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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 24, 2019, Vol. 23, No. 54

                            Headlines

ACC TRUST 2019-1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating on Class C Notes
ADVANCED SPORTS: Has Final Authorization to Use Cash Collateral
ALESCO PREFERRED XV: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa2
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2003-11: Moody's Cuts M-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-2: S&P Withdraws D Rating on Cl. A-J Certs

BANK OF AMERICA 2017-BNK3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on F Certs
BBCMS TRUST 2018-RRI: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 4 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
BEDFORD PROPERTIES: May Continue Cash Collateral Use Until Feb. 28

BENCHMARK 2019-B9: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
BERAKAH INVESTMENT: Seeks Access to Cash for Continued Operation
BLOX INC: Posts $201K Net Loss in Dec. 31 Quarter
BURKHALTER RIGGING: Seeks OK on $350K Loan, Cash Collateral Use
CANYON CLO 2019-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes

CARLYLE US 2019- 1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-1 Certs to B1
CBA COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Class A Certs at 'Caa3'
CBAM LTD 2019-9: Moody's Rates $36.3MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. E Certs

CFCRE TRUST 2018-TAN: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class HRR Certs
CIFC FUNDING 2015-II: Moody's Hikes Class E-R Notes Rating to 'Ba3'
CIFC FUNDING 2019-I: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
CIG AUTO 2019-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2012-GCB: Moody's Affirms Caa1 on Cl. F Certs

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC19: DBRS Hikes F Certs Rating to BB
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC21: Fitch Affirms B on $13MM F Debt
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-SST2: Moody's Rates Class F Notes (P)B3
COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class K Certificates to C
COMM 2013-300P: Fitch Affirms $28MM Class E Debt at 'BB+sf'

COMM 2014-UBS3: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
COMM 2014-UBS6: Fitch Affirms BB+ on Class F Certs, Outlook Stable
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2019-R01: Fitch Rates 29 Tranches 'Bsf'
CSAIL 2019-C15: Fitch to Rate $9.32MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'B2'

CSMC 2019-SKLZ: S&P Assigns 'BB+ (sf)' Rating on Class HRR Certs
DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2019-1: S&P Assigns B- Rating on B-2 Notes
DEUTSCHE ALT-A 2007-RS1: Moody's Cuts Class A-1 Certs to 'Caa3'
FREDDIE MAC 2019-HQA1: Fitch to Rate $152MM Class M-2B Notes 'B+sf'
GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms $12.3MM Class F Certs at B

GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: Fitch Affirms $10.3MM Class F Certs at 'B-'
IBIO INC: Posts $4.53-Mil. Net Loss in Dec. 31 Quarter
JFIN MM CLO: S&P Removes Cl. E Notes Rating from Watch Positive
JONES ENERGY: Moody's Lowers CFR to 'Ca', Outlook Stable
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Hikes Class G Debt Rating to 'Caa2'

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Affirms Csf Ratings on 2 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2013-C15: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on $11.9MM Cl. F Debt
JP MORGAN 2014-C19: Fitch Affirms B Rating on $17.6MM Class F Debt
JP MORGAN 2019-LTV1: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to Class B-5 Debt
JPMORGAN CHASE 2003-CIBC7: S&P Affirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. H Certs

MANITOULIN USD: DBRS Finalizes BB on Muskoka 2019-1 D Notes
MAPS 2019-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB (sf) Rating on Class C Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Lowers Class H Notes Rating to CCC
MORGAN STANLEY 2019-L2: Fitch to Rate $9.1MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-'
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 24: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to E-S Notes

OCTAGON INVESTMENT XXI: Moody's Rates $12MM Class E-RR Notes 'B3'
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 2019-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on B-2 Notes
SCF EQUIPMENT 2017-2: Moody's Puts B1 on Class D Debt Under Review
SDART 2019-1: Fitch Gives 'BB-sf' Rating on $101.87MM Class E Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-CH2: Moody's Hikes Class B-5 Debt to 'Ba2'

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-CH1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on B-4 Certs
STRUCTURED ASSET 2007-GEL1: Moody's Ups Cl. A2 Debt Rating to B1
T CAT ENTERPRISE: May Continue Using Cash Collateral Until Feb. 28
TOWD POINT 2019-2: Fitch to Rate $53.34MM Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
TOWD POINT 2019-HY1: Moody's Gives (P)B1 Rating on Class B2 Debt

TOWD POINT 2019-SJ1: Fitch to Rate  $19.91MM Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
TPG PACE: KPMG LLP Raises Going Concern Doubt
VERTICAL BRIDGE 2018-1: Fitch Affirms BB- on $38MM Class F Debt
VERUS SECURITIZATION 2019-1: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on B-2 Certs
VOIP-PAL.COM: Has $5.87-Mil. Net Loss in Dec. 31 Quarter

VOYA CLO 2019-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Affirms CCC on $13.6MM Class H Certs
WAIKIKI BEACH 2019-WBM: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Cl. F Notes
WAMU MORTGAGE 2006-AR3: Moody's Lowers X-2 Certs Rating to 'C'
WELLFLEET CLO X: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on $16MM Class D Notes

WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2017-SMP: Moody's Affirms Ba3 on Class E Certs
WELLS FARGO 2019-C49: Fitch to Rate Class H-RR Certs 'B-sf'
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2019-1: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating to Class F Notes
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'Bsf'

[*] DBRS Reviews 482 Classes From 53 US RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 48 Classes From Six US RMBS Deals

                            *********

ACC TRUST 2019-1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by ACC Trust 2019-1 (ACC 2019-1). This is the
first auto lease transaction of the year and the second overall for
RAC King, LLC (not rated). The notes will be backed by a pool of
closed-end retail automobile leases originated by RAC King, LLC.
RAC Servicer, LLC is the servicer and administrator for this
transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACC Trust 2019-1

Class A Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of RAC Servicer, LLC as
the servicer and administrator.

Moody's median cumulative net credit loss expectation for ACC
2019-1 is 30%. Moody's based its cumulative net credit loss
expectation on an analysis of the quality of the underlying
collateral; managed portfolio performance; the historical credit
loss of similar collateral; the ability of RAC Servicer, LLC to
perform the servicing functions; and current expectations for the
macroeconomic environment during the life of the transaction.

Moody's also analyzed the residual risk of the pool based on the
exposure to residual value risk; the historical turn-in rate; and
the historical residual value performance.

At closing, the Class A notes, the Class B notes and the Class C
notes are expected to benefit from 42.50%, 30.10%, 22.45% of hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the
notes consists of a combination of overcollateralization, a
non-declining reserve account and subordination, except for the
Class C notes, which do not benefit from subordination. The notes
may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Methodology for auto loans and leases. If the
revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating
on ACC 2019-1 may be neutrally affected.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the subordinate notes if levels of credit
enhancement are higher than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of portfolio losses. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the vehicles
securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses also
depend greatly on the US job market and the market for used
vehicles. Other reasons for better-than-expected performance
include changes to servicing practices that enhance collections or
refinancing opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit enhancement
are insufficient to protect investors against current expectations
of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the US
job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


ADVANCED SPORTS: Has Final Authorization to Use Cash Collateral
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Benjamin A. Kahn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina has entered a Final Order
authorizing Advanced Sports Enterprises, Inc., and its
debtor-affiliates to use the cash collateral in the ordinary course
of business.

The Debtors acknowledge and agree that following prepetition
Secured Parties have interest in cash collateral:

     (1) Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as administrative
agent and collateral agent (the "Prepetition ABL Agent") under that
certain Credit Agreement, by and among the Debtors, the Prepetition
ABL Agent, and the other lenders party thereto from time to time.
As of the Petition Date, the Debtors were liable to the Prepetition
ABL Lenders in the approximate aggregate principal amount of
$36,557,807, plus letters of credit in the approximate stated
amount of not less than $807,000.

     (2) Ideal Bike Corporation (the "Trade Creditor Agent"), under
that certain Manufacturing and Marketing Agreement;  

     (3) York Street Mezzanine Partners II, L.P. (the "Note
Purchaser Agent"), under that certain Note Purchase Agreement;

     (4) Advanced Holdings BVI Co. Ltd. ("AH BVI") under that
certain Loan Agreement; and

     (5) Amer Sports Winter and Outdoor Company in respect of
certain obligations purported to be secured by a certain Uniform
Commercial Code financing statement filed with the North Carolina
Secretary of State.

The Prepetition ABL Agent, Trade Creditor Agent, Note Purchaser
Agent and AH BVI have agreed to the Debtors' use of Cash Collateral
in exchange for the grant of following Adequate Protection, under
the terms set forth in the Final Order:

      (a) The Prepetition Secured Parties will have valid,
perfected, and enforceable additional and replacement security
interests and Liens in all property and categories of property of
the Debtors in which and of the same priority as said creditors
held a similar, unavoidable lien as of the Petition Date, and the
proceeds thereof, whether acquired pre-petition or post-petition
which will be junior only to the Permitted Prior Liens;

      (b) Each of the Prepetition Secured Parties will have an
allowed superpriority administrative expense claim which will have
priority in the Chapter 11 Cases under sections 503(b) and 507(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code and otherwise over all administrative
expense claims and unsecured claims against the Debtors and their
estates, now existing or hereafter arising, of any kind or nature
whatsoever;

      (c) The Debtors will be required to maintain all of their
insurance coverages as same were in effect on the Petition Date.

      (d) The Debtors will continue to deposit all cash and other
proceeds of the Prepetition Collateral into the Debtors' existing
accounts maintained under the prepetition cash management system,
and such collections and proceeds will not be available for use by
the Debtors for any purpose except as expressly provided for and
limited here.

      (e) As additional adequate protection, the Debtors will pay
the Prepetition ABL Agent, for the benefit of the Prepetition ABL
Lenders, postpetition interest at the applicable contractual
Default Rate with respect to the Prepetition ABL Debt;

      (f) The Prepetition ABL Agent and the Prepetition ABL Lenders
will be reimbursed, on a current basis and subject to the
limitations of Section 506(b), for all reasonable and documented
out-of-pocket costs and expenses of the consultants, financial
advisors and outside attorneys engaged by such parties, solely to
the extent permitted under the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement;

      (g) The Debtors will deposit with the Prepetition ABL Agent,
for the benefit of itself and the Prepetition ABL Lenders, the sum
of $250,000 (the "Indemnification Reserve Funds") on the date the
Prepetition ABL Debt is otherwise being paid in full as cash
collateral for any contingent Obligations under the Prepetition ABL
Credit Agreement, including, without limitation, the Debtors'
indemnification obligations under Section 10.04 of the Prepetition
ABL Credit Agreement;

      (h) The Debtors will permit representatives, agents, and
employees of the Prepetition Secured Parties: (i) to have access to
and inspect the Debtors' properties, (ii) to examine the Debtors'
books and records, (iii) to discuss the Debtors' affairs, finances,
and condition with the Debtors' officers and financial advisors,
and (iv) otherwise to have the full cooperation of the Debtors;
and

      (i) The Prepetition ABL Agent and Prepetition ABL Lenders,
respectively, may seek to credit bid some or all of their claims
for their respective collateral pursuant to section 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code in connection with any sale or other dispositions
of any assets of the Debtors.

Concurrent with the indefeasible payment to the Prepetition ABL
Agent for application to a permanent reduction and satisfaction in
full of the Prepetition ABL Debt and the Adequate Protection
Obligations from the net proceeds of the BikeCo Transactions or
other available proceeds from the Debtors' estates, as needed, the
Debtors will set aside ("Administrative Set-Aside") cash collateral
in an amount equal to, and thereafter use that cash collateral
(including, but not limited to, any remaining net proceeds realized
from the consummation of the BikeCo Transactions or other available
proceeds from the Debtors' estates) to pay the aggregate of:

      (1) the unpaid balance of post-petition administrative claims
arising out of the conduct of the Debtor's business and
administration of these Chapter 11 Cases that accrued and remain
unpaid as of the closing and consummation of the BikeCo
Transactions, plus

      (2) such additional post-petition administrative claims
arising out of the conduct of the Debtor's business and
administration of these Chapter 11 Cases that may accrue during the
Approved Budget Period, including any other permitted trailing
expenses (including, without limitation, the estimated amount of
any "stub" rent and administrative claims under section 503(b)(9)
of the Bankruptcy Code) set forth in the Approved Budget, plus

      (3) any accrued and unpaid fees and expenses of Case
Professionals through the Approved Budget Period (net of any funds
previously reserved/escrowed by the Debtors on account of the Carve
Out Reserve in accordance with any prior Interim Order(s) and the
budgets approved thereunder)

The Debtors' authorization to use Cash Collateral will continue
through and including the earliest to occur of the end of the
Approved Budget Period, or the occurrence of any one or more the
following events:

      (A) the Debtors' use of Cash Collateral for any purpose or in
any amount not in compliance with the Approved Budget and the Final
Order;

      (B) the occurrence of a Material Budget Deviation;

      (C) any failure by the Debtors to make any payment required
under the Final Order, including, but not limited to, the Adequate
Protection Obligations, if any;

      (D) without the prior written consent of the Prepetition ABL
Agent (or following the ABL Payment in Full, the Trade Creditor
Agent and the Note Purchaser Agent), the appointment of a chapter
11 trustee or examiner with duties in addition to those set forth
in sections 1106(a)(3) and (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code;

      (E) without the prior written consent of the Prepetition ABL
Agent(or following the ABL Payment in Full, the Trade Creditor
Agent and the Note Purchaser Agent), one or more of the Debtors'
Chapter 11 Cases is/are converted to cases under chapter 7;

      (F) without the prior written consent of the Prepetition
Secured Parties, the obtaining after the Petition Date of credit or
the incurring of indebtedness that is (a) secured by a security
interest, mortgage or other lien on all or any portion of the
Prepetition Collateral that is equal or senior to any security
interest, mortgage or other lien of the Prepetition Secured
Parties, including, without limitation, any Adequate Protection
Lien granted hereunder, or (b) entitled to priority administrative
status which is equal or senior to that granted to the Prepetition
Agents herein, including, without limitation, the Superpriority
Claims;

      (G) without the prior written consent of the Prepetition
Secured Parties, the entry of an order by the Court granting relief
from or modifying the automatic stay of section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code (a) to allow any creditor to execute upon or
enforce a lien on or security interest in (1) any inventory or (2)
in any other Prepetition Collateral that is senior to any liens or
security interests of the Prepetition Secured Parties, in each case
only if such property has a value greater than $250,000, or (b) the
granting (whether voluntary or involuntary) of any lien on any
Collateral to any state or local environmental or regulatory agency
or authority that is senior to any liens or security interests of
the Prepetition Agents;  

      (H) without the prior written consent of the Prepetition
Secured Parties, reversal, vacatur, or reconsideration of any
Interim Order(s) or Final Order by the Court or any appellate
court; and/or

      (I) without the prior written consent of the Prepetition
Secured Parties, the entry of any order granting any motion by the
Debtors, the Committee, or any other third party having the effect
of amending or modifying the terms of any Interim Order(s) or the
Final Order.

A full-text copy of the Final Order is available at

           http://bankrupt.com/misc/ncmb18-80856-498.pdf

                 About Advanced Sports Enterprises

Advanced Sports Enterprises, Inc., designs, manufactures and sells
bicycles and related goods and accessories.

Advanced Sports is a wholesale seller of bicycles and accessories.
ASI owns the following bicycle brands and is responsible for their
design manufacture and worldwide distributions: Fuji, Kestrel, SE
Bikes, Breezer, and Tuesday.

Performance Direct, Inc., designs, manufactures and sells bicycles
and related goods and accessories and operates a national
distribution of these goods under the Performance Bicycle brand
through an internet website business via the URL
http://www.performancebike.com/   
   
Bitech, Inc., operates 104 retail stores across 20 states under the
Performance Bicycle brand related to the sale of bicycles and
related good and accessories.  The businesses of Performance and
Bitech operate in conjunction with each other and they share a
number of services and a distribution warehouse.

Nashbar Direct, Inc. designs, manufactures and sells bicycles and
related goods and accessories under the Bike Nashbar brand through
an internet website business via the URL
http://www.bikenashbar.com/The businesses of Nashbar also operate
in conjunction with Performance and share services and a
distribution warehouse.

Advanced Sports Enterprises and its affiliates sought protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Lead Case
No. 18-80856) on Nov. 16, 2018.

Advanced Sports Enterprises estimated assets of $1 million to $10
million and liabilities of $10 million to $50 million while
Advanced Sports, Inc., estimated assets of $100 million to $500
million and liabilities of $50 million to $100 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge Benjamin A. Kahn.

The Debtors tapped Northen Blue, LLP and Flaster/Greenberg P.C. as
their bankruptcy counsel; D.A. Davison & Co. as investment banker;
Clear Thinking Group LLC as financial advisor; and Kurtzman Carson
Consultants LLC as claims, noticing and balloting agent.


ALESCO PREFERRED XV: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding XV, LTD.:

US$362,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due December 2037 (current balance of $196,207,491),
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 9, 2017 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

US$78,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due December 2037, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
August 9, 2017 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes due December 2037 (current balance of $39,845,370),
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to Ca
(sf)

US$35,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Third Priority Secured Monthly
Pay Floating Rate Notes due December 2037 (current balance of
$39,681,674), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding XV, LTD., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2018.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 22.0% or $55.3
million since February 2018, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class B notes have improved to 193.9%,
138.7% and 107.5%, respectively, from February 2018 levels of
171.7%, 131.1% and 106.2%, respectively. Moody's gave full par
credit in its analysis to one deferring asset with a par of $4
million that meets certain criteria. The Class A-1 notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the
use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral
pool.

The deal experienced an event of default on November 30, 2010,
because the Class A OC ratio fell below 100%. On August 26, 2011,
acceleration of the notes was declared. As a result, the Class B,
Class C, and Class D notes will not receive any interest or
principal distributions until the Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes are
repaid in full. The Class A-2 notes are subordinate to the Class
A-1 notes with respect to principal repayments, but will continue
to receive interest payments after the A-1 notes' interest is
paid.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

The Credit Ratings on the notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding
XV, LTD. were assigned in accordance with Moody's existing
Methodology entitled "Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" dated
October 7, 2016. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for TruPS CDOs.
If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, it does not
expect the changes to affect the Credit Ratings on notes issued by
Alesco Preferred Funding XV, LTD.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: The timing
and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive impact
on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the ratings
on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit estimates.
Because these are not public ratings, they are subject to
additional uncertainties.

Moody's obtained a loss distribution for this CDO's portfolio by
simulating defaults using Moody's CDOROM, which used Moody's
assumptions for asset correlations and fixed recoveries in a Monte
Carlo simulation framework. Moody's then used the resulting loss
distribution, together with structural features of the CDO, as an
input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $380.5 million, defaulted/deferring par of $127.7 million, a
weighted average default probability of 6.93% (implying a WARF of
620), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc,
an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive
credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the
bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.
For insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies
on the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit
analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory
financial reports.


AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2003-11: Moody's Cuts M-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-11

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-11

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
rating downgrades are due to weaker performance of the underlying
collateral and/or the erosion of enhancement available to the
bonds. The downgrade of Cl. AF-6 also reflects a correction to the
cash-flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction
previously. In prior rating actions, the cash-flow model was
treating the delinquency trigger incorrectly during the first
projected period. This error has now been corrected, and its rating
action reflects this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

The Credit Ratings were assigned in accordance with Moody's
existing Methodology entitled "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology,"
dated 1/31/2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for pre-2009 US
RMBS Prime Jumbo, Alt-A, Option ARM, Subprime, Scratch and Dent,
Second Lien and Manufactured Housing transactions. If the revised
Methodology is implemented as proposed, these Credit Ratings are
not expected to be affected.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.0% in January 2019 from 4.1% in
January 2018 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-2: S&P Withdraws D Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
on the class A-J and A-JFL commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction,
and then subsequently withdrew the ratings. In addition, S&P
discontinued its 'D (sf)' rating on class B from the same
transaction.

The downgrades on classes A-J and A-JFL to 'D (sf)' reflect
principal losses incurred by the classes due to the liquidation of
the 11 remaining specially serviced assets from the trust, as
detailed in the Feb. 11, 2019, trustee remittance report. The four
largest specially serviced assets contributed $113.1 million of the
recent losses to the trust. The largest loan by balance, Mall of
Acadiana liquidated at a 71.7% loss severity on its $118.5 million
beginning pooled trust balance. Davisville Shopping Center ($13.3
million beginning balance at liquidation), Radisson Phoenix ($9.7
million beginning balance at liquidation), and Parkway Shopping
Center($9.6 million beginning balance at liquidation) are the
second-, third- and fourth-largest assets in the portfolio. They
liquidated at 66.6%, 99.9%, and 100.0% loss severity of their
beginning balances, respectively. The remaining seven assets had a
combined realized loss of $17.0 million.    

Consequently, classes A-J and A-JFL experienced a loss of $34.9
million and $22.7 million, respectively, representing 22.7% of the
$153.8 million and $100.0 million respective original principal
balances. Classes B, C, and D (class B is currently rated 'D (sf)';
classes C and D are not rated by S&P Global Ratings) experienced a
100% loss of their respective beginning balances. S&P subsequently
withdrew its ratings on classes A-J and A-JFL because the principal
balances were reduced to zero.   

S&P discontinued the rating on class B according to its
surveillance and withdrawal policy. S&P had previously lowered the
rating on this class to 'D (sf)' because of accumulated interest
shortfalls that it believed would remain outstanding for an
extended period of time. S&P views a subsequent upgrade to a rating
higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely under the relevant criteria for
the classes within this review."

  RATINGS LOWERED AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWN

  Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                     Rating
  Class     To       Interim       From
  A-J       NR       D (sf)        CCC (sf)
  A-JFL     NR       D (sf)        CCC (sf)

  RATING DISCONTINUED

  Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                   Rating
  Class        To        From
  B            NR        D (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


BANK OF AMERICA 2017-BNK3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK3 (the Certificates)
issued by Bank of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Trust
2017-BNK3 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. At issuance, the collateral
consisted of 63 fixed-rate loans secured by 94 commercial and
multifamily properties, with a trust balance of $977.1 million. As
of the January 2019 remittance, all loans remain in the pool with a
current trust balance of $969.0 million, representing a collateral
reduction of 1.5% due to scheduled loan amortization. Loans
representing 97.5% of the pool are reporting year-end (YE) 2017
financials and reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.99 times (x) and 10.5%,
respectively. At issuance the pool reported a DBRS WA Term DSCR and
debt yield of 1.83x and 10.2%, respectively, representing a WA net
cash flow growth of 9.1% since issuance. The largest 15 loans,
representing 60.7% of the pool balance, reported a WA DSCR and WA
debt yield of 2.19x and 10.4%, respectively.

Sixteen loans, representing 54.5% of the pool balance and including
11 of the top 15 loans, are structured with full-term interest-only
(IO) payments. An additional 13 loans, representing 12.9% of the
pool, have partial IO payments remaining.

The pool has a high concentration of retail properties representing
33.9% of the pool, with six loans (representing 21.4% of the pool
balance) within the top 15. The retail sector has been generally
underperforming reflected in recent store closures and chain
bankruptcies. These loans reported a WA annualized YE2017 DSCR of
1.82x, representing an 8.4% improvement in cash flows since DBRS's
original analysis and continue to exhibit a strong WA occupancy
rate of 91.6%. At issuance, DBRS noted the bulk of the pool's
retail exposure includes collateral properties located in
established suburban markets with strong sales figures reported for
retail loans in the top ten.

As of the January 2019 remittance, six loans, representing 3.3% of
the balance are on the servicer's watchlist. The largest watchlist
loan, Harwood Hills (Prospectus ID#29, 1.0% of the pool balance),
is being monitored for the collateral's loss of the grocery anchor
in place at issuance, Fiesta Mart, which represented 41.6% of the
net rentable area. The marketing efforts and hefty tenant reserve
balance do provide strong mitigants against the risk in the
increased physical vacancy at the property.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the 85 Tenth Avenue loan (Prospectus
ID#4, 5.2% of the pool balance) and the Potomac Mills loan
(Prospectus ID#14, 2.1% of the pool balance) investment grade. With
this review, DBRS confirms that the performance of these loans
remain consistent with investment-grade characteristics.

Classes X-A, X-B, and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


BBCMS TRUST 2018-RRI: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-RRI issued by BBCMS
Trust 2018-RRI as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. At issuance, the $400.0 million
trust mortgage loan was secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in a portfolio of 86 limited-service Red Roof Inn (RRI) hotels with
franchise agreements that expire in 2035, well beyond the loan's
maturity. In aggregate, the portfolio consisted of 10,397 keys
located in 25 different states. Since issuance, three properties
(10245 El Paso, 10052 Madison, and 10253 Boardman), which
represented 1.4% of the trust balance, were released from the
portfolio during Q2 and Q3 2018. Approximately $6.4 million of
principal was paid down to the trust, bringing the total trust
balance to $393.6 million. In addition, the $50.0 million mezzanine
loan was paid down by an estimated $691,000. As a condition of the
release provisions, the borrower was required to pay a release
price of 115% of the allocated loan amount and maintain a minimum
debt yield of 10.7% with respect to the remaining properties.
Portfolio financials for the trailing 12-month (T-12) ending
September 30, 2018, reported a debt yield of 11.1%. The portfolio
currently consists of 10,044 keys across 83 properties following
the release of the three properties mentioned above.

Twenty-three properties totaling 3,205 keys represent Red Roof Inns
Inc.'s premier design package, otherwise known as Red Roof PLUS +
(RR+). Sponsorship for the loan is provided by a joint venture
between affiliates of Westmont Hospitality Group (Westmont; 20%
ownership), which owns the RRI and RR+ brands, and Bestford Capital
Pte. Ltd. (Bestford Capital; 80% ownership), a Singapore-based
investment advisory firm. Westmont owns a diversified portfolio of
over 500 hotels across three continents, which include some of the
world's largest hotel brands. RRI West Management, LLC, an
affiliate of Westmont, manages the portfolio. The loan has a
two-year initial term with three one-year extension options with a
floating-rate (one-month London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
plus 3.125% per annum) interest-only (IO) mortgage loan. The
sponsors have spent approximately $15.5 million in capital
improvements through January 2018 since acquiring the collateral
properties in 2015. At issuance, the sponsor indicated that an
additional $4.5 million would be invested in nine additional
properties.

The T-12 ending September 30, 2018, Smith Travel Research (STR)
reports showed that the portfolio was generally in line with DBRS's
expectations at issuance. The largest 16 hotels in the pool by loan
size, representing 38.9% of the pool balance, reported occupancy,
average daily rate (ADR) and revenue-per-available-room (RevPAR) of
75.0%, $85.67 and $65.10, respectively, compared with the T-12
ending November 30, 2017, STR figures of 75.4%, $86.70 and $65.76,
respectively. The T-12 ending September 30, 2018, financials
reported a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.81 times (x),
which is slightly down from the DBRS Term DSCR of 1.90x derived at
issuance; however, LIBOR has increased since issuance and the DBRS
Term DSCR would total 1.75x after increasing LIBOR to the 3.0%
strike rate. The portfolio slightly outperformed the DBRS Term DSCR
based on the T-12 ending September 30, 2018, financials.
Classes X-CP and X-NCP are IO certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 4 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP28 issued by Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-TOP28 as
follows:

-- Class C at C (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)
-- Class E at C (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)

These classes have ratings that do not carry trends.

The rating confirmations reflect DBRS's outlook for the remaining
loan in the transaction, which has had a collateral reduction of
94.8% since issuance. As of the January 2019 remittance, the
remaining loan, secured by a regional mall in Charleston, West
Virginia, has a current balance of $91.6 million and is currently
in special servicing as the loan sponsor, Forest City Realty Trust,
was unable to sell the property or repay the loan as at the
September 2017 maturity date. Based on the October 2018 valuation
for the property, as well as the foreclosure sale price of $35.0
million when the trust took title of the property earlier this
month, DBRS anticipates losses for this loan could flow into Class
D, supporting the rating confirmations at C (sf) for the
outstanding Certificates.

Since the April 2018 surveillance review of this transaction, four
loans have left the trust, representing a paydown of approximately
$20.6 million. Three of the loans were paid in full post maturity
and the remaining loan was liquidated with a loss of $2.1 million
and a loss severity of 34.8% in August 2018, a relatively positive
end result considering the October 2017 appraised value of $3.5
million suggested the loss severity could be as high as 71.0%.
Although this and the full payoff for the other three loans are
improvements over the expectations for those loans at last review,
the deterioration of the outlook for the Charleston Town Center
loan negates any of the gains in the outlook for the transaction
overall.

The Charleston Town Center loan is secured by a 363,000 square foot
(sf) portion of a 782,720 sf enclosed mall located in downtown
Charleston, West Virginia. Receivership was appointed to CBRE
Group, Inc. in mid-January 2018 and recently on January 24, 2019,
the property was acquired by the servicer via a foreclosure sale
and the property is now real estate owned. The foreclosure sale
price was $35.0 million, compared with the October 2018 appraised
value of $50.0 million. In early 2017, the property's
non-collateral anchor, Sears, closed and later that year, the
sponsor reached an agreement with Macy's (also non-collateral) to
remain in place through 2019. However, the agreement fell through
after the loan defaulted and the property went into receivership.
Recent news articles indicate that Macy's is set to close in early
2019, leaving JCPenney as the only anchor and mall occupancy at
approximately 50%. In addition, news reports have suggested that
the former Sears space was to be redeveloped as a Hilton-branded KM
Hotel, with the project to be complete by mid-2020. It is unclear
if the recent Macy's announcement or the foreclosure sale will
impact these plans, however.

Given the sharp occupancy declines and projected further declines
in cash flows, DBRS expects the value will further decline from the
$50.0 million figure estimated with the October 2018 appraisal and
as such, assumed a loss in excess of 70% in the analysis for this
review. Overall, the DBRS analysis approach for the remaining loan
in the pool suggests losses will be contained to the Class D and
below Certificates; however, the dire outlook for the Charleston
Town Center loan suggests the prospects for principal recovery
could diminish over the near to medium term, supporting the rating
confirmation for the Class C Certificates. For additional
commentary and analysis on the remaining loan in the pool, please
see the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which information is provided
below.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, pass-through certificates, series
2007-TOP28 (BSCMSI 2007-TOP28).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations; Specially Serviced Asset: The affirmation
of the distressed ratings on the remaining classes is due to
expected losses on the remaining asset in the pool, Charleston Town
Center.

REO Asset: The remaining asset, Charleston Town Center became REO
in February 2019. The property has had significant occupancy
declines, with Sears (non-collateral) closing in April 2017. In
addition, the property has exposure to both Macy's and J.C. Penney,
which are both also non-collateral. Per media reports, Macy's is
expected to close in the first quarter of 2019. Per servicer
updates, several in-line tenants have vacated over the past 12
months including Zales, New York & Co., Gymboree, Pacific Sunwear,
Finish Line, Yankee Candle, Bare Escentuals, Coach and Motherhood
Maternity. As of the September 2018 rent roll, collateral occupancy
was reported at 80%, with total mall occupancy at 68%.

Increasing Credit Enhancement/Dispositions: Since Fitch's last
rating action, the pool balance has been reduced by 17.9% from the
disposition of four loans ($18.7 million balance at disposition),
including three specially serviced loans/assets. The three
specially serviced loans/assets ($14 million balance at
disposition) were disposed with better than expected recoveries and
only $2.1 million in realized losses to the trust.

As of the January 2019 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 94.8% to $91.6 million from
$1.76 billion at issuance. There have been $60.9.million (3.5% of
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Cumulative
interest shortfalls of $4.2 million are currently affecting classes
C through P.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Repayment for the outstanding classes is dependent on the remaining
specially serviced REO asset, Charleston Town Center. Fitch's loss
expectations remain high on the loan. Upgrades are not expected
while uncertainty remains on the ultimate resolution and/or timing
of disposition.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $13.7 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;

  -- $28.6 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  -- $22 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  -- $17.6 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  -- $9.6 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-J and B
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P
certificates. Fitch had previously withdrawn the ratings on the
interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


BEDFORD PROPERTIES: May Continue Cash Collateral Use Until Feb. 28
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James J. Tancredi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut authorized Bedford Properties BEH Y LLC and
debtor-affiliates to use cash collateral pursuant to the Seventh
Interim Order for a period commencing on Feb. 1 and ending on Feb.
28, 2019.

The Debtors are authorized to use all rents, royalties, issues,
license fees, profits, revenue, income and other benefits of and
generated by the Properties on an interim basis, which Rents
Debtors concede are subject to the security interests of Bayview
Loan Servicing, LLC and GREF Hartford LLC, as the first and second
lienholders, respectively. The Debtors may use Rents for operating
and maintaining the Properties, to meet all necessary business
expenses incurred in the ordinary course of their business,
including payment of Court-approved professional fees and the U.S.
Trustee's statutory fees, but only in the amounts and for the
purposes specifically identified in Debtors' budgets.

According to the Seventh Interim Order, (i) quarterly fees due to
the U.S. Trustee in the amount of $1,950 due Jan. 31, 2019 (which
will be paid in full by the Debtors within five days of the entry
of the Seventh Interim Order) and (ii) any other fees and expenses
of the United States Trustee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1930
will have a prior right to satisfaction from all Rents or other
cash collateral generated post-petition and from all other assets
of Debtors.

The Seventh Interim Order has modified Automatic Stay to permit
Bayview and/or GREF (and/or their respective successors and
assigns) to immediately proceed to exercise their respective rights
and remedies, under their applicable loan documents against Debtors
and the Properties (and any of Debtors' personal property and/or
equipment used in connection with any of the Properties),
including, without limitation, to permit GREF to immediately
proceed with that certain foreclosure action now pending in the
Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford,
entitled "GREF Hartford LLC v Bedford Properties BEH Y, LLC, et
al.," Docket No. HHD-CV-18-6090812-S.

The Debtors (and all other related defendants in the GREF
Foreclosure Action) will execute and deliver to GREF a written
stipulation consenting to the immediate entry of a judgment of
strict foreclosure in favor of GREF in the GREF Foreclosure Action
with an immediate law day or the earliest law day permitted by the
State Court, and Debtors will waive all rights to modify, open or
appeal the entry of the Foreclosure Judgment.

Upon GREF filing notice with the Bankruptcy Court that title to the
Properties has irrevocably vested in GREF and that Debtors have
complied with each and every requirement: (i) any right or ability
of Debtors to use Rents pursuant to the Seventh Interim Order (or
otherwise) will immediately cease and expire, and (ii) the Court
will enter an order dismissing each of Debtors' Chapter 11 cases
with prejudice to refiling within 180 days.

If the Dismissal Order is not sooner entered, a hearing before the
Court pertaining to the status of the case and the entry of the
Dismissal Order will be held on Feb. 28, 2019 at 11:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Interim Order is available at

               http://bankrupt.com/misc/ctb18-21009-152.pdf

                       About Bedford Properties

Bedford Properties is the fee simple owner of five six-unit
residential apartment buildings in Hartford, Connecticut having a
total aggregate value of $1.05 million.

Bedford Properties BEH Y, LLC, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr.
D. Conn. Case No. 18-21009) on June 19, 2018.  In the petition
signed by Yakov Stiel, member, the Debtor disclosed $1.07 million
in total assets and $4.61 million in total debt.  The Debtor is
represented by Gary J. Greene, Esq. of Greene Law, PC.


BENCHMARK 2019-B9: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following Ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Benchmark 2019-B9 Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, Series 2019-B9:

  -- $15,600,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,800,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,867,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $130,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $385,272,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,000,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $649,440,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $61,901,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $38,820,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,869,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $78,689,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,229,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46,163,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,934,000b class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,984,000b class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,984,000ab class X-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,443,000b class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,443,000ab class X-G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

  -- $9,442,000b class H;

  -- $9,442,000ab class X-H;

  -- $25,180,928b class J;

  -- $25,180,928ab class X-J;

  -- $44,175,891c class VRR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest, which equals at least
5% of the estimated fair market value of all the classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 13, 2019.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Jan. 28, 2019, the
balances for class A-4 and class A-5 were finalized. At the time
that the expected ratings were assigned, the exact initial
certificate balances of the class A-4 and class A-5 were unknown
and expected to be within the range of $100,000,000 to $240,000,000
for class A-4 and between $275,272,000 to $415,272,000 for class
A-5. The final class balances for class A-4 and class A-5 are
$130,000,000 and $385,272,000, respectively.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 88
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$883,517,820 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corporation, JPMorgan
Chase Bank, National Association and German American Capital
Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 80.1% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is higher than that of recent, comparable, Fitch-rated
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch LTV of 108.9% is
higher than the 2017 and 2018 averages of 101.6% and 102.0%,
respectively. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.11x is well below the 2017
and 2018 averages of 1.26x and 1.22x, respectively.

Limited Amortization: Nineteen loans (53.3% of the pool) are
full-term interest only and 18 loans (33.4%) are partial
interest-only. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool
will amortize by 6.1%, which is lower than the 2017 and 2018
averages of 7.9% and 7.2%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: Only one loan, representing
1.7% of the pool, received an investment-grade credit opinion,
which is lower than the 2017 and 2018 averages of 11.7% and 13.6%,
respectively. The 22nd largest loan, Aventura Mall, has a
stand-alone credit opinion of 'Asf*'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 11.7% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
Benchmark 2019-B9 certificates and found that the transaction
displays average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a
scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could
result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further
30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf'
certificates to 'BBB-sf' could result. Page 11 of the presale
report includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.


BERAKAH INVESTMENT: Seeks Access to Cash for Continued Operation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Berakah Investment Solutions, LLC, seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas to use the
alleged cash collateral of the Secured Creditors to continue its
operations.

The Debtor's business consists of buying and selling real estate.
The Debtor has currently multiple properties that must be
maintained. Thus, the Debtor asserts it must have cash to pay other
immediate expenses to keep its doors open.

The Debtor believes that a number of potential creditors have
claimed liens on the its accounts receivable and/or inventory and
real estate.

The Debtor is willing to provide Secured Creditors with replacement
liens pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 552 in accordance with their
existing priority without making any determination at this time as
to the validity or priority of the claims asserted by the Secured
Creditors.

A full-text copy of the Debtor's Motion is available at

              http://bankrupt.com/misc/txnb19-30473-6.pdf

                 About Berakah Investment Solutions

Berakah Investment Solutions is a privately owned company that
leases real estate. The Company is the fee simple owner of nine
properties in Texas having a total current value of $1.94 million.

Berakah Investment Solutions filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Case No. 19-30473) on Feb. 4, 2019.  In the petition
signed by LaShantell Williams, member, the Debtor estimated
$1,983,499 in assets and $1,648,148 in liabilities.  The case is
assigned to Judge Barbara J. Houser.  The Debtor is represented by
Robert C. Newark, III, Esq., A Newark Firm.


BLOX INC: Posts $201K Net Loss in Dec. 31 Quarter
-------------------------------------------------
Blox, Inc. filed its quarterly report on Form 10-Q, disclosing a
net loss of $201,105 on $0 of revenue for the three months ended
Dec. 31, 2018, compared to a net loss of $90,920 on $0 of revenue
for the same period in 2017.

At Dec. 31, 2018 the Company had total assets of $1,131,552, total
liabilities of $451,461, and $680,091 in total stockholders'
equity.

The Company states, "We have not yet established an ongoing source
of revenues sufficient to cover our operating costs and to allow us
to continue as a going concern.  We have incurred a net loss of
$324,627 for the nine months ended December 31, 2018 and have
incurred cumulative losses since inception of $11,179,054.  These
factors raise substantial doubt about the ability of the Company to
continue as going concern.  Our ability to continue as a going
concern is dependent on our ability to continue obtaining adequate
capital to fund operating losses until we become profitable.  If we
are unable to obtain adequate capital, we could be forced to
significantly curtail or cease operations.

"We will need to raise additional funds to finance continuing
operations.  However, there are no assurances that we will be
successful in raising additional funds.  Without sufficient
additional financing, it would be unlikely for us to continue as a
going concern.  Our ability to continue as a going concern is
dependent upon our ability to successfully accomplish the plans
described in this quarterly report and eventually secure other
sources of financing and attain profitable operations."

A copy of the Form 10-Q is available at:

                       https://is.gd/25TAkb

Blox, Inc. explores for and develops mineral properties in West
Africa.  The Company primarily explores for gold deposits.  It owns
a 78% interest in the Mansounia property covering an area of 145
square kilometers located in Kankan Region, Guinea, West Africa.
The Company also has interests in Pramkese, Osenase, and Asamankese
properties situated in Ghana.  Blox, Inc. is headquartered in New
York, New York.


BURKHALTER RIGGING: Seeks OK on $350K Loan, Cash Collateral Use
---------------------------------------------------------------
Burkhalter Rigging, Inc., and its debtor-affiliates seek the
authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Texas to obtain postpetition financing pursuant to a senior
secured super-priority debtor-in-possession term loan facility in
an aggregate principal amount of up to $350,000 and to use cash
collateral.

The Debtors seek authority to obtain postpetition financing from
their prepetition lenders, Metropolitan Partners Group
Administration LLC, as administrative agent and collateral agent
and the lenders party thereto from time to time, the proceeds of
which will be used by the Debtors for operational and
administrative expenses.

The Debtors' primary prepetition obligor was at least $19.5 million
in outstanding principal amount pursuant to that certain Loan and
Security Agreement, by and among the Debtors, as Borrower,
Metropolitan Partners, as administrative agent and collateral agent
thereunder, and the financial institutions and other entities party
thereto. The Prepetition Agent, for its benefit and the benefit of
the Prepetition Lenders, was granted a security interest in and
lien on substantially all assets of the Debtors, as set forth in
the Prepetition Credit Agreement.

Interest on the Bridge DIP Facility will accrue and be payable on
the Termination Date at a rate per annum equal to 16%.

The Bridge DIP Facility will mature on the earliest to occur of (i)
March 4, 2019, (ii) the closing date of any sale of substantially
all of the Debtors' assets, and (iii) the occurrence of an Event of
Default which remains uncured following the Remedies Notice
Period.

The adequate-protection package includes:

      (A) The Prepetition Senior Loan Agent and the Prepetition
Senior Lenders, effective as of the entry of the Bridge Financing
Order, will be granted continuing, valid, binding, enforceable and
automatically perfected postpetition liens on all DIP Collateral.

      (B) Pursuant to section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Prepetition Senior Loan Agent and the Prepetition Senior Lenders,
are further granted an allowed superpriority administrative expense
claim, which claim will be junior to the DIP Superiority Claim,
which will be junior to the Carve-Out, but will be senior to and
have priority over any other administrative expense claims,
unsecured claims and all other claims against the Debtors or their
estates in any of the Chapter 11 Cases or any Successor Cases.

The Bridge Order contemplates certain milestones in the sales
process:

      (a) An order granting interim approval of a subsequent senior
post-petition loan facility with the DIP Agent and the DIP Lenders
entered by the Court on or before March 1, 2019;

      (b) An order granting authority for the Debtors to retain a
Chief Restructuring Officer reasonably acceptable to the DIP Agent
and the DIP Lenders entered by the Court on or before March 1,
2019;

      (c) A motion seeking approval of bidding procedures and the
sale of all or substantially all of the Debtors' assets to a
stalking horse bidder acceptable to the DIP Agent and the DIP
Lenders is not filed on or before Feb. 15, 2019;

A full-text copy of the Debtor's Motion is available at

             http://bankrupt.com/misc/txsb19-30495-42.pdf

                     About Burkhalter Rigging

Burkhalter Rigging, Inc., Burkhalter Transport, Inc. and Burkhalter
Specialized Transport, LLC each filed voluntary petitions seeking
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Case Nos. 19-30495 to 19-30497), on Jan. 31, 2019. The Petition was
signed by Brooke Burkhalter, president. The case is assigned to
Judge Marvin Isgur. The Debtor is represented by Marcus Alan Helt,
Esq. at Foley & Lardner LLP. At the time of filing, the Debtor had
$10 million to $50 million in estimated assets and $10 million to
$50 million in estimated liabilities.


CANYON CLO 2019-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Canyon CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$19,400,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$24,400,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$20,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Canyon 2019-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

Canyon CLO Advisors LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for Canyon CLO 2019-1, Ltd. was assigned in
accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 31, 2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for
Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on Canyon CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CARLYLE US 2019- 1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Carlyle US CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$372,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1b Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$26,500,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$36,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Carlyle 2019-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans and unsecured loans. Moody's expects the
portfolio to be approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Carlyle CLO Management L.L.C. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for Carlyle US CLO 2019-1, Ltd. was assigned in
accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 31, 2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for
Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on Carlyle US CLO 2019-1, Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-1 Certs to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on three classes in CBA Commercial Assets,
Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2004-1 as follows:

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2018 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2018 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. IO*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2018 Affirmed C
(sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. M-1, was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 19% since Moody's last review.

The ratings on Cl. M-2 and Cl. M-3 were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized
losses. Cl. M-3 has already experienced a 56% realized loss as
result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 18.2% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 16.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used
in rating interest-only classes were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 63% of the pool was
identified by Moody's as troubled loans. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from troubled loans to the most junior class(es) and
the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior
class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 25, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $6.8 million
from $102 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 59.2% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, compared to 24 at Moody's last review.

Fifty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $10.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 67%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 14 poorly
performing loans, constituting 63% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $1.1 million (a 25% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, compared to 97% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.01X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.08X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Class A Certs at 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2018 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. A was affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl. A has already
experienced a 17% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 30.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 29.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 34.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 33.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017.


Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 34% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 8.2% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 25, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to $17.9 million
from $127.6 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 41 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 57% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 3.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ninety-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $38 million (for an average loss
severity of 72%). Nine loans, constituting 33.6% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 8.2% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $5.1 million (a 68% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans and specially serviced loans.

As of the January 25, 2019 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $5.1 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.


CBAM LTD 2019-9: Moody's Rates $36.3MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by CBAM 2019-9, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$384,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class A
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$36,300,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$29,700,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$27,300,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$36,300,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

CBAM 2019-9 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans and senior unsecured loans. The portfolio is at
least 95% ramped as of the closing date.

CBAM CLO Management LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's three year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2725

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.3351%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for CBAM 2019-9, Ltd. was assigned in accordance
with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's Global Approach
to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 31, 2017.
Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Methodology for Collateralized Loan Obligations.
If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, Moody's does
not expect the changes to affect the Credit Rating on CBAM 2019-9,
Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on five classes in CFCRE Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2011-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2018 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2018 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2018 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2018 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2019 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Cl. A-4 and Cl. D were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on Cl. B and Cl. C were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as a significant increase
in defeasance. The pool has paid down by 14% since Moody's last
review. In addition, loans constituting 39% of the current pool
have defeased, as compared to 19% at the last review.

The rating on Cl. E was affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl. E has already
experienced a 22% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.0% of the
original pooled balance, unchanged from Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO)
Securities" published in February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 71% to $186 million
from $635 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 9%
of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 59% of the pool. Five loans, constituting 39% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $40.7 million (for a loss severity of 86%). No
loans are currently in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for one poorly performing loan, Amber
Fields & Calico Apartments ($8.0 million -- 4.3% of the pool),
which is secured by two multifamily properties located in Fargo,
North Dakota. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist for
low DSCR (below 1.10X) due to high operating expenses and low
rental rates.

Moody's received full year 2017 and partial year 2018 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 84%, compared to 87% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
12% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Walker Center Loan ($17.1 million -- 9% of the
pool), which is secured by a 154,000 SF office building located in
the central business district of Salt Lake City, Utah. As per the
September 2018 rent roll, the property was 83% leased, compared to
85% leased as of December 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
92.4% and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.17X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Heights at McArthur Park Loan ($15.7
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 216-unit
garden-style apartment complex located near Fort Bragg and Pope Air
Force Base in Fayetteville, North Carolina. As per the September
2018 rent roll the property was 91% leased, compared to 90% leased
as of December 2017. Property performance is below expectations at
securitization due to higher operating expenses and the loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist for low DSCR (below 1.10X). Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.71X.

The third largest loan is the Las Colinas Village Loan ($15.6
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a power center
consisting of four, single-story buildings built in 2000 and
situated on a 13.15 acre parcel located in Irving, Texas. Property
performance is below expectations at securitization mainly due to
lower occupancy. As per the June 2018 rent roll the property was
70% leased, unchanged from December 2017, but significantly lower
than the occupancy of 95% in December 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 101% and 1.02X, respectively.


CFCRE TRUST 2018-TAN: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class HRR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-TAN issued by CFCRE Trust
2018-TAN (the Trust) as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class HRR at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. This transaction closed in February
2018 with an original trust balance of $195.0 million. The subject
loan consists of a $135.0 million senior note (Note A) and a $60.0
million subordinated note (Note B), both of which are assets of the
Trust. The collateral for this transaction is the Aruba Marriott
Resort, a 411-key upscale beachfront resort located in Aruba.
Included in the collateral is the Stellaris Casino, the largest
casino on the island. The underlying loan is interest-only (IO)
throughout its five-year term and the loan is sponsored by a joint
venture between DLJ Real Estate Investment Partners and MetaCorp
International. The hotel has been managed by an affiliate of
Marriott International since it opened in 1995 and the current
management agreement runs through 2025 with four consecutive
ten-year extension options thereafter.

The hotel has received over $51.0 million ($126,192 per key) of
capital investment over the last ten years, including approximately
$17.6 million ($42,822 per key) since 2016. Recent renovations
include updates to guest rooms, painting the exterior facade,
expanding the fitness center and updates to restaurants. Per the
trailing 12 months ending September 2018 Smith Travel Research
(STR) report, the subject reported an occupancy rate, average daily
rate (ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPAR) of 85.8%,
$426.28 and $365.54, respectively, compared with the trailing six
months ending November 2017 STR report metrics of 83.2%, $305.36
and $254.06, respectively. The subject continues to outperform its
competitive set with an overall RevPAR penetration of 154.2%, as
ADR and RevPAR both increased over 11% year over year. According to
annualized Q3 2018 financials, the loan is reporting a debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 3.05 times (x), compared with the DBRS
Term DSCR at issuance of 2.23x. The increase in cash flow from
issuance represents higher ADR and occupancy as annualized room
revenue increased by 24% ($11 million).

Aruba's credit rating continues to exhibit investment-grade
characteristics, primarily benefiting from its long-standing
institutional relationship with the Netherlands (rated AAA with a
Stable trend by DBRS) and its relatively high per capita income in
the Caribbean region. Key challenges include weak growth prospects,
limited economic diversification and relatively high debt levels
for a small island economy. Aruba's economy also has negative
exposure to the current turmoil in Venezuela. This had led to a
reduction of tourist arrivals from Venezuela and adversely affects
the operations and planned the upgrade of an oil refinery in Aruba,
which relies on crude oil shipments from Venezuela. DBRS accounted
for the sovereign risk at issuance by applying a stressed cap rate
in its analysis and as Aruba's credit rating has remained broadly
unchanged and consistent with investment-grade characteristics,
DBRS has maintained the assumption for the February 2019
surveillance review.

Class X is an IO certificate that references a single rated tranche
or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.


CIFC FUNDING 2015-II: Moody's Hikes Class E-R Notes Rating to 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by CIFC Funding 2015-II, Ltd.:

US$55,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on December 21, 2017
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$26,700,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on December 21,
2017 Assigned A2 (sf)

US$30,300,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on December 21,
2017 Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on December 21,
2017 Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CIFC Funding 2015-II, Ltd., issued in May 2015, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
April 2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating actions reflect the benefit of the limited
period of time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment
period in April 2019 and the expectation that deleveraging will
commence shortly. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Moody's notes that
based on the trustee's January 2019 report, the weighted average
spread (WAS) of the portfolio was reported at 3.47%, versus the
December 2017 level of 3.61%. Over the same period, WARF has
increased, and is currently reported at 2971, versus the December
2017 level of 2812.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $498.6 million, defaulted par of
$0.57 million, a weighted average default probability of 22.61%
(implying a WARF of 3002), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.17%, a diversity score of 74 and a weighted average
spread of 3.47% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for CIFC Funding 2015-II, Ltd. was assigned in
accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 31, 2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for
Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on CIFC Funding 2015-II, Ltd.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.


CIFC FUNDING 2019-I: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by CIFC Funding 2019-I, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$322,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$24,250,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$30,250,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$28,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

CIFC Funding 2019-I is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.

CIFC CLO Management II LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for CIFC Funding 2019-I, Ltd. was assigned in
accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 31, 2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for
Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on CIFC Funding 2019-I, Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CIG AUTO 2019-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by CIG Auto Receivables 2019-1 (CIGAR 2019-1).
This is the first auto loan transaction of the year for CIG
Financial, LLC (CIG; Unrated). The notes will be backed by a pool
of retail automobile loan contracts originated by CIG, which is
also the servicer for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIG Auto Receivables Trust 2019-1

Class A Notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, the experience and expertise of CIG Financial LLC as
servicer and administrator, and the presence of Wilmington Trust,
National Association (long-term CR assessment A1(cr) stable) as
named backup servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2019-1 pool
is 11.5%. The expected loss is higher by 1.5 percentage points than
its initial expected loss for CIGAR 2017-1, the last transaction
that it rated. Moody's based its cumulative net loss expectation on
an analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the
historical performance of similar collateral, including
securitization performance and managed portfolio performance; the
ability of CIG to perform the servicing functions; and current
expectations for the macroeconomic environment during the life of
the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes and
Class D notes are expected to benefit from 31.50%, 19.50%, 13.50%
and 7.50%, of hard credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit
enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization, a non-declining reserve account and
subodination, except the Class D notes, which do not benefit from
subordination. The notes may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published
October 2016.

Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Methodology for auto loans and leases. If the
revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating
on CIGAR 2019-1 may be neutrally affected.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such as the one in
this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a percentage of the
collateral balance as collections pay down senior notes.
Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note principal
payments will accelerate this build of enhancement. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a lower
number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2012-GCB: Moody's Affirms Caa1 on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes in Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-GC8, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-GC8 ("CGCMT
2012-GC8") as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

  * Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.0% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 6.0% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 4.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in Febraury 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to $765.5
million from $1.04 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 48 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 62% of the pool. Thirteen loans,
constituting 16% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

Twelve loans, constituting 56% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2017 and partial year 2018 operating
results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and
defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%,
compared to 104% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 1% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Miami Center Loan ($103.1 million -- 13.5% of
the pool), which is secured by a pari-passu portion of a $154.9
million first mortgage loan. The collateral property is a 35-story,
787,000 square foot (SF) office tower located on South Biscayne
Boulevard in Miami, Florida. The property is located adjacent to an
Intercontinental Hotel and contains a 9-story parking garage. As of
September 2018, the property was 68% leased unchanged from June
2017 and compared to 84% at securitization. The two largest
tenants, which account for over 23% of the net rentable area (NRA),
extended their leases until 2030, however, the property has
experienced a decline in revenue due to other tenant rollover. The
loan has approximately $3.7 million in a tenant reserve account.
Property performance declined in 2017 due to lower revenue and
higher operating expenses. As a result, the loan is currently on
the watchlist for a low DSCR. The loan has amortized nearly 10%
since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and
0.85X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.88X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the 17 Battery Place South Loan ($86.1
million -- 11.2% of the pool), which is secured by the office
portion of a 31-story, mixed use tower located in lower Manhattan.
The asset is also encumbered with $14 million of mezzanine debt. As
of the September 2018, the property was 87% leased, compared with
76% in June 2017 and 79% in December 2016. Property performance
impoved in 2017 due to lower operating expenses, driven by a
decrease in the repair and maintenance line item. The two largest
tenants comprise almost 29% of the NRA, and both leases expire in
2029. The loan has amortized approximately 5.0% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and
0.82X, respectively, compared to 125% and 0.80X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Pinnacle at Westchase Loan ($71.4
million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 471,000 SF
class A suburban office complex in the Westchase submarket of
Houston, Texas. The largest tenant, Phillips 66 (45% of NRA; lease
expiration July 2019), vacated the property in July 2016 and is
currently marketing their space for sublease through the balance of
their lease term. The property faces additional near term rollover
as the second largest tenant, MHWirth (42% of NRA), has a lease
expiration in 2020. As of December 2018, there was a tenant reserve
account with a balance of approximately $5.3 million. As of the
September 2017 rent roll, the property was 89% leased, however,
excluding Philips 66 the physical occupancy was only 44%. Due to
the decline in occupancy, Moody's has identified this as a troubled
loan.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC19: DBRS Hikes F Certs Rating to BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC19 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC19 as follows:

-- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class X-C to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D to BB (high) sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class F to BB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the ratings on six classes as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of successful loan repayment and scheduled loan
amortization since issuance. Per the January 2019 remittance, 70 of
the original 84 loans remain in the pool with an aggregate trust
balance of approximately $754.4 million, representing a collateral
reduction of 25.8% since issuance. In addition, there are currently
nine loans (6.1% of the pool) secured by collateral that is fully
defeased. To date, non-defeased loans representing approximately
96.7% of the pool have reported YE2017 financials. Based on the
most recent year-end reporting, the non-defeased loans in the pool
reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and debt yield of 1.56 times (x) and 10.4%, respectively, compared
to the DBRS Term DSCR figure and DBRS debt yield figures of 1.25x
and 7.9%, respectively, at issuance. Based on the same reporting,
the top 15 loans (41.7% of the pool) reported a WA DSCR of 1.68x
compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.38x, reflecting a 28.1%
net cash flow (NCF) growth over the DBRS issuance figure.

Of the loans in the top 15, two of them (3.2% of the pool) are
being monitored due to uncertainty with their grocery-anchored
tenants. The largest of these loans, Mid-City Plaza (Prospectus
ID#13; 1.8% of the pool), is anchored by a Tops Friendly Markets
(Tops; 26.6% of net rentable area (NRA), through July 2024), which
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in September 2018, but has since
had a court-approved debt restructuring in November 2018. As part
of the restructuring, Tops closed ten underperforming stores and
amended other locations' leases with reduced rental payments. The
loan is secured by a 218,145-square foot (sf) grocery-anchored
retail center, located in North Tonawanda, about ten miles north of
Buffalo. As of Q3 2018, the loan reported an annualized amortizing
DSCR of 1.62x, compared with 1.69x at YE2017 and 1.34x at YE2016.
DBRS has asked the servicer if the subject Tops has had any
amendments to their lease. The second loan, Anthem Marketplace
(Prospectus ID#17; 1.5% of the pool), is anchored by a Safeway,
Inc. (Safeway; 48.7% of NRA), with a near term lease expiration in
May 2020. Safeway does have renewal options available, but to date,
it has not been confirmed if the tenant will elect to renew. At
issuance, Safeway reported a low trailing 12-month sales figure of
$255 per square foot. The collateral is secured by a 113,292-sf
grocery-anchored retail plaza, located in Anthem, Arizona, 30 miles
northwest of Phoenix. DBRS is now monitoring the loan on DBRS
Hotlist given the upcoming lease expiration and has requested an
updated sales figure as well as a leasing update on the preliminary
renewal discussions.

As of the January 2019 remittance, there are seven loans (7.8% of
the pool) on the servicer's watchlist, with no loans in special
servicing. Of the seven loans on the servicer's watchlist, four of
them (2.9% of the pool) were flagged for performance-related
reasons. Based on the most recent partial year financials, these
loans had a WA DSCR of 0.99x, compared to the WA DBRS Term figure
of 1.26x, reflecting a 3.5% NCF decline over the DBRS issuance
figure. The most noteworthy of these loans, 334-336 West 46th
Street (Prospectus ID#35; 0.8% of the pool), was flagged for a low
DSCR as a result of fluctuating occupancy. The collateral is
secured by a mixed-use property located in New York City that is
comprised of both apartment units and a retail portion. Despite the
recent improvement in occupancy to 89% in September 2018, from 59%
in December 2016, financial performance remains poor, as the loan
reported an annualized amortizing DSCR of 0.70x as of Q3 2018. In
addition to poor financial performance, the borrower has
historically been delinquent and is often late on debt service
payments.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC21: Fitch Affirms B on $13MM F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2014-GC21 (CGCMT 2014-GC21).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement to Offset Higher Loss Expectations:
The rating affirmations reflect increased credit enhancement to the
classes due to loan payoffs and continued amortization, which help
to offset Fitch's higher loss expectations. While the majority of
the pool continues to exhibit stable performance, the change in
loss expectations is primarily due to higher losses projected for
the Maine Mall and Hairston Village loans, the latter of which
transferred to special servicing in November 2018. The higher loss
expectations also reflect the increased number of Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs; 28% of pool) and high concentration of loans
secured by retail properties (33.3%).

As of the January 2019 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 15.8% to $875.9 million from
$1.04 billion at issuance. Since Fitch's last rating action, three
loans totaling $116.8 million were repaid between May and December
2018, prior to their 2024 scheduled maturity dates. This includes
the former second largest loan, Newcastle Senior Housing Portfolio
($96.3 million), which repaid in May 2018. Six loans (5.7%) have
been defeased. The majority of the pool (58 loans; 68.9% of pool)
is currently amortizing. Six loans (23.8%) are full-term
interest-only and three loans (7.3%) still have a partial
interest-only component during their remaining loan term, compared
with 31.8% of the original pool at issuance. There have been no
realized losses since issuance.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated 10 loans (28% of
current pool) as FLOCs, including five of the top 15 loans (23.7%),
one of which is specially serviced (1.9%). Four of these top 15
(21.9%) reported significant occupancy declines following the loss
of major tenants in 2017 and 2018. The largest loan, Maine Mall
(14.3%), a regional mall in South Portland, ME, lost its largest
collateral anchor when The Bon-Ton terminated its lease and vacated
in June 2017. The 201 Fourth Avenue North (3.2%) office property in
downtown Nashville, TN lost its second largest tenant, which
vacated at its February 2017 lease expiration. The second largest
tenant at the Lanes Mill Marketplace (2.6%) retail property in
Howell, NJ vacated at its February 2019 lease expiration, and the
center's Stop & Shop grocery anchor has reported declining sales
since issuance. The Harbor Square (1.9%) loan faces the upcoming
lease rollover of its second largest tenant, Burlington Coat
Factory, in November 2019.

The FLOCs outside of the top 15 (combined 4.3%) were flagged for
declines in occupancy and cash flow or upcoming lease rollover.

Specially Serviced Loan: The Hairston Village (1.9%) loan, which is
secured by a neighborhood retail center in Stone Mountain, GA,
transferred to special servicing in November 2018 for imminent
default following the loss of multiple major tenants, including
Kroger going dark in October 2017 (ahead of its scheduled December
2019 lease expiration); Conway Stores closing in the fall of 2018
after the bankruptcy filing of its parent entity, National Stores,
and Pet Supermarket terminating its lease in September 2018 after
its co-tenancy right was triggered.

Alternative Loss Considerations: In addition to modeling a base
case loss, Fitch applied a 25% loss severity on the maturity
balance of the Maine Mall loan to reflect the potential for
outsized losses given the vacant anchor box and exposure to weak
noncollateral anchors Macy's and Sears. The sensitivity scenario
also factored in the expected paydown of the transaction from
defeased loans and the two non-defeased loans expected to repay at
their April 2019 maturity dates. This sensitivity analysis
contributed to the Negative Rating Outlook on classes E, F and
X-C.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentrations: Loans secured by retail properties comprise
33.3% of the current pool balance and include five of the top 15
loans (23.1%). The regional mall exposure is limited to the largest
loan, Maine Mall (14.3%), a regional mall in South Portland, ME
with exposure to Macy's and Sears as noncollateral tenants and
JCPenney as a collateral tenant. Loans secured by multifamily
properties comprise 23.2% of the current pool balance, including
three of the top 15 loans (11%).

Upcoming loan maturities include six loans (7%) in April 2019, one
loan (1.2%) in 2021, one loan (5.1%) in 2023 and the remaining 59
loans (86.8%) in 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes E, F and X-C reflect
additional sensitivity analysis and potential downgrade concerns
should performance of the FLOCs, primarily the Maine Mall and
Hairston Village loans, continue to deteriorate. The Stable Rating
Outlooks for classes A-4 through D reflect increasing credit
enhancement and expected continued paydown. Future rating upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $200.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $291.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $71.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $622.4 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $58.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $70.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 class PEZ** at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $115.7 million class X-B* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $24.7 million class X-C* at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

  * Notional and interest-only.

  ** Class A-S, B, and C certificates may be exchanged for a
related amount of class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ
certificates may be exchanged for class A-S, B, and C
certificates.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class G or X-D certificates.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2019-SST2: Moody's Rates Class F Notes (P)B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2019-SST2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2019-SST2:

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-CP*, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

  * Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificates are collateralized by a single floating-rate,
mortgage loan secured by the fee simple interests in 29
self-storage properties located across 10 states.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's LTV ratio.

The first mortgage balance of $180,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 112.3%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 1.68X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 0.91X. The financing
is subject to an additional mezzanine loan totaling $55,000,000.
The Moody's Total Debt LTV (inclusive of the mezzanine loan) is
146.6% while the Moody's Total Debt Actual DSCR is 1.17X and
Moody's Total Debt Stressed DSCR is 0.70X.

The mortgage loan is secured by the fee simple interests in 29
self-storage properties. In aggregate, there are 17,978 units that
contain 2,086,594 SF of rentable area. The largest property
represents 13.8% of the mortgage allocated loan amount ("ALA"). The
portfolio is geographically diverse as the 29 properties are
located across 17 MSA's in 10 states. The largest state
concentration is California, which represents 35.8% of the mortgage
ALA. The portfolio's property-level Herfindahl score is 17.9, based
on mortgage ALA.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The portfolio's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.45.

The portfolio reported a weighted average physical occupancy rate
of 89.2% by net rentable area for the trailing twelve month period
ending on October 31, 2018.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: portfolio's
historical operating performance, geographic diversity, demographic
profile and experienced property management.

Notable credit challenges of the transaction include: the average
age of the collateral improvements, the loan's floating-rate and
interest-only mortgage loan profile, and certain credit negative
legal features.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class K Certificates to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the rating of one class of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-LNB2 issued by COMM
2004-LNB2, as follows:

-- Class K to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

Class K is the only remaining class in the transaction rated by
DBRS and is assigned a rating that does not carry a trend.

The rating downgrade reflects the increase in expected loss to the
trust for the Alta Mesa loan (Prospectus ID#54, 57.0% of the pool),
which is one of two loans remaining in the pool and has been in
special servicing since 2014 after failing to repay at maturity as
a result of sustained performance declines at the collateral
property following the closure of the Sack N Save shadow anchor in
2010. The property became real estate owned in February 2016. As of
the November 2018 rent roll, the property was 46.9% occupied and an
August 2018 site inspection conducted by the servicer noted the
overall quality of the property remained below average compared to
other centers in the submarket. DBRS expects the servicer will have
significant difficulty with any attempts to stabilize and/or sell
this asset and, in the analysis for this review, DBRS assumed a
loss severity approaching 65% based on the most recent appraised
value of $2.9 million as of February 2018. If that scenario is
realized, DBRS expects a minor loss to Class K, supporting the
rating downgrade to C. For additional information on this loan,
please see the loan commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for
which information is provided below.

As of the January 2019 remittance report, the transaction has
experienced the collateral reduction of 99.6% as a result of
successful loan repayment, scheduled amortization, realized losses
from liquidated loans and principal recoveries from liquidated
loans as only two of the original 90 loans remain in the pool.
Since the last review in July 2018, three fully defeased loans,
representing 8.9% of the pool at issuance, were successfully repaid
and have left the pool and seven classes have been fully repaid.
The other remaining loan in the pool, Walgreen College Station
(Prospectus ID#62, 43% of the pool), is secured by a single-tenant
retail property occupied by the Walgreen Company (Walgreens), an
investment-grade-rated tenant, on a triple-net lease with extension
options until May 2078. The loan is fully amortizing and the
Walgreens lease expires at loan maturity in April 2028.


COMM 2013-300P: Fitch Affirms $28MM Class E Debt at 'BB+sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rated classes of COMM 2013-300P
Mortgage Trust.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The underlying property performance remains in
line with Fitch's issuance expectations. Occupancy has been stable,
and although expenses have increased since issuance, revenues have
also continued to improve year-over-year. Fitch expects many of the
expense increases to be recoverable.

Tenant Concentration and Rollover Risk: Colgate-Palmolive is the
largest tenant, leasing 65.3% of the NRA and representing 76.9% of
the current base rent. WeWork currently subleases approximately
110,000 sf from Colgate-Palmolive, helping to diversify the tenant
base. Although there will be a negligible amount of tenant rollover
in the next few years, Colgate-Palmolive's lease expires two months
before the loan matures in August 2023. They have agreed to give
back 109,631-sf of space (14.2% of the NRA) at the end of their
current lease, and this space has already been pre-leased to
another tenant. Colgate-Palmolive has demonstrated a commitment to
the property through long-term occupancy of 60 years and ongoing
investments in their space.

Collateral Quality: 300 Park Avenue consists of a 25-story, LEED
Silver high-rise office building totaling 771,643 sf. The property
underwent substantial renovations between 1998 and 2000 including a
new lobby, elevator modernization and upgraded building systems.
Additionally, a facade renovation around the same time completely
transformed the property's exterior with new windows, aluminium
spandrel panels and retail storefronts. At issuance, Fitch assigned
300 Park Avenue a property quality grade of 'B+'.

Excellent Location: The asset's location borders the Grand Central
and Plaza submarkets. It is situated between 49th and 50th streets
on the west side of Park Avenue. The location is four blocks north
of Grand Central Terminal and offers excellent accessibility and
proximity to public transportation.

Low Trust Leverage: Fitch's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the trust component of the debt is 1.31x, and the
stressed loan to value (LTV) is 67.5%. Additionally, the 'AAAsf'
rated debt is only $385 per square foot (psf), which implies the
property could sustain a 70% decline in value from its current $1
billion appraised value and still repay 'AAAsf' debt.

Limited Structural Features: The loan has no upfront reserves other
than real estate taxes, no structure in place to mitigate the
Colgate-Palmolive lease expiration, springing cash management, and
there is no carve-out guarantor. The loan sponsor is controlled by
Prime Plus Investments, Inc. (PPI) a private Maryland REIT. PPI is
a partnership of a Tishman Speyer affiliated entity, the National
Pension Service of Korea, and the second Swedish National Pension
Fund AP2, which owns 51.0% of PPI and is an affiliate of GIC Real
Estate Private Ltd. (a sovereign wealth fund established and funded
by the Singapore government), which owns the remaining 49%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remains Stable. No rating
actions are anticipated unless there are material changes in
property occupancy or cash flow. The property performance is
consistent with issuance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $222 million class A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $75 million class A1P at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $297 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $61 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28 million class E at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest only


COMM 2014-UBS3: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. changed the trend on Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-UBS3, Classes G and X-D issued by COMM
2014-UBS3 Mortgage Trust (the Trust) to Negative from Stable.

In addition, DBRS confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
the Trust:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

Except for Classes G and X-D, the trend in all classes is Stable.

DBRS also discontinued the rating on Class A-1, as the class was
fully repaid per the January 2019 remittance report.

The Class PEZ certificates are exchangeable for the Class A-M,
Class B and Class C certificates (and vice versa).

The trend change on Classes G and X-D reflects the increased risk
to the pool as two loans (Prospectus ID#19 – Cincinnati
Multifamily Portfolio and Prospectus ID#39 – Radcliff Square
Shopping Center), representing 1.8% of the pool balance, are in
special servicing and are expected to result in realized losses to
the Trust when each is ultimately resolved. While there is credit
risk surrounding the specially serviced loans, the rating
confirmations reflect the overall stability of the transaction.

According to the January 2019 remittance report, 48 of the original
49 loans remain in the pool with a Trust balance of $1,018 million,
representing a 3.6% collateral reduction since issuance. Class A-1
was fully repaid as of the January 2019 remittance; therefore, DBRS
discontinued its rating on the class.

As of January 2019 reporting, 99.5% of the pool balance reported
YE2017 financials and 98.6% of the pool balance reported
partial-year 2018 financials. According to these financials, the
pool exhibited a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and debt yield of 1.50 times (x) and 9.1%, respectively,
relatively in line with the DBRS Term DSCR and Debt Yield of 1.47x
and 8.6%, respectively. The WA annualized partial-year 2018 DSCR
for the top 15 non-defeased loans was 1.73x. The transaction
benefits from defeasance collateral, as three loans, representing
3.3% of the pool balance, are fully defeased. Additionally,
approximately 33.4% of the pool balance is secured by properties
located in urban markets and the pool features a low
retail-property-type concentration at 20.1% of the pool balance.

Four loans, representing 10.9% of the pool balance, are scheduled
to mature in April and May 2019. Based on the preceding cash flows,
the exit debt yields for the subject loans ranged from 6.0% to
15.5%. DBRS is monitoring one particular upcoming loan (Prospectus
ID#5 – Sixty LES; 6.0% of the pool balance), which is secured by
a 141-key boutique hotel in New York and is on the servicer's
watchlist due to continued weak financial performance.

Ten loans, representing 14.6% of the pool balance, are on the
servicer's watchlist. Seven of these loans (52.1% of the watchlist
loan balance) were flagged due to deferred maintenance, while the
remaining loans were flagged for performance issues. The Fairfield
Inn & Suites by Marriott loan (Prospectus ID#35; 0.5% of the pool
balance) in particular was added, as the borrower modified the
franchise agreement without lender approval and due to stressed
financial performance following an extensive renovation in 2017.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.


COMM 2014-UBS6: Fitch Affirms BB+ on Class F Certs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of COMM 2014-UBS6
pass-through certificates, which were issued by Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall loss expectations remain high,
but slightly lower than Fitch's prior rating action. The majority
of the pool continues to exhibit stable performance. However,
expected losses are high due to four loans (4.8%) in special
servicing and two performing loans (4.6%) that have been designated
as Fitch Loans of Concern. The largest increase in expected losses
is attributed to the Riverspointe Apartment Phase II loan (2.5%),
which transferred to special servicing in June 2018. The loan
remains current during an investigation into the sponsor, Robert C.
Morgan.

The largest loan in special servicing is the Cray Plaza loan
(1.2%), which is secured by a 219,313-sf mixed-use property
(office/retail/parking garage) located in St. Paul, MN. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2017 due to imminent
default as largest tenant Cray, Inc. (30% of the net rentable area)
exercised a contractual termination option and vacated in April
2017. The servicer is working to improve occupancy (24% as of
December 2018) and anticipates selling the property through a court
appointed receiver in 2019.

Increased Credit Enhancement: The rating affirmations reflect
increased credit enhancement to the classes due to loan payoffs and
continued amortization, which help to offset Fitch's high loss
expectations. As of the January 2019 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has paid down by 7.05% to $1.12 billion
from $1.30 billion at issuance. Since Fitch's last rating action,
three loans totaling $116.8 million were repaid between May and
December of 2018, prior to their scheduled maturity dates. Six
loans (3.7%) have been defeased. The majority of the pool (66.6% of
pool) is currently amortizing. Four loans (14%) are full-term
interest-only and 10 loans (19.5%) still have a partial
interest-only component during their remaining loan term. There
have been $7.1 million in realized losses to date, which were the
result of the disposition of a previously specially serviced
portfolio of hotels located in North Dakota. Losses from the
portfolio were in line with Fitch's expectations.

Alternative Loss Considerations: In addition to modeling a base
case loss, Fitch applied a 25% loss severity on the maturity
balance of the Larkridge Shopping Center loan to reflect the
potential for outsized losses given the vacant anchor box, near
term lease expiration of Dick's and exposure to a weak
noncollateral anchor (Sears Grand). The sensitivity scenario also
factored in the expected paydown of the transaction from defeased
loans and the five non-defeased loans expected to repay at their
respective maturity dates in 2019. This sensitivity analysis
contributed to the Negative Rating Outlook on classes F and X-D.

Non-Traditional Properties: The fourth largest loan in the pool
(3.9% of the pool by balance) is secured by a portfolio of
convenience stores and gas stations. There are three loans (6.9%),
including two in the top 10 totaling 6.4%, that are secured by
student housing properties. Additionally, two loans totaling 0.7%
of the pool are secured by airport parking lots.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for class E has been revised to Stable due to a
decrease in loss expectations and overall stable pool performance.
Additionally, the largest loan (Tops and Kroger Portfolio; 8.8%) is
no longer a Fitch Loan of Concern as Tops emerged from bankruptcy
in November 2018. The Rating Outlook for class F remains Negative
due to concerns related to the four loans in special servicing and
the two other Fitch Loans of Concern. The Rating Outlook on class
X-D remains Negative as it references class F. Sustained
underperformance of the specially serviced loans may warrant a
downgrade; conversely, the Rating Outlook may be revised to Stable
should asset-level performance revert to levels seen at issuance.
Rating Outlooks for A-2 through D remain Stable due to increases in
credit enhancement from amortization and expected loan payoffs in
2019 (five loans; 3.8%). Downgrades are possible with significant
performance decline. Upgrades, while not likely in the near term,
are possible with overall improved pool performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the rating and revised the Outlook on the
following class:

  -- $12.8 million class E at 'BB+sf'; Outlook to Stable from
Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $77.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $97.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $275 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $337.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $907.3 million interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $97.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $220 million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $122.8 million interest-only class X-B at 'AA-sf', Outlook
Stable;

  -- $60.6 million interest-only class X-C at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $33.5 million interest-only class X-D at 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Negative;

  -- $60.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.7 million class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 certificates have been paid in full. Fitch does not
rate the class G, H or X-E certificates. Class A-M, B and C
certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ certificates, and class
PEZ certificates may be exchanged for class A-M, B, and C
certificates.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2019-R01: Fitch Rates 29 Tranches 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities Trust series 2019-R01:

  -- $186,724,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $586,848,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2A-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2A-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2A-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2A-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2B-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2B-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2B-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2B-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2C-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2C-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2C-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2C-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-X1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-X2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-X3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-X4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-Y1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-Y2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-Y3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-Y4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2-J1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2-J2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2-J3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $195,616,000 class 2-J4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-K1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-K2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-K3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $391,232,000 class 2-K4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $586,848,000 class 2M-2Y exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $586,848,000 class 2M-2X notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $26,927,688,943 class 2-AH reference tranche;

  -- $186,724,000 class 2-B1 notes;

  -- $9,828,474 class 2M-1H reference tranche;

  -- $10,296,116 class 2M-AH reference tranche;

  -- $10,296,116 class 2M-BH reference tranche;

  -- $10,296,116 class 2M-CH reference tranche;

  -- $9,828,474 class 2B-1H reference tranche;

  -- $140,394,624 class 2B-2H reference tranche;

  -- $186,724,000 class 2B-1Y exchangeable notes;

  -- $186,724,000 class 2B-1X notional exchangeable notes.

The notes are issued from a bankruptcy remote vehicle and are
subject to the credit and principal payment risk of the mortgage
loan reference pools of certain residential mortgage loans held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS. The 'BBB-sf' rating for the
2M-1 notes reflects the 3.40% subordination provided by the 0.73%
class 2M-2A, the 0.73% class 2M-2B, the 0.73% class 2M-2C, the
0.70% class 2B-1 and their corresponding reference tranches as well
as the 0.50% 2B-2H reference tranche.

Connecticut Avenue Securities Trust series 2019-R01 (CAS 2019-R01)
is Fannie Mae's 31st risk transfer transaction issued as part of
the Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan
for 2013 to 2019 for each of the government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The CAS 2019-R01 transaction includes one loan group that will
consist of loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 80%
and less than or equal to 97%.

This is the second risk transfer transaction Fannie Mae is issuing
in which the notes are not general, senior unsecured obligations of
Fannie Mae but instead issued as a REMIC from a Bankruptcy Remote
Trust. This is similar to the prior transactions; however, the
notes are still subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
a pool of certain residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held
in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities, the
bond payments are not made directly from the reference pool of
loans. Principal payments are made from a release of collateral
deposited into a segregated account as of the closing date.
Interest payments on the bonds are made from a combination of
interest accrued on the eligible investments in the CCA and certain
interest amounts received from the Designated Q-REMIC Interests on
certain designated loans acquired by Fannie Mae during the given
acquisition period. Fannie Mae acts as ultimate backstop with
regard to the portion of interest applicable to LIBOR in the event
the money from earnings on the CCA is insufficient.

Given the structure and counterparty dependence on Fannie Mae,
Fitch's ratings on the 2M-1 and 2M-2 notes will be based on the
lower of the following: the quality of the mortgage loan reference
pool and credit enhancement (CE) available through subordination,
or Fannie Mae's Issuer Default Rating (IDR). While this transaction
reduces counterparty exposure to Fannie Mae compared with prior
transactions, there is still a reliance on them to cover potential
interest shortfalls or principal losses on eligible investments.
The notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and carry
a 12.5-year legal final maturity. This will be an actual loss risk
transfer transaction in which losses borne by the noteholders will
not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS) schedule. The notes in
this transaction will experience losses realized at the time of
liquidation or modification that will include both lost principal
and delinquent or reduced interest.

Under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into
receivership if it determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less
than its obligations for more than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing, as well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae if the
termination of such contract would promote an orderly
administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the
U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in Fannie Mae's current rating. However, if at some
point, Fitch observes that support is reduced and receivership
likely, Fannie Mae's ratings could be downgraded and the 2M-1,
2M-2A, 2M-2B and 2M-2C notes' ratings of each group affected.

The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. Should the one-month LIBOR rate fall below
the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described in the
offering memorandum, the interest payment on the interest-only
notes will be capped at the excess of the following: (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating-rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating-rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Fannie Mae
between May 1, 2018 and Aug. 31, 2018. The reference pool will
consist of loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 80%
and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference pool's
collateral characteristics reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

Strong Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
Ratings found that Fannie Mae has a well-established and
disciplined process in place for the purchase of loans and views
its lender approval and oversight processes for minimizing
counterparty risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as
positive. Loan quality control (QC) review processes are thorough
and indicate a tight control environment that limits origination
risk. Fitch has determined Fannie Mae to be an above average
aggregator for its 2013 and later product. Fitch accounted for the
lower risk by applying a lower default estimate for the reference
pool.

HomeReady Exposure (Negative): Approximately 19.9% of the reference
pool was originated under Fannie Mae's HomeReady program; this is
the highest percentage of this type of loan in any Fitch-rated
transaction to date. Fannie Mae's HomeReady program targets low- to
moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost or
underrepresented communities and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
HomeReady loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and
property value), which is reflected in increased credit enhancement
(CE).

Collateral Drift (Negative): While the credit attributes remain
significantly stronger than any pre-crisis vintage, the CAS credit
attributes are weakening relative to CAS transactions issued
several years ago. Compared to the earlier post-crisis vintages,
this reference pool consists of weaker FICO scores and
debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. The credit migration has been a key
driver of Fitch's rising loss expectations, which have moderately
increased over time.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or modification
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. Fitch accounted
for the 12.5-year hard maturity in its default analysis and applied
a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will retain credit risk in the transaction by holding
the 2A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial loss
protection of 4.10%, as well as the first loss 2B-2H reference
tranche, sized at 0.50%. Fannie Mae is also retaining a vertical
slice or interest of at least 5% in each reference tranche (2M-1H,
2M-AH, 2M-BH, 2M-CH and 2B-1H).

Limited Size and Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): Fitch
received third-party due diligence on a loan production basis, as
opposed to a transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that
regular, periodic third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan
production basis are sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality
control processes. Fitch views the results of the due diligence
review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence.

Move to REMIC Structure (Neutral): This is Fannie Mae's second
credit risk transfer transaction being issued as a REMIC from a
bankruptcy remote trust. The change limits the transaction's
dependency on Fannie Mae for payments of principal and interest
helping mitigate potential rating caps in the event of a downgrade
of Fannie Mae's counterparty rating. Under the current structure,
Fannie Mae still acts as a final backstop with regard to payments
of LIBOR on the bonds as well as potential investment losses of
principal. As a result, ratings may still be limited in the future
by Fannie Mae's rating but to a lesser extent than in previous
transactions as there are now other recourses for investors for
payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected sMVD. It indicates there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities that determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 30% would potentially reduce the
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. (Adfitech). The due diligence focused on credit and compliance
reviews, desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Adfitech
examined selected loan files with respect to the presence or
absence of relevant documents. Fitch received certification
indicating that the loan-level due diligence was conducted in
accordance with Fitch's published standards. The certification also
stated that the company performed its work in accordance with the
independence standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due
diligence analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of
minimum years of experience. Fitch considered this information in
its analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the
analysis.


CSAIL 2019-C15: Fitch to Rate $9.32MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Credit Suisse CSAIL
2019-C15 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2019-C15.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $11,856,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $64,072,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $137,500,000d class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $341,526,000d class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25,521,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62,194,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $642,669,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,316,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,390,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $76,706,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,536,000ae class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,536,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,073,000ace class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,731,000ac class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,329,000ac class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $34,207,166ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

(d) The initial certificate balances of classes A-3 and A-4 are
unknown and expected to be approximately $479,026,000 in aggregate,
subject to a 5% variance. The expected class A-3 balance range is
$50,000,000 to $225,000,000, and the expected class A-4 balance
range is $254,026,000 to $429,026,000.

(e) The aggregate initial certificate balances of the class D and
E-RR certificates are estimated based in part of the ranges of
certificate balances and estimated fair values. The class D
certificate balances are expected to fall within a range of and
$24,670,000 to $28,526,000 and class E-RR certificate balances are
expected to fall within a range of $17,083,000 to $20,939,000, with
the ultimate certificate balance determined such that the aggregate
fair value of the class E-RR, class F-RR, class G-RR and class
NR-RR certificates will equal at least 5% of the aggregate
estimated fair value of all of the classes of certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 15, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 36 loans secured by 83
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$829,251,166 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by: 3650 REIT, Column Financial, Inc., Societe Generale
Financial Corporation and BSPRT CMBS Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 75.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 91.9% and asset summary reviews
on 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher than Average Leverage Relative to Recent Transactions: The
pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.16x is worse
than the 2018 average of 1.22x the 2017 average of 1.26x. The
pool's Fitch LTV of 103.9% is slightly worse than the 2018 average
of 102.0% and the 2017 average of 101.6%. Excluding the credit
opinion loans, the Fitch DSCR is 1.11x and the Fitch LTV is
111.4%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans totaling 15.6%
of the pool have stand-alone investment grade credit opinions. SITE
JV Portfolio (6.0% of the pool) received a credit opinion of
'A-sf*', 787 Eleventh Avenue (5.4% of the pool) received a credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf*' and 2 North 6th Place (4.1%) received a credit
opinion of 'BBBsf*'.

High Hotel Exposure: Loans secured by hotel properties represent
23.8% of the pool by balance. Three of the top 10 loans are backed
by hotel properties. The total hotel concentration far exceeds both
the 2018 average of 14.7% and the 2017 average of 15.8%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 17.7% below the most recent
year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period.
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CSAIL 2019-C15 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the rating on on one class in CSFB Mortgage Securities
Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, 2005-C2

Cl. A-MFL, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2017
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2017
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-X*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

  * Reflects interest-only class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Cl. A-MFL and Cl. A-MFX were downgraded due to an
increase in realized losses as a result of the liquidation of the
390 Park Avenue Loan. As a result of the recent liquidation, Cl.
A-MFL and Cl. A-MFX have now each expierenced a realized loss of
2.6%.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate material losses from the remaining
collateral in the current environment. However, over the remaining
life of the transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to
the environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's
ratings reflect the potential for future losses under varying
levels of stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 20.3% of the original pooled balance, compared to 16.6% at
the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by over 99% to $3.1
million from $1.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 68%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, the same as at Moody's last review.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $325.2 million. Losses increased
from the prior review due to the disposition of the 390 Park Avenue
Loan which resulted in a loss amount of $68.3 million, or a 85%
loss severity based on the balance at disposition.

No remaining loans are in special servicing.

The two remaining non-defeased loans represent 32% of the pool
balance. The largest performing loan is the Plymouth Industrial
Center Loan ($0.57 million -- 18.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 484,600 SF industrial building complex just west of Detroit in
Plymouth, Michigan. As of December 2017, the property was 67%
leased. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 93% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 6% and greater
than 4.00X, respectively.

The other remaining loan is the Park Square Apartments Loan ($0.43
million -- 13.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 38-unit low
income multifamily property in Detroit, Michigan. The loan has been
on the watchlist since 2009 for low occupancy and DSCR. As of
September 2018, the property was 89% leased, compared to 87% in
December 2017. The loan has amortized 22% since securitization and
matures in October 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 132% and
0.75X, respectively.


CSMC 2019-SKLZ: S&P Assigns 'BB+ (sf)' Rating on Class HRR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CSMC 2019-SKLZ's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by the borrowers' fee simple and/or leasehold
interest in 83 properties, including 80 skilled nursing facilities,
two assisted-living facilities, and one assisted-living and skilled
nursing facility containing 9,908 licensed beds and 9,441 available
beds. The properties are located in 12 states.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  CSMC 2019-SKLZ

  Class       Rating(i)          Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)          142,900,000
  X-CP        AA- (sf)           64,030,000(ii)
  X-NCP       AA- (sf)           67,400,000(ii)
  B           AA- (sf)           67,400,000
  C           A- (sf)            50,000,000
  D           BBB- (sf)          57,850,000
  HRR         BB+ (sf)           16,850,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii)Notional balance. The class X-CP certificates will initially be
equal to the B-2 and B-3 portions of the class B certificates. The
notional balance of the class X-NCP certificates will initially be
equal to the balance of the class B certificates.


DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2019-1: S&P Assigns B- Rating on B-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Deephaven Residential
Mortgage Trust 2019-1's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed transaction
backed by first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, amortizing (with
some interest-only and principal balloon payments) residential
mortgage loans secured by single-family residences, planned-unit
developments, two- to four-family residences, and condominiums to
both prime and nonprime borrowers. The pool has 809 loans, which
are primarily non-qualified mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework; and
-- The mortgage aggregator.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2019-1
  Class     Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1       AAA (sf)         214,513,000
  A-2       AA (sf)           22,108,000
  A-3       A (sf)            41,624,000
  M-1       BBB (sf)          22,972,000
  B-1       BB (sf)           17,962,000
  B-2       B- (sf)           16,581,000
  B-3       NR                 9,672,609
  XS        NR                  Notional(i)
  A-IO-S    NR                  Notional(i)
  R         NR                       N/A

(i)Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal
balance.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


DEUTSCHE ALT-A 2007-RS1: Moody's Cuts Class A-1 Certs to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche,
and downgraded the rating of one tranche issued by Deutsche ALT-A
Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2007-RS1.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Deutsche ALT-A Securities, Inc. Re-Remic Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2016
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2016
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions consider the recent performance of the
underlying bonds and reflect Moody's updated loss on the
re-securitized bonds together with changes in tranche level credit
enhancement.

The rating upgrade of Cl. A-3 primarily reflects the deleveraging
of the tranche due to the excess spread generated from the
underlying portfolio.

The rating downgrade of the Class A-1 primarily reflects the
decrease in credit enhancement available to the tranche. Although
payment and losses are allocated pro-rata among the Class A-1,
Class A-2 and Class A-3 tranches, losses allocated to the Class A-1
tranche are first allocated to the Class A-2 tranche. Due to the
pro rata pay structure of the transaction and losses allocated to
the Class A-2 tranche, credit enhancement to the Class A-1 will
continue to decrease.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was " Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations " published in February 2014.


The Credit Rating for these tranches was assigned in accordance
with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's Approach to
Rating Resecuritizations," dated 2/11/2014. Please note that on
11/14/18, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which it has
requested market feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology
for Resecuritizations. If the revised Methodology is implemented as
proposed, the Credit Rating on senior bonds is expected to be
affected and the Credit Rating on support tranches is expected to
be negatively impacted.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.0% in January 2019 from 4.1% in
January 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


FREDDIE MAC 2019-HQA1: Fitch to Rate $152MM Class M-2B Notes 'B+sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Freddie Mac's Structured Agency
Credit Risk Trust 2019-HQA1 (STACR 2019-HQA1) as follows:

  -- $131,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2B notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $305,000,000 class M-2 exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $305,000,000 class M-2R exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $305,000,000 class M-2S exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $305,000,000 class M-2T exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $305,000,000 class M-2U exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $305,000,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2AR exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2AS exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2AT exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2AU exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2BR exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2BS exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2BT exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2BU exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2BI notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2RB exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2SB exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2TB exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $152,500,000 class M-2UB exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $19,825,770,945 class A-H reference tranche;

  -- $55,839,726 class M-1H reference tranche;

  -- $65,479,680 class M-2AH reference tranche;

  -- $65,479,680 class M-2BH reference tranche;

  -- $65,500,000 class B-1A notes;

  -- $27,919,863 class B-1AH reference tranche;

  -- $65,500,000 class B-1B notes;

  -- $27,919,863 class B-1BH reference tranche;

  -- $36,500,000 class B-2A notes;

  -- $15,399,924 class B-2AH reference tranche;

  -- $36,500,000 class B-2B notes;

  -- $15,399,924 class B-2BH reference tranche;

  -- $20,759,971 class B-3H reference tranche;

  -- $131,000,000 class B-1 exchangeable notes;

  -- $73,000,000 class B-2 exchangeable notes;

  -- $65,500,000 class B-1AR exchangeable notes;

  -- $65,500,000 class B-1AI notional exchangeable notes;

  -- $36,500,000 class B-2AR exchangeable notes;

  -- $36,500,000 class B-2AI notional exchangeable notes.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The reference pool for STACR 2019-HQA1 will consist of loans with
loan to value ratios greater than 80% and less than or equal to 97%
that were acquired by Freddie Mac between April 1, 2018 and June
30, 2018.

The notes will be issued from a special-purpose trust whose
security interest consists of the custodian account and a credit
protection agreement with Freddie Mac. Funds in the custodian
account will be used to pay principal on the notes and to make
payments to Freddie Mac for mortgage loans that experience certain
credit events. The notes will be issued as LIBOR-based floaters and
carry a 30-year legal final maturity. Freddie Mac is responsible
for making interest payments through a credit protection agreement
with the trust.

The ratings on the M-1, M-2A and M-2B notes are limited to the
lower of 1) the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and CE
available through subordination and 2) Freddie Mac's issuer default
rating (IDR).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality loans acquired by Freddie Mac between
April 1, 2018 and June 30, 2018. The reference pool will consist of
loans with loan to value (LTV) ratios greater than 80% and less
than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference pool's collateral
characteristics are similar to recent STACR transactions and
reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

Home Possible Exposure (Negative): Approximately 26% of the
reference pool (versus 18% in 2018-HQA1) was originated under
Freddie Mac's Home Possible or Home Possible Advantage program,
which is the largest concentration that Fitch has seen in a Fitch
rated STACR transaction. The Home Possible program targets low- to
moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost or
underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
Home Possible loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV
and property value), which is reflected in increased credit
enhancement.

30-year Legal Maturity (Negative): The M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1A, B-1B,
B-2A and B-2B have a 30-year legal final maturity, which is
different than prior Fitch-rated STACR DNA and HQA transactions,
which have a 12.5-year maturity. Thus, life-of-loan losses on the
reference pool will be passed through to noteholders. As a result,
Fitch did not apply a maturity credit to reduce its default
expectations.

Clean Pay History for Loans in Disaster Areas (Positive): Freddie
Mac will not remove loans in counties designated as natural
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, any loans with a prior delinquency were removed from the
reference pool. In addition, Freddie Mac will remove loans that
were on a disaster forbearance plan and become delinquent between
the deal closing date and April 2019 if the loan is located in an
area designated as a major disaster area by FEMA and FEMA
authorized individual assistance to those homeowners prior to the
closing date. As a result, Fitch does not consider there to be
additional risk to the pool by including these loans.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 98.7% of
the loans are covered either by borrower paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI) or lender paid MI (LPMI). While the Freddie Mac guarantee
allows for credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the
amount of BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision
as required by the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance
is first scheduled to reach 78%. LPMI does not automatically
terminate and remains for the life of the loan.

Very Low Operational Risk (Positive): Fitch considers this
transaction to have very low operational risk. Freddie Mac is an
industry leader in residential mortgage activities and is as
assessed as 'Above Average' aggregator due to the GSE's strong
seller oversight and risk management controls. Due diligence for
this transaction was performed by a Tier 2 third-party review firm
on a statistically random sample of loans. The sampling methodology
is consistent with Fitch criteria, and the results of the review
indicate high loan origination quality and further verified a low
level of operational risk.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from solid alignment of
interests. Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 4.50% of
loss protection, as well as a minimum of 5% of the M-1, M-2A, M-2B,
B-1A, B-1B, B-2A and B-2B reference tranches, and a 100% of the
first-loss B-3H reference tranche. Initially, Freddie Mac will
retain an approximately 29% vertical slice/interest through the
M-1H, M-2AH, M-2BH, B-1AH, B-1BH, B-2AH and B-2BH reference
tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) assets are less
than its obligations for longer than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Freddie Mac if it is determined that such action
would promote an orderly administration of the GSE's affairs. Fitch
believes that the U.S. government will continue to support Freddie
Mac, as reflected in its current rating of the GSE. However, if, at
some point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, the rating of Freddie Mac could be downgraded,
and ratings on the M-1, M-2A, and M-2B notes, along with their
corresponding MAC notes, could be affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected 6.1% at the base case. The analysis indicates that
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms $12.3MM Class F Certs at B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed six classes of
General Electric Capital Assurance Company (GFCM) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance and Loss Projections: The overall pool
performance remains stable with minimal changes since the last
rating action. There are no specially serviced loans and all loans
are current. Eight loans (22.7%) are on the servicer's watchlist
for declining performance or performance triggers; two (3.1%) were
flagged as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs). While not on the
servicer's watchlist, three loans in the top 15 (11.3%) were
flagged as FLOCs due upcoming rollover.

Increased Credit Enhancement Since Issuance: As of the January 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 92.6% to $60.8 million from $822.6 million at issuance.
Forty of the original 171 loans remain. All loans are fully
amortizing. Cumulative interest shortfalls of $137,460 are
currently affecting classes H and J. There has been $2.9 million
(0.4% of original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Amortization: The remaining loans are low levered and performing.
The loans mature between 2019 and 2028 with a weighted average
coupon of 6.57%. Additional paydown is expected due to scheduled
amortization, as well as the expectation that most loans will be
able to refinance at maturity.

Additional Loss Consideration: In addition to modeling a base case
loss, Fitch applied the following loss severities in a sensitivity
scenario: 30% on the Windhaven Plaza Retail and California Avenue I
& II Industrial loans due to upcoming rollover in 2019
(approximately 30% at each property), 50% on the Carnegie VIII
Office due to the significant decline in occupancy to 77% as of YE
2017 from 98% at YE 2016 and upcoming rollover in 2019
(approximately 30%) and 50% on both the Valley Business Park
Portfolio and Biscayne Boulevard Retail due to upcoming rollover in
2019 (approximately 65%), and significant decline in DSCR without
an update from the servicer, respectively. Fitch's upgrades of
classes D and E took this sensitivity scenario into consideration.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Carnegie VIII Office (6%), the fourth
largest loan and largest FLOC, is secured by a 105,055 sf suburban
office building in the Southpark submarket of Charlotte, NC.
Occupancy declined to 77% at YE 2017 from 98% at YE 2016 due to DAK
Americas (21% NRA) vacating upon its June 30, 2017 lease
expiration. Approximately 30% NRA expires in 2019. Fitch requested
a leasing status update and awaiting a response.

Valley Business Park Portfolio (3.1%), the ninth largest loan and
second largest FLOC, is secured by four single tenant industrial
buildings totaling 88,987 sf located in Fountain Valley, CA.
Approximately 65% and 24% NRA was scheduled to expire in 2018 and
2019, respectively.

Biscayne Boulevard Retail (2.2%), the 12th largest loan and 3rd
largest FLOC, is secured by a 42,500 sf retail property located in
Aventura, FL fully leased to Dick's Sporting Goods through 2022.
While occupancy has been 100% since issuance, DSCR declined to
0.93x at YE 2017 from 1.74x at YE 2016 due to increased taxes.

Property Type Concentration: Approximately 35.5% of the pool,
including four of the top 15 loans, consists of retail properties.
Multifamily properties comprise 33.3%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes B, C and D reflect high
credit enhancement and continued deleveraging of the pool. The
Positive Rating Outlooks on classes E and F reflect the possibility
of future upgrades with continued amortization and/or defeasance
and stable pool performance. Ratings on the distressed class G may
be subject to further downgrades as losses are realized. Additional
downgrades are not expected, but are possible if loans default and
transfer to special servicing.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:

  -- $11.3 million class D to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.3 million class E to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised
to Positive from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $5.1 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13.7 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.3 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Positive
from Stable;

  -- $7.2 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 75%;

  -- $1.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5 were repaid in full. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X
certificates.


GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: Fitch Affirms $10.3MM Class F Certs at 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2017-GS5 (GSMS 2017-GS5).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance and loss expectations with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. There have been no
specially serviced loans since issuance. Two loans (5.8% of pool)
have been designated as Fitch Loan of Concerns (FLOCs) due to
occupancy declines/concerns.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the February 2019
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 0.4% to $1.058 billion from $1.062 billion at issuance. All
original 32 loans remain in the pool. Based on the loans' scheduled
maturity balances, the pool is expected to amortize 4.4% during the
term. Fifteen loans (64% of pool) are full-term, interest-only and
12 loans (21.8%) have a partial-term, interest-only component of
which four have begun to amortize.

ALTERNATIVE LOSS CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 64.4% of the pool.
Loan maturities are concentrated in 2027 (83.5%). Two loans (4.9%)
mature in 2021 and four loans (11.6%) in 2026.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Two loans (5.8% of pool) were designated
FLOCs due to occupancy declines/concerns. The largest FLOC, Lyric
Centre (4.5%), which is secured by a 381,280 sf office property in
Houston, TX, has experienced significant occupancy declines since
issuance. Occupancy declined to 75.9% as of February 2019 from
84.2% as of September 2018 and 89.5% at issuance. The primary
driver of the decline was the departure of the largest tenant,
Bailey, Perrin & Bailey (8.3% NRA), upon its September 2018 lease
expiration. Per servicer updates, this space remains vacant. While
occupancy has declined, the borrower was successful in recently
renewing its lease with Clayton Clark (5.9% NRA) for an additional
10 years through January 2029 from the prior January 2019
expiration. Also, per servicer updates, while the property was
affected by Hurricane Harvey, no tenants were relocated and all
repairs were confirmed to be completed in May 2018. As of YTD
September 2018, the servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 2.40x.

The other FLOC, Market at Cedar Hill (1.3%), which is secured by an
128,384 sf community shopping center in Cedar Hill, TX
(approximately 20 miles from Arlington, TX), was designated a FLOC
due to major hail damage suffered in April 2017. Per servicer
updates, $560,784 in insurance claims were received by the borrower
to date; however, updates regarding the status of repairs and
tenancy remain outstanding. The largest tenant is Burlington Coat
Factory, which leases approximately 40% NRA through February 2027.
As of YTD September 2018, property occupancy was reported at 94.6%
and the servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 1.27x based on fully
amortizing principal and interest payments.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans representing
14.4% of the pool were issued investment-grade credit opinions at
issuance. The largest loan in the pool, 350 Park Avenue (9.5%) was
issued a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf' at issuance. The
loan is secured by a 570,831 sf office building located in
Manhattan's Plaza District approximately a half mile from Grand
Central Terminal. The sponsor, Vornado Realty Trust, has invested
over $20 million in structural and capital improvements since
acquiring the property in 2006. The largest tenant is Ziff Brothers
Investments, which leases approximately 50% NRA through April 2021.
While Ziff Brothers Investments currently subleases a substantial
portion of their space, they have been at the property since 2005
and the loan is structured with a cash flow sweep and rollover
reserve tied to their lease renewal. Other larger tenants include
Manufacturers & Traders Trust, which leases approximately 18% NRA
through March 2023 and has been at the property since 1993 and
Marshall Wace North America, which leases approximately 6% NRA
through August 2024. Property performance continues to be in-line
with Fitch's expectations at issuance.

The two other investment-grade credit opinion loans are AMA Plaza
(2.8%) and 225 Bush Street (2.1%), which were issued stand-alone
credit opinions of 'BBBsf' and 'BBB+sf', respectively, at
issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to relatively
stable performance with no material changes to pool metrics since
issuance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration until a material economic or asset-level event changes
the transaction's overall portfolio-level metrics. For more
information on rating sensitivities please refer to Fitch's
original presale dated March 1, 2017.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $9.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $51.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $248 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $381.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $72.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.3 million class F at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and VRR Interest certificates.


IBIO INC: Posts $4.53-Mil. Net Loss in Dec. 31 Quarter
------------------------------------------------------
iBio, Inc. filed its quarterly report on Form 10-Q, disclosing a
net loss (available to iBio, Inc.) of $4,534,000 on $651,000 of
revenues for the three months ended Dec. 31, 2018, compared to a
net loss (available to iBio, Inc.) of $3,964,000 on $153,000 of
revenues for the same period in 2017.

At Dec. 31, 2018 the Company had total assets of $40,303,000, total
liabilities of $29,225,000, and $11,078,000 in total stockholders'
equity.

The Company disclosed that it has incurred "significant losses and
negative cash flows from operations" since its spin-off from
Integrated BioPharma, Inc. in August 2008.  For the six months
ended December 31, 2018, the Company's net loss was approximately
$8.9 million and it had cash used in operating activities of $5.4
million.  As of December 31, 2018, cash on hand is approximately
$13.4 million which is expected to support the Company's activities
until at least November 30, 2019.

The Company has historically financed its activities through the
sale of common stock and warrants.  Through Dec. 31, 2018, the
Company has dedicated most of its financial resources to research
and development, including the development and validation of its
own technologies and the development of a proprietary therapeutic
product against fibrosis based upon those technologies, advancing
its intellectual property, the build-out and recommissioning of its
CDMO facility, and general and administrative activities.

A copy of the Form 10-Q is available at:

                       https://is.gd/ZJq2Nx

Newark, Del.-based iBio, Inc., is a biotechnology company focused
on commercializing its proprietary platform technologies: the
iBioLaunch(TM) platform for vaccines and therapeutic proteins, and
the iBioModulator(TM) platform for vaccine enhancement.


JFIN MM CLO: S&P Removes Cl. E Notes Rating from Watch Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes from JFIN MM CLO 2014 Ltd. S&P also removed class B, C, D,
and E from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive
implications on Dec. 20, 2018. At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A and E notes from the same transaction. JFIN
MM CLO 2014 Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
managed by Jefferies Finance LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 9, 2019, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $128.38 million in paydowns
to the class A notes since S&P's Oct. 11, 2016, rating actions.
These paydowns resulted in improved reported overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios since the Sept. 8, 2016, trustee report, which S&P
used for its previous rating actions:

-- Class A/B overcollateralization test increased to 215.23% from
156.39%.
-- Class C overcollateralization test increased to 168.15% from
140.13%.
-- Class D overcollateralization test increased to 143.11% from
129.38%.
-- Class E overcollateralization test increased to 120.64% from
118.05%.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.
Despite the senior note paydowns, recent defaults within the
increasingly concentrated portfolio have limited the improvement in
O/C ratios for the class E notes.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated higher ratings on the class C, D, and E notes. However,
S&P's actions on these classes reflect the transaction becoming
more concentrated as it continues to amortize, the exposure to
'CCC' rated collateral obligations increasing, and the weighted
average spread dropping to 4.77% from 5.26%. S&P subsequently
limited the upgrades to offset future potential increased
concentration risk and credit migration in the underlying
collateral.

The affirmed ratings reflect adequate credit support at the current
rating levels, though any further changes in the credit support
available to the notes could result in further rating changes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with its criteria, S&P's cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis -- and other qualitative factors as applicable --
demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated outstanding
classes have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating
levels associated with these rating actions. S&P Global Ratings
will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

  RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH
  JFIN MM CLO 2014 Ltd.
                      Rating
  Class          To             From
  B              AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  C              AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
  D              A (sf)         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

  RATING REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH
  JFIN MM CLO 2014 Ltd.
                      Rating
  Class          To            From
  E              BB (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Pos

  RATING AFFIRMED
  JFIN MM CLO 2014 Ltd.

  Class           Rating
  A               AAA (sf)


JONES ENERGY: Moody's Lowers CFR to 'Ca', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings for Jones Energy
Holdings, LLC (Jones), including the company's Corporate Family
Rating (CFR; to Ca from Caa2) and Probability of Default Rating (to
Ca-PD from Caa2-PD), the ratings for the company's $450 million
senior secured first lien notes due 2023 (to Caa2 from B2) and $559
million unsecured notes due 2022 and 2023 (to C from Caa3), and its
Speculative Grade Liquidity rating (to SGL-4 from SGL-3). The
ratings outlook is stable.

"Jones Energy's ratings downgrade reflects high likelihood of
distressed debt exchange amid high leverage and weak financial
performance and liquidity," said Arvinder Saluja, Moody's Vice
President. "The downgrades also reflect our view that weak asset
coverage will result in minimal recovery for unsecured debt holders
in an event of default."

Downgrades:

Issuer: Jones Energy Holdings, LLC

  - Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Ca-PD from
Caa2-PD

  - Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, Downgraded to SGL-4 from
SGL-3

  - Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ca from Caa2

  - Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa2(LGD2)
from B2(LGD2)

  - Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to C(LGD5)
from Caa3(LGD5)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Jones Energy Holdings, LLC

  - Outlook, Changed to Stable from Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

Jones' Ca CFR reflects the high likelihood of distressed debt
exchange, weak credit metrics and liquidity, untenable debt burden,
its modest scale, and single basin concentration. Although a
transaction hasn't been consummated yet, the company is in
discussions with its debt holders to exchange its unsecured notes
for $245 million 12% PIK second lien notes and 70% common equity
ownership. Given the weak asset coverage, Moody's anticipates
unsecured debt holders will suffer material loss absorption in a
subsequent event of default scenario, with the bulk of the firm's
value likely inuring only to the benefit of first lien notes
holders. The company's Merge acreage in the eastern Anadarko basin
is relatively undeveloped and in need of significant drilling
capex, and its western Anadarko basin acreage has production in
decline. Additionally, with negative free cash flow due to high
capital spending needs, high cash interest burden, and revolver
maturity in November 2019, Jones' liquidity is weak even assuming
over $50 million balance sheet cash at year end 2018. Its ability
to pay cash interest in March and April 2019, therefore, is highly
uncertain. Ratings benefit from the company's ownership of its
Merge assets despite them being relatively undeveloped as they have
value due to relatively attractive production economics.

The first lien notes are rated Caa2, two-notches above the Ca CFR
given the superior position the secured notes occupy in the capital
structure, and reflecting their priority claim to Jones' assets, in
accordance with Moody's Loss Given Default Methodology. The C
rating on Jones' senior unsecured notes reflects their
subordination to the secured borrowings and the size of the senior
secured claims relative to Jones' senior unsecured notes, which
results in the senior unsecured notes being rated one notch below
the CFR.

Moody's considers Jones' liquidity to be weak as evidenced by its
SGL-4 liquidity rating. Additionally, with a de minimis borrowing
base revolver and $94 million balance sheet cash at September 30,
2018, which is likely significantly lower in early 2019 due to
negative cash flow from low cash flow from operations and high
capital spending needs of about $160 million annually, the company
is likely to run out of liquidity latest by mid-year 2019 if Jones
solely funds the development of the Merge assets internally. It is
also likely that Jones will be unable to pay over $40 million cash
interest due in March and April. The company is not subject to
financial covenants under its revolver agreement as they were
removed as of June 2018 when the revolver was downsized from $50
million. The revolver matures in November 2019 with no other
maturities until 2022.

The ratings could be downgraded if the company enters into a debt
restructuring and/or files for bankruptcy. Alternatively, although
unlikely, the ratings could be upgraded if Jones is able to
significantly improve its liquidity.

Jones Energy Holdings, LLC is an independent oil and gas
exploration and production company with producing operations
focused on the Anadarko basin, headquartered in Austin, Texas.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Hikes Class G Debt Rating to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2005-LDP2 ("JPMCC
2005-LDP2") as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2017 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

  * Reflects Interest-Only Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Cl. F and Cl. G were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns as well as
lower than anticipated losses on recently liquidated loans.

The rating on Cl. H was affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class H has
already experienced a 74% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.2% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 10.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except the
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating interest-only classes were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in
February 2019.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2019 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $56.5 million
from $2.98 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 18 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21.6% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 3.8% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of eight, compared to ten at Moody's last review.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. Fifty-seven
loans have been liquidated from the pool at a loss, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $200.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 36%). One loan, the Landmark Retail Portfolio ($2.1
million -- 3.7% of the pool), is currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loan was originally secured by three retail
centers totaling 78,131 SF. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2014 due to imminent default. Two properties were
sold in 2017 and 2018. The loan is now secured by one retail
center, Prestige Plaza, totaling 22,661 SF located and located in
Miamisburg, Ohio. The remaining property was 76% leased as of
August 2018.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 88% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 83% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 70%, the same as at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 19% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.21X and 1.83X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.86X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 54.0% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Mounts Corner Shopping Center Loan ($12.2
million -- 21.6% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored
retail shopping center located in Freehold, New Jersey. The anchor
space, which is ground leased to ACME, is now subleased to Club
Metro USA. The property was 100% leased as of September 2018,
compared to 97% in September 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 73% and 1.41X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.32X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Mesquite Crossing Loan ($9.3 million
-- 16.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 63,000 SF shadow
anchored, multi-tenant retail center in Mesquite, Texas. The
property is situated on a major retail corridor between the Town
East Mall & Market East Shopping Center. It was 100% leased as of
September 2018 and has been since 2014. However, the property faces
near term rollover with, 36% of the NRA expiring in December 2019
and 11% in December 2020. The loan matures in June 2020 and Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to
80% and 1.29X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Texas Avenue Crossing Shopping Center
Loan ($8.9 million -- 15.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
87,000 SF retail center located in College Station, Texas. The
property is located within walking distance of Texas A&M
University. It was 100% leased as of September 2018 and has been
since securitization. The loan has amortized 28% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.56X,
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.47X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Affirms Csf Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed 24 classes of JP Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2006-LDP9 (JPMCC 2006-LDP9).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The senior classes continue to pay
down due to amortization and loan payoffs and benefit from very
high credit enhancement (CE). Since the last rating action, four
loans have repaid and 16 loans, which were previously in special
servicing, were disposed. Combined, these payoffs/dispositions
contributed $146 million in principal paydown. The A-M and A-MS
classes also benefit from very high CE. The transaction has paid
down 87.7% since issuance to $601 million from $4.85 billion at
issuance. All of the performing loans are scheduled to mature in
2021.

Stable Loss Expectations: The largest loan remaining is 131 South
Dearborn, representing 39.3% of the pool. The loan was previously
in special servicing and modified including a bifurcation of the
loan into A/B notes, and has been performing since it was
transferred back to the Master Servicer in November 2016. The
collateral is a class A office building located in Chicago's
central business district constructed in 2005 and renovated in
2018. Recent leasing activity has resulted in occupancy increasing
to 84% as of January 2019 from 71% at YE 2017 and there is minimal
near term tenant rollover. Additionally, the NOI DSCR increased to
1.13x as of September 2018 compared to 1.08x at YE 2017. The A-M
and A-MS classes are reliant on proceeds from the A note.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated seven loans (59.7% of
the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), including six loans in
special servicing (59.4% of the pool). Of the assets in special
servicing, four (42.1% of the pool) are REO. The largest specially
serviced asset, the Colony Portfolio, has largely been disposed
with only one property remaining. This remaining property is
expected to be disposed imminently at which point significant
losses are expected to be realized. There is one non-specially
serviced loan (0.3% of the pool) considered a FLOC due to combined
high leverage and tenancy related issues.

Concentrated Pool, Alternative Loss Considerations: As an
additional sensitivity, Fitch assumed a 100% loss on all of the
specially serviced assets. Given the credit support provided by the
class A-J and A-JS certificates, a full loss on all of these loans
would still be contained by classes currently rated 'Csf'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for A-3SFL and A-3SFX remain Stable based on
high credit enhancement and expected continued paydown. Based on
expected recoveries related to future paydown from the largest
loan, 131 South Dearborn, the Outlook for classes A-M and A-MS has
been revised to Positive from Stable. Upgrades could be possible
for these classes with further stabilization of this property,
additional paydown, or defeasance. The A-J notes are expected to be
downgraded to 'Dsf' as losses are realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes:

  --$41,236,536 class A-M notes to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; revised
Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  --$121,432,000 class A-MS notes to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; revised
Outlook to Positive from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $8,410,865 class A-3SFL notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,057,985 class A-3SFX notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $318,494,000 class A-J notes at 'Csf'; RE 40%;

  -- $106,253,000 class A-JS notes at 'Csf'; RE 40%;

  -- $1,114,725 class B notes at 'Dsf'; RE0 %;

  -- $371,891 class B-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class C notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class C-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class D notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class D-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class E notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class E-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class F notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class F-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class G notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class G-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H-S notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class P notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1S, A-2, A-2S, A-2SFL, A-2SFX, A-3, and A-1A
certificates have been paid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificate. Fitch does not
rate the class NR certificate.


JP MORGAN 2013-C15: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on $11.9MM Cl. F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed nine classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (JPMBB)
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates series 2013-C15.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The upgrades of classes B, X-B and C
are due to increased credit enhancement following significant
paydown from amortization and loan payoffs including the Fitch Loan
of Concern (FLOC) Hulen Mall (9.5% at last review). Fitch performed
an additional sensitivity scenario at last review on the Hulen Mall
loan to reflect the potential for outsized losses due to
refinancing risk, which contributed to the prior negative outlooks
on classes D, E and F. As of the January 2019 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 37.9% to
$741 million from $1.19 billion at issuance. Fourteen loans have
paid off since issuance. Two loans, approximately 15% of the pool
are full-term, interest only, including the second largest loan,
1615 L Street (13.5%). All of the partial-term, interest only loans
(22.7%) are now amortizing. Four loans (4.3%) are fully defeased,
including the 15th largest loan. There have been no realized losses
to date.

Stable Performance of Remaining Pool: The performance and loss
expectation for the remaining pool has remained relatively stable
since issuance. As of the January 2019 remittance report, there was
one (0.91% of the pool) specially serviced loan and five loans
(6.40% of pool) that were flagged as FLOCs, including two loans in
the top 15 (3.50%), due to declining performance and upcoming
rollover concerns.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC, Alameda Crossing (1.8%),
is secured by a 132,213-sf open-air shopping center located in
Avondale, AZ, that has experienced declining occupancy since
issuance. The second FLOC, North Park Plaza (1.7%), is secured by a
175,869-sf retail shopping center located in Pittsburg, CA. Per the
servicer, tenant Ramos Furniture (20.6% of NRA) is currently
month-to-month after its lease expired in May 2018 and there are
currently no prospective replacement tenants. The third FLOC,
Marriott Spring Hill Suites Vernal (1.2%), is secured by a 97-key
limited service hotel located in Vernal, UT that suffered
performance declines due to volatility in the oil and gas sector.
The specially serviced Southway Plaza (0.9%) is secured by a
106,344 sf neighborhood shopping center located in Fall River, MA,
that transferred to special servicing in November 2017 for payment
delinquency after occupancy fell to 75% at YE 2017 from 95% at YE
2016. The borrower filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy the day before the
foreclosure sale. The last FLOC, South County Medical Plaza (0.8%),
is secured by a 27,522 sf office building located in San Clemente,
CA. with declining occupancy and performance.

Additional Sensitivity Scenario: Fitch applied an additional
pool-wide sensitivity scenario that increased the stressed cap
rates and additional stress to the reported net operating incomes
by an additional 100 bps and 10%, respectively. The upgrades and
affirmations reflect this additional stress.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

High Retail and Office Concentration: Retail properties constitute
32% of the pool, including five of the top 15 loans. The largest
loan in the pool is secured by Miracle Mile Shops (14.8%), a
448,835 sf enclosed regional mall located along the Las Vegas
Strip. Additionally, loans backed by office properties represent
37.1% of the pool, including five loans (31.5%) in the top 15.

Longer Term Maturities: The majority of the remaining pool matures
in 2023 (98.3%), with limited loan maturities scheduled in 2020
(1.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The revision of the Outlooks assigned to classes D through F to
Stable from Negative reflects the increasing credit enhancement
mainly from the payoff of Hulen Mall. The Outlooks on classes A-1
through C and the interest-only classes X-A and X-B are Stable due
to overall stable performance and expected continued amortization.
Downgrades to classes are possible should overall pool performance
decline related to the above-mentioned FLOCs, or any other loans in
the pool.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes:

  -- $76.0 million class B to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.7 million class C to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $76.0 million class X-B to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook
Stable.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Rating Outlooks to the following
classes as indicated:

  -- $4.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $110.0 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $206.9 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $93.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $59.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
Negative;

  -- $23.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
Negative;

  -- $11.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to stable from
Negative;

  -- $477.1 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, A-2FL, and A-2FX certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class NR or the interest-only class
X-C certificates.


JP MORGAN 2014-C19: Fitch Affirms B Rating on $17.6MM Class F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on all 13 classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (JPMBB)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-C19.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Credit Enhancement: The pool has benefited from increased
credit enhancement due to loan payoffs, scheduled amortization and
defeased collateral. As of the January 2019 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate balance has been paid down by 16.6% to $1.18
billion from $1.41 billion at issuance. Nine loans have paid off
since issuance, and seven of the nine, including two in the top 15,
have paid off since Fitch's last rating action. There have been no
realized losses to date. Seven loans (4.3% of pool) are fully
defeased. Twelve loans (40.9%) are full-term, interest-only, and
two loans (1%) are still within their partial interest-only term.

Stable Loss Expectations: The performance and loss expectation of
the majority of the pool has remained stable since issuance. Fitch
has designated seven loans (13.2% of pool) as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs), including three loans in the top 15 loan (10.8%)
and one specially serviced loan (0.7%).

The Grand Williston Hotel and Conference Center loan (0.7%), which
is secured by a 147-room hotel located in Williston, ND,
transferred to special servicing in March 2017 due to the borrower
failing to make the January 2017 and subsequent payments. The
special servicer is currently in litigation with the borrower over
the sale of the property, which had gone to auction and
subsequently put into contract in September 2018. The borrower is
attempting to receive an extension on the appeal period.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The 10th largest loan, Muncie Mall (2.9%),
which is secured by a 524,752-sf portion of a 644,752-sf regional
mall located in Muncie, IN, lost two collateral anchor tenants,
Sears and Carson's in August 2018. Both anchors closed their stores
prior to their respective January 2019 and January 2020 lease
expirations. Collateral occupancy has declined to 45.3%.
Comparative in-line sales for tenants occupying less than 10,000 sf
declined to $288 psf in 2017 from $318 psf in 2016 and $303 psf in
2015. The Northtowne Mall property, which is part of the sixth
largest loan, Gumberg Retail Portfolio (4.6%), lost its second
anchor, Elder-Beerman, in 2018. Additionally, JCPenney has been
reporting weak sales and has a lease rolling in March 2020. The
11th largest loan, Residence Inn Anaheim (2.8%), which is secured
by a 200-room hotel property located in Anaheim, CA, has had
performance negatively impacted by new hotel supply in the
immediate area.

The David Taylor Office loan (0.9%), which is secured by a
143,129-sf office property located in Charlotte, NC, was flagged
due to a significant occupancy decline. Occupancy as of December
2018 dropped to 21.6% following the loss of TIAA-CREF (65.9% of
NRA) and TZ Insurance Solutions (13.4%), both of which vacated at
their respective November 2018 and June 2018 lease expirations.
TIAA-CREF is consolidating staff into another nearby campus. The
Columbus Corners loan (0.6%), which is secured by a 93,460-sf
retail center located in Whitehall, NC that is shadow-anchored by a
Walmart Supercenter, was flagged due to occupancy declining to 72%
as of September 2018 from 83% and 92% at YE 2017 and YE 2016,
respectively, as well as Stage Stores (19.3% of NRA) having an
upcoming lease expiration in July 2019. The Valley Creek Apartments
loan (0.2%), which is secured by a 102-unit garden-style
multifamily property located in Spartanburg, SC, has reported
declining NOI DSCR to 1.19x at YE 2017 from 1.32x at YE 2016 and
1.41x at YE 2015 due to increased operating expenses.

Additional Loss Consideration: In addition to modeling a base case
loss on Muncie Mall, Fitch applied an additional sensitivity
scenario to reflect a potential outsized loss of 75% on the loan's
balloon balance. The Negative Outlook on class F incorporates this
analysis.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Loan Maturities: Ten loans (25.4% of pool) mature in 2019,
including the second and third largest loans. Three loans (9.6%)
mature in 2021, six loans (2.6%) mature in 2023, 38 loans (54.9%)
mature in 2024, two loans (4.2%) mature in 2034 and two loans
(3.3%) have an ARD in 2024.

High Retail Concentration: Loans secured by retail properties
represent 44.2% of the pool, including eight loans in the top 15.
Regional mall and outlet exposure consists of four top 15 loans
(21.8%), including The Outlets at Orange (10.6%; Orange, CA),
Arundel Mills & Marketplace (7.7%; Hanover, MD), Muncie Mall (2.9%;
Muncie, IN) and the Northtowne Mall (0.6% allocated pool balance;
Defiance, OH) in the Gumberg Portfolio. Simon Property Group is the
sponsor for The Outlets at Orange and Arundel Mills & Marketplace
loans, combined 14.9% of the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class F reflects an additional sensitivity
scenario on the Muncie Mall loan due to the high anchor vacancies,
low sales and tertiary market location and the potential for
downgrade if performance further declines. The Outlooks on classes
A-2 through E remain Stable due to the relatively stable
performance of the majority of the remaining pool, sufficient
credit enhancement and expected continued amortization. Rating
upgrades, although unlikely due to high retail pool concentration,
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $302.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $112.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $276.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $851.8 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $98.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $89.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $89.9* million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $63.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $252 million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

  * Notional and interest-only.

The class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR,
CSQ and the interest-only X-C certificates. Class A-S, B, and C
certificates may be exchanged for a related amount of class EC
certificates, and class EC certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B, and C certificates.


JP MORGAN 2019-LTV1: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to Class B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 22
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust (JPMMT) 2019-LTV1. The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 585 30-year, fully-amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of $366,319,629 as
of the February 1, 2019 cut-off date. Conforming loans comprise
only 3.8% of the pool balance. All the loans are subject to the
Qualified Mortgage (QM) and Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules and are
categorized as either QM-Safe Harbor or QM-Agency Safe Harbor.

JPMMT 2019-LTV1 is the second JPMMT transaction with the LTV
designation. The weighted average (WA) loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
the mortgage pool is 87%, which is in line with JPMMT 2018-LTV1,
however higher than that of previous JPMMT transactions which had
WA LTVs of about 70% on average. All the loans have LTVs of at
least 80%, and 72% of the loans by balance have LTVs greater than
85%. None of the loans in the pool have mortgage insurance.
Consistent with previous JPMMT transactions, the borrowers in the
pool have a WA FICO score of 763 and a WA debt-to-income ratio of
36%. The WA mortgage rate of the pool is 5.0%.

United Shore Financial Services (United Shore) originated 60.6% of
the mortgage loans by balance and SoFi Lending Corp. (SoFi)
originated 10.6%. The remaining originators each account for less
than 4.0% of the aggregate principal balance of the loans in the
pool. About 57.5% of the mortgage pool was originated under United
Shore's High Balance Nationwide program, in which, using the
Desktop Underwriter (DU) automated underwriting system, loans are
underwritten to Fannie Mae guidelines with overlays. The loans
receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due to the loan amount
exceeding the GSE limit for certain markets.

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) will service 100% of the
pool. The servicing fee for loans serviced by Shellpoint will be
based on a step-up incentive fee structure with a $20 base
servicing fee and additional fees for servicing delinquent and
defaulted loans. Shellpoint will act as the interim servicer for
100% of the mortgage pool balance from the closing date until the
servicing transfer date, which is expected to occur on or about
April 1, 2019 (but which may occur after such date). After the
servicing transfer date, these mortgage loans will be serviced by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase).

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will be the master servicer
and securities administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association
will be the trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a typical
shifting interest structure that benefits from senior and
subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2019-LTV1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.90%
in a base scenario and reaches 12.15% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using the US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
assessments and the financial strength of Representation & Warranty
(R&W) providers.

Moody's based its provisional ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, its assessments of the aggregators, originators
and servicers, the strength of the third party due diligence and
the representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2019-LTV1 is a securitization of a pool of 585 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$366,319,629 as of the cut-off date, with a WA remaining term to
maturity of 356 months and a WA seasoning of 4 months. The WA
current FICO score of the borrowers in the pool is 763. The WA LTV
ratio of the mortgage pool is 87%, which is in line with JPMMT
2018-LTV1, however higher than that of previous JPMMT transactions
which had WA LTVs of about 70% on average. All the loans have LTVs
of at least 80%, and 72% of the loans by balance have LTVs greater
than 85%. None of the loans in the pool have mortgage insurance.
The other characteristics of the loans in the pool are generally
comparable to that of recent JPMMT transactions.

The mortgage loans in the pool were originated mostly in California
(31% by loan balance). The sponsor is in the process of determining
which loans in the pool are backed by properties that may be
affected by the recent California wildfires. The sponsor will order
post-disaster inspection reports for properties in areas designated
for individual assistance by FEMA. To the extent any of these
properties sustained material damage from the wildfires, the
sponsor will repurchase the affected loans from the pool.

United Shore Financial Services (United Shore) originated 60.6% of
the mortgage loans by balance and SoFi Lending Corp. (SoFi)
originated 10.6%. The remaining originators each account for less
than 4.0% of the aggregate principal balance of the loans in the
pool. About 57.5% of the mortgage pool was originated under United
Shore's High Balance Nationwide program, in which, using the
Desktop Underwriter (DU) automated underwriting system, loans are
underwritten to Fannie Mae guidelines with overlays. The loans
receive a DU Approve Ineligible feedback due to the loan amount
exceeding the GSE limit for certain markets.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee will be based on a step-up incentive fee
structure with a monthly base fee of $20 per loan and additional
fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans.

While this fee structure is common in non-performing mortgage
securitizations, it is relatively new to rated prime mortgage
securitizations which typically incorporate a flat 25 basis point
servicing fee rate structure. By establishing a base servicing fee
for performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans,
the fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The servicer receives
higher fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less
labor-intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary. By
contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a servicer can take actions,
such as modifications and prolonged workouts, that increase the
value of its mortgage servicing rights.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $20 for all performing loans and increases according to the
delinquent and incentive fee schedules.

The delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from
the available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The Class
B-6 is first in line to absorb any increase in servicing costs
above the base servicing fee. Once the Class B-6 is written off,
the Class B-5 will absorb any increase in servicing costs. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Three third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, regulatory compliance,
valuation and data integrity reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool.
A third party Collateral Desk Appraisal (CDA) value review was
conducted on a sample of 388 non-conforming loans out of 559
non-conforming loans. For the remaining 171 loans, a CDA value
review was not provided because these loans were originated under
United Shore's High Balance Nationwide program and had Collateral
Underwriter (CU) risk score less than or equal to 2.5. Moody's
deemed the 388 CDA sample of loans adequate and it did not make any
adjustment to loss levels.

The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of loans, no material
compliance issues, and no appraisal defects. The loans that had
exceptions to the originators' underwriting guidelines had strong
documented compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high
reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms
also identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations related to
fees that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed.
Moody's did not make any adjustments to its expected or Aaa (sf)
loss levels due to the TPR results.

JPMMT 2019-LTV1's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework takes into account the
financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including
qualifiers and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. The sponsor, J.P.
Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. (JPMMAC), is the R&W provider for
approximately 1% (by loan balance) of the pool. Moody's made no
adjustments to the loans for which JPMMAC provided R&Ws since it is
an affiliate of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (rated Aa2). In contrast,
the rest of the R&W providers are unrated and/or financially weaker
entities and Moody's applied an adjustment to the loans for which
these entities provided R&Ws. JPMMAC will not backstop any R&W
providers who may become financially incapable of repurchasing
mortgage loans. JPMMAC is the R&W provider for loans originated by
FirstBank of Colorado, Guaranteed Rate Affinity, Inc., Finance of
America Mortgage LLC and Western Bancorp.

For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MAXEX platform, MAXEX under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MAXEX to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in the JPMMT
transactions. Five Oaks Acquisition Corp. will backstop the
obligations of MaxEx with respect to breaches of the mortgage loan
representations and warranties made by MaxEx.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank Trust National Association.
The custodian, paying agent, and cash management functions will be
performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In addition, as master
servicer, Wells Fargo is responsible for servicer oversight, the
termination of servicers and the appointment of successor
servicers. Wells Fargo is committed to act as successor servicer if
no other successor servicer can be engaged.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 2.00% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 12.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 1.25% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero, i.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


JPMORGAN CHASE 2003-CIBC7: S&P Affirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. H Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class F and G
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-CIBC7, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its rating on class H from the same
transaction.

For the upgrades and affirmation, S&P's credit enhancement
expectation was in line with the raised and affirmed rating
levels.

While the available credit enhancement levels suggest further
positive rating movements on classes F and G, and positive rating
movement on class H, S&P's analysis also considered prior interest
shortfalls experienced by the classes. For class H in particular,
S&P considered the low absolute liquidity support available to the
class and the recent shortfalls affecting the trust in January and
February of 2019.

As of the Feb. 12, 2019, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $39.6 million, which was 2.9% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 26 loans, down from 184
loans at issuance. Three of these loans ($2.4 million, 6.0%) are on
the master servicer's watchlist, and seven ($12.7 million, 32.0%)
are defeased.

S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt service
coverage (DSC) ratio of 1.60x and an S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 18.9%, using an S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average capitalization rate of 7.79%. The DSC,
LTV, and capitalization rate calculations exclude the defeased
loans. The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding
pool trust balance of $24.5 million (61.7%). Using adjusted
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings
weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.57x and 19.5%, respectively, for
the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $52.7 million in principal
losses, or 3.8% of the original pool trust balance.

  RATINGS RAISED
  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
  mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7             


                Rating
  Class    To           From
  F        AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
  G        AA (sf)      BBB+ (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED
  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7

  Class    Rating
  H        B (sf)


MANITOULIN USD: DBRS Finalizes BB on Muskoka 2019-1 D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Muskoka Series 2019-1 Class B Guarantee Linked Notes (the Class B
Notes), the Muskoka Series 2019-1 Class C Guarantee Linked Notes
(the Class C Notes) and the Muskoka Series 2019-1 Class D Guarantee
Linked Notes (the Class D Notes; together, with the Class B Notes
and Class C Notes, the Notes) issued by Manitoulin USD Ltd.
(Manitoulin or the Issuer) referencing the executed Junior Loan
Portfolio Financial Guarantee (the Financial Guarantee) dated
January 30, 2019, between Manitoulin as Guarantor and the Bank of
Montreal (rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) as Beneficiary with
respect to a portfolio of primarily U.S. and Canadian senior
secured and senior unsecured loans:

-- Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Class C Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings on the Notes address the timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal on or before the Scheduled
Termination Date (as defined in the Financial Guarantee referenced
above). The payment of the interest due to the Notes is subject to
the Beneficiary's ability to pay the Guarantee Fee Amount (as
defined in the Financial Guarantee referenced above).

To assess portfolio credit quality, for each corporate obligor in
the portfolio, DBRS relies on DBRS ratings and public ratings from
other rating agencies or DBRS may provide a credit estimate,
internal assessment or rating mapping of the Beneficiary's internal
rating model. Credit estimates, internal assessments and rating
mappings are not ratings; rather, they represent an abbreviated
analysis, including model-driven or statistical components of
default probability for each obligor that is used in assigning a
rating to a facility sufficient to assess portfolio credit
quality.

On the Effective Date, the Issuer will utilize the proceeds of the
issue of the Notes to make a deposit into the Cash Deposit Accounts
with the Cash Deposit Bank. DBRS may review the ratings on the
Notes in the event of a downgrade of the Cash Deposit Bank below
certain thresholds, as defined in the transaction documents.

The ratings reflect the following:

(1) The Financial Guarantee dated January 30, 2019.
(2) The integrity of the transaction structure.
(3) DBRS's assessment of the portfolio quality.
(4) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
loss rates.


MAPS 2019-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB (sf) Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to MAPS 2019-1
Ltd.'s series A, B, and C fixed-rate 2019-1.

The note issuance is backed by 19 aircraft and the related leases
and shares and beneficial interests in entities that directly and
indirectly receive aircraft portfolio lease rental and residual
cash flows, among others.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 15,
2019. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the following:

-- The likelihood of timely interest on the series A notes
(excluding step up interest) on each payment date, the timely
interest on the series B notes (excluding step up interest) when
series A notes are no longer outstanding on each payment date, the
ultimate interest on the series C notes (excluding step up
interest), and the ultimate principal payment on the series A, B,
and C notes on or prior to the legal final maturity at the
respectively rating stress ('A', 'BBB', 'BB').

-- The approximately 63% loan-to-value ratio (LTV, based on the
lower of the mean and median [LMM] of the half-life base value
[HLBV] and the half-life current market value [HLMV]) on the series
A notes, the 76.4% LTV on the series B notes, and the 83% LTV on
the series C notes.

-- The aircraft portfolio comprises popular narrow-body aircraft
(48% B737 family, 42% A320 Family) and 11% A330-200 wide-body
aircraft by LMM of the half-life value. All of the aircraft models
are in production.

-- The weighted average age (by value) of the aircraft in the
portfolio is 8.5 years. Currently, 18 of the 19 aircraft are on
lease, with weighted average remaining maturity of approximately
5.2 years (excluding the off-lease aircraft).

-- Some of the lessees are in emerging markets where the
commercial aviation market is growing. The existing and future
lessees' estimated credit quality and diversification. The 18
on-lease aircraft are currently leased to 15 airlines in nine
countries, many of the initial lessees have low credit quality, and
approximately 59% of lessees (by aircraft value) are domiciled in
emerging markets. Four of the 19 aircraft are leased to flag
carriers internationally.

-- Each series' scheduled amortization profile, which is straight
line over 12.5 years for series A and B, and straight line over
seven years for series C.

-- The transaction's debt service coverage (DSC) ratios and
utilization trigger--a failure of which will result in the series A
and B notes' turbo amortization; turbo amortization for the series
A and B notes will also occur if they are outstanding after year
seven.

-- The end-of-lease payment will be paid to the series A, B, and C
notes according to a percentage equaling to each series'
then-current LTV ratio.

-- The subordination of series C principal and interest to series
A and B principal and interest.

-- A revolving credit facility that Credit Agricole will provide,
which is available to cover senior expenses, including hedge
payments and interest on the series A and B notes. The amount
available under the facility will equal nine months of interest on
the series A and B notes.

-- Alton Aviation Consulting performed a maintenance analysis
before closing. After closing, the servicer will perform a
forward-looking 18-month maintenance analysis at least
semiannually, which Alton Aviation Consulting will review and
confirm for reasonableness and achievability.

-- The senior maintenance reserve account ($8.1 million balance at
closing), which is required to keep a balance to meet the higher of
$1 million and (i) if prior to year seven, the projected
maintenance expenses in the next five months of the transaction and
(ii) if after year seven, the projected maintenance expenses in the
next 12 months of the transaction.

-- The junior maintenance reserve, which, during the first two
years of the transaction, sets aside projected maintenance expenses
for the next 12 months and, during years three to seven of the
transaction, sets aside projected maintenance expenses for the next
10 months. The deficiency in the maintenance account will be topped
up from the waterfall. The excess maintenance over the required
maintenance amount will be transferred to the waterfall.

-- The special reserve amount, which is an additional deposit at
closing of approximately $21 million, which will be used to pay for
certain maintenance expenses related to MSN 1224.

-- The expense reserve account, which will be funded at closing
from note proceeds with approximately $1.2 million that is expected
to cover the next three months expenses, including the near-term
transition costs associated with the aircraft on lease to Pegasus
Airlines (MSN 40877) and the one off-lease aircraft (MSN 32659) on
the closing date plus an additional $1.8 million deposit, which
will be used to cover the repayment of rent paid in advance with
respect to two aircraft in the portfolio, MSN 4567 and MSN 35714.

-- The series C interest reserve account, which will be funded at
closing from note proceeds of approximately $1.5 million, which may
be used to pay interest on the series C notes. The initial lease
rate 1.17%, based on LMM of half-life values), as measured by the
portfolio's weighted average lease rate factor based on aircraft
half-life value. The rental rate associated with six of the
aircraft leases is scheduled to reset to a lower rate during the
term of the initial lease, resulting in a decline of the lease rate
factor.

-- The senior indemnification (excluding indemnification amounts
to lessees under leases entered into before the transaction closing
date) is capped at $10 million and is modeled to occur in the first
12 months.

-- The junior indemnification (uncapped) is subordinated to the
rated series' principal payment.

-- Merx Aviation, an aircraft lessor founded by Apollo Investment
Corp. in 2012, is the servicer for this transaction.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  MAPS 2019-1 Ltd.

  Series     Prelim rating          Prelim amount
                                        (mil. $)

  A          A (sf)                     325.675
  B          BBB (sf)                    72.372
  C          BB (sf)                     31.017


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Lowers Class H Notes Rating to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three and affirmed seven classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2011-C2 (MSCI 2011-C2) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades to classes F, G, and H
reflect increased base case loss expectations on the specially
serviced Towne West Square Mall loan (6.2% of pool) and the
flood-damaged Three Riverway Office loan (6.4%). Fitch modeled
losses of 83% and 27%, respectively, on these loans.

The Towne West Square Mall loan, which is secured by a portion of a
regional mall located in Wichita, KS, transferred to special
servicing in February 2017 due to imminent monetary default. The
property has seen a significant performance decline since issuance.
A cash flow sweep was triggered in November 2017. Per the most
recent servicer reporting, the amortizing loan remained current.
However, the YTD June 2018 servicer-reported NOI DSCR was only
0.91x while occupancy was approximately 37.1% as of the June 2018
rent roll. The servicer is currently pursuing foreclosure.

The Three Riverway Office loan, which is designated a Fitch Loan of
Concern (FLOC), is secured by a 398,413-sf high-end office property
located in Houston, TX that was severely damaged by flooding
related to Hurricane Harvey in August/September 2017. Repairs
remain ongoing and occupancy has declined to approximately 64%. The
servicer-reported YTD September 2018 NOI DSCR was 0.98x.

Additional Loss Considerations; Regional Mall Concentration: In
addition to the Towne West Square Mall, the two largest loans in
the pool (36% of pool) are secured by portions of regional malls;
both are considered FLOCs.

While the two loans, the Deerbrook Mall loan (18.5% of pool;
Humble, TX) and the Ingram Park Mall loan (17.5%; San Antonio, TX)
have strong sponsorship, combined, they comprise over one-third of
the pool and Fitch is concerned about the ability of these loans to
refinance at their scheduled 2021 loan maturities. Both malls are
anchored by a non-collateral Dillard's, Macy's and JCPenney.
Deerbrook Mall also has Sears and Dick's Sporting Goods as
additional anchors, while Ingram Park Mall has two additional dark
anchor spaces, which were formerly occupied by Dillard's Home and
Sears. Although in line sales for both malls remain healthy in the
range of $425 to $440 psf, collateral occupancy has declined
slightly at both malls over the past year and scheduled tenant roll
over the next year comprises over 20% of the collateral NRA.

Given the potential for outsized losses on the three mall loans,
Fitch's analysis included an additional stress scenario that
assumed a 15% loss on the balloon balance of both the Deerbrook
Mall and Ingram Park Mall loans and a full loss on the current
balance of the specially serviced Towne West Square Mall. The
Negative Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 through G, and the interest
only class X-A, reflect this scenario.

Additional Fitch Loans of Concern: In addition to the four
aforementioned FLOCs, three other loans (4.7% of pool) have also
been designated as FLOCS. The Riverside 5 loan (2.7%), which is
secured by an office property located in Frederick, MD that has
suffered a cash flow decline since it lost its third largest tenant
in 2017. The Timberway II loan (1.2%), which is secured by a
134,000-sf office property located in Houston, TX that has seen
occupancy decline to 65% as of October 2018 reporting, and the
specially serviced 192nd Avenue Plaza loan (0.8%), which
transferred to special servicing in June 2017 after the borrower
executed a major lease without the prior written consent of the
servicer. The loan remains current, and the servicer is working
towards a resolution with the borrower. Fitch applied increased
cash flow haircuts and/or higher cap rates in its analysis to
account for performance concerns.

Improved Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement continues to
increase due to paydown and amortization. As of the January 2019
distribution date, the transaction has been paid down by 40%. Ten
loans have paid off since issuance with no realized losses to date.
Approximately 7.7% of the pool is currently defeased. Nearly all
loans (96.7%) are currently amortizing. The next scheduled loan
maturity is December 2020 (one loan, 1.9% of the pool), with the
remainder of the pool maturing in 2021 (41 loans; 98.1%).

Additional Considerations

Portfolio Concentrations: Forty-two of the original 52 loans remain
in the pool. The top two loans compose 36.1% of the pool while the
top five loans in the pool make up 52.6%. Loans secured by retail
properties represent 57.1% of the pool, including five of the top
15 loans. Loans secured by properties located in Texas compose
48.4% of the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks assigned to classes A-4 through G, and the
interest only class X-A, primarily reflect concern over the
regional mall concentration; including concerns over the ability of
the Deerbrook Mall and Ingram Park Malls to refinance at maturity
as well as the deteriorating performance of the specially serviced
Towne West Square Mall. Fitch ran additional sensitivity scenarios
on the three regional malls in the pool; and based on the results,
classes A-4 through G, and the interest only class X-A, could be
subject to future downgrades. Class A-3 is fully covered by
defeased collateral.

Fitch has downgraded the following rating:

  -- $15.2 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Negative;

  -- $12.1 million class G to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.2 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $34.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $439.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $45.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $50.1 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $31.9 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $50.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class J and X-B certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2019-L2: Fitch to Rate $9.1MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Morgan Stanley Capital
I Trust 2019-L2 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2019-L2.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $16,200,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17,100,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,400,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $167,500,000c class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $411,991,000c class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $641,191,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $82,438,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44,655,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,219,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $168,312,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25,190,000af class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,343,000adf class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40,533,000abf class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24,731,000ad class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,160,000ad class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.
  
The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $32,060,275ad class H-RR;

  -- $18,884,408ae class VRR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) The initial certificate balances of classes A-3 and A-4 are
unknown and expected to be approximately $579,491,000 in aggregate,
subject to a 5% variance. The expected class A-3 balance range is
$75,000,000 to $260,000,000 and the expected class A-4 balance
range is $319,491,000 to $504,491,000. The balances shown reflect
the midpoint of the ranges.

(d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

(e) Vertical credit risk retention interest.

(f) The initial certificate principal balance of each of the Class
D and Class E-RR Certificates and the initial notional amount of
the Class X-D Certificates are subject to change based on final
pricing of all Certificates and the final determination of the fair
market value of the Class F-RR, Class G-RR and Class H-RR
Certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 20, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 68
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$934,871,683 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Argentic
Real Estate Finance LLC, Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC, Cantor
Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P. and BSPRT CMBS Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 76.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.7% and asset summary reviews
on 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: Overall, the pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.27x is
better than average when compared with the 2017 average of 1.26x
and 2018 average of 1.22x for other recent Fitch-rated
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch LTV of 98.5% is also
better than average when compared with the 2017 average of 101.6%
and 2018 average of 102.0%.

Single-Tenant Concentration: Ten loans comprising approximately
20.4% of the pool are backed by properties designated single-tenant
properties by Fitch, including properties backing five of the 20
largest loans. This is greater than the 2017 single-tenant property
concentration average of 19.3% and lower than the 2018 average of
22.6%. Fitch was comfortable the dark value covers the implied high
investment-grade proceeds for the single-tenant properties sampled,
except for NTT-Quincy. Fitch increased the 'AAAsf' loss estimate to
account for the shortfall allocable to the NTT-Quincy loan.

Better Pool Diversity: The pool is more diverse than recent
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The 10 largest loans
account for 44.5% of the pool, compared to the 2017 and 2018
averages of 53.1% and 50.6%, respectively. The pool's loan
concentration index (LCI) is 319, which better than average when
compared with the 2017 average of 398 and 2018 average of 373 for
other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 15.8% below the most recent
year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period.
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the MSC
2019-L2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 24: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to E-S Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of CLO refinancing notes to be issued by Octagon Investment
Partners 24, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$522,700,000 Class A-1-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$88,400,000 Class B-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class B-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$41,200,000 Class C-S Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class C-S Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$51,900,000 Class D-S Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class D-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$50,100,000 Class E-S Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class E-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer intends to issue the Refinancing Notes on March 14, 2019
in connection with the refinancing of all classes of secured notes
previously refinanced on October 10, 2017 or originally issued on
May 21, 2015. On the Second Refinancing Date, the Issuer will use
proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, along with the
proceeds from the issuance of one other class of secured notes and
additional subordinated notes, to redeem in full the Refinanced
Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, one other
class of secured notes and additional subordinated notes, a variety
of other changes to the transaction's features will occur in
connection with the refinancing. These include: extension of the
reinvestment period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call
period; changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to
the overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $850,000,000

Defaulted par: $1,418,252

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2680

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for Octagon Investment Partners 24, Ltd. was
assigned in accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 31, 2017. Please note that on November
14, 2018, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which it has
requested market feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology
for Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on Octagon Investment Partners 24, Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XXI: Moody's Rates $12MM Class E-RR Notes 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CLO refinancing notes issued by Octagon Investment
Partners XXI, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$450,000,000 Class A-1A-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1A-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$86,250,000 Class A-2-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-2-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
(sf)

US$36,000,000 Class B-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class B-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$40,250,000 Class C-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class C-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$37,000,000 Class D-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class E-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class E-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
CLO. The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The definitive ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on February 14, 2019 in
connection with the refinancing of all classes of the secured notes
previously issued on October 30, 2014 and on November 14, 2016. On
the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of
the Refinancing Notes, along with the proceeds from the issuance of
two other classes of secured notes and additional subordinated
notes, to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, the other
classes of secured notes and additional subordinated notes, a
variety of other changes to transaction features will occur in
connection with the refinancing. These include: reinstatement and
extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the stated
maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral quality
tests; and changes to the overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $750,000,000

Defaulted par: $0

Diversity Score: 80

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2654

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for Octagon Investment Partners XXI, Ltd. was
assigned in accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 31, 2017. Please note that on November
14, 2018, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which it has
requested market feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology
for Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on Octagon Investment Partners XXI, Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 2019-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on B-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Residential Mortgage
Loan Trust 2019-1's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate,
amortizing (some with interest-only periods) residential mortgage
loans secured by single-family residences, planned-unit
developments, two- to four-family residences, and condominiums to
both prime and nonprime borrowers. The pool has 574 loans, which
are primarily non-qualified mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The transaction's representation and warranty (R&W) framework;
and
-- The mortgage aggregator.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-1

  Class     Rating(i)    Amount (mil. $)
  A-1       AAA (sf)         141,944,000
  A-2       AA (sf)           16,352,000
  A-3       A (sf)            29,978,000
  M-1       BBB (sf)          14,649,000
  B-1       BB (sf)           10,447,000
  B-2       B (sf)             8,403,000
  B-3       NR                 5,337,045
  XS        NR                  Notional(ii)
  A-IO-S    NR                  Notional(ii)
  R         NR                       N/A

(i)The ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.
(ii)Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal
balance.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


SCF EQUIPMENT 2017-2: Moody's Puts B1 on Class D Debt Under Review
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible upgrade
8 classes of notes issued by SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-1 LLC (SCF
2017-1) and SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-2 LLC (SCF 2017-2). The SCF
2017-1 and SCF 2017-2 transactions are securitizations of equipment
loans and leases and owner-occupied commercial real estate loans
originated and serviced by Stonebriar Commercial Finance, LLC. The
equipment loans and leases are backed primarily by collateral that
include corporate aircraft, railcars, and manufacturing and
assembly equipment.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-1 LLC

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class A, A1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 8, 2018 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class B, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 8, 2018 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class C, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 8, 2018 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Class D, B1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 8, 2018 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Issuer: SCF Equipment Leasing 2017-2 LLC

Class A Equipment Contract Backed Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov 22, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov 22, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class C Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov 22, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Class D Equipment Contract Backed Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov 22, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The review actions reflect build-up in credit enhancement levels
since transaction closing and/or last rating action as a result of
deleveraging, which results in upward ratings pressure for SCF
2017-1 and 2017-2. Additionally, an error has been discovered in
the analysis applied after the closing of these transactions, the
correction of which may have positive impact on the ratings. The
modelling error resulted in the calculated expected loss being
inflated in the analyses because additional stress, not applicable
in these circumstances, was applied to recovery rates and default
probabilities. The error was present in analysis underlying the
upgrade actions taken on certain notes from SCF 2017-1 on December
19, 2017, and August 8, 2018.

The actions reflect build-up in credit enhancement levels for all
the classes of notes in the transactions due to deleveraging from
the sequential pay structures, overcollateralization and
non-declining reserve accounts. The SCF 2017-1 and SCF 2017-2
transactions feature overcollateralization (OC) targets of 10.25%
and 5.50% of original pool balance, respectively. As of the January
22, 2019 distribution date, OC represents 15.17% and 7.51% of the
outstanding pool balances of SCF 2017-1 and SCF 2017-2,
respectively. The non-declining reserve account target of 1.50% of
original balance is fully funded for both SCF 2017-1 and SCF
2017-2, representing 2.22% and 2.05% of the outstanding pool
balances, respectively. In addition, the transactions have
exhibited strong performance with no cumulative net losses to
date.

Along with the strong performance and build-up in credit
enhancement, Moody's continues to consider credit risks associated
with these transactions, such as the substantial residual value
risk. These transactions are exposed to the market value of the
equipment if lessees return the equipment upon maturity of the
leases. In addition, lease renewals or prolonged timelines to sell
returned equipment would result in slower pay down of the notes,
while Classes A and B in the SCF 2017-1 transaction have final
maturity dates of January and March 2023, respectively. Stonebriar,
as a servicer of these deals, is obligated to monetize the booked
residual value of rail and aircraft equipment within 120 days of
related lease expiry or early termination.

During the review period, Moody's will continue to analyze and
review model inputs to ensure that the expected loss is calculated
appropriately, and will also complete updated analysis to reflect
current transaction performance.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Methodology for ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and
Loans. If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the
Credit Ratings on SCF 2017-1 and SCF 2017-2 may be positively
affected. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the equipment and commercial real estate that secure
the obligor's promise of payment. As the primary drivers of
performance, positive changes in the US macro economy and the
strong performance of various sectors where the obligors operate
could also affect the ratings. In addition, faster than expected
reduction in residual value exposure could prompt upgrade of
ratings.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or a greater than
expected deterioration in the value of the equipment and commercial
real estate that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the
primary drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro
economy and the weak performance of various sectors where the
obligors operate could also affect Moody's ratings. Other reasons
for worse performance than Moody's expectations could include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack of
transaction governance and fraud.


SDART 2019-1: Fitch Gives 'BB-sf' Rating on $101.87MM Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the notes issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables
Trust (SDART) 2019-1:

  -- $172,500,000 class A-1 'F1+sf';

  -- $231,100,000 classes A-2a and A-2b 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $133,570,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $121,350,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $149,740,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $133,590,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $101,870,000 class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Quality: The 2019-1 pool is backed by collateral
consistent with 2017-2018 pools, with a WA FICO score of 615 and
internal WA loss forecast score (LFS) of 551. WA seasoning is four
months, new vehicles total 48.60% and the pool is geographically
diverse.

High Extended-Term Concentration: Loans with terms over 61 months
total 93.7% of the pool, which is toward the higher end of the
range for the platform. Further, 75-month term loans total 17.4%,
down from recent transactions. Consistent with prior Fitch-rated
transactions, an additional stress was applied to 75-month loans in
deriving the loss proxy, as performance for these contracts has
been volatile.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement (CE): Initial hard CE totals 52.75%,
41.85%, 28.40%, 16.40% and 7.25% for classes A, B, C, D and E,
respectively. Hard CE is consistent from 2018-5 for the classes.
Excess spread is expected to be 12.18% per annum. Loss coverage for
each class of notes is sufficient to cover respective multiples of
Fitch's base case credit net loss (CNL) proxy of 17.0%.

Stable Portfolio/Securitization Performance: Fitch took into
consideration economic conditions and future expectations by
assessing key macroeconomic and wholesale market conditions, when
deriving the series loss proxy. Although within range of 2010-2012
performance, 2013-2017 losses are tracking higher, but ABS
performance still remains within Fitch's initial expectations,
consistently exhibiting stronger performance than that of the
managed portfolio.

Macroeconomic and Auto Industry Risks - Stable

Portfolio/Securitization Performance: Fitch took into consideration
the strength of the economy and future expectations, by assessing
key macroeconomic and wholesale market conditions when assessing
and deriving Fitch's loss proxy for this series. Although within
range of 2010-2012 performance, Santander Consumer USA Inc.'s (SC)
2013-2017 losses are tracking higher but ABS performance still
remains within Fitch's initial expectations consistently exhibiting
stronger performance than that of the managed portfolio.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: SC demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter and servicer, as
evidenced by historical portfolio and securitization performance.
Fitch rates SC's ultimate parent Banco Santander, S.A.
'A-'/'F2'/Stable. Fitch deems SC capable to service this
transaction.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SC would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case. This in turn could result in Fitch taking
negative rating actions on the notes.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to 2019-1
to increased credit losses over the life of the transaction.
Fitch's analysis found that the transaction displays some
sensitivity to increased defaults and credit losses. This analysis
exhibited a potential downgrade of one or two categories under
Fitch's moderate (1.5x base case loss) scenario, and potentially
distressed ratings or defaults for the class E bonds. The notes
could experience downgrades of three or more rating categories,
potentially leading to distressed ratings (below Bsf) or possibly
default, under Fitch's severe (2x base case loss) scenario.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-CH2: Moody's Hikes Class B-5 Debt to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches from Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH2. The transaction is
backed by one pool of first-lien mortgage loans acquired by Redwood
Residential Acquisition Corporation, a subsidiary of Redwood Trust,
Inc., under its expanded credit prime loan program called "Redwood
Choice". Redwood's Choice program is a prime program with credit
parameters outside of Redwood's traditional prime jumbo program,
"Redwood Select." The Choice program expands the low end of
Redwood's FICO range to 661 from 700, while increasing the high end
of eligible loan-to-value ratios from 85% to 90%. The pool also
includes loans with non-Qualified Mortgage characteristics (21.5%),
including loans with debt-to-income ratios up to 58.8%. The loans
were sourced from multiple originators and acquired by Redwood. All
of the loans conform to the Seller's guidelines, except for loans
originated by First Republic Bank, which were originated to conform
with First Republic Bank's guidelines. The loan-level third party
due diligence review (TPR) at issuance encompassed credit
underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH2

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds as a result of the high observed
prepayments, and a decrease in Moody's projected pool losses. The
actions reflect the recent strong performance of the underlying
pools. As of December 2018, the collateral pool had an average
3-month prepayment rate of approximately 20%, serious delinquencies
(loans 60 or more days delinquent) as a percentage of current
balance of 0.12% and no realized losses. High prepayment rates
since issuance have contributed to fast pay downs and large
increases in percentage credit enhancement levels for the upgraded
bonds.

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility as fewer loans remain in pool ("tail risk"). The
transactions provide for a credit enhancement floor of 1.25% of the
closing pool balance to the senior bonds which mitigates tail risk
by protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time.

Similar to recently rated Sequoia transactions, in this
transaction, the servicer, or securities administrator, is
prohibited from advancing principal and interest to loans that are
120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are designated as Stop Advance Mortgage Loans
("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding; and
if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration its expected losses
on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, its assessment of the representations and warranties
frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence findings of the
third party reviews received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in November 2018.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

Finally, performances of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2019-CH1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on B-4 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2019-CH1 ("SEMT 2019-CH1"), except for the
interest-only classes. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans.

SEMT 2019-CH1 is the seventh securitization that includes loans
acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation, a
subsidiary of Redwood Trust, Inc., under its expanded credit prime
loan program called "Redwood Choice". Redwood's Choice program is a
prime program with credit parameters outside of Redwood's
traditional prime jumbo program, "Redwood Select". The Choice
program expands the low end of Redwood's FICO range to 661 from
700, while increasing the high end of eligible loan-to-value ratios
from 85% to 90%. The pool also includes loans with non-QM
characteristics (35.33%), such as debt-to-income ratios up to
60.94%. Non-QM loans were acquired by Redwood under each of the
Select and Choice programs.

The assets of the trust consist of 475 fixed rate mortgage loans,
substantially all of which are fully amortizing. The mortgage loans
have an original term to maturity of 30 years except for two loans
which have an original term to maturity of 20 years. The loans were
sourced from multiple originators and acquired by Redwood.

All of the loans conform to the Seller's guidelines, except for
loans originated by First Republic Bank with Redwood overlays,
TIAA, FSB (FKA EverBank) and high balance agency conforming loans
underwritten to GSE guidelines with Redwood overlays. Two loans
from Guaranteed Rate were purchased on reliance letter,
underwritten to Guaranteed Rate Flex Jumbo guidelines. First
Republic Bank originated loans conform with First Republic Bank's
guidelines with Redwood overlays. TIAA, FSB (FKA EverBank) were
purchased on reliance letter and underwritten to EverBank
Non-Agency Preferred credit guidelines.

The transaction benefits from nearly 100% due diligence of data
integrity, credit, property valuation, and compliance conducted by
an independent third-party firm.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as the master servicer of the
loans in this transaction. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, TIAA,
FSB, First Republic Bank and HomeStreet Bank will be primary
servicers on the deal.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2019-CH1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2B, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.65%
in a base scenario and reaches 9.55% at a stress level roughly
consistent with Aaa ratings. The MILAN CE may be different from the
credit enhancement that is consistent with a Aaa rating for a
tranche, because the MILAN CE does not take into account the
structural features of the transaction. Moody's took this
difference into account in iits ratings of the senior classes. The
MILAN CE may be different from the credit enhancement that is
consistent with a Aaa rating for a tranche, because the MILAN CE
does not take into account the structural features of the
transaction. Moody's took this difference into account in its
ratings of the senior classes. Its loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2019-CH1 transaction is a securitization of 475 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $341,077,904. There are 100 originators in this pool,
TIAA, FSB (5.71%). The remaining originators contributed less than
5% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. The
loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed
credit underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank.

SEMT 2019-CH1 includes loans acquired by Redwood under its Choice
program. Although from a FICO and LTV perspective, the borrowers in
SEMT 2019-CH1 are not the super prime borrowers included in
traditional SEMT transactions, these borrowers are prime borrowers
with a demonstrated ability to manage household finance. On
average, borrowers in this pool have made a 24.8% down payment on a
mortgage loan of $718,059. In addition, 64.9% of borrowers have
more than 24 months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to pay
the mortgage for two years should there be an interruption to the
borrower's cash flow. The WA FICO is 750, which is lower than
traditional SEMT transactions, which has averaged 771 in 2018 SEMT
transactions. The lower WA FICO for SEMT 2019-CH1 may reflect
recent mortgage lates (0x30x3, 1x30x12, 2x30x24) which are allowed
under the Choice program, but not under Redwood's traditional
product, Redwood Select (0x30x24). While the WA FICO may be lower
for this transaction although it is the highest among Choice deals,
Moody's believes that the limited mortgage lates is less likely to
demonstrates a history of financial mismanagement.

Moody's also notes that SEMT 2019-CH1 is the seventh SEMT Choice
transaction to include a slightly lower number of non-QM loans
(151) compared to SEMT 2018-CH3 (155), SEMT 2018-CH2 (156) and SEMT
2018-CH1 (157) with the exception of SEMT 2018-CH4 (148).

Redwood's Choice program was launched by Redwood in April 2016. In
contrast to Redwood's traditional program, Select, Redwood's Choice
program allows for higher LTVs, lower FICOs, non-occupant
co-borrowers, non-warrantable condos, limited loans with adverse
credit events, among other loan attributes. Under both Select and
Choice, Redwood also allows for loans with non-QM features, such as
interest-only, DTIs greater than 43%, asset depletion, among other
loan attributes.

However, Moody's notes that Redwood historically has been on
average stronger than its peers as an aggregator of prime jumbo
loans, including a limited number of non-QM loans in previous SEMT
transactions. As of the January 2019 remittance report, there have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's has
rated recently, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
While in traditional SEMT transactions, Moody's has factored this
qualitative strength into its analysis, in SEMT 2019-CH1, it has a
neutral assessment of the Choice Program until it is able to review
a longer performance history of Choice mortgage loans.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered. As
such, Moody's incorporated some additional sensitivity runs in its
cashflow analysis in which it increased the tranche losses due to
potential interest shortfalls during the loan's liquidation period
in order to reflect this feature and to assess the potential impact
to the bonds.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2019-CH1 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments owing to
potential future lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the
loans are prime quality and were originated under a regulatory
environment that requires tighter controls for originations than
pre-crisis, which reduces the likelihood that the loans have
defects that could form the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood (or
a majority-owned affiliate of the sponsor), who will retain credit
risk in accordance with the U.S. Risk Retention Rules and provides
a back-stop to the representations and warranties of all the
originators except for First Republic Bank, has a strong alignment
of interest with investors, and is incentivized to actively manage
the pool to optimize performance. Third, the transaction has
reasonably well defined processes in place to identify loans with
defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent
breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations
and warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which
reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.90% ($6,480,480) of the closing pool
balance, which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds
from eroding credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 462 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 13 First Republic
and Primelending loans. For the 13 loans, Redwood Trust elected to
conduct a limited review, which did not include a TPR firm check
for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the two PrimeLending,
and eleven First Republic Bank limited review loans. Therefore,
there is a possibility that some of these loans could have
unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial compliance
findings of loans for the First Republic Bank and PrimeLending
loans where a full review was conducted. The due diligence report
did not indicate any significant credit, valuation or compliance
concerns. As a result, Moody's did not increase its Aaa loss.

For full review loans, the TPR report identified one grade "C" and
one grade "D" compliance-related conditions relating to missing
disclosure and loan consummation before end of waiting period. One
additional loan had an ATR issue with State compliance. Moody's
believes that the risk to the trust is material therefore Moody's
made adjustments to its losses for these loans.

The property valuation review conducted by the TPR firm consisted
of (i) a review of all of the appraisals for full review loans,
checking for issues with the comparables selected in the appraisal
and (ii) a value supported analysis for all loans. The TPR report
identified two loans with a final grade "D" for conditions relating
to missing valuations and appraisal subject to completion. The
conditions cited by Clayton included the appraisal was "subject to
completion" per plans and specification. The TPR report also
identified two loans with a final grade "C" property
valuation-related condition due to significant variation in the
appraised value from BPO. Moody's believes that such conditions are
material and thus, it made adjustments for these loans.

Moody's has received the results of the inspection report or
appraisal confirmation for all the mortgage loans secured by
properties in the areas affected by FEMA disaster areas. The
results indicate that the properties did not receive any material
damage. SEMT 2019-CH1 includes a representation that the pool does
not include properties with material damage that would adversely
affect the value of the mortgaged property.

The originators and Redwood have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, as Master Servicer, is responsible for
servicer oversight, and termination of servicers and for the
appointment of successor servicers. In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC is committed to act as successor if no other successor
servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in November 2018.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


STRUCTURED ASSET 2007-GEL1: Moody's Ups Cl. A2 Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Cl. A2 from
Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2007-GEL1.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2007-GEL1

Cl. A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade is driven by an increase in the credit
enhancement available to Class A2 due to its sequential payment of
principal and the correction of an error in Moody's analysis
applied after the downgrade action in March 2009 regarding the
bonds' principal payment priority. Based on the Private Placement
Memorandum, on or following the distribution date on which the
aggregate class principal amount of the offered subordinate
certificates and the amount of overcollateralization has been
reduced to zero, principal is allocated pro rata to Class A1, Class
A2 and Class A3 Certificates. However, as per the Trust Agreement,
Classes A1, A2 and A3 continue to pay sequentially after the
subordinate certificates and overcollateralization have been
reduced to zero. Moody's rating action properly reflects the
current allocation of principal as per the Trust Agreement. The
rating action also incorporates potential future interest shortfall
risk due to the deal's growing undercollateralization. The rating
action reflects the recent performance and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying pool.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

The Credit Rating was assigned in accordance with Moody's existing
Methodology entitled "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology," dated
1/31/2017. Please note that on 11/14/2018, Moody's released a
Request for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its Methodology for pre-2009 US RMBS Prime
Jumbo, Alt-A, Option ARM, Subprime, Scratch and Dent, Second Lien
and Manufactured Housing transactions. If the revised Methodology
is implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating on this tranche is
not expected to be affected.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.0% in January 2019 from 4.1% in
January 2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


T CAT ENTERPRISE: May Continue Using Cash Collateral Until Feb. 28
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jack B. Schmetterer of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois authorized T CAT Enterprise, Inc., to
use cash collateral through and including Feb. 28, 2019 pursuant to
the terms and conditions set forth in the Sixth Order.

A further hearing to consider the Cash Collateral Motion and entry
of final cash collateral order will be held on Feb. 28, 2018 at
10:30 a.m.

The Debtor may use the cash collateral to pay those items
delineated in the cash collateral budget with a variance from
actual-to-projected weekly disbursements not to exceed 10% on
cumulative basis. The approved budget provides total projected
expenses of approximately $100,213 for the month of February 2019.

Associated Bank, N.A. asserts secured claims against some or all of
the Debtor's assets, including Debtor's cash and accounts
receivable.

Associated Bank and any other secured creditor are granted
replacement liens upon and security interests in the Debtor's
post-petition cash and accounts receivable in the same priority as
Associated Bank's and any other secured creditor's existing
prepetition liens (to the extent valid), and in no event to exceed
the type, kind, priority and amount, if any, of their security
interests which existed on the Petition Date.

The Debtor proposes to initially make monthly adequate protection
payments to Associated Bank in the amount of $6,000 by Feb. 21,
2019, consisting of principal and interest on the outstanding
balance.

A copy of the Sixth Order is available at

            http://bankrupt.com/misc/ilnb18-22736-99.pdf

                     About T CAT Enterprise

T Cat Enterprise, Inc. -- http://www.tcatinc.com/-- is a
family-owned and operated construction company specializing in
excavation, railroad clean up, and snow plowing services in the
tri-state area.  In addition, the Company also offers hauling
services, demolition services, and pavers and asphalt repairs.  

T Cat Enterprise, Inc., based in Franklin Park, IL, filed a Chapter
11 petition (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Case No. 18-22736) on Aug. 13, 2018.
In the petition signed by James R. Trumbull, president, the Debtor
estimated $0 to $50,000 in assets and $1 million to $10 million in
liabilities.  The Hon. Jack B. Schmetterer oversees the case.
Joseph E. Cohen, Esq., and Gina B. Krol, Esq., at Cohen & Krol,
serve as bankruptcy counsel to the Debtor.


TOWD POINT 2019-2: Fitch to Rate $53.34MM Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2019-2 (TPMT 2019-2):

  -- $1,947,787,000 class A1A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $427,563,000 class A1B notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,375,350,000 class A1 exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $194,547,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,569,897,000 class A3 exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $134,927,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,704,824,000 class A4 exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $109,825,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69,032,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53,344,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $37,654,000 class B3 notes;

  -- $37,654,000 class B4 notes;

  -- $125,514,580 class B5 notes;

  -- $3,137,847,580 class A5 exchangeable notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
17,096 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $3.14 billion, which includes $367.79
million, or 11.7%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the
statistical calculation date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, seasoned performing and RPLs,
including loans that have been paying for the past
24 months, which Fitch identifies as "clean current" (82.9%).
Additionally, 1.2% of the pool was 30 days delinquent as of the
statistical calculation date, and the remaining 15.9% of loans are
current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete pay strings,
identified as "dirty current." Of the loans, 87.3% have received
modifications.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): The operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
(FirstKey) has a well-established track record in RPL activities
and carries an 'average' aggregator assessment from Fitch. The
loans are approximately 149 months seasoned, reducing the risk of
misrepresentation at origination. Additionally, the transaction
benefits from third-party due diligence on nearly 100% of the pool,
and the diligence results generally indicate low risk for an RPL
transaction. While the issuer did not provide reps and warranties
on the second lien loans (6.7%), their retention of at least 5% of
the bonds contributes to the overall low operational risk of the
transaction.

Inclusion of Second Liens (Negative): While the collateral pool
consists primarily of first lien, seasoned RPLs, FirstKey has also
included approximately 6.7% (by unpaid principal balance [UPB]) of
closed-end second lien loans. The expected losses were adjusted to
account for the increased risk associated with this collateral
type.

Low Aggregate Servicing Fee (Mixed): Fitch determined that the
stated servicing fee of 13 bps may be insufficient to attract
subsequent servicers under a period of poor performance and high
delinquencies. To account for the potentially higher fee needed to
obtain a subsequent servicer, Fitch's cash flow analysis assumed a
35 bp servicing fee.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Negative): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted and focused on regulatory compliance, pay
history and a tax and title lien search. Of the loans reviewed, the
third-party review (TPR) firm's due diligence review resulted in
approximately 12% (by loan count) "C" and "D" graded loans, meaning
the loans had material violations or lacked documentation to
confirm regulatory compliance.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings. However, the issuer will not be
providing reps and warranties for any second lien loans (6.7% of
the pool by UPB) and Fitch treated these loans as Tier 5 to account
for this. To account for the Tier 2 and Tier 5 loans, Fitch
increased its 'AAAsf' loss expectations by 147 bps to account for a
potential increase in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses
in the reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): FirstKey, as rep provider,
will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to breaches prior
to the payment date in March 2020. Thereafter, a reserve fund will
be available to cover amounts due to noteholders for loans
identified as having rep breaches. Amounts on deposit in the
reserve fund, as well as the increased level of subordination, will
be available to cover additional defaults and losses resulting from
rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or after the payment date
in March 2020.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. P&I advances made on behalf of loans that
become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation
proceeds to the trust. Due to the lack of P&I advancing, the
loan-level loss severity (LS) is less for this transaction than for
those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural
provisions and cash flow priorities, together with increased
subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $367.79 million (11.7%) of the UPB are
outstanding on 2,768 loans. Fitch included the deferred amounts
when calculating the borrower's loan to value ratio (LTV) and
sustainable LTV (sLTV), despite the lower payment and amounts not
being owed during the term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in a
higher probability of default (PD) and LS than if there were no
deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior for these
loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit strategies
(that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to those
borrowers with more equity in the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.9% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivity analysis to determine the stresses
to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by WestCor Land Title Insurance Company (WestCor), Clayton
Services LLC and AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC). The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on regulatory compliance,
pay history, servicing comments, the presence of key documents in
the loan file and data integrity. In addition, AMC and Westcor were
retained to perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a
review to confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant
local jurisdiction and the related assignment chains. A regulatory
compliance and data integrity review was completed on 96% of the
pool by balance. Fitch considered this information in its analysis,
and, based on the findings, Fitch made several adjustments to its
analysis.

Fitch adjusted its loss expectation at the 'AAAsf' level by
approximately 12bps to account for the due diligence findings.
Included in this adjustment were 681of the "C" or "D" graded loans,
due to missing documents that prevented testing for predatory
lending compliance. The inability to test for predatory lending may
expose the trust to potential assignee liability, which creates
added risk for bond investors. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed
a 100% LS for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do
not purchase list of "high cost" or "high risk"; 111 loans were
affected by this approach. For the remaining 570 loans, where the
properties are not located in the states that fall under Freddie
Mac's do not purchase list, the likelihood of all loans being high
cost is low. However, Fitch assumes the trust could potentially
incur notable legal expenses. Fitch increased its loss severity
expectations by 5% for these loans to account for the risk.

Other causes for the remaining 'C' and 'D' grades include missing
final HUD1s that are not subject to predatory lending, missing
state disclosures and other missing compliance-related documents.
Fitch believes these issues do not add material risk to
bondholders, since the statute of limitations has expired. No
adjustment to loss expectations were made for these loans.
Fitch expects a servicing comment review for all loans that are
delinquent as of the statistical calculation date. For the loans
where a servicing comment review was not performed or was outdated,
Fitch applied 100% PD.

There were 918 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated two criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria." The first variation relates to the tax/title review. An
updated tax/title review was not completed on 4,629 loans, all of
which are second liens. While a tax/title review was not completed,
Fitch's analysis already assumed that these loans were not in
first-lien position, and Fitch assumes 100% LS for all second
liens. There was no rating impact due to this variation.

The second and final variation is that a due diligence compliance
and data integrity review was not completed on 4,629 loans (all
second lien loans). Fitch's model assumes 100% LS for all second
liens and therefore no additional adjustment was made to Fitch's
expected losses.


TOWD POINT 2019-HY1: Moody's Gives (P)B1 Rating on Class B2 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
class of notes issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust ("TPMT")
2019-HY1.

The notes are backed by one pool of predominantly seasoned
performing residential mortgage loans. The collateral pool is
comprised of 3,751 first and junior lien adjustable-rate mortgage
loans, and has a non-zero updated weighted average FICO score of
702 and a weighted average combined current LTV of 66.2% (using
current senior loan balance where available) as of December 31,
2018 (the statistical calculation date). First lien loans comprise
about 95% of the pool by balance and about 80% of the pool by
balance consists of non-modified seasoned performing loans with
about 20% consisting of modified re-performing loans. Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. will be the primary servicer for 100% of
the collateral. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC ("FirstKey") will be the
asset manager for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2019-HY1

Cl. A1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A3, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B1, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B2, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss on TPMT 2019-HY1's collateral pool is 2.70%
in its base case scenario. Moody's loss estimate takes into account
the historical performance of the loans that have similar
collateral characteristics as the loans in the pool, and also
incorporate an expectation of a continued strong credit environment
for RMBS, supported by a current strong housing price environment.

Moody's estimated expected losses using two approaches -- (1)
pool-level approach, and (2) re-performing loan level analysis. In
the pool-level approach, it estimated losses on the pool by
applying its assumptions on expected future delinquencies, default
rates, loss severities and prepayments as observed on similar
seasoned collateral. It projected future annual delinquencies for
eight years by applying an initial annual default rate assumption
adjusted for future years through delinquency burnout factors. The
delinquency burnout factors reflect Moody's future expectations of
the economy and the U.S. housing market. Based on the loan
characteristics of the pool and the demonstrated pay histories, it
applied an initial expected annual delinquency rate of 4.61% for
first lien loans and 4.21% for junior lien loans for year one. It
then calculated future delinquencies using default burnout and
voluntary conditional prepayment rate (CPR) assumptions. Moody's
aggregated the delinquencies and converted them to losses by
applying pool specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity
assumptions. Its default, CPR and loss severity assumptions are
based on actual observed performance of seasoned performing,
re-performing modified loans and prior TPMT deals. In applying
Moody's loss severity assumptions, it accounted for the lack of
principal and interest advancing in this transaction. Junior lien
loans, which represent about 5% of the pool, are likely to
experience high severity in the event of default. In its analysis,
Moody's assumes these loans would experience 100% severity. Of
note, since the overall profile of this pool is more similar to
seasoned performing pools, it applied similar seasoned performing
loss assumptions to this pool to derive collateral losses.

Moody's also conducted a loan level analysis on TPMT 2019-HY1's
collateral pool. It applied loan-level baseline lifetime propensity
to default assumptions, and considered the historical performance
of seasoned loans with similar collateral characteristics and
payment histories. Moody's then adjusted this base default
propensity up for, if any, (1) adjustable-rate loans, (2) loans
that have the risk of coupon step-ups and (3) loans with high
updated loan to value ratios (LTVs). It applied a higher baseline
lifetime default propensity for interest-only loans, using the same
adjustments. To calculate the final expected loss for the pool, it
applied a loan-level loss severity assumption based on the loans'
updated estimated LTVs. Moody's further adjusted the loss severity
assumption upwards for loans in states that give super-priority
status to homeowner association (HOA) liens, to account for
potential risk of HOA liens trumping a mortgage.

The final expected loss for the collateral pool reflects the due
diligence findings of three independent third party review (TPR)
firms as well as Moody's assessment of TPMT 2019-HY1's
representations & warranties (R&Ws) framework.

Collateral Description

TPMT 2019-HY1's collateral pool is primarily comprised of seasoned
performing first lien mortgage loans. Approximately 20% of the
loans in the collateral pool have been previously modified and
second lien loans make up about 5% of the pool. The majority of the
loans underlying this transaction exhibit collateral
characteristics similar to that of seasoned Alt-A mortgages.

Moody's based its expected loss on the pool on its estimates of 1)
the default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and 2) the
principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. The two factors
that most strongly influence a re-performing mortgage loan's
likelihood of re-default are the length of time that the loan has
performed since modification, and the amount of the reduction in
monthly mortgage payments as a result of modification. The longer a
borrower has been current on a re-performing loan, the less likely
they are to re-default. Approximately 95% of the borrowers of the
loans in the collateral pool have been current on their payments
for the past 24 months or more under the OTS method.

Transaction Structure

TPMT 2019-HY1 has a sequential priority of payments structure, in
which a given class of notes can only receive principal payments
when all the classes of notes above it have been paid off.
Similarly, losses will be applied in the reverse order of priority.
The Class A1, A2, M1, M2, B1, B2, B3 and B4 notes carry a
floating-rate coupon indexed to one-month LIBOR and subject to the
collateral adjusted net WAC and applicable available funds cap. The
Class A3 and A4 notes are floating-rate notes where the coupon is
equal to the weighted average of the note rates of the related
exchange notes. The Class B5 notes are principal-only notes. There
are no performance triggers in this transaction. Additionally, the
servicer will not advance any principal or interest on delinquent
loans.

Moody's coded TPMT 2019-HY1's cashflows using its proprietary
cashflow tool. To assess the final rating on the notes, Moody's ran
96 different loss and prepayment scenarios through SFW. The
scenarios encompass six loss levels, four loss timing curves, and
four prepayment curves. The structure allows for timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal with respect to the
notes by the legal final maturity.

Third Party Review

Three independent third party review (TPR) firms -- Clayton
Services, LLC, AMC Diligence, LLC and Westcor Land Title Insurance
Company -- conducted due diligence for the transaction. Due
diligence was performed on about 75% of the loans by unpaid
principal balance in TPMT 2019-HY1's collateral pool for
compliance, 75% for data capture, 76% for pay string history, and
96% for title and tax review. The TPR firms reviewed compliance,
data integrity and key documents to verify that loans were
originated in accordance with federal, state and local
anti-predatory laws. The TPR firms conducted audits of designated
data fields to ensure the accuracy of the collateral tape.

Based on Moody's analysis of the third-party review reports, it
determined that a portion of the loans had legal or compliance
exceptions that could cause future losses to the trust. It
incorporated an additional increase to its expected losses for
these loans to account for this risk. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
retained AMC and Westcor to review the title and tax reports for
the loans in the pool, and will oversee AMC and Westcor and monitor
the loan sellers in the completion of the assignment of mortgage
chains. In addition, FirstKey expects a significant number of the
assignment and endorsement exceptions to be cleared within the
first eighteen months following the closing date of the
transaction. It took these loans into account in its loss
analysis.

Representations & Warranties

Moody's ratings reflect TPMT 2019-HY1's weak representations and
warranties (R&Ws) framework. The representation provider, FirstKey
Mortgage, LLC is unrated by Moody's. Moreover, FirstKey's
obligations will be in effect for only thirteen months after
transaction settlement. The R&Ws themselves are weak because they
contain many knowledge qualifiers and the regulatory compliance R&W
does not cover monetary damages that arise from TILA violations
whose right of rescission has expired. While the transaction
provides a breach reserve account to cover for any breaches of
R&Ws, the target size of the account (0.25% of the current balance
of the Class A1, A2, M1 and M2s) is small relative to TPMT
2019-HY1's aggregate collateral pool ($665.8 billion at closing).

Similar to recent TPMT transactions, the sponsor will not be
funding the breach reserve account at closing. On each payment
date, the paying agent will fund the reserve account from the Class
XS2 each month up to target balance based on the outstanding
principal balance of the Class A1, A2, M1 and M2 notes. Since
Moody's loss analysis already takes into account the weak R&W
framework, it did not apply an additional penalty.

Transaction Parties

The transaction benefits from a strong servicing arrangement.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. will service 100% of TPMT
2019-HY1's collateral pool. Moody's considers the overall servicing
arrangement for this pool to be better than average given the
strength of the servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and the
existence of an asset manager, FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, which will
oversee the servicer. This arrangement strengthens the overall
servicing framework in the transaction. U.S. Bank National
Association is the indenture trustee and custodian of the
transaction. The Delaware Trustee for TPMT 2019-HY1 is Wilmington
Trust, National Association.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from its original expectations
as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligors defaulting or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


TOWD POINT 2019-SJ1: Fitch to Rate  $19.91MM Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2019-SJ1 (TPMT 2019-SJ1):

  -- $265,507,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,784,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35,230,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33,189,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,040,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,913,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $303,291,000 class A3 exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $338,521,000 class A4 exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $371,710,000 class A5 exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $26,551,000 class B3 notes;

  -- $25,529,000 class B4 notes;

  -- $40,848,026 class B5 notes;

  -- $510,591,026 class A6 exchangeable notes;

  -- $26,500,000 class XA notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
14,056 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $510.59 million, which includes $2.5
million, or 0.5%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the
statistical calculation date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Closed-End Second Liens (Negative): The collateral pool consists of
100% closed-end, second lien, seasoned performing loans and RPLs
with a weighted average (WA) model credit score of 713, sustainable
loan to value ratio (sLTV) of 81%, 68% 36 months of clean pay
history and seasoning of approximately 144 months. Fitch assumes
100% loss severity (LS) on all defaulted second lien loans. Fitch
assumes second lien loans default at a rate comparable to first
lien loans, after controlling for credit attributes, no additional
default penalty was applied.

Re-Performing Loans (Negative): No loans were delinquent as of the
statistical calculation date, and 75% of the pool have been
"current" for over two years. 25% of loans are current but have
recent delinquencies or incomplete pay strings. Of the total pool,
18.2% have received modifications. The average time since loan
modification is approximately 57 months.

Sequential-Pay Structure With Higher CE (Positive): The
transaction's cash flow is based on a sequential-pay structure
whereby the subordinate classes do not receive principal until the
senior classes are repaid in full. Losses are allocated in
reverse-sequential order. Furthermore, a provision to re-allocate
principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes
prior to other principal distributions is supportive of timely
interest payments to those classes. Notably, the bonds benefit from
credit enhancement (CE) 100-200 basis points above the minimum
needed for each respective rating category. While the additional CE
is not enough to warrant a higher initial rating, it will provide
added protection against downgrades and losses for investors.

Realized Loss and Writedown Feature (Positive): Loans that are
delinquent for 180 days or more will be considered a realized loss
and, therefore, will cause the most subordinated class to be
written down. Despite the 100% LS assumed for each defaulted loan,
Fitch views the writedown feature positively as cash flows will not
be needed to pay timely interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' notes
during loan resolution by the servicer. In addition, subsequent
recoveries realized after the writedown at 180 days delinquent will
be passed on to bondholders as principal.

Moderate Operational Risk (Negative): Operational risk is
considered to be moderate for this transaction since not all loans
were subject to a due diligence review by a third party review
(TPR) firm. Approximately 37% of loans by UPB (23% by loan count)
were reviewed. The due diligence was performed by Tier 1 TPR firms
and the results were consistent with the sponsor's prior
transactions. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) has a
well-established track record as an aggregator of seasoned
performing and RPL mortgages and has an 'Average' aggregator
assessment from Fitch. Most of the loans were originated by a
single large bank seller, and the sponsor's (or its affiliate's)
retention of at least 5% of the bonds should help mitigate the
operational risk of the transaction.

Low Aggregate Servicing Fee (Negative): Fitch determined that the
initial servicing fee of 30 basis points (bps) may be insufficient
to attract subsequent servicers under a period of poor performance
and high delinquencies. In the event that a successor servicer is
appointed, the servicing fee can be increased to an amount greater
than the cap. To reflect the risk of an increased servicing fee,
Fitch assumed a 75-bp servicing fee in its cash flow analysis to
test the adequacy of CE and excess spread.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Neutral): A third-party due diligence
sample review of 23% by loan count and 37% by unpaid principal
balance (UPB) was conducted and focused on regulatory compliance,
pay history (Clayton and AMC, both assessed by Fitch as Tier 1
third-party review firms) and a tax and title lien search (WestCor
and AMC). The diligence findings and lack of 100% tax and title
review did not result in an additional adjustment due to the 100%
LS assumption applied by Fitch.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of certain reps that Fitch typically expects for
RPL transactions. After a threshold event (which occurs when
realized loss exceeds the class principal balance of the B3, B4 and
B5 notes), loan reviews for identifying breaches will be conducted
on loans that experience a realized loss of $10,000 or more. To
account for the Tier 2 framework, Fitch increased its 'AAAsf' loss
expectations by roughly 314 bps to account for a potential increase
in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses in the reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): FirstKey, as rep provider,
will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to breaches prior
to the payment date in March 2020. Thereafter, a reserve fund will
be available to cover amounts due to noteholders for loans
identified as having rep breaches. Amounts on deposit in the
reserve fund, as well as the increased level of subordination, will
be available to cover additional defaults and losses resulting from
rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or after the payment date
in March 2020.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $2.5 million (0.5%) of the UPB are
outstanding on 190 loans. Fitch included the deferred amounts when
calculating the borrower's loan to value ratio (LTV) and
sustainable LTV (sLTV), despite the lower payment and amounts not
being owed during the term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in a
higher probability of default (PD) than if there were no deferrals.
Because deferred amounts are due and payable by the borrower at
maturity, Fitch believes that borrower default behavior for these
loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit strategies
(that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to those
borrowers with more equity in the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.0% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivity analysis to determine the stresses
to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by WestCor Land Title Insurance Company (WestCor), Clayton
Services LLC and AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC). The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on regulatory compliance,
pay history, servicing comments, the presence of key documents in
the loan file and data integrity. In addition, AMC and Westcor were
retained to perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a
review to confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant
local jurisdiction and the related assignment chains. A regulatory
compliance and data integrity review was completed on 37.2% of the
pool by balance.

344 of the reviewed loans received either a "C" or "D" grade. For
193 of these loans, this was due to missing documents that
prevented testing for predatory lending compliance. The inability
to test for predatory lending may expose the trust to potential
assignee liability, which creates added risk for bond investors.
Typically, Fitch makes an LS adjustment to account for this;
however, all loans in the pool are already receiving 100% LS;
therefore, no adjustments were made. Reasons for the remaining 151
"C" and "D" grades include missing final HUD1s that are not subject
to predatory lending, missing state disclosures and other
compliance-related documents. Fitch believes these issues do not
add material risk to bondholders, since the statute of limitations
has expired. No adjustment to loss expectations were made for any
of the 344 loans that received either a "C" or "D" grade.
dated May 31, 2016.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated two criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria" and one variation from the "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria." The first variation relates to the tax/title review. An
updated tax/title review was not completed on 11,161 loans. While a
tax/title review was not completed, Fitch's analysis already
assumed that these loans were not in first-lien position, and Fitch
assumes 100% LS for all second liens. There was no rating impact
due to this variation.

The second variation is that a due diligence compliance and data
integrity review was not completed on 10,850 loans. Fitch's model
assumes 100% LS for all second liens and therefore no additional
adjustment was made to Fitch's expected losses. There was no rating
impact from application of this variation.


TPG PACE: KPMG LLP Raises Going Concern Doubt
---------------------------------------------
TPG Pace Holdings Corp. filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission its annual report on Form 10-K, disclosing a net income
(attributable to ordinary shares) of $6,865,501 on $0 of revenue
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2018, compared to a net loss
(attributable to ordinary shares) of $376,372 on $0 of revenue for
the period from Feb. 14, 2017 (Inception) to Dec. 31, 2017.

The audit report of KPMG LLP states that the Company's limited
amount of time to complete an initial business combination for
which significant contingencies to completion exist raise
substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going
concern.

President and Chief Executive Officer Karl Peterson states, "If the
Company does not complete an initial Business Combination within 24
months from June 30, 2017 (the "Close Date"), or 27 months from the
Close Date if the Company has executed a letter of intent,
agreement in principle or definitive agreement for an initial
business combination within 24 months of the Close Date, the
Company will (i) cease all operations except for the purposes of
winding up, (ii) as promptly as reasonably possible, but not more
than ten business days thereafter, redeem all of the Class A
ordinary shares issued as part of the units in the Public Offering
at a per-share price, payable in cash, equal to the aggregate
amount then on deposit in the trust account with Continental Stock
Transfer and Trust Company acting as trustee (the "Trust Account"),
including interest, net of taxes (less up to $100,000 of such net
interest to pay dissolution expenses), divided by the number of
then outstanding public shares, which redemption will completely
extinguish the shareholder rights of owners of Class A ordinary
shares (including the right to receive further liquidation
distributions, if any), subject to applicable law, and (iii) as
promptly as reasonably possible following such redemption, subject
to the approval of the remaining shareholders and the board of
directors, dissolve and liquidate, subject in each case to the
Company's obligations under Cayman Islands law to provide for
claims of creditors and the requirements of other applicable law.
In the event of such distribution, it is possible that the per
share value of the residual assets remaining available for
distribution, including Trust Account assets, will be less than the
initial public offering price per unit in the Public Offering.  In
addition, if the Company fails to complete its Business Combination
within 24 months of the Close Date, or 27 months from the Close
Date if the Company has executed a letter of intent, agreement in
principle or definitive agreement for an initial business
combination within 24 months of the Close Date, there will be no
redemption rights or liquidating distributions with respect to
warrants to purchase the Company's Class A ordinary shares, which
will expire worthless.  This mandatory liquidation and subsequent
dissolution requirement raises substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern."

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2018, showed total assets
of $457,467,378, total liabilities of $16,002,472, and a total
stockholders' equity of $5,000,006.

A copy of the Form 10-K is available at:

                       https://is.gd/S3psgt

TPG Pace Holdings Corp. does not have significant operations.  It
intends to effect a merger, share exchange, asset acquisition,
share purchase, reorganization, or similar business combination
with one or more businesses.  The Company was founded in 2017 and
is based in Fort Worth, Texas.



VERTICAL BRIDGE 2018-1: Fitch Affirms BB- on $38MM Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of VB-S1 Issuer, LLC's
(Vertical Bridge) Secured Tower Revenue Notes, Series 2016-1 and
2018-1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Cash Flow and Leverage: Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) on the
pool is $66.5 million, which equates to a Fitch DSCR of 1.26x. The
debt multiple relative to Fitch's NCF would be 8.6x, which equates
to a debt yield of 11.7%. Excluding the Risk Retention Class R, the
offered notes would have a Fitch DSCR, NCF Multiple and Debt Yield
of 1.28x, 8.4x and 11.9%, respectively. Fitch NCF has increased
approximately 5% since last rating action.

Diversified Pool: There are 2,551 wireless sites (2,664 towers and
other structures) spanning 47 states and Puerto Rico. The largest
state (Illinois) represents approximately 11.3% of ARR.

Leases to Strong Tower Tenants: There are 4,052 wireless tenant
leases, an increase from 3,961 when the Series 2018-1 notes were
issued. Telephony and data tenants represent 85.4% of annualized
run rate revenue (ARRR), and approximately 40% of the ARRR is from
investment-grade tenants. Tenant leases on the cellular sites have
average annual escalators of approximately 2.8% and an average
final remaining term (including renewals) of approximately 23.4
years.

Broadcast Concentration: Broadcast tenants represent approximately
14.3% of the ARRR. Broadcast has limited growth prospects given the
ability for one or a few towers to cover a metropolitan statistical
area (MSA), the low levels of consumption of over-the-air
television and competing mediums for distributing local
advertising.

Technology Dependent Credit: Due to the specialized nature of the
collateral and potential for changes in technology to affect
long-term demand for tower space, similar to most wireless tower
transactions, the senior classes of this transaction do not achieve
ratings above 'Asf'. The securities have a rated final payment date
30 years after closing, and the long-term tenor of the securities
increases the risk that an alternative technology rendering
obsolete the current transmission of wireless signals through
cellular sites -- will be developed. Currently, wireless service
providers (WSPs) depend on towers to transmit their signals and
continue to invest in this technology.

Additional Debt: The transaction allows for the issuance of
additional notes. Such additional notes may rank senior to, pari
passu with, or subordinate to, the 2018 notes. Any additional notes
will be pari passu with any class of notes bearing the same
alphabetical class designation. Additional notes may be issued
without the benefit of additional collateral, provided the
post-issuance DSCR is not less than 2.0x. The possibility of
upgrades may be limited due to this provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch does not foresee negative ratings migration unless a material
economic or asset level event changes the transaction's
portfolio-level metrics. The class ratings are expected to remain
stable based on anticipated cash flow growth due to annual rent
escalations, tenant renewals and additional leasing on existing
towers. Upgrades could be limited due to the allowance for
additional notes without the benefit of additional collateral, the
specialized nature of the collateral and the potential for changes
in technology to affect long-term demand for wireless tower space.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $185,000,000 series 2018-1 class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,000,000 series 2018-1 class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $38,000,000 series 2018-1 class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $240,000,000 series 2016-1 class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29,000,000 series 2016-1 class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52,000,000 series 2016-1 class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The 2018-1 class C ranks pari passu with the 2016-1 class C, the
2018-1 class D with the 2016-1 class D and the 2018-1 class F with
the 2016-1 class F.

Fitch does not rate Class R, which represents the horizontal credit
risk retention interest for the 2018 certificates.


VERUS SECURITIZATION 2019-1: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on B-2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Verus
Securitization Trust 2019-1's mortgage pass-through certificates.

The issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transaction backed by U.S. residential mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 13,
2019. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The representation and warranty framework for this transaction;
and
-- The mortgage aggregator, Invictus Capital Partners.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Verus Securitization Trust 2019-1
  Class       Rating(i)     Amount (mil. $)
  A-1         AAA (sf)          457,227,000
  A-2         AA (sf)            42,834,000
  A-3         A (sf)             74,378,000
  M-1         BBB- (sf)          39,514,000
  B-1         BB- (sf)           26,232,000
  B-2         B+ (sf)             5,472,000
  B-3         NR                 18,435,303
  A-IO-S      NR                   Notional(ii)
  XS          NR                   Notional(ii)
  P           NR                        100
  R           NR                        N/A

(i)The collateral and structural information in this report reflect
the term sheet dated Feb. 13, 2019. The preliminary ratings
assigned to the classes address the ultimate payment of interest
and principal.
(ii)The notional amount equals the loans' stated principal balance.

N/A--Not applicable.
NR--Not Rated.


VOIP-PAL.COM: Has $5.87-Mil. Net Loss in Dec. 31 Quarter
--------------------------------------------------------
VoIP-Pal.Com Inc. filed its quarterly report on Form 10-Q,
disclosing Net Loss and Comprehensive Loss of $5,871,403 on $0 of
revenue for the three months ended Dec. 31, 2018, compared to Net
Loss and Comprehensive Loss of $665,090 on $0 of revenue for the
same period in 2017.

At Dec. 31, 2018 the Company had total assets of $4,256,383, total
liabilities of $94,156, and $4,162,227 in total stockholders'
equity.

VoIP-Pal.Com states, "The Company is in various stages of product
development and continues to incur losses and, at December 31,
2018, had an accumulated deficit of $48,519,767 (September 30, 2018
- $42,648,364).  The ability of the Company to continue operations
as a going concern is dependent upon raising additional working
capital, settling outstanding debts and generating profitable
operations.  These material uncertainties raise substantial doubt
about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  Should
the going concern assumption not continue to be appropriate,
further adjustments to carrying values of assets and liabilities
may be required.  There can be no assurance that capital will be
available as necessary to meet these continued developments and
operating costs or, if the capital is available, that it will be on
the terms acceptable to the Company.  The issuances of additional
stock by the Company may result in a significant dilution in the
equity interests of its current shareholders.  Obtaining commercial
loans, assuming those loans would be available, will increase the
Company's liabilities and future cash commitments.  If the Company
is unable to obtain financing in the amounts and on terms deemed
acceptable, its business and future success may be adversely
affected.

"Additionally, as the Company's stated objective is to monetize its
patent suite through the licensing or sale of its intellectual
property ("IP"), the Company being forced to litigate or to defend
its IP claims through litigation casts substantial doubt on its
future to continue as a going concern.  IP litigation is generally
a costly process, and in the absence of revenue the Company must
raise capital to continue its own defense and to validate its
claims - in the event of a failure to defend its patent claims,
either because of lack of funding, a court ruling against the
Company or because of a protracted litigation process, there can be
no assurance that the Company will be able to raise additional
capital to pay for an appeals process or a lengthy trial.  The
outcome of any litigation process may have a significant adverse
effect on the Company's ability to continue as a going concern."

A copy of the Form 10-Q is available at:

                       https://is.gd/DWxkas

VoIP-Pal.Com Inc. was incorporated in the state of Nevada in
September 1997 as All American Casting International, Inc. and
changed its name to VOIP MDU.com in 2004 and subsequently to
VoIP-Pal.Com Inc. in 2006.  Since March 2004, the Company has been
in the development stage of becoming a Voice-over-Internet Protocol
re-seller, a provider of a proprietary transactional billing
platform tailored to the points and air mile business, and a
provider of anti-virus applications for smartphones.



VOYA CLO 2019-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Voya CLO
2019-1 Ltd./Voya CLO 2019-1 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
securitization backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 15,
2019. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests;

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Voya CLO 2019-1 Ltd./Voya CLO 2019-1 LLC
  Class              Rating               Amount
                                        (mil. $)
  A                  AAA (sf)             259.00
  B                  AA (sf)               54.00
  C (deferrable)     A (sf)                21.00
  D (deferrable)     BBB- (sf)             18.00
  E (deferrable)     BB- (sf)              16.00
  Subordinate notes  NR                    30.70

  NR--Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Affirms CCC on $13.6MM Class H Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven distressed ratings of Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2005-C17.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Loss Projections Remain High: The majority of the outstanding bond
balance remains reliant on loans which are either already in
default or are expected to default in the near term. Defeased
collateral and fully amortizing loans represent 10.9% of the pool,
which is not enough to cover the senior-most class. Given the
concentration of defaulted and distressed assets in the pool, Fitch
maintains that losses are possible, if not inevitable, for all
outstanding bonds.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: Since the last rating action,
no loans have been repaid or disposed. The largest asset in the
pool is REO, and as of the January 2019 remittance, class H is the
only certificate which is not being shorted interest payments.
Credit enhancement is not expected to change significantly until a
loan repays. The next scheduled loan maturity is in 2020, when two
loans representing 21.5% of the pool, one of which is a Fitch Loan
of Concern (FLOC), are scheduled to mature.

Retail Concentration: While the pool is highly concentrated by loan
count, it is also concentrated by property type. Retail accounts
for 93.8% of the underlying collateral, much of which has been
flagged by Fitch for significant vacancy and upcoming tenant
rollover. Fitch has flagged three loans representing 77.5% of the
pool as FLOCs. The largest asset, Westland Mall, represents 47.3%
of the pool. The property is a distressed mall with 35% inline
occupancy and is located in a tertiary market in south-eastern
Iowa. It recently became REO. The second largest FLOC is also
secured by a distressed retail property. It is located in central
Illinois and is only 8.4% physically occupied. The smallest FLOC is
an anchored retail property located in Edgewood, KY. The largest
tenant is Kmart, occupying 65% of the NRA on a lease through
November 2022. Given mounting concerns with Sears' recent
bankruptcy filing and ongoing financial challenges, Fitch believes
this loan is at risk for default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Given the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch utilized a
sensitivity analysis to determine a realistic recovery scenario for
the remaining loans. Upgrades are not expected given the underlying
collateral consists primarily of properties in weak markets with
vacancy issues and upcoming tenant rollover. The distressed classes
may be downgraded as loss expectations increase or as losses are
realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due-diligence was provided or reviewed as part of
this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $13.6 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE revised to 90% from
100%;

  -- $6.8 million class J at 'Csf'; RE revised to 0% from 50%;

  -- $10.2 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  -- $2.2 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-1A, A-PB, A-J, B, C, D, E, F and G
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P
certificate. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-P and X-C certificates.


WAIKIKI BEACH 2019-WBM: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Waikiki Beach Hotel
Trust 2019-WBM's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by the borrower's leasehold interest in the
1,310-guestroom Waikiki Beach Marriott Resort & Spa.

The ratings reflect S&P Global Ratings' view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure. S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 103.5%, based on its
value of the property backing the transaction.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Waikiki Beach Hotel Trust 2019-WBM

  Class       Rating          Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)       112,200,000
  B           AA- (sf)        36,800,000
  C           A- (sf)         27,300,000
  D           BBB- (sf)       36,100,000
  E           BB- (sf)        56,900,000
  F           B- (sf)         50,375,000
  HRR         NR              16,825,000

  NR--Not rated.


WAMU MORTGAGE 2006-AR3: Moody's Lowers X-2 Certs Rating to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Cl. X-2 from
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series 2006-AR3
Trust, backed by Option ARM loans

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-AR3 Trust

Cl. X-2*, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

  * Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
rating downgrade on Cl. X-2 is because the bond hasn't been paying
interest for more than 12 months due to it's coupon calculation to
zero.

The methodologies used in this rating were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest Only (IO) Securities" published
in February 2019.

The Credit Rating was assigned in accordance with Moody's existing
Methodologies entitled "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology," dated
1/31/2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities," dated February 11, 2019. Please
note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's released a Request for
Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Methodology for pre-2009 US RMBS Prime Jumbo,
Alt-A, Option ARM, Subprime, Scratch and Dent, Second Lien and
Manufactured Housing transactions. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, this Credit Rating is not expected to be
affected.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate was 4.0% in January 2019 from 4.1% in January
2018. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2019 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2019. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


WELLFLEET CLO X: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on $16MM Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Wellfleet CLO X, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$187,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2032 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$12,500,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A-1b Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2032
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$13,930,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$19,180,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2032 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$16,100,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2032 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Wellfleet CLO X is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist
of second lien loans, senior unsecured loans, and first-lien last
out loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Wellfleet Credit Partners, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $312,500,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2791

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.1 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for Wellfleet CLO X, Ltd. was assigned in
accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 31, 2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for
Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on Wellfleet CLO X, Ltd.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C33 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: The affirmations are based on the overall
stable performance of the underlying collateral. No loans have
transferred to special servicing since issuance. Three loans (3.8%
of the current pool balance) have been designated as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs). Three loans (1.6%) have been defeased, and there
have been no realized losses to date.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the January 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 2.5% to $694.2 million from $712.2 million at
issuance. As property-level performance is generally in line with
issuance expectations, the original rating analysis was considered
in affirming the transaction.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Fitch Loans of Concern: Three loans (3.8%) have been designated as
a FLOC. The largest FLOC, 116 Inverness (2%), is secured by a
214,478 sf suburban office property located in Englewood, CO. The
property has seen a steady decline in occupancy and NOI since
issuance. As of the December 2018 rent roll, the property was 64%
occupied. The remaining two FLOCs are secured by a neighborhood
retail center located in Humble, TX and a limited service hotel
located in Richmond, VA. Both have been designated as a FLOC due to
a Low DSCR and occupancy declines since issuance. Fitch will
continue to monitor the FLOCs and provide updates as received.

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 14 loans (5.3% of the pool)
secured by multifamily co-ops; 12 are located in New York City
metro area; one is in Washington, D.C; and one is in Atlanta, GA.

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest property type
concentrations are office (32.8% of the pool), retail (18.5%),
self-storage (14%) and hotel (13%) of the pool. There are no
regional malls in the pool.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The third largest loan in the
pool. 225 Liberty Street (5.7%) located in New York, NY was
assigned an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf' at
issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on all classes remains Stable given the
relatively stable performance of the transaction since issuance.
Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until
a material economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's
overall portfolio level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $12.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $84.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $191.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53.4 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $533.9* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $70.3* million class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $38.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35.6* million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.9* million class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.1* million class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.9 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.1 class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or class X-G certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2017-SMP: Moody's Affirms Ba3 on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on five classes of
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-SMP, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-SMP ("WFCM 2017-SMP").
Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the five P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, defeasance of
the loan or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan, or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2018 Distribution Date, the transaction's
certificate balance remains unchanged at $300 million from
securitization. The Certificates are collateralized by a single
loan backed by a first lien commercial mortgage related to one
property, Santa Monica Place. The loan's final maturity date is in
December 2022.

Santa Monica Place is an open-air, regional mall located in Santa
Monica, CA. Collateral for the loan includes (i) the fee simple
interest in the 523,139 SF, three-level shopping center (including
the Anchor SF) and (ii) the leasehold interest in two, multi-level
parking garages contiguous to the shopping center and the retail
space in the parking facilities. The Property contains three anchor
tenants, which include Nordstrom (121,665 SF, 23.3% of NRA),
Bloomingdale's (101,756 SF, 19.5% of NRA), and ArcLight Cinemas
(48,000 SF, 9.2% of NRA). Other noteworthy national retailers at
the Property include Tiffany & Co., Louis Vuitton, All Saints,
Coach and Hugo Boss. The Property also contains an entertainment
component including a 12-screen movie theater, six restaurants, and
a food court.

The Property is well located in downtown Santa Monica, CA, one
block from the famous Santa Monica Pier and at the southern base of
the Third Street Promenade retail district. The Property is
situated just off Interstate 10 and adjacent to the newly added
Metro Expo Line, which connects Santa Monica to downtown Los
Angeles.

The property's reported net cash flow (NCF) for the first nine
months of 2018 was $16.6 million. Moody's stabilized NCF is $23.8
million, the same as securitization. Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio is 94.7% and Moody's stressed DSCR is at 0.86X. There are no
interest shortfalls or losses outstanding as of the current
Distribution Date.


WELLS FARGO 2019-C49: Fitch to Rate Class H-RR Certs 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2019-C49 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2019-C49.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $18,904,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,083,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,500,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,974,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $130,000,000d class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $293,499,000d class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $541,960,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $125,812,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46,453,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40,647,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $38,712,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,014,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,014,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18,504,000bc class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,646,000bc class F-RR 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,677,000bc class G-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,711,000bc class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $8,710,000bc class J-RR;

  -- $24,194,767bc class K-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.

(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

(d) The certificate balances will be determined based on the final
pricing of those classes of certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 12, 2019.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 64 loans secured by 71
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$774,228,768 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Ladder Capital
Finance LLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance LLC, Barclays Capital Real
Estate Inc. and C-III Commercial Mortgage LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 80.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch LTV is 108.2%, which is well
above the 2017 and 2018 averages of 101.6% and 102.0% for other
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. Additionally, the pool's
DSCR of 1.14x is considerably lower than the 2017 and 2018 averages
of 1.26x and 1.22x, respectively.

Above Average Pool Diversification: The pool is less concentrated
than recent Fitch-rated transactions. The largest 10 loans comprise
46.0% of the pool, lower than the average top 10 concentrations for
2017 and 2018 of 53.1% and 50.6%, respectively. The concentration
results in an LCI of 311, which is lower than the respective 2017
and 2018 averages of 398 and 373. Additionally, the pool's SCI of
311 is lower than the 2017 average of 422 and the 2018 average of
398.

Above-Average Hotel and Retail Property Type Concentrations: Loans
secured by hotel properties make up 21.9% of the pool, which is
well above the 2017 and 2018 averages of 15.8% and 14.7% for other
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. Loans secured by hotel
properties have a high probability of default in Fitch's
multiborrower model. Additionally, the pool's largest property type
concentration is retail, which at 31.1% of the pool is well above
the 2017 and 2018 averages of 24.8% and 28.5%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 18.1% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the WFCM
2019-C49 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2019-1: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2019-1
(the Issuer):

-- $166,400,000 Class A-1 at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Class A-2-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2-B at AAA (sf)
-- $70,560,000 Class B at AA (sf)
-- $89,430,000 Class C at A (sf)
-- $83,700,000 Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $35,280,000 Class E at BB (sf)
-- $47,170,000 Class F at B (sf)

The combination of Classes A-2-A and A-2-B is expected to equal
$307.46 million.

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the
following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the rating addresses the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date for each class.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of the
auto loan portfolio by origination channels.

-- The capabilities of Westlake Services, LLC (Westlake) with
regards to originations, underwriting, and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool
data for Westlake originations and performance of the Westlake auto
loan portfolio.

-- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA /R-1 (high) with Stable trends
by DBRS) has served as a backup servicer for Westlake since 2003
when a conduit facility was put in place.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Westlake,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance."

The collateral securing the notes consists entirely of a pool of
retail automobile contracts secured by predominantly used vehicles
that typically have high mileage. The loans are primarily made to
obligors who are categorized as subprime largely because of their
credit history and credit scores.

The ratings on the Class A Notes reflect the 43.25% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.00%) and over-collateralization (2.50%). The
ratings on Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F Notes
reflect 34.65%, 23.75%, 13.55%, 9.25% and 3.50% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-C14.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement has increased
since issuance due to loan payoffs, scheduled amortization and
defeased collateral. As of the January 2019 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 8.3% to $1.3
billion from $1.5 billion at issuance; realized losses to date have
been minimal, totaling $125,268 (0.01% of the original pool
balance). Five loans (2.8% of the current pool) are fully defeased.
Five loans (32.6% of pool) are full-term interest-only. All 14 of
the partial-term interest-only loans are amortizing.

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: Overall performance and
loss expectations for the majority of the pool have remained
relatively stable since issuance. Eight loans/assets (34.2% of
pool) have been flagged as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs),
including five loans in the top 15 (31.3%) and one specially
serviced asset (0.7%).

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest FLOC is the second largest
loan, The Plant - San Jose (9.1% of pool), which is secured by a
485,895-sf power center in San Jose, CA. Property occupancy dropped
to 80.5% in April 2018 due to Toys "R" Us and Office Max both
vacating in 2018. In addition, a co-tenancy clause with Ross Dress
for Less was triggered, converting the tenant to percentage rent.

The second largest FLOC is the fourth largest loan, White Marsh
Mall (8.2%), which is secured by a regional mall in Baltimore, MD.
The property has reported lower sales since issuance and faces
significant competition in its trade area. The property is not the
dominant mall in the Baltimore market.

The third largest FLOC is the fifth largest loan, 301 South College
Street (6.6%), which is secured by a 988,646-sf office building in
Charlotte, NC. The property faces significant upcoming rollover in
2021 when 74% of the NRA is expected roll over, including the
largest tenant, Wells Fargo (69.5% of NRA).

The fourth largest FLOC is the sixth largest loan, Cheeca Lodge &
Spa (5.9%), which suffered extensive water and wind-related damage
as a result of Hurricane Irma in September 2017. The property was
fully closed between September 2017 and March 2018. Per the
servicer, all rooms are back online and hotel operations continue
to stabilize.

The fifth largest FLOC, Continental Plaza (1.5%), is secured by a
568,740-sf, 34-story office building in Columbus, OH. The property
faces significant upcoming rollover with 48.5% of the NRA expiring
in 2019. Ohio Health Corporation (20% of NRA) announced they will
be vacating at their 2019 lease expiration.

The two non-specially serviced FLOCs outside the top 15 were
flagged for occupancy issues. The Mobile Festival Centre loan
(1.4%) is secured by a 380,619-sf power center in Mobile, AL.
Occupancy at the property is estimated to have dropped to 51% from
82% at YE 2017, driven by the closure of Virginia College, Bed Bath
& Beyond and Ross Dress for Less. The 7220 Wisconsin Ave loan
(0.8%) is secured by a 41,525-sf mixed-use building in Bethesda,
MD. The servicer-reported NOI DSCR has remained below 1.0x since
2016. Property occupancy remains low; the recent improvement to 69%
as of September 2018 from 51% at YE 2017 was mainly due to
short-term, one-year leases to various local tenants during the
first half of 2018. In addition, approximately 33% of NRA is
expected to roll in 2019.

Specially Serviced Asset: The specially serviced BSG Texas Hotel
Portfolio asset (0.7%), which has been REO since February 2017,
consists of two hotels in Big Spring, TX and Graham, TX. One of the
assets, The Hilton Express in Graham, TX, was recently sold in
January 2019. The special servicer continues to stabilize the
remaining asset, The La Quinta Inn and Suites in Big Spring, TX,
which recently underwent a property improvement plan and retained
new third-party management.

Additional Loss Consideration: In addition to modeling a base case
loss, Fitch Ratings applied an additional sensitivity whereby
potential outsized losses of 15% and 10% were applied on the White
Marsh Mall loan (8.2% of pool) and the 301 South College Street
loan (6.6%), respectively. This scenario contributed to the
Negative Rating Outlook on class F.


RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlook on class F reflects an additional
sensitivity performed on the White Marsh Mall and 301 South College
Street loans to address refinance and significant rollover
concerns, and the potential for rating downgrade should performance
of the FLOCs further deteriorate. The Stable Rating Outlooks for
classes A-3 though E reflect the relatively stable performance of
the majority of the pool, increased credit enhancement and expected
continued amortization. Rating upgrades may be limited due to
increasing pool concentration and adverse selection.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $55.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $160.0 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $437.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55.0 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0.0 million class A-3FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $95.0 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0.0 million class A-4FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $104.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,015.9 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $108.4 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $102.9 million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $102.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $111.7 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $77.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class G and the interest-only class X-C certificates.


[*] DBRS Reviews 482 Classes From 53 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 482 classes from 53 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the 482 classes
reviewed, DBRS upgraded 76 ratings, confirmed 388 ratings,
downgraded one rating and discontinued 17 ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating confirmations reflect asset
performance and credit support levels that are consistent with the
current ratings. The rating downgrade reflects the transaction's
continued erosion of credit support as well as negative trends in
delinquency and projected loss activity. The discontinued ratings
are the result of the full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," published on September 27, 2018.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, subprime, Alt-A and
ReREMIC collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities listed below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect actual deal or tranche
performance that is not fully reflected in the projected cash flows
or model output.

-- Banc of America Funding 2015-R3 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class 9A1

-- BCAP LLC 2015-RR3 Trust, Resecuritization Trust Securities,
Class 2A1

-- BCAP LLC 2015-RR3 Trust, Resecuritization Trust Securities,
Class 4A1

-- Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2014-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-2, Class B-4

-- Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2014-3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-3, Class B-4

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class M-4

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class B-1

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class B-2

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN2, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN2, Class A-IO-S

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN2, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2015-3, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series
2015-3, Class A-IO-S

-- CSMC Trust 2015-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2015-WIN1, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2015-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2015-WIN1, Class A-IO-S

-- Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2008-6, Class 2-A1

-- Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2008-6, Class 2-A2

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class II-A-1

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class III-A-1

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class III-A-3

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class III-A-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A4, Class 1-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A4, Class 2-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A4, Class 3-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A4, Class 3-A-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A4, Class 4-A-2

-- Banc of America Funding 2016-R1 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class M2

-- Banc of America Funding 2016-R1 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class A5

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 7A7

The Affected Ratings is available at https://bit.ly/2BxZqmE


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 48 Classes From Six US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 48 ratings from six U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2005. All of these transactions are backed by
prime jumbo and subprime collateral. The review yielded seven
downgrades and 41 affirmations.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Erosion of or increases in credit support;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.
-- Tail risk;
-- Interest-only criteria; and
-- Principal-only criteria

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

S&P lowered its rating on class 3-A-1 from MASTR Asset
Securitization Trust 2004-10 as a result of the risk of not paying
down by maturity. One loan was modified with a significant term
extension and is currently in foreclosure. It is unclear when this
loan may be liquidated. The total balance of the other loans in
group three are insufficient to fully pay down class 3-A-1. As a
result, S&P believes class 3-A-1 may not pay down by its maturity
date.

S&P lowered its rating on class DB1 from CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust
Series 2002-34 as a result of credit support erosion due to class
DB2 experiencing write-downs each month since April 2018. Credit
support decreased to 31.3% (as of January 2019) from 36.6% during
last review. Ultimately, S&P believes that class DB1 has credit
support that is insufficient to withstand losses at higher rating
levels."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/2T7qTWc


                            *********

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