/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/190407.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 7, 2019, Vol. 23, No. 96

                            Headlines

ACCESS TO LOANS: S&P Lowers Series IV Bond Ratings to 'CCC'
ASSET BACKED 2004-HE6: Moody's Lowers Class M2 Debt Rating to B1
BARINGS LTD 2019-I: Moody's Rates $27.5MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
C-BASS MORTGAGE 2005-CB3: Moody's Hikes Class B-1 Certs to 'B2'
CANYON CLO 2019-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

CARLYLE US 2019-1: Moody;s Rates $33MM Class D Notes 'Ba3'
CARVANA AUTO 2019-1: Moody's Rates $28MM Class E Debt 'B2'
CD 2017-CD4: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'Bsf'
CD COMMERCIAL 2006-CD2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A-J Debt
CIM TRUST 2019-INV1: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on $3.8MM Cl. B-5 Certs

CIM TRUST 2019-INV1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' on Class F Certs
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2005-OPT4: Moody's Cuts Class M-5 Debt to B1
COLT MORTGAGE 2019-2: Fitch Rates $9.38MM Class B-2 Certs 'Bsf'
COMM 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms Class G Certs at 'B2'

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2001-CMLB1: Moody's Affirms B3 on Class X Certs
ENGS COMMERCIAL 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-2: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: Moody's Affirms Class F Certs at 'B2'
GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2019-PJ1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2019-PJ1: Moody's Rates Class B-5 Debt 'B2'
JP MORGAN 2004-C2: Fitch Puts 4 Certs Classes on Watch Evolving
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class X-1 Certs
JP MORGAN 2019-2: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs

JP MORGAN 2019-2: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
MERRILL LYNCH 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms Class A-J Certs at 'CCCsf'
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C22: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs Rating to 'CCCsf'
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
MOUNTAIN VIEW XIV: Moody's Rates $3.5MM Class F Notes 'B3'

OCTAGON INVESTMENT 40: Moody's Rates $30MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
ROCKFORD TOWER 2019-1: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
SCF EQUIPMENT 2019-1: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating on Class F Notes
TRINITAS CLO X: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $9MM Class F Notes
UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2013-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 on Cl. F Debt

UCAT 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Class A Notes to Ba1
WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-C30: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class X-E Certs
[*] DBRS Reviews 355 Classes From 41 US RMBS Transactions

                            *********

ACCESS TO LOANS: S&P Lowers Series IV Bond Ratings to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered ratings on nine classes from Access To
Loans For Learning Student Loan Corp.'s series IV master trust.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view of the negative excess spread
available to the trust and the available credit enhancement, which
is declining because the auction-rate securities (ARS) have been
paying the ratings-based unfavorable maximum rate definitions. The
trust is a student loan asset-backed securities trust
collateralized by a pool of consolidation loans originated through
the U.S. Department of Education's (ED's) Federal Family Education
Loan Program (FFELP).

The rating actions reflect S&P's views of the transaction's future
collateral performance and the current credit enhancement available
to support the bonds, including overcollateralization (parity),
subordination for the senior bonds, and the reserve accounts. The
rating agency also considered secondary credit factors such as
credit stability, sector- and issuer-specific analyses, and peer
analysis.

  Table 1
  Current Capital Structure(i)

                        Current        Bond             Maturity  

  Series   Class     balance ($)  factor (%)   Coupon       date
  IV-A-8   Senior     19,100,000        56.2   Tax AR   7/1/2037
  IV-A-10  Senior     15,900,000        68.5   T/E AR   7/1/2037
  IV-A-11  Senior        100,000         0.3   T/E AR   7/1/2037
  IV-A-14  Senior      9,650,000        12.1   Tax AR  10/1/2042
  IV-A-15  Senior        200,000         0.3   Tax AR  10/1/2042
  IV-A-16  Senior     12,850,000        16.1   Tax AR  10/1/2042
  IV-A-17  Senior     25,430,000        31.8   Tax AR  10/1/2042
  IV-A-18  Senior     15,250,000        19.1   Tax AR  10/1/2042
  IV-C-1   Subordinate 7,000,000        23.3   T/E AR   1/1/2033

  (i)As of the December 2018 servicer report.
  Tax--Taxable.
  T/E--Tax-exempt.
  AR--Auction-rate.

KEY STRUCTURAL FEATURES

The bonds were issued per a master trust indenture dated May 1,
1998. The trust was restructured in 2013. Collateral was
transferred to a new discrete trust in exchange for cash, which was
used to redeem bonds in this trust at discounts to the par face
amount. The current trust includes senior taxable auction-rate
bonds (approximately 78.2% of the total bonds), senior tax-exempt
auction rate bonds (approximately 15.2% of the total bonds), and
one subordinate tax-exempt bond (approximately 6.7% of the total
bonds). Since auctions began failing in 2008, the trust has paid
interest to the ARS based on the maximum rate.

The maximum rate for taxable ARS (the senior auction-rate notes) is
defined as the least of:

-- LIBOR plus a rating-dependent margin in the 2.0%-3.0% range,
-- The maximum legal rate, and
-- 17.0%.

The maximum rate for tax-exempt ARS (the subordinate notes) is
defined as the least of:

-- The greater of the after-tax equivalent rate or the SIFMA
Municipal Swap Index, multiplied by a rating-dependent multiplier
in the 200%-250% range;

-- The maximum legal rate; and

-- 14.0%.

S&P views the auction-rate definitions for this trust as
unfavorable because the maximum rate definitions do not have a net
loan rate, which limits the impact of negative excess spread. The
auction-rate bonds will mature between July 2037 and October 2042.
The bonds are subject to optional redemption at par plus accrued
interest on any interest payment date. However, any redemptions are
subject to meeting asset percentage requirements (generally defined
as total assets divided by total liabilities). For optional
redemptions, the trust must have a senior asset percentage of 110%,
subordinate asset percentage of 106%, and a total asset percentage
of 102%.

The bonds are also subject to purchases in lieu of redemptions at
the option of the issuer. The transaction documents require that
the purchase price cannot exceed the par amount of any bonds
purchased. There are no targeted asset percentage requirements for
purchases in lieu of redemptions. However, no subordinate or junior
subordinate bonds can be purchased until all of the senior bonds
are paid in full. As a result, only senior class ARS have been
purchased since S&P's last review.

Releases of excess funds to the issuer are permitted, subject to a
senior asset percentage of 110%, subordinate asset percentage of
106%, and a total asset percentage of 102%.

COLLATERAL SUMMARY

The collateral in this pool is 100% FFELP loans with approximately
96% FFELP consolidation loans, and the balance of the pool is
Stafford/PLUS loans. Loans originated under the FFELP program are
at least 97% guaranteed by the ED. Approximately 56% of the loans
were disbursed after April 2006. The loans that originated after
April 2006 do not benefit from "floor" income. Non-floor income
loans require the trust to rebate the positive difference between
the borrowers' interest payments and the special allowance payments
back to the ED, which limits the trust's available excess spread.
Since S&P's last full surveillance review in 2016, the liquidity
available to the trust has improved because more loans have come
into repayment.

  Table 2
  Loan Status(i)
                                2018      2015
  Current   (%)                   81.3      72.1
  30-plus-day delinquent (%)       6.1       8.7
  Forbearance (%)                  7.6      12.2
  Deferment (%)                    4.4       7.0

(i)As of December 2018.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

All of the classes of bonds benefit from a reserve fund, which will
not be less than the greater of 0.75% of the aggregate principal
amount of the bonds outstanding or $500,000. The senior bonds
benefit from the subordination of the subordinate bond. Available
hard credit enhancement to support the bonds, as measured by parity
levels, has decreased since S&P's last full surveillance review in
2016.

  Table 3
  Reported Parity(i)
                            2018      2015
  Senior(%)                  103.5     108.3
  Subordinate(ii)(%)           N/A     102.8
  Total(%)                    96.7     100.6

(i)As of December.
(ii)Subordinate parity generally defined as total assets divided by
the sum of the senior bonds and the subordinate bonds.
N/A--Not applicable.
  
RATIONALE

S&P lowered its ratings on the eight senior classes to 'CCC (sf)'
and its rating on the subordinate bond to 'CC (sf)' based on its
criteria.

The downgrade of the senior (class A) auction-rate bonds to 'CCC
(sf)' reflects S&P's view that these bonds have sufficient
collateralization but are vulnerable to nonpayment. The senior
bonds currently have senior parity of 103.5% and sufficient
capacity to meet their current debt service obligations. However,
absent improvement in trust performance, the trust may not be able
to repay the principal balance of the senior auction-rate bonds in
full at their legal final maturity dates due to the impact of
negative excess spread. The trust has more than half of its
collateral as non-floor income loans and does not have a net loan
rate concept in its maximum rate definitions, as S&P has seen in
other similar auction-rate trusts, to limit the impact of negative
excess spread if interest rates increase. These classes will rely
on a lower interest rate scenario, favorable business, financial,
or economic conditions to be repaid by their legal final maturity
dates.

The downgrade of the subordinate (class C) auction-rate bond to 'CC
(sf)' reflects S&P's expectation that default is virtually certain,
based on the subordinate bond's substantial undercollateralization
and the declining trend in its credit enhancement. The subordinate
bond is also affected by negative excess spread and is currently
undercollateralized. It has a nearer-term legal final maturity,
which gives the transaction less time to grow sufficient credit
enhancement to absorb the negative excess spread before final
principal payment is due and is structurally junior to the senior
bonds. The subordinate bond cannot be repurchased at discounts
until the class A bonds have been paid in full or optionally
redeemed unless hard enhancement targets are maintained.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of the student loan
receivables backing these transactions relative to its ratings and
the available credit enhancement to the classes."

  RATINGS LOWERED
  Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corp.
  $252.2 million student loan program revenue bonds
                           Rating
  Series           To                  From
  IV-A-8           CCC                 CCC+ (sf)
  IV-A-10          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)

  $351 million student loan program revenue bonds
                           Rating
  Series           To                  From
  IV-A-11          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)
  IV-C-1           CC                  CCC (sf)

  $400 million student loan program revenue bonds
                           Rating
  Series           To                  From
  IV-A-14          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)
  IV-A-15          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)
  IV-A-16          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)
  IV-A-17          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)
  IV-A-18          CCC                 CCC+ (sf)


ASSET BACKED 2004-HE6: Moody's Lowers Class M2 Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from two transactions,
backed by Subprime loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE6

Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrade is a result of an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrade is due to
the outstanding interest shortfalls on the bond which is not
expected to be recouped as the bond has weak reimbursement
mechanism for interest shortfalls.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in February 2019 from 4.1% in
February 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BARINGS LTD 2019-I: Moody's Rates $27.5MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to three classes of
notes issued by Barings CLO Ltd. 2019-I.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$294,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$21,750,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes and the Class E Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the rating is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in the methodology.

Barings 2019-I is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing
date.

Barings LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition
of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the transaction's
five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain
restrictions, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued four other
classes of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 67

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.3%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.05 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


C-BASS MORTGAGE 2005-CB3: Moody's Hikes Class B-1 Certs to 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches from one transaction, backed by subprime loans, issued by
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-CB3.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB3

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2018
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades reflect the recent deterioration in deal
performance and Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying
pools. The rating downgrades of Cl. M-2 and Cl. M-3 are due to
outstanding interest shortfalls on the bonds which are not expected
to be recouped as the bonds have a weak reimbursement mechanism for
interest shortfalls. The rating downgrades of Cl. M-2 and Cl. M-3
also reflect the correction of an error. In the April 2018 rating
action, the outstanding interest shortfalls on these bonds were
incorrectly not taken into consideration. The rating action
properly reflects the bonds' current outstanding cumulative
interest shortfalls. In addition, the cash-flow model used by
Moody's in rating this transaction has been changed to reflect the
allocation of excess cash-flow to reimburse losses to the bonds
after they have been written down. Although this change had a
positive rating impact on Cl. B-2, the rating has been downgraded
due to deterioration in deal performance and projected loss
expectations for this bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in February 2019 from 4.1% in
February 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction.


CANYON CLO 2019-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of notes issued by Canyon CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$19,400,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$24,400,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$20,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in the methodology.

Canyon 2019-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 92% ramped as of
the closing date.

Canyon CLO Advisors LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2820

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CARLYLE US 2019-1: Moody;s Rates $33MM Class D Notes 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Carlyle US CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$372,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1b Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$26,500,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$36,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

Carlyle 2019-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Carlyle CLO Management L.L.C. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CARVANA AUTO 2019-1: Moody's Rates $28MM Class E Debt 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Carvana Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1 (CRVNA
2019-1). This is the inaugural 144A auto loan transaction for
Carvana, LLC (Carvana), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
Carvana Co. (B3 stable). The notes are backed by a pool of retail
automobile loan contracts originated by Carvana, who is also the
administrator of the transaction. Bridgecrest Credit Company, LLC
(Bridgecrest Credit), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
DriveTime Auto Group (B3 stable), is the servicer of the
transaction.

The complate rating actions are as follow:

Issuer: Carvana Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1

$73,000,000, 3.01%, Class A-2 Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$61,200,000, 3.08%, Class A-3 Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$51,275,000, 3.29%, Class B Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa1 (sf)

$34,300,000, 3.50%, Class C Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned A1 (sf)

$46,025,000, 3.88%, Class D Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$28,000,000, 5.64%, Class E Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
originated by Carvana and its expected performance, the strength of
the capital structure, the experience and expertise of Bridgecrest
Credit as the servicer and the presence of First Associates Loan
Servicing, LLC (unrated) as the backup servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2019-1 pool
is 11% and the loss at a Aaa stress is 50%. Moody's based its
cumulative net loss expectation on an analysis of the credit
quality of the underlying collateral; the historical performance of
similar collateral including Carvana's managed portfolio
performance; the ability of Bridgecrest Credit to perform the
servicing functions; and current expectations for the macroeconomic
environment during the life of the transaction.

The Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes Class D notes and
Class E notes benefit from 50.05%, 35.40%, 25.60%, 12.45% and 4.45%
of hard credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit enhancement
for the notes consists of a combination of overcollateralization, a
non-declining reserve account and subordination except for the
Class E notes which do not benefit from subordination. The notes
may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the subordinated notes if, given current
expectations of portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are
consistent with higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such
as the one in this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a
percentage of the collateral balance as collections pay down senior
notes. Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note
principal payments will accelerate this build of enhancement.
Moody's expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a
lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of
the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio
losses also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for
used vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud.


CD 2017-CD4: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of CD 2017-CD4 Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-CD4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance and loss expectations with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. There have been no
specially serviced or delinquent loans since issuance. Fitch has
designated two loans (3.2% of the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs).

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC is Hamilton Crossing (2.2%
of the pool), which is secured by a 590,917 square foot (sf) office
property located in Carmel, IN. The largest tenant, ADESA (30.1% of
NRA), did not exercise its renewal option 12 months prior to its
scheduled July 31, 2019 lease expiration. As a result, the loan is
in cash trap. The tenant is currently paying above the $20.62 psf
average asking rent, according to Reis, for its submarket. Per the
servicer, the space is currently being marketed and there are
multiple potential tenants that are interested.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2019
remittance, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down by 0.8%
to $893.6 million from $900.5 million at issuance. All of the
original 47 loans remain in the pool. Ten loans (28.6% of the pool)
are interest-only for the full loan term, including four loans
(22.3%) in the top 15. Seventeen loans (41.4%) have remaining
partial-term interest only periods and the remaining loans are
amortizing (29.9%). Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the
pool is only expected to be reduced by 9.9%. No loans are
defeased.

Single-Tenant Concentration: Four loans among the largest 20 are
secured by single-tenant properties (14.2% of the pool). Moffett
Place Google (8.4%), Malibu Vista (2.0%), Alvogen Pharma US (1.9%),
and SG360 (1.9%) are secured by single-tenant properties.

High Office and Hotel Loan Concentration: Loans backed by office
properties represent 41.9% of the pool, including 35.1% in the top
15. Hotel properties represent 20.8%, including 18.2% in the top
15.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks reflect the stable performance of the
underlying pool collateral and expected continued paydown. Upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades may be possible should material asset-level
or economic events adversely affect pool performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $22,499,402 class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $90,250,000 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53,102,000 class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $192,000,000 class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $234,483,000 class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $662,907,402* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $70,573,000 class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,355,000 class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,564,000 class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $75,919,000* class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44,910,000* class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,386,000* class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,554,000* class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44,910,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,386,000 class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,554,000 class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,889,868** class at V-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3,995,737** class V-BC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,363,684** class V-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest only.

  ** Exchangeable classes that are a component of VRR Interest.

Fitch does not rate class G, X-G, V-E, and VRR Interest
certificates.


CD COMMERCIAL 2006-CD2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A-J Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in CD 2006-CD2 Commercial Mortgage Trust, as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

  * Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one principal and interest (P&I) class was affirmed
because the rating was consistent with Moody's expected loss plus
realized losses. Cl. A-J has already experienced a 31.6% realized
loss as a result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the interest only (IO) class was affirmed based on
the credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 47.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 33.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 15.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 73% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98.0% to $62.0
million from $3.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 3.2% to
33.7% of the pool. One loan, constituting 5.5% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to five at Moody's last review.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $462.8 million (for an average
loss severity of 58%). Four loans, constituting 73.0% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Alpine Commons Shopping Center loan ($20.9 million --
33.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 209,000 square foot (SF)
anchored retail property in Wappingers Falls, New York. The loan
initially transferred to special servicing in 2016 after the
borrower was unable to repay the loan at maturity. The loan was
subsequently extended by 24 months, with a new maturity date in
January 2018. The loan transferred back to the special servicer in
January 2018 for maturity default. The second largest tenant, Tops
Market, had a lease expiration in August 2018 and did not renew. As
of the July 2018 rent roll, the property was 69% leased with no
leases schedule to roll in the next two years.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Galleria Pavilion
($14.1 million -- 22.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 64,000
SF retail property located in Henderson, Nevada. The property is in
a retail area surrounding the Galleria at Sunset Mall and was
anchored by Walgreens until the tenant vacated in 2016. As of the
November 2018 rent roll, the property was only 50% leased with 20%
of the leases scheduled to roll within the next two years.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by two
retail properties located in North Carolina and Wisconsin. Moody's
estimates an aggregate $29.5 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (65% expected loss on average).

The two non-defeased, non-specially serviced conduit loans
represent 21.5% of the pool balance. The largest loan is the
Shelton Pointe loan ($11.3 million -- 18.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 158,000 SF suburban office property located in
Shelton, Connecticut. As of January 2019 rent roll, the property
was 99% leased, with 30% of the leases scheduled to roll within the
next two years. The loan has amortized approximately 28% and is
scheduled to mature in September 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 71% and 1.61X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.54X at
the last review.

The second conduit loan is the Francis Murphy Senior Apartments
loan ($2.0 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
120-unit senior living complex in Hagerstown, Maryland. The
property features one- and two-bedroom units and is located across
from a medical center. As of June 2018, the property was 81%
leased, slightly down from 82% in 2017. The loan has amortized
approximately 19% and is scheduled to mature in January 2024.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.14X, respectively,
compared to 75% and 1.38X at the last review.


CIM TRUST 2019-INV1: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on $3.8MM Cl. B-5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-INV1 (the
Certificates) to be issued by CIM Trust 2019-INV1:

-- $214.4 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $91.9 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $128.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.2 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $10.7 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $42.9 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $160.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.6 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.8 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $171.5 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.4 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.4 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $306.3 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $91.9 million Class A-2IO at AAA (sf)
-- $30.4 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class B-IO1 at AA (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $10.5 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $10.5 million Class B-IO2 at A (sf)
-- $10.5 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $9.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $8.4 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $3.8 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-2IO, A-IO3, B-IO1, and B-IO2 are interest-only
certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-12, B-1A and B-2A are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a
combination of exchange certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior-support certificates (Classes A-11 and A-12)
with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 12.05% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 9.65%, 6.90%, 4.40%, 2.20% and 1.20% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of prime,
first-lien, fixed-rate, agency eligible, investment property
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Certificates.
The Certificates are backed by 1,304 loans with a total principal
balance of $382,903,313 as of the Cut-Off Date (March 1, 2019).

The pool comprises 100% fully amortizing fixed-rate conventional
mortgages with original terms to maturity of 30 years. All of the
loans in the pool are conventional mortgages made to investors
either for business purposes or as cash-out refinancing for
personal use. The personal-use loans (14.4% of the pool) are
subject to the Qualified Mortgage and Ability-to-Repay rules
(together, the Rules), and the remainder (85.6% of the pool) are
not subject to the Rules.

All the mortgage loans in the portfolio were eligible for purchase
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are Caliber Home
Loans, Inc. (27.8%); Home Point Financial Corporation (22.7%); and
various other originators, each comprising less than 10.0% of the
mortgage loans.

The loans will be serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (91.4%)
and TIAA, FSB (8.6%).

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) will
act as the Master Servicer, Custodian and Securities Administrator.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will serve as Trustee.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and
satisfactory third-party due diligence on all the loans.


CIM TRUST 2019-INV1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
CIM Trust 2019-INV1 (CIM 2019-INV1). The ratings range from Aaa
(sf) to B2 (sf).

CIM 2019-INV1, the first rated issue from Chimera Trust in 2019, is
a prime RMBS securitization of fixed-rate investment property
mortgage loans secured by first liens on agency-eligible non-owner
occupied residential properties with 30-year original term to
maturity. All of the loans are underwritten in accordance with
Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae guidelines, which take into
consideration, among other factors, the income, assets, employment
and credit score of the borrower. All the loans were run through
one of the government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE) automated
underwriting systems (AUS) and received an "Approve" or "Accept"
recommendation.

The mortgage loans for this transaction were acquired by the
affiliates of the sponsor, Chimera Funding TRS LLC and Chimera
Residential Mortgage Inc. (the sellers) from Bank of America,
National Association (BANA). BANA acquired the mortgage loans
through its whole loan purchase program from various originators.

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) and TIAA, FSB will
service 91% and 9% of the aggregate balance of the mortgage pool,
respectively, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2) will be the master
servicer. The servicers will be primarily responsible for funding
certain servicing advances and delinquent scheduled interest and
principal payments for the mortgage loans, unless the servicer
determines that such amounts would not be recoverable. The master
servicer is obligated to fund any required monthly advances if the
servicer fails in its obligation to do so. The master servicer and
servicer will be entitled to reimbursements for any such monthly
advances from future payments and collections (including insurance
and liquidation proceeds) with respect to those mortgage loans.

CIM 2019-INV1 has a shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination floor and
a subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow model. In
its analysis of tail risk, Moody's considered the increased risk
from borrowers with more than one mortgage in the pool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIM Trust 2019-INV1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 1.00%
in a base scenario and reaches 11.30% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings.

Moody's loss estimates are based on a loan-by-loan assessment of
the securitized collateral pool as of the cut-off date using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for risks related to mortgaged
properties in Homeownership associations (HOAs) in super lien
states. Moody's final loss estimates also incorporate adjustments
for originator assessments and the strength of the representation
and warranty (R&W) framework.

Moody's bases its definitive ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, its assessments of origination quality and
servicing arrangement, the strength of the third party due
diligence and the R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

The CIM 2019-INV1 transaction is a securitization of 1,301
investment property mortgage loans secured by first liens on
one-to-four family residential investment properties, planned unit
developments and condominiums with an unpaid principal balance of
$382,091,125. All the loans have a 30-year original term to
maturity. The mortgage pool has a weighted average (WA) seasoning
of six months. The loans in this transaction have strong borrower
characteristics with a WA original primary borrower FICO score of
769 and a WA original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 68.7%.
In addition, 33% of the borrowers are self-employed and refinance
loans comprise about 33% of the aggregate pool. The pool has a high
geographic concentration with 35% of the aggregate pool located in
California and 13% located in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim,
CA MSA. The characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to CIM 2018-INV1.

Three loans were dropped from the pool between provisional ratings
and definitive ratings due to suspected early payment default
(EPD). After further review, the loans ended up becoming current
and it was identified that the payment disruption was due to
servicing transfer related issues. However, the EPD proceeding had
already started and the loans were dropped from the pool. There
were no material changes to the collateral due to loan drops.

About 5.4% of the aggregate stated balance of the Mortgage Loans as
of the Cut-off Date, have been 30 days or more delinquent and are
now current under the methodology used by the Mortgage Bankers
Association (the "MBA Method"). All such delinquencies occurred
around the time of a servicing transfer and the Sponsor believes
that these delinquencies were related to the transfer of the
servicing on such Mortgage Loans. The servicer confirmed that there
were issues with contacting the borrower and transferring automated
clearing house (ACH) but were subsequently resolved. All the loans
post transfer have been current. Out of the total 66 mortgage loans
with delinquent history, four loans have been 90 days or more
delinquent. Moody's took into consideration updated FICO scores for
borrowers with over 90 days delinquency and adjusted its base case
and Aaa loss assumptions accordingly.

Origination

Loans in the pool were originated by 10 different originators. The
largest originators in the pool with more than 10% by balance are
Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (28%), and Home Point Financial
Corporation (23%). Moody's took into consideration the origination
quality of these originators and factored it in its analysis.
Moody's increased its base case and Aaa loss assumption for the
loans originated by Home Point Financial Corporation due to limited
historical performance data, reduced retail footprints which will
limit the seller's oversight on originations and lack of strong
controls to support recent rapid growth.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Two third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data
integrity and regulatory compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage
pool. The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
and aggregators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of
the loans, no material compliance issues, and no material appraisal
defects.

Each originator will provide comprehensive loan level reps and
warranties for their respective loans. BANA will assign each
originator's R&W to the Sellers (Chimera Funding TRS LLC and
Chimera Residential Mortgage Inc.), who will in turn assign to the
depositor, which will assign to the trust. To mitigate the
potential concerns regarding the originators' ability to meet their
respective R&W obligations, the sellers will backstop the R&Ws for
all originators loans. The sellers obligation to backstop third
party R&Ws will terminate 5 years after the closing date, subject
to certain performance conditions. The sellers will also provide
the gap reps. The R&W framework is adequate in part because the
results of the independent TPRs revealed a high level of compliance
with underwriting guidelines and regulations, as well as overall
adequate appraisal quality. These results give confidence that the
loans do not systemically breach the R&Ws the originators have made
and that the originators are unlikely to face material repurchase
requests in the future. The loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in
general, either meet or exceed the baseline set of credit-neutral
R&Ws Moody's identified for US RMBS. Among other considerations,
the R&Ws address property valuation, underwriting, fraud, data
accuracy, regulatory compliance, the presence of title and hazard
insurance, the absence of material property damage, and the
enforceability of mortgage.

Tail Risk and Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.60% of the closing pool balance,
which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time. Additionally there is a
subordination lock-out amount which is 0.70% of the closing pool
balance.

Exposure to Extraordinary expenses

Extraordinary trust expenses in this transaction are deducted from
net WAC. Moody's believes there is a very low likelihood that the
rated certificates in CIM 2019-INV1 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments from potential
future lawsuits against key deal parties. Firstly, the loans are of
prime quality and were originated under a regulatory environment
that requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis,
which reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could
form the basis of a lawsuit. Secondly, the transaction has
reasonably well-defined processes in place to identify loans with
defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent
breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations
and warranties when certain clearly defined triggers have been
breached which reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for
inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has disclosed results of the
credit, compliance and valuation review of 100% of the mortgage
loans by independent third parties.

Other Considerations

In CIM 2019-INV1, the controlling holder has the option to hire at
its own expense the independent reviewer upon the occurrence of a
review event. If there is no Controlling Holder (no single entity
holds a majority of the Class Principal Amount of the most
subordinate class of certificates outstanding), the trustee will
appoint an independent reviewer at the cost of the trust. However,
if the controlling holder does not hire the independent reviewer,
the holders of more than 50% of the aggregate voting interests of
all outstanding certificates may direct (at their expense) the
trustee to appoint an independent reviewer. In this transaction,
the controlling holder can be the depositor or a seller (or an
affiliate of these parties). If the controlling holder is
affiliated with the depositor, seller or Sponsor, then the
controlling holder may not be motivated to discover and enforce R&W
breaches for which its affiliate is responsible.

The servicer will not commence foreclosure proceedings on a
mortgage loan unless the servicer has notified the controlling
holder at least five business days in advance of the foreclosure
and the controlling holder has not objected to such action. If the
controlling holder objects, the servicer has to obtain three
appraisals from the appraisal firms as listed in the pooling and
servicing agreement. The cost of the appraisals are borne by the
controlling holder. The controlling holder will be required to
purchase such mortgage loan at a price equal to the highest of the
three appraisals plus accrued and unpaid interest on such mortgage
loan as of the purchase date. If the servicer cannot obtain three
appraisals there are alternate methods for determining the purchase
price. If the controlling holder fails to purchase the mortgage
loan within the time frame, the controlling holder forfeits any
foreclosure rights thereafter. Moody's considers this credit
neutral because a) the appraiser is chosen by the servicer from the
approved list of appraisers, b) the fair value of the property is
decided by the servicer, based on third party appraisals, and c)
the controlling holder will pay the fair price and accrued
interest.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 15 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust CGCMT 2016-P3 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.


KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect the
generally stable performance of the pool. There have been no
material changes to the pool since issuance; however, four loans
(21.7%) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) including
three loans in the top 15 for vacancy issues. There have been no
delinquent or specially serviced loans since issuance and no
realized losses to date.

The largest FLOC is the Empire Mall (8.5%), the largest loan in the
transaction. The loan is secured by a 1,124,178 sf superregional
mall located in Sioux Falls, SD. The property's occupancy has
declined to 75.5% as of September 2018 due to the loss of anchor
tenants, Younkers and Sears, and large tenant ToysRUs. Since
Fitch's last modeling of this pari passu loan in October 2018,
there has been positive leasing momentum whereby Dillards has
backfilled 100,000 sf of vacant Younkers space and is expected to
open late Fall 2019; Scandinavian Designs (upscale furniture store)
is expected to open in the former ToysRUs space, and Camping World
(temporary tenant) has opened in the Sears space (December
2018-April 2019). Fitch has inquired about tenants with co-tenancy
triggers but has not received a response. The mall has also
experienced declining in-line and anchor sales. The YE 2017 in-line
sales were $406 per square foot (psf) compared to $437 (TTM
September 2015) and $421 (YE 2014). Anchors JC Penney and Macy's
reported YE 2017 sales of $142 psf compared to $156 psf (YE 2014)
and $189 psf (YE 2013) and $105 psf down from $150 psf (YE 2014)
and at $145 psf (YE 2013), respectively.

The next largest FLOC is 600 Broadway (6.5%) and is secured by a
77,280 sf retail property located on the corner of Houston and
Broadway in New York's SoHo neighborhood. The property continues to
be 100% leased to Abercrombie and Fitch (61% of NRA; May 2028
expiration) and 24 Hour Fitness (39% of NRA, December 2023
expiration), although its only 35% occupied. The Abercrombie and
Fitch space is its flagship Hollister location in New York City. At
issuance it was noted that 23.9% of NRA, which was leased to
Abercrombie and Fitch was dark, this space remains dark. 24 Hour
Fitness, has closed this location and vacated but continues to pay
rent. Per the master servicer, 24 Hour Fitness has subleased a
portion of their space to TruFusion SOHO. The most recent reported
NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 2.25x as of YTD
September 2018 compared to 1.67x at issuance.

The third largest FLOC is One Court Square (5.2%) and is secured by
a 51-story, 1.4 million sf office tower located in Long Island
City, NY that is 100% leased to Citibank, N.A. (rated A+'/F1) on a
NNN lease expiring in May 2020, which is prior to the loan's
September 2020 maturity. The property was built-to-suit for
Citibank in 1989. In March 2018, Citibank announced their intention
to vacate approximately one million sf in 2020, thus reducing its
footprint to 400,000 sf. Amazon had previously signed a letter of
intent in November 2018 to lease that one million sf at the
property as part of its efforts to build a second headquarters in
New York City. However, in February 2019, Amazon cancelled those
plans and announced it was no longer pursuing opening a second
campus in New York City and as a result, would no longer lease the
space at One Court Square. The property remains 100% occupied.
Since Fitch's last modeling of this pari passu loan in February
2019, it has been recently publicly reported, the St. Louis-based
healthcare firm Centene is close to finalizing a deal to lease up
to 500,000 sf, which has not yet been confirmed by the servicer.

Minimal Changes in Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 0.9% to $764.8 million from $771.0 million at issuance.
The pool is scheduled to amortize by 6.8% of the initial pool
balance prior to maturity. Twelve loans (47.9%) are full-term
interest-only and 13 loans (37.1%) remain in partial-interest-only
periods. The remaining 12 loans (15.1%) are amortizing balloon
loans with terms of five to 10 years. No loans have defeased or
paid off since issuance. Loan maturities are concentrated in 2026
(70.8%), with limited maturities scheduled in 2020 (5.3%), 2021
(7.2%) and 2025 (16.8%). No loans are defeased.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed a sensitivity test
which assumed losses on two FLOCs: Empire Mall and One Court
Square. This sensitivity scenario addressed concerns with potential
continued performance declines given anchor vacancy and turnover,
as well as declining in-line and anchor sales (Empire Mall) and
potential future significant vacancy (One Court Square). Fitch
assumed losses of 15% on Empire Mall and 20% on One Court Square,
which contributed to the Negative Outlook on class F.

New York City Concentration: Eight loans (38.1% of the pool) are
secured by properties located in the New York MSA, including six of
the top 10, Nyack College NYC, 600 Broadway, 79 Madison Avenue, 5
Penn Plaza, and 225 Liberty Street are located in Manhattan. One
Court Square is located in Long Island City, Queens.

Pool Concentrations: The largest 10 loans comprise 61.7% of the
pool by balance. The pool has a diverse mix of property types, with
office as the largest at 35.4%, followed by retail at 24.8%, hotel
at 20.3%, and industrial/warehouse at 11.5%. There are 26 loans
secured by retail properties, including the largest loan in the
pool (13.2% of the pool). The retail element of the pool consists
of one regional mall (largest loan in the pool 8.5%), and a mix of
unanchored and anchored shopping centers.

Pari Passu Loans: Approximately 59% of the pool, including nine of
the top 10 loans, consists of loans with pari passu
participations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 thru X-D remain Stable. Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's
overall portfolio-level metrics. The revision of the Outlook to
Negative from Stable on class F reflects the potential for
downgrades if the Empire Mall and One Court Square loans continue
to underperform or default, or if overall pool performance
declines.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Outlooks on the following ratings:

  -- $7.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $98.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $175 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $221.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $576.8 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.4 million class X-B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $121.4 million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $38.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.3 million class X-D* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

  * Indicates notional amount and interest-only.

The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2005-OPT4: Moody's Cuts Class M-5 Debt to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
for one transaction, backed by Subprime loans, issued by Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The rating
downgrade is due to the outstanding interest shortfalls on the bond
which is not expected to be recouped as the bond has weak
reimbursement mechanism for interest shortfalls.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in February 2019 from 4.1% in
February 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


COLT MORTGAGE 2019-2: Fitch Rates $9.38MM Class B-2 Certs 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch assigns the following ratings to COLT 2019-2 Mortgage Loan
Trust (COLT 2019-2):

  -- $314,447,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,464,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,342,000 class A-3 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14,189,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,811,000 class B-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,386,000 class B-2 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $6,677,337 class B-3 certificates;

  -- Notional class A-IO-S certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Non-Prime Credit Quality (Concern): The pool has a weighted average
(WA) model credit score of 736 and a WA combined loan to value
ratio (CLTV) of 82%. Of the pool, 17% consists of borrowers with
prior credit events and 41% had a debt to income (DTI) ratio of
over 43%. Investor properties and those run as investor properties
for loss modeling (ie: Non Permenant Residents) account for 3.1% of
the pool.

Fitch applied default penalties to account for these attributes,
and loss severity (LS) was adjusted to reflect the increased risk
of ATR challenges.

Primarily Full Income Documentation (Positive): The large majority
of loans in the mortgage pool were underwritten to the
comprehensive Appendix Q documentation standards defined by ATR,
which is not typical for non-prime RMBS. Mortgage pools of all
other active non-prime RMBS issuers include a significant
percentage of non-traditional income documentation. While a due
diligence review identified roughly 47% of loans (by count) as
having minor variations to Appendix Q, Fitch views those
differences as immaterial and substantially all loans as having
full income documentation. The COLT series transactions that are
comprised of 100% Caliber Home Loans (Caliber) origination are the
only non-prime RMBS issued with more than 95% full income
documentation.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Fitch has reviewed Caliber and
Hudson Americas L.P.'s (Hudson's) origination and acquisition
platforms and found them to have sound underwriting and operational
control environments. Caliber has a long operating history and has
one of the largest and most established Non-QM programs in the
sector. Hudson's oversight of Caliber's origination of Non-QM loans
reduces the risk of manufacturing defects. Strong loan quality was
evidenced with third-party due diligence performed by an Acceptable
- Tier 1 diligence firm on 100% of the pool. The issuer's retention
of at least 5% of the transaction's fair market value helps to
ensure an alignment of interest between the issuer and investors.

Alignment of Interests (Positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors. LSRMF
Acquisitions I, LLC (LSRMF), as sponsor and securitizer, or an
affiliate will retain a horizontal interest in the transaction
equal to not less than 5% of the aggregate fair market value of all
certificates in the transaction. Lastly, the representations and
warranties are provided by Caliber, which is owned by LSRMF
affiliates and, therefore, also aligns the interest of the
investors with those of LSRMF to maintain high-quality origination
standards and sound performance, as Caliber will be obligated to
repurchase loans due to rep breaches.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A
certificates while shutting out the subordinate bonds from
principal until all three classes have been reduced to zero. To the
extent that any of the cumulative loss trigger event, the
delinquency trigger event or the credit enhancement trigger event
occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates until they
are reduced to zero.

R&W Framework (Concern): As originator, Caliber will be providing
loan-level representations and warranties to the trust. While the
reps for this transaction are substantively consistent with those
listed in Fitch's published criteria and provide a solid alignment
of interest, Fitch added approximately 134 bps to the expected loss
at the 'AAAsf' rating category to reflect the non-investment-grade
counterparty risk of the provider and the lack of an automatic
review of defaulted loans. The lack of an automatic review is
mitigated by the ability of holders of 25% of the total outstanding
aggregate class balance to initiate a review.

Servicing and Master Servicer (Positive): Servicing will be
performed on 100% of the loans by Caliber. Fitch rates Caliber
'RPS2-'/Negative due to its fast-growing portfolio and regulatory
scrutiny. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), rated
'RMS1-'/Stable, will act as master servicer and securities
administrator. Advances required but not paid by Caliber will be
paid by Wells Fargo.

Performance Triggers (Mixed): Credit enhancement, delinquency and
loan loss triggers convert principal distribution to a straight
sequential payment priority in the event of poor asset performance.
The delinquency trigger is based only on the current month and not
on a rolling six-month average. The triggers for this transaction
are weaker compared with prior deals as the subordination to the
'Asf'-rated class is lower than the highest loss trigger threshold.
Under this structure, the A3 class could potentially be receiving
principal and incurring losses simultaneously, eroding protection
to the A2 and A1 classes at a faster pace than deals with tighter
triggers.


COMM 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms Class G Certs at 'B2'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes in COMM 2012-CCRE1 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE1 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2018 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current pooled balance, essentially the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.5%
of the original pooled balance, essentially the same as at Moody's
last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 2019 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $709 million from $933
million at securitization. The certificates are collateralized by
41 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 15% of the
pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance) constituting
59% of the pool. Six loans, constituting 9% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2017 and full or partial year 2018
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 83.8%, compared to 81.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
12% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.69X and 1.37X,
respectively, compared to 1.75X and 1.38X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 30% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Crossgates Mall Loan ($107.5 million --
15.2% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a
$268.7 million loan. The loan is secured by a two-story, 1.3
million square foot (SF) super regional mall located in Albany, New
York. The mall is anchored by Macy's (non-collateral), J.C. Penney,
Dick's Sporting Goods, Best Buy and Regal Crossgates. As per the
December 2018 rent roll, the total mall and in-line occupancy was
89% and 73%, respectively, compared to 89% and 75% in December
2017. For the trailing twelve month (TTM) period ending November
2018, reported in-line tenant sales excluding the Apple store were
$357 PSF, compared to $340 PSF for the TTM period ending November
2017. The property is benefiting from amortization and has
amortized 10% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 104% and 1.02X, respectively compared to 101% and 1.04X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Creekside Plaza Loan ($53.5
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a Class A,
228,000 SF, three-building office complex located in San Leandro,
California. The collateral also includes an above-ground parking
structure. As of December 2018 the property was 78% leased,
compared to 89% in December 2017. Financial performance declined in
2018 as a result of the reduced occupancy. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 98% and 1.05X, respectively compared to 87% and 1.18X,
respectively at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall Loan
($49.3 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion of a $137.3 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 635,769 SF portion of a 1.2 million SF regional mall
located in Grandville, Michigan. The property was built in 2000 and
is anchored by Macy's, Sears, Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting
Goods and Celebration Cinemas. The property contains one vacant
anchor space, a former Younkers, that vacated in 2018 as a result
of Bon-Ton's bankruptcy. Only the Dick's and Celebration Cinemas
anchors are part of the collateral. As of September 2018, the
inline space was 91% leased. Property performance has declined
recently, from 2016 to 2017, as a result of lower rental revenue,
however, property performance remains above the levels at
securitization. The loan has amortized approximately 11% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.36X at the last review.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2001-CMLB1: Moody's Affirms B3 on Class X Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in Commercial Mortgage Leased-Backed Certificates 2000-CMLB1 (CMLBC
2001-CMLB1) as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X*, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metric, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF), is within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a lower
loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant
Lease and Comparable Lease Financings" published in November 2018.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only class were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease
Financings" published in November 2018 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO) Securities" published
in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 2019 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 75% to $119.6 million from
$476.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 83 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool. Fifty-eight of the loans are CTL loans
secured by properties leased to 15 corporate credit tenants. Twenty
five loans, representing 26% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

The CTL pool, excluding defeasance, consists of 58 loans secured by
properties leased to 15 tenants. The largest exposure is AutoZone,
Inc. ($20.5 million -- 17.2% of the pool; senior unsecured rating:
Baa1 -- Stable outlook). Twelve of the tenants (54% of the pool
excluding defeasance) have a Moody's rating. The bottom-dollar
weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool (including
defeasance) is 1838, compared to 1543 at the last review. WARF is a
measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The
bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default probability.


ENGS COMMERCIAL 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed ten ratings from two U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the ten outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, four were upgraded and six were
confirmed. For the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at their new respective rating levels. For
the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends are such that
credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected
losses at their current respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting, and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
performance.

The Affected Ratings are:

Engs Commercial Finance Trust 2018-1

                    Action            Rating
                    ------            ------
Class A-1 Notes     Confirmed         AAA(sf)
Class A-2 Notes     Confirmed         AAA(sf)
Class B Notes       Upgraded          AA(high)(sf)
Class C Notes       Confirmed         A(sf)
Class D Notes       Confirmed         BBB(sf)
Class E Notes       Confirmed         BB(sf)

Engs Commercial Finance Trust 2016-1

                    Action            Rating
                    ------            ------
Class A-2 Notes     Confirmed         AAA(sf)
Class B Notes       Upgraded          AA(sf)
Class C Notes       Upgraded          AA(low)(sf)
Class D Notes       Upgraded          A(low)(sf)


FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-2: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings for 8 tranches
issued by Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust in 2018.
The notes are backed by a pool of retail automobile loan contracts
originated by Foursight Capital LLC (Foursight; Unrated), who is
also the servicer and administrator for these transactions.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018
Affirmed A2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2018
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-2

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade is a result of the buildup of credit enhancement owing
to structural features including a sequential pay structure,
non-declining reserve account and overcollateralization.

The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectation remains
unchanged at 9.25% for the 2018-1 transaction and 9.00% for the
2018-2 transaction.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the ratings. Losses could decline from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor
defaults or greater recoveries from the value of the vehicles
securing the obligors promise of payment. The US job market and the
market for used vehicles are also primary drivers of the
transaction's performance. Other reasons for better-than-expected
performance include changes in servicing practices to maximize
collections on the loans or refinancing opportunities that result
in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Losses could increase from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor
defaults or a deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing
the obligors promise of payment. The US job market and the market
for used vehicles are also primary drivers of the transaction's
performance. Other reasons for worse-than-expected performance
include poor servicing, error on the part of transaction parties,
lack of transactional governance and fraud.


GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: Moody's Affirms Class F Certs at 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 2019 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $1.13 billion from
$1.75 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 49 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 58% of the pool. One loan, constituting
0.8% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Fourteen loans, constituting 22% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10, compared to 12 at Moody's last review.

Six loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $6.9 million (for a loss severity of
47%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 4% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $21.4 million (a 44% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2017 and full or partial year 2018
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 80%, compared to 81% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
16% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.68X and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 1.68X and 1.29X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Alhambra
Renaissance Center Loan ($9.4 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which
is secured by a Regal Cinema anchored center located in Alhambra,
CA approximately 10 miles northeast of Los Angeles. The Regal
Cinema occupies 87.5% of the NRA, with a lease due to expire in
November 2022. The Regal Cinema extended its lease for five years
in November 2017. Due to the single tenant concentration, Moody's
valuation incorporates a lit/dark analysis. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa3 (sca.pd) and 1.41X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 38.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 1551 Broadway Loan ($180.0 million -- 15.9%
of the pool), which is secured by a 26,000 SF single tenant retail
property and a 15,000 SF LED sign located in the Bow Tie area of
Manhattan's Times Square district. The property and LED sign are
leased to AE Outfitters, Inc. a fully owned subsidiary of American
Eagle Outfitters, Inc. through February 2024. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 0.95X, respectively, the same as at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Park Place Mall Loan ($174.5 million
-- 15.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 478,000 SF portion of
a 1.06 million SF dominant super-regional mall in Tucson, Arizona.
At securitization the non-collateral anchors were Sears, Dillard's
and Macy's. Sears closed its store at this location in July 2018,
however, Round 1, an entertainment venue, is expected open in 2019
and occupy a portion of the former Sears space. The largest
collateral tenant is a Century Theaters, an 18-screen movie
theatre. As per the September 2018 rent roll, the total mall and
in-line occupancy was 77% and 94%, respectively, compared to 99%
and 98% as of December 2017. The reduction in the total mall
occupancy was due to Sears vacating. For the trailing twelve month
(TTM) period ending September 2018, reported in-line comparable
sales (tenants


GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2016-GS2 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Performance and loss expectations for the
majority of the pool have remained stable since issuance. There are
no specially serviced or delinquent loans since issuance. One loan
which is outside of the top 15, Times Square Retail Center (0.6% of
the pool), was flagged as a Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC) due to
upcoming rollover concerns of the subject's largest tenant, Vons
(33% of NRA), whose lease expires in August 2019.

Minimal Changes in Credit Enhancement: There have been minimal
changes to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the March 2019
remittance report, the transaction's aggregate balance has been
paid down by 0.76% to $744.9 million from $750.6 million at
issuance. There are no defeased loans and there have been no
realized losses to date. Based on the scheduled balance at
maturity, the initial pool balance will pay down by 5.08% prior to
maturity. Seventeen loans (63% of the pool) are interest only,
including eight loans in the top 15: Veritas Multifamily Pool 1
(10.1%), Twenty Ninth Street (10.1%), Panorama Corporate Center
(10.0%), Cedarbrook Plaza (7.9%), Veritas Multifamily Pool 2
(7.4%), 18th Avenue (2.5%), 86th Street (2.4%) and Junction
Boulevard (2.1%). Fourteen loans (23.4% of the pool) are partial
interest only and the remaining six loans (13.6%) are amortizing.

ADDITIONAL LOSS CONSIDERATIONS

High Retail and Hotel Concentrations: Twenty-four loans (44.2%) are
secured by retail properties including seven loans in the top 15:
Twenty Ninth Street (10.1%), Cedarbrook Plaza (7.9%), Deerbrook
Plaza (2.9%), 18th Avenue (2.5%), 86th Street (2.4%), Highlands
Shopping Center (2.3%) and Junction Boulevard (2.1%). Additionally,
five loans (12.8%) are secured by hotel properties, all of which
are in the top 15 (Hampton Inn San Diego Mission Valley (4.4%),
Residence Inn & Springhill Suites North Shore (3.2%), Aloft
Sunnyvale (3.0%) and the Residence Inn Princeton (2.1%)).

Credit Opinion Loans: At issuance, the Veritas Multifamily Pool 1
loan received a standalone, investment grade credit opinion of
'AAAsf*'. The loan has continued to perform in line with
expectations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks reflect the continued amortization and stable
performance of the underlying collateral. Rating changes are not
expected in the near term, unless there are significant changes to
credit enhancement or pool performance. Upgrades are possible
should the pool receive significant defeasance or additional
paydown. Downgrades are possible should a material asset-level or
economic event adversely affect pool performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $6.0 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $137.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $165 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $188 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $564.8 million (b) class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45 million (c) class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.2 million (c) class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.2 million (b) class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 (c) class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35.7 million (c) class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.2 million (a) class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.2 million (a)(b) class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.6 million (a) class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.5 million (a) class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

a) Privately placed and pursuant to rule 144A.

b) Notional amount and interest only.

c) The class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be
exchanged for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates
may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B, and class C
certificates.

Fitch does not rate class G.


GS MORTGAGE 2019-PJ1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-PJ1 to be issued by GS
Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ1 as follows:

-- $196.0 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $196.0 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.6 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.6 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $147.0 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $147.0 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $49.0 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $49.0 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $214.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $214.6 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $214.6 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.6 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $147.0 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $49.0 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $2.9 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $3.3 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $2.0 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $577.0 thousand Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-3, A-X-5, and A-X-7 are interest only
certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a combination of
depositable certificates, as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-5 and A-7 are super senior certificates. These classes
benefit from additional protection from the senior support
certificate (Class A-3) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.95% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 5.70%, 3.00%, 1.55%, 0.70% and 0.45% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 334 loans with a total principal
balance of $230,602,197 as of the Cut-Off Date (March 1, 2019).

The originators for the mortgage pool are loanDepot.com, LLC
(loanDepot; 47.3%); Pentagon Federal Credit Union (19.3%); Caliber
Home Loans, Inc. (17.8%); and Provident Funding Associates, L.P.
(Provident; 15.6%). Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company is the Sponsor
and the Mortgage Loan Seller of the transaction.

NewRez LLC (formerly known as New Penn Financial, LLC) doing
business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will service
approximately 52.7% of the mortgage loans. loanDepot will own the
mortgage servicing rights for 47.3% of the pool, and Cenlar FSB
will service such loans as the sub-servicer. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as the Master
Servicer, Securities Administrator and Custodian. U.S. Bank Trust
National Association will serve as Delaware Trustee. Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC will serve as the representations and warranties
(R&W) File Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of 30 years and a weighted-average loan
age of six months. Approximately 24.8% of the pool is conforming,
high-balance mortgage loans that were underwritten by loanDepot and
Provident using an automated underwriting system designated by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and were eligible for purchase by such
agencies. The remaining 75.2% of the pool is traditional,
non-agency, prime jumbo mortgage loans. Details on the underwriting
of conforming loans can be found in the Key Probability of Default
Drivers section of the related presale report.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

This transaction employs an R&W framework that contains certain
weaknesses, such as materiality factors, some unrated R&W
providers, knowledge qualifiers and sunset provisions that allow
for certain R&Ws to expire within three to five years after the
Closing Date. The framework is perceived by DBRS to be limiting
compared with traditional lifetime R&W standards in certain
DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the perceived weaknesses in
the R&W framework, DBRS reduced the originator scores in this pool.
A lower originator score results in increased default and loss
assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


GS MORTGAGE 2019-PJ1: Moody's Rates Class B-5 Debt 'B2'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 15
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ1 (GSMBS 2019-PJ1). The
ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

GSMBS 2019-PJ1 is the first prime jumbo transaction of 2019 issued
by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company (GSMC). The certificates are
backed by 334 30-year, fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans
with a total balance of $230,602,197 as of the March 1, 2019
cut-off date. Conforming loans comprise $57,138,244 of the pool
balance. All the loans are subject to the Qualified Mortgage (QM)
and Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules and are categorized as either
QM-Safe Harbor or QM-Agency Safe Harbor.

The mortgage loans for this transaction were acquired by the seller
and sponsor, GSMC, from LoanDepot.com, LLC (LoanDepot, 47.3%),
Pentagon Federal Credit Union (PenFed, 19.3%), Caliber Home Loans,
Inc. (Caliber, 17.8%) and Provident Funding Associates, L.P.
(Provident, 15.6%), (by loan balance of the pool).

The weighted average (WA) loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of the mortgage
pool is 73.2%, which is in line with prime jumbo J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) and Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT)
transactions which had WA LTVs of about 70% on average. None of the
loans in the pool have mortgage insurance. Similar to JPMMT and
SEMT prime jumbo transactions, the borrowers in the pool have a WA
FICO score of 770 and a WA debt-to-income ratio of 35%. The WA
mortgage rate of the pool is 4.65%.

NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) will
service 43% of the pool and Cenlar FSB will service 57% of the loan
on behalf of LoanDepot. The servicing fee for loans serviced by
Shellpoint will be 4bps and the fee for LoanDepot/Cenlar will be 25
bps. Moody's considers the servicing fee charged by Shellpoint low
compared to the industry standard of 0.25% for prime fixed rate
loans - in the event of a servicing transfer, the successor
servicer may unlikely accept such an arrangement. However, the
transaction documents provide that any successor servicer to
Shellpoint will be paid the successor servicing fee rate of 0.25%,
which is not limited to the Shellpoint servicing fee rate.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will be the master servicer
and securities administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association
will be the trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a typical
shifting interest structure that benefits from a senior floor and a
locked out percentage.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2019-PJ1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 6.15% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using the US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. The final loss
estimates also incorporate adjustments for origination quality and
overall Representation & Warranty (R&W) framework.

Moody's ratings on the certificates take into consideration the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, the origination quality, the servicing
arrangement, the strength of the third party due diligence and the
representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

GSMBS 2019-PJ1 is a securitization of a pool of 334 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$230,602,197 as of the cut-off date, with a WA remaining term to
maturity of 353 months and a WA seasoning of 7 months. The WA
current FICO score of the borrowers in the pool is 770. The WA LTV
ratio of the mortgage pool is 73.2%, which is in line with previous
JPMMT and SEMT prime jumbo transactions which had WA LTVs of about
70% on average. None of the loans in the pool have mortgage
insurance. The other characteristics of the loans in the pool are
generally comparable to that of recent JPMMT and SEMT prime jumbo
transactions.

The mortgage loans in the pool were originated mostly in California
(48.4% by loan balance). Of note, wildfires have affected certain
counties in northern California, including Shasta and Lake
counties. As of the cut-off date, 1 of the mortgaged properties in
the mortgage pool, representing approximately 0.33% of the
aggregate stated principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the
cut-off date, was located in Shasta or Lake counties.

Aggregator/Origination Quality

Moody's considers GSMC's aggregation platform to be weaker than
that of peers due to the lack of historical performance and limited
quality control process. Nevertheless, since these loans were
originated to the originators' underwriting guidelines and Moody's
reviewed each of the originators, all of whom contributed at least
10% of the loans to the transaction, it did not apply a separate
loss-level adjustment for aggregation quality. Instead, Moody's
based its loss-level adjustments on the reviews of each of the
originators.

In addition to reviewing GSMC as an aggregator, Moody's has
reviewed all the originators in this transaction, among other
considerations, their underwriting guidelines, performance history,
policies and documentation (where available). Moody's  considers
Provident and Caliber to have stronger residential prime jumbo loan
origination practices than their peers due to their strong
underwriting processes and solid loan performance. Moody's
decreased its base case and Aaa (sf) loss expectations for
non-conforming loans originated by Provident and Caliber.

Moody's considers LoanDepot and PenFed adequate originators of
prime jumbo loans. As a result, it did not make any adjustments to
its loss levels for these loans. Moody's did not make an adjustment
for GSE-eligible loans, regardless of the originator, since those
loans were underwritten in accordance with GSE guidelines.

LoanDepot.com, LLC, Pentagon Federal Credit Union, Caliber Home
Loans, Inc. and Provident Funding Associates, L.P. originated
approximately 47.3%, 19.3%, 17.8% and 15.6% of the mortgage loans
(by balance) in the pool, respectively.

Servicing Arrangement

Shellpoint and LoanDepot will be the named primary servicers for
this transaction and Cenlar will sub-service the portfolio for
LoanDepot. Shellpoint and LoanDepot/Cenlar will service
approximately 53% and 47% of the pool by balance, respectively.
Shellpoint will be paid a flat servicing fee of 0.0400% per annum.
Moody's considers the servicing fee charged by Shellpoint as low
compared to the industry standard of 0.25% for prime fixed rate
loans. In the event of a servicing transfer, the successor servicer
may unlikely accept such an arrangement. However, the transaction
documents provide that any successor servicer to Shellpoint will be
paid the successor servicing fee rate of 0.25%, which is not
limited to the Shellpoint servicing fee rate.

LoanDepot has strong sub-servicing monitoring processes, seasoned
oversight team and system access to sub-servicers. Moody's
considers the servicing fee of 0.25% charged by LoanDepot to be in
line with the standard fee for prime fixed rate loans. Cenlar's
core business includes servicing and subservicing residential
loans. The company is adequately staffed when benchmarked to other
major servicers Moody's assesses.

Third-party Review

AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), which is a third party review (TPR) firm,
verified the accuracy of the loan-level information that Moody's
received from the sponsor. AMC conducted detailed credit,
regulatory compliance and data integrity reviews on 100% of the
mortgage pool. The TPR results indicated compliance with the
originators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of
loans, no material compliance issues and no appraisal defects. The
loans that had exceptions to the originators' underwriting
guidelines had strong documented compensating factors such as
significant liquid assets, low LTVs and consistent long-term
employment. AMC also identified minor compliance exceptions for
reasons such as inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have
assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID)
violations related to fees that were out of variance but then were
cured and disclosed. Moody's did not make any adjustments to its
expected or Aaa (sf) loss levels due to the TPR results.

Representations & Warranties

GSMBS 2019-PJ1's R&W framework is in line with that of recent JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework takes into account the
financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including
qualifiers and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

Loan Depot (47.3%), Pentagon Federal Credit Union (19.3%), Caliber
Home Loans, Inc. (17.8%) and Provident Funding Associates, L.P.
(15.6%) are the R&W providers (by loan balance of the pool). The
R&W providers vary in financial strength. The creditworthiness of
the R&W provider determines the probability that the R&W provider
will be available and have the financial strength to repurchase
defective loans upon identifying a breach. Because the R&W
providers are unrated and/or exhibit limited financial flexibility,
Moody's applied an adjustment to the loans for which these entities
provided R&Ws. GSMC will not backstop any R&W providers who may
become financially incapable of repurchasing mortgage loans.

The loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, either meet or
exceed the baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified
for US RMBS. Among other considerations, the R&Ws address property
valuation, underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory
compliance, the presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence
of material property damage, and the enforceability of the
mortgage. The transaction has some knowledge qualifiers, which do
not appear material. While three R&Ws sunset after three years, all
three of these provisions are subject to performance triggers which
extend the R&W an additional three years based on the occurrence of
certain events of delinquency.

The R&W enforcement mechanisms are adequate. Moody's analyzed the
triggers for breach review, the scope of the review, the
consistency and transparency of the review, and the likelihood that
a breached R&W would be put back to the R&W provider. The breach
review is thorough, transparent, consistent and independent. The
transaction documents prescribe a comprehensive set of tests that
the reviewer will perform to test whether the R&Ws are breached.
The tests, for the most part, are very thorough. They are
transparent and consistent because the same tests will be performed
for each loan and the reviewer will report the results.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank Trust National Association.
The custodian, paying agent, and cash management functions will be
performed by Wells Fargo Bank. In addition, as master servicer,
Wells Fargo is responsible for servicer oversight, the termination
of servicers and the appointment of successor servicers. Moody's
considers the presence of an experienced master servicer such as
Wells Fargo to be a mitigant for any servicing disruptions. Wells
Fargo is committed to act as successor servicer if no other
successor servicer can be engaged.

Tail Risk and Locked Out Percentage

For deals in which the issuer does not exercise a clean-up call
option, the remaining subordination at the tail end of
transaction's life could become insufficient to support high
ratings on senior bonds as tranche performance depends highly on
the performance of a small number of loans. To address this risk,
the transaction has a senior floor of 1.80% and a locked out
percentage of 2.75%, both expressed as a percentage of the closing
pool balance and equivalent to $4.15M and $6.34M, respectively. The
locked out amount protects both the senior tranches and non-locked
subordinate tranches. It diverts allocable principal payments from
locked out subordinate tranches to the non-locked subordinate
tranches. Other than the Class B1, a subordinate tranche is locked
out if its outstanding balance plus the outstanding balance of all
classes subordinate to it are less than $6.34M. Class B1 will not
be subject to the locked out amount. If the Class B1 is paid to
zero and the aggregate amount of outstanding subordinate tranches
is equal to or less than the locked out amount, than the allocable
principal payments from all subordinate tranches are diverted to
pay senior tranches until they are paid off. The senior floor and
locked out features are common in RMBS 2.0 prime jumbo
securitizations; however, this transaction is unique because the
locked out percentage is higher than that of the senior floor.
Nonetheless, these features adequately mitigate the aforementioned
tail risk.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero, i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


JP MORGAN 2004-C2: Fitch Puts 4 Certs Classes on Watch Evolving
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes and placed four classes on
Rating Watch Evolving of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2004-C2 (JPMCC 2004-C2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The placement of classes K through N on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE)
is due to notification that the largest loan, Employers Reinsurance
Corporation II loan (59.6% of pool), is expected to pay off in the
near term. The master servicer, Berkadia, received written notice
from the borrower of their plans to repay the loan on April 1st,
2019, one month prior to its upcoming May 1, 2019 anticipated
repayment date (ARD). The repayment of the loan would pay off
classes H, J, K and L. In addition, classes M and N will benefit
from increased credit enhancement, resulting in the possibility of
multi-category upgrades to these classes.

However, if the payoff does not happen as anticipated, given the
binary risk, downgrades may be possible to classes K, L and M.

The Employers Reinsurance Corporation II loan is secured by a
155,925 square foot single tenant suburban office property located
in Kansas City, MO, approximately 15 miles south of the central
business district. The property is located in the State Line office
submarket of Kansas City, which according to REIS and as of fourth
quarter 2018, reported an average vacancy rate of 18.7%.

The property is fully leased to Swiss Re Management (US) Corp.
through April 1st, 2019; however, Swiss Re vacated the property in
October 2006 following a consolidation of its Kansas City-area
staff to Overland Park, KS. The property is currently 59.6%
physically occupied by Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company, which
is subleasing a portion of the property from Swiss Re and maintains
its global headquarters in the immediate area of the subject
property. According to the servicer, Burns and McDonnell intends to
enter into a direct lease with the borrower for the entire
building. Per the servicer, the lease review is currently on hold
due to the borrower's intention to pay off the loan within the next
month. The loan is currently cash managed with excess cash being
trapped and deposited into the TI/LC reserve; the reserve had a
balance of $1.07 million as of March 2019.

Alternative Loss Consideration; Concentrated Pool: The transaction
is highly concentrated with only 10 of the original 134 loans
remaining. The majority of the outstanding loans are secured by
properties located in secondary/tertiary markets and/or leased to a
single tenant. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans
based on loan structural features, collateral quality and
performance, and then ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment. The affirmations reflect this sensitivity analysis.
Class H is fully covered by defeased collateral. Class J is covered
by defeased and fully amortizing, low leveraged loans.

Relatively Stable Performance: Loss expectations for the majority
of the pool have remained relatively stable since Fitch's last
rating action. Three loans (8.3% of pool) are fully defeased and
five loans (24.5%) are fully amortizing, low leveraged loans. Fitch
designated two loans (67.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, including
the largest loan (59.6%) and one specially serviced loan (7.6%).

Specially Serviced Loan: The specially-serviced Hillside MHP
Portfolio loan (7.6% of pool) is secured by a portfolio of 122
manufactured homes spanning three communities in Mount Morris,
Nunda, and Silver Springs, NY. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2014 for maturity default. A receiver was
appointed in August 2016 and a Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ)
was filed in October 2016. The foreclosure and note sale procedures
will occur following the court's ruling on the MSJ, which remains
pending.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2019 remittance
report, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
97.4% to $25.5 million from $1.06 billion at issuance. Since
Fitch's last rating action, the Spring Valley II Apartments loan
(0.4% of original pool balance) prepaid during its open period in
May 2018. Realized losses to date total 1.2% of the original pool
balance. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting class P and
the non-rated class.

Loan Maturities: Of the non-specially serviced loans, the largest
loan (59.6% of pool) has an ARD in May 2019; the remaining loans
are scheduled to mature in 2020 (one loan; 1.7% of pool), 2022 (one
loan; 1.7%) and 2024 (six loans; 29.3%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Watch Evolving on classes K through N will be resolved
over the next few months following updates on whether the payoff of
the Employers Reinsurance Corporation II loan occurs and whether
the current subtenant executes a final lease for the entire
building. Multi-category upgrades to classes M and N are possible
if the Employers Reinsurance Corporation II loan repays in full
given the increased credit enhancement and pool composition.
However, downgrades to classes K, L and M are possible if the loan
does not repay by the ARD and the property becomes fully vacant.
The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes H and J reflect the increased
credit enhancement and expected continued paydowns.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has placed the following classes on Rating Watch Evolving:

  -- $5.2 million class K at 'BBsf';

  -- $2.6 million class L at 'Bsf';

  -- $3.9 million class M at 'CCCsf'; RE 45%;

  -- $2.6 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $270,000 class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.5 million class J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-1-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, RP-1, RP-2,
RP-3, RP-4, and the RP-5 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class X-1 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-CIBC10 as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2018 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2018 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2018 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2018 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X-1*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three classes, Cl. C, Cl. D, and Cl. E, were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 46%
since Moody's last review and 97% since securitization.

The rating on the Cl. F was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl. F
has already experienced a 36% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except the
interest-only class were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating
interest-only class were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest Only (IO) Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 2019 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $55.9 million from
$1.96 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 27% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 89% of the pool. Three loans, constituting
5.1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7, compared to 10 the at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $150.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 42%).

Moody's received full year 2017 and full/partial year 2018
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 60%, compared to 59% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
20% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.16X and 2.17X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 2.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 54% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 65-75 Lower Welden Street Loan ($15.0 million
-- 27% of the pool), which is secured by a 141,000 square foot (SF)
suburban office building located in St. Albans, Vermont
(approximately 18 miles from the Canadian border). As of March
2019, the property was 100% occupied by The Department of Homeland
Security (US Citizenship and Immigration Services), with a lease
expiration date in December 2021. A cash flow sweep period
commenced in November 2017 with excess cash flow being deposited to
a cash collateral reserve. The reserve balance is approximately
$1.29 million (or $9 PSF) as of the March 2019 remittance date. Due
to the single tenancy, Moody's value incorporated a lit/dark
analysis. This loan has amortized 26% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.11X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Universal Technical Institute Loan
($7.9 million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by a 282,000 SF
warehouse/distribution building located in Avondale, Arizona, which
is approximately 14 miles east of downtown Phoenix. As of December
2018, the property was 100% leased to Universal Technical Institute
of Arizona, with a lease expiration date in July 2024. The loan is
fully amortizing, has amortized 57% since securitization and
matures in December 2024. Due to the single tenancy, Moody's
analysis incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 34% and 2.90X.

The third largest loan is the Foss Manufacturing Loan ($7.2 million
-- 13% of the pool), which is secured by three buildings
(industrial, mixed use, and office) that total 528,000 SF. The
properties are located in Hampton, New Hampshire. As of December
2018, the properties were fully leased to Foss Performance
Materials, which has a lease expiration in August 2035. The loan is
fully amortizing, has amortized 57% since securitization and
matures in July 2024. Due to the single tenancy, Moody's analysis
incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
37% and 2.63X, respectively.


JP MORGAN 2019-2: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2019-2 to be issued by J.P.
Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-2 as follows:

-- $411.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $385.0 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $315.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $236.8 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $78.9 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $185.9 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $129.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $63.1 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $15.8 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-11-X at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $26.3 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $26.3 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $337.3 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $74.0 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $411.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $411.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $26.3 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $5.5 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $8.8 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $5.0 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.7 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.1 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-11-X, A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3 and A-X-4 are interest-only
notes. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-12, A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17,
A-X-2 and A-X-3 are exchangeable certificates. These classes can be
exchanged for a combination of depositable certificates, as
specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12
and A-13 are super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from
additional protection from the senior support certificates (Classes
A-14 and A-15) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.00% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.75%, 2.75%, 1.60%, 0.75% and 0.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 729 loans with a total principal
balance of $437,535,993 as of the Cut-Off Date (March 1, 2019).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years. Approximately
64.8% of the loans in the pool are conforming mortgage loans
originated mostly by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMCB; rated AA
with a Stable trend by DBRS), Quicken Loans Inc. (Quicken) and
AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC (AmeriHome), which were eligible
for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. For conforming loans,
JPMCB generally delegates underwriting authority to correspondent
lenders and does not subsequently review those loans.

Details on the underwriting of conforming loans can be found in the
Key Probability of Default Drivers section of the related presale
report.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are JPMCB (34.1%),
Quicken (18.7%), AmeriHome (13.2%), United Shore Financial
Services, LLC (12.44%) and various other originators, each
comprising less than 5.0% of the mortgage loans. Approximately
2.84% of the loans sold to the mortgage loan seller were acquired
by MaxEx Clearing LLC, which purchased such loans from the related
originators or an unaffiliated third party that directly or
indirectly purchased such loans from the related originators.

The loans will be serviced or sub-serviced by JPMCB (34.1%), New
Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (25.1%),
Quicken (18.7%), Cenlar FSB (13.2%) and various other services,
each comprising less than 5.0% of the mortgage loans.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the Master Servicer. Citibank,
N.A. (rated AA (low) with a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as the
Securities Administrator and Delaware Trustee. JPMCB and Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as
the Custodians. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will serve as the
Representations and Warranties (R&W) Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

This transaction employs an R&W framework that contains certain
weaknesses, such as materiality factors, some unrated R&W
providers, knowledge qualifiers and sunset provisions that allow
for certain R&Ws to expire within three to six years after the
Closing Date. The framework is perceived by DBRS to be limiting
compared with traditional lifetime R&W standards in certain
DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the perceived weaknesses in
the R&W framework, DBRS reduced the originator scores in this pool.
A lower originator score results in increased default and loss
assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


JP MORGAN 2019-2: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 22
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) 2019-2. The ratings range from
Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 729 30-year, fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of $437,535,993 as
of the March 1, 2019 cut-off date. Similar to prior JPMMT
transactions, JPMMT 2019-2 includes conforming mortgage loans (65%
by loan balance) mostly originated by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(Chase) and Quicken Loans Inc. underwritten to the government
sponsored enterprises (GSE) guidelines in addition to prime jumbo
non-conforming mortgages purchased by J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Corp. (JPMMAC) from various originators and
aggregators. Chase, Quicken Loans Inc., AmeriHome Mortgage Company,
LLC and United Shore Financial Services originated 34%, 19%, 13%
and 12% of the mortgage pool, respectively.

Chase, Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint), Quicken Loans
Inc. and AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC will be the servicers for
majority of the pool. The servicing fee for loans serviced by Chase
and Shellpoint will be based on a step-up incentive fee structure
with a monthly base fee of $20 per loan and additional fees for
delinquent or defaulted loans. All other servicers will be paid a
monthly flat servicing fee equal to one-twelfth of 0.25% of the
remaining principal balance of the mortgage loans. Nationstar
Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the master servicer and Citibank,
N.A. will be the securities administrator and Delaware trustee.
Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the representations and
warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of principal and interest
and loss allocations are based on a typical shifting interest
structure that benefits from senior and subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-2

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 5.75% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for origination quality
and the financial strength of representation & warranty (R&W)
providers.

Moody's bases its definitive ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, its assessments of the aggregators, originators
and servicers, the strength of the third party due diligence and
the R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2019-2 is a securitization of a pool of 729 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$437,535,993 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted average (WA)
remaining term to maturity of 356 months, and a WA seasoning of 4
months. The borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and
sizeable equity in their properties. The WA current FICO score is
771 and the WA original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is
70.8%. The characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to other JPMMT transactions backed by prime
mortgage loans that Moody's has rated.

In this transaction, about 65% of the pool by loan balance was
underwritten to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's guidelines
(conforming loans). The conforming loans in this transaction have a
high average current loan balance at $561,791. The high conforming
loan balance of loans in JPMMT 2019-2 is attributable to the large
number of properties located in high-cost areas, such as the metro
areas of New York City, Los Angeles and San Francisco. Chase,
Quicken Loans Inc., AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC and United
Shore Financial Services originated 34%, 19%, 13% and 12% of the
mortgage pool, respectively. The remaining originators each account
for less than 10% of the principal balance of the loans in the
pool.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for loans serviced by Chase and Shellpoint (60%
of the mortgage pool by balance) will be based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $20 per loan and
additional fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans. All
other servicers will be paid a monthly flat servicing fee equal to
one-twelfth of 0.25% of the remaining principal balance of the
mortgage loans.

While this fee structure is common in non-performing mortgage
securitizations, it is unique to rated prime mortgage
securitizations which typically incorporate a flat 25 basis point
servicing fee rate structure. By establishing a base servicing fee
for performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans,
the fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The servicer receives
higher fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less
labor-intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary. By
contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a servicer can take actions,
such as modifications and prolonged workouts, that increase the
value of its mortgage servicing rights.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $20 for all performing loans and increases according to a
pre-determined delinquent and incentive servicing fee schedule.

The delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from
the available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Five third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, valuation, regulatory
compliance and data integrity reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool.
The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of loans, no material
compliance issues, and no appraisal defects. The loans that had
exceptions to the originators' underwriting guidelines had strong
documented compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high
reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms
also identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations related to
fees that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed.
Moody's did not make any adjustments to its expected or Aaa (sf)
loss levels due to the TPR results.

JPMMT 2019-2's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework takes into account the
financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including
qualifiers and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association (rated Aa2), along with JPMMAC, is the R&W
provider for approximately 35% (by loan balance) of the pool.
Moody's made no adjustments to the loans for which Chase, JPMMAC,
USAA Federal Savings Bank (a subsidiary of USAA Capital Corporation
which is rated Aa1) and TIAA, FSB (subsidiary of Teachers Ins. and
Annuity Assoc.of America (TIAA) which has an Insurance Financial
Strength of Aa1) provided R&Ws since they are highly rated
entities. In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers are unrated
and/or financially weaker entities. Moody's applied an adjustment
to the loans for which these entities provided R&Ws. JPMMAC will
not backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable
of repurchasing mortgage loans.

For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MAXEX platform, MAXEX under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MAXEX to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in the JPMMT
transactions. Five Oaks Acquisition Corp. will backstop the
obligations of MaxEx with respect to breaches of the mortgage loan
representations and warranties made by MaxEx.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Citicorp Trust Delaware, National
Association. The custodian's functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. and Chase. The paying agent and cash management
functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A. Nationstar Mortgage
LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight, and
termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. In addition, Nationstar is committed to act as successor
if no other successor servicer can be found. The master servicer is
required to advance principal and interest if the servicer fails to
do so. If the master servicer fails to make the required advance,
the securities administrator is obligated to make such advance.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 1.50% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 6.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 0.95% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. The principal those tranches would have received is
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero I.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms Class A-J Certs at 'CCCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, series
2006-C1 (MLMT 2006-C1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Specially Serviced Loans; High Loss Expectations: Only nine
loans/assets remain of the 246 at issuance. The eight largest
loans/assets (99.3%) remain specially serviced with three loans
(56.5%) in foreclosure and five assets (42.8%) real estate owned
(REO). No loans/assets have been disposed since the last rating
action, and none are reported to be currently marketed for sale.
Only one small loan (0.7%) is currently performing. The ratings
remain distressed given the high portion of specially serviced
loans/assets in the remaining pool and significant losses expected
on these loans/assets upon disposition.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been limited change
to credit enhancement since the last rating action as there has
been only 2.1% in principal paydown.

As of the March 2019 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.0% to $99.7 million from
$2.490 billion at issuance. Realized losses since issuance total
$197.8 million (7.9% of the original pool balance). Cumulative
interest shortfalls totaling $18.5 million are currently impacting
classes B and below.

Highly Concentrated Pool; Adverse Selection: The pool is very
concentrated with only nine loans/assets remaining. Further, the
two largest loans/assets represent 55.9% of the pool. Due to the
concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity
analysis, which assumed conservative loss expectations on the
remaining loans/REO assets; the ratings reflect this analysis. The
rating for class A-J is capped at 'CCCsf' due to the significant
percentage of specially serviced loans/assets and their high
expected losses.

Gateway One: The largest loan in the pool is Gateway One (43.9%),
which is secured by a 409,920sf urban office located in the Gateway
Mall in downtown St. Louis, MO, just three blocks north of Busch
Stadium. The property was built in 1986. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2016 for non-performing maturity default;
and after the largest tenant, Peabody Investments Corp. had filed
for bankruptcy protection. Peabody, which is the world's largest
private-sector coal company and is listed on the Fortune 500, is
headquartered at the property. Peabody downsized its space to
156,000sf from 223,000sf in January 2017, and subsequently emerged
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 2017. As of the January 2019
rent roll, the property was 77% occupied, compared with 74% at
year-end (YE) 2017, 86% at YE 2016 and 94% at YE 2015. The servicer
reported net operating income debt-service coverage ratio (NOI
DSCR) was 0.52x at YE 2017, compared with 0.94x at YE 2016 and
1.28x at YE 2015. The special servicer is moving forward with
foreclosure; a receiver was appointed in August 2016.

Wachovia Center: The second-largest asset in the pool is the REO
Wachovia Center (12.0%), a 91,154sf suburban office located in
Gainesville, GA, approximately 55 miles northeast of Atlanta. The
property was built in 1990. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2017 due to imminent default related to expected
cash flow issues. Wells Fargo (20% of NRA), which occupied a ground
floor bank space, and M3 Accounting (29% of NRA) vacated upon their
respective lease expirations in June 2017 and January 2018. The
property became REO in November 2017. As of the January 2019 rent
roll, the property was 53% occupied, compared with 44% at March
2018, 72% at YE 2017 and 91% at YE 2016. The special servicer is
working to stabilize the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

All remaining classes have distressed ratings, which are subject to
further downgrade as losses are realized. Future upgrades may occur
should recoveries be better on the specially serviced assets than
expected.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $17.3 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;

  -- $56.0 million class B at 'Csf'; RE 30%.

  -- $26.3 million class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

  -- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3B, A-SB, A-4, A-1A and A-M certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C22: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs Rating to 'CCCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 13 classes of
Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust (MSBAM) 2015-C22
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increasing Loss Expectations: Deal-level loss expectations have
increased since Fitch's last rating action. Two loans have
transferred to special servicing: Saucon Valley Plaza (1.3%) and
Sheraton Four Points College Station (0.7%). In addition, the
largest Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC) is Hilton Houston Westchase
(4.2%), which continues to underperform and has exhibited continued
year-over-year performance decline.

The loan is secured by a 297-key Hilton hotel located in Houston's
Energy Corridor. Year-end (YE) 2018 NOI was approximately 57.7%
below issuer underwriting, largely mirroring a market-wide trend as
a result of the decline in oil and gas prices. RevPAR in the
property's competitive set has declined approximately 24.3% between
the TTM period ended January 2015 and YE 2018. The property's ADR,
RevPAR and occupancy at YE 2018 were $119, $85 and 71.1%,
respectively, compared to $135, $89 and 66% at YE 2017 and $133,
$93 and 70.1% at YE 2016, respectively. As of YE 2018, the
servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 0.84x with a debt yield of 5.4%. The
reported NOI DSCR was 1.15x at YE 2017, 1.40x at YE 2016 and 2.12x
at YE 2015.

The sponsor continues to fund the shortfalls despite continued
market and property-level performance declines. Fitch's analysis
was based on the YE 2018 reported NOI and an 11.25% cap rate which
resulted in a value significantly below the current debt. In
addition, Fitch reviewed recent sales of similar hotels within the
Houston submarket which aligned with Fitch's valuation using the
current reported cash flow.

The loan matures March 2020. Given the cash flow shortfall and
continued performance decline, a default prior to or at maturity is
likely without the borrower's continued equity contributions.

Decreased Credit Enhancement to Junior Classes: Since the last
Fitch rating action, the trust incurred losses related to the
disposition of the Pathmark - Linden loan. Losses were
approximately $10.9 million which equated to an approximately 81.9%
loss severity at the time of disposition. As a result, credit
enhancement for all junior classes is currently below issuance
levels.

The pool has paid down 4.9% since issuance, to $1.05 billion as of
March 2018 from $1.11 billion. In addition, three loans totaling
3.6% of the pool have defeased. This has resulted in minor
improvements to credit enhancement for the senior classes. Credit
Enhancement is unlikely to improve materially in the near term;
while three loans totaling 6.3% of the pool are scheduled to mature
in 2020, this includes the Hilton Houston Westchase (4.2%) and
Saucon Valley Plaza (1.3%) loans.

Hotel and Retail Concentration: Eleven loans totaling 23.2% of the
pool are collateralized by hotel properties. This includes four
loans in the top 15 totaling 18.7% of the pool. Approximately 32.0%
of the pool, 33 loans, is secured by retail properties. This
includes four loans in the top 15 totaling 14.2% of the pool. There
are no loans in the pool secured by regional malls.

Specially Serviced Loans: There are two loans in special servicing,
Saucon Valley Plaza (1.3%) and Four Points College Station (0.7%).


Saucon Valley Plaza is an approximately 87,000 sf office property
located in Central Valley, PA. The loan transferred to special
servicing given a technical default as a result of the borrower not
depositing a $1.9 million tenant termination fee. The borrower
later spent approximately $3 million to backfill the vacant space;
however, the master servicer denied approval to the new lease due
to the failure of the borrower to deposit the lease termination
fee. The borrower is suing the trustee, master servicer, and
special servicer. The borrower has continued to pay the loan as
agreed and collateral performance remains stable, with a year-to
date September 2018 servicer-reported NOI DSCR of 1.59x.

Four Points College Station is a 126-key hotel located in College
Station, TX, near Texas A&M University. The property recently
transferred to special servicing following a monetary default for
its December 2018 payment. Property-level performance has declined
substantially since issuance with September TTM DSCR declining to
1.31x, from 2.12x per issuer underwriting.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes D and E are Negative due to the
reduction in credit enhancement, the transfer to special servicing
of two loans since the previous rating action, as well as the
continued decline in performance of the largest FLOC. In addition
to the substantial performance decline, the Hilton Houston
Westchase, reflects a loan maturity within the next year, and will
likely struggle to obtain suitable takeout financing. Downgrades
are possible with further collateral performance declines,
particularly as it relates to the Hilton Houston Westchase loan.

Ratings on the remaining classes remain stable given overall stable
performance from the remainder of the pool, stable to slightly
higher credit enhancement among these senior classes and
defeasance. Upgrades to senior classes, while not expected in the
near term, may be possible with continued improved credit
enhancement from paydown and/or defeasance and stable to improved
performance of the remainder of the pool.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has downgraded the following class:

  -- $26.3 million class E to 'Bsf' from 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Negative.

Fitch has affirmed the following class and revised its Rating
Outlook:

  -- $62.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $11.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $84.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $250 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $318.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $60.9** million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $63.7** million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $51.2** million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13.8 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE50%;

  -- $175.8** million class PST at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $792.8* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $63.7* million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional and interest-only.

  ** Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PST
certificates, and class PST certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the classes G and H certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust Series 2017-C33 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance and loss expectations with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. There are no
specially serviced or delinquent loans; however, there is one Fitch
Loan of Concern (FLOC).

The Tops Portfolio loan (approximately 1% of the pool), is secured
by three grocery anchored retail properties near Buffalo, NY. In
February of 2018, Tops Markets, the anchor tenant accounting for
approximately 67% of the portfolio GLA, filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. While Tops has emerged from bankruptcy, there is
currently over $450,000 being held in the cash flow sweep reserve.
The borrower is currently in the process of getting the tenant
estoppels.

The largest loan in the pool is the Hyatt Regency Austin (8.63% of
the pool). The subject is a 16-story, full service hotel located in
Austin, TX. The property contains 448 rooms, including 225 king
rooms, 205 queen rooms and 18 suites. Amenities include two
restaurants, a Starbucks, a sushi bar, a market pantry, an outdoor
pool, a fitness center, a business center and nine meeting rooms
totaling approximately 33,080 SF of meeting space. As of August
2018, occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR, were 86%, $211.79, and $182.14,
respectively. The penetration rates for the occupancy, ADR, and
RevPAR, were 103.1%, 94.6%, and 97.6%, respectively.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the March 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 1.02% to $695.4 million from $702.6 million at issuance. All
original 44 loans remain in the pool. Based on the scheduled
balance at maturity, the pool will pay down by 11.4%, which is
above the 2017 average of 7.9%. There are six (26.9%) full-term
interest-only (IO) loans, 20 (27.3%) balloon loans, and 18 (45.8%)
partial IO loans. Fitch-rated transactions in 2017 had an average
full-term, IO percentage of 46.1% and a partial IO percentage of
28.7%.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Self-Storage and Industrial Exposure: The pool has an above-average
concentration of self-storage and industrial properties compared to
other recent vintage Fitch-rated transactions. The pool is 17.7%
self-storage, compared with the 2017 average of 3.9% and 11%
industrial, compared with the 2017 average of 6.3%. Industrial and
self-storage properties have an average probability of default in
Fitch's multiborrower model. The hotel concentration of 12.7% is
below the 2017 average of 15.8%. Hotels have a higher probability
of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.

Additional Debt: Seven loans (32% of the pool) have pari passu debt
held outside of the trust. Of these seven loans, the trust holds
the controlling note of three loans and the non-controlling notes
of four loans. Four loans (approximately 20% of the pool) have in
place subordinate debt held outside of the trust. This transaction
has a total debt stack Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) of 1.17x and 107.1%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $21.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $75.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $52.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $37.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $130 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $156.1 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $472.8b million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $125.1b million class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $58.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $38.6 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $28.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $32.6ab million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $32.6a million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $14.6a million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $6.9a million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the G class, or the VRR Interest.

a - Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

b - Notional amount and interest only.


MOUNTAIN VIEW XIV: Moody's Rates $3.5MM Class F Notes 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Mountain View CLO XIV Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$252,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$17,600,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$22,400,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$3,500,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2029 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the
Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in its methodology.

Mountain View XIV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
5.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior
unsecured loans and first-lien last-out loans. The portfolio is
approximately 75% ramped as of the closing date.

Seix Investment Advisors LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's two year reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject
to certain restrictions, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2735

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 40: Moody's Rates $30MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to three classes of
notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners 40, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$369,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$16,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes and the Class E Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in the methodology.

Octagon 40 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10.0% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is approximately 95% ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued three other
classes of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2830

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.1 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


ROCKFORD TOWER 2019-1: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Rockford Tower CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$300,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$44,650,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$22,100,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$30,900,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$27,350,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in the methodology.

Rockford Tower CLO 2019-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing
date.

Rockford Tower Capital Management, L.L.C. will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one other class
of secured notes and subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2670

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


SCF EQUIPMENT 2019-1: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
equipment contract backed notes, Series 2019, Class A, Class B,
Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F (Series 2019-1 notes or the
notes) to be issued by SCF Equipment Leasing 2019-1 LLC and SCF
Equipment Leasing Canada 2019 Limited Partnership. Stonebriar
Commercial Finance LLC (unrated, Stonebriar) along with its
Canadian counterpart - Stonebriar Commercial Finance Canada Inc.
(unrated) are the originators and Stonebriar alone will be the
servicer of the assets backing this transaction. The issuers are
wholly-owned, limited purpose subsidiaries of Stonebriar and
Stonebriar Commercial Finance Canada Inc. The assets in the pool
will consist of loan and lease contracts, secured primarily by
corporate aircraft, railcars, transportation equipment and marine
vessels.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2019-1 LLC/SCF Equipment Leasing
Canada 2019 Limited Partnership

Class A-1 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Class F Notes, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Series 2019-1 transaction will be the fifth securitization
sponsored by Stonebriar and fourth that Moody's rates. Stonebriar
was founded in 2015 and is led by a management team with an average
of over 25 years of experience in equipment financing.

The provisional ratings that Moody's assigned to the notes are
primarily based on; the experience of Stonebriar's management team
and the company as servicer; U.S. Bank National Association
(long-term deposits Aa1/ long-term CR assessment Aa2(cr),
short-term deposits P-1, BCA aa3) as backup servicer for the
contracts; the weak credit quality and concentration of the
obligors backing the loans and leases in the pool; the assessed
value of the collateral backing the loans and leases in the pool;
the credit enhancement, including overcollateralization, excess
spread and non-declining reserve account and the sequential pay
structure.

Credit enhancement to the notes will include (i) initial
overcollateralization of 3.50%, which is expected to grow to a
target of 5.50% of the initial collateral balance, (ii) excess
spread, (iii) a non-declining reserve account funded at 1.50% of
the initial collateral balance, and (iv) subordination in the case
of the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F
notes (36.50%, 26.00%, 17.00%, 13.00%, 8.00%, and 2.00%,
respectively). After the target overcollateralization level is met,
50% of the excess spread that would otherwise be released to the
issuer will instead be used to pay the subordinate Class E notes,
Class F notes and Class G notes, pro-rata. This will increase the
overcollateralization above the target level.

The equipment loans and leases that will back the notes were
extended primarily to middle market obligors and are secured by
various types of equipment including; aircraft, railcars,
transportation and marine vessels.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or lower than
expected depreciation in the value of the equipment that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. As the primary drivers of
performance, positive changes in the US macro economy and the
performance of various sectors where the obligors operate could
also affect the ratings.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors of the contracts or
a greater than expected deterioration in the value of the equipment
that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the primary
drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro economy
could also affect Moody's ratings. Other reasons for worse
performance than Moody's expectations could include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transaction
governance and fraud.


TRINITAS CLO X: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $9MM Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
debt issued by Trinitas CLO X, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$300,000,000 Class A Loan maturing in 2032 (the "Class A Loan"),
Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$84,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2032 (the "Class A
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$73,200,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2032 (the "Class B
Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$26,400,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$35,400,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2032 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2032 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2032 (the
"Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A Loan, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C
Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes
are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Debt."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in Moody's methodology.

Trinitas X is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 5% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. The
portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Trinitas Capital Management, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions, the Manager may
reinvest proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in March 2019.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2795

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
March 2019.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt


UBS-BARCLAYS COMMERCIAL 2013-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes of UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C6,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2018 Affirmed A2
(sf)

  * Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eleven principal and interest (P&I) classes were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the interest only (IO) classes were affirmed based
on the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 12, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $1.169
billion from $1.295 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 59.4% of the pool. One loan, constituting
10.8% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Ten loans, constituting 11.4% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, compared at 17 at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 3.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance. No loans have been liquidated from the pool.
One loan, constituting 1.0% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 88% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 95%, compared to 92% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.81X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.86X and 1.15X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25 % stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 575 Broadway
Loan ($125.85 million -- 10.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
170,000 square foot (SF) mixed use retail and office building
located in Manhattan's SoHo submarket. The property is encumbered
by a ground lease that is scheduled to expire in June 2060. As of
September 2018, the property was 100% leased, unchanged from
year-end 2015 and up from 93% at securitization. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.38X,
respectively, unchanged from the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 28.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Gateway Center Loan ($160 million -- 13.7%
of the pool), which is secured by three cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans secured by 355,000 SF within a 639,000 SF
class A anchored retail center in Brooklyn, New York. The property
was constructed in 2002 by The Related Companies. The properties
are shadow anchored by Target and Home Depot. Collateral tenants
include BJ's Wholesale Club (lease expiration: September 2027) and
Bed Bath & Beyond (lease expiration: January 2023). As of September
2018, the property was 100% leased, however the former Babies R US
location has closed, representing 10.4% of the NRA. This ten-year
loan is interest-only throughout the term. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 110% and 0.78X, respectively, unchanged from the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Broward Mall Loan ($95 million --
8.1% of the pool), which is secured by 326,000 SF within a 1.042
million SF super-regional mall located in Plantation, Florida. The
mall is currently anchored by Macy's, JC Penney and Dillards, none
of which are part of the collateral. Seritage closed the fourth
anchor, Sears, in 2018. As of September 2018, the collateral was
91% leased, compared to 95% at the last review. This ten-year loan
is interest-only throughout the term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 113% and 0.96X, respectively.

The third largest loan is The Shoppes at River Crossing Loan ($76.0
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by 528,000 SF within
a 728,000 SF lifestyle center located in Macon, Georgia.
Non-collateral anchors include Dillard's and Belk. Collateral
tenants include Dick's Sporting Goods, Barnes & Noble, Jo-Ann
Fabric and Crafts, and DSW Shoe Warehouse. As of September 2018 the
collateral was 98% leased, up from 97% the year prior and 94% at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.99X,
respectively, compared to 108% and 0.98X at the last review.


UCAT 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Class A Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class A Notes
issued by UCAT 2005-1 (UCAT).

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: UCAT 2005-1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2016 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating action reflects deleveraging of the UCAT class A
as it pays down, and Moody's expectation about the prospects for
future income to UCAT from the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes issued by
Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT), Series 2001-1 Notes (the
underlying LIFT Notes). As UCAT's class A has paid down, its loan
to aircraft value (LTV) ratio, based on the appraisal values
associated with the underlying LIFT aircraft, has improved to 33%
as of February 2019 from 49% as of April 2018.

In its analysis, Moody's considered future prospects for lease
income to the underlying LIFT transaction based on its fleet and
recent performance as well as recent market lease rate trends. The
aircraft portfolio backing the underlying LIFT Notes consists of
eight aircraft with a weighted average age of about 19 years, with
a 39% concentration in Boeing 767s, 47% in B737s, and 14% in Airbus
320s weighted by aircraft value. All of the aircraft in the
portfolio were manufactured between 1998 and 2000.

Interest and principal payments on the underlying LIFT Notes are
allocated to pay UCAT's Class A Interest, Class A principal, Class
B-1-A principal and Class B-1-B principal, sequentially in that
order. Interest payments on the underlying LIFT Notes are greater
than interest payments due to the UCAT Notes, and the resulting
excess spread is applied as principal to pay down the UCAT Notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Monitoring Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitizations" published in
November 2018.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Changes to underlying lease rates or aircraft values that differ
from historical and current trends.


WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial pass-through certificates, series
2013-LC12 (WFCM 2013-LC12).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relatively Stable Performance: Outside the Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs) and specially serviced loans, the remaining pool has had
relatively stable performance since issuance. Credit enhancement
has slightly improved due to amortization and loan repayments.
There have been no losses to date, and interest shortfalls are
currently affecting class G.

High Regional Mall Concentration; FLOCs: Four loans in the top five
(26.1% of pool) are secured by regional malls, including the
largest loan, Cumberland Mall (7.1%), secured by 541,527 sf of a
1.0 million-sf regional mall in Atlanta, GA. The other three
regional malls (19%) were designated FLOCs due to major tenant
vacancies and performance concerns. Carolina Place (6.7%), secured
by 694,983 sf of a 1.2 million-sf regional mall in Pineville, NC,
approximately 10 miles southwest of the Charlotte CBD, was
designated a FLOC due to near-term rollover concerns, collateral
anchor Sears vacating in January 2019 and significant market
competition. White Marsh Mall (6.3%), secured by 702,317 sf of a
1.2 million-sf regional mall in Baltimore, MD, was designated a
FLOC due to declining tenant sales and significant market
competition. Rimrock Mall (6%), secured by 428,661 sf of a 586,446
sf regional mall in Billings MT, was designated a FLOC due to
collateral anchor Herberger's vacating, near-term rollover
concerns, low in-line tenant sales and its tertiary market
location. Two additional non-specially serviced loans (1.5%), each
less than 1% of the pool, were also designated FLOCs due to
significant occupancy declines and/or performance concerns.

Specially Serviced Loans: Three loans (1.9% of pool) are in
specially servicing, all secured by hotel properties. The largest
specially serviced loan, Crowne Plaza Madison (0.8%), secured by a
226-key, full-service hotel property in Madison, WI, transferred to
special servicing in March 2017 for imminent maturity default. The
loan matured without repayment in September 2017. The property has
experienced cash flow declines driven by low occupancy and
excessive deferred maintenance costs. A property receiver was
appointed in June 2017 and is working to complete deferred
maintenance repairs and remedy franchise delinquencies.
Approximately $575,000 in capex/deferred maintenance has been spent
to date. Per servicer updates, the lender filed foreclosure and
anticipates taking title.

Holiday Inn Westchase (0.7%), secured by a 130-key, full-service
Holiday Inn in Houston, TX, transferred to special servicing in
March 2019 for imminent monetary default. As of YE 2018, the
property had occupancy of 64% with servicer-reported NOI DSCR of
0.58x. Per servicer updates, the performance decline is attributed
to increased competition in the area and Houston's heavy reliance
on the oil industry. Additional updates remain outstanding, as this
loan is a recent transfer to special servicing and remained current
as of the March 2019 remittance.

Holiday Inn Express-Vernal (0.4%), secured by a 69-key Holiday Inn
Express in Vernal, UT, transferred to special servicing in December
2017 for imminent monetary default. As of March 2018, the property
had occupancy of 42% with servicer-reported NOI DSCR of 0.19x. Per
servicer updates, the decline in performance is attributed to the
Vernal economy's reliance on declining oil and gas extraction and
tourism, which occurs primarily in the summer months. The loan is
being cash managed and remains current, while upcoming PIP
discussions with the franchisor are ongoing.

Slight Increase in Credit Enhancement: As of the March 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance had paid
down by 9.8% to $1.271 billion from $1.409 billion at issuance. One
loan (1.2%) prepaid in full during its open period since the last
rating action. The entire pool is currently amortizing. Two loans
(1.8%) are fully defeased.

Alternative Loss Considerations: Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario on Carolina Place (6.7%), White Marsh Mall
(6.3%) and Rimrock Mall (6%), which assumed potential outsized
losses of 15%, 15% and 25%, respectively, while also factoring in
the expected paydown of the transaction from defeased loans. This
additional sensitivity scenario took into consideration refinance
concerns based on near-term rollover risks, anchor vacancies,
declining/low tenant sales, significant market competition and/or
tertiary market locations. The Negative Rating Outlooks on class E
and class F reflect this analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on class E and class F reflect the
concerns with the regional malls Carolina Place, White Marsh Mall
and Rimrock Mall; should the loans continue to decline and/or fail
to refinance at maturity downgrades are possible. The Stable Rating
Outlooks on classes A-1 through D reflect the stable performance of
the majority of the underlying pool, and expected continued paydown
and increasing credit enhancement from amortization. Rating
upgrades, although unlikely due to pool concentrations, may occur
with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $8.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $160 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $363.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $134 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $103 million (#) (a) class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 (a) class A-3FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $116.3 million (b) class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $88.1 million (b) class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.4 million (b) class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $260.7 million (b) class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.9 million (a) class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.1 million (a) class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $14.1 million (a) class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G or interest only class X-B
certificates.

  (#) Floating rate.

  (a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

  (b) Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PEX certificates, and class PEX certificates may be
exchanged for class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the swap counterparty for the floating
rate class A-FL. In the event that any swap breakage costs are due
to the swap counterparty from the trust, any breakage costs will
only be paid after all payments on the class A-FL certificates have
been paid in full. The aggregate balance of the class A-FL may be
adjusted as a result of the exchange of all or a portion of the
class A-FL certificates for the non-offered class A-FX.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C30: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class X-E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-C30 commercial pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: The pool's performance and Fitch's loss
projections have remained generally stable since the last rating
action. There have been no material changes to the pool's
performance since issuance.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement/Limited Amortization: There
has been paydown of 4.9%, bringing the current balance to $704
million from $740 million at issuance. Three loans (3.1% of the
pool) are fully defeased including one loan in the top 15. Five
loans representing 11.7% of the pool are interest only (IO) for the
full term. An additional 33 loans representing 46.3% of the pool
have partial IO periods. Of the partial IO loans, nine loans
representing 11.78% of the pool have not yet begun to amortize.

Additional Considerations

Multifamily/Co-Op Pool Concentration: Multifamily properties make
up 35.6% of the pool, which is significantly higher than the
average multifamily concentration for similar vintage transactions.
Five loans (21.2%) in the top 15, including the largest loan in the
pool, Somerset Park Apartments (10.4% of the pool), are secured by
collateral backed by multifamily properties. Of the multifamily
concentration, approximately 6.5% are secured by multifamily co-ops
located in New York.

Specially Serviced Loans/FLOC: Two loans (2.0% of the pool) have
transferred to Special Servicing and both are flagged as a Fitch
Loan of Concern (FLOC). Eisenhower Crossing (0.86% of the pool)
transferred to Special Servicing in February 2019 and is currently
60 days delinquent. As of September 2018, the DSCR had fallen to
0.65x with an occupancy of 53%, a decline from 91% at issuance.
Bristol Retail Portfolio (1.1% of the pool), transferred to Special
Servicing due to a failure to implement Cash Management related to
a NCF DSCR of 1.06. As of September 2019, occupancy declined to
61.9% resulting in a low DSCR primarily due to tenant turnover,
increased competition, decreased demand and a decrease in average
rental rates. In addition to the Specially Serviced Loans,
Riverpark Square (8.28% of the pool), the second largest loan in
the pool, is considered a FLOC due to concerns with low sales at
the property. Riverpark Square is a five-story regional mall
located in the central business district of Spokane, WA. As of
year-end 2018, the NOI DSCR was 2.05x, and inline tenant sales
(excluding Apple) were $336 per square foot.

Secondary Markets: Only four of the top 15 loans are secured by
properties located in what Fitch considers to be primary markets.
Secondary and tertiary markets represented in the top 15 include
Troy, MI; Spokane, WA; Little Rock, AR; Columbus, OH; West
Sacramento, CA; and Slidell, LA.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on all classes remain stable due to the overall stable
performance for the majority of the pool. No rating changes are
expected unless a material asset-level or economic event affects
pool performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $2,834,496 class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,385,000 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150,000,000 class A-3 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $263,131,000 class A-4 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $61,764,000 class A-SB notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $51,822,000 class A-S notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43,493,000 class B notes at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,464,000 class C notes at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,792,000 class D notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,657,000 class E notes at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,328,000 class F notes at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $533,936,496 class X-A notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,657,000 class X-E notes at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 class PEX notes at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the Class G, H, X-B, X-FG, and X-H
certificates.


[*] DBRS Reviews 355 Classes From 41 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 355 classes from 41 U.S. resecuritization of
real estate mortgage investment conduits (ReREMICs) and residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 353 classes
reviewed, DBRS upgraded 15 ratings, confirmed 337 ratings and
discontinued three ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating confirmations reflect asset
performance and credit-support levels that are consistent with the
current ratings. The discontinued ratings are the result of the
full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are a result of DBRS's application of the "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology" published in September 2018.

The pools backing these ReREMIC and RMBS transactions consist of
prime, subprime, Alt-A, option adjustable-rate mortgage and
second-lien collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect a dependency on another
tranche's ratings as well as actual deal or tranche performance
that is not fully reflected in the projected cash flows or model
output.

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR5, Class 4A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 1A1

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 1A4

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 1A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 2A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, 3A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 4A2

-- GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-AR6, Class 4A5

-- HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-13, Mortgage Loan
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-13, Class X

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 1-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 2-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 2-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 3-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 3-A-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 5-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class T-B-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class A-X

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 1-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 1-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-6

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-8

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-5

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-6

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-8

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 2-A-9

-- Lehman XS Trust 2006-5, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-5, Class 2-A4A

-- MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class 1-A-1

-- MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class 7-A-X

-- Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2005-SL2,
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-SL2, Class
M-2

-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class A-2d

-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class M-1

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-1

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-2

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-P

-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-V

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-3, Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-3, Class A9

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-3, Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-3, Class A13

-- CSMC Series 2010-9R, CSMC Series 2010-9R, Class 49-A-4

The Affected Ratings is available at https://bit.ly/2V8zWnJ


                            *********

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