/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/190519.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 19, 2019, Vol. 23, No. 138

                            Headlines

AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2005-R1: Moody's Cuts Class M-4 Debt to B1
ASSET BACKED 2004-HE10: Moody's Cuts Class M2 Debt Rating to B1
BANK 2019-BNK18: Fitch to Rate $9.938MM Class G Certs 'Bsf'
BBCMS MORTGAGE 2019-C3: Fitch to Rate $9.3MM H-RR Certs 'B-sf'
COMM MORTGAGE 2015-CCRE24: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs

CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Moody's Cuts A-J Debt Rating to Caa3
ELMWOOD CLO II: Moody's Rates $55MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
HALCYON LOAN 2014-3: Moody's Cuts $22.5MM Class E-1 Notes to B1
JP MORGAN 2005-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Moody's Affirms Class G Certs at B3

OCTAGON INVESTMENT 20-R: Moody's Rates $24.1MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-CH2: Moody's Hikes Class B-5 Debt to Ba1
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-2: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt '(P)Ba3'
UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2012-C3: Moody's Affirms B2 on F Debt
UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2013-C5: Moody's Cuts Class E Certs to Ba3

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C15: Fitch Cuts $11.1MM Class F Certs to CCC
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $48.9MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004

                            *********

AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2005-R1: Moody's Cuts Class M-4 Debt to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded one tranche of Ameriquest
Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R1.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R1

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the recent performance and Moody's
updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The rating
downgrade is primarily due to outstanding interest shortfalls on
the bond which is not expected to be recouped as the impacted bond
has weak structural mechanisms to reimburse accrued interest
shortfalls.

The principal methodology used in this rating was US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology published in February 2019.

The Credit Rating for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series
2005-R1 was assigned in accordance with Moody's existing
methodology entitled US RMBS Surveillance Methodology, dated
February 2019. Please note that on May 8th, Moody's released a
Request for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
the use of an updated version of third-party cash flow modeling
software for certain structured finance asset classes. If the
revised update is implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating on
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R1 may be
negatively or positively affected. The final rating outcome will
overlay qualitative judgments and considerations such as
performance to date and structural features.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.6% in April 2019 from 3.9% in April
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
this transaction.


ASSET BACKED 2004-HE10: Moody's Cuts Class M2 Debt Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Class M2 from Asset Backed
Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HE10

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE10

Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Its rating downgrade is due to the outstanding interest shortfalls
on the bond which is not expected to be recouped as the bond has
weak reimbursement mechanism for interest shortfalls. The rating
action reflects the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectation on the pool.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

The Credit Rating for Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home
Equity Loan Trust 2004-HE10 was assigned in accordance with Moody's
existing methodology entitled "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology,"
dated 2/22/2019. Please note that on 5/8/2019, Moody's released a
Request for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
the use of an updated version of third-party cash flow modeling
software for certain structured finance asset classes. If the
revised update is implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating on
Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE10 is not expected to be affected.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.6% in April 2019 from 3.9% in April
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BANK 2019-BNK18: Fitch to Rate $9.938MM Class G Certs 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on BANK 2019-BNK18
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-BNK18.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $18,052,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,774,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,882,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $202,500,000a class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $411,435,000a class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $695,643,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $181,364,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $90,682,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $49,689,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40,993,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53,415,000bc class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,876,000bc class X-F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,938,000bc class X-G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29,813,000c class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,602,000c class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,876,000c class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,938,000c class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

  -- $33,539,971bc class X-H;

  -- $33,539,971c class H;

  -- $52,303,998.48d RR Interest.

(a) The initial certificate balances of classes A-3 and A-4 are
unknown and expected to be $613,935,000 in aggregate. The expected
class A-3 balance range is $100,000,000 to $305,000,000, and the
expected class A-4 balance range is $308,935,000 to $513,935,000.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(d) Represents the eligible vertical credit risk retention
interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 13, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 57 loans secured by 243
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,046,079,969 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Bank of America, National
Association and National Cooperative Bank, N.A.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 85.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: Overall, the pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.48x is
better than average when compared to the 2018 average of 1.22x and
the 2019 YTD average of 1.21x for other Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's LTV of 94.4% is also better than the 2018
and YTD 2019 averages of 102.0% and 102.3%, respectively. Excluding
the co-op collateral and credit opinion loans, the pool's DSCR and
LTV are 1.17x and 110.0%, respectively.

High Pool Concentration: The pool's 10 largest loans comprise
approximately 65.8% of the pool, which is significantly greater
than the 2018 and YTD 2019 averages of 50.6% and 50.7%,
respectively. The pool's LCI of 520 is greater than the 2018 and
YTD 2019 averages of 373 and 375, respectively.

Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans, representing 20.4% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions, which is above both the 2018
and YTD 2019 averages of 13.6% and 10.8%, respectively, for
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. 350 Bush Street (9.6% of
the pool) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'A-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis, Newport Corporate Center (7.1% of the pool) has
an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone
basis, and ILPT Hawaii Portfolio (3.8% of the pool) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone basis.
The three loans have a weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR and LTV of
1.42x and 62.6% on the first mortgage.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow was 13.1% below the
most recent year's net operating income for properties for which a
full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2019-BNK18 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


BBCMS MORTGAGE 2019-C3: Fitch to Rate $9.3MM H-RR Certs 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on BBCMS Mortgage Trust
2019-C3 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, Series
2019-C3.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $16,654,000class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $212,500,000d class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $360,500,000d class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,000,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $655,654,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $167,426,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $87,811,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,808,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,807,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18,349,000ab class X-D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18,349,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27,313,000bc class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11,708,000bc class F-RR 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,537,000bc class G-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,367,000bc class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $36,295,542bc class J-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.

(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(c) Horizontal credit-risk retention interest.

(d) The initial certificate balances of class A-3 and A-4 are
unknown and expected to be $573,000,000 in aggregate. The
certificate balances will be determined based on the final pricing
of those classes of certificates. The expected class A-3 balance
range is $100,000,000 to $325,000,000, and the expected class A-4
balance range is $248,000,000 to $473,000,000.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 10, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 517
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$936,649,542 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by KeyBank National Association, Natixis Real Estate
Capital LLC, Societe Generale, Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc.,
UBS Real Estate Securities Inc. and Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 63.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 88.2% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Ratings Leverage: The pool's Fitch leverage is slightly
higher than other Fitch-rated fixed-rate, multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio of 1.18x
is lower than the 2018 and YTD 2019 averages of 1.22x and 1.21x,
respectively. The pool's Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 105.2%
is higher than the 2018 and YTD averages of 102.0%, and 102.3%,
respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion loans, the
pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.17x and 108.9%, respectively.

Lower Pool Concentration Relative to Recent Transactions: The top
ten loans make up 45.4% of the pool, which is below the 2018 and
YTD 2019 averages of 50.6%, and 50.7%, respectively. The pool has a
loan concentration index of 312, indicating a lower loan
concentration than the 2018 and YTD 2019 averages of 373 and 375,
respectively. Additionally, the pool has a sponsor concentration
index of 319, indicating a lower sponsor concentration than the
2018 and YTD 2019 averages of 398 and 404, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans, representing
9.0% of the pool, are credit assessed, which is lower than the 2018
and YTD 2019 averages of 13.6% and 10.8%, respectively. Two of the
investment-grade credit option loans are in the top 10; NEMA San
Francisco (3.7% of the pool) received a credit opinion of BBB-sf*
on a stand-alone basis and 787 Eleventh Avenue (3.2% of the pool)
received a credit opinion of BBB-sf* on a stand-alone basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow was 10.2% below the
most recent year's net operating income for properties for which a
full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
BBCMS 2019-C3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


COMM MORTGAGE 2015-CCRE24: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2015-CCRE24.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall pool performance and loss
expectations remain generally stable. All of the loans are current
as of the April 2019 distribution date with no material changes to
pool metrics.

Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC): Fitch identified three loans (12.25%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) due to upcoming tenant rollover or
performance declines.

The fourth largest loan in the pool, Palazzo Verdi (5.61%), secured
by a 302,245 square foot office building in Greenwood Village,
Colorado has been designated a FLOC due to tenant rollover risk.
The largest tenant, who occupies 72% of net rentable area, has
given notice that they will vacate their space upon expiration in
October 2020. A cash trap has been triggered and the servicer has
begun trapping all excess cash in the excess cash reserve. Fitch
will continue to monitor this loan.

The seventh largest loan in the pool, Westin Portland (4.21%),
secured by a 205-unit full service hotel located in downtown
Portland, Oregon, has been flagged as a FLOC due to declining
performance. The hotel underwent an eight-month construction
project and was as "Dossier". It is no longer under the Westin
flag. There have been declines in occupancy since the rebranding of
the hotel began. Rooms were offline during construction. The
Borrower anticipates performance will increase once construction is
complete. Market conditions in Portland remain soft, as a
significant amount of new supply has entered the market. The TTM
September 2018 NOI DSCR was 0.87x with an occupancy of 80.90%, an
increase from the 2017 NOI DSCR of 0.79x and occupancy of 74%.

The 11th largest loan in the pool, McMullen Portfolio (2.42%),
secured by eight office properties totaling 274,919 square feet
located in Ann Arbor and Pittsfield Township, Michigan, has been
identified has a FLOC due to upcoming tenant rollover. Two tenants
occupying 48% of net rentable area have leases expiring in 2020.
The University of Michigan, occupying 100% of Atrium II, has a
lease scheduled to roll in November 2020, and Nexient, occupying
100% of Valley Ranch Business Park 3 and Valley Ranch Business Park
4&5 has leases scheduled to expire in July 2020. The year-end 2018
occupancy and NOI DSCR were 90% and 1.86x, respectively.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the April 2019 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid down by 5.66%
to $1.31 billion from $1.39 billion at issuance. One loan is
defeased. There are 30 loans (42.4% of current pool) with partial
interest-only periods and 16 loans (22.1%) that are full-term
interest only. Of the loans with partial interest-only periods, 10
loans (22.0%) have not begun amortizing. The remaining 33 loans
(35.5%) are amortizing balloon loans with loan terms of five to 10
years.

Pool Concentration: Approximately 20.3% of the current pool
balance, including three of the top 15 loans (13.7%), consists of
hotel properties. This represents higher hotel exposure than
similar vintage transactions. Conversely, the pool is diverse by
loan count given the top 10 loans comprise 51.7% of the current
pool and the top 15 loans comprise 62.9%.

Additional Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario on Palazzo Verdi and McMullen Portfolio. The
sensitivity for Palazzo Verdi assumes a 25% loss severity given
concerns related to the departure of the largest tenant, but also
gives credit for the property's borrower, quality, location,
remaining tenancy, and cash flow reserves. The sensitivity for the
McMullen Portfolio assumes a 15% loss severity given concerns
associated with scheduled tenant rollover in 2020 for two large
tenants. The sensitivities had no impact on the ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to generally
stable performance of the pool. Increased defeasance, unscheduled
paydown, or significant performance improvement could lead to
future upgrades. Downgrades could occur in the event that the FLOCs
see continued performance declines.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $14.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $108.0 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $300.0 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $470.5 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $85.0 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $95.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $71.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.2 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13.9 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $978.1 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $71.1 million class X-C* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G, H, X-E, or X-F certificates. The
class a-1 certificate has been paid in full. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the class X-B and X-D certificates.



CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Moody's Cuts A-J Debt Rating to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in CSFB Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2006-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

  - Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. A-J was downgraded due to higher anticipated
losses from special serviced loans. All of the remaining loans are
in special servicing and 13 loans, representing 92% of the pool
balance, are already real estate owned.

The rating on the Cl. B was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl. B
has already experienced a 53% realized loss as a result of
previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 73.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 53.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 12.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except the
interest only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior class.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $112.2
million from $3.43 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 62% of the pool.

Eighty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $392.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 50%). Fourteen loans, constituting 100% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. Additionally, all of the
remaining loans have been deemed non-recoverable and there have
been no principal or interest payments remitted to the certificates
since December 2018.

The specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of office,
retail, and hotel properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $82.8
million loss for the specially serviced loans (74% expected loss on
average).

The largest specially serviced loan is the former Best Western
President Loan ($70 million -- 62.4% of the pool), which is secured
by the leasehold interest in a 16-story, 334-room, full service
hotel located in the Theater District on West 48th Street between
Seventh and Eighth Avenue in Manhattan, New York. The property's
flag was changed from a Best Western to a TRYP by Wyndham in 2014
and is now known as the Gallivant Times Square. The loan was first
transferred to special servicing in March 2014 for imminent payment
default and was modified effective October 2014. The loan
transferred back into special servicing in December 2015 and did
not pay off at maturity in August 2016. The property faces several
deferred maintenance and repair issues. The property's net
operating income has been negative for several years and faces a
scheduled ground rent payment increase of 2.5% in March 2021.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Duke University
Health Systems, Inc.—OPS Loan ($9.0 million -- 8.0% of the pool),
which is secured by an approximately 41,000 SF office property
located in Durham, NC, four miles north of the Central Business
District. The property was previously fully occupied by Duke
University Health System until November 2017, at which time the
single tenant vacated the premises. The loan transferred to special
servicing in November 2017 due to imminent default and the property
remains 100% vacant.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Cortez West
Shopping Center Loan ($4.8 million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a roughly 16,300 SF un-anchored retail center located in
Bradenton, FL, approximately four miles southwest of the Central
Business District. The loan transferred to special servicing in May
2012 due to imminent default. The loan's DSCR has been below 1.00X
since 2011.

As of the April 17, 2019 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $30.8 million and impact all of the remaining
classes. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls will continue
because of the exposure to specially serviced loans. Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout
and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs),
non-recoverability determinations and extraordinary trust expenses.


ELMWOOD CLO II: Moody's Rates $55MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Elmwood CLO II Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$640,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the "Class A
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$118,100,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the "Class B
Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$43,700,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$60,400,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

Elmwood II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio
may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio
is approximately 85% ramped as of the closing date.

Elmwood Asset Management LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's four year reinvestment period. Thereafter,
subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,000,000,000

Diversity Score: 63

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.40%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


HALCYON LOAN 2014-3: Moody's Cuts $22.5MM Class E-1 Notes to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2014-3
Ltd.:

US$22,500,000 Class E-1 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2025, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 1, 2018
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class E-2 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2025, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 1, 2018
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2025, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 1, 2018
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating actions on the Class E-1, Class E-2, and Class
F notes reflect the specific risks to these notes posed by par loss
and credit deterioration observed in the underlying CLO portfolio.
Based on the trustee's April report, the OC ratios for the Class E
and Class F notes (in the latter case as inferred from the interest
diversion test ratio) is reported at 105.23% and 102.64%,
respectively, versus May 2018 levels of 106.58% and 104.31%,
respectively. Moody's observed that the weighted average rating
factor (WARF) and weighted average spread (WAS) have been
deteriorating and the current trustee-reported levels are 2965 and
3.65%, respectively, compared to 2818 and 3.90%, respectively, in
May 2018. Moody's also notes that the issuer is failing both the
maximum WARF test and the minimum WAS test levels of 2861 and
3.75%, respectively.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
spread, and the weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as
having a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $472.8
million, defaulted par of $16.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.48% (implying a WARF of 2958), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 47.79%, a diversity score of 63 and a
weighted average spread of 3.67%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The CLO manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated notes.


JP MORGAN 2005-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-C1, as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2018 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2018 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

  - Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the principal and interest (P&I) class, Cl. F, was
upgraded because the class is fully covered by defeasance.

The rating on the P&I class, Cl. G, was affirmed because the rating
is consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.
Class Cl. G has already experienced a 69% realized loss as result
of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. The ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.5%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 8.6% at the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except the
interest-only class was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating the interest-only class were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $12.3 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 13% to
61% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 87% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one, compared to two at Moody's last review.

There are currently no loans on the watchlist.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $91 million (for an average loss
severity of 68%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

The sole non-defeased loan is the Walgreens-Lyndon Lane Loan ($1.6
million -- 12.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000 square
foot (SF) retail property. Walgreens leases the entire property
with a long-term triple net lease expiring in October 2061. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 32% and 3.23X, respectively, compared to
38% and 2.70X at the last review.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Moody's Affirms Class G Certs at B3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C14,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C14 as
follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on ten principal and interest classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on one P&I class, Cl. G, was affirmed because the rating
is consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the interest only class was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 4.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except the
interest-only class were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating the
interest-only class were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17th, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 28% to $829 million
from $1.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 34 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 71% of the pool. Four loans, constituting
6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 18 at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. One loan, the Four
Points Sheraton -- San Diego ($8.6 million -- 1% of the pool), is
in special servicing. The loan is secured by a 225-room full
service hotel built in 1987 and located in Kearny Mesa,
approximately 10 miles north of the San Diego CBD. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2016 due to imminent
default followed by a monetary default. The borrower filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2016 and a bankruptcy plan was
subsequently confirmed in the second quarter of 2017. As of the
April 2019 remittance statement, the loan is current on its debt
service payments.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for a poorly
performing loan, the Country Club Mall Loan ($22.9 million -- 2.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 394,000 square foot (SF)
component of a 597,000 SF regional mall located in LaVale,
Maryland. At securitization the mall was anchored by Wal-Mart
(non-collateral), Sears, The Bon-Ton and JCPenney. The Bon-Ton
closed its store at the property in 2018. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate loss of $10.4 million (a 33% expected loss on average)
from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 82% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 97% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 18.5% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.59X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.61X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 33.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Meadows Mall Loan ($93.7 million -- 11.3%
of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a $140.2
million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 308,190 SF portion
of a 945,000 SF regional mall located five miles west of the Strip
in Las Vegas, Nevada. The mall is anchored by Dillard's, JC Penney,
Sears and Macy's. All anchor tenants own their respective stores
which are not included as collateral for the loan. The entire mall
was 98% leased as of June 2018, essentially unchanged from 2017 and
2016. In-line tenant sales for tenants less than 10,000 SF were
approximately $383 per square foot (PSF) for the trailing twelve
month period ending June 2018, compared to $378 PSF in 2017 and
$374 PSF in 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.89X,
respectively.

The second largest loan is the Spirit Portfolio Loan ($93.8 million
-- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of 26
properties including retail, industrial, office, and mixed-use. The
properties are located in 13 different states. The top five states
by allocated loan balance are Illinois (19%), New Hampshire (13%),
Texas (12%), North Carolina (11%), and Indiana (11%). Twenty-five
of the 26 properties are leased to single tenants. Several tenants
have leases at more than one property: LA Fitness leases two
properties; CVS leases four properties; Walgreens leases two
properties; Ferguson Enterprises leases three properties; and
Tractor Supply leases two properties. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 79% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.31X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the 589 Fifth Avenue Loan ($87.5 million
-- 10.6% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a
$175.0 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 17-story,
169,000 SF office and retail property located near the Diamond
District in New York City. The entire retail portion is leased to
H&M through July 2033. The office portion is mostly leased to
jeweler tenants. No office tenant accounts for more than 5% of the
net rentable area. The property was 100% leased as of December
2018, unchanged from 2017 and 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 100% and 0.88X, respectively, the same as at last review.

Including the largest loan in the pool, Moody's identified four
loans in the pool secured by regional malls that represent a
combined 31% of the pool. Aside from the troubled loan, another
regional mall identified as high risk is the Southridge Mall Loan
($69.7 million -- 8.4% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
portion of a $116.1 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 550,000 SF portion of a 1.1 million SF regional mall
in Greendale, Wisconsin, a suburb of Milwaukee. At securitization,
the mall was anchored by Boston Store(non-collateral),
Sears(non-collateral), JCPenney(non-collateral), Macy's and Kohl's.
However, Sears and Boston Store closed their store at the property
in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Kohl's also moved their store to a
new retail development in late 2018. The former Sears store has
been redeveloped in to a Dick's Sporting Goods, Golf Galaxy, and a
Round 1 Bowling and Amusement Complex. A T.J. Maxx store is also
expected to open in 2019. The property faces additional competition
as it is one of four regional or super-regional malls in the
Milwaukee MSA. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 142% and 0.78X,
respectively, compared to 138% and 0.76X at the last review.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 20-R: Moody's Rates $24.1MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners 20-R, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  US$5,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2031 (the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  US$305,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  due 2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Aaa (sf)

  US$55,800,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  US$23,600,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  A2 (sf)

  US$31,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Baa3 (sf)

  US$24,100,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the rating is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

Octagon 20-R is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 90% ramped as
of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one other class
of secured notes and three classes of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 66

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2825

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.51%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-CH2: Moody's Hikes Class B-5 Debt to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-CH2. This
transaction is a securitization of fixed rate mortgage loans with
an original term to maturity of 30 years.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-CH2

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2018 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a decrease in its projected
pool losses. The actions reflect the strong performance of the
underlying pool. As of April 2019, there were minimal serious
delinquencies (loans 60 days or more delinquent) in the underlying
pool.

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility as fewer loans remain in pool ("tail risk"). The
transaction provides for a credit enhancement floor of $
$6,036,506.99 to the senior bonds which mitigates tail risk by
protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in November 2018.

The updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, its assessment of the representations and warranties
framework of the transaction, the due diligence findings of the
third party reviews received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-2: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt '(P)Ba3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Sequoia
Mortgage Trust 2019-2. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans, including 171 mortgage
loans. The assets of the trust consist of 634 fully amortizing,
fixed-rate mortgage loans. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO
scores, significant equity in their properties and liquid cash
reserves. Nationstar Mortgage LLC will serve as the master servicer
for this transaction. There are six servicers for this pool: Cenlar
FSB (45.8% by loan balance), Quicken Loans Inc.("Quicken Loans",
23.0%), Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (20.8%), First Republic Bank
(9.1%), HomeStreet Bank (0.7%) and Associated Bank, N.A. (0.6%).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2019-2

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.30%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.30% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings. Its loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to its Aaa stress loss below the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregation and origination quality. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2019-2 transaction is a securitization of 634 first-lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $400,835,590. There are 131 originators in this pool
with Quicken Loans (25%) being the largest. None of the originators
other than Quicken Loans contributed 10% or more of the principal
balance of the loans in the pool. Unlike prior SEMT transactions,
approximately 46.1% of the pool by loan balance (318 loans) is
seasoned over 18-months with an weighted average seasoning of about
four years. Moody's analyzed these loans taking into consideration
borrower payment history, additional mortgages taken by the
borrower since origination of the first lien loans and updated FICO
scores to arrive at its loss levels.

Moody's received information on the total debt for the seasoned
loans post-origination. Of the 318 seasoned loans in the pool, 69
loans also had some form of junior mortgage debt after the
origination date of the first lien loans. It should be noted that
at some point in time the junior lien loans may or may not have
been paid in full at the time of this transaction. Nevertheless,
Moody's made an adjustment to its collateral losses to account for
the increased probability of default due to an increase in borrower
leverage.

Moody's did not receive updated property values for any of the
seasoned loans. Of note, Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation will provide representation and warranty that all
mortgaged properties are in substantially the same condition as it
was at the time of the appraisal. However, to account for the
uncertainties of property values for these seasoned loans Moody's
made further adjustment to its losses. The loan-level third party
due diligence review encompassed credit underwriting, property
value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood will backstop
the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of all originators other
than First Republic Bank. The loans were all aggregated by Redwood
Residential Acquisition Corporation. Moody's considers Redwood, the
mortgage loan seller, to have strong aggregation and origination
practices compared to peers.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have a
demonstrated ability to save and to manage credit. In addition, the
60.9% of the borrowers in the pool have more than 24 months of
liquid cash reserves or enough money to pay the mortgage for two
years should there be an interruption to the borrower's cash flow.
Consistent with prudent credit management, the borrowers have high
FICO scores with a weighted average score of 766. In general, the
borrowers have high income, significant liquid assets and a stable
employment history, all of which have been verified as part of the
underwriting process and reviewed by the TPR firms. Borrowers also
have significant equity in their homes (WA original CLTV 70.4%)
consistent with recent SEMT transactions.

Approximately, 10.7% of the mortgage loans by aggregate stated
principal balance are secured by mortgaged properties located in
the areas that the Federal Emergency Management Agency had
designated for federal assistance during the prior 12 months.
Redwood has engaged a third party to inspect these properties. No
material visible damage was detected from the inspection and the
related mortgage was included in the transaction pool.
Representations and warranties as to the mortgage loans will have
been made to the effect that in general, the mortgage loans will be
free of material damage as of the closing date.

Structural considerations

Similar to recently rated Sequoia transactions, in this
transaction, Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer,
or securities administrator, from advancing principal and interest
to loans that are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which
principal and interest advances are not made are called the Stop
Advance Mortgage Loans. The balance of the SAML will be removed
from the principal and interest distribution amounts calculations.
In its opinion, the SAML feature strengthens the integrity of
senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML feature, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payments to
certain tranches even when more subordinated tranches are
outstanding. The senior/subordination relationship between tranches
is strengthened since the removal of SAML in the calculation of the
senior percentage amount directs more principal to the senior bonds
and less to the subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the
amount of servicer advances that could increase the loss severity
on the liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for
the most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds take into
consideration its expected losses on the collateral and the
potential reduction in interest distributions to the bonds.
Furthermore, the likelihood that the subordinate tranches could
potentially permanently lose some interest as a result of this
feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2019-2 will incur any losses from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the loans are of prime
quality and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the
subordinate classes and provides a back-stop to the representations
and warranties of all the originators except for First Republic
Bank, has a strong alignment of interest with investors, and is
incentivized to actively manage the pool to optimize performance.
Third, historical performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has
been very strong to date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably
well defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on
an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach
reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations and
warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which reduces
the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.45% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of nearly 100% of
the mortgage loans in the pool. Generally, the TPR firms conducted
a review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review loans"). The TPR firms randomly selected 32
mortgage loans for limited review that were originated by First
Republic Bank.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believes that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase its Aaa stress
loss.

Original property valuation was verified using an additional
valuation tool including, but not limited to, Collateral Desktop
Analysis (CDA), field review, Broker Price Opinion (BPO),
Collateral Underwriter's (CU) score, and/or Automated Valuation
Model (AVM). Moody's applied a negative adjustment to loans for
which property valuation was verified using AVM, since it considers
AVMs to be typically less accurate than desk reviews and field
reviews.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's notes that
there are 3 loans with final grade 'D' due to escrow holdback
distribution amounts. The review for these loans was incomplete
because the related appraisals were subject to the completion of
renovation work or missing evidence of disbursement of escrow
funds. In the event the escrow funds greater than 10% have not been
disbursed within six months of the closing date, the seller shall
repurchase the affected escrow holdback mortgage loan, on or before
the date that is six months after the closing date at the
applicable repurchase price. There are two other loans with final
grade 'C' due to compliance related issues. One such mortgage loan
was identified as having no evidence to support initial closing
disclosure was sent to non-borrowing spouse. The other mortgage
loan was identified as having TRID related waiver as the total fee
amount exceeded the tolerance limit. Moody's did not make any
adjustment to the losses, as the seller has taken steps to
remediate both issues and it deems these issues to be not
significant.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago were originated by various participating financial
institution originators. For these mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago
will provide the loan-level R&Ws that are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2019-2 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US
RMBS.

Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for
servicer oversight, and termination of servicers and for the
appointment of successor servicers. In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC is committed to act as successor if no other successor
servicer can be found. If servicers and the master servicer fail in
their obligation to fund any required advances, Citbank, N.A., as
the securities administrator will be obligated to do so.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in November 2018.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2012-C3: Moody's Affirms B2 on F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed nine classes and downgraded
one class in UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C3 as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2018
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

  - Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on one IO class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating on one IO class, Cl. X-B, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes as a result
of higher expected losses from specially serviced and troubled
loans. Class X-B references P&I classes B through G. Class G is not
rated by Moody's.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest only classes was "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used
in rating interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $813.5
million from $1.08 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 78 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 41% of the pool. Fourteen loans,
constituting 18% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool. One loan, the
Great Northeast Plaza loan ($20.5 million -- 2.5% of the pool), is
currently in special servicing. The loan is secured by an
approximately 293,000 SF community shopping center located in
Philadelphia, PA. The loan transferred to special servicing in
October 2018 due to imminent default after the former anchor
tenant, Sears (81% of the NRA and 61% of base rent), vacated in
April 2018. Excluding the Sears revenue, the loans DSCR will be
below 1.00X. The special servicer indicated that the sponsor is
exploring plans to split the Sears space into multiple tenant
suites.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 0.8% of the pool. Moody's estimates
an aggregate $12.0 million loss from these specially serviced and
troubled loans (45% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 87% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 92% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.66X and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 1.71X and 1.31X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23.0% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 1000 Harbor Boulevard Loan ($113.0
million -- 13.9% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
interest in a $120 million loan. The loan is secured by a ten-story
suburban office building located in Weehawken, New Jersey. As of
December 2018, the property was 100% leased to UBS Financial
Services, Inc. through 2028. The property is part of Lincoln
Harbor, a master planned community set on 60 acres along the Hudson
River, directly across from Midtown Manhattan. The loan is
structured with an Anticipated Repayment Date ("ARD") in September
2022, after which the loan will hyper-amortize and has a final
maturity date in December 2028. Due to the single-tenant nature of
the asset, Moody's value incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Given
the financial strength of the tenant and the hyper-amortizing ARD
feature of the loan structure, there is a high probability that the
loan will be lower leverage at the tenant's lease maturity date in
December 2028, even if the tenant were to elect to vacate its
premises. Considering these additional factors, Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.69X, respectively, the same as at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza at Imperial Valley Loan ($40.2
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 362,400 SF
retail property located in El Centro, California. The property is
located 15 miles from the Mexico/California border. Major tenants
at the property include Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Ross
Dress for Less, Best Buy, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Michaels, Staples,
DD's Discounts and DSW. As of December 2018 the property was 100%
occupied, compared to 99% at last review. The loan has amortized
11% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90%
and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.12X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Crossways Shopping Center Loan ($34.1
million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
351,000 SF retail power center located in Chesapeake, VA. Major
tenants in occupancy include Value City Furniture, Ross Dress for
Less, DSW, TJ Maxx, Marshall's, and Mattress Firm. Several of the
largest tenants recently executed extension options on their
respective leases. The property was 96% leased as of December 2018,
compared to 97% leased as of December 2017. The loan has amortized
16% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78%
and 1.29X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.25X at last review.


UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2013-C5: Moody's Cuts Class E Certs to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in UBS-Barclays
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-C5, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2018 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. EC**, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2019 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

  - Reflects Interest Only Classes

- Reflects Exchangeable Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes, Cl. A-3 through Cl. D, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes, Cl. E and Cl. F, were downgraded
due to an increase in expected losses from specially serviced
loans. Two loans, representing 7% of the pool, have transferred to
special servicing since January 2019.

The ratings on the two interest-only classes were affirmed based on
the credit quality of their referenced classes.

The rating on Cl. EC was affirmed due to the credit quality of its
referenced exchangeable classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except the interest
only and exchangeable class were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The principal methodology used in
rating the exchangeable class was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Repackaged Securities" published in March 2019. The methodologies
used in rating the interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to $1.33 billion
from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 77 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 56% of the pool. Fifteen loans,
constituting 15% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

Four loans, constituting 9.1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 23%). Two loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Harborplace Loan ($66.9
million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in an approximately 149,000 SF lifestyle retail center in
Baltimore, Maryland. The property is located less than 0.5 miles
south of the Baltimore Central Business District, right on the
harbor waterfront. The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2019 due to payment default after the borrower indicated
their unwillingness to continue covering cash flow shortfalls. The
loan's DSCR has been below 1.00X since 2017 as a result of
declining revenues since securitization. The sponsor completed
renovations at the end of 2017. Six new leases totaling
approximately 28,000 SF were signed during 2018 and 2019, however,
several other tenants including Urban Outfitters, Five Guys and
Noodles & Co. have vacated the property. The property was 72%
occupied as of September 2018, compared to 95% at securitization.
The loan is currently paid through its February 2019 payment date.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Village of Cross
Keys Loan ($20.8 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is secured by
an approximately 297,000 SF mixed-use property located roughly five
miles northwest of the Baltimore CBD. The property consists of
119,334 SF of office, 147,140 SF of retail space and a 30,292 SF
outparcel. The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2019
due to imminent default after the borrower indicated their
unwillingness to continue covering cash flow shortfalls. The
property was 66% leased as of September 2018 compared to 64% in
December 2017 and 79% at securitization. Several recent tenant
departures include Red Door Salon & Spa, the Jean Pool denim
boutique, Samuel Parker Clothier, Jones & Jones women's boutique,
Chico's and Donna's Cafe. As a result, the property's revenue has
declined since securitization. The loan is paid through its March
2019 payment date and the special servicer indicated a
pre-negotiation agreement has been signed.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 99% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 91%, compared to 94% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.14X and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 2.05X and 1.14X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 39% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Santa Anita Mall Loan ($215 million -- 16.2% of
the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $285 million
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by 956,343 SF portion of a 1.47
million SF super-regional mall located in Arcadia, California. The
mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Macy's, and Nordstrom. All three
anchor units are owned by their respective tenants and are not
contributed as collateral for the loan. The mall was expanded in
2009 to include the promenade portion of the center. The property
is adjacent to the Santa Anita Park, a thoroughbred racetrack,
which is a demand driver for the mall. As of December 2018, the
total property was 98% leased, with inline occupancy of 97%,
essentially unchanged from the prior review and compared to 97% for
the total property and 93% for inline space at securitization.
Property performance has improved since securitization due
primarily to an increase in rental revenue. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.13X, respectively, the same as at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Valencia Town Center Loan ($195
million -- 14.7% of the pool), which is secured by 646,121 SF
portion of a 1.1 million SF super-regional mall located in
Valencia, California. The mall is anchored by Macy's and JC Penney.
The anchor units are owned by their respective tenants and are not
included as collateral for the loan. The mall was expanded in 2010,
adding roughly 180,000 SF of outdoor space at a cost of
approximately $131 million. Sears was an anchor at the mall but
closed during 2018, decreasing total occupancy to 84% as of
December 2018 compared 96% in September 2017. Inline occupancy
remains unchanged from the prior review, at 95%. To replace the
Sears location, the Sponsor announced plans for an over $100
million investment, called the Patios Connection Project, to add
features such as a new Costco, luxury cinema and fitness center.
This closely follows the November 2018 announcement of a $20
million renovation of the interior of the center. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.09X, respectively, the same as at
Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Starwood Office Portfolio Loan
($109.0 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five class A office buildings totaling 1.1 million SF.
The properties are located across three states including Florida,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. As of September 2018, the
portfolio was 84% leased, compared to 99% at securitization. The
portfolio was originally secured by six office properties. One
office property, Edgewater Corporate Center 1 located in Fort Mill,
SC, was released from the pool in 2018 and paid down the loan by
approximately $20 million. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106%
and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 111% and 0.97X at the last
review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C15: Fitch Cuts $11.1MM Class F Certs to CCC
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 10 classes of
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2013-C15.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The rating downgrade of class F
primarily reflects the declining performance of the specially
serviced assets/loans as well as increased loss expectations on the
overall pool. There are six Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 12.4% of
the pool), including four specially serviced assets/loans (3.6%)
that have seen substantial performance declines over the past year.
Further, the pool has a significant retail concentration of 40.6%
with three of the top five loans in the pool secured by regional
malls, including the largest FLOC, the Carolina Place loan (8.4%).


Fitch Loans of Concern: The Carolina Place loan is secured by a
694,983-sf portion of a 1.2 million-sf regional mall located in
Pineville, NC. Collateral occupancy decreased to 76.6% after Sears
closed in January 2019. The loan remains current and has a
servicer-reported YE 2018 NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.90x. As of YE 2018, in-line sales had decreased to $376 psf from
$383 psf at YE 2017 and $412 psf at issuance. While non-collateral
Macy's closed in March 2017, the space has been backfilled by a
Dick's Sporting Goods/Golf Galaxy, which opened earlier this month.
Further, per the servicer, several parties have reportedly
expressed interest in the former Sears space.

The second largest FLOC, the REO Cleveland Airport Marriott (1.7%),
is a 372-key, full-service hotel located in Cleveland, OH. The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2017 due to imminent
payment default related to declining performance caused by the
overbuilt local lodging market. Per the servicer, the YE 2018 NOI
DSCR was 0.76x. The property became REO in February 2019 and is
currently being marketed for sale.

The remaining loans/assets of concern are two REO vacant Gander
Mountain stores (1.0%) located in Valdosta, GA and Opelika, AL; a
specially serviced anchored retail property located in North
Olmsted, OH (0.5%) that is anchored by a vacant former Babies "R"
Us and is currently in foreclosure; an extended-stay hotel located
in College Station, TX (0.4%) that has experienced performance
decline due to the overbuilt local lodging market; and an REO
limited-service hotel located in Sidney, MT (0.4%), which has a
negative cash flow due to occupancy and ADR decline. Fitch Ratings
expects significant losses upon disposition of the REO assets and
will continue to monitor all FLOCs.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has increased
since issuance due to loan payoffs, scheduled amortization and
defeasance. As of the April 2019 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 13.1% to $961.7
million from $1.107 billion at issuance and by 3.4% over the past
year. The non-rated class G has sustained $133,458 in losses due to
non-recoverable reimbursements of servicer advances on delinquent
loans and $1.0 million in interest shortfalls. Since issuance,
seven loans of the original pool of 86 loans have paid in full,
including three loans in the past year. Nine loans (8.0%) are fully
defeased. Four loans (12.4%) are full-term interest-only, including
the largest loan in the pool. Two loans (9.4%) remain in partial
interest-only periods; both begin amortizing in August 2019.
Remaining loan maturities are concentrated in 2023 (96.6%), with
limited maturities scheduled in 2019 (1.0%), 2020 (1.2%) and 2028
(1.2%).

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch is concerned about the
loan's ability to refinance at maturity in June 2023 given the
vacant collateral anchor space, declining sales performance and
strong nearby competition. Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario on the loan that assumed a potential outsized
loss of 15% on the loan. The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D
and E partially reflect concerns surrounding the refinance risk of
the Carolina Place loan.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Co-op Loans: Twenty-three loans (7.9% of the pool) are secured by
cooperative properties in the New York metro area. These co-op
loans have very low leverage metrics on a rental-scenario basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D and E primarily reflect
concerns over the declining performance of the FLOCs, including the
specially serviced loans/assets. Fitch ran an additional
sensitivity scenario on the Carolina Place loan primarily due to
concerns over its ability to refinance at maturity. Classes D and E
could be subject to future rating downgrades should the performance
of the specially serviced loans/assets continue to decline or
should the Carolina Place loan transfer to special servicing or
continue to underperform. Distressed rated class F may be
downgraded further as losses are realized or should loss
expectations on the specially serviced loans/assets exceed Fitch's
expectations. The Rating Outlooks for the senior classes remain
Stable due to the stable performance of the majority of the
remaining pool and continued expected amortization. Rating upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has downgraded the following rating:

  -- $11.1 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 95%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $234.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $301.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $93.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $710.0 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $74.7 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $22.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $197.9 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.  

  * Notional amount and interest only.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class G certificates. The class A-S, B and C
certificates may be exchanged for class PEX certificates, and the
class PEX certificates may be exchanged for the class A-S, B, and C
certificates.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $48.9MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's takes action on 48.9 Million of Subprime RMBS issued from
2003 to 2004

Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 10 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from four transactions,
backed by Subprime loans, issued by Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. S*, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2018 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2018 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. S*, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

  * Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The downgrade of the rating to
C (sf) reflects the nonpayment of interest for an extended period
of at least 12 months.

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in February 2019. The methodologies used in rating
interest-only classes were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in February 2019 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

The Credit Ratings were assigned in accordance with Moody's
existing methodology entitled "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology,"
dated 2/22/2019. Please note that on 5/8/2019, Moody's released a
Request for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
the use of an updated version of third-party cash flow modeling
software for certain structured finance asset classes. If the
revised update is implemented as proposed, these Credit Ratings may
be negatively or positively affected. The final rating outcome will
overlay qualitative judgments and considerations such as
performance to date and structural features.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.6% in April 2019 from 3.9% in April
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the referenced bonds and/or pools.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


                            *********

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