the income, assets, employment
and credit score of the borrower. All of the loans were
underwritten using one of the government-sponsored enterprises'
automated underwriting systems (AUS) and received an "Approve" or
"Accept" recommendation.

The mortgage loans for this transaction were acquired by the seller
and sponsor, Onslow Bay, either directly from Quicken Loans Inc.
(35.6%), loanDepot.com, LLC (25.6%), or from various mortgage
lending institutions, each of which originated less than 10% of the
mortgage loans in the pool.

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Quicken Loans Inc. and PNC Bank,
National Association will service 59.2%, 35.6%, and 5.2% of the
aggregate balance of the mortgage pool, respectively, and Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will be the master servicer. Certain
servicing advances and advances for delinquent scheduled interest
and principal payments will be funded, unless the related mortgage
loan is 120 days or more delinquent or the servicer determines that
such delinquency advances would not be recoverable. The master
servicer is obligated to fund any required monthly advances if the
servicer fails in its obligation to do so. The master servicer and
servicer will be entitled to reimbursements for any such monthly
advances from future payments and collections with respect to those
mortgage loans.

OBX 2020-INV1 has a shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination floor and
a subordination floor. In its analysis of tail risk, Moody's
considered the increased risk from borrowers with more than one
mortgage in the pool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: OBX 2020-INV1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3A, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected losses in a base case scenario are 1.06% and reach
9.72% at a stress level consistent with its Aaa rating scenario.

Its loss estimates are based on a loan-by-loan assessment of the
securitized collateral pool as of the cut-off date using Moody's
Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included but were not limited to
adjustments for origination quality and third party review (TPR)
scope and results. Its loss levels and ratings on the certificates
also took into consideration qualitative factors such as the
servicing arrangement, alignment of interest of the sponsor with
investors, the representations and warranties (R&W) framework, and
the transaction's legal structure and documentation.

Collateral Description

The OBX 2020-INV1 transaction is a securitization of 1,055 mortgage
loans secured by fixed-rate, agency-eligible first liens on
non-owner occupied one-to-four family residential properties,
planned unit developments and condominiums with an unpaid principal
balance of $374,608,743. All of the loans have a 30-year original
term. The mortgage pool has a WA seasoning of about 6 months. The
loans in this transaction have strong borrower credit
characteristics with a weighted average original FICO score of 764
and a weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
of 67.4%. In addition, 30.5% of the borrowers are self-employed and
refinance loans comprise about 48.1% of the aggregate pool. The
pool has a high geographic concentration with 51.9% of the
aggregate pool located in California, with 19.9% located in the Los
Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim MSA and 10.1% located in the San
Francisco-Oakland-Hayward MSA. The characteristics of the loans
underlying the pool are generally comparable to other recent prime
RMBS transactions backed primarily by 30-year mortgage loans that
Moody's has rated.

Origination Quality

Majority of the mortgage loans in the pool were originated by
Quicken Loans (35.6%) and loanDepot.com, LLC. (25.6%). Moody's
applied an adjustment to the loss levels for loans originated by
Quicken Loans due to the relatively worse performance of their
agency-eligible investment property mortgage loans compared to
similar loans from other originators in the Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae database. All of the loans comply with Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae underwriting guidelines, which take into consideration, among
other factors, the income, assets, employment and credit score of
the borrower. All the loans received an "Approve" or "Accept"
recommendation from one of the government-sponsored enterprises'
(GSE) automated underwriting systems (AUS).

Servicing Arrangement

Quicken Loans and PNC will make principal and interest advances
(subject to a determination of recoverability) for the mortgage
loans that it services. The P&I Advancing Party (Onslow Bay) will
make principal and interest advances (subject to a determination of
recoverability) for the mortgage loans serviced by SPS to the
extent that such delinquency advances exceed amounts on deposit for
future distribution, the excess servicing strip fee that would
otherwise be paid to the Class A-IO-S notes and the P&I Advancing
Party fee.

The master servicer is obligated to fund any required monthly
advances if a servicer or any other party obligated to advance
fails in its obligation to do so. The master servicer and servicers
will be entitled to be reimbursed for any such monthly advances
from future payments and collections (including insurance and
liquidation proceeds) with respect to those mortgage loans.

No advances of delinquent principal or interest will be made for
mortgage loans that become 120 days or more delinquent under the
MBA method. Subsequently, if there are mortgage loans that are 120
days or more delinquent on any payment date, there will be a
reduction in amounts available to pay principal and interest
otherwise payable to note holders.

Similar to the previous OBX Trust transaction Moody's rated, with
respect to the mortgage loans serviced by SPS, the controlling
holder has the right (i) to oversee certain matters relating to the
servicing of defaulted mortgage loans (such as approving any
modifications and actions relating to the management of REO
property), (ii) to direct the master servicer to terminate a
servicer upon an uncured servicing event of default under the
related servicing agreement, and (iii) to direct the transaction
parties to take certain actions in connection with a proposed
acquisition of a mortgaged property as a result of an eminent
domain proceeding by a governmental entity.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Two third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data
integrity and regulatory compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage
pool. The TPR checked to ensure that all of the reviewed loans were
in compliance with (AUS) underwriting guidelines and AUS loan
eligibility requirements with generally no material compliance,
credit data or valuation issues. The TPR results indicate that
there are no material compliance, credit, or data issues. For one
loan the property valuation was verified using AVM, Moody's took
this into consideration when calculating the expected losses since
Moody's considers AVMs to be typically less accurate than desk
reviews and field reviews.

The R&W provider is the sponsor (Onslow Bay), an unrated entity
that may not have the financial wherewithal to purchase defective
loans. However, all the loans in the pool had independent due
diligence review and the results of the review revealed compliance
with underwriting guidelines and regulations, as well as overall
strong valuation quality. These results indicate that the loans
most likely do not breach the R&Ws. Also, the transaction benefits
from unqualified R&Ws and an independent breach reviewer. The R&Ws
do not protect against issues discovered and disclosed during the
due diligence review. The R&W's are not subject to sunset, other
than the six-year statute of limitations for R&W claims in New
York. Moody's increased its loss levels to account for some
weaknesses in the overall R&W framework due to the financial
weakness of the R&W provider and the higher percentage of loans
experiencing an early payment default and weaknesses in the review
procedures compared to other prime jumbo transactions.

Tail Risk and Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility, as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.20% of the closing pool balance.
and a subordination lock-out amount equal 0.88% of the closing pool
balance. The floors are consistent with the credit neutral floors
for the assigned ratings according to its methodology.

Other Transaction Parties

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will act as the trustee for
this transaction. Wells Fargo will act as a paying agent, master
servicer, note registrar and custodian for this transaction. In its
capacity as custodian, Wells Fargo will hold the collateral
documents, which include, the original note and mortgage and any
intervening assignments of mortgage.

Wells Fargo provides oversight of the servicer. Moody's considers
Wells Fargo as a strong master servicer of residential loans. Wells
Fargo's oversight encompasses loan administration, default
administration, compliance and cash management.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


OHA LOAN 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R1, B-R2, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from OHA Loan
Funding 2016-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 LLC, a CLO originally
issued in December 2016 that is managed by Oak Hill Advisors L.P.

This is a proposed refinancing and extension of JFIN CLO 2013
Ltd.'s December 2016 transaction. The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 24,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Feb. 7, 2020, refinancing date, proceeds from the issuance
of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the outstanding
notes from OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2016-1
LLC. At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on the
outstanding notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the
ratings on the outstanding notes and withdraw its preliminary
ratings on the replacement notes.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 LLC

  Class                Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-R                  AAA (sf)             384.60
  B-R1                 AA (sf)               62.10
  B-R2                 AA (sf)               10.00
  C-R                  A (sf)                36.05
  D-R                  BBB- (sf)             36.05
  E-R                  BB- (sf)              24.05
  Subordinated notes   NR                    58.00



RCKT MORTGAGE 2020-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to 23
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by RCKT
Mortgage Trust 2020-1. The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B2
(sf).

RCKT Mortgage Trust 2020-1 is a securitization of prime jumbo and
agency-eligible mortgage loans originated and serviced by Quicken
Loans Inc. (rated long-term senior unsecured Ba1). The assets of
the trust consist of 489 first lien, fully amortizing, fixed-rate
qualified mortgage loans, each with an original term to maturity of
30 years.

The transaction will be sponsored by Woodward Capital Management
LLC and will be the second transaction for which Quicken Loans is
the sole originator and servicer. There is no master servicer in
this transaction. Citibank, N.A. (Citibank, rated long-term senior
unsecured Aa3) will be the securities administrator and the trustee
will be Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB.

Transaction credit strengths include the high credit quality of the
collateral pool, the strong third-party review (TPR) results, a
shifting interest structure that incorporates a subordination
floor, and the prescriptive, unambiguous representations &
warranties framework. Transaction credit weaknesses include weaker
property valuation review and having no master servicer to oversee
the primary servicer, unlike typical prime jumbo transactions, as
well as limited performance history for Quicken Loans' prime jumbo
originations.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RCKT Mortgage Trust 2020-1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario is 0.51%
and reaches 4.98% at a stress level consistent with its Aaa
ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the assumed
February 1, 2020 collateral tape and closing date balances will
reflect the actual February 1, 2020 cut-off tape (the cut-off
date). In other words, the statistical information regarding the
mortgage loans in the collateral tape is based on the assumed
stated principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the cut-off
date.

Moody's bases its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its assessments of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence, and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

The RCKT 2020-1 transaction is a securitization of 489 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$365,830,933. The collateral pool includes 431 prime jumbo mortgage
loans comprising 89.9% of the aggregate pool balance underwritten
to Quicken Loans' prime jumbo guidelines. The remaining 58 mortgage
loans comprising 10.1% of the collateral pool balance are
agency-eligible loans underwritten to either or both of the Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac guidelines.

The loans in this transaction have strong borrower characteristics
with a weighted average original FICO score of 768 and a
weighted-average original loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 68.1%. In
addition, approximately 23.4% of the borrowers are self-employed
and refinance loans comprise 71.4% of the aggregate pool. The pool
has a high geographic concentration with 39% of the aggregate pool
related to mortgages originated in California.

Origination Quality

Quicken Loans (rated long-term senior unsecured Ba1), founded in
1985 and headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, is the second-largest
overall US residential mortgage originator and the largest retail
originator. Quicken Loans' origination of agency-eligible loans is
designed to be executed in accordance with underwriting guidelines
established by the Fannie Mae Single Family Selling Guide and the
Freddie Mac Single Family Seller/Servicer Guide.

Quicken Loans' prime jumbo guidelines are comparable with those of
other prime jumbo originators. The guidelines generally adhere to
the underwriting guidelines established by Fannie Mae and Qualified
Mortgage Appendix Q, except for loan amount, certain underwriting
ratios, and certain documentation requirements. Moody's considers
Quicken Loans an adequate originator of prime jumbo and
agency-eligible mortgage loans based on its staff and processes for
underwriting, quality control and risk management.

However, Moody's applied an adjustment to its expected losses for
the prime jumbo mortgage loans due to the limited performance
history for Quicken Loans' prime jumbo mortgage originations. While
the performance of such loans was strong and comparable to that of
other originators such as JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, the
volume of Quicken Loans' originations is much lower. Moody's also
notes that the available performance data of such prime jumbo loans
covers a recent period in a relatively benign economic environment
and Moody's has less insight into how such loans may perform in a
stressed economic environment than Moody's does for other
originators.

Servicing Arrangement

Quicken Loans has been servicing residential mortgage loans, beyond
an interim capacity, since 2009 and retains the mortgage servicing
rights on the majority of its mortgage loan originations. Quicken
Loans primarily services mortgages for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
Ginnie Mae.

Quicken Loans has the necessary processes, staff, technology and
overall infrastructure in place to effectively service this
securitized pool. Quicken Loans is responsible for advancing
delinquent interest and principal for loans that are less than 120
days delinquent. In the event Quicken Loans is unable to make such
advances, Citibank as securities administrator is required to do
so.

Quicken Loans is an approved servicer for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
and Ginnie Mae, and is a Fannie Mae Star Performer for General
Servicing and Solutions Delivery. In addition, Quicken Loans is
subject to periodic routine supervisory activity, primarily by
various state regulators, state enforcement agencies and the CFPB,
among others.

Moody's assesses the overall servicing arrangement for this pool as
adequate, given the ability, scale and experience of Quicken Loans
as a servicer, while noting that the servicing arrangement is
weaker than other prime jumbo transactions which typically have a
master servicer.

While the lack of a master servicer is not unique to transactions
backed by seasoned performing and re-performing mortgage loans, it
is unique to post-crisis transactions backed by newly originated
prime mortgage loans. Furthermore, the servicers in such seasoned
performing and re-performing transactions are third-parties,
whereas the servicer, originator, and R&W provider is the same
party in RCKT 2020-1. RCKT 2020-1's unique servicing arrangement
presents risks such as (1) weaker servicer oversight and (2) weaker
alignment of interest compared to the typical prime jumbo
transactions, since the originator, servicer and R&W provider are
the same party.

Though a third-party review of Quicken Loans' servicing operations,
performance and regulatory compliance will be conducted at least
annually by an independent accounting firm, as well as by the
government-sponsored entities (GSEs), the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and state regulators, such oversight lacks
the depth and frequency that a master servicer would provide for
this transaction.

Given that Quicken Loans is the loan originator, R&W provider and
the servicer in this transaction, a potential conflict of interest
could arise if Quicken Loans were to modify delinquent loans prior
to 120 day delinquency in order to avoid triggering the R&W review.
However, this risk is mitigated by the inclusion of a breach review
trigger if a mortgage loan (that is at least 30 days or more
delinquent) is modified before becoming 120 days delinquent.

However, Moody's did not apply an adjustment to its expected losses
for the weaker servicing arrangement due to the following:

(1) Quicken Loans' relative financial strength, scale, franchise
value, experience and demonstrated ability as a servicer. Quicken
Loans is also a Fannie Mae Star Performer for General Servicing and
Solutions Delivery.

(2) Citibank is an experienced securities administrator and will be
responsible for making advances of delinquent interest and
principal if Quicken Loans is unable to do so and for reconciling
monthly remittances of cash by Quicken Loans.

(3) The R&W framework is strong and includes triggers for
delinquency and modification, which ensure that poorly performing
mortgage loans will be reviewed by a third-party and mitigates the
risk from misalignment of interest.

(4) The mortgage pool is of high credit quality and a third-party
review firm has conducted due diligence on 100% of the mortgage
loans in the pool with satisfactory results.

Third-Party Due Diligence Review

One independent third-party review firm, AMC Diligence LLC (AMC),
was engaged to conduct due diligence for the credit, regulatory
compliance, property valuation, and data accuracy for the 489 loans
in the initial population of this transaction.

The credit review consisted of a review of the documentation in
each loan file relating to the creditworthiness of the borrowers,
and an assessment of whether the characteristics of the mortgage
loans and the borrowers reasonably conformed to Quicken Loans'
underwriting guidelines. Where there were exceptions to guidelines,
the TPR firm noted compensating factors. Additionally, the TPR firm
evaluated evidence of the borrower's willingness and ability to
repay the obligation. AMC did not identify any material credit
issues.

AMC's regulatory compliance review consisted of a review of
compliance with the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act among other federal, state and local
regulations. Additionally, the TPR firm applied SFIG's enhanced
RMBS 3.0 TRID Compliance Review Scope. AMC did not identify any
material compliance issues.

AMC's property valuation review consisted of reviewing the
valuation materials utilized at origination to ensure the appraisal
report was complete and in conformity with the underwriting
guidelines. The TPR firm also compared third-party valuation
products to the original appraisals. The appraisals for the
agency-eligible loans were checked using Fannie Mae's Collateral
Underwriter (Collateral Underwriter) and those for the prime jumbo
loans were checked using desktop review and/or a CU Score. In this
transaction, 178 of the non-conforming loans originated under
Quicken Loans' prime jumbo guidelines had a property valuation
review only consisting of a Collateral Underwriter and no other
third-party valuation product such as a CDA and field review.
Moody's considers the use of Collateral Underwriter for
non-conforming loans to be credit negative due to (1) the lack of
human intervention which increases the likelihood of missing
emerging risk trends, (2) the limited track record of the software
and limited transparency into the model and (3) GSE focus on
non-jumbo loans which may lower reliability on jumbo loan
appraisals. However, Moody's has not applied an adjustment to the
loss for such loans since the statistically significant sample size
and valuation results of the loans that were reviewed using a
third-party valuation product such as a CDA (which Moody's
considers to be a more accurate third-party valuation product) were
sufficient and the original appraisal balances for such loans were
not significantly higher than that of appraisal values for
GSE-eligible loans.

AMC also sought to identify data discrepancies in comparing the
data tape to the information utilized during their reviews. Of the
489 mortgage loans reviewed, 7 unique mortgage loans had 7 tape
discrepancies across 1 data field, Investor: Qualifying Total Debt
Ratio. Qualifying Total Debt Ratio variances are the difference on
the percentage of income dedicated toward making debt payments.
These variances occur frequently due to differences in calculating
complex incomes.

Representations & Warranties (R&W)

Moody's assessed RCKT 2020-1's R&W framework for this transaction
as adequate, consistent with that of other prime jumbo transactions
for which an independent reviewer is named at closing, the breach
review process is thorough, transparent and objective, and the
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance. An
effective R&W framework protects a transaction against the risk of
loss from fraudulent or defective loans.

Moody's assessed the R&W framework based on three factors: (a) the
financial strength of the R&W provider, (b) the strength of the
R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets), and (c) the effectiveness
of the enforcement mechanisms. Moody's applied an adjustment to its
expected losses to account for the risk that Quicken Loans may be
unable to repurchase defective loans in a stressed economic
environment, given that it is a non-bank entity with a monoline
business (mortgage origination and servicing) that is highly
correlated with the economy. However, Moody's tempered this
adjustment by taking into account Quicken Loans' relative financial
strength and the strong TPR results which suggest a lower
probability that poorly performing mortgage loans will be found
defective following review by the independent reviewer.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
balance declines, senior bonds are exposed to eroding credit
enhancement over time, and increased performance volatility as a
result. To mitigate this risk, the transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.10% of the cut-off date pool
balance, and a subordination lock-out amount of 1.10% of the
cut-off date pool balance. The floors are consistent with the
credit neutral floors for the assigned ratings according to its
methodology.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior floor and a subordinate floor. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments and
then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then interest and
principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all transactions
with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds benefit from a
cash flow waterfall that allocates all unscheduled principal
collections to the senior bond for a specified period and
increasing amounts of unscheduled principal collections to the
subordinate bonds thereafter, but only if loan performance
satisfies delinquency and loss tests. Realized losses are allocated
reverse sequentially among the subordinate and senior support
certificates and on a pro-rata basis among the super senior
certificates.

Structural Considerations

Similar to recently rated Sequoia transactions, RCKT 2020-1
contains a structural deal mechanism that will control stop
advances on delinquent loans. The stated rationale for the proposed
mechanism is to remove ambiguity and servicer discretion in
advancing. Although this feature lowers the risk of high advances
that may negatively affect the recoveries on liquidated loans, the
reduction in interest distribution amount is credit negative to the
subordinate bonds but credit positive for the senior bonds. One key
difference from the Sequoia transactions is that stop-advance
interest shortfalls are allocated first to the senior support and
then to the super senior classes.

The servicer and the securities administrator will not advance
principal and interest to loans that are 120 days or more
delinquent. The balance and the interest accrued on such stop
advance mortgage loans (SAML) will be removed from the calculation
of the principal and interest distribution amounts with respect to
the seniors and subordinate bonds. In other words, the interest
distribution amount will be reduced by the interest accrued on the
SAML. This reduction will be allocated first to the class of
certificates with the lowest payment priority and then to the class
of certificates with the next lowest payment priority, and so on.
In the case of the senior certificates stop-advance interest
shortfalls are allocated first to the senior support then to the
super senior classes, in the following order: first, to the Class
A-14 certificates and second, to the Class A-4, Class A-12 and
Class A-10 certificates on a pro rata basis.

Once a SAML is liquidated, the net recovery from that loan's
liquidation is allocated first to pay down the loan's outstanding
principal amount and then to repay its accrued interest. The
recovered accrued interest on the loan is used to repay the
interest reduction incurred by the bonds that resulted from that
SAML.

While the transaction is backed by collateral with strong credit
characteristics and, as such, Moody's expects strong performance
similar to other prime jumbo deals, Moody's considered scenarios in
which the delinquency pipeline rises, and interest distribution
amounts are reduced. The final ratings on the bonds reflect the
additional loss that the bonds may incur due to interest shortfall
on the bonds from SAML.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


RMF BUYOUT 2020-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class M4 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by RMF
Buyout Issuance Trust 2020-1. The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to
Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 744 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages and 74 real estate owned
properties. The servicer for the deal is Reverse Mortgage Funding,
LLC.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RMF Buyout Issuance Trust 2020-1

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. M1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. M3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing RBIT 2020-1 consists of first-lien inactive
HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance
secured by properties in the US along with Real-Estate Owned (REO)
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, the sale of the property is used to recover the amount
owed. The mortgage assets were acquired from Ginnie Mae sponsored
HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations, from the collapse of
previous private-label securitizations by an unrelated third-party
sponsor or from a third party unaffiliated with the seller. All of
the mortgage assets are covered by FHA insurance for the repayment
of principal up to certain amounts.

There are 818 mortgage assets with a balance of $175,730,590. The
assets are in either default, due and payable, bankruptcy,
foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default may cure or
move to due and payable; due and payable loans may cure or move to
foreclosure; and foreclosure loans may cure or move to REO. 26.8%
of the assets are in default of which 1.5% (of the total assets)
are in default due to non-occupancy and 25.3% (of the total assets)
are in default due to delinquent taxes and insurance. 20.8% of the
assets are due and payable, 2.2% are in bankruptcy status and 42.7%
are in foreclosure. Finally, 7.7% of the assets are REO properties
and were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure on the associated loan. This transaction has a
relatively low percentage of REO properties when compared to RBIT
2019-1. All else equal, a higher percentage of REO properties
suggests that a larger percentage of assets will be liquidated
shortly after closing and therefore the weighted average life may
be shorter.

The initial weighted average loan-to-value-plus-insurance ratio is
53.0%, which is comparable to RBIT 2019-1. This implies that, all
else equal, similar loans in this pool will have their insurance
claims capped by the MCA. Also, the weighted average LTV ratio is
119.1% which is lower than 120.1% in RBIT 2019-1.

There are 85 loans in this transaction, 9.2% of the asset balance,
backed by properties in Puerto Rico. The concentration of Puerto
Rico is much higher than RBIT 2019-1. Puerto Rico HECMs pose
additional risk due to the poor state of the Puerto Rico economy,
declining population, and bureaucratic foreclosure process.
Furthermore, Puerto Rico is still struggling to recover from
Hurricane Maria and the region has experienced over 500 earthquakes
since late December 2019 . In August 2018, HUD extended the
foreclosure moratorium in areas affected by Hurricane Maria for an
additional month. The moratorium ended on September 15, 2018. Even
though the moratorium has now been lifted, there are likely to be
additional delays due to court related backlogs, additional
foreclosure procedures for impacted properties, and difficulties in
tracking down borrowers or their heirs. Moody's applied additional
stresses in its analysis to account for the risks posed by
properties in Puerto Rico. However, Moody's has not made any
earthquake related adjustments because the damages are still
unknown and the transaction will be covered under the property
condition representation.

Of note, On November 29, 2019, Reverse Mortgage Investment Trust
which is the parent company of the seller and servicer, entered
into a definitive agreement to be acquired by BNGL Parent, L.L.C.,
an affiliate of Starwood Capital Group Global II, L.P. The
transaction is expected to close during 2020. The members of the
management team of RMF and RMIT have entered into agreements with
the acquirer that provide for such management team members to
continue performing the same respective roles following the closing
of the transaction. Therefore, Moody's does not expect this
transaction to materially affect RMF's ability to either service
the assets or perform its obligations under the servicing
agreement.

On May 30, 2019, RMF received a civil investigative demand from the
U.S. Department of Justice relating to allegations that RMF
submitted noncompliant properties and property appraisals for
reverse mortgage insurance by the FHA. There are 20 mortgage assets
(which represents approximately 2.7% of total UPB of the pool)
originated by RMF (or one of its approved partners) in this pool
which are within the scope of the demand. Moody's has not made any
adjustments for these 20 mortgages because the allegations would
not affect the validity of the FHA insurance for the affected
mortgages. Per 12 U.S.C. § 1709(e), the statutory incontestability
clause prevents HUD from asserting origination errors against a
subsequent holder of the loan, except for such holder's own fraud
or misrepresentation. At the closing of the securitization, RMF
will transfer the mortgage to the acquisition trust and the
acquisition trustee on behalf of the acquisition trust would be the
subsequent holder of the loans. Any monetary damages associated
with the allegations would be paid by RMF (or its affiliates) and
would not be passed on to the noteholders. There is a strong
mechanism to ensure continuous advancing for the assets in the pool
along with a clear and efficient process for choosing a successor
servicer that protects the noteholders if this alleged violation
adversely affects RMF's ability to perform its obligations under
the sale and servicing agreement.

Servicing

RMF will be the named servicer for the portfolio under the sale and
servicing agreement. RMF has the necessary processes, staff,
technology and overall infrastructure in place to effectively
oversee the servicing of this transaction. RMF will use Compu-Link
Corporation, d/b/a Celink ("Celink") as subservicer to service the
mortgage assets. Based on an operational review of RMF, it has
adequate sub-servicing monitoring processes, a seasoned servicing
oversight team and direct system access to the sub-servicers' core
systems. In addition, a third party will review RMF's monthly
servicing reports on a quarterly basis to ensure data accuracy
throughout the life of the transaction.

Similar to the prior two RBIT transactions, a firm of independent
accountants or a due-diligence review firm (the verification agent)
will perform quarterly procedures with respect to the monthly
servicing reports delivered by the servicer to the trustee. These
procedures will include comparison of the underlying records
relating to the subservicer's servicing of the loans and
determination of the mathematical accuracy of calculations of loan
balances stated in the monthly servicing reports delivered to the
trustee. Any material exceptions identified as a result of the
procedures will be described in the verification agent's report. To
the extent the verification agent identifies errors in the monthly
servicing reports, the servicer will be obligated to correct them.

Of note, unlike prior RBIT transactions, the servicer will also
reimburse the trust for curtailments resulting from a failure of a
prior servicer to comply with the HUD HECM guidelines.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst six
classes of notes with structural subordination. All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their expected final payment dates. The subordinate notes will not
receive principal until the beginning of their respective target
amortization periods (in the absence of an acceleration event). The
notes benefit from structural subordination as credit enhancement,
and an interest reserve account funded with cash received from the
initial purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit
enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in March 2022. For the Class M1
notes, the expected final payment date is in June 2022. For the
Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is in August 2022.
For the Class M3 notes, the expected final payment date is in
October 2022. For the Class M4 notes, the expected final payment
date is in December 2022. Finally, for the Class M5 notes, the
expected final payment date is in February 2023. For each of the
subordinate notes, there are target amortization periods that
conclude on the respective expected final payment dates. The legal
final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve account may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon RMF remaining
as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related reimbursements are
subordinated to interest and principal payments while RMF is
servicer. However, servicing advances will instead have priority
over interest and principal payments in the event that RMF defaults
and a new servicer is appointed.

The transaction provides a strong mechanism to ensure continuous
advancing for the assets in the pool. Specifically, if the servicer
fails to advance and such failure is not remedied for a period of
15 days, the sub-servicer can fund their advances from collections
and from an interim advancing reserve account. Given the
significant amount of advancing required to service inactive HECMs
with tax delinquencies, this provision helps to minimize
operational disruption in the event RMF encounters financial
difficulties.

In addition, the transaction establishes a clear and efficient
process for choosing a successor servicer following the removal of
the servicer. Specifically, the servicer will provide a list of
eligible successor servicers to the indenture trustee on a
semiannual basis and if the controlling noteholders have directed
the indenture trustee to terminate the servicer, a successor
servicer will be selected based on a voting process that does not
require a supermajority of the senior noteholders to actively
consent.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of RMF. The review focused on data
integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification, accuracy of
appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status recording,
borrower age documentation, identification of excessive corporate
advances, documentation of servicer advances, and identification of
tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions
(BPOs) were ordered for 204 properties in the pool.

The third party review (TPR) firm conducted an extensive data
integrity review. Certain data tape fields, such as the mortgage
insurance premium (MIP) rate, the current UPB, current interest
rate, and marketable title date were reviewed against RMF's
servicing system. Additionally, a significant number of data tape
fields were reviewed against imaged copies of original documents of
record, screen shots of HUD's HERMIT system, or HUD documents. Some
key fields reviewed in this manner included the original note rate,
the debenture rate, foreclosure first legal date, and the called
due date.

The TPR results are stronger than RBIT 2019-1. There are no data
exceptions, fewer categories with exceptions and the number of
exceptions found are also lower in most of the categories. For
example, RBIT 2020-1's TPR results showed a 1.7% initial-tape
exception rate related to the taxes and insurance disbursement
compared to 10.7% in RBIT 2019-1. Similarly, there is 4.9%
initial-tape exception rate related to borrower age documentation
compared to 12.5% in RBIT 2019-1. In its analysis, Moody's applied
adjustments to account for the TPR results in certain areas.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

RMF is the loan-level R&W provider and is not rated. This
relatively weak financial profile is mitigated by the fact that RMF
will subordinate its servicing advances, servicing fees, and MIP
payments in the transaction and thus has significant alignment of
interests. Another factor mitigating the risks associated with a
financially weak R&W provider is that a third-party due diligence
firm conducted a review on the loans for evidence of FHA
insurance.

RMF represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA insurance
that is in full force and effect. RMF provides further R&Ws
including those for title, first lien position, enforceability of
the lien, and the condition of the property. Although RMF provides
a no fraud R&W covering the origination of the mortgage loans,
determination of value of the mortgaged properties, and the sale
and servicing of the mortgage loans, the no fraud R&W is made only
as to the initial mortgage loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, RMF
does not provide any other R&W in connection with the origination
of the mortgage loans, including whether the mortgage loans were
originated in compliance with applicable federal, state and local
laws. Although certain representations are knowledge qualified, the
transaction documents contain language specifying that if a
representation would have been breached if not for the knowledge
qualifier then RMF will be obligated to remedy the breach in the
same manner as if no knowledge qualifier had been made.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, RMF has to cure the
breach. If RMF is unable to cure the breach, RMF must repurchase
the loan within 90 days from receiving the notification. Moody's
believes the absence of an independent third party reviewer who can
identify any breaches to the R&W makes the enforcement mechanism
weak in this transaction. Also, RMF, in its good faith, is
responsible for determining if a R&W breach materially and
adversely affects the interests of the trust or the value the
collateral. This creates the potential for a conflict of interest.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the acquisition trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believes that RBIT
2020-1 is adequately protected against such risk in part because a
third-party data integrity review was conducted on a significant
random sample of the loans. In addition, the third-party due
diligence firm verified that all of the loans in the pool are
covered by FHA insurance.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the RBIT 2020-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank National
Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also serve as the
claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD mortgagee of
record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loan Securitizations Methodology" published in
January 2020 and "Reverse Mortgage Securitizations Methodology"
published in November 2019.

Its quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan modeling
of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA insurance and
with various stresses applied to model parameters depending on the
target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than 95% of its appraised
value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
marketable title to the property. ABCs are filed six months after
the servicer has obtained marketable title if the property has not
yet been sold. For an SBC, HUD insurance will cover the difference
between (i) the loan balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price
and 95.0% of the latest appraisal, with the transaction on the hook
for losses if the sales price is lower than 95.0% of the latest
appraisal. For an ABC, HUD only covers the difference between the
loan amount and 100% of appraised value, so failure to sell the
property at the appraised value results in loss.

Moody's expects ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Its base case expectation is that properties will be
sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. To make
this assumption, Moody's considered industry data and the
historical experience of RMF. Moody's stressed this percentage at
higher credit rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed
that ABC appraisal haircuts could reach up to 30.0%.

In its asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed this percentage at higher credit
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that SBC
appraisal haircuts could reach up to 11.0% (i.e., 6.0% below
95.0%).

Under its analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go through
both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability. Each loan
will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. For the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that 85% of claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs.
Moody's stressed this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages
for higher rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed
that 85% of insurance claims would be submitted as ABCs.

Liquidation process: each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In
its analysis, Moody's assumes loans that are in referred status to
be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed to
move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to 12 months
depending on the default reason. Foreclosure status is based on the
state in which that the related property is located and is further
stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and 12
months with respect to ABCs.

Debenture interest: the receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment. Its
base case assumption is that 90.0% of debenture interest will be
received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of debenture
interest that will be received at higher rating levels. Its
debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that RMF
(not rated) reimburse the trust for debenture interest curtailments
due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD guidelines.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into its analysis, including the following:

  -- In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in its analysis. However, for seasoned appraisals
Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential home price
depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the cut-off
date.

  -- Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in
their homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their
heirs rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's
estimated which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing
each loans' appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB.

  -- Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

  -- Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where RMF is no longer the
servicer. Moody's assumes the following in the situation where RMF
is no longer the servicer:

  -- Servicing advances and servicing fees: While RMF subordinates
their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing fees, and MIP
payments, a replacement servicer will not subordinate these
amounts.

  -- RMF indemnifies the trust for lost debenture interest due to
servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD guidelines. In the
event of a bankruptcy, RMF will not have the financial capacity to
do so.

  -- A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assumes a 25 bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

  -- One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse a replacement servicer (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500 per loan.

Furthermore, to account for risks posed by Puerto Rican loans,
Moody's considered the following for loans backed by properties
located in Puerto Rico:

  -- To account for delays in the foreclosure process in Puerto
Rico due to the hurricanes, Moody's assumed extended foreclosure
timelines across rating levels and assumed five years as its Aaa
foreclosure timeline.

  -- Moody's assumed that all insurance claims will be submitted as
ABCs. In addition, Moody's assumed that properties will sell for
significantly lower than their appraised values.

Moody's also applied a small adjustment in its analysis to account
for the risks associated with certain damaged properties that are
located in areas impacted by Hurricane Florence or Hurricane
Michael.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from its original expectations resulting in appreciation in
the value of the mortgaged property and faster property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from its original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.


SCF EQUIPMENT 2017-1: Moody's Raises Class D Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded 14 tranches from four
transactions sponsored by Stonebriar Commercial Finance LLC and, in
the case of the transaction issued in 2018 and 2019, also
Stonebriar Commercial Finance Canada Inc. The transactions are
securitizations of equipment loans and leases and owner-occupied
commercial real estate loans.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-1 LLC

  Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class A, Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2019 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class B, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
  previously on Apr 10, 2019 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class C, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
  previously on Apr 10, 2019 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class D, Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2019 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-2 LLC

  Class A Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
  previously on Jul 1, 2019 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  Class B Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
  previously on Jul 1, 2019 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Class C Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Upgraded to    
  Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2019 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Class D Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
  previously on Apr 10, 2019 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2018-1 LLC/SCF Equipment Leasing
Canada 2018 Limited Partnership Series 2018-1

  Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2019
  Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  Class D Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2019
  Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10,
  2019 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2019-1 LLC/SCF Equipment Leasing
Canada 2019 Limited Partnership

  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10,
  2019 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10,
  2019 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  Class F Notes, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2019
  Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)


RATINGS RATIONALE

The review actions reflect build-up in credit enhancement levels
since transaction closing and/or last rating action as a result of
deleveraging and assignment of public rating to one of the largest
obligors in the pools backing the transactions.

The actions reflect build-up in credit enhancement levels for all
the classes of notes in the transactions due to deleveraging from
the sequential pay structures, overcollateralization (OC) and
non-declining reserve accounts. The SCF 2017-2, SCF 2018-1, and SCF
2019-1 transactions feature an OC target of 5.50% of original pool
balance whereas SCF 2017-1 features an OC target of 10.25%. In SCF
2019-1 transaction, since the target OC level is met, 50% of the
excess spread is used to pay the subordinate class E notes, class F
notes, and class G notes, pro-rata. The non-declining reserve
account target of 1.50% of original balance is fully funded for all
the transactions. In addition, the transactions have exhibited
strong performance with no cumulative net losses to date.

Along with the strong performance, Moody's continued to consider
credit risks associated with the transactions, such as the
substantial residual value risk. The transactions are exposed to
the market value of the equipment if lessees return the equipment
upon maturity of the leases. Residual risk in the transactions are
partially mitigated by the required return conditions under most of
the leases which incentivize the lessees to either renew the lease
or purchase the equipment at the end of the lease term. However,
lease renewals instead of equipment purchases would result in
slower pay down of the notes. If the equipment were to be returned,
lengthy re-lease or disposition timeframe could also slow pay down
of the notes. This risk is specifically greater for SCF 2017-1
since it has approximately 38% exposure to residuals while classes
A and B have final maturity dates of January and March 2023
respectively.

Moody's considered greater volatility in projected asset values,
which were provided at transaction closing. Over time, the age of
the asset valuations may lead to volatility in the determination of
recovery values of the loans and leases backing the transaction. To
take this into consideration, Moody's performed sensitivity
analysis on the projected future asset values received at the
closing of the transaction.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or lower than
expected depreciation in the value of the equipment and commercial
real estate that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the
primary drivers of performance, positive changes in the US macro
economy and the strong performance of various sectors where the
obligors operate could also affect the ratings. In addition, faster
than expected reduction in residual value exposure could prompt
upgrade of ratings.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or a greater than
expected deterioration in the value of the equipment and commercial
real estate that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the
primary drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro
economy and the weak performance of various sectors where the
obligors operate could also affect Moody's ratings. Other reasons
for worse performance than Moody's expectations could include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack of
transaction governance and fraud.


TICP CLO XV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to TICP CLO XV
Ltd./TICP CLO XV LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 28,
2020. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  TICP CLO XV Ltd./TICP CLO XV LLC

  Class                Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A                    AAA (sf)             267.75
  B                    AA (sf)               54.40
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                26.35
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)             24.70
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)              16.80
  Subordinated notes   NR                    42.90


TOWD POINT 2020-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on 3 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Asset-Backed
Securities, Series 2020-1 (the Notes) to be issued by Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2020-1 (TPMT 2020-1 or the Trust) as follows:

-- $440.3 million Class A1A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $77.7 million Class A1A2 at AAA (sf)
-- $59.7 million Class A2A at AAA (sf)
-- $25.0 million Class A2B at AA (low) (sf)
-- $24.2 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1A at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1B at BB (sf)
-- $13.6 million Class B2A at B (sf)
-- $13.6 million Class B2B at B (sf)
-- $518.0 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $518.0 million Class A1X at AAA (sf)
-- $440.3 million Class A1A at AAA (sf)
-- $440.3 million Class A1AX at AAA (sf)
-- $77.7 million Class A1B at AAA (sf)
-- $77.7 million Class A1BX at AAA (sf)
-- $59.7 million Class A2C at AAA (sf)
-- $59.7 million Class A2CX at AAA (sf)
-- $59.7 million Class A2D at AAA (sf)
-- $59.7 million Class A2DX at AAA (sf)
-- $25.0 million Class A2E at AA (low) (sf)
-- $25.0 million Class A2EX at AA (low) (sf)
-- $25.0 million Class A2F at AA (low) (sf)
-- $25.0 million Class A2FX at AA (low) (sf)
-- $577.8 million Class A3 at AAA (sf)
-- $602.7 million Class A4 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $626.9 million Class A5 at A (sf)
-- $24.2 million Class M1A at A (sf)
-- $24.2 million Class M1AX at A (sf)
-- $24.2 million Class M1B at A (sf)
-- $24.2 million Class M1BX at A (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class M2A at BBB (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class M2AX at BBB (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class M2B at BBB (sf)
-- $26.5 million Class M2BX at BBB (sf)
-- $25.7 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1C at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1CX at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1D at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1DX at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1E at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1EX at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1F at BB (sf)
-- $12.9 million Class B1FX at BB (sf)
-- $27.2 million Class B2 at B (sf)

Classes A1X, A1AX, A1BX, A2CX, A2DX, A2EX, A2FX, M1AX, M1BX, M2AX,
M2BX, B1CX, B1DX, B1EX, and B1FX are interest-only notes. The class
balances represent a notional amount.

Classes A1, A1A, A1AX, A1B, A1BX, A2C, A2CX, A2D, A2DX, A2E, A2EX,
A2F, A2FX, A3, A4, A5, M1A, M1AX, M1B, M1BX, M2A, M2AX, M2B, M2BX,
B1, B1C, B1CX, B1D, B1DX, and B2 are exchangeable notes. These
classes can be exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as
specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 23.60% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the pool. The
AA (low) (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) ratings
reflect 20.30%, 17.10%, 13.60%, 11.90%, and 6.60% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified class above, DBRS Morningstar does not
rate any other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and reperforming primarily first-lien mortgages funded
by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 5,078 loans
with a total principal balance of $756,264,221 as of the Cut-Off
Date (December 31, 2019).

The Notes are backed by 5,166 loans with a total principal balance
of $771,742,925 as of the Statistical Calculation Date (November
30, 2019). Unless specified otherwise, all the statistics regarding
the mortgage loans in this report are based on the Statistical
Calculation Date.

The portfolio is approximately 136 months seasoned, and of the
loans, 64.2% are modified. The modifications happened more than two
years ago for 84.0% of the modified loans. Within the pool, 750
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equate
to approximately 4.0% of the total principal balance. Included in
the deferred amounts are the Home Affordable Modification Program
and proprietary principal forgiveness amounts, which together
comprise 0.1% of the total principal balance.

As of the Statistical Calculation Date, 94.7% of the pool is
current, 3.5% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) delinquency method, and 1.9% is in bankruptcy
(all bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).

Approximately 64.2% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30
days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least the past 24 months under the
MBA delinquency method. The majority of the pool (88.3%) is exempt
from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay
(ATR)/Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules. The loans subject to the ATR
rules are designated as QM Safe Harbor (10.4%), QM Rebuttable
Presumption (0.7%), and Non-QM (0.6%).

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from
various transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and
2019 and are beneficially owned by funds managed by affiliates of
Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. Upon acquiring the loans from the
transferring trusts, FirstKey, through a wholly-owned subsidiary,
Towd Point Asset Funding, LLC (the Depositor), will contribute
loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, FirstKey, through a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than any residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements. These loans were originated and previously
serviced by various entities through purchases in the secondary
market.

The loans will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(91.9%) and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (8.1%). The initial
aggregate servicing fee for the TPMT 2020-1 portfolio will be
0.1706% per annum, lower than transactions backed by similar
collateral. DBRS Morningstar stressed such servicing expenses in
its cash flow analysis to account for a potential fee increase in a
distressed scenario.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of homeowner association fees, taxes, and insurance;
installment payments on energy improvement liens; and reasonable
costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing and
disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
nonperforming loans or real estate–owned (REO) properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. Bulk
sales require an asset sale price to at least equal a minimum
reserve amount of the product of (1) 56.15% and (2) the current
principal amount of the mortgage loans or REO properties as of the
bulk sale date.

When the aggregate pool balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to
less than 30.0% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the holders of more
than 50% of the Class X Certificates will have the option to cause
TPMT 2020-1 to sell all of its remaining property (other than
amounts in the Breach Reserve Account) to one or more third-party
purchasers so long as the aggregate proceeds meet a minimum price.

When the aggregate pool balance is reduced to less than 10% of the
balance as of the Cut-Off Date, the majority representative, as
appointed by the holder(s) of more than 50% of the notional amount
of the Class X Certificates or their affiliates, may purchase all
of the mortgage loans, REO properties, and other properties from
TPMT 2020-1 so long as the aggregate proceeds meet a minimum
price.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds and excess interest can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Notes, but such shortfalls on Class A2B
and more subordinate bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds
until Class A1A1, A1A2, and A2A are retired.

The DBRS Morningstar ratings of AAA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related notes. The DBRS Morningstar ratings of AA (low) (sf), BBB
(sf), BB (sf), and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related notes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TRAPEZA CDO IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Tranches to B3
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO IX, Ltd.:

US$162,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due January 27, 2040 (current outstanding balance of
$81,119,513.36), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 10, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due January 27, 2040, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
on July 10, 2017 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due January 27, 2040, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July
10, 2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class B-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
due January 27, 2040 (current outstanding balance of
$24,493,023.14), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
Notes due January 27, 2040 (current outstanding balance of
$10,649,140.50), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B-3 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
Notes due January 27, 2040 (current outstanding balance of
$27,221,173.06), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Trapeza CDO IX, Ltd., issued in January 2006, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and insurance trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios, and the improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since January 2019.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 2.0% or $1.7
million since January 2019, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class A-3, and Class B notes have
improved to 246.6%, 185.0%, 152.8%, and 103.4%, respectively, from
January 2019 levels of 241.6%, 182.2%, 150.7%, and 102.9%,
respectively. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor improved to 781 from 908 in January
2019.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $200.1 million, defaulted/deferring par of $32.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 8.45% (implying a WARF of
781), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.00%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in March 2019.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
assessments. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


VERUS SECURITIZATION 2020-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating to B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Verus Securitization
Trust 2020-1's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a RMBS backed by first-lien fixed- and
adjustable-rate fully amortizing residential mortgage loans (some
with interest-only periods) secured by single-family residential
properties, townhouses, planned-unit developments, condominiums,
and two- to four-family residential properties to both prime and
nonprime borrowers. The pool has 1,376 loans, which are primarily
non-qualified mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The representation and warranty framework for this transaction;
and
-- The mortgage aggregator, Invictus Capital Partners.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Verus Securitization Trust 2020-1

  Class            Rating             Amount ($)
  A-1              AAA (sf)          472,657,000
  A-1X             AAA (sf)             Notional(i)
  A-1B             AAA (sf)          472,657,000
  A-2              AA (sf)            42,301,000
  A-3              A (sf)             80,757,000
  M-1              BBB- (sf)          47,895,000
  B-1              BB (sf)            20,627,000
  B-2              B (sf)             22,374,000
  B-3              NR                 12,585,961
  A-IO-S           NR                   Notional(ii)
  XS               NR                   Notional(ii)
  P                NR                        100
  R                NR                        N/A

(i)The notional amount equals the class A-1 balance as of the prior
distribution date.
(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' stated principal
balance.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.



VITALITY RE XI: S&P Assigns 'BB+(sf)' Rating to Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings of 'BBB+(sf)' and 'BB+(sf)'
to the class A and B notes, respectively, to be issued by Vitality
Re XI Ltd. The notes will cover claims payments of Health Re Inc.,
and ultimately Aetna Life Insurance Co. (ALIC), related to the
company's covered insurance business to the extent the medical
benefits ratio (MBR) exceeds 102% for the class A notes and 96% for
the class B notes. The MBR is calculated on an annual aggregate
basis.

S&P bases its ratings on the lowest of the following: the MBR risk
factor on the ceded risk ('bbb+' for the class A notes and 'bb+'
for the class B notes); the rating on ALIC (the underlying ceding
insurer); and the rating on the permitted investments ('AAAm') that
will be held in the collateral account (there is a separate
collateral account for each class of notes) at closing.

According to the risk analysis provided by Milliman Inc.--one of
the world's largest providers of actuarial and related products and
services, the primary driver of historical financial fluctuations
has been the volatility in per capita claim-cost trends and lags in
insurers' reactions to these trend changes in their premium rating
increase actions. Other volatility factors include changes in
expenses and target profit margins. Although these factors cause
the majority of claims volatility, the extreme tail risk is
affected by severe pandemic.

This is the fifth Vitality Re issuance that permits the probability
of attachment--for the class A notes only--to be reset higher or
lower than at issuance. For each reset of the class A notes, if any
class B notes are outstanding on the applicable reset calculation
date, the updated MBR attachment of the class A notes will be set
so it is equal to the updated MBR exhaustion for the class B
notes.




WELLS FARGO 2019-2: Moody's Upgrades Class B-4 Debt to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of six tranches,
backed by Prime Jumbo mortgage loans issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage
Backed Securities 2019-2 Trust.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2019-2 Trust

Cl. A-17, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-18, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2019
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a decrease in its projected
pool losses. The actions reflect the strong performance of the
underlying pool. As of November 2019, the loans underlying the
pools have no delinquencies and have prepaid at a faster rate than
originally anticipated.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools
which incorporate its assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third party review at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's servicers. Wells Fargo is the primary
servicer for the transaction

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
October 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.5% in December 2019 from 3.9% in
December 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2020 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2020. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C3: Moody's Lowers Class F Certs to C(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on four classes and
downgraded the ratings on four classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2011-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2011-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2019
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on three P&I classes were downgraded primarily due to
the continued decline in performance of the two specially servicing
loans secured by regional malls; Park Plaza (9.9% of the pool) and
Oakdale Mall (6.2% of the pool).

The rating on one IO class, Class X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating on one IO Class, Class X-B, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes. The IO
Class references six P&I classes including Class G, which is not
rated by Moody's.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 7.0% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 4.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 17, 2020 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 45.5% to $788
million from $1.45 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 46 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9.9% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 33.2% of the pool. Twenty-three loans,
constituting approximately 60% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of nine, the same as at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 5.1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $0.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 1.1%). Two loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Park Plaza Loan ($78.1
million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured by a three-story,
283,000 square foot (SF), enclosed regional mall located in Little
Rock, Arkansas. Dillard's anchors the mall, occupying two boxes on
the east and west wings of the property, and is not included as
part of the collateral. The largest collateral tenants include H&M
(10.4% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration in 2028)
and Forever 21 (8.8% of the NRA; lease expiration in 2023). As of
September 2019 the collateral was 98% leased, compared to 94% in
December 2018. The loan transferred to special servicing in June
2019 for imminent monetary default. The property's net operating
income (NOI) has declined since 2012 and the year-end 2018 NOI was
approximately 28% lower than in 2012. The decline in NOI is due to
lower rental revenue driven by tenant departures, including
Aeropostale, The Limited, Wet Seal, Payless Shoe Store, Abercrombie
& Fitch, Foot Locker, and Lane Bryant. Additionally, Gap stores and
Banana Republic, representing an aggregate 9% of the collateral
NRA, announced they will be vacating in January 2020. Furthermore
mall stores, as reported by the Sponsor, declined to $319 per
square foot (PSF) from $349 in 2016. The loan Sponsor is CBL. The
loan is structured on a 25-year amortization schedule, has
amortized 21% since securitization, and has a scheduled maturity
date in April 2021. The loan remains current on its debt service
payments, however, the DSCR has continued to decline since
securitization. Due to the property's continued decline in
performance, Moody's anticipates a high probability of default.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Oakdale Mall
($49.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 709,000
SF enclosed regional mall located in Johnson City, New York. The
mall is anchored by a JC Penney (13% of NRA; lease expiration July
2025) and Burlington Coat Factory (12% of NRA; lease expiration
August 2023). The decline in property performance was due to the
departure of three anchor tenants; non-collateral Sears (store
closure - September 2017), a ground leased Macy's (store closure -
April 2018) and Bon Ton (store closure - Summer 2018). The property
has been unable to fill these vacant anchor spaces. As of March
2019, the property was 51% leased, compared to 76% leased in
December 2018, 85% leased in December 2017 and 93% leased at
securitization. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
July 2018 due to imminent monetary default. Moody's anticipates a
significant loss on this loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one loan,
the White Flint Plaza, constituting 4% of the pool. The loan is
further described.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2019 operating results for 99% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 76%, compared to 82% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 17% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.56X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 1.28X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 10.1% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the White Flint Plaza Loan ($31.6 million --
4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery-anchored retail
center located in Kensington, Maryland, approximately 12 miles
northwest of the Washington, DC central-business district (CBD).
The property is anchored by Shoppers Foodwarehouse (31% of the NRA)
and also features national tenants HomeGoods, PetSmart and Advance
Auto Parts. However, United Natural Foods (UNFI), the parent
company of Shoppers, announced plans to close twelve stores across
Maryland, including this location. As of September 2019, the
property was 99% leased to 26 tenants. However, accounting for the
anticipated January 2020 departure of Shoppers Foodwarehouse, the
occupancy would fall to 68%. Additionally, the property faces near
term rollover risk with the next four largest tenants (totaling 38%
of the NRA) each having lease expiration dates prior to April 2021.
The loan has a scheduled maturity date in June 2021. Due to the
expected grocer departure and upcoming rollover risk, Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the Bridgewater Promenade Loan ($27.7
million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a retail power
center in Bridgewater, New Jersey. The property is shadow anchored
by Target, Costco and Home Depot. Major national tenants at the
property include Marshall's, Bed Bath & Beyond, PetSmart, Bob's
Discount Furniture and Michaels. Bed Bath & Beyond, Marshall's, and
Michael's have all recently resigned their respective leases for an
additional five years. As of September 2019, the property was 100%
leased, compared to 80% leased in December 2018. The loan has
amortized 13.5% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 69% and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.26X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Meadowbrook Commons Loan ($20.7
million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by is a community
shopping center located in Freeport, New York. The property is
anchored by Target and features junior anchors Modell's, Marshalls,
and Bob's Furniture. As of September 2019, the property is 95%
leased to ten tenants, however, these figures include the now
closed Dressbarn (5% of the NRA) . The property has exposure to
Pier 1 (5% of NRA), which recently announced its plan to close
nearly half its stores, however, this location was not included on
the store closure list. The loan has amortized 13.7% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.81X,
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.39X at the last review.


YORK CLO-7: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating to $18MM Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to York CLO-7 Ltd./York
CLO-7 LLC's floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral management team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through collateral
selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The legal structure of the transaction, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  York CLO-7 Ltd./York CLO-7 LLC

  Class                Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)             230.50
  A-2                  AAA (sf)              25.50
  B-1                  AA (sf)               23.00
  B-2                  AA (sf)               23.00
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                26.00
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)             20.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)              18.00
  Subordinated notes   NR                    36.80

  NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 122 Classes From 35 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 122 classes from 35 U.S.
RMBS transactions issued between 1997 and 2005. The review yielded
eight upgrades, two downgrades, 104 affirmations, and eight
withdrawals.

In addition, 49 ratings from 25 of the transactions within this
review were placed under criteria observation (UCO) on Oct. 18,
2019, following the publication of "Methodology To Derive Stressed
Interest Rates In Structured Finance." The rating actions resolve
the UCO placements and each of the ratings reviewed are based on
the application of S&P's updated stressed interest rate assumptions
and incorporate any performance changes since last review.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Some of these considerations may include:

-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
and
-- Erosion of or increases in credit support.

RATING ACTIONS

"The rating changes reflect our opinion regarding the associated
transaction-specific collateral performance and/or structural
characteristics, and/or reflect the application of specific
criteria applicable to these classes," S&P said.

"The rating affirmations reflect our opinion that our projected
credit support and collateral performance on these classes has
remained relatively consistent with our prior projections," the
rating agency said.

S&P withdrew its ratings on seven classes from four transactions
due to the small number of loans remaining within the related
structure. Once a pool has declined to a de minimis amount, the
rating agency believes there is a high degree of credit instability
that is incompatible with any rating level.

S&P withdrew its ratings on class A from Park Place NIM 2005-WHQN2.
This NIMS class has not received its applicable interest due for
more than 12 months, and the rating agency does not project that
the outstanding missed interest amounts will be reimbursed in its
cash flow analysis. S&P attributes these missed interest amounts to
the underlying transaction's inability to maintain sufficient
overcollateralization for residual interest to be released to the
NIMS class. This class had a rating of 'D (sf)' prior to the
withdrawal. This follows the application of S&P's policy for rating
withdrawals, based on its belief that there is a lack of market
interest in the ratings assigned to the class.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/2RB2qXZ


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 158 Classes From 47 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 158 classes from 47 U.S.
RMBS transactions issued between 2002 and 2008. All of these
transactions are backed by alternative-A, neg-am,
outside-the-guidelines, prime jumbo, re-performing, small-balance
commercial, and subprime collateral. The review yielded eight
upgrades, 14 downgrades, 132 affirmations, and four
discontinuances. Additionally, S&P subsequently discontinued one of
the lowered ratings.

All of the transactions within this review had at least one class
that was placed under criteria observation (UCO) on Oct. 18, 2019,
following the publication of "Methodology To Derive Stressed
Interest Rates In Structured Finance." The rating actions resolve
the UCO placements based on the application of S&P's updated
stressed interest rate assumptions and incorporate any performance
changes since its last review.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Some of these considerations may include:

-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization;
-- Erosion of or increases in credit support;
-- Expected short duration;
-- Loan modifications;
-- Payment priority due to triggers;
-- Counterparty exposure;
-- Stressed interest rates criteria; and
-- Interest-only criteria.

RATING ACTIONS

"The rating changes reflect our opinion regarding the associated
transaction-specific collateral performance and/or structural
characteristics, and/or reflect the application of specific
criteria applicable to these classes. Please see the ratings list
below for the specific rationales associated with each of the
classes with rating transitions," S&P said.

"The rating affirmations reflect our opinion that our projected
credit support and collateral performance on these classes has
remained relatively consistent with our prior projections," the
rating agency said.

S&P raised its ratings on class M-1 from CDC Mortgage Capital Trust
2003-HE2 and classes M-1 and M-2 from Wachovia Loan Trust 2005-SD1
due to increased credit support experienced by the classes. These
classes are receiving all of the scheduled and unscheduled
principal in the transaction while the more subordinate tranches
are not receiving any principal. This is due to failing loss
triggers for Wachovia Loan Trust 2005-SD1, and the principal
payment mechanics described in the transaction documents for CDC
Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE2 as the loss trigger is not failing
in this transaction," the rating agency said.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes M-2 and M-3 from C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust based on missed interest payments during recent remittance
periods and the rating agency's assessment that ultimate interest
repayments are not likely at the previous rating levels. The
lowered ratings were derived by applying S&P's interest shortfall
criteria, which impose a maximum rating threshold on classes that
have incurred missed interest payments resulting from credit or
liquidity erosion. In applying the criteria, S&P looked to see if
the applicable classes received additional compensation beyond the
imputed interest due as direct economic compensation for the delay
in interest payment, which these classes have. Additionally, some
of these classes have delayed reimbursement provisions. As such,
S&P used its projections in determining the likelihood that the
shortfalls would be reimbursed under various scenarios.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/2GHx2kc


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 97 Classes From 24 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 97 classes from 24 U.S.
RMBS transactions issued between 2003 and 2012. The transactions
are backed by prime jumbo, alternative-A, subprime, neg-am,
re-performing, and outside-the-guidelines collateral. The review
yielded 10 upgrades, nine downgrades, 69 affirmations, and nine
withdrawals.

In addition, 35 ratings from 19 of the transactions within this
review were placed under criteria observation (UCO) on Oct. 18,
2019, following the publication of "Methodology To Derive Stressed
Interest Rates In Structured Finance." The rating actions resolve
the UCO placements and each of the ratings reviewed are based on
the application of S&P's updated stressed interest rate assumptions
and incorporate any performance changes since last review.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Some of these considerations may include:

-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends;
-- Historical missed interest payments;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization;
-- Erosion of or increases in credit support; and
-- Tail risk.

RATING ACTIONS

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of the associated
transaction-specific collateral performance and structural
characteristics, and/or the application of specific criteria
applicable to these classes. See the ratings list below for the
specific rationales associated with each of the classes with rating
transitions.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that its projected credit
support and collateral performance on these classes have remained
relatively consistent with its prior projections.

S&P raised two ratings from two transactions by five notches due to
increased credit support, as stated below:

-- Class M-2 from Alternative Loan Trust 2004-J9 to 'BB+ (sf)'
from 'B- (sf)', its credit support increased to 21.82% in December
2019 from 16.51% during S&P's last review, and

-- Class IV-A-1 from Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-3 to 'A+ (sf)'
from 'BBB- (sf)', its credit support increased to 23.71% in
December 2019 from 18.47% during S&P's last review.

The upgrades reflect the classes' ability to withstand a higher
level of projected losses than previously anticipated.

S&P also raised its rating on class I-A-2 from Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE5 to 'A (sf)' from 'B (sf)' due to
expected short duration. Based on the classes' average recent
principal allocation, this class is projected to pay down in a
short period of time relative to projected loss timing, which
limits its exposure to potential losses.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/2O7CgtU


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
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affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
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than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

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