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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, September 15, 2019, Vol. 23, No. 257

                            Headlines

AMERICREDIT AUTO 2019-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
BANK 2019-BNK20: Fitch to Rate on $22MM Class F Certs 'BB-'
BBCMS MORTGAGE 2018-TALL: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Debt
BLACKROCK IX: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class E Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-P8: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches

COLONNADE GLOBAL 2017-1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Tranche K
CWALT INC 2004-22CB: Moody's Hikes Class PO Debt Rating to 'B1'
DENBURY RESOURCES: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Moody's Affirms Cl. A-J Certs at Caa2
GS MORTGAGE 2019-GC42: Fitch to Rate $10MM Cl. G-RR Debt 'B-'

JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C25: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2017-C7: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on F-RR Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Lowers CLass D Certs Rating to Csf
LIMEROCK CLO III: Moody's Lowers $12.5MM Class E Notes to Caa3
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2019-NQM4: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on B-2 Notes

PREFERRED TERM XVI: Moody's Hikes $77MM Class C Notes to Caa2
PREFERRED TERM XXI: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Classes to B2
RIN LTD II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $7MM Class E Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-CH3: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B-4 Certs
SKOPOS AUTO 2019-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class E Notes

TPREF FUNDING II: Fitch Withdraws Dsf Rating on Class B Notes
WELLS FARGO 2019-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class B-4 Notes

                            *********

AMERICREDIT AUTO 2019-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
2019-3 (AMCAR 2019-3 or the Issuer):

-- $158,000,000 of Class A-1 at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $62,730,000 of Class A-2-A at AAA (sf)*
-- $188,210,000 of Class A-2-B at AAA (sf)*
-- $172,610,000 of Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $63,120,000 of Class B at AA (sf)
-- $78,350,000 of Class C at A (sf)
-- $77,040,000 of Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $20,460,000 of Class E at BB (sf)

*The total Class A-2 size is expected to be $250,940,000, split
between Classes A-2-A and Classes A-2-B. The Class A-2-B Notes will
not exceed 75% of the total Class A-2 Notes.

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

-- AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.'s (AmeriCredit)
capabilities with regard to origination, underwriting and servicing
and ownership by General Motors Company (rated BBB (high) with a
Stable trend by DBRS).

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
AmeriCredit's auto loan portfolio.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with AmeriCredit,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance."

The receivables securitized in AMCAR 2019-3 will be subprime auto
loan contracts secured by new and used automobiles, light-duty
trucks and vans.

This transaction is structured as a public transaction offering
four classes of notes: Class A (split into three sequential
tranches — Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3), Class B, Class C and Class
D. The Class E Notes are not publicly offered and will initially be
retained by the Depositor or an affiliate thereof. Initial Class A
credit enhancement of 35.20% will include a reserve account (2.00%
of the initial pool balance; funded at inception and
non-declining), over-collateralization (OC) of 5.75% and
subordination of 27.45% of the initial pool balance. Initial Class
B enhancement of 27.95% will include a 2.00% reserve account, 5.75%
OC and 20.20% subordination. Initial Class C enhancement of 18.95%
will include a 2.00% reserve account, 5.75% OC and 11.20%
subordination. Initial Class D enhancement of 10.10% will include a
2.00% reserve account, 5.75% OC and 2.35% subordination. OC will
build to a target of 14.75% of the pool balance, less the amount on
deposit in the reserve account, based on excess spread available in
the structure and will be subject to a floor of 0.50% of the
initial pool balance.

Notes:
All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK 2019-BNK20: Fitch to Rate on $22MM Class F Certs 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on BANK 2019-BNK20
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates series 2019-BNK20.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $26,600,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,100,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $275,000,000a class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $474,221,000a class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $822,921,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $238,059,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $146,950,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45,555,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45,554,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,024,000bc class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27,921,000c class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,103,000c class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22,043,000c class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11,756,000c class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $33,799,042c class H;

  -- $61,873,792d RR Interest.

(a)The initial certificate balances of classes A-2 and A-3 are
unknown and expected to be approximately $749,221,000 in aggregate,
subject to a 5% variance. The expected class A-2 balance range is
$200,000,000 to $350,000,000, and the expected class A-3 balance
range is $399,221,000 to $549,221,000. Fitch's certificate balances
for classes A-2 and A-3 are assumed at the midpoint of the range
for each class.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(d) Represents the eligible vertical credit risk retention
interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 8, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 72 loans secured by 95
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,237,475,835 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Bank of America, National
Association and National Cooperative Bank, N.A.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 77.3% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 82.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Low Fitch Leverage: Overall, the pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.80x is
better than average when compared to the 2018 and 2019 YTD average
of 1.22x and 1.21x, respectively. The pool's LTV of 91.3% is lower
than the 2018 and 2019 YTD average of 102.0% and 102.0%,
respectively. Excluding the co-op and credit assessed collateral;
the pool has a respective Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.29 and 105.1%,
respectively.

Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans representing 18.3% of the pool are
credit assessed. This is significantly above the 2019 YTD and 2018
values of 14.5% and 13.6%, respectively.

The following four loans received stand-alone credit opinions of
'BBB-sf*': The Park Tower at Transbay loan (9.7% of the pool),
Solstice on The Park loan (3.7% of the pool), Grand Canal Shoppes
loan (3.2% of the pool) and the Residence Inn Seattle loan (1.8% of
the pool).

Above Average Collateral Quality: The pool's collateral quality is
higher than that of recent transactions. As a percentage of
Fitch-inspected properties, 34.2% of Fitch inspected properties
received a grade of 'A-' or better, above the 2019 YTD and 2018
averages of 23.6% and 20.5%, respectively. The following five
properties received property grades of 'A-' or 'A': The Park Tower
at Transbay (9.7% of pool), The Tower at Burbank (8.1% of pool),
Solstice on the Park (3.6% of pool), Grand Canal Shoppes (3.2%) and
Residence Inn Seattle (1.8% of pool). As a percentage of
Fitch-inspected properties, 58.1% received a property quality grade
of 'B+' or higher, which is higher than the respective YTD 2019 and
2018 averages of 51.5% and 48.9%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.2% below
the most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI
was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during
this period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2019-BNK20 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


BBCMS MORTGAGE 2018-TALL: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on six classes of
BBCMS 2018-TALL Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-TALL. Moody's rating action is as
follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the six P&I classes outstanding due to the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
being within acceptable ranges.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
defeasance or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 9, 2019 Determination Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance remains unchanged at $1.325 billion
from securitization. The Certificates are collateralized by a
single loan secured by the borrower's fee simple interest in the
Willis Tower, a 3.8 million SF, Class A office property located in
Chicago, IL. The loan is a two-year (with five one-year extension
options), floating-rate, interest-only, first lien mortgage loan
with a final maturity date in March 2025.

The Willis Tower, formerly known as the Sears Tower, is a
110-story, Class A office building, which in addition to the office
component has retail, a Skydeck observatory, and antenna
components. The property is centrally located in the West Loop
submarket of Chicago CBD and is currently undergoing a major
capital improvement plan that is scheduled to be completed by 2020.
As such, the most recent financial results do not yet reflect the
stabilized performance that has been reflected in Moody's analysis.
Moody's net cash flow considered current office and retail market
conditions, the properties' historical performance, operating
expense ratios and industry outlooks. As of the March 2019 rent
roll, the office component was 86% leased. The property featured a
diverse tenant roster, including the headquarters for United
Airlines Inc. (22% of NRA), Seyfarth Shaw LLP (5% of NRA), and
Schiff Hardin LLP (5% of NRA), among others.

Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio is 108%, and Moody's stressed
DSCR is at 0.80X, the same as at securitization. There are no
cumulative bond loss or interest shortfall as of the current
Determination Date.


BLACKROCK IX: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings of AAA (sf) to the Class
A-1 Notes and BBB (low) (sf) to the Combination Notes to be issued
by BlackRock DLF IX 2019 CLO, LLC (BlackRock IX CLO or the Issuer),
as well as assigned new ratings of AA (sf) to the Class A-2 Notes,
A (sf) to the Class B Notes, BBB (sf) to the Class C Notes, BB (sf)
to the Class D Notes and B (sf) to the Class E Notes issued by
BlackRock IX CLO, pursuant to the Note Purchase and Security
Agreement (NPSA) dated as of August 30, 2019, among the Issuer;
U.S. Bank National Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend
by DBRS) as Collateral Agent, Custodian, Document Custodian,
Collateral Administrator, Information Agent, and Note Agent; and
the Purchasers referred to therein.

The provisional rating on the Class A-1 Notes and new rating on the
Class A-2 Notes address the timely payment of interest (excluding
the additional interest payable at the Post-Default Rate, as
defined in the NPSA referred to above) and the ultimate payment of
principal on or before the Stated Maturity of August 30, 2029. The
ratings on the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes
and the Class E Notes address the ultimate payment of interest
(excluding the additional interest payable at the Post-Default
Rate, as defined in the NPSA referred to above) and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the Stated Maturity of August 30,
2029.

The provisional rating on the Combination Notes addresses the
ultimate repayment of the Combination Note Rated Principal Balance
(which is equal to the Commitment amount for the Combination Notes)
on or before the Stated Maturity of August 30, 2029. The
Combination Notes have no stated Coupon. The Components of the
Combination Notes include portions of the Class A-2 Notes, Class B
Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Subordinated
Notes (or equity) of the Issuer (for more information, see the
Components and Combination Notes section in the related report).

All interest and principal amounts paid on the Secured Notes and
any distributions made to the Subordinated Notes are the only
sources of payment for the Combination Notes. All payments made on
the Component Notes (whether interest, principal or otherwise) to
the Combination Notes shall reduce the Combination Note Rated
Principal Balance. The Combination Notes shall remain outstanding
until the earlier of (a) the payment in full and redemption of each
Component and (b) the Stated Maturity of each Component.

As of the Closing Date, DBRS's ratings on the Class A-1 Notes and
Combination Notes will be provisional. The provisional ratings
reflect the fact that the effectiveness of the Class A-1 Notes and
Combination Notes are subject to certain conditions after the
Closing Date, such as a drawing order. It is expected that the
Combination Notes will be funded in tandem with, and in proportion
to, each Underlying Class but that the Class A-1 Notes and
Combination Notes will not become effective until each of the
Subordinated Notes and other Secured Notes are funded in
reverse-sequential order. The finalization of the provisional
ratings on the Class A-1 Notes and Combination Notes will be
subject to satisfaction of certain conditions, as specified in the
NPSA, including, but not limited to, the remaining unfunded
commitments of the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C
Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes being reduced to
zero. The provisional ratings on the Class A-1 Notes and
Combination Notes may not be finalized if the other Secured Notes
fail to be fully drawn.

The principal methodology used to rate the Secured Notes and
Combination Notes is "Rating CLOs and CDOs of Large Corporate
Credit," which can be found on dbrs.com under Methodologies &
Criteria. The Combination Notes were stressed by applying the BBB
(low) stress scenario under the "Rating CLOs and CDOs of Large
Corporate Credit" methodology to the loans securing the Component
Notes.

The notes will be collateralized primarily by a portfolio of U.S.
middle-market corporate loans. The Issuer will be managed by
BlackRock Capital Investment Advisors, LLC (BCIA), which is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of BlackRock, Inc. DBRS considers BCIA to
be an acceptable collateralized loan obligation (CLO) manager.

The ratings reflect the following:

(1) The NPSA dated as of August 30, 2019;
(2) The integrity of the transaction structure;
(3) DBRS's assessment of the portfolio quality;
(4) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
loss rates under various cash flow stress scenarios; and
(5) DBRS's assessment of the origination, servicing and CLO
management capabilities of BCIA.

To assess portfolio credit quality, DBRS provides a credit estimate
or internal assessment for each non-financial corporate obligor in
the portfolio that is not rated by DBRS. Credit estimates are not
ratings; rather, they represent a model-driven default probability
for each obligor that is used in assigning a rating to a facility.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-P8: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has affirmed 22 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2017-P8 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates (CGCMT
2017-P8).

CGCMT 2017-P8

                         Current Rating      Prior Rating
Class A-1 17326DAA0;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-2 17326DAB8;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-3 17326DAC6;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 17326DAD4;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-AB 17326DAE2;  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 17326DAF9;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 17326DAG7;     LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C 17326DAH5;     LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class D 17326DAM4;     LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class E 17326DAP7;     LT  BB-sf  Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class F 17326DAR3;     LT  B-sf   Affirmed;  previously at B-sf
Class V-2A 17326DBF8;  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class V-2B 17326DBH4;  LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class V-2C 17326DBK7;  LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class V-2D 17326DBM3;  LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class V-3AC 17326DBR2; LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class V-3D 17326DBV3;  LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class X-A 17326DAJ1;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-B 17326DAK8;   LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class X-D 17326DAV4;   LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class X-E 17326DAX0;   LT  BB-sf  Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class X-F 17326DAZ5;   LT  B-sf   Affirmed;  previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations:  The overall pool
performance and loss expectations remain stable from issuance.
There are no delinquent or specially serviced  loans  and overall
performance has been in line with issuance expectations. There are
currently four loans totaling 9.1% of the pool on the servicer
watch list. One of these loans, Low Country Village (1.3%), is
considered a Fitch Loan of Concern, given upcoming lease
expirations from the two largest tenants at the property and
several other month-to-month tenants.

Limited Change to Credit Enhancement:  As of the August 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
0.8% to $1.08 billion, from $1.09 billion at issuance. At issuance,
the pool was scheduled to paydown approximately 8.4%. Nineteen
loans loans totaling 43.4% of pool are full-term interest-only and
17 loans totaling 35.8% of the pool are partial interest-only. No
loans have paid off or defeased since issuance.

Granular Pool: The top 10 and 15 loans account for approximately
43.7% and 58.8% of total pool balances, respectively. This compares
favorably with the 2017 averages of 53.1% and 66.9%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.


COLONNADE GLOBAL 2017-1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Tranche K
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed its provisional ratings on 22
tranches of two unexecuted, unfunded financial guarantees regarding
the Colonnade Global 2017-1 and Colonnade Global 2017-3 portfolios
as follows:

Colonnade Global 2017-1:

-- USD 2,420,563,380 Tranche A at AAA (sf)
-- USD 30,422,535 Tranche B at AA (high) (sf)
-- USD 15,774,648 Tranche C at AA (sf)
-- USD 17,746,479 Tranche D at AA (low) (sf)
-- USD 27,887,324 Tranche E at A (high) (sf)
-- USD 8,169,014 Tranche F at A (sf)
-- USD 22,816,901 Tranche G at A (low) (sf)
-- USD 30,985,915 Tranche H at BBB (high) (sf)
-- USD 9,577,465 Tranche I at BBB (sf)
-- USD 13,521,127 Tranche J at BBB (low) (sf)
-- USD 19,436,620 Tranche K at BB (high) (sf)

Colonnade Global 2017-3:

-- USD 1,364,423,529 Tranche A at AAA (sf)
-- USD 22,070,588 Tranche B at AA (high) (sf)
-- USD 8,564,706 Tranche C at AA (sf)
-- USD 10,211,765 Tranche D at AA (low) (sf)
-- USD 19,764,706 Tranche E at A (high) (sf)
-- USD 5,929,412 Tranche F at A (sf)
-- USD 15,482,353 Tranche G at A (low) (sf)
-- USD 21,411,765 Tranche H at BBB (high) (sf)
-- USD 7,082,353 Tranche I at BBB (sf)
-- USD 9,552,941 Tranche J at BBB (low) (sf)
-- USD 22,564,706 Tranche K at BB (high) (sf)

Each transaction is a synthetic balance-sheet collateralized loan
obligation structured in the form of a financial guarantee (the
Guarantee). The tranches are collateralized by a portfolio of
corporate loans and credit facilities (the Guaranteed Portfolio)
originated by Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays or the Beneficiary). The
rated tranches are unfunded and the senior guarantee remains
unexecuted.

The ratings address the likelihood of a loss under the guarantee on
the respective tranche resulting from borrower defaults at the
legal final maturity dates of 20 September 2025 for Colonnade
Global 2017-1 and 5 December 2025 for Colonnade Global 2017-3.
Borrower default events are limited to failure to pay, bankruptcy
and restructuring events. The ratings assigned by DBRS to each
tranche are expected to remain provisional until the senior
guarantee is executed. The ratings do not address counterparty risk
nor the likelihood of any event of default or termination events
under the agreement occurring.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transactions and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of cumulative defaults, and
compliance with portfolio profile tests under the replenishment
period as of the reporting date of August 2019;

-- Updated default rate, recovery rate and expected loss
assumptions for the reference portfolios; and

-- The currently available credit enhancement (CE) to the rated
tranches and capacity to withstand losses under stressed interest
scenarios.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

The transactions are currently within their three-year
replenishment periods during which time the Beneficiary can add new
reference obligations or increase the notional amount of existing
reference obligations provided that they meet eligibility criteria,
portfolio profile tests and are made according to replenishment
guidelines. The Guaranteed Portfolio of Colonnade Global 2017-1
currently stands at USD 2,684 million, below the maximum Guaranteed
Portfolio notional amount of USD 2,817 million. The Guaranteed
Portfolios of Colonnade Global 2017-3 currently stands at its
maximum guaranteed amounts of USD 1,647 million. For the two
transactions, the Guaranteed Portfolios are non-granular, composed
mainly of revolving credit facilities, bear a floating interest
rate and are mainly unsecured. The facilities in each Guaranteed
Portfolio are mainly drawn in the Protection Currency, which is
U.S. dollars for both transactions. The composition of the
Guaranteed Portfolio in terms of DBRS ratings and DBRS Country
Tiers has remained stable since closing.

As of August 2019, there have not been any borrower defaults and
the portfolio profile tests allowing further replenishment of the
Guaranteed Portfolio have all been met.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

The transactions are subject to interest rate risk as the loans in
the Guaranteed Portfolios bear floating interest rates which could
lead to higher losses under the Guarantee in an upward interest
scenario. In addition, up to 2% of each Guaranteed Portfolio amount
can be drawn in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, British
pound sterling, Japanese yen, Canadian dollar, euro, Swedish krona,
Norwegian krone, Danish krone and Australian dollar (Minority
Currencies). Furthermore, up to 2% of each Guaranteed Portfolio can
be drawn in Japanese yen. To mitigate the interest rate risk,
additional covenants on the spread and the weighted-average payment
frequency of the portfolio are in place.

Based on its "Interest Rate Stresses for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology and incorporating these
covenants, DBRS calculated a stressed interest rate index at each
rating level for the obligations denominated in Eligible
Currencies, Minority Currencies, and Japanese yen. For example, at
the AAA (sf) stress level, for both transactions, the stressed
interest rate index for the obligations denominated in Eligible
Currencies is 6.1%, the stressed interest rate index for the
obligations denominated in Minority Currencies is 30.4% and the
stressed interest rate index for the obligations denominated in
Japanese yen is 4.7%.

DBRS calculated the weighted-average recovery rate at each rating
level based on the worst-case concentrations in terms of DBRS
Country Tier and blend of secured and unsecured obligations
permissible under the portfolio profile tests and adjusted its
assumptions with the projected loss on the guarantee under stressed
interest rate scenarios. For example, at the AAA (sf) stress level,
the recovery rate was reduced to 19.8% from 23.3% for Colonnade
Global 2017-1 and to 21.1% from 24.6% for Colonnade Global 2017-3.

DBRS used its CLO Asset Model to update its expected default rates
for the portfolio at each rating level. To determine the credit
risk of each underlying reference obligation, DBRS relied on either
public ratings or a mapping from Barclays' internal rating models
to DBRS ratings. The mapping was completed in accordance with
DBRS's "Mapping Financial Institution Internal Ratings to DBRS
Ratings for Global Structured Credit Transactions" methodology.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The credit enhancement levels for each of the tranches remains the
same as at closing, given that no loss has been recorded to date.
Currency risk is mitigated in these transactions. Although the
obligations in the Guaranteed Portfolio can be drawn in various
currencies, any negative impact from currency movements is overall
neutralized and therefore movements in the foreign exchange rate
should not have a negative impact on the rated tranches.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CWALT INC 2004-22CB: Moody's Hikes Class PO Debt Rating to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches from
five Countrywide RMBS backed by Alt-A and Subprime loans.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-10

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2018
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2018
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-26

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-22CB

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2016 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-33

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J5

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and improved underlying
collateral pool performance. Bonds that have been upgraded in the
transactions have benefited from failed cumulative loss triggers
that divert principal payments from subordinate bonds to the senior
bonds. The cumulative loss triggers, in addition to higher levels
of prepayment in some transactions, have accelerated the buildup of
credit enhancement for the upgraded senior and mezzanine bonds. The
actions also reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.7% in August 2019 from 3.8% in
August 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, the performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any changes resulting from
servicing transfers, or other policy or regulatory shifts can
impact the performance of these transactions.


DENBURY RESOURCES: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on September 3, 2019, upgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Denbury Resources Incorporated to B from B-.

Denbury Resources is a company engaged in hydrocarbon exploration.
It is organized in Delaware and headquartered in Plano, Texas. The
company extracts petroleum via enhanced oil recovery, which
utilizes carbon dioxide to extract petroleum from fields that have
been previously exploited.



GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Moody's Affirms Cl. A-J Certs at Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on two classes in
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp., 2007-GG9, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-GG9 as follows

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-J was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl. A-J
has already experienced a 5.5% realized loss as a result of
previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 71.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 82.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 12.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings except for the
interest only class was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating the interest only class were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans and the recovery as a paydown of the principal.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 12, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $36.6 million
from $6.58 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans, all of which are in special
servicing and real estate owned (REO).

Seventy-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $771 million.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Verizon Wireless Center
($21.2 million -- 57.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 197,000
SF office property located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Although the
building is fully leased to Verizon through December 2020, the
tenant is in the process of vacating the property. As of July 2019,
a small collection of employees remain in place as part of a
bi-lingual call center for Verizon. The loan transferred to the
special servicer for imminent default in February 2017 and became
REO in May 2018.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 126-130 Main
Street ($9.8 million -- 26.9% of the pool), which is secured by two
mixed-use buildings in downtown New Canaan, Connecticut, located
eight miles north of downtown Stamford. The first building is a
three-story, 17,000 SF Class B office building featuring ground
floor retail, originally built in the 1920's. The second property
is an approximately 1,700 SF, two-story building originally built
in 1850 and later renovated for retail use. The special servicer
indicated a recently signed lease for approximately 6,000 SF would
increase occupancy to 100%, as compared to 70% in January 2019. The
loan transferred to the special servicer for imminent default in
October 2016 and became REO in May 2018. The special servicer
indicated the property failed to sell at a May 2019 auction.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Chapel Ridge
Shopping Center ($5.6 million -- 15.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 61,683 SF power center located in Fort Wayne, Indiana.
The property is shadow anchored by Walmart and Kohl's. The property
is currently 100% vacant following departures of all three tenants,
Marshall's, Office Depot, and Mattress Firm, between November 2016
and January 2017. The loan transferred to the special servicer for
maturity default in January 2017 and became REO in July 2019.


GS MORTGAGE 2019-GC42: Fitch to Rate $10MM Cl. G-RR Debt 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a presale report on GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2019-GC42 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2019-GC42.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $11,528,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $117,422,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $185,000,000a class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $390,209,000a class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,849,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $823,402,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $89,332,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $98,394,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45,313,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44,019,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,482,000c class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50,491,000bcf class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22,009,000cf class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22,010,000cdf class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,357,000cdf class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $40,134,720cdf class H-RR;

  -- $24,700,000ce class VRR Interest.

(a) The initial certificate balances of classes A-3 and A-4 are
unknown and expected to be $575,209,000 in aggregate. The
certificate balances will be determined based on the final pricing
of those classes of certificates. The expected class A-3 balance
range is $100,000,000 to $270,000,000, and the expected class A-4
balance range is $305,209,000 to $475,209,000. Fitch's certificate
balances for classes A-3 and A-4 are assumed at the midpoint of the
range for each class.

(b) Notional amount and interest only.

(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(d) Horizontal credit-risk retention interest.

(e) Vertical credit-risk retention interest.

(f) The initial certificate balance of each of the class E, class
F-RR, class G-RR and class H-RR certificates, and the initial
notional amount of the class X-D certificates is subject to change
based on final pricing of all certificates and the final
determination of the class F-RR, class G-RR and class H-RR
certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 10, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 36 loans secured by 94
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,060,426,720 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities, Citi Real Estate
Funding Inc., and German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 86.0% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 88.6% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage is lower than that of
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.30x is higher than the 2018
and YTD 2019 averages of 1.22x and 1.23x, respectively. The pool's
loan-to-value (LTV) of 101.3% is lower than the 2018 and YTD 2019
averages of 102.0% and 101.4%, respectively. Excluding the credit
assessed collateral, the pool has a respective Fitch DSCR and LTV
of 1.27x and 110.6%.

Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans, representing 19.4% of the pool,
are credit assessed. This is higher than the 2018 and YTD 2019
averages of 13.6% and 14.5%, respectively. One loan, 30 Hudson
Yards (1.9% of the pool), received a stand-alone credit opinion of
'A-sf*'. Four loans, Moffett Towers - Buildings 3 and 4 (6.2% of
the pool), Diamondback Industrial Portfolio 1 (4.7% of the pool),
Woodlands Mall (4.7% of the pool), and Grand Canal Shoppes (1.9% of
the pool), each received stand-alone credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*'.

Minimal Amortization: The pool contains 26 loans that are full
interest-only (81.7% of the pool), five loans that are partial
interest-only (8.8% of the pool), and five loans that are
amortizing balloon loans (9.6% of the pool). Based on the scheduled
balance at maturity, the pool will pay down by just 3.2%, which is
below the 2018 and YTD 2019 averages of 7.2% and 6.0%,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.6% below
the most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI
was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during
this period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the GSMS
2019-GC42 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AA-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C25: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 18 classes of JPMBB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2014-C25.

JPMBB 2014-C25

Class A-2 46643PBB5;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-3 46643PBC3;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4A1 46643PBD1; LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4A2 46643PAA8; LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-5 46643PBE9;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 46643PBJ8;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-SB 46643PBF6;  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 46643PBK5;     LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C 46643PBL3;     LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class D 46643PAN0;     LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class E 46643PAQ3;     LT  BB-sf  Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class EC 46643PBM1;    LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class F 46643PAS9;     LT  B-sf   Affirmed;  previously at B-sf
Class X-A 46643PBG4;   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-B 46643PBH2;   LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class X-D 46643PAE0;   LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class X-E 46643PAG5;   LT  BB-sf  Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class X-F 46643PAJ9;   LT  B-sf   Affirmed;  previously at B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: While the majority of the pool
continues to exhibit stable performance, Fitch Ratings' loss
expectations have increased slightly since issuance, primarily due
to the 12 loans designated as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 19.6%
of pool), which includes four loans in the top 15 (14.8%) and five
specially serviced loans/assets (2.3%). There have been no realized
losses to date.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC, The Mall at Barnes
Crossing and Market Center Tupelo (6.2%), is secured by a
629,757-sf collateral portion of a 732,386-sf regional mall and
strip shopping center located in the tertiary market of Tupelo, MS
that lost its collateral tenant Sears (13.1% of NRA) in February
2019. Collateral occupancy decreased to 83.3% as of the March 2019
rent roll from 96.1% at YE 2018 and 97.4% at YE 2017. Two
collateral anchors, Belk Home & Men's (14.9% of NRA) and JCPenney
(14.4%), have upcoming lease expirations in October 2020 and March
2020, respectively. Tenants occupying less than 10,000 sf reported
increased sales of $398 psf as of TTM June 2019 compared with $367
psf as of TTM August 2018 and $379 psf at issuance.

The second largest FLOC, Hilton Houston Post Oak (4.2%), is secured
by the leasehold interest in a 15-story, 448-key full-service hotel
located in downtown Houston, TX that experienced a performance
decline related to the slumping Houston energy sector and the
softened lodging market in the two years since Hurricane Harvey.
Occupancy, ADR and RevPAR as of TTM June 2019 decreased to 70.3%,
$153 and $107, respectively, compared with 83.5%, $157 and $131 at
issuance. Per the servicer, management is undertaking an aggressive
expense reduction plan.

The two other FLOCs in the top 15 include Mason Devonshire Plaza
(2.3%), a shopping center in Chatsworth, CA with an upcoming lease
expiration of its grocery anchor Smart & Final in November 2019,
and Hershey Square Shopping Center (2.1%), a shopping center in
Hummelstown, PA that lost its anchor tenant Kmart in March 2019.
The non-specially serviced FLOCs outside of the top 15 include a
shopping center in Decatur, IL (0.9%) that experienced a
significant occupancy decline following the loss of several
tenants, a portfolio of two hotels near Corpus Christi, TX (0.8%)
that were heavily damaged from Hurricane Harvey and an office
property located in Baton Rouge, LA (0.8%) that is losing its
largest tenant in December 2019. The five specially serviced
loans/assets (2.3%) include two retail properties (0.9%) with a
cash management issue or vacant anchor space and three
limited-service hotels (1.4% of the pool) with performance decline
and/or flag related issues.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the August 2019 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid down by 12.3%
to $1.039 billion from $1.184 billion at issuance and 9.9% since
Fitch's last rating action. Two loans have paid off since the last
rating action, including the second largest loan, BankNote
Building. Five loans (7.2% of current pool) are fully defeased,
including two loans in the top 15 (5.4%). Five loans (17.4%),
including three loans in the top 15, are full-term interest only,
while 10 loans (26.4%) remain in their partial interest-only
periods. Loan maturities are concentrated in 2024 (96.7%), with
limited maturities scheduled in 2019 (0.6%), 2013 (1.4%) and 2025
(1.3%).

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario that assumed a potential outsized loss of 50%
on the Mall at Barnes Crossing and Market Center Tupelo loan due to
the loss of Sears and possible co-tenancy violations, as well as
the near-term lease rollover concerns of the anchor tenants and
tertiary market. The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes E, F, X-E
and X-F reflect this analysis.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentrations: The largest property type concentration is
office (34.8%), followed by retail (27.5%), multifamily (10.8%) and
hotel (11.7%). Loans backed by retail properties include four loans
(17.6%) in the top 15, two of which are regional malls (13.3%),
including the second largest loan, Grapevine Mills (7.0%), which is
secured by a 1.3 million-sf super regional mall located in
Grapevine, TX sponsored by a joint venture between Simon Property
Group and KanAm USA, and the third largest loan, Mall at Barnes
Crossing and Market Center Tupelo (6.2%), which is sponsored by
Brookfield Property Partners. Loans backed by hotel properties
include three loans (5.6%) secured by Texas properties that have
experienced deteriorating performance caused by the declining
energy sector (4.8%) or significant damage from Hurricane Harvey
(0.8%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes E, F, X-E and X-F reflect
the additional sensitivity scenario on the Mall at Barnes Crossing
and Market Center Tupelo loan and potential rating downgrades due
to concerns with further performance deterioration of the FLOCs.
The Stable Rating Outlooks on all other classes reflect the stable
performance of the majority of the pool and increasing credit
enhancement from continued amortization. Rating upgrades, while
unlikely in the near term, may occur with improved pool
performance, stabilization of the FLOCs and/or additional paydown
or defeasance.


JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2017-C7: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on F-RR Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of JPMDB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2017-C7, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

JPMDB 2017-C7
  
                 Current Rating        Prior Rating
Class A-1   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-2   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-3   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-5   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-SB  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B     LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C     LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class D     LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class E-RR  LT  BB-sf  Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class F-RR  LT  B-sf   Affirmed;  previously at B-sf
Class X-A   LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-B   LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class X-D   LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-s

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Pool performance and loss expectations remain
stable since issuance. There have been no specially serviced loans
since issuance. Fitch designated one loan in the top 15, First
Stamford Place (5% of pool) as a Fitch Loan of Concern due to the
above market in-place rents, upcoming lease rollover concerns and
soft submarket fundamentals. This full-term interest only loan is
secured by an 810,475 square foot office building located in
Stamford, CT. The servicer-reported net operating income declined
21.9% between 2017 and 2018. According to the March 2019 rent roll,
upcoming near-term lease rollover includes 5.4% of the NRA in 2019,
11.5% in 2020 and 11.9% in 2021. Per Reis and as of second quarter
2019, the Stamford office submarket reported a vacancy of 26%.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement:  As of the August 2019
remittance, the pool has been paid down by 0.8% to $1.096 billion
from $1.105 billion at issuance. No loans have paid off since
issuance. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is
expected to be reduced by 7.5%. Sixteen loans (50% of pool) are
full-term, interest only and 10 loans (26.3%) are partial-term,
interest-only, one of which (1.1%) has begun to amortize.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Investment Grade Credit Opinions: Three loans in the top 15 (13.4%
of pool) received stand-alone, investment-grade credit opinions at
issuance: Moffett Place Building 4 (6.4%) received a credit opinion
of 'BBB-sf'; General Motors Building (4.1%) received a credit
opinion of 'AAAsf'; and 245 Park Avenue (2.9%) received a credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Lowers CLass D Certs Rating to Csf
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 17 classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2006-C1.

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1

Class B      LT Bsf   Affirmed;   previously at Bsf
Class C      LT CCsf  Downgrade;  previously at CCCsf
Class D      LT Csf   Downgrade;  previously at CCsf
Class E      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class F      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class G      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class H      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-3  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-4  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-5  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-6  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-7  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-8  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class IUU-9  LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class J      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class K      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class L      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class M      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf
Class N      LT Dsf   Affirmed;   previously at Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations: The downgrades to classes C and D are due
to Fitch's increased certainty of losses. Loss expectations remain
high due to the largest remaining asset, Triangle Town Center
(94.2%), which became REO in July 2019. Triangle Town Center is a
regional mall in the Raleigh metro. Non-collateral anchors include
Sears, Macy's, Dillard's, Belk, and Saks Fifth Avenue. As of YE
2018, the property was 96% occupied and performing at a 1.54x IO
DSCR. Upcoming tenant rollover consists of 19.9% of NRA prior to YE
2020. The most recent sales report was from August 2017 when the
property reported in-line sales of $467 psf.

The loan first transferred to special servicing in September 2015
for imminent maturity default. The lender and borrower agreed to a
modification that included extending the loan term, adjusting the
interest rate, switching to interest-only payments, releasing the
Triangle Town Place parcel and using the proceeds from this sale
($29 million) to pay down the trust debt, and an assumption where
DRA Advisors assumed 90% of the ownership interest, leaving CBL
with a 10% stake and the management of the property. The loan
transferred back to special servicing in August 2018 when the
borrower indicated that they were unable to repay the loan prior to
the December 2018 maturity date. The asset became REO in July 2019,
and the servicer is in the process of developing a business plan.
Fitch modeled a 75% loss in its base case for this loan.

Stable Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has remained largely
unchanged since Fitch's prior rating action. The pool has only
received approximately $316,000 in principal repayment since
Fitch's prior rating action, and due to the majority of the pool
(97% of the remaining pool balance) being in special servicing, the
pool will continue to receive minimal amortization.

As of the August 2019 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.8% to $79.2 million from
$2.5 billion at issuance. The pool has $204.1 million in realized
losses and interest shortfalls are currently impacting classes E
through T.

Alternative Loss Considerations: The pool is highly concentrated
with only four of the original 149 loans remaining. Due to the
concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity
analysis that grouped the remaining loans based on loan structural
features, collateral quality, and performance and ranked them by
their perceived likelihood of repayment. The ratings reflect the
sensitivity analysis.

Payoff Timing Uncertain: Loans and assets accounting for 97% of the
remaining pool balance are in special servicing and resolution
timing is uncertain. Park City Shopping Center (3%), the only
performing loan in the pool, is the only loan contributing monthly
principal resulting in minimal amortization. All remaining classes
are dependent on the disposition of Triangle Town Center (94.2%)
for principal repayment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on Class B remains Stable as recoveries from the
remaining assets should repay the class. Downgrades are possible if
recoveries from Triangle Town Center and the two other REO assets
are lower than expected. Upgrades are unlikely, but possible, with
better than expected recoveries on the Triangle Town Center loan.


LIMEROCK CLO III: Moody's Lowers $12.5MM Class E Notes to Caa3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Limerock CLO III, Ltd. as follows:

  US$55,500,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate
  Notes due October 20, 2026, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
  previously on April 9, 2018 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

  US$25,000,000 Class B-R Deferrable Mezzanine Secured
  Floating Rate Notes due October 20, 2026, Upgraded to
  Aa2 (sf); previously on April 9, 2018 Affirmed A1 (sf)

MOODY'S ALSO DOWNGRADED THE RATING ON THE FOLLOWING NOTES:

  US$12,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes due October 20, 2026, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
  previously on April 9, 2018 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Limerock CLO III, Ltd., issued in November 2014 and partially
refinanced in February 2017 is a managed cashflow CLO. The notes
are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2018. The Class
A-1R notes have been paid down by approximately 19.3% or $60.7
million since August 2018. Based on the trustee's August 2019
report, the OC ratios for the Senior Par Coverage Test, the Class
B, Class C, and Class D notes are reported at 134.87%, 124.80%,
113.60% and 104.64%, respectively, versus August 2018 levels of
131.57%, 123.26%, 113.76% and 105.97%, respectively.

The downgrade rating action on the Class E notes reflects the
specific risks to the junior notes posed by par loss and credit
deterioration observed in the underlying CLO portfolio. Based on
the trustee's August 2019 report, the interest reinvestment test
ratio, a proxy for Class E coverage, is reported at 101.47% versus
the August 2018 level of 103.17%.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $415.3 million, defaulted par of $6.6
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.32% (implying
a WARF of 2739), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.22%, a diversity score of 76 and a weighted average spread of
3.17%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2019-NQM4: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on B-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2019-NQM4 (the Notes) to be issued by New Residential
Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-NQM4 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- $276.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $36.0 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $14.5 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $13.3 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $7.0 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Notes reflects the 27.35% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 20.50%,
11.05%, 7.25%, 3.75% and 1.90% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, prime, expanded prime and non-prime first-lien
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Notes. The
Notes are backed by 734 loans with a total principal balance of
$380,598,970 as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1, 2019).

All the loans were originated by NewRez LLC (NewRez) or by a
correspondent and underwritten by NewRez. Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing is the Servicer. The mortgages were originated under the
following programs:

(1) SmartSelf and SmartSelf Plus (51.2%) — Generally made to
self-employed borrowers using bank statements to support
self-employed income for qualification purposes.

(2) SmartEdge and SmartEdge Plus (36.8%) — Generally made to
borrowers seeking flexible financing options (interest-only (IO)
loans or higher debt-to-income ratios (DTIs)) who may have a hard
recent credit event (two or more years seasoned) that may preclude
prequalification for another program.

(3) SmartVest (8.7%) — Generally made to borrowers who are
experienced real estate investors looking to purchase or refinance
an investment property that is held for business purposes.

(4) Smart Funds (1.3%) — Generally made to prime borrowers with
significant assets who can purchase the property with their assets
but choose to use a financing instrument for cash flow purposes.

(5) Portfolio Express ReFi (0.7%) — Generally made to existing
borrowers seeking flexible-rate and term refinancing options who do
not meet agency guidelines.

(6) Portfolio Debt Consolidation (0.5%) — Generally made to
existing borrowers seeking flexible refinance options to help
consolidate debt who do not meet agency guidelines.

(7) SmartCondo (0.5%) — Generally made to prime borrowers seeking
flexible financing options for condominium properties who do not
meet agency guidelines.

(8) SmartTrac (0.2%) — Generally made to borrowers seeking
flexible financing options (IO loans or higher DTIs) that may have
had a recent credit event (one to two or more years seasoned) that
may preclude prequalification for another program.

(9) High-Balance Extra (0.1%) — Generally made to prime borrowers
with loan amounts exceeding the government-sponsored-enterprise
loan limits that may fall outside the Qualified Mortgage (QM)
requirements based on documentation and DTI.

New Residential Investment Corp. is the Sponsor of the transaction.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the Master Servicer. Citibank,
N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as the
Paying Agent, Note Registrar, and Owner Trustee. U.S. Bank National
Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS) will
serve as Indenture Trustee. Citicorp Trust Delaware, National
Association will serve as the Delaware Trustee. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) will serve as
Custodian.

Although the applicable mortgage loans were originated to satisfy
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Ability-to-Repay
(ATR) rules, they were made to borrowers who generally do not
qualify for an agency, government or private-label non-agency prime
jumbo products for various reasons. In accordance with the CFPB
QM/ATR rules, 75.5% of the loans are designated as non-QM.
Approximately 24.5% of the loans are made to investors for business
purposes and, hence, are not subject to the QM/ATR rules.

The Servicer will fund advances of delinquent principal and
interest on any mortgage until such loan becomes 180 days
delinquent. The Servicer is also obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes, insurance premiums and reasonable costs incurred
in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

Through a majority-owned affiliate, the Sponsor intends to retain
at least 5% of each class of notes issued by the Issuer (other than
the Class R Notes) to satisfy the credit risk retention
requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

The Seller will have the option, but not the obligation, to
repurchase any mortgage loan that becomes 60 or more days
delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association method or any
real estate–owned property acquired in respect of a mortgage loan
at a price equal to the stated principal balance of such loan,
provided that such repurchases in aggregate do not exceed 10% of
the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date (Optional
Repurchase Price).

On or after the earlier of (1) the Payment Date occurring in
September 2022 or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Depositor has the option to purchase all of the
outstanding mortgage loans, thereby retiring the Notes, at a price
equal to the outstanding aggregate stated principal balance of the
mortgage loans plus accrued and unpaid interest.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro-rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes as the outstanding senior Notes are paid in full.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


PREFERRED TERM XVI: Moody's Hikes $77MM Class C Notes to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.:

US$327,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due March 23,
2035 (current balance of $137,481,866), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on March 28, 2017 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$69,900,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due March 23,
2035, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 28, 2017 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes due March
23, 2035, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 28, 2017
Affirmed A1 (sf)

US$63,650,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes due March 23,
2035 (current balance of $61,795,169), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
previously on March 28, 2017 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$77,650,000 Floating Rate Class C Mezzanine Notes due March 23,
2035 (current balance of $76,042,622), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
previously on March 28, 2017 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by a portfolio of bank
and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since September 2018.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 5.1% or $7.4
million since September 2018, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1, Class A, Class B and Class C notes have improved to
264.6%, 165.8%, 129.4%, and 101.8 respectively, from September 2018
levels of 237.3%, 151.9%, 119.3% and 93.2%, respectively. Since
September 2018, three assets with a total par of $6.5 million have
redeemed at par. Additionally, the Class C deferred interest
balance has been repaid in full since September 2018. The Class
A-1, Class B, and Class C notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest so long as the Class C OC test is
failing (current level of 101.85% versus trigger of 107.00%), and
the Class A-1 notes will benefit from the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has
deteriorated. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) increased to 1150, from 912 in September
2018.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par of $363.8 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $86.6 million, a weighted average
default probability of 11.5% (implying a WARF of 1150), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in March 2019.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
assessments. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


PREFERRED TERM XXI: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Classes to B2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXI, Ltd:

US$413,500,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $221,716,801.98), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on May 11, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$105,300,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $98,070,648.50), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on May 11, 2015 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

US$46,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $42,841,878.75), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
previously on May 11, 2015 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$35,800,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
2038 (current balance of $33,342,157.83), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
previously on May 11, 2015 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$48,500,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $45,769,713.77), Upgraded to B2 (sf);
previously on May 11, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

US$28,350,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
2038 (current balance of $26,754,049.20), Upgraded to B2 (sf);
previously on May 11, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXI, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank,
insurance, and REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since September 2018.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 2.7% or $6.2
million since September 2018, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class B, and Class C notes have improved
to 227.2%, 157.5%, 127.2%, and 107.5%, respectively, from September
2018 levels of 216.4%, 151.1%, 122.5%, and 103.7%, respectively.
The credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since September 2018. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) declined to 1292, from 1185 in
September 2018.

Moody's rating actions took into account a stress scenario for
highly levered bank holding company issuers. The transaction's
portfolio includes TruPS issued by a number of bank holding
companies with significant amounts of other debt on their balance
sheet which may increase the risk presented by their subsidiaries.
To address the risk from higher debt burden at the bank holding
companies, Moody's conducted a stress scenario in which Moody's
made adjustments to the RiskCalc credit scores for these highly
leveraged holding companies. This stress scenario was an important
consideration in the rating actions.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par of $497.6 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $88.8 million, a weighted average
default probability of 13.5% (implying a WARF of 1292), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in March 2019.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
assessments. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


RIN LTD II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $7MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of notes issued by RIN II Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$256,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$41,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2030 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Mezzanine Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

U.S$.28,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Mezzanine Notes
due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$7,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Mezzanine Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CDO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

RIN II is a managed cash flow project finance CDO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured project finance and corporate infrastructure loans.
At least 95% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans
and eligible investments, and up to 5% of the portfolio may consist
of second lien loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as
of the closing date.

RREEF America L.L.C., a subsidiary of DWS Group GmbH & Co. KGaA,
(the "Portfolio Advisor") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's four year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Portfolio Advisor is not permitted to purchase additional assets,
and unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from the sale of
assets will be used to amortized the Rated Notes in sequential
order. In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class
of preferred shares.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes also took into account the
concentrated nature of the portfolio. The CDO's indenture allows
for a portfolio that is highly concentrated by sector and
individual asset size. Up to 45% of the portfolio's assets may be
in the Electricity (Thermal) Contracted or Merchant sectors. The
four largest sub-sectors could constitute up to 55% of the
portfolio, with the largest sub-sector potentially being up to 25%
of the portfolio. Additionally, the portfolio may only have 36
obligors with the largest obligor potentially comprising up to
4.75% of the portfolio. Credit deterioration in a single sector or
in a few obligors could have an outsized negative impact on the CDO
portfolio's overall credit quality. In its analysis, Moody's
considered several stress scenarios assuming higher asset
correlation.

Moody's modeled the transaction by applying the Monte Carlo
simulation framework in Moody's CDOROM, as described in Section 2.4
of the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Debt Obligations
Backed by Project Finance and Infrastructure Assets" rating
methodology published in July 2019 and by using a cash flow model
which estimates expected loss on a CDO's tranche, as described in
Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
March 2019.

In its analysis, Moody's assumed a 1.5 year lag on recoveries for
defaulted securities. To account for the recovery lag, Moody's also
conducted additional analysis in which the certainty equivalent
recovery rate for each tranche was determined using the base case
portfolio and the recovery rate was then applied with the default
distribution in the cash flow model. This scenario was an
importation consideration in the assigned ratings.

Moody's also applied a default probability stress on the WARF
covenant listed below for the project finance pool in accordance
with Footnote 13 in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Debt
Obligations Backed by Project Finance and Infrastructure Assets".
For project finance loans with a WARR of 75%, the default
probability stress is 120% and for project finance loans with a
WARR of 65%, the default probability stress is approximately 57.1%.
The overall WARF after DP stress of the project finance pool is
2733.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Project Finance Loan Par Amount: $200,000,000

Corporate Infrastructure Loan Par Amount: $200,000,000

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) of Project Finance Loans:
2107

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) of Corporate Infrastructure
Loans: 2407

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.62%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR) of Project Finance Loans:
63.6%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR) of Corporate Infrastructure
Loans: 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7 years

Second Lien Loans: 5.0%

Total Obligors: 36

Largest Obligor: 4.75%

Largest 5 Obligors: 23.0%

B2 Default Probability Rating Obligations: 17.5%

B3 Default Probability Rating Obligations: 10.0%

PF Infrastructure Obligors: 50.0%

Corporate Power Infrastructure Obligors: 20.0%

Power Infrastructure Obligors: 50.0%

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors were part of the rating committee
consideration. Moody's considers the structural protections in the
transaction, the risk of an event of default, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transaction, influenced the rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Debt Obligations Backed by Project Finance
and Infrastructure Assets" published in July 2019 and "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Portfolio Advisor's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Rated Notes.

Moody's obtained a loss distribution for this CDO's portfolio by
simulating defaults using Moody's CDOROM, which used Moody's
assumptions for asset correlations and fixed recoveries in a Monte
Carlo simulation framework. Moody's then used the resulting loss
distribution, together with structural features of the CDO, as an
input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-CH3: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B-4 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Sequoia
Mortgage Trust 2019-CH3, except for the interest-only classes. The
certificates are backed by one pool of prime quality, first-lien
mortgage loans.

SEMT 2019-CH3 is the ninth securitization that includes loans
acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation, a
subsidiary of Redwood Trust, Inc., under its expanded credit prime
loan program called "Redwood Choice". Redwood's Choice program is a
prime program with credit parameters outside of Redwood's
traditional prime jumbo program, "Redwood Select". The Choice
program expands the low end of Redwood's FICO range to 661 from
700, while increasing the high end of eligible loan-to-value ratios
from 85% to 90%. The pool also includes loans with non-QM
characteristics (32.2%), such as debt-to-income ratios greater than
43%. Non-QM loans were acquired by Redwood under each of the Select
and Choice programs.

The assets of the trust consist of fixed-rate fully amortizing
loans and three interest only loans. The mortgage loans have an
original term to maturity of 30 years except for two loans which
have an original term to maturity of 29 years and one loan which
has an original term to maturity of 20 years. The loans were
sourced from multiple originators and acquired by Redwood.

All of the loans conform to the Seller's guidelines, except for
loans originated by TIAA, FSB ("TIAA"; FKA EverBank) under reliance
letter. All TIAA loans were underwritten to TIAA's underwriting
guidelines.

The transaction benefits from nearly 100% due diligence of data
integrity, credit, property valuation, and compliance conducted by
an independent third-party firm.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the master servicer of the
loans in this transaction. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
("Shellpoint"), TIAA, FSB, and HomeStreet Bank will be primary
servicers on the deal.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2019-CH3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2B, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.90%
in a base scenario and reaches 9.10% at a stress level consistent
with Aaa (sf) ratings. Its loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to its Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to origination quality and the third party
review results. The model combines loan-level characteristics with
economic drivers to determine the probability of default for each
loan, and hence for the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also
calculated on a loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then
adjusted for borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2019-CH3 transaction is a securitization of 472 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $360,458,793. There are 107 originators in this pool.
The largest originator by balance is Fairway Independent Mortgage
Corporation (8.61%). The remaining originators contributed less
than 5% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. There
are three servicers in this pool: Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(96.2%), HomeStreet Bank (2.4%), and TIAA, FSB (1.4%). The
loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed
credit underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators.

SEMT 2019-CH3 includes loans acquired by Redwood under its Choice
program. Although the borrowers in SEMT 2019-CH3 are not the super
prime borrowers included in traditional SEMT transactions from a
FICO and LTV perspective, these borrowers are prime borrowers with
a demonstrated ability to manage household finance. On average,
borrowers in this pool have made a 22.2% down payment on a mortgage
loan of $763,684. In addition, 60.6% of borrowers have more than 24
months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to pay the mortgage
for two years should there be an interruption to the borrower's
cash flow. The WA FICO is 749, which is lower than traditional SEMT
transactions, which has averaged 771 in 2018 SEMT transactions. The
lower WA FICO for SEMT 2019-CH3 may reflect recent mortgage lates
(0x30x3, 1x30x12, 2x30x24) which are allowed under the Choice
program, but not under Redwood's traditional product, Redwood
Select (0x30x24). While the WA FICO may be lower for this
transaction compared to previous transactions, Moody's believes
that the limited mortgage lates are less likely to demonstrate a
history of financial mismanagement.

Moody's also notes that SEMT 2019-CH3 is the ninth SEMT Choice
transaction to include a comparable number of non-QM loans (142)
compared to SEMT 2019-CH2 (140), SEMT 2019-CH1 (151), SEMT 2018-CH3
(155), SEMT 2018-CH2 (156) and SEMT 2018-CH1 (157) with the
exception of SEMT 2018-CH4 (148).

Redwood's Choice program was launched by Redwood in April 2016. In
contrast to Redwood's traditional program, Select, Redwood's Choice
program allows for higher LTVs, lower FICOs, non-occupant
co-borrowers, non-warrantable condos, limited loans with adverse
credit events, among other loan attributes. Under both Select and
Choice, Redwood also allows for loans with non-QM features, such as
interest-only, DTIs greater than 43%, asset depletion, among other
loan attributes.

However, Moody's notes that Redwood historically has been on
average stronger than its peers as an aggregator of prime jumbo
loans, including a limited number of non-QM loans in previous SEMT
transactions. As of the June 2019 remittance report, there have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's has
rated recently, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
While in traditional SEMT transactions, Moody's has factored this
qualitative strength into its analysis, in SEMT 2019-CH3, Moody's
has a neutral assessment of the Choice Program until Moody's is
able to review a longer performance history of Choice mortgage
loans.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans. The balance of the SAML will be removed from the principal
and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's views the
SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity of senior
and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in certain
scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this transaction, can
lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain tranches even
when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration its expected losses
on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered. As
such, Moody's incorporated some additional sensitivity runs in its
cashflow analysis in which Moody's increases the tranche losses due
to potential interest shortfalls during the loan's liquidation
period in order to reflect this feature and to assess the potential
impact to the bonds.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2019-CH3 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments owing to
potential future lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the
loans are prime quality and were originated under a regulatory
environment that requires tighter controls for originations than
pre-crisis, which reduces the likelihood that the loans have
defects that could form the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood (or
a majority-owned affiliate of the sponsor), who will retain credit
risk in accordance with the U.S. Risk Retention Rules and provides
a back-stop to the representations and warranties of all the
originators, has a strong alignment of interest with investors, and
is incentivized to actively manage the pool to optimize
performance. Third, the transaction has reasonably well defined
processes in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing
basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer must
review loans for breaches of representations and warranties when a
loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which reduces the likelihood that
parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Senior Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.90% of the closing pool balance,
which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 459 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 13 PrimeLending
loans. For the 13 loans, Redwood Trust elected to conduct a limited
review, which did not include a TPR firm check for TRID
compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

Two loans were graded "C" by the third party review firm for issues
relating to closing disclosure. Moody's considers such exceptions
to be minor and as such did not adjust its losses due to those
exceptions. No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the 13
PrimeLending limited review loans. Therefore, there is a
possibility that some of these loans could have unresolved TRID
issues. Moody's reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans
for the PrimeLending loans where a full review was conducted. The
due diligence report did not indicate any significant credit,
valuation or compliance concerns. As a result, Moody's did not
increase its Aaa loss.

The property valuation review conducted by the TPR firm consisted
of (i) a review of all of the appraisals for full review loans,
checking for issues with the comparables selected in the appraisal
and (ii) a value supported analysis for all loans. After a review
of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's found the exceptions to be
minor in nature and did not pose a material increase in the risk of
loan loss. Moody's notes that there is one loan with final grade
'D' due to escrow holdback distribution amounts. The review for
this loans was incomplete because the related appraisals was
subject to the completion of renovation work or missing evidence of
disbursement of escrow funds. In the event the escrow funds greater
than 10% have not been disbursed within six months of the closing
date, the seller shall repurchase the affected escrow holdback
mortgage loan, on or before the date that is six months after the
closing date at the applicable repurchase price. Given that the
seller has the obligation to repurchase, Moody's did not make an
adjustment for these loans.

Original property values were verified predominantly using CDA
valuation or CU scores. CU scores were used to verify property
values for two GSE eligible loans and 17 non-conforming loans.
Moody's considers the use of CU scores for non-conforming loans to
be credit negative due to (1) the lack of human intervention which
increases the likelihood of missing emerging risk trends, (2) the
limited track record of the software and limited transparency into
the model and (3) GSE focus on non-jumbo loans which may lower
reliability on jumbo loan appraisals. Moody's increased its loss
levels based on the pre-securitization third party, for all
non-conforming loans that had valuation verification using only CU
scores.

Moody's has received the results of the inspection report or
appraisal confirmation for all the mortgage loans secured by
properties in the areas affected by FEMA disaster areas. The
results indicate that the properties did not receive any material
damage. SEMT 2019-CH3 includes a representation that the pool does
not include properties with material damage that would adversely
affect the value of the mortgaged property.

The originators and Redwood have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) and the custodian functions will be
performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In
addition, Nationstar Mortgage LLC, as Master Servicer, is
responsible for servicer oversight, and termination of servicers
and for the appointment of successor servicers. In addition,
Nationstar Mortgage LLC is committed to act as successor if no
other successor servicer can be found.

Servicing arrangement

There are three servicers in this pool: Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (96.2%), HomeStreet Bank (2.4%), and TIAA, FSB (1.4%).

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate given the strong servicing arrangement of the
servicers, as well as the presence of a strong master servicer to
oversee the servicers. In this transaction, Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar) will act as the master servicer. The servicers are
required to advance principal and interest on the mortgage loans.
To the extent that the servicers are unable to do so, the master
servicer will be obligated to make such advances. In the event that
the master servicer, Nationstar (rated B2), is unable to make such
advances, the securities administrator, Citibank (rated Aa3) will
be obligated to do so.

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (servicer): Shellpoint has
demonstrated adequate servicing ability as a primary servicer of
prime residential mortgage loans. Shellpoint has the necessary
processes, staff, technology and overall infrastructure in place to
effectively service the transaction.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC (master servicer): Nationstar is the master
servicer for the transaction and provides oversight of the
servicers. Moody's considers Nationstar's master servicing
operation to be above average compared to its peers. Nationstar has
strong reporting and remittance procedures and strong compliance
and monitoring capabilities. The company's senior management team
has on average more than 20 years of industry experience, which
provides a solid base of knowledge and leadership. Nationstar's
oversight encompasses loan administration, default administration,
compliance, and cash management. Nationstar is an indirectly held,
wholly owned subsidiary of Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in November 2018.


SKOPOS AUTO 2019-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Skopos Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1 (SKOP
2019-1 or the Issuer):

-- $73,190,000 Class A Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $19,010,000 Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- $25,030,000 Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $16,480,000 Class D Notes rated BB (sf)
-- $11,090,000 Class E Notes rated B (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

(1) Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form, and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of over-collateralization
(OC), subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption under
various stress scenarios.

(2) The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the rating addresses the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the final scheduled distribution date.

(3) The capabilities of Skopos Financial, LLC (Skopos) with regard
to origination, underwriting, and servicing.

(4) DBRS has performed an operational review of Skopos and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator of subprime
automobile loan contracts and an acceptable servicer of subprime
automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup servicer.

-- The Skopos senior management team has considerable experience
and a successful track record within the subprime auto finance
industry.

-- Skopos outsources certain operational functions to CSC Logic,
Inc (CSC). DBRS has performed an operational review of CSC and
considers the entity to be an acceptable provider of
servicing-related processes for subprime automobile loan
contracts.

(5) The credit quality of the collateral and the performance of
Skopos' auto loan portfolio.

-- Availability of sufficient historical performance data on the
Skopos portfolio.

-- The statistical pool characteristics.

-- The pool is seasoned by approximately 14 months and contains
Skopos originations from Q1 2013 through Q4 2019.

-- The weighted-average (WA) remaining term of the collateral pool
is approximately 57 months.

-- The WA FICO score of the pool is 545.

(6) Systems and Services Technologies, Inc. (SST) will act as the
backup servicer for the transaction.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of SST and considers
the entity to be an acceptable backup servicer of subprime
automobile loan contracts.

(7) The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Skopos, that the trust has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets and the consistency
with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."

The Skopos 2019-1 transaction represents the third securitization
completed by Skopos and will offer both senior and subordinate
rated securities. The receivables securitized in Skopos 2019-1 will
be subprime automobile loan contracts secured by new and used
automobiles, light-duty trucks, minivans, and sport-utility
vehicles.

The initial credit enhancement for the Class A Notes will be 54.80%
and will include a 1.00% reserve account of the aggregate
outstanding principal balance (i.e., sum of the initial pool
balance and the balance of the expected prefunded collateral, which
is funded at inception and non-declining); 8.60% OC of the
aggregate outstanding principal balance; and subordination of
45.20% of the aggregate outstanding principal balance. Initial
Class B enhancement of 42.80% includes the 1.00% reserve account,
8.60% OC and 33.20% subordination. Initial Class C enhancement of
27.00% includes the 1.00% reserve account, 8.60% OC and
subordination of 17.40%. Initial Class D enhancement of 16.60%
includes the 1.00% reserve account, 8.60% OC and subordination of
7.00%. Initial Class E enhancement of 9.60% includes the 1.00%
reserve account and 8.60% OC.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TPREF FUNDING II: Fitch Withdraws Dsf Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed and subsequently withdrawn the 'Dsf' rating
on the class B notes of TPref Funding II, Ltd./Corp., a
collateralized debt obligation backed by trust preferred securities
issued by banks. Fitch has withdrawn the rating due to the default
of the rated entity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

While the class B notes received current and deferred interest on
the most recent payment date, Fitch expects the notes will
experience a shortfall on the next payment date, absent collateral
redemptions. As the performing portfolio becomes increasingly
concentrated, the interest proceeds generated from the remaining
assets continue to decrease. With an out-of-the-money swap
outstanding, interest proceeds are unlikely to be sufficient to
cover the periodic interest due on the class and would be reliant
on principal proceeds to prevent a default in the payment interest
on the notes. Accordingly, Fitch affirmed the class B notes at
'Dsf'.

In March 2019, Fitch downgraded the class B notes to 'Dsf' from
'Csf' following the failure of the timely class to receive the
entire amount of interest due related to the February 2019 payment
period. Over the last few years, the payment of the class B
interest has frequently relied on funds from the reserve account,
proceeds from prepayments and/or cured interest. On the February
2019 payment date, the funds in the reserve account were exhausted,
and no new redemptions or cures took place, resulting in the
interest shortfall. The non-payment continued for five days, which
triggered an event of default, and in April 2019 Fitch received a
notice of acceleration.

On the May 2019 payment date, the class A-2 notes were paid in full
due to the CDO receiving principal proceeds from one redemption
totalling $25 million. The proceeds were distributed pursuant to
section 5.8 of the indenture as follows: administrative expenses;
amounts due to the hedge counterparty; class A-2 notes periodic
interest; class A-2 notes principal until paid in full; class B
notes periodic interest including any previously accrued and unpaid
interest. There were insufficient proceeds to pay the full amount
of class B interest.

In August 2019 a $2.9 million redemption occurred, which allowed
the class B notes to receive their periodic timely interest and all
unpaid interest due from the prior two payment dates. The remaining
proceeds were used to pay down the outstanding note balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivities do not apply as the ratings have been
withdrawn.


WELLS FARGO 2019-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class B-4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-3 (the Certificates) to be
issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2019-3 Trust as
follows:

-- $466.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $466.5 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.9 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.9 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $116.6 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $116.6 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $279.9 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $279.9 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $186.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $186.6 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.0 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.0 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $75.8 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $75.8 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.8 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.8 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.0 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.0 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $521.4 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $521.4 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $521.4 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $466.5 million Class A-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.9 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $116.6 million Class A-IO4 at AAA (sf)
-- $279.9 million Class A-IO5 at AAA (sf)
-- $186.6 million Class A-IO6 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.0 million Class A-IO7 at AAA (sf)
-- $75.8 million Class A-IO8 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.8 million Class A-IO9 at AAA (sf)
-- $55.0 million Class A-IO10 at AAA (sf)
-- $521.4 million Class A-IO11 at AAA (sf)
-- $11.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $1.6 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO6, A-IO7, A-IO8,
A-IO9, A-IO10 and A-IO11 are interest-only certificates. The class
balance represents a notional amount.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-13,
A-15, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO6 and A-IO11 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a
combination of initial exchangeable certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11,
A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15 and A-16 are super-senior certificates.
These classes benefit from additional protection from senior
support certificates (Classes A-17 and A-18) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 5.00% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect
3.00%, 1.70%, 0.90% and 0.60% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 759 loans with a total principal balance of $548,882,258
as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1, 2019).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years and a
weighted-average loan age of six months. All of the mortgage loans
were originated by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) or were
acquired by Wells Fargo from its qualified correspondents. In
addition, Wells Fargo is the Servicer of the mortgage loans, as
well as the Mortgage Loan Seller and Sponsor of the transaction.
Wells Fargo will also act as the Master Servicer, Securities
Administrator and Custodian. DBRS rates both Wells Fargo's
Long-Term Issuer Rating and Long-Term Senior Debt rating at AA with
Stable trends and rates it is Short-Term Instruments rating at R-1
(high) with a Stable trend.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will serve as Trustee. Opus
Capital Markets Consultants, LLC will act as the Representation and
warranty (R&W) Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets with clean payment histories,
well-qualified borrowers, a highly rated R&W provider, and
satisfactory third-party due diligence.

Although Wells Fargo had been a prolific residential
mortgage-backed securities issuer pre-crisis, the company recently
re-entered the securitization market with its first prime jumbo
transaction in October 2018 after an extensive hiatus. As a result,
Wells Fargo has limited publicly available performance history on
securitized loans. Mitigating factors include robust performance on
Wells Fargo's non-agency originations since 2011, satisfactory
operational risk assessments and a comprehensive due diligence
review.

In addition, this transaction has an R&W framework that contains
certain weaknesses, including knowledge qualifiers and sunset
provisions that allow for certain R&Ws to expire within three to
six years after the Closing Date. The framework is perceived by
DBRS to be limiting compared with traditional lifetime R&W
standards in certain DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the
perceived weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator score in this
pool. A lower originator score results in increased default and
loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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