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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, August 4, 2019, Vol. 23, No. 215

                            Headlines

A10 BRIDGE 2019-B: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Certs
AJAX MORTGAGE 2019-D: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Notes
AMUR EQUIPMENT 2019-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
ANCHORAGE CREDIT 1: Moody's Rates $26MM Class C-R Notes Ba3
BICENTENNIAL TRUST 2017-1: Moody's Ups Class G Certs Rating to Ba2

BLADE ENGINE 2006-1: Fitch Downgrades Class B Notes to Dsf
BNC MORTGAGE 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class A3 Debt Rating to B1
BXP TRUST 2017-GM: Moody's Affirm Ba2 Rating on Class E Certs
CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. G Certs
CHASE HOME 2019-ATR2: Fitch Assigns B+ Rating on Class B-5 Certs

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2013-GC15: Fitch Affirms Cl. F Certs at Bsf
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Affirms B- on 2 Tranches
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-GC41: Fitch Rates Class GRR Certs 'B-'
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-PRM: Moody's Rates Cl. F Certs B2(sf)
COMM MORTGAGE 2015-LC23: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class G Debt

CPS AUTO 2019-C: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Notes
CWALT INC 2006-OA14: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class X-1 Debt to C
FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-1: Moody's Hikes Class F Notes Rating to B1
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Fitch Downgrades 2 Tranches to Dsf
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. G Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2019-PJ2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
JP MORGAN 2016-JP3: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class F Certs
JP MORGAN 2019-BOLT: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. C Certs
JP MORGAN 2019-LTV2: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
LSTAR COMMERCIAL 2014-2: DBRS Hikes Class G Certs to BB(high)

N-STAR REL VI: Fitch Lowers Rating on $19.9MM Class J Debt to CCsf
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2019-RPL2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on B-2 Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2019-RPL2: Moody''s Gives (P)B3 Rating to B-2 Debt
NRZ ADVANCE 2015-ON1: S&P Rates $4.468MM Class E-T1 Notes 'BB (sf)'
OBX TRUST 2019-EXP2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class B-5 Notes

PRESTIGE AUTO 2019-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
ROCKFORD TOWER 2019-2: Moody's Rates $9MM Class F Notes 'B3'
SACO TRUST 2005-3: Moody's Hikes Class M-3 Debt Rating to Caa1
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-3: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt (P)B1(sf)
STWD LTD 2019-FL1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B (low) Rating on Cl. G Notes

UBS COMMERCIAL 2017-C3: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on G-RR Certs
VIBRANT CLO XI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $22.5MM Cl. D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2019-C52: Fitch to Rate $9MM Class G-RR Debt 'B-sf'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Debt
WOODMONT 2019-6: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating to $29MM Class E Notes


                            *********

A10 BRIDGE 2019-B: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-B to be
issued by A10 Bridge Asset Financing 2019-B, LLC:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The initial collateral consists of 36 fixed-rate and eight
floating-rate mortgages secured by 45 mostly transitional
properties with a cut-off balance as of March 31, 2019, totaling
approximately $281.1 million, excluding approximately $83.3 million
of future funding commitments. The pool will have a maximum balance
of $320.0 million inclusive of $38.9 million of Future Funding
Companion Participations that may be acquired using amounts in the
$38.9 million pre-funding accounts. Most loans are in a period of
transition with plans to stabilize and improve asset value. During
the Reinvestment Period, the Issuer may acquire Pre-Approved Future
Funding Companion Participations and additional eligible loans
subject to the Reinvestment Conditions.

For the floating-rate loans, DBRS used the one-month LIBOR index,
which is based on the lower of a DBRS stressed rate that
corresponded to the remaining fully extended term of the loans or
the strike price of the interest rate cap with the respective
contractual loan spread added to determine a stressed interest rate
over the loan term. When the cut-off balances were measured against
the DBRS As-Is net cash flow (NCF), 29 loans, comprising 64.9% of
the initial pool balance, had a DBRS As-Is debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) below 1.00 times (x), a threshold indicative of
default risk. Additionally, the DBRS Stabilized DSCR for six loans,
comprising 20.0% of the initial pool balance, is below 1.00x, which
is indicative of elevated refinance risk. The properties are often
transitioning with potential upside in cash flow; however, DBRS
does not give full credit to the stabilization if there are no
holdbacks or if other loan structural features in place are
insufficient to support such treatment. Furthermore, even with the
structure provided, DBRS generally does not assume the assets to
stabilize above market levels. The transaction will have a
sequential-pay structure.

The transaction is governed by a trust indenture that will hold all
of the commercial real estate (CRE) loans as collateral in addition
to other accounts assigned to the Issuer. Collateral of the Issuer
includes loans and various accounts established for and on behalf
of the Issuer. Collateral does not include any Membership Interest
or Membership Distribution Account. A10 Capital, LLC (A10 Capital),
the loan originator, provides a unique strategy in its lending
platform and serves a segment of the commercial mortgage market
largely underserved by community banks because of their
overexposure to CRE. Specifically, A10 Capital specializes in
mini-perm loans, which typically have an initial three- to a
five-year term with extension options and are used to finance
properties until they are fully stabilized. Most of the loans
contain a future funding component that, subject to A10 Capital's
sole discretion, is to be disbursed for tenant improvement costs,
letters of credit or other value-added propositions presented by
the borrowers of the underlying CRE loans. The borrowers are
typically new equity sponsors of fairly well-positioned assets
within their respective markets. A10 Capital's initial advance is
the senior debt component, typically for the purchase of a real
estate-owned acquisition or a discounted payoff.

Three loans, totaling 6.2% of the pool, are in markets with a DBRS
Market Rank of 8, while seven loans, totaling 21.6% of the pool,
are in markets with a DBRS Market Rank of 7 and 6. The market ranks
correspond to zip codes that are more urbanized in nature. As
measured, including all future funding in the calculation, the
weighted-average (WA) DBRS As-Is loan-to-value (LTV) is low at
71.8%. Further, the WA As-Stabilized LTV is also quite low at
55.1%. The WA DBRS As-Is LTV reflects upward as-is appraised value
adjustments to nine loans based on the appraiser's as-completed
value, which are based on upfront CAPEX facilities that address
deferred maintenance. Additionally, downward as-is and stabilized
value adjustments were made to two loans. Please see the model
adjustment section below for more on the above-mentioned
adjustments. The origination is generally found to be on projects
that have a reasonable likelihood of achieving stabilization with
the capital injected by the loan sponsor and/or the A10 Capital
future advance conditioned upon the execution of leases approved by
A10 Capital. The collateral of the underlying loans primarily
consists of a traditional office, retail, industrial and
multifamily property types and minimal exposure to assets with very
high expense ratios, such as hotels or property types where
conventional takeout financing may not be as readily available. An
affiliate of A10 Capital will be holding the first-loss position
(including Classes E and F and equity tranches), and as part of the
Trust Indenture, it or an affiliate must retain that position for
as long as the Offered Notes remain outstanding.

The pool consists of transitional assets. Given the nature of the
assets, DBRS determined a sample size representing 77.6% of the
cut-off date balance. This is higher than the typical sample size
for traditional conduit CMBS transactions. Physical site
inspections were also performed, including management meetings.
DBRS also notes that when DBRS analysts visit the markets, they may
actually visit properties more than once to follow the progress (or
lack thereof) toward stabilization. The service is also in constant
contact with the borrowers to track progress. DBRS has assigned a
stabilized cash flow to a level that is above the in-place level.
There is a possibility that the sponsors will not execute their
business plans as expected and that the higher stabilized cash flow
will not materialize during the loan term. DBRS made relatively
conservative stabilization assumptions and, in each instance,
considered the business plan to be rational and the future funding
amounts to be sufficient to execute such plans. In addition, DBRS
analyzes loss given default (LGD) based on the DBRS As-Is LTV,
assuming that the loan is fully funded. Based on the weighted
initial pool balances, the overall WA DBRS As-Is DSCR of 0.77x is
reflective of high-leverage financing. The assets are generally
well-positioned to stabilize, and any realized cash flow growth
would help to offset a rise in interest rates and also improve the
overall debt yield of the loans. DBRS associates its LGD based on
the assets' As-Is LTV that does not assume that the stabilization
plan and cash flow growth will ever materialize. There is an
inherent conflict of interest between the special servicer and the
seller, as they are related entities. Given that the special
servicer is typically responsible for pursuing remedies from the
seller for breaches of the representations and warranties, this
conflict could be disadvantageous to the certificate holders. While
the special servicer is classified as the enforcing transaction
party, if a loan repurchase request is received, the trustee and
originator shall be notified, and the originator is required to
correct the material breach or defect or repurchase the affected
loan within a maximum period of 270 days. The repurchase price
would amount to the outstanding principal balance and unpaid
interest less relevant Issuer expenses and protective advances made
by the servicer. The Issuer retains 13.9% equity in the transaction
holding the first-loss piece.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


AJAX MORTGAGE 2019-D: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2019-D (the Notes) issued by
Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-D (AJAX 2019-D or the Trust):

-- $140.4 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $10.1 million Class A-3 at A (low) (sf)
-- $9.3 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Notes reflects the 27.35% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 24.20%, 18.95%, 14.15 %, 10.25% and 6.60% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages
funded by the issuance of the Notes. The Notes are backed by 857
loans with a total principal balance of approximately $193,301,213
as of the Cut-Off Date (June 30, 2019).

The portfolio is approximately 149 months seasoned. As of the
Cut-Off Date, 94.0% of the pool is current, 3.7% is 30 days
delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency
method and 2.3% is in bankruptcy (all bankruptcy loans are
performing or 30 days delinquent). Approximately 67.7% of the pool
has been zero times 30 (0 x 30) days delinquent for the past 24
months, 90.7% has been 0 x 30 for the past 12 months and 95.2% has
been 0 x 30 for the past six months.

Modified loans comprise 89.9% of the portfolio. The modifications
happened more than two years ago for 96.2% of the modified loans.
Within the pool, 266 mortgages (38.0% of the pool) have
non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equate to 7.1% of the
total principal balance. Included in the deferred amounts are the
Home Affordable Modification Program and proprietary principal
forgiveness amounts, which comprise 0.2% of the total principal
balance.

In accordance with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Qualified Mortgage (QM) and Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules, one loan
is designated as QM Safe Harbor, one loan as QM Rebuttable
Presumption and one loan as non-QM. Approximately 99.7% of the
loans are not subject to the QM rules.

Prior to the Closing Date, Great Ajax Operating Partnership L.P.
(Ajax), in its capacity as the Sponsor, acquired the loans from
various unaffiliated third-party sellers. The mortgage loans were
acquired by Ajax between 2013 and 2018. To satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements, the Sponsor or a majority-owned affiliate
of the Sponsor will retain at least a 5% eligible horizontal
interest in the securities.

As of the Cut-Off Date, Gregory Funding LLC is the Servicer for all
the loans in the pool.

Since 2013, Ajax and its affiliates have issued 27 securitizations
under the Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust shelf prior to AJAX 2019-D.
These issuances were backed by seasoned, re-performing or
non-performing loans. Only one of the previously issued Ajax deals,
AJAX 2017-B, was rated by DBRS. DBRS reviewed the historical
performance of the Ajax shelf; however, the non-rated deals
generally exhibit much worse collateral attributes than the rated
deals with regard to delinquencies at issuance. The prior Ajax
transactions currently exhibit high levels of delinquencies and
losses, which are expected given the nature of these severely
distressed assets.

There will not be advancing of delinquent principal or interest on
the mortgage loans by the Servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the Servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of real estate assessments, taxes, and insurance and
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

Beginning three years after the Closing Date, the Issuer, at the
direction of the Depositor, has the option to redeem all of the
Notes at a price equal to the remaining note amount of the Notes
plus accrued and unpaid interest and any unpaid expenses and
reimbursement amounts (Aggregate Redemption Price). Additionally,
beginning three years after the Closing Date, the Issuer, at the
direction of the Depositor, has the option to redeem one or more of
the most senior notes outstanding at a price (Class Redemption
Price) for each class equal to the sum of the remaining note amount
of such class and any accrued and unpaid interest due through the
redemption date. When the rated Notes are outstanding, the Issuer
has the option to sell any mortgage loan to an affiliate or
non-affiliate provided that the proceeds of such sale are equal to
the aggregate outstanding note amount of the rated Notes and,
beginning with the second payment date, certain post-sale debt
enhancement requirements are met.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class A-2 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired. In
addition, unique to this transaction, the senior and mezzanine
classes are entitled to Step-Up Interest Payments beginning eight
years from the Closing Date.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB
(sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Notes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


AMUR EQUIPMENT 2019-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
equipment contract-backed notes to be issued by Amur Equipment
Finance Receivables VII LLC (the Issuer):

-- $48,000,000 Series 2019-1, Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $170,802,000 Series 2019-1, Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $19,074,000 Series 2019-1, Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $8,696,000 Series 2019-1, Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $11,081,000 Series 2019-1, Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $6,311,000 Series 2019-1, Class E Notes at BB (sf)
-- $5,470,000 Series 2019-1, Class F Notes at B (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the
following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings as well as the
sufficiency of available credit enhancement, which includes
over-collateralization (OC), subordination and amounts held in the
reserve account, to support the DBRS-projected cumulative net loss
assumption under various stressed cash flow scenarios.

-- The proposed concentration limits mitigating the risk of
material migration in the collateral pool's composition during the
approximately four-month prefunding period.

-- The capabilities of Amur Equipment Finance, Inc. (Amur EF) with
regard to origination, underwriting, and servicing. DBRS performed
an operational review of Amur EF and considers the company to be an
acceptable originator and servicer of equipment-backed lease and
loan contracts. In addition, Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, an experienced servicer of equipment lease-backed
securitizations currently rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS,
will be the back-up servicer for the transaction.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Amur EF, that
the trustee has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance."

Amur EF (f/k/an Axis Capital, Inc.) is a commercial finance company
providing equipment financing solutions to a broad range of small-
to medium-sized businesses across all 50 states of the United
States.

The rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 84.14% of initial hard
credit enhancement (as a percentage of collateral balance) provided
by the subordinated notes in the pool (78.94%), the Reserve Account
(1.25%) and OC (3.95%). The rating on the Class A-2 Notes reflects
23.25% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by the
subordinated notes in the pool (18.05%), the Reserve Account
(1.25%) and OC (3.95%). The ratings on Class B, Class C, Class D,
Class E, and Class F Notes reflect 16.45%, 13.35%, 9.40%, 7.15% and
5.20% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ANCHORAGE CREDIT 1: Moody's Rates $26MM Class C-R Notes Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to five classes of CDO
refinancing notes issued by Anchorage Credit Funding 1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$246,800,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037
(the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$76,300,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2037 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A3 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2037 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
Due 2037 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CDO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow CDO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by corporate bonds and loans . At least
30% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, senior
secured notes, and eligible investments, and up to 20% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans, and up to 5% of the
portfolio may consist of letters of credit.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (the "Manager") will continue to
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's extended five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest up to 50% of unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on July 29, 2019 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
originally issued on June 9, 2015 (the "Original Closing Date"). On
the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of
the Refinancing Notes and the new subordinated notes to redeem in
full the Refinanced Original Notes and the original subordinated
notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $525,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3181

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.70%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 36.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 11.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


BICENTENNIAL TRUST 2017-1: Moody's Ups Class G Certs Rating to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded securities issued from the
Bicentennial Trust, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2017-1
securitization issued in 2017. The transaction is a securitization
of prime quality, fixed rate mortgage loans originated by Bank of
Montreal (Aa2, stable; a3, Aa2(cr); Prime-1), with a remaining
balance of CAD950,297,951 as of June 30, 2019.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bicentennial Trust, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates
2017-1

  Class B Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 1,
  2017 definitive rating assigned Aa2 (sf)

  Class C Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1,
  2017 definitive rating assigned A1 (sf)

  Class D Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 1,
  2017 definitive rating assigned A3 (sf)

  Class E Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 1,
  2017 definitive rating assigned Baa2 (sf)

  Class F Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 1,
  2017 definitive rating assigned Ba1 (sf)

  Class G Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 1,
  2017 definitive rating assigned B2 (sf)

The upgrades were prompted primarily by a build-up of credit
enhancement as the pool has amortized to less than half of its
original size, while the lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL)
expectation for the transaction has remained unchanged at 0.45%.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
July 2019.

This methodology was calibrated based on settings specific for
Canada.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with its
expectations at close, due to either a change in economic
conditions from its central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions. For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from greater unemployment,
worsening household affordability and a weaker housing market could
result in a downgrade of the rating. Deleveraging of the capital
structure or conversely a deterioration in the certificate's
available credit enhancement could result in an upgrade or a
downgrade of the rating, respectively.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal at par on or before the rated final legal
maturity date. Moody's ratings only address the credit risk
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.


BLADE ENGINE 2006-1: Fitch Downgrades Class B Notes to Dsf
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the series B notes of Blade Engine
Securitization LTD.

Blade Engine Securitization LTD 2006-1

Class B Notes, longterm rating currently downgraded to Dsf;
previous rating was at Csf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The interest amount due for the series B notes was not paid in full
on the June 2019 payment date. The series A notes remain
outstanding and the holders of the majority of the outstanding
series A principal amount have directed the trustee to give a
default notice. As a result, an event of default (EOD) is in effect
and no further payments are expected to be made to the series B
notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bond that has defaulted is not expected to recover any
amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility that this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch
would further review the affected class.


BNC MORTGAGE 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class A3 Debt Rating to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of 20 tranches from
14 RMBS backed by Subprime loans.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-8

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-AM1

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-10HE

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-7

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2018 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-9

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2018 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 5, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and improved underlying
collateral pool performance. Bonds that have been upgraded in the
transactions have benefited from cumulative loss triggers that
divert principal payments from subordinate bonds to the senior
bonds. The cumulative loss triggers, in addition to higher levels
of prepayment in some transactions, have accelerated the buildup of
credit enhancement for the upgraded senior and mezzanine bonds. For
the Class M-2 in FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2, consistent and
high levels of prepayment averaging $1.6M since January 2019 has
rapidly increased credit enhancement levels for the tranche to 57%
from 51% a year ago. The action also reflects the recent
performance as well as Moody's updated loss expectation on the
underlying pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.7% in June 2019 from 4.0% in June
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, the
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any changes resulting from servicing
transfers, or other policy or regulatory shifts can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BXP TRUST 2017-GM: Moody's Affirm Ba2 Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on six classes in
BXP Trust 2017-GM, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2017-GM :

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio, are within
acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced class.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, defeasance of
the loan, or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance was approximately $1.555 billion, the
same as at securitization. The certificates are collateralized by a
portion of a first-lien whole loan with an outstanding balance of
$2.3 billion. The Whole Loan is secured by the Borrower's fee
simple interest in the General Motors Building, a 1.99 million
square foot (SF), Class A, office property located at 767 Fifth
Avenue in New York City.

The trust components consist of eight senior promissory notes (the
"Senior Trust Notes") and four junior promissory notes (the "Junior
Notes"), which combined have an aggregate principal balance of
$1.555 billion. The Mortgage Loan (Senior Trust Notes plus Junior
Notes) is part of a split loan structure comprised of the Mortgage
Loan and Companion Loans (not asset of the trust). The Companion
Loans include 21 promissory notes with a balance of $745 million
that are pari passu with each other and with the Senior Trust Notes
and are senior to the Junior Notes.

The 50-story property was developed in 1968 and spans the entire
city block bound by 58th Street, 59th Street, Madison Avenue and
Fifth Avenue on the southeast corner of Central Park. The Property
features 188,000 SF of retail space on the first two stories and
the below-grade concourse. As of March 2019, the property was 95%
leased and has a diverse tenant roster including Weil Gotshal &
Manges, Aramis/Estee Lauder, Parella Weinberg, BAMCO, and Apple.

The property's net cashflow (NCF) for the first three months of
2019 was $46.9 million. Moody's stabilized LTV ratio for the Whole
Loan is 91% and stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the
Whole Loan is 0.87X, the same as at securitization. There are no
outstanding interest shortfalls or losses to date.


CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of Cantor Commercial Real
Estate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C2 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

CFCRE 2011-C2

                         Current Rating      Prior Rating
Class A-3 12527DAQ3  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 12527DAR1  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  previously at AAAsf
Class A-J 12527DAC4  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  previously at AAAsf
Class B 12527DAD2    LT  AAsf    Affirmed  previously at AAsf
Class C 12527DAE0    LT  Asf     Affirmed  previously at Asf
Class D 12527DAF7    LT  BBB+sf  Affirmed  previously at BBB+sf
Class E 12527DAG5    LT  BBB-sf  Affirmed  previously at BBB-sf
Class F 12527DAH3    LT  BBsf    Affirmed  previously at BBsf
Class G 12527DAJ9    LT  Bsf     Affirmed  previously at Bsf
Class X-A 12527DAA8  LT  AAAsf   Affirmed  previously at AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance and Loss Projections: The overall pool
performance remains stable from issuance and relatively in line
with Fitch's base case loss expectations. There has been de minimis
realized losses ($1,928) to date. Five loans (37.4%) were flagged
as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) due to significant upcoming
tenant rollover risk, deteriorating performance and increasing
refinance risk as loans approach their maturities in 2021.  This
includes the largest loan, RiverTown Crossings Mall. Three other
FLOCs are within the top 15, including one specially serviced
loan.

Fitch Loans of Concern: RiverTown Crossings Mall (25.1%) is secured
by a 1.3 million-sf (635,769-sf collateral space) regional mall
located in Grandville, MI.  The largest collateral tenant, Dick's
Sporting Goods' (14.4% NRA), lease expires Jan. 31, 2020.
Additionally, the four remaining non-collateral anchors (Macy's,
Sears, JC Penney and Kohl's) leases expire on Aug. 31, 2019.
Non-collateral anchor tenant Younkers vacated in 2018. While not
confirmed by the master servicer, media reports indicate the
sponsor, Brookfield Properties Partners LP, purchased the former
Younkers store. Fitch will continue to monitor the loan as updates
with respect to leasing and development of the vacant space are
received.  The loan matures in June 2021.

Hanford Mall (6.6%), the fourth largest loan, is secured by a
488,833-sf (331,080 sf collateral) regional mall located in
Hanford, CA. The mall is anchored by JC Penney, Sears and Kohl's
(non-collateral). Sears, the largest tenant representing 22.9% NRA,
vacated in 2018 prior to its July 31, 2019 lease expiration date.
The loan matures in December 2021.

Mountain View at Southgate Apartments (2.5%), the 10th largest
loan, is secured by a 297-unit multifamily complex located in El
Paso, TX.  Servicer reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) has
been near or below 1.0x since YE 2016.

Crossroads Center (2.2%), the 11th largest loan and sole specially
serviced asset, is collateralized by a 321,824-sf former shopping
mall that has been converted to office space and is located in
Roanoke, VA. The asset has been REO since July 2017.

The smallest FLOC (1.1%) is secured by a 24-unit mixed use property
located in Dearborn, MI. Servicer reported DSCR has been below 1.0x
since YE 2017.

Increased Credit Enhancement Since Issuance: As of the July 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
55% to $348.6 million from $774.1 million at issuance. Seven loans
(23.6%) are defeased, including three (16.7%) in the top 15. All
loans are amortizing. However, the increased credit enhancement
(CE) and high defeasance did not result in upgrades to senior
classes due to the increased deal concentrations and FLOCs. Only 30
of the original 51 loans remain and the top 10 and top 15 loans
represent 70.0% and 80.4%, respectively.  Over 60% are
collateralized by retail properties.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Due to declining sales or lack of
updated sales and upcoming tenant rollover concerns, Fitch
performed an additional sensitivity scenario in addition to a base
case loss that considered a potential outsized loss of 25% on the
balloon balance of the RiverTown Crossings Mall and 50% on the
balloon balance of the Hanford Mall loan. The Negative Rating
Outlooks on classes E, F and G reflect this analysis.  In addition,
although CE has increased, upgrades on senior classes were not
considered based on these concerns, as well as the deal
concentrations.

Retail Concentration: 62.3% of the pool is collateralized by retail
properties, of which 57.6% are within the top 15. Regional mall
exposure consists of (i) RiverTown Crossings Mall, which is located
in Grandville, MI and has four non-collateral anchors, including
Macy's, Sears, JC Penney and Kohl's and (ii) Hanford Mall, which is
located Hanford, CA and anchored by JC Penney, Sears and Kohl's
(non-collateral).


CHASE HOME 2019-ATR2: Fitch Assigns B+ Rating on Class B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to JPMorgan Chase Bank's
second non-qualified mortgage residential mortgage-backed
transaction, Chase Home Lending Mortgage Trust 2019-ATR2. The
certificates are supported by 769 prime-quality Non-QM loans with a
total balance of $608.83 million as of the cutoff date. The loans
were underwritten to satisfy the Ability to Repay (ATR) Rule but do
not qualify for Qualified Mortgage status due to approved
exceptions to guidelines or exceptions to Appendix Q documentation
requirements.

Chase Home Lending Mortgage Trust 2019-ATR2

                   Current Rating       Prior Rating
Class A-1;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-10;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-11;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-11-X;  LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-12;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-13;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-14;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-15;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-16;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-17;    LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-2;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-3;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-4;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-5;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-6;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-7;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-8;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-9;     LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-X-1;   LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-X-2;   LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-X-3;   LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class A-X-4;   LT AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class B-1;     LT AA+sf  New Rating;  previously at AA+(EXP)sf
Class B-2;     LT A+sf   New Rating;  previously at A+(EXP)sf
Class B-3;     LT BBBsf  New Rating;  previously at BBB(EXP)sf
Class B-4;     LT BB+sf  New Rating;  previously at BB+(EXP)sf
Class B-5;     LT B+sf   New Rating;  previously at B+(EXP)sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists
primarily of 30-year (97.6%), 20-year (2.3%), and 25-year (0.1%)
fixed-rate mortgage loans. The borrowers have strong credit
profiles with a Fitch calculated weighted average (WA) FICO score
of 775 and 69.6% WA combined loan to value ratio (CLTV). The WA
loan size is almost $792,000 and liquid reserves average $516,393.
The loans were originated through JPM Chase's, or its
correspondents', retail channel, which Fitch views positively. The
largest MSA concentrations are in Los Angeles (13.2%), New York
(11.1%) and San Francisco (6.1%). Fitch's 'AAAsf' expected loss of
4.00% reflects the pool's very high quality attributes.

Non-Qualified Mortgage (Negative): All of the loans in this
transaction were underwritten to satisfy the ATR Rule, but do not
qualify for QM status. A majority of the loans were coded non-QM
due to the use of tax transcripts in lieu of signed tax returns.
The remaining loans had Appendix Q exceptions, which in Fitch's
view, are immaterial and unlikely to present any additional default
or loss risk to the transaction. Fitch's 'AAAsf' loss was increased
by roughly 18bps to account for the potential risk of foreclosure
challenges under the ATR Rule.

Underwriting Guideline Exceptions: All the loans in the pool were
approved by JPM Chase's exception desk prior to origination. About
40% of the pool, or 314 loans, contain approved underwriting
exceptions outside of the Appendix Q requirements. All loans in the
pool meet the industry accepted standards for full documentation
and were confirmed by the third-party due diligence review firm as
having income, assets and employment fully verified and consistent
with full documentation.

Minimal Operational Risk (Positive): JPM Chase has a long operating
history of originating and securitizing residential mortgage loans,
and is assessed as 'Above Average' by Fitch. JPM Chase is also the
servicer of this transaction; it is rated 'RPS1-' by Fitch. Loan
origination and servicer quality have an impact on performance, and
Fitch lowers its loss expectations for highly rated originators and
servicers (rated 1- or higher) due to their strong practices and
higher expected recoveries. Fitch reduced its 'AAAsf' loss
expectations, by 67bps, to account for the low operational risk
associated with this pool.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Positive): The
representation and warranty (R&W) construct is viewed by Fitch as a
Tier 2 framework due to inclusion of knowledge qualifiers without a
clawback provision and the narrow testing construct, which limits
the breach reviewers' ability to identify or respond to issues not
fully anticipated at closing. The R&Ws are being provided by JPM
Chase, rated 'AA'/'F1+'/Outlook Stable. There was no adjustment to
the loss expectation due to the R&W framework and financial
strength of JPM Chase as R&W provider.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Positive): Third-party due diligence was
performed by a Fitch-assessed 'Acceptable-Tier 2' due diligence
review firm on 100% of the loans. The review confirmed sound
operational quality with no incidence of material defects. While a
higher percentage of loans were approved with non-material credit
exceptions compared to Chase 2019-ATR1 and prime industry averages,
the exceptions are supported by strong mitigating factors and, in
Fitch's view, do not compromise the overall credit profile of the
borrowers or expected performance of the transaction.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement levels
are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 1.20% of the
original balance will be maintained for the senior certificates and
a subordination floor of 0.75% of the original balance will be
maintained for the subordinate certificates.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2013-GC15: Fitch Affirms Cl. F Certs at Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2013-GC15.

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-GC15

                       Current Rating       Prior Rating
Class A-3 17321JAC8  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 17321JAD6  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-AB 17321JAE4 LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 17321JAF1  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 17321JAG9    LT  AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C 17321JAH7    LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class D 17321JAP9    LT  BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class E 17321JAR5    LT  BBsf   Affirmed;  previously at BBsf
Class F 17321JAT1    LT  Bsf    Affirmed;  previously at Bsf
Class PEZ 17321JAZ7  LT  A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class X-A 17321JAJ3  LT  AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-C 17321JAM6  LT  BBsf   Affirmed;  previously at BBsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations/Specially Serviced Loan: Loss
expectations have increased since Fitch's last rating action. The
fifth largest loan, 735 Sixth Avenue (4.3% of the pool), was
transferred to special servicing in February 2019 due to delinquent
payments. The property consists of 16,500 sf of retail located on
the ground level of a 40-story, mixed-use residential condominium
building totaling approximately 250,000 sf. The ground-floor retail
is currently divided into five spaces of various sizes. The
property is located in NYC along 6th Avenue between W. 24th and W.
25th Streets. The largest two tenants, David's Bridal and T-Mobile,
vacated at their respective lease expirations in October and
November of 2018, which caused a significant drop in occupancy at
the property to 20%, and net operating income (NOI) to negative
$100,000. These vacancies resulted in insufficient cash flow to
make the full debt service payment. The special servicer is dual
tracking foreclosure while continuing discussions with the borrower
on alternate workout strategies and there are no prospective
tenants for the vacant space. A recent appraisal value indicates
potential losses on the loan.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Although expected losses have
increased, the transaction's credit enhancement has improved since
issuance due to loan payoffs at maturity, prepayments, continued
amortization and defeasance. The affirmations reflect the higher
credit enhancement. The pool has paid down approximately 28.9%
since issuance and 11.6% since Fitch's last rating action, largely
due to the payoff of five loans, including the largest and ninth
largest loans in the pool: South Beach Marriott and Columbia
Square. Additionally, the previously specially serviced loan, City
Centre, was disposed for better than expected recoveries. Six loans
(5.3% of the pool) are defeased, of which, two (1.3%) were defeased
since Fitch's last rating action.

Pool Concentrations: The pool is highly diverse, with the top 10
loans representing 44.5% of the pool balance, well below Fitch
rated transactions between 2013 and 2017. Three loans (18.2%) are
full-term interest only. Thirteen loans (26.7%) were structured as
partial interest-only, of which 11 (15.5%) have transitioned into
their amortization periods. Approximately 34.9% of the pool is
secured by retail properties (34 loans), including six loans
(15.3%) within the top 15, none of which are classified as regional
malls.

Loan Maturities: All of the remaining loans mature in 2023.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Affirms B- on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 17 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, series
2016-C2.

CGCMT 2016-C2
   
Class A-1 17291CBN4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-2 17291CBP9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-3 17291CBQ7;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 17291CBR5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-AB 17291CBS3; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 17291CBT1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 17291CBU8;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C 17291CBV6;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf
Class D 17291CAA3;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf
Class E 17291CAG0;    LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class E-1 17291CAC9;  LT BB+sf Affirmed;  previously at BB+sf
Class E-2 17291CAE5;  LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class EF 17291CBC8;   LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf
Class F 17291CAN5;    LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf
Class X-A 17291CBW4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-B 17291CBX2;  LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf
Class X-D 17291CBG9;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations
are based on the stable performance of the underlying collateral.
There have been no material changes to the pool since issuance, and
therefore the original rating analysis was considered in affirming
the transaction. Fitch has designated two loans (2.2% of the
remaining pool balance) as Fitch Loans of Concern. There are four
loans (4.4%) on the servicer's watchlist, and no loans are
delinquent or in special servicing. There have been no realized
losses to date, and interest shortfalls are currently impacting
classes H and H-2.

Minimal Credit Enhancement Improvement/Limited Amortization: As of
the July 2019 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been paid down by 1.5% to $599.9 million from $609.2
million at issuance.

The pool is scheduled to amortize by 9.6% of the initial pool
balance through maturity. Of the current pool, 11 loans (32.8%) are
full-term interest-only, and 11 loans (35.2%) have partial-term
interest-only periods remaining.

High Retail Concentration: Loans collateralized by retail
properties and mixed use properties with a retail component account
for 47.9% of the pool, including one regional mall (10%) and a
mixed use property (10%) in the top three.

The second largest loan in the pool is Opry Mills (10%), a regional
mall located in Nashville, TN. The mall does not have exposure to
traditional anchors like JC Penney, Sears, or Macy's; instead major
tenants include Bass Pro Shops, Regal Cinemas, and Dave & Buster's.
As of YE 2018, the property was 97.9% occupied and performing at a
2.36x NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).

The third largest loan in the pool is Crocker Park Phase One & Two
(10%), a 615,062 sf mixed use retail/office property built in 2004
and located in Westlake, OH. Major tenants include Dick's Sporting
Goods, Fitness & Sports Clubs, Barnes & Noble, and Regal Cinemas.
As of YE 2018, the property was 95.7% occupied and performing at a
1.71x NOI DSCR.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Hotel Concentration: Loans collateralized by hotel properties
account for 19.6% of the pool, including four (15.7%) in the top
15. Hotels in the top 15 include an extended stay hotel in New York
City's Times Square with a franchise expiration date in April 2020,
a full service resort on the beach in Huntington Beach, CA, a hotel
portfolio with two properties located in Scranton, PA and West
Springfield, MA, and a full-service hotel in the Detroit metro.

Maturity Concentration: Maturities for the pool are as follows:
2021 - one loan (2.6%), 2025 - one loan (1.5%), and 2026 - 42 loans
(95.9%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction, and also serves
as the backup advancing agent. Fitch's Issuer Default Rating for
Deutsche Bank is currently 'BBB'/Evolving/'F2'. Fitch relies on the
master servicer, Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank,
N.A. (A+/Stable/F1), which is currently the primary advancing
agent, as counterparty. Fitch provided ratings confirmation on Jan.
24, 2018.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-GC41: Fitch Rates Class GRR Certs 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2019-GC41 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2019-GC41.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:
  
  -- $11,825,000 class A1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $128,097,000 class A2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,112,000 class A3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $215,000,000d class A4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $478,106,000d class A5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,494,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $972,004,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $120,152,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $109,370,000 class AS 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69,319,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50,833,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,349,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $58,536,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,187,000b class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,187,000b class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,187,000ab class X-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,324,000bc class GRR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $43,131,964bc class JRR;

  -- $44,300,000bc class VRR Interest

(a) Notional amount and interest only.

(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(c) Vertical credit-risk retention interest.

(d) The expected class A-4 balance range is $100,000,000 to
$330,000,000 and the expected class A-5 balance range is
$363,106,000 to $593,106,000.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of July 26, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 43 loans secured by 100
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,276,634,964 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities, Citi Real Estate
Funding Inc., and German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.3% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.1% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch leverage is better compared with
other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate, multiborrower transactions.
The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.26x is better than the YTD 2019 and 2018
averages of 1.21x and 1.22x, respectively. The pool's Fitch LTV of
103.9% is slightly worse than the YTD 2019 and 2018 averages of
102.0%. Excluding investment grade credit opinion loans, the pool
has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.26x and 111.4%, respectively.

Limited Amortization: There are 27 loans that are full interest
only (80.5% of the pool), eight loans (9.2% of the pool) that are
partial interest only, eight loans (10.3% of the pool) that are
amortizing balloon loans and two ARD loans (9.0% of the pool).
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will pay down
by just 2.7%, which is below the YTD 2019 and 2018 averages of 6.1%
and 7.2% respectively.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans comprising 18.0%
of the pool, have investment grade credit opinions. This is above
the YTD 2019 and 2018 averages of 13.2% and 13.6%, respectively.
Hudson Yards (7.8% of the pool) received a credit opinion of
'A-sf'* on a standalone basis. Grand Canal Shoppes (4.7% of the
pool), Moffett Towers II - Buildings 3 & 4 (4.3% of the pool) and
The Centre (1.2% of the pool) each received standalone credit
opinions of 'BBB-sf'*.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-PRM: Moody's Rates Cl. F Certs B2(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2019-PRM, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2019-PRM:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X*, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by two loans backed by a first
lien commercial mortgage related to two portfolios of 49, in
aggregate, self-storage properties located across 17 states. The
single borrower underlying the mortgage is comprised of 49
special-purpose bankruptcy-remote entities, each of which is
wholly-owned and controlled, indirectly or directly by Prime Group
Holdings, LLC.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by the portfolio loan compares the credit
risk inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit
protection offered by the structure. The structure's credit
enhancement is quantified by the maximum deterioration in property
value that the securities are able to withstand under various
stress scenarios without causing an increase in the expected loss
for various rating levels. In assigning single borrower ratings,
Moody's also considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's LTV ratio.

The first mortgage balance of $278,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 105.8%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 1.86X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 0.96X.

Loan collateral is comprised of the borrower's fee interest in 49
self-storage properties in aggregate, with "Portfolio I" containing
11 properties and "Portfolio II" containing 38 properties located
across 22 markets (Portfolio I: 8; Portfolio II: 17) in 17 states
(Portfolio I: 6 states; Portfolio II: 14 states). Approximately
75.9% of the properties by mortgage ALA are located in markets
deemed to be in equilibrium or in under-supply by the 2019
Self-Storage Almanac (Portfolio I: 95.2%; Portfolio II: 70.4%). The
portfolios reported a weighted average physical occupancy rate of
86.4% (Portfolio I: 84.0%; Portfolio II: 86.7%) as a percentage of
net rentable area ("NRA") for the trailing twelve month period
ending April 30, 2019 ("TTM April 2019"). The properties have an
average age of 21.3 years as the collateral improvements were built
at various points between 1945 and 2017. The average age for
Portfolio I is 16.6 years and for Portfolio II it is 21.3 years.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: the benefits of
multiple-property pooling related to a large and granular
portfolio, geographic diversity across major market locations,
strong forecasted market conditions, strong operating performance,
and strong sponsorship and property management.

Notable credit challenges of the transaction include: the high
Moody's LTV compounded by the addition of subordinate debt, the
loan's interest-only mortgage loan profile, the average of the
collateral improvements, the amount of equity that was returned to
the sponsor as part of this financing, and certain credit negative
legal features.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only class were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from its
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


COMM MORTGAGE 2015-LC23: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class G Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of COMM 2015-LC23 Mortgage
Trust.

COMM 2015-LC23

Class A-1 12636FBE2;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-2 12636FBF9;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-3 12636FBH5;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 12636FBJ1;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-M 12636FBM4;  LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-SB 12636FBG7; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 12636FBN2;    LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C 12636FBP7;    LT A-sf Affirmed;   previously at A-sf
Class D 12636FAL7;    LT BBBsf Affirmed;  previously at BBBsf
Class E 12636FAN3;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf
Class F 12636FAQ6;    LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class G 12636FAS2;    LT B-sf Affirmed;   previously at B-sf
Class X-B 12636FAA1;  LT AA-sf Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class X-C 12636FAC7;  LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf
Class X-D 12636FAE3;  LT BB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BB-sf
Class XP-A 12636FBK8; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class XS-A 12636FBL6; LT AAAsf Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the pool's generally stable performance that remains in line with
Fitch's expectations at issuance. While the majority of the pool
continues to perform, there are five Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs;
7.4% of the pool), including one real estate owned (REO) asset
(1.2%).

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC is the Whitehall Hotel
loan (3.6%), which is secured by a 222-key full service hotel
located in Chicago, IL.  Property-level net operating income (NOI)
declined 23% from issuer's underwritten cash flow at issuance as
competition has increased in the submarket. The property is
underperforming relative to its comp set with RevPAR and ADR
penetration of 98% and 92%, respectively.

The second largest FLOC is the A & H Olympic loan (1.5%), which is
secured by a 105,000 sf unanchored retail center located in Los
Angeles, CA. Recent performance has declined at the subject; the
servicer reported YE 2018 NOI DSCR was 1.18x compared with 1.67x at
YE 2017. While occupancy was most recently reported at 92%, a
significant percentage of the NRA is either month to month or
scheduled to roll by year end. The loan is currently being cash
managed as the DSCR fell below the required threshold.  

The next largest FLOC is the REO Colerain Center (1.2%), which is
secured by a 74,000 sf community retail center located in Colerain
Township, OH. The loan transferred to special servicing in December
2017 for imminent default and became REO in June 2019. The largest
tenant LA Fitness (38.4% of NRA) went dark in January 2017. As of
YE 2018, occupancy was reported at 59%.  No other FLOC comprises
more than 0.75% of the pool.  Fitch will continue to monitor all
FLOCs going forward.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the June 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 3% to $931.8 million from $960.9 million at issuance. Based on
the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is expected to pay down
by 10%, which is below historical averages for similar vintages. 14
loans (40%) are full-term interest only, while six loans (7.8%)
remain in their partial IO periods. Six loans (22.6%) are scheduled
to mature in September and October 2020.

Additional Considerations

Pool Concentrations: The largest property type concentration is
retail at 31.9% followed by office at 28.8% and hotel loans with an
above average concentration of 19.9%. Hotel loans have one of the
highest probabilities of default in Fitch's multiborrower CMBS
model.

Loans secured by properties located in California have the highest
concentration at 26.4% followed by New York at 21.3%.


CPS AUTO 2019-C: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2019-C (CPS
2019-C):

-- $105,095,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $41,501,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $35,398,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $31,248,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $24,656,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)
-- $5,615,000 Class F Notes rated B (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement will be in the form of
overcollateralization, subordination, amounts held in the reserve
fund and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to
support the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The capabilities of Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS)
with regard to origination, underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of CPS and considers
the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of subprime
automobile loan contracts. This transaction also has an acceptable
backup servicer.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and
a successful track record within the auto finance industry, having
managed the company through multiple economic cycles.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool
data for CPS originations and performance of the CPS auto loan
portfolio.

-- The May 29, 2014, settlement of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade practices. CPS
paid imposed penalties and restitution payments to consumers.

-- CPS has made considerable improvements to the collections
process, including management changes, upgraded systems, and
software as well as the implementation of new policies and
procedures focused on maintaining compliance, and will be subject
to ongoing monitoring of certain processes by FTC.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that the trust has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets and the consistency
with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance"
methodology.

The CPS 2019-C transaction represents the 34th securitization
completed by CPS since 2010 and will offer both senior and
subordinate rated securities. The receivables securitized in CPS
2019-C will be subprime automobile loan contracts secured primarily
by used automobiles, light-duty trucks, vans, and minivans.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 57.95% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(56.70%), the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization
(0.25%). The ratings on Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and
Class F Notes reflect 40.95%, 26.45%, 13.65%, 3.55% and 1.25% of
initial hard credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit
support may be provided from excess spread available in the
structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CWALT INC 2006-OA14: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class X-1 Debt to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three tranches
and upgraded the rating of one tranche from three transactions,
backed by Subprime and Option ARM loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA14

Cl. X-1*, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC1

Cl. S*, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2019 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-1

Cl. S*, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

*Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrade is a result of an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bond. The downgrade of the ratings
reflects the nonpayment of interest for an extended period of at
least 12 months. For these bonds, the coupon rate is subject to a
calculation that has reduced the required interest distribution to
zero. Because the coupon on these bonds is subject to changes in
interest rates and/or collateral composition, there is a remote
possibility that they may receive interest in the future.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in February 2019. The methodologies used in rating
interest-only classes were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in February 2019 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate
The unemployment rate fell to 3.7% in June 2019 from 4.0% in June
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the referenced bonds and/or pools.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-1: Moody's Hikes Class F Notes Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings for 8 tranches
issued by Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust in 2018.
The notes are backed by a pool of retail automobile loan contracts
originated by Foursight Capital LLC (Unrated), who is also the
servicer and administrator for these transactions.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1

  Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  Class D Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Class F Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 12,
  2018 Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-2

  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  Class D Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 27,
  2019 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade is a result of the buildup of credit enhancement owing
to structural features including a sequential pay structure,
overcollateralization and non-declining reserve account.

The lifetime cumulative net loss expectation is reduced from 9.25%
to 9.00% for the 2018-1 transaction and reduced from 9.00% to 8.50%
for the 2018-2 transaction.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the ratings. Losses could decline from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor
defaults or greater recoveries from the value of the vehicles
securing the obligors promise of payment. The US job market and the
market for used vehicles are also primary drivers of the
transaction's performance. Other reasons for better-than-expected
performance include changes in servicing practices to maximize
collections on the loans or refinancing opportunities that result
in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Losses could increase from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor
defaults or a deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing
the obligors promise of payment. The US job market and the market
for used vehicles are also primary drivers of the transaction's
performance. Other reasons for worse-than-expected performance
include poor servicing, error on the part of transaction parties,
lack of transactional governance and fraud.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Fitch Downgrades 2 Tranches to Dsf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded already distressed bonds in two U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions.

Bank of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5

                       Current Rating      Prior Rating
Class A-J 05952CAH3;  LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at CCsf
Class B 05952CAL4;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf
Class C 05952CAN0;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf
Class D 05952CAQ3;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf
Class E 05952CAS9;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf
Class F 05952CAU4;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf
Class G 05952CAW0;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. 2007-GG9

                       Current Rating    Prior Rating
Class A-J 20173QAH4;  LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf
Class B 20173QAJ0;    LT Dsf  Downgrade; previously at Csf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Nine bonds in two transactions have been downgraded to 'Dsf', as
the bonds have incurred a loss. Eight of the bonds were previously
rated 'Csf', which indicated default was imminent and one of the
bonds was previously rated 'CCsf', which indicated that a default
was probable.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on two classes and
affirmed the ratings on eleven classes in GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2013-GCJ14, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2013-GCJ14 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. PEZ**, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

** Reflects Exchangeable Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two principal and interest (P&I) classes, Cl. B and
Cl. C, were upgraded primarily due to an increase in credit support
resulting from loan paydowns and amortization, as well as an
increase in defeasance. The deal has paid down 8% since Moody's
last review and 15% since securitization, and defeasance has
increased to 10% of the current pool balance.

The ratings on nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the interest-only class was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class was affirmed due to the credit
quality of the referenced exchangeable classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except exchangeable
classes and interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The principal methodology used in
rating exchangeable classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Repackaged Securities" published in March 2019. The methodologies
used in rating interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to $1.05 billion
from $1.24 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 51% of the pool. Eight loans, constituting
10% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, compared to 21 at Moody's last review.

Sixteen loans, constituting 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a minimal
realized loss. One loan, constituting 1% of the pool, is currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Indiana Mall loan ($13.9 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is
secured by an approximately 457,000 square feet (SF) regional mall
located in Indiana, Pennsylvania. Prior anchors included Sears,
Kmart, and Bon-Ton. The property is currently anchored by J.C.
Penney (14% of net rentable area (NRA)). Harbor Freight Tools and
Sobex Fitness LLC recently signed leases at the property in 2018
and 2019, respectively, and account for 7.1% of NRA. As of December
2018, the property was 35% occupied. A foreclosure complaint has
been filed and potential resolution to the loan's default status
are under discussions.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, and has
estimated an aggregate loss of $10.2 million (a 60% expected loss
on average) from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2018 operating results for 89% of the
pool and partial year 2019 operating results for 83% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 97%, the same as at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.58X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 31% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 11 West 42nd Street loan ($150.0 million --
14.2% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$300.0 million interest-only mortgage loan. The loan is secured by
a 33-story office building located in the Grand Central submarket
of Manhattan, New York. Michael Kors and CIT Group account for 28%
and 22% of NRA, respectively. The CIT Group has recently renewed a
large portion of their space for an additional 15 years and the
2018 and 2019 financials will be impacted due to a free rent
period. As of March 2019, the property was 90% leased, compared to
91% in December 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and
0.95X, respectively, the same as the last review.

The second largest loan is the ELS Portfolio loan ($99.2 million --
9.4% of the pool), which is currently secured by twelve
manufactured housing and RV sites totaling 5,849 pads. The
properties are located across four states (Florida, Texas, Maine,
and Arizona) with the highest concentration in Florida (57% of
pads). Subsequent to an April 2018 modification, one property with
424 pads was released and two properties with combined pads of 619
were added to the portfolio. As of March 2019, the portfolio
occupancy was 85%. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.15X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the W Chicago - City Center Hotel loan
($79.3 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
403-room, full-service, luxury hotel located in the Loop of
Chicago, Illinois. The property underwent renovation from December
2017 to April 2018 which impacted the 2018 financials, and the loan
is currently on the watchlist. As of December 2018, the hotel was
72% occupied and had a revenue per available room (RevPar) of $183,
compared to an occupancy and RevPar of 74% and $185, respectively,
in 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.19X at the last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2019-PJ2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-PJ2 (the Certificates)
issued by GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ2 as follows:

-- $451.0 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $451.0 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.8 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.8 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.3 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.3 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.8 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $495.9 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $495.9 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $495.9 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.8 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.3 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $112.8 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $9.0 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $8.0 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $4.5 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.6 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-3, A-X-5, and A-X-7 are interest-only
certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a combination of
exchange certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7 and A-8 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
the senior support certificates (Classes A-3 and A-4) with respect
to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.55% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.80%, 3.10%, 1.60%, 0.75% and 0.45% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of prime,
first-lien, fixed-rate residential mortgages funded by the issuance
of the Certificates. The Certificates are backed by 791 loans with
a total principal balance of $530,631,934 as of the Cut-Off Date
(July 1, 2019).

The originators for the mortgage pool are Flagstar Bank, FSB
(52.8%), loanDepot.com, LLC (18.8%) and various other originators,
each comprising less than 10.0% of the mortgage loans. Goldman
Sachs Mortgage Company is the Sponsor and the Mortgage Loan Seller
of the transaction.

NewRez LLC doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will
service all mortgage loans within the pool. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as the Master
Servicer, Securities Administrator and Custodian. U.S. Bank Trust
National Association will serve as Delaware Trustee. Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC will serve as the representations and warranties
(R&W) File Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years and a
weighted-average (WA) loan age of eight months. Approximately 16.3%
of the loans in the pool are conforming, high-balance mortgage
loans that were primarily underwritten by Caliber Home Loans, Inc.
(9.9% of the aggregate pool) and Homebridge Financial Services Inc.
(7.2% of the aggregate pool) using an automated underwriting system
designated by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and were eligible for
purchase by such agencies. The remaining 83.7% of the loans in the
pool are traditional, non-agency, prime jumbo mortgage loans.
Details on the underwriting of conforming loans can be found in the
Key Probability of Default Drivers section of the related report.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

This transaction employs an R&W framework that contains certain
weaknesses, such as materiality factors, some unrated R&W
providers, knowledge qualifiers and sunset provisions that allow
for certain R&Ws to expire within three to five years after the
Closing Date. The framework is perceived by DBRS to be limiting
compared with traditional lifetime R&W standards in certain
DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the perceived weaknesses in
the R&W framework, DBRS reduced the originator scores in this pool.
A lower originator score results in increased default and loss
assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JP MORGAN 2016-JP3: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-JP3 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

JPMCC 2016-JP3

                        Current Rating         Prior Rating
Class A-2 46590RAB5;   LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class A-3 46590RAC3;   LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 46590RAD1;   LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class A-5 46590RAE9;   LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 46590RAJ8;   LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class A-SB 46590RAF6;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class B 46590RAK5;     LT AA-sf  Affirmed;   previously at AA-sf
Class C 46590RAL3;     LT A-sf   Affirmed;   previously at A-sf
Class D 46590RAP4;     LT BBB-sf Affirmed;   previously at BBB-sf
Class E 46590RAR0;     LT BBsf   Affirmed;   previously at BBsf
Class F 46590RAT6;     LT B-sf   Affirmed;   previously at B-sf
Class X-A 46590RAG4;   LT AAAsf  Affirmed;   previously at AAAsf
Class X-B 46590RAH2;   LT AA-sf  Affirmed;   previously at AA-sf
Class X-C 46590RAM1;   LT BBB-sf Affirmed;   previously at BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The overall pool
performance remains stable from issuance with the majority of the
pool continuing to perform as expected. There are currently no
specially serviced loans.  Four loans (8.9% of the pool) are
designated Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs).

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC is the 1 Kaiser Plaza loan
(5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 530,000 sf office
property located in Oakland, CA. As of the December 2018 rent roll,
the property was 93.5% leased.   The largest tenant is Kaiser
Permanente (Kaiser; rated AA-), which leases approximately 70% of
the NRA through Feruary 2027, per the most recent rent roll. While
it was reported early last year that Kaiser contracted a portion of
its space, the most recent rent roll does not reflect any reduction
in its square footage.  Kaiser has two options remaining to
terminate or contract additional portions of its space in 2023 and
2025.  Per recent news reporting, Kaiser announced that it would be
consolidating all Oakland area office space into one location for
which they are expected to break ground in 2020.   No further
update on the status of Kaiser has been provided by the servicer.
The loan continues to perform with a servicer reported YE 2018 NOI
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.52x.  Fitch will continue
to monitor leasing developments at the property.

The next largest FLOC is the Fountains on the Bayou loan (1.9%),
which is secured by a multifamily property located in Houston, TX,
that suffered damage from Hurricane Harvey as well as subsequent
fire damage. Most recent performance, which likely reflects down
units, has been poor. The TTM March 2019 servicer reported NOI DSCR
was 0.67x, a slight increase from YE 2018 at 0.54x.   All
renovation work was scheduled to be completed last year, and an
update has been requested from the servicer.  

The other two FLOCs are secured by hotels.   The Hilton Garden Inn
Ridgefield Park loan (1.5%) has seen NOI decline from $2.4 million
at YE 2016 and $2.7 million at YE 2017 to $1.2 million for YE 2018.
The servicer reported NOI DSCR for YE 2018 was 0.98x. A request was
submitted to the servicer for a further explanation of the
performance decline, but no response has been received to date.
The other FLOC is the Best Western Ellenberg loan (0.4%), which was
recently transferred back to the master servicer. The loan had
previously transferred to special servicing in October 2018 due to
non-monetary default.  The loan had failed servicer required DSCR
testing and the borrower disputed the tests results. Most recent
financial reporting is positive with a YE 2018 servicer reported
NOI DSCR of 2.08x. Further, per the TTM May 2019 STR report, the
subject hotel is outperforming its competitive set with RevPAR
penetration of 123.3%.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement: As of the July 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
4.9% to $1.16 billion from $1.22 billion at issuance. Three loans
(3.6% of the pool at issuance) have paid in full, and two loans
(3.6%) have defeased.  The transaction has below average scheduled
amortization; a significant concentration of the pool is full term
interest-only at 47.1% (13 loans) while an additional 14.1% of the
pool (seven loans) remains in their partial interest-only periods.
No loans are scheduled to mature until 2021 (5.7%); with the
majority of loans scheduled to mature in 2026 (92.6%).  

Additional Loss Consideration:  Fitch is concerned about the
possibility of an outsized loss on the 1 Kaiser Plaza loan should
Kaiser begin to significantly contract its presence at the
property. Fitch performed an additional sensitivity on the loan
that assumed a 25% loss; ratings were not impacted in this
scenario.

Credit Opinion Loans: At issuance, the largest loan in the pool and
the fourth largest loan in the pool, 9 West 57th Street (8.6% of
the pool) and Westfield San Francisco Centre (5.2% of the pool),
were assigned investment-grade credit opinions of 'AAAsf' and
'Asf', respectively, on a stand-alone basis. The assets both
continue to perform in line with expectations at issuance.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Loan Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 52.2% of the pool,
which is below the average for deals of similar vintage. The
highest property type concentration is office at 32.2%, followed by
mixed use at 20.1%, including Westfield San Francisco Centre, which
includes a regional mall component, and hotel at 17.3%.  Loans
secured solely by retail properties comprise only 12.7% of the
pool, including Opry Mills (6.9%), a regional outlet mall located
in Nashville, TN. Loans secured by properties located in New York
comprise 19.5% of the pool with California at 16.2%.

Above Average Property Quality: The pool's collateral quality is
considered better than other Fitch-rated transactions of similar
vintage. At issuance, approximately 60% of the properties inspected
by Fitch received a property quality grade of 'B+' or higher, while
four of the top six loans received a grade of 'A-' or better.


JP MORGAN 2019-BOLT: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. C Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 4
classes of CMBS securities, issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2019-BOLT, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-BOLT:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-CP*, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by a single loan secured by a
first lien commercial mortgage on a suburban office park in
Overland Park, KS that is home to the world headquarters of Sprint
Corporation, Inc. The property's 17 office buildings and three
support buildings comprise 3,577,933 SF of net rentable area (NRA)
and are situated on 190.4 acres. Sprint has been leasing space to
third party tenants since 2009, which now represent 32.8% of NRA.
As the largest tenant at the property, Sprint occupies 28.6% of NRA
under a ten-year lease, and another 31.7% under short term leases
that expire within the next 23 months. Overall, the property's NRA
is 94.6% leased to 28 tenants including WeWork (5.2% of NRA) which
has a substantially negotiated lease agreement that is expected to
be executed within 90 days of the loan's closing date. Its ratings
are based on the credit quality of the loans and the strength of
the securitization structure.

The trust loan is a two-year, floating-rate, interest-only
promissory note with one one-year extension option and an
outstanding principal balance of $202,387,000. The mortgage loan is
split into two promissory notes that include the $202,387,000 trust
loan and one non-trust pari passu note with an initial balance of
zero and a maximum principal amount of $22,267,000.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

Moody's DSCR is based on its assessment of the property's
stabilized NCF. The Moody's trust loan DSCR is 1.20X based on
in-place loan terms and the Moody's trust loan stressed DSCR is
0.83X based on a 9.25% constant. The trust loan balance of $202.387
Million represents a Moody's LTV ratio of 136.4%.

Notable strengths of the transaction include the superior asset
quality, Overland Park location, and experienced sponsorship.
Offsetting these strengths are the lack of diversity for this
single asset transaction, tenant concentration, high leverage and
the lack of operating history.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's and (b) must be construed solely
as a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.


JP MORGAN 2019-LTV2: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to 24 classes
of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Trust 2019-LTV2. The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B3
(sf).

The definitive rating on Class B-4 has been upgraded from the
provisional rating previously assigned to this class in order to
correct an error. In assigning the provisional rating, an error was
made in the derivation of macroeconomic forecasts used as an input
into the collateral analysis. The rating action reflects the
appropriate macroeconomic forecasts. Its expected loss in a base
scenario decreased from 1.10% at the time of provisional rating
assignment to 1.05% following the correction of the error.

The certificates are backed by 607 30-year, fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of $385,276,468 as
of the July 1, 2019 cut-off date. Conforming loans comprise only
0.5% of the pool balance. All the loans are subject to the
Qualified Mortgage (QM) and Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules and are
categorized as either QM-Safe Harbor or QM-Agency Safe Harbor.

JPMMT 2019-LTV2 is the third JPMMT transaction with the LTV
designation. The weighted average (WA) loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
the mortgage pool is approximately 88%, which is in line with those
of the other JPMMT LTV transactions, but higher than those of
previous JPMMT transactions which had WA LTVs of about 70% on
average.

United Shore Financial Services, LLC (United Shore) originated 77%
of the mortgage loans by balance. The remaining originators each
account for less than 5% of the aggregate principal balance of the
loans in the pool.

At closing, Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) and USAA
Federal Savings Bank (USAA) will be the named servicers for
approximately 99.5% and 0.5% of the aggregate stated unpaid
principal balance of the pool, respectively. Shellpoint will be an
interim servicer from the closing date until the servicing transfer
date, which is expected to occur on or about September 1, 2019.
After the servicing transfer date, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(Chase) will assume servicing responsibilities for the mortgage
loans previously serviced by Shellpoint. The servicing fee for
loans serviced by Shellpoint and Chase will be based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a $20 base servicing fee and
additional fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the master servicer
and Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) will be the securities administrator
and Delaware trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a typical
shifting interest structure that benefits from senior and
subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-LTV2

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 1.05%
in a base scenario and reaches 12.10% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default based on borrower debt-to-income ratios
(DTIs), borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership association
(HOA) properties in super lien states. The losses also include
adjustments for borrower and geographic concentration. Its final
loss estimates incorporate adjustments for origination quality and
the financial strength of representation & warranty (R&W)
providers.

Moody's bases its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
its evaluation of the origination quality and servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third-party due diligence and the
R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2019-LTV2 is a securitization of a pool of 607 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$385,276,468 as of the cut-off date, with a WA remaining term to
maturity of 356 months and a WA seasoning of 4 months. The WA
current FICO score of the borrowers in the pool is 759. The WA LTV
ratio of the mortgage pool is 88%, which is in line with those of
the other JPMMT LTV transactions, but higher than those of previous
JPMMT transactions which had WA LTVs of about 70% on average. All
loans have LTVs of between 80% and 90%, and about 74% of the loans
by balance have LTVs greater than 85%. None of the loans in the
pool have mortgage insurance. Consistent with previous JPMMT
transactions, the borrowers in the pool have a WA FICO score of 759
and a WA debt-to-income ratio of 35%. The WA mortgage rate of the
pool is 4.9%. The mortgage loans in the pool were originated mostly
in California (approximately 33% by loan balance).

United Shore originated 77% of the mortgage loans by balance. The
remaining originators each account for less than 5% of the
aggregate principal balance of the loans in the pool. About 75% of
the mortgage pool was originated under United Shore's High Balance
Nationwide program, in which, using the Desktop Underwriter (DU)
automated underwriting system, loans are underwritten to Fannie Mae
guidelines with overlays. The loans receive a DU Approve Ineligible
feedback due to the loan amount exceeding the GSE limit for certain
markets.

Servicing Arrangement

At closing, Shellpoint and USAA will be the named servicers for
99.5% and 0.5% of the aggregate stated unpaid principal balance of
the pool, respectively. Shellpoint will be an interim servicer from
the closing date until the servicing transfer date, which is
expected to occur on or about September 1, 2019. Chase will assume
servicing responsibilities for the mortgage loans previously
serviced by Shellpoint. Nationstar will be the master servicer.

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate given the servicers' extensive experience and
capabilities, as well as the presence of an experienced master
servicer to oversee the servicers.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for loans serviced by Shellpoint and Chase will
be based on a step-up incentive fee structure with a monthly base
fee of $20 per loan and additional fees for servicing delinquent
and defaulted loans.

By establishing a base servicing fee for performing loans that
increases with the delinquency of loans, the fee-for-service
structure aligns monetary incentives to the servicer with the costs
of the servicer. The servicer receives higher fees for
labor-intensive activities that are associated with servicing
delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they receive for
servicing a performing loan, which is less labor-intensive. The
fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and adequate for this
transaction because it better aligns the servicer's costs with the
deal's performance. Furthermore, higher fees for the more
labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these loans to another
servicer easier, should that become necessary. By contrast, in
typical RMBS transactions a servicer can take actions, such as
modifications and prolonged workouts, that increase the value of
its mortgage servicing rights.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $20 for all performing loans and increases according to the
delinquent and incentive fee schedules.

The delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from
the available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The Class
B-6 is first in line to absorb any increase in servicing costs
above the base servicing fee. Once the Class B-6 is written off,
the Class B-5 will absorb any increase in servicing costs. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Three third-party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, regulatory compliance and
data integrity reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool. The property
valuation portion of the TPR was conducted on a sample of 316
non-conforming loans out of 603 non-conforming loans using a
third-party collateral desk appraisal (CDA), broker price opinion
(BPO) or automated valuation model (AVM). A CDA, BPO or AVM was not
provided for the remaining 287 loans (about 45% of the aggregate
pool balance) because these loans were originated under United
Shore's High Balance Nationwide program and had a Collateral
Underwriter (CU) risk score less than or equal to 2.5. Moody's
considers the use of Collateral Underwriter for non-conforming
loans to be credit negative due to (1) the lack of human
intervention which increases the likelihood of missing emerging
risk trends, (2) the limited track record of the software and
limited transparency into the model and (3) GSE focus on non-jumbo
loans which may lower reliability on jumbo loan appraisals.
However, Moody's did not apply an adjustment to the loss for such
loans since the sample size and valuation result of the loans that
were reviewed using a third-party valuation product were
sufficient, and the original appraisal balances for such loans
(average of approximately $698,000) were not significantly higher
than that of appraisal values for GSE-eligible loans. In addition,
there were 55 loans for which the original appraisal was evaluated
using only an AVM. Moody's applied an adjustment to the loss for
such loans, since Moody's considers AVM valuations to be less
accurate than desk reviews and field reviews. Moody's considers the
use of AVM valuations to be credit negative due to inherent data
limitations that could adversely impact the reliability of AVM
results.

The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for most loans, no material compliance
issues, and no appraisal defects. The loans that had exceptions to
the originators' underwriting guidelines had strong documented
compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves,
high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms also
identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations related to
fees that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed.
Moody's did not make any adjustments to its expected or Aaa (sf)
loss levels due to the TPR results for compliance and credit.

JPMMT 2019-LTV2's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
the costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Its review of the R&W framework considers the financial strength of
the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers and sunsets)
and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. Moody's made no
adjustments to the loans for which J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition
Corp. (JPMMAC, an affiliate of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. which is
rated Aa2) and USAA (a subsidiary of USAA Capital Corporation which
is rated Aa1) provided R&Ws since they are affiliates of highly
rated entities. In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers are
unrated and/or financially weaker entities and Moody's applied an
adjustment to the loans for which these entities provided R&Ws.
JPMMAC will not backstop any R&W providers who may become
financially incapable of repurchasing mortgage loans.

For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MaxEx platform, MaxEx under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MaxEx to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in the JPMMT
transactions. Five Oaks Acquisition Corp. will backstop the
obligations of MaxEx with respect to breaches of the mortgage loan
representations and warranties made by MaxEx for 5.82% of the
mortgage loans acquired via the MaxEx platform.

Other Transaction Parties

The Delaware trustee and securities administrator is Citibank. The
custodian is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. As master servicer, Nationstar
is responsible for servicer oversight, the termination of servicers
and the appointment of successor servicers. Nationstar is committed
to act as successor servicer if no other successor servicer can be
engaged.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior floor and a subordinate floor. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero, i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. If there is a small number of
loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate can be reduced to
zero.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 1.75% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 12.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds benefit
from a floor. When the total current balance of a given subordinate
tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate tranches that
are junior to it amount to less than approximately 1.30% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


LSTAR COMMERCIAL 2014-2: DBRS Hikes Class G Certs to BB(high)
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the following classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-2 issued by LSTAR Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2014-2:

-- Class D to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class E to AA (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to BBB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class G to BB (high) (sf) from B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the transaction's overall healthy
performance, including significant collateral reduction since
issuance. At issuance, the transaction consisted of 208 loans,
including 203 seasoned loans purchased by the issuer from Fannie
Mae, two 2006 small-balance transactions and five newly originated
loans. According to the July 2019 remittance, the trust has a
current balance of $40.4 million, representing a collateral
reduction of approximately 85.6% due to the repayment of 127 loans
(including the five newly originated loans), scheduled loan
amortization and principal curtailments. Based on the most recent
net cash flow (NCF) reporting, the pool reported a weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.05
times (x) and 9.5%, respectively. There have been WA NCF growth of
approximately 14.7% over DBRS NCF figures. The Top 15 loans (43.9%
of the pool) reported a 4.2% increase in NCF over the DBRS NCF
figures from issuance and a WA debt yield of 10.5%. The WA
remaining term to maturity for the pool is 16.5 years, while the
top 15 loans have a WA outstanding remaining term of 17.0 years.

According to the July 2019 remittance, there are two loans (1.1% of
the pool) in special servicing and four loans (7.6% of the pool) on
the servicer's watchlist. The Berkley Apartments loan (Prospectus
ID#185, 0.5% of the pool) was transferred to the special servicer
in May 2017; DBRS analyzed this loan under a hypothetical
liquidation scenario at an estimated loss severity just under
50.0%. The 59 Samsonville Road loan (Prospectus ID#186, 0.5% of the
pool) was transferred to the special servicer in May 2017; DBRS
analyzed this loan based on issuance analysis results. The largest
loan at issuance, 399 Jefferson (Prospectus ID#1, previously 44.5%
of the pool) repaid from the trust with the June 2019 remittance.
With the repayment from the trust, the loan sustained a loss of
$518,430.

DBRS materially deviated from its "North American CMBS Surveillance
Methodology" when determining the ratings assigned to Class F and
Class G, which deviated from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative results. DBRS considers a material deviation from a
methodology to exist when there may be a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor or other users of the credit ratings
would consider the material deviation to be a significant factor in
evaluating the ratings. The material deviations are warranted given
uncertain loan-level event risk.

Notes: All figures are in U.S dollars unless otherwise noted.


N-STAR REL VI: Fitch Lowers Rating on $19.9MM Class J Debt to CCsf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgrade one and affirmed one class of N-Star
REL CDO VI, Ltd./LLC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pool Concentration; Adverse Selection: The downgrade of class J
reflects a greater certainty of loss; default of this class is
considered probable.

Due to concentration and adverse selection concerns, a look-through
analysis of the remaining pool was the determining factor in the
rating actions. Class J, which continues to capitalize a portion of
its missed interest payment, is reliant on 'CCsf' rated collateral
to repay. Default of class K, which is capitalizing its entire
missed interest payment, is considered inevitable as it is expected
to be affected by losses from the defaulted assets.

The collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is highly concentrated
with only seven assets remaining. As of the June 2019 trustee
report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was invested in three
commercial real estate (CRE) loans (66.3% of pool) and four CRE CDO
bonds (33.7%). Fitch designated all three CRE loans and one of the
four CRE CDO bonds as assets of concern (combined, 67.9% of pool)
as they have either defaulted or are considered overleveraged.

High Loss Expectations: The pool's base case loss expectation is
86.3%. Fitch modeled a full loss on the three CREL assets, which
consist of a defaulted A-note (39.9% of pool) secured by
undeveloped land in the Poconos Mountains where the lender is
pursuing foreclosure; a defaulted B-note (22.4%) secured by a
leasehold interest on an office property in Cincinnati, OH; and a
highly leveraged mezzanine loan (4.0%) on an interest in a
portfolio of limited-service hotels across the U.S. The four CRE
CDO bonds from two obligors (CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust
2006-A and N-Star REL CDO VIII) are rated by Fitch as follows:
'BBsf' (3.0%), 'Bsf' (19.4%), 'CCCsf' (9.7%) and 'CCsf' (1.6%).

The CRE CDO is managed by NS Advisors, LLC, which was previously a
wholly owned subsidiary of NorthStar Realty Finance Corp. (NRF). In
January 2017, NRF, along with Northstar Asset Management, merged
with Colony Capital, Inc. to form Colony Northstar Inc.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Upgrades are not expected due to the concentration and adverse
selection of the remaining pool. Downgrades may occur should the
ratings of the CRE CDO bonds migrate downward, further losses be
realized or a default occurs at or prior to legal final maturity.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following class:

  -- $19.9 million class J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 55%.

Fitch has affirmed the following class:

  -- $18.7 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 through H notes were paid in full. Fitch does not
rate the income notes.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2019-RPL2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2019-RPL2 (the Notes) to be issued by
New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-RPL2 (NRMLT or the
Trust):

-- $272.7 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $25.7 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $24.9 million Class M-1 at A (sf)
-- $20.4 million Class M-2 at BBB (sf)
-- $15.4 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $10.7 million Class B-2 at B (sf)
-- $298.5 million Class A-3 at AA (sf)
-- $323.3 million Class A-4 at A (sf)

Classes A-3 and A-4 are exchangeable notes. These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable notes as
specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects the 36.40% of
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated Notes in the pool.
The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect
30.40%, 24.60%, 19.85%, 16.25% and 13.75% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 2,667 loans with a total principal balance of
$428,820,751 as of the Cut-Off Date (June 30, 2019).

The portfolio is approximately 152 months seasoned and contains
91.0% modified loans. The modifications happened more than two
years ago for 79.2% of the modified loans. Within the pool, 825
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equate
to 7.7% of the total principal balance.

As of the Cut-off Date, 68.7% of the pool is current, 24.4% is 30
days delinquent and 1.3% is 60 days delinquent under the Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency method. Additionally, 5.6% of
the pool is in bankruptcy (all bankruptcy loans are performing, 30
days delinquent or 60 days delinquent under the MBA delinquency
method). Approximately 26.2% and 54.1% of the loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least 24 months and 12
months, respectively, under the MBA delinquency method. All but
0.4% of the pool is exempt from the Ability-to-Repay/Qualified
Mortgage (QM) rules. These loans are designated as Temporary QM
Safe Harbor.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor VII LLC (NRZ), acquired the loans in a
whole loan purchase or in connection with the termination of a
securitization trust prior to the Closing Date and, through an
affiliate, New Residential Funding 2019-RPL2 LLC (the Depositor),
will contribute the loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, New
Residential Investment Corp., or a majority-owned affiliate, will
acquire and retain a 5.0% eligible vertical interest to satisfy the
credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. These loans were originated and previously serviced by
various entities through purchases in the secondary market.

The loans will be serviced by NewRez, LLC doing business as
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (60.3%), Fay Servicing LLC (Fay
Servicing, 36.0%) and Nationstar Mortgage LLC doing business as Mr.
Cooper Group, Inc. (Mr. Cooper, 3.7%). Approximately 35.1% of the
aggregate pool currently serviced by Mr. Cooper is scheduled to
transfer to Fay Servicing on August 1, 2019.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
with respect to the preservation, inspection, restoration,
protection and repair of a mortgaged property, including delinquent
tax and insurance payments, the enforcement or judicial proceedings
associated with a mortgage loan and the management and liquidation
of properties (to the extent such advances are deemed recoverable
by the related servicer).

NRZ, as the Seller, will have the option to repurchase any loan
that becomes 60 or more days delinquent under the MBA method or any
real estate-owned property acquired in respect of a mortgage loan
at a price equal to the principal balance of the loan (Optional
Repurchase Price), provided that such repurchases will be limited
to 10.0% of the principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the
Cut-Off Date.

As a loss mitigation alternative, each Servicer has the right to
sell (or cause to be sold) mortgage loans that become 60 or more
days delinquent under the MBA method to any party in the secondary
market in an arms-length transaction at fair market value to
maximize proceeds on such loan on a present value basis.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds and excess interest can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M-1
and more subordinate bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds
until the more senior classes are retired.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially, and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2019-RPL2: Moody''s Gives (P)B3 Rating to B-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to 8 classes
of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-RPL2.
The NRMLT 2019-RPL2 transaction is a $428.8 million securitization
of 2,667 first lien, seasoned performing and re-performing mortgage
loans with weighted average seasoning of 152 months, a weighted
average updated LTV ratio of 77.5% and a weighted average non-zero
updated FICO score of 623. Approximately 91% of the loans by
scheduled balance have been previously modified and about 95% are
fixed-rate mortgages. Based on MBA methodology, approximately 26%
of the loans by scheduled balance have been continuously current
for the last 24 months. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint),
Fay Servicing LLC (Fay) and Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar)
will act as the primary servicers on 60.3%, 36.0% and 3.7% of the
loans by scheduled balance, respectively. Nationstar will act as
master servicer and successor servicer.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-RPL2

Cl. A-1, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Provisional Rating Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Its losses on the collateral pool equal 12.00% in an expected case
and 36.00% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa (sf) ratings.
Moody's based its expected losses for the pool on its estimates of
(1) the default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and (2)
the principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. The final
expected losses for the pool reflect the third-party review (TPR)
findings and its assessment of the representations and warranties
(R&Ws) framework for this transaction. Also, the transaction
contains a mortgage loan sale provision, the exercise of which is
subject to potential conflicts of interest. As a result of this
provision, Moody's increased its expected losses for the pool.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to its surveillance approach. Under this approach, Moody's
applies expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool. Its assumptions for the expected annual
delinquency rate and CPR are based on the observed performance of
agency-eligible seasoned modified and non-modified loans and the
collateral attributes of the pool including the percentage of loans
that were delinquent in the past 36 months. Its expected loss
severity rate is based on the observed loss severity performance of
seasoned modified and non-modified loans. For this pool, Moody's
used default burnout assumptions similar to those detailed in its
"US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated
pre-2005. Moody's then aggregated the delinquencies and converted
them to losses by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency
and loss severity assumptions. Since the overall profile of this
pool is more similar to RPL pools, Moody's applied similar RPL loss
assumptions to this pool to derive collateral losses.

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2019-RPL2 is a securitization of 2,667 seasoned performing
and re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor VII LLC, acquired mostly via whole loan purchase. Similar
to prior NRMLT transactions Moody's has rated, a majority of the
collateral was previously in securitizations that have been
terminated. Approximately 91.0% of the loans had previously been
modified, 95.0% are fixed-rate mortgage loans, 2.7% are step-rate
mortgage loans and 2.3% are adjustable-rate mortgage loans.

The updated value of properties in this pool were provided by a
third-party firm using a home data index (HDI) or an updated broker
price opinion (BPO). BPOs were provided for 1,790 loans accounting
for approximately 67% of the aggregate pool balance and HDIs were
provided for 877 loans comprising about 33% of the aggregate pool
balance. In its analysis, Moody's calculated LTV ratios using the
BPO in all cases where it is available and applied a haircut to
HDIs in cases where a BPO is not available. The weighted average
updated LTV ratio on the collateral is 77.5%.

Third-Party Review (TPR) and Representations & Warranties (R&W)

One third party due diligence provider, AMC, conducted a compliance
review, data integrity review and payment history review on an
initial population of 2,687 mortgage loans which included all the
mortgage loans in the pool. The regulatory compliance review
consisted of a review of compliance with the federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) as implemented by Regulation Z, the federal Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) as implemented by
Regulation X, the disclosure requirements and prohibitions of
Section 50(a)(6), Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, federal,
state and local anti-predatory regulations, federal and state
specific late charge and prepayment penalty regulations, and
document review.

AMC found that 1,244 mortgage loans had compliance or documentation
exceptions with 285 having rating agency grade C or D level
exceptions. Based on its analysis of the TPR reports, Moody's
determined that a portion of the loans with some cited violations
are at enhanced risk of having violated TILA through an
under-disclosure of the finance charges or other disclosure
deficiencies. Although the TPR report indicated that the statute of
limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has already
passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense
against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that
can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. Such damages
include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees
and other actual damages. Moody's increased its losses for these
loans to account for the risk of such damages.

AMC conducted a title review (2,612 loans) or a lien search review
(75 loans) on all the mortgage loans in the pool in order to
confirm the first lien position of the related mortgages. Overall,
AMC's review confirmed that 2,434 mortgages were in first lien
position. For the remaining loans reviewed by AMC, proof of first
lien position could only be confirmed using the final title policy
as of loan origination for 25 loans and 228 loans had critical
findings. The sponsor makes a representation as to the validity and
enforceability of the mortgage loan as first lien on the related
property, except in the case of specified encumbrances as listed in
the offering document. Moody's considers this representation to be
a strong mitigating factor to the critical findings of the title
and lien review.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor VII LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files. To the extent that the master
servicer, related servicer or depositor has actual knowledge, or a
responsible officer of the Indenture Trustee has received written
notice, of a defective or missing mortgage loan document or a
breach of a representation or warranty regarding the completeness
of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the mortgage loan
documents, and such missing document, defect or breach is
preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization against the
related mortgaged property through foreclosure or similar loss
mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title claim under the
related title insurance policy, the party with such actual
knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the seller, indenture trustee,
depositor, master servicer and related servicer. Upon notification
of a missing or defective mortgage loan file, the seller will have
120 days from the date it receives such notification to deliver the
missing document or otherwise cure the defect or breach. If it is
unable to do so, the seller will be obligated to replace or
repurchase the mortgage loan.

Unlike previous NRMLT transactions Moody's has rated, the seller's
obligation to cure or repurchase any mortgage loan for which a
material breach of the R&Ws (other than those with respect to the
REMIC reps) has occurred is in effect for only twelve months after
closing, after which the only recourse available to noteholders
upon the occurrence of a material breach of the R&Ws will be funds
in the breach reserve account. The breach reserve account will have
a balance of $0 at closing and, for each payment date, will build
to a target of the sum of (i) 0.375% of the Class A-1 note balance,
(ii) 0.250% of the Class A-2 note balance, (iii) 0.125% of the
Class M-1 note balance, and (iv) 0.050% and the Class M-2 note
balance immediately prior to each payment date. The initial target
amount on the closing date will be $1,128,333.25. Moody's took the
R&W sunset provision into consideration in determining its expected
loss on the pool.

Trustee, Custodians, Paying Agent, Servicers, Master Servicer, and
Successor Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A and U.S. Bank National Association. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by Citibank,
N.A. In addition, Nationstar, as master servicer, is responsible
for servicer oversight, termination of servicers, and the
appointment of successor servicers. Having Nationstar as a master
servicer mitigates servicing-related risk due to the performance
oversight that it will provide. Nationstar will serve as the
designated successor servicer for each of the servicers other than
Nationstar.

Shellpoint, Fay and Nationstar will act as the primary servicers on
60.3%, 36.0% and 3.7% of the loans by scheduled balance,
respectively. Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement
to be adequate.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a sequential priority of
payments, in which a given class of notes can only receive
principal payments once all the classes of notes above it have been
paid off. Losses will be applied in reverse order of priority.
Monthly available excess spread can be used to pay principal on the
notes sequentially.

Moody's coded the transaction cash flows using its proprietary
cashflow tool. To assess the final ratings on the notes, Moody's
ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios. The scenarios
encompass six loss levels, four loss timing curves, and four
prepayment curves.

Other Considerations

The transaction contains a mortgage loan sale provision, the
exercise of which is subject to potential conflicts of interest.
The servicers in the transaction may sell mortgage loans that
become 60 or more days delinquent according to the MBA methodology
to any party in the secondary market in an arms-length transaction
and at a fair market value. For such sale to take place, the
related servicer must determine, in its reasonable commercial
judgment, that such sale would maximize proceeds on a present value
basis. If the sponsor or any of its subsidiaries is the purchaser,
the related servicer must obtain at least two additional
independent bids. The transaction documents provide little detail
on the method of receipt of bids and there is no set minimum sale
price. Such lack of detail creates a risk that the independent bids
could be weak bids from purchasers that do not actively participate
in the market. Furthermore, the transaction documents provide
little detail regarding how servicers should conduct present value
calculations when determining if a note sale should be pursued. The
servicer in the transaction, Nationstar, has a commercial
relationship with the sponsor outside of the transaction. These
business arrangements could lead to conflicts of interest. Moody's
took this into account and adjusted its losses accordingly.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the indenture trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believes that NRMLT
2019-RPL2 is adequately protected against such risk primarily
because the loans in this transaction are highly seasoned. Although
some loans in the pool were previously delinquent and modified, the
loans all have a substantial history of payment performance. This
includes payment performance during the recent recession. As such,
if loans in the pool were materially defective, such issues would
likely have been discovered prior to the securitization.
Furthermore, third-party due diligence was conducted on all the
loans for issues such as data integrity, compliance, and title. As
such, Moody's did not apply adjustments in this transaction to
account for indemnification payment risk.

In addition, prior to closing, the collateral pool has
approximately $1,827,209 of unreimbursed servicing advances such as
taxes and insurance. The mortgage borrower is responsible for
reimbursing the servicer for the pre-existing servicing advances.
The servicer may choose to set the pre-existing advances as escrow
to be repaid by the borrower as part of monthly mortgage payments.
However, in the event the borrower defaults on the mortgage prior
to fully repaying the pre-existing servicing advances, the servicer
will recoup the outstanding amount of pre-existing advances from
the loan liquidation proceeds. The amount of pre-existing servicing
advances represents approximately 0.43% of total pool balance. As
borrowers make monthly mortgage payments, this amount would likely
decrease. Moreover, its loan loss severity assumption incorporates
reimbursement of servicing advances from liquidation proceeds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from its original expectations
as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above its original expectations as
a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


NRZ ADVANCE 2015-ON1: S&P Rates $4.468MM Class E-T1 Notes 'BB (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to NRZ Advance Receivables
Trust 2015-ON1's $400 million advance receivables-backed notes
series 2019-T1.

The note issuance is a servicer advance transaction backed by
servicer advance reimbursements and accrued and unpaid servicing
fees.

The ratings reflect:

-- The strong likelihood of reimbursement of servicer advance
receivables given the priority of such reimbursement payments;

-- The transaction's revolving period, during which collections or
draws on the outstanding variable-funding note may be used to fund
additional advance receivables, and the specified eligibility
requirements, collateral value exclusions, credit enhancement test
(the collateral test), and amortization triggers intended to
maintain pool quality and credit enhancement during this period;

-- The transaction's use of predetermined, rating
category-specific advance rates for each receivable type in the
pool that discount the receivables, which are non-interest bearing,
to satisfy the interest obligations on the notes, as well as
provide for dynamic overcollateralization;

-- The projected timing of reimbursements of the servicer advance
receivables, which, in the 'AAA', 'AA', and 'A' scenarios, reflects
S&P's assumption that the servicer would be replaced, while in the
'BBB' and 'BB' scenarios, reflects the servicer's historical
reimbursement experience;

-- The credit enhancement in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, and the series reserve accounts;

-- The timely interest and full principal payments made under
S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios consistent with the
assigned ratings; and

-- The transaction's sequential turbo payment structure that
applies during any full amortization period.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  NRZ Advance Receivables Trust 2015-ON1 Series 2019-T1
  Class       Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-T1        AAA (sf)            328.841
  B-T1        AA (sf)              12.223
  C-T1        A (sf)               14.286
  D-T1        BBB (sf)             40.182
  E-T1        BB (sf)               4.468


OBX TRUST 2019-EXP2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class B-5 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to OBX 2019-EXP2 Trust.

The notes are supported by 737 loans with a total unpaid principal
balance of approximately $463.4 million as of the cut-off date. The
pool consists of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs) acquired by Annaly Capital Management, Inc. from
various originators and aggregators. Distributions of principal and
interest and loss allocations are based on a traditional
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest Y-structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A notes reflects the 11.00%
subordination provided by the 1.05% class B-1, 5.15% class B-2,
2.15% class B-3, 1.30% class B-4, 0.50% class B-5 and 0.85% class
B-6 notes.

OBX 2019-EXP2

                   Current Rating         Prior Rating  
Class 1-A-1;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-10;  LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-2;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-3;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-4;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-5;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-6;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-7;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-8;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-9;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-IO1; LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-IO2; LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-IO3; LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-IO4; LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-IO5; LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 1-A-IO6; LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 2-A-1;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 2-A-1A;  LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 2-A-1B;  LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 2-A-2;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 2-A-3;   LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class 2-A-IO;  LT  AAAsf  New Rating;  previously at AAA(EXP)sf
Class B-1;     LT  AA-sf  New Rating;  previously at AA-(EXP)sf
Class B-2;     LT  Asf    New Rating;  previously at A(EXP)sf
Class B-3;     LT  BBBsf  New Rating;  previously at BBB(EXP)sf
Class B-4;     LT  BBsf   New Rating;  previously at BB(EXP)sf
Class B-5;     LT  Bsf    New Rating;  previously at B(EXP)sf
Class B-6;     LT  NRsf   New Rating;  previously at NR(EXP)sf
Class B1-A;    LT  AA-sf  New Rating;  previously at AA-(EXP)sf
Class B1-IO;   LT  AA-sf  New Rating;  previously at AA-(EXP)sf
Class B2-A;    LT  Asf    New Rating;  previously at A(EXP)sf
Class B2-IO;   LT  Asf    New Rating;  previously at A(EXP)sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists primarily
of 30-year fixed-rate and adjustable-rate fully amortizing loans to
borrowers with strong credit profiles, relatively low leverage and
large liquid reserves. The loans are seasoned an average of 20
months.

The pool has a weighted average (WA) model FICO score of 754, high
average balance of $628,772 and a low sustainable loan-to-value
(sLTV) ratio of 64.3%. However, the pool also contains a meaningful
amount of investor properties (23%), non-qualified mortgage
(non-QM) or higher-priced qualified mortgage (HPQM) loans (65%),
and non-full documentation loans (53%). Fitch's loss expectations
reflect the higher default risk associated with these attributes as
well as loss severity adjustments for potential ability-to-repay
(ATR) challenges.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is
well-controlled in this transaction. Annaly employs an effective
loan aggregation process and has an 'Average' assessment from
Fitch. Approximately 67% of the loans are being serviced by Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), which is rated 'RPS1-', and the
remaining 33% is being serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC
(SLS), which is rated 'RPS2' for this product. The issuer's
retention of at least 5% of the bonds helps ensure an alignment of
interest between issuer and investor.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch considers
the transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier 2 quality. The RW&Es
are being provided by Onslow Bay Financial, LLC, which does not
have a financial credit opinion or public rating from Fitch. While
an automatic review can be triggered by loan delinquencies and
losses, the triggers can toggle on and off from period to period.
Additionally, a high threshold of investors is needed to direct the
trustee to initiate a review. The Tier 2 framework and non-rated
counterparty resulted in a loss penalty of 66 bps AAAsf.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Positive): A very low incidence of
material defects was found in the third-party credit, compliance
and valuation due diligence performed on 100% of the pool. A third
party review (TPR) was conducted by AMC, Clayton and Opus; both AMC
and Clayton are assessed by Fitch as 'Acceptable - Tier 1' and Opus
is assessed as 'Acceptable - Tier 2'. The due diligence results are
in line with industry averages, and based on loan count, 98% were
graded 'A' or 'B'. Since loan exceptions either had strong
mitigating factors or were accounted for in Fitch's loan loss
model, no additional adjustments were made. The model credit for
the high percentage of loan level due diligence combined with the
adjustments for loan exceptions reduced the 'AAAsf' loss
expectation by 28 bps.

Servicing Advancing (Neutral): Advances of delinquent P&I will be
made on the mortgage loans for the first 120 days of delinquency to
the extent such advances are deemed recoverable. P&I advances will
be made from amounts on deposit for future distribution, the excess
servicing strip fee that would otherwise be allocable to the class
A-IO-S notes and the P&I advancing party fee. If such amounts are
insufficient, the P&I advancing party (Onslow Bay Financial LLC)
will be responsible for any remaining amounts. In the event the
underlying obligations are not fulfilled, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(Wells Fargo), as master servicer, will be required to made
advances.

High California Concentration (Negative): Approximately 53% of the
pool is located in California, which is higher than many other
recent Fitch-rated transactions. In addition, the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) concentration is large, as the top three
MSAs (Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco) account for 51.4% of
the pool. As a result, a geographic concentration penalty of 1.09x
was applied to the probability of default (PD).

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocations are based on a traditional senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest Y-structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The applicable
credit support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal
to classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the
pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor
of 1.75% of the original balance will be maintained for the notes.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the notes.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$275,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full.


PRESTIGE AUTO 2019-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1
(PART 2019-1 or the Issuer):

-- $51,400,000 Class A-1 Notes rated R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $117,000,000 Class A-2 Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $59,950,000 Class A-3 Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $40,940,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $47,010,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $38,580,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $10,380,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the reserve account and excess
spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumptions under
various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS performed an operational risk review of Prestige Financial
Services, Inc. (Prestige) and considers the entity an acceptable
originator and servicer of subprime auto receivables. Additionally,
the transaction has an acceptable backup servicer.

-- Prestige's management team has extensive experience. They have
been lending to the subprime auto sector since 1994 and have
considerable experience lending to Chapter 7 and 13 obligors.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
Prestige's auto loan portfolio.

-- DBRS base-case cumulative net loss (CNL) assumed for modeling
purposes was 14.30%. Prestige shared vintage CNL data with DBRS
that dates back to 2009. The data was broken down by credit tier,
payment-to-income ratio, and other buckets. The analysis indicated
a pattern of increasing losses that were consistent with expected
trends.

-- Prestige continues to evaluate and adjust its underwriting
standards as necessary to target and maintain the credit quality of
its loan portfolio.

-- DBRS rating category loss multiples for each rating assigned
are within the published criteria.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Prestige, that the trust has a
valid first-priority security interest in the assets and
consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured
Finance."

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ROCKFORD TOWER 2019-2: Moody's Rates $9MM Class F Notes 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to six classes of notes
issued by Rockford Tower CLO 2019-2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  US$325,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2032 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

  US$54,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2032 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  US$24,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

  US$31,750,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  US$25,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2032 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  US$9,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2032 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

Rockford Tower CLO 2019-2, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO. The
issued notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 92%
ramped as of the closing date.

Rockford Tower Capital Management, L.L.C. will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2713

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


SACO TRUST 2005-3: Moody's Hikes Class M-3 Debt Rating to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of six tranches from
six transactions and downgraded one tranche from one transaction,
backed by Second Lien and Manufactured Housing RMBS loans, issued
by multiple issuers.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 1998-A

M, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2018 Upgraded to Aa3
(sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1999-B

A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2018 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-A

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2018 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-S4

Cl. M6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrade is a result of an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrade for Class
A-2 from OMI Trust 2002-A reflects the expectation that this
tranche is unlikely to be paid in full prior to its final scheduled
distribution date in March 2020.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.7% in June 2019 from 4.0% in June
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-3: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt (P)B1(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Sequoia
Mortgage Trust 2019-3. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans, including 133 agency high
balance mortgage loans. The assets of the trust consist of 510
fully amortizing, fixed-rate mortgage loans. The borrowers in the
pool have high FICO scores, significant equity in their properties
and liquid cash reserves. Nationstar Mortgage LLC will serve as the
master servicer for this transaction. There are four servicers for
this pool: Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (85.5% by loan balance),
First Republic Bank (13.6%), HomeStreet Bank (0.8%) and TIAA, FSB
(0.2%).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2019-3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.35% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings. Its loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to its Aaa stress loss below the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregation and origination quality. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2019-3 transaction is a securitization of 510 first-lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $371,184,988. There are 90 originators in this pool with
United Shore Financial Services, LLC (United Shore, 14.7%) and
First Republic Bank (13.6%) being the largest. None of the
originators other than United Shore and First Republic Bank
contributed 10% or more of the principal balance of the loans in
the pool. There is approximately 6% of the pool by loan balance (33
loans) is seasoned over 18-months with weighted average seasoning
of about four years, compared to 46% (318 loans) for SEMT 2019-2
with similar average seasoning. Moody's analyzed these loans taking
into consideration borrower payment history, additional mortgages
taken by the borrower since origination of the first lien loans and
updated FICO scores to arrive at its loss levels.

Moody's received information on the total debt for the seasoned
loans post-origination with only 13 loans showing additional liens
after origination. However, given the amount of seasoned loans is
not substantial compared to previous transaction and given the
loans have been current for since origination Moody's did not make
any adjustment. Additionally, it should be noted that at some point
in time the junior lien loans may or may not have been paid in full
at the time of this transaction. Moody's did not receive updated
property values for 20 of the seasoned loans. Of note, Redwood
Residential Acquisition Corporation (Redwood) will provide
representation and warranty that all mortgaged properties are in
substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the
appraisal. However, to account for the uncertainties of property
values for these seasoned loans Moody's made further adjustment to
its losses.

The loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed
credit underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood will backstop the rep and warranty repurchase
obligation of all originators other than First Republic Bank. The
loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation. Moody's considers Redwood, the mortgage loan seller,
to have strong aggregation and origination practices compared to
peers.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have a
demonstrated ability to save and to manage credit. In addition, the
69% of the borrowers in the pool have more than 24 months of liquid
cash reserves or enough money to pay the mortgage for two years
should there be an interruption to the borrower's cash flow.
Consistent with prudent credit management, the borrowers have high
FICO scores with a weighted average score of 769. In general, the
borrowers have high income, significant liquid assets and a stable
employment history, all of which have been verified as part of the
underwriting process and reviewed by the TPR firms. Borrowers also
have significant equity in their homes (WA original CLTV 70.8%)
consistent with recent SEMT transactions.

Approximately, 5.5% of the mortgage loans by aggregate stated
principal balance are secured by mortgaged properties located in
the areas that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had
designated for federal assistance during the prior 12 months.
Redwood has engaged a third party to inspect these properties. No
material visible damage was detected from the inspection and the
related mortgage was included in the transaction pool.
Representations and warranties as to the mortgage loans will have
been made to the effect that in general, the mortgage loans will be
free of material damage as of the closing date.

Structural considerations

Similar to recently rated Sequoia Mortgage Trust transactions, in
this transaction, Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the
servicer, or securities administrator, from advancing principal and
interest to loans that are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans
on which principal and interest advances are not made are called
the Stop Advance Mortgage Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML
will be removed from the principal and interest distribution
amounts calculations. In its opinion, the SAML feature strengthens
the integrity of senior and subordination relationships in the
structure. Yet, in certain scenarios the SAML feature, as
implemented in this transaction, can lead to a reduction in
interest payments to certain tranches even when more subordinated
tranches are outstanding. The senior/subordination relationship
between tranches is strengthened since the removal of SAML in the
calculation of the senior percentage amount directs more principal
to the senior bonds and less to the subordinate bonds. Further,
this feature limits the amount of servicer advances that could
increase the loss severity on the liquidated loans and preserves
the subordination amount for the most senior bonds. On the other
hand, this feature can cause a reduction in the interest
distribution amount paid to the bonds; and if that were to happen
such a reduction in interest payment is unlikely to be recovered.
The final ratings on the bonds take into consideration its expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that the
subordinate tranches could potentially permanently lose some
interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2019-3 will incur any losses from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the loans are of prime
quality and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the
subordinate classes and provides a back-stop to the representations
and warranties of all the originators except for First Republic
Bank, has a strong alignment of interest with investors, and is
incentivized to actively manage the pool to optimize performance.
Third, historical performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has
been very strong to date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably
well defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on
an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach
reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations and
warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which reduces
the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.85% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Three TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of nearly 100% of
the mortgage loans in the pool. Generally, the TPR firms conducted
a review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review loans"). The TPR firms randomly selected 66
mortgage loans for limited review that were originated by First
Republic Bank and PrimeLending.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believes that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase its Aaa stress
loss.

Original property valuation was verified using an additional
valuation tool including, but not limited to, Collateral Desktop
Analysis (CDA), field review, Broker Price Opinion (BPO),
Collateral Underwriter's (CU) score, and/or Automated Valuation
Model (AVM). Moody's applied a negative adjustment to two loans for
which property valuation was verified using AVM, since Moody's
considers AVMs to be typically less accurate than desk reviews and
field reviews.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's notes that
there are two loans with final grade 'D' due to escrow holdback
distribution amounts. The review for these loans was incomplete
because the related appraisals were subject to the completion of
renovation work or missing evidence of disbursement of escrow
funds. In the event the escrow funds greater than 10% have not been
disbursed within six months of the closing date, the seller shall
repurchase the affected escrow holdback mortgage loan, on or before
the date that is six months after the closing date at the
applicable repurchase price. There are three other loans with final
grade 'C' due to compliance related issues. One such mortgage loan
was related to escrow holdback. The other mortgage loans were
identified as having TRID related waiver as the total fee amount
exceeded the tolerance limit and borrower not receiving the initial
Closing Disclosure three days prior to consummation. Moody's did
not make any adjustment to the losses, as the seller has taken
steps to remediate both issues and Moody's deems these issues to be
not significant.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago were originated by various participating financial
institution originators. For these mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago
will provide the loan-level R&Ws that are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2019-3 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US
RMBS.

Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for
servicer oversight, and termination of servicers and for the
appointment of successor servicers. In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC is committed to act as successor if no other successor
servicer can be found. If servicers and the master servicer fail in
their obligation to fund any required advances, Citibank, N.A., as
the securities administrator will be obligated to do so.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


STWD LTD 2019-FL1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B (low) Rating on Cl. G Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Floating-Rate Notes, Series 2019-FL1 to be issued by STWD 2019-FL1,
Ltd.:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The initial collateral consists of 20 floating-rate mortgages and
one fixed-rate mortgage secured by 38 mostly transitional
properties, with a cut-off balance totaling $1.1 billion, excluding
approximately $116 million of future funding commitments. Most
loans are in a period of transition with plans to stabilize and
improve asset value. During the Reinvestment Period, the Issuer may
acquire future funding commitments and additional eligible loans
subject to the Eligibility Criteria. The transaction stipulates a
$5 million threshold on pari passu participation acquisitions
before a rating agency confirmation is required if there is already
participation of the underlying loan in the trust.

For the floating-rate loans, DBRS used the one-month LIBOR index,
which is based on the lower of a DBRS stressed rate that
corresponded to the remaining fully extended term of the loans or
the strike price of the interest rate cap with the respective
contractual loan spread added to determine a stressed interest rate
over the loan term. When the cut-off balances were measured against
the DBRS As-Is net cash flow (NCF), nine loans, comprising 37.7% of
the initial pool, had a DBRS As-Is debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) below 1.00 times (x), a threshold indicative of default
risk. Additionally, the DBRS Stabilized DSCR for two loans,
comprising 6.5% of the initial pool balance, is below 1.00x, which
is indicative of elevated refinance risk. The properties are often
transitioning with potential upside in cash flow; however, DBRS
does not give full credit to the stabilization if there are no
holdbacks or if other loan structural features in place are
insufficient to support such treatment. Furthermore, even with the
structure provided, DBRS generally does not assume the assets to
stabilize above market levels. The transaction will have a
sequential-pay structure.

The loans are generally secured by traditional property types
(i.e., retail, multifamily, office, and hotel). Additionally, none
of the multifamily loans in the pool is currently secured by a
student housing property, which often exhibits higher cash flow
volatility than traditional multifamily properties. The properties
are primarily located in core markets with the overall pool's
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Market Rank at a very high 5.4. Five
loans, totaling 32.5% of the pool, are in markets with a DBRS
Market Rank of 7, and another two are within markets with a Market
Rank of 6, totaling 16.4% of the pool. These higher DBRS Market
Ranks correspond to zip codes that are more urbanized in nature.
As-measured including all future funding in the calculation, the WA
As-Is loan-to-value (LTV) is low at 76.8%. Further, the WA
As-Stabilized LTV is also quite low at 65.3%. The WA As-Is LTV and
the WA As-Stabilized LTV reflect downward as-is and stabilized
value adjustments made to three loans by DBRS. Please see the model
adjustment section in the related presale report for more on the
above-mentioned adjustments. Nine loans in the pool, totaling 65.3%
of the DBRS sample by cut-off date pool balance, are backed by a
property with a quality deemed to be Average (+) by DBRS. The
borrowers of all 20 floating-rate loans have purchased LIBOR rate
caps that have a range of between 2.5% up to 3.5% to protect
against rising interest rates over the term of the loan. The Class
F Notes, Class G Notes, and Preferred Shares will be retained by
STWD CLO Retention Holder, LLC, and an affiliate of the trust asset
seller. The Class F Notes, Class G Notes, and Preferred Shares
represent 14.9% of the transaction balance.

The pool consists of mostly transitional assets. Given the nature
of the assets, DBRS determined a sample size, representing 81.0% of
the pool cut-off date balance. This is higher than the typical
sample size for traditional conduit CMBS transactions. Physical
site inspections were also performed, including management
meetings. DBRS also notes that when DBRS analysts are visiting the
markets, they may actually visit properties more than once to
follow the progress (or lack thereof) toward stabilization. The
service is also in constant contact with the borrowers to track
progress.

Twenty loans, comprising 91.0% of the cut-off date pool balance,
have floating interest rates, and the aforementioned loans are
interest-only during the original term and have original term
ranges from 15 months to 60 months, creating interest rate risk. Of
the floating-interest rate loans, 73.1% are short-term loans, and
even with extension options, they have a fully extended maximum
loan term of five years. Additionally, for the floating-rate loans,
DBRS used the one-month LIBOR index, which is based on the lower of
a DBRS stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining fully
extended term of the loans or the strike price of the interest rate
cap with the respective contractual loan spread added to determine
a stressed interest rate over the loan term. The floating-rate
loans have extension options, and in order to qualify for these
options, the loans must meet minimum DSCR and LTV requirements.

DBRS has analyzed the loans to a stabilized cash flow that is in
some instances above the current in-place cash flow. There is a
possibility that the sponsors will not execute their business plans
as expected and that the higher stabilized cash flow will not
materialize during the loan term. Failure to execute the business
plan could result in a term default or the inability to refinance
the fully funded loan balance. DBRS made relatively conservative
stabilization assumptions and in each instance considered the
business plan to be rational and the future funding amounts to be
sufficient to execute such plans. In addition, DBRS analyzes loss
given default based on the As-Is LTV assuming the loan is fully
funded.

Thirteen loans, totaling only 67.5% of the initial pool balance,
represent refinance financing. The refinance financings within this
securitization generally do not require the respective sponsor(s)
to contribute material cash equity as a source of funding in
conjunction with the mortgage loan, resulting in a lower sponsor
cost basis in the underlying collateral. Of the 20 refinance loans,
four loans representing 26.1% of the pool have a current occupancy
of less than 80.0%, and four of the refinance loans account for
$67.5 million of the $116 million of future funding (58.2%). This
suggests that at least half of the refinance loans are near
stabilization, which would partially mitigate the higher risk
associated with a sponsor's lower cost basis.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2017-C3: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on G-RR Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2017-C3.

UBS 2017-C3

                        Current Rating     Previous Rating
Class A-1 90276GAN2;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-2 90276GAP7;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-3 90276GAR3;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 90276GAS1;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 90276GAW2;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-SB 90276GAQ5; LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 90276GAX0;    LT AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf
Class C 90276GAY8;    LT A-sf   Affirmed;  previously at A-sf
Class D-RR 90276GAA0; LT BBBsf  Affirmed;  previously at BBBsf
Class E-RR 90276GAC6; LT BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class F-RR 90276GAE2; LT BBsf   Affirmed;  previously at BBsf
Class G-RR 90276GAG7; LT B-sf   Affirmed;  previously at B-sf
Class X-A 90276GAU6;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-B 90276GAV4;  LT AA-sf  Affirmed;  previously at AA-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the pool's overall stable performance, with loss expectations in
line with Fitch's expectations at issuance. Fitch designated three
loans as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 4.8% of pool), including
one specially serviced loan in the top 15 (3.9%) and two loans
outside of the top (0.9%). The largest FLOC is the specially
serviced IC Leased Fee Hotel Portfolio, which is secured by a
leased fee interest in the land underneath seven full service
hotels (2,168 keys) located across seven states. The transfer to
special servicing was a result of the borrower's failure to pay
taxes. A protective advance was made and a notice of default was
issued. The borrower continues to make monthly debt service
payments. The other two FLOCs, La Quinta Fort Worth (0.5%) and
Sunrise Apartments (0.4%), were both flagged for declining cash
flow. The La Quinta Fort Worth is a 71-key limited-service hotel
property located in Fort Worth, TX.  Occupancy declined to 56% at
year-end (YE) 2018 from 68% at YE 2017. As a result, net operating
income (NOI) dropped 24% in that same time frame, with NOI debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) declining to 1.14x for YE 2018 from
1.50x at YE 2017. The Sunrise Apartments is an 84-unit multifamily
property located in Montgomery, AL. Although year-end (YE) 2018
occupancy has remained stable at 94% compared with 95% at YE 2017,
property-level NOI declined 44% between 2017 and 2018. The
servicer-reported YE 2018 NOI DSCR dropped to 0.90x from 1.79x at
YE 2017.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement:  As of the June 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 1.1% to $700.8 million from $708.6 million at issuance. The pool
is scheduled to amortize by 10.7% of the initial pool balance by
maturity. Eight loans (35% of current pool) are full-term
interest-only and eight loans (31.2%) are partial interest-only,
none of which have begun to amortize.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans, representing
16.8% of the pool, received investment-grade credit opinions on a
stand-alone basis at issuance: Del Amo Fashion Center (7.1%;
BBBsf), 245 Park Avenue (5.4%; BBBsf) and Park West Village (4.3%;
BBB-sf).

Pool Concentrations: Loans backed by office properties represent
23.2% of the pool, including five loans in the top 15 (22.8%).
Loans backed by retail properties represent 21.8% of the pool,
including four loans in the top 15 (18.2%). The regional mall and
outlet exposure consists of two loans (12.4%), including the Del
Amo Fashion Center (7.1%) in Torrance, CA, which has exposure to
Macy's and Sears as non-collateral anchors and JCPenney, Nordstrom
and Dick's Sporting Goods as collateral anchors, and OKC Outlets
(5.3%) in Oklahoma City, OK, which includes major tenants such as
Nike Factory Store, Forever 21 and Old Navy Factory Store.


VIBRANT CLO XI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $22.5MM Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to five classes of notes
issued by Vibrant CLO XI, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$325,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

Vibrant XI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as
of the closing date.

Vibrant Credit Partners, LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter,
subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued two classes of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2708

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): n/a

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


WELLS FARGO 2019-C52: Fitch to Rate $9MM Class G-RR Debt 'B-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2019-C52.

  -- $26,626,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43,907,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,568,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,444,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $170,000,000d class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $313,623,000d class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $630,168,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $174,421,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $93,400,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45,012,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,009,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,632,000ac class D-RR 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,879,000ac class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,754,000ac class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,003,000ac class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $30,383,221ac class H-RR NR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

(d) The initial certificate balances of class A-4 and A-5 are
unknown and expected to be $483,623,000 in aggregate. The
certificate balances will be determined based on the final pricing
of those classes of certificates. The expected class A-4 balance
range is $100,000,000 to $240,000,000, and the expected class A-5
balance range is $243,623,000 to $383,623,000.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of July 29, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 67 loans secured by 126
commercial properties with an aggregate principal balance of
$900,240,222 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Ladder Capital
Finance LLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC, Barclays Capital Real
Estate Inc., Argentic Real Estate Finance LLC and BSPRT CMBS
Finance LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 60.3% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 75.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch trust leverage is better when
compared with other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate, multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.30x is significantly better than the 2018 and 2019 YTD
averages of 1.22x and 1.22x, respectively, for other Fitch-rated
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch loan-to value (LTV) of
100.7% is in line with the 2018 and 2019 YTD averages of 102.0% and
101.8%, respectively.

Above-Average Pool Diversification: The pool is less concentrated
than recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The largest 10
loans comprise 39.2% of the pool, which is significantly below the
2018 average of 50.6% and YTD 2019 average of 51.3%. The
concentration results in an LCI of 255, which is lower than the
respective 2018 and 2019 YTD averages of 373 and 382.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loan: Fitch assigned Moffett Towers
- Buildings 3 and 4 a standalone credit opinion of 'BBB-'.
Excluding investment-grade credit opinions, the pool has a Fitch
DSCR and LTV of 1.29x and 102.7%, respectively.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed eight classes of
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C17 pass-through
certificates.

WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C17

                       Current Rating       Prior Rating
Class A-3 92938GAC2;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-4 92938GAD0;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-S 92938GAF5;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class A-SB 92938GAE8; LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class B 92938GAJ7;    LT AAsf   Upgrade;   previously at AA-sf
Class C 92938GAK4;    LT Asf    Upgrade;   previously at A-sf
Class D 92938GAN8;    LT BBB-sf Affirmed;  previously at BBB-sf
Class E 92938GAQ1;    LT BBsf   Affirmed;  previously at BBsf
Class F 92938GAS7;    LT Bsf    Affirmed;  previously at Bsf
Class X-A 92938GAG3;  LT AAAsf  Affirmed;  previously at AAAsf
Class X-B 92938GAH1;  LT AAsf   Upgrade;   previously at AA-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The overall performance
of the pool has been stable since issuance. One loan totaling 1.33%
of the pool is in special servicing. The loan is secured by a
108-unit multifamily property in Washington, D.C, and originally
transferred to the special servicer for monetary default despite
the collateral property generating adequate cash flow to make all
debt service payments. The loan is currently in foreclosure.

In addition to the specially serviced loan, 11 loans totaling
10.53% of the pool are on the servicer's watchlist; however, all of
these loans remain current. The Staybridge Suites - Minot loan
(1.1%) remains the only Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC) due to poor
performance and exposure to the oil and gas industry. It is secured
by a 102-room hotel located in Minot, ND. NOI, debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR), and occupancy improved from 2017 to 2018,
but DSCR still remains below 1.0x. As of March 2019, occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR were 79.54%, $88.47, and $70.37, respectively.

Increased Credit Enhancement; Paydown and Defeasance: The pool has
paid down approximately 24.51% since issuance and 17.4% since
Fitch's prior rating action in August 2018 primarily from five
loans (three of the loans were in the top 15) maturing in 2018.
Thirteen loans, totaling 9.39% of the pool's balance, are defeased.
The paydown and defeasance has led to increases in credit
enhancement. The defeasance has also reduced the pool-level
exposure to non-traditional properties such as mixed-use,
self-storage and manufactured housing properties.

Property Type Concentrations: Excluding the defeased loans,
approximately 33.6%, 25.2%, and 12.4% of the loans in the pool are
secured by retail, hotel, and office properties, respectively.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Fitch's analysis included an
additional sensitivity scenario to further support the upgrades to
classes B, C, and interest-only class X-B that factored in the
paydown of the defeased loans, applied a 25% loss on the maturity
balances of the Westfield Mission Valley loan and included
additional stresses to the cap rate and NOI haircut applied to the
performing loans in the pool.

Maturity Concentration: Excluding the defeased loans, the remaining
64 loans (90.6%) are scheduled to mature in 2023.


WOODMONT 2019-6: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating to $29MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Woodmont 2019-6 L.P.'s
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by middle market speculative-grade (rated 'BB+'
and lower) senior secured term loans managed by MidCap Financial
Services Capital Management LLC, which has a management agreement
with Apollo Capital Management L.P., a subsidiary of Apollo Global
Management LLC.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Woodmont 2019-6 L.P./Woodmont 2019-6 LLC

  Class                Rating                 Amount
                                            (mil. $)
  X                    AAA (sf)                 2.50
  A-1                  AAA (sf)               277.00
  A-2                  AAA (sf)                25.00
  B                    AA (sf)                 42.50
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                  36.50
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)               30.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)                29.00
  Subordinated notes   NR                      66.60

  NR--Not rated.


                            *********

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Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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