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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, November 25, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 328

                            Headlines

BARINGS MIDDLE 2018-I: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on D Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on E-R Notes
CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C7: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
CIG AUTO 2017-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Debt
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2009-7: Moody's Hikes 5A2 Debt Rating to Caa3

FREDDIE MAC SCRT 2018-4: Fitch Rates Class M Certs B-sf
GOLDMAN SACHS 2013-GC10: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2012-GC6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2018-RPL1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Notes
GUGGENHEIM MM 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B Rating on F Notes

LONE STAR 2015-LSP: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class E Certs
MAGNETITE LTD XVIII: Moody's Rates $6.89MM Class F-R Notes B3
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class E Certs
MONROE CAPITAL VII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-XLF2: Fitch Cuts SNMD Debt Rating to BB-

NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-5: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on 5 Tranches
OZLM LTD VIII: Moody's Rates $31.5MM Class D-RR Notes 'Ba3'
REALT 2007-2: S&P Raises Class L Notes Rating to BB+
RMF BUYOUT 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class M4 Debt
SLM STUDENT 2014-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Bsf

TRUPS FINANCIALS 2018-2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to B Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL 2018-C14: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs BB-sf
UNITED AUTO 2018-1: DRBS Hikes Class F Notes Rating to BB
VOYA CLO 2015-3: Fitch Rates $18.4MM Class E-R Notes 'Bsf'
VOYA CLO 2015-3: S&P Rates $31.9MM Class D-R Notes 'BB-'

WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Hikes Class G Debt Rating to B1
WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class H Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-LC25: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
[*] Moody's Hikes $76MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued in 2017-2018
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $519.8MM RMBS Issued in 2003-2007

[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 49 Classes From 14 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 79 Classes From 19 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

BARINGS MIDDLE 2018-I: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Barings
Middle Market CLO Ltd. 2018-I's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by middle-market speculative-grade (rated 'BB+'
and lower) senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 16,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Barings Middle Market CLO Ltd. 2018-I/Barings Middle Market CLO  

  2018-I LLC

  Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                   AAA (sf)              226.00
  A-2                   AA (sf)                40.20
  B (deferrable)        A- (sf)                37.80
  C (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)              20.10
  D (deferrable)        BB- (sf)               28.00
  Subordinated notes    NR                     50.40

  NR--Not rated.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class X, A-1R, B-R,
C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from BlueMountain CLO 2016-3
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
September 2016 that is managed by BlueMountain Capital Management
LLC. The deal also issued an A-2R note that we are not rating. S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original class A, B, C, D, and E notes
following payment in full on the November 15, 2018 refinancing
date.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

On the Nov. 15, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes were used to redeem the original
notes. S&P withdrew the ratings on the original notes and assigned
ratings to the replacement notes.

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

-- The class A notes were split into class A-1R and A-2R notes.

-- A class X note was issued and is expected to paydown equally
over eight periods, starting on the second payment date.

-- The replacement class A-1R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes were
issued at lower spreads than the original notes.

-- The replacement class A-2R notes are issued at a higher spread
than the original class A notes.

-- The non-call period was extended to November 2020.

-- The reinvestment period was be extended to November 2023.

-- The maturity date was extended to November 2030.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate, and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 LLC

  Replacement class                 Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X                                 AAA (sf)               2.70
  A-1R                              AAA (sf)             280.25
  A-2R                              NR                    19.00
  B-R                               AA (sf)               57.00
  C-R (deferrable)                  A (sf)                36.80
  D-R (deferrable)                  BBB- (sf)             24.95
  E-R (deferrable)                  BB- (sf)              19.00
  Subordinate notes (deferrable)    NR                    43.10

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 LLC
  
                               Rating
  Original class          To          From        Amount (mil. $)
  A                       NR          AAA (sf)             294.50
  B                       NR          AA (sf)              68.875
  C                       NR          A (sf)               30.875
  D                       NR          BBB (sf)              23.75
  E                       NR          BB (sf)               19.00

  NR--Not rated.


CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C7: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Cantor Commercial Real
Estate (CFCRE) Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C7 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations are
based on the stable performance of the underlying collateral. There
are no delinquent loans and no loans are currently in special
servicing. No loans have been designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern
(FLOC). There have been no material changes to the pool since
issuance, therefore the original rating analysis was considered in
affirming the transaction.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement since issuance. As of the October 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
2.1% to $639.5 million from $652.9 million at issuance. 36 loans
remain in the pool, and one loan has been disposed since Fitch's
last rating action. Twelve loans, representing 51.6% of the pool,
are full-term interest only, and nine loans, representing 15.9% of
the pool, are partial interest only.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Retail Concentration: The pool's largest property type is retail at
37.5% of the pool balance; that includes two regional malls
(12.7%), one of which is sponsored by Simon Property Group, L.P.
(A/Stable).

Fresno Fashion Fair Mall (6.4%) is the dominant mall in its primary
trade area of an approximately seven-mile radius in Fresno, CA.
Anchor tenants include Macy's (non-collateral), JC Penney (29%),
Forever 21 (non-collateral), and Macy's Men's and Children's. Of
note, is that, except for Forever 21, the anchor tenants perform
above their respective national sales average.

Potomac Mills (6.3%) is secured by approximately 1.46 million
square feet of a 1.84 million square foot (sf) regional outlet mall
in Woodbridge, VA along the I-95 corridor, between Washington D.C.
and Richmond, VA. IKEA and Burlington Coat Factory are
non-collateral anchors. Larger collateral anchors include Costco
Warehouse, J.C. Penney and an 18-screen AMC movie theatre.
Performance continues to be in line with issuance levels. At
issuance, this loan received an investment-grade credit opinion of
'BBBsf' on a standalone basis. Fitch continues to monitor this
asset type in light of changing consumer trends and continued store
closures.

Pari Passu Loans: Six loans comprising 36.8% of the pool, including
five of the top 10, are pari passu loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on all classes remains Stable given the
generally stable performance of the transaction since issuance.
Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until
a material economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's
overall portfolio level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $9.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $184 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $224.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32.6 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.3 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $446.3 million* X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $77.5 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.3 million* class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million* class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest-only

Fitch does not rate class G or X-G certificates.


CIG AUTO 2017-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed the three outstanding ratings from CIG Auto
Receivables Trust 2017-1. Of the three outstanding publicly rated
classes reviewed, DBRS upgraded two classes and confirmed one. For
the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such that
credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected
losses at their new respective rating levels. For the rating that
was confirmed, performance trends are such that the credit
enhancement level is sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at
its current rating level.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
performance.

The Affected Ratings are:

CIG Auto Receivables Trust
Series 2017-1

Class A     Upgraded      AA(sf)
Class B     Upgraded      BBB(high)
Class C     Confirmed     BB(sf)


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2009-7: Moody's Hikes 5A2 Debt Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranche
from two transaction, downgraded the rating of one tranche from one
transaction and withdrawn the rating of one tranche from one
re-securitization transaction.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-7, Resecuritization
Trust Certificates, Series 2009-7

Cl. 5A2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Assigned
C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-RR1

Cl. A-1A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-2

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Pass-Through Trust 2004-2R

Cl. A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2016 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgrade for Cl.A3 from Financial Asset Securities Corp.
AAA Trust 2005-2 and Cl.5A2 from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2009-7, Resecuritization Trust Certificates, Series 2009-7 reflects
the loss expectation and amortization of the underlying securities,
and the rating downgrade for Cl.A-1A1 from Citigroup Mortgage Loan
Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2008-RR1 is a result
of weak performance of the underlying security.

Cl.A from GSMPS Pass-Through Trust 2004-2R is backed by multiple
underlying securities, the rating of one of which has been
withdrawn for small pool factor. Because the ratings on Resec bonds
generally link to the ratings on the underlying securities and
their performance, Moody's cannot maintain the ratings on this
resec bond due to the withdrawal of the rating of one of the
underlying securities. Moody's has decided to withdraw the rating
because it believes it has insufficient or otherwise inadequate
information to support the maintenance of the rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was " Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate
The unemployment rate fell to 3.7% in September 2018 from 4.2% in
September 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


FREDDIE MAC SCRT 2018-4: Fitch Rates Class M Certs B-sf
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates Freddie Mac's risk-transfer transaction, Seasoned
Credit Risk Transfer Trust Series 2018-4 as follows:

  -- $63,442,000 class M certificates 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $370,761,000 class HT exchangeable certificates;

  -- $278,071,000 class HA certificates;

  -- $92,690,000 class HB exchangeable certificates;

  -- $46,345,000 class HV certificates;

  -- $46,345,000 class HZ certificates;

  -- $1,356,091,000 class MT exchangeable certificates;

  -- $1,017,069,000 class MA certificates;

  -- $339,022,000 class MB exchangeable certificates;

  -- $169,511,000 class MV certificates;

  -- $169,511,000 class MZ certificates;

  -- $73,907,000 class M55D certificates;

  -- $73,907,000 class M55E exchangeable certificates;

  -- $6,718,818 class M55I notional exchangeable certificates;

  -- $87,842,342 class B certificates

  -- $1,800,759,000 class A-IO notional certificates;

  -- $151,284,342 class B-IO notional certificates;

  -- $87,842,342 class BX exchangeable certificates;

  -- $87,842,342 class BBIO exchangeable certificates;

  -- $87,842,342 class BXS exchangeable certificates.

The 'B-sf' rating for the M certificates reflects the 4.50%
subordination provided by the class B.

SCRT 2018-4 represents Freddie Mac's ninth seasoned credit risk
transfer transaction issued. SCRT 2018-4 consists of three
collateral groups backed by 9,782 seasoned performing and
re-performing mortgages, with a total balance of approximately
$1.952 billion, of which $258.0 million, or 13.2%, was in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts as of the cutoff
date. The three collateral groups are distinguished between loans
that have additional interest rate increases outstanding due to the
terms of the modification and those that are expected to remain
fixed for the remainder of the term. Among the loans that are
fixed, the groups are further distinguished by both loans that
include a portion of principal forbearance as well as the interest
rate on the loans. The distribution of principal and interest (P&I)
and loss allocations to the rated note is based on a senior
subordinate, sequential structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
comprises primarily peak-vintage re-performing loans (RPLs), all of
which have been modified. Roughly 88% of the pool has been paying
on time for the past 24 months, per the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) methodology, and none of the loans have
experienced a delinquency within the past 12 months. The pool has a
weighted average sustainable loan to value ratio (WA sLTV) of
83.5%, and the WA model FICO score is 690.

Interest Payment Risk (Negative): In Fitch's timing scenarios, the
M class incurs temporary shortfalls in the 'B-sf' rating category
but is ultimately repaid prior to maturity of the transaction. The
difference between Fitch's expected loss and the credit enhancement
(CE) on the rated classes is due to the repayment of interest
deferrals. Interest to the rated classes is subordinated to the
senior bonds as well as repayments made to Freddie Mac for prior
payments on the senior classes. Timely payments of interest are
also at potential risk as principal collections on the underlying
loans can only be used to repay interest shortfalls on the rated
classes after the balance is paid off. This results in an extended
period until potential shortfalls are ultimately repaid in Fitch's
stress scenarios.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Neutral): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted on a sample basis of approximately 10% of the
pool as it relates to regulatory compliance and pay history, while
a modification data review and a tax and title lien search were
conducted on 100%. The third-party review firms' due diligence
review resulted in 3% of the sample loans remaining in the final
pool graded 'C' or 'D' (less than 1% graded 'C'), meaning the loans
had material violations or lacked documentation to confirm
regulatory compliance.

Regular Issuer (Neutral): This is Freddie Mac's ninth rated RPL
securitization and the sixth that Fitch has been asked to rate.
Fitch has conducted multiple reviews of Freddie Mac and is
confident that the government-sponsored entity (GSE) has the
necessary policies, procedures and third-party oversight in place
to properly aggregate and securitize RPLs.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction weaker than other Fitch-rated RPL deals. The
weakness is due to the exclusion of a number of reps that Fitch
views as consistent with a full framework as well as the limited
diligence that may have otherwise acted as a mitigant.
Additionally, Freddie Mac as rep provider will only be obligated to
repurchase a loan, pay an indemnity loss amount or cure the
material breach prior to Nov. 12, 2021. However, Fitch believes
that the defect risk is lower relative to other RPL transactions
because the loans were subject to Freddie Mac's loan-level review
process in place at the time the loan became delinquent. Therefore,
Fitch treated the construct as Tier 3 and increased its 'B-sf'
expected loss expectations by 13bps to account for the weaknesses
in the reps.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
similar to Freddie Mac's STACR transactions. Once the initial CE of
the senior class has reached the target and if all performance
triggers are passing, principal is allocated pro rata among the
seniors and subordinate classes with the most senior subordinate
bond receiving the full subordinate share. This structure is a
positive to the rated class as it results in a faster paydown and
allows them to receive principal earlier than under a traditional
sequential structure. However, to the extent any of the performance
triggers are failing, principal is distributed sequentially to the
senior class until triggers pass.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severities
(LS) are less for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for ultimate payments of interest to the rated classes.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria, as
described in its October 2018 report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
This incorporates a review of the aggregator's lending platforms,
as well as an assessment of the transaction's R&W and due diligence
results, which were found to be consistent with the ratings
assigned to the bonds.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 13% at the 'B-sf' level. The analysis indicates that
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities that determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 4% would potentially move the 'B-sf' rated class
down to 'CCCsf' respectively.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from the
third-party diligence provider. The due diligence focused on
regulatory compliance, pay history, the presence of key documents
in the loan file and data integrity on a sample of the loans in the
pool. Additionally, an updated tax and title search was conducted
on all of the loans in the transaction. Fitch received
certifications indicating that the loan-level due diligence was
conducted in accordance with Fitch's published standards. The
certifications also stated that the company performed its work in
accordance with the independence standards, per Fitch's criteria,
and that the due diligence analysts performing the review met
Fitch's criteria of minimum years of experience. Fitch considered
this information in its analysis and based on the findings, Fitch
made the following adjustments:

Fitch made an adjustment on 77 loans that were subject to federal,
state and/or local predatory testing. These loans contained
material violations, including an inability to test for high-cost
violations or confirm compliance, which could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability. These loans were marked as
"indeterminate." Typically, the HUD issues are related to missing
the final HUD, illegible HUDs, incomplete HUDs due to missing pages
or only having estimated HUDs where the final HUD1 was not used to
test for high-cost loans. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a
100% LS for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's "do
not purchase" list of high cost or "high risk." Six loans were
affected by this approach. For the remaining 71 loans, where the
properties are not located in the states that fall under Freddie
Mac's "do not purchase" list, the likelihood of all loans being
high cost is lower. However, Fitch assumes the trust could
potentially incur additional legal expenses. Fitch increased its LS
expectations by 5% for these loans to account for the risk.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2013-GC10: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Goldman Sachs Mortgage
Company's GS Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2013-GC10.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Loss expectations have increased
mainly as a result of performance declines for the largest loan in
the pool, Empire Hotel & Retail (15% of the pool), which is
designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC). The property
experienced a decline in occupancy during renovations, which
commenced in 2014 and were finalized in December 2016. Due to the
soft market, performance has not improved since completion of the
renovations, as anticipated. As of the trailing twelve month (TTM)
period ended June 2018, the servicer-reported DSCR was 1.03x,
compared with 1.26x at year-end (YE) 2017, 1.34x at YE 2016 and
2.09x at YE 2015. The loan's interest-only period expired in 2018,
resulting in increased debt service. Second-quarter 2018 TTM net
operating income (NOI) was 6.5% lower than YE 2017 and 45% lower
than Fitch Ratings' cash flow analysis at issuance. Per the March
2018 STR report, the property reported a TTM RevPAR of $185.99
compared with $211.64 at issuance.

Sensitivity on Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated seven
loans (26.8% of the pool) as FLOCs, including five loans in the top
15 (23.2% of the pool). The FLOCs in the top 15 include a mixed-use
property where the second largest tenant is currently dark
(Galleria Building, 4.3% of pool) and two underperforming office
properties (One Technology Plaza and 701 Technology Drive; combined
3.9%) with recent occupancy declines and the previously mentioned
Empire Hotel & Retail loan. Fitch's analysis included additional
sensitivity to address the potential for outsized losses based on
leasing prospects and likelihood of re-leasing the vacancies.
Losses of 25%, 75% and 25% were applied to Galleria Building, One
Technology Plaza and 701 Technology Drive, respectively. The
sensitivity analysis is the driver for the Negative Rating Outlooks
on classes E and F.

Increased Credit Enhancement: The repayment of three loans since
the last rating action has contributed $31.5 million of principal
paydown and increased credit enhancement offsetting some of the
concern regarding the FLOCs and increased loss expectations. The
transaction has paid down 15.4% since issuance. Additionally, there
are 12 loans that are fully defeased. Defeased collateral now
represents 12.6% of the pool, up from 6.1% at the last rating
action.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes E and F remain Negative to reflect
the potential for downgrades due to underperformance of the FLOC's.
Fitch performed an additional sensitivity on three of these loans
to address the potential for outsized losses. This sensitivity
analysis is the primary driver for the Negative Rating Outlooks on
classes E and F. The Stable Rating Outlooks for classes A-1 through
D reflect the overall stable pool performance and expected
continued paydown. Future rating upgrades may occur with stable to
improved pool performance and additional defeasance or paydown.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $99,256,667 class A-4 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $300,475,000 class A-5 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69,503,088 class A-AB notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $54,785,000 class A-S notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $63,380,000 class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,746,000 class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,376,000 class D notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22,558,000 class E notes at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,114,000 class F notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $524,019,756 class X-A* notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $103,126,000 class X-B* notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, and A-3 have repaid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class G certificates.

  * Notional amount and interest only.


GS MORTGAGE 2012-GC6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
in GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-GC6, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-GC6 as follows:

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed A3 (sf)


Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed B2 (sf)


Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eight principal and interest classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index, are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the interest only class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based
on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.9% at the last review.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating GS Mortgage Securities Trust
2012-GC6 Cl. A-3, Cl. A-AB, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E,
Cl. F were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-GC6
Cl. X-A were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $970 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 67 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 50% of the pool. One loan, constituting
9.5% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Fifteen loans, constituting 19.6% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

Ten loans, constituting 20.1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $34,211 (for an average loss severity of
1.5%). Four loans, constituting 3.2% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Coconut Grove Courtyard by Marriott Loan ($12.1 million -- 1.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a 196 room lodging property, built
in 1973. The property is located in Grove, Florida, approximately 4
miles from downtown Miami and 15 minutes from the Miami
International Airport. The property suffered major damage in
September 2017 caused by Hurricane Irma and as a result, was shut
down. The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2018 and
is currently in the restoration process. There is sufficient
insurance coverage in place for both property and business
interruption. This loan remains current and was reported as part of
Moody's conduit metrics.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Preston Belt Line
Office Park ($7.8 million -- 0.8 % of the pool), which is secured
by an 111,286 square foot (SF) office building, which was built in
1985 and located in Dallas, Texas approximately 15 miles from
downtown Dallas. Occupancy has been trending downwards since
December 2015, at which point the property was 91% leased. As per
the September 2018 rent roll, the property occupancy declined to
59%. The loan transferred to special servicing in September 2018
due to imminent monetary default. The servicer has attempted to
reach out to the borrower to determine a resolution strategy.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by an office
and lodging property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.6 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (11.7% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 95% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 85%, compared to 86% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16.8% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.30X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the ELS Portfolio
Loan ($92.1 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which consists of 12
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by
manufactured housing communities and recreational vehicle (RV)
parks. The properties are located across six states and consist of
a total of 5,530 pads. As of June 2018 the portfolio was 79%
leased, compared to 82% leased as of June 2017. The loan's partial
interest-only term has expired and the loan has amortized 8% since
securitization. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.47X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 21.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Meadowood Mall Loan ($112.7 million --
11.6% of the pool), which is secured by 405,000 square feet (SF)
portion of a 878,000 SF regional mall in Reno, Nevada. Mall anchors
include J.C. Penney, Macy's and Macy's Men's and Home store. The
property was formerly anchored by Sears who vacated their space in
mid-2018. Except for the Macy's South store, all of the anchors are
independently owned and not contributed as collateral for the loan.
The property was 89% leased as of June 2018, compared to 96% leased
as of June 2017 and in-line occupancy was reported to be 84% as of
June 2018, compared to 87% as of June 2017. Performance has been
stable. The loan benefits from amortization and has amortized 9.6%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and
1.12X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.10X at the last review.


The second largest loan is the LHG Hotel Portfolio Loan ($51.6
million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of 12
limited service hotels located across six states and totaling 852
rooms. The hotel flags are Fairfield Inn, Fairfield Inn & Suites,
Courtyard by Marriot and Country Inn & Suites. Financial
performance declined in 2016 due to lower revenues but performance
was in line with its expectations at securitization. For the
trailing twelve month period ending June 2018 occupancy was 75%,
the same as of June 2017, compared to 63% in December 2016 and 76%
at securitization. The loan benefits from amortization and has
amortized approximately 14% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.48X, respectively, compared to 86% and
1.44X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Hotel ZaZa - Houston Loan ($43.8
million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 315 luxury full
service boutique hotel located in the Museum District of Houston,
Texas. The property includes over 20,000 SF of meeting space, a
restaurant and lounge, a full service spa, outdoor swimming pool
and a fitness center. The hotel is situated adjacent to the Museum
of Fine Arts, two miles south of Houston's CBD. The property was
72% occupied as of March 2018, compared to 64% as of December 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.92X, respectively,
compared to 59% and 1.98X at the last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2018-RPL1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2018-RPL1 (the Notes) to be
issued by GS Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2018-RPL1 (the
Trust):

-- $1.0 billion Class A1A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $111.3 million Class A1A2 at AAA (sf)
-- $1.1 billion Class A1A at AAA (sf)
-- $123.6 million Class A1B at AAA (sf)
-- $1.2 billion Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $81.6 million Class A2 at AAA (sf)
-- $82.0 million Class A3 at AA (sf)
-- $96.5 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $72.1 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $70.3 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $54.1 million Class B2 at B (sf)

Classes A1A and A1 are exchangeable notes. These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as specified in the
offering documents.

Classes A1A1, A1A2 and A1A are super-senior notes. These classes
benefit from additional protection from the senior support note
(Class A1B) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the notes reflect the 26.90% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect credit
enhancement of 22.35%, 17.00%, 13.00%, 9.10% and 6.10%,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 8,138 loans with a total principal balance of
$1,897,809,031 as of the Cut-Off Date (October 31, 2018).

The portfolio is approximately 139 months seasoned, and 99.3% of
the loans are modified. The modifications happened more than two
years from the Cut-Off Date for 93.5% of the modified loans. Within
the pool, 84.4% are mortgages that have non-interest-bearing
deferred amounts, which equate to 19.7% of the total principal
balance.

The majority of the loans in the pool (97.3%) are current as of the
Cut-Off Date. Approximately 1.5% of the pool is 30 days delinquent,
0.2% is 60 days delinquent, less than 0.1% is 90 days delinquent
and 0.9% is bankruptcy loans, which are either performing or 30
days to 90 days delinquent. Approximately 87.9% of the mortgage
loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least
the past 24 months under the Mortgage Bankers Association
delinquency method. All but seven of the loans are not subject to
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified
Mortgage rules.

The Mortgage Loan Sellers, Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company (GSMC;
99.8% of the loans) and MTGLQ Investors, L.P. (0.2% of the loans),
acquired the loans in a whole-loan purchase from a third-party
mortgage loan seller prior to the Closing Date and, through an
affiliate, GS Mortgage Securities Corp. (the Depositor), will
contribute the loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, GSMC, or a
majority-owned affiliate, will retain an eligible vertical interest
in the transaction consisting of an uncertificated interest (the
Retained Interest) in the Issuer, representing the right to receive
at least 5.0% of the amounts collected on the mortgage loans, net
of fees, expenses and reimbursements of the Issuer and paid on the
Notes (other than the Class R Notes) and the Retained Interest to
satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. These loans were originated and previously serviced by
various entities through purchases in the secondary market.

The loans will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. The
servicing fee for the GSMBS 2018-RPL1 portfolio will be 0.08% per
annum, significantly lower than transactions backed by similar
collateral. DBRS stressed such servicing expenses in its cash flow
analysis to account for a potential fee increase in a distressed
scenario.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the Servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the Servicer is obligated to make advances
with respect to the preservation, inspection, restoration,
protection and repair of a mortgaged property, including delinquent
tax and insurance payments, the enforcement or judicial proceedings
associated with a mortgage loan and the management and liquidation
of properties (to the extent such advances are deemed recoverable
by the Servicer).

As a loss mitigation alternative, the Servicer may sell mortgage
loans that are in early stage or advanced default to maximize
proceeds on such defaulted loan on a net present value basis.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds and excess interest can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1
and more subordinate bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds
until the more senior classes are retired.

The representations and warranties (R&W) framework is comparable
with other DBRS-rated seasoned re-performing transactions with some
variances with respect to the Breach Reserve Account. The remedy
obligations of a Mortgage Loan Seller with regard to material
breaches of R&W will expire 13 months from the Closing Date (Sunset
Date), after which a Breach Reserve Account will be available to
satisfy losses related to potential R&W breaches. It is beneficial
that such reserve account will be fully funded (as opposed to
partially funded in certain other transactions) upfront at the
initial target amount of $7,123,780 by the Sponsor. However, in the
future, if there is a need to build the account back to target, the
additional amounts will be funded using monthly excess cash flow at
the bottom of the payment waterfall. This funding mechanism is
weaker than certain other securitizations where the account is
funded using excess servicing at the top of the waterfall.
Furthermore, the cash flow structure of GSMBS 2018-RPL1 allows very
little, if any, excess cash flow to accrue to target due to the
lack of spread between the collateral Net Weighted-Average Coupon
and bond coupons.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that had relatively clean performance in the recent past, a
strong servicer and better credit quality as compared with other
distressed and re-performing pools. Additionally, a satisfactory
third-party due diligence review was performed on the entire
portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history,
data integrity, servicing comments and title and tax review.
Updated broker price opinions were provided for all the loans;
however, a reconciliation was not performed on the updated values.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


GUGGENHEIM MM 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B Rating on F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Guggenheim
MM CLO 2018-1 Ltd./Guggenheim MM CLO 2018-1 LLC's floating- and
fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily middle-market speculative-grade
(rated 'BB+' and lower) senior secured term loans that are governed
by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 15,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool;
-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization;
-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading; and
-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Guggenheim MM CLO 2018-1 Ltd./Guggenheim MM CLO 2018-1 LLC
  
  Class                Rating     Amount (mil. $)
  A                    AAA (sf)            222.20
  B                    AA (sf)              40.40
  C                    A (sf)               37.40
  D                    BBB (sf)             21.20
  E                    BB (sf)              20.20
  F                    B (sf)                8.10
  Subordinated notes   NR                   53.00

  NR--Not rated.


LONE STAR 2015-LSP: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades two classes and affirms seven classes of
Lone Star Portfolio Trust 2015-LSP Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-LSP.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increasing Credit Enhancement: The upgrades reflect increased
credit enhancement from pay down related to property releases.
Since issuance, 58 of the 103 properties in the portfolio have been
released from the transaction. The properties were released at a
120% premium to the individual allocated loan amounts (ALA) at
issuance. As of the October 2018 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 54.3% to $322.1
million from $705.3 million at issuance.

The transaction is currently following a sequential pay structure
after paying pro rata for the initial 15% of the transaction's
balance.

Collateral Characteristics: After 58 property releases, the
collateral now consists of 45 properties. All the remaining
properties are fee simple interests in office properties. Two
properties (1.4% of the ALA) are currently fully vacant.

The properties are located in 13 states in generally suburban
locations. The three states with the greatest concentration are
Massachusetts (29% of the ALA), Illinois (28.8%), and Minnesota
(17.4%); no other state represents more than 7.7% of the ALA.

Adverse Selection, Declining Occupancy: The Negative Outlooks on
classes E and F reflect the transactions increasing concentration
and adverse selection. The current portfolio's occupancy has
declined since issuance. As of the March or June 2018 rent rolls,
portfolio occupancy was 65.8% compared to approximately 75.7% at
issuance for the same properties. The original 103 property
portfolio was 79.6% occupied at issuance, with a business plan to
stabilize properties with renovations and increased leasing, prior
to property by property dispositions.

Approximately 11.7% of the NRA is scheduled to roll in the next
year; tenants occupying approximately 20% of the rolling space (or
2.3% of NRA) are reportedly in lease renewal discussions, per the
servicer. An additional 1% of the NRA has been pre-leased to new
tenants. There are at least $8 million in reserve funds available
for leasing costs and capital improvements.

The properties are generally located in weak suburban office
sub-markets, which have a weighted average vacancy rate of
approximately 19.9%, per Reis (3Q 2018).

High Fitch Leverage: In additional to the trust loan balance of
$322.1 million, there is pari passu debt in place of $10.1 million
in the form of a future funding advance note. Further, there is
mezzanine debt in the amount of $57.6 million also in place.

The $322.1 million trust loan has a Fitch debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), debt yield (DY), and loan-t-value (LTV) of 0.77x,
7.5% and 119.9%, respectively, totaling trust debt of $55 psf. The
Fitch total all in debt DSCR, DY, and LTV are 0.66x, 6.4% and
140.7%, respectively.

Experienced Sponsorship: The loan is sponsored by Lone Star. Lone
Star is a global private equity firm that invests in real estate,
equity, credit and other financial assets. Hudson Advisors, Lone
Star's asset management affiliate, serves as the portfolio's
asset.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes E and F reflect the possibility of
downgrades should the portfolio be subject to further adverse
selection and/or declining property performance. The Positive
Outlook on class C reflects the expectation that the class could be
upgraded with further de-leveraging.

The loan is in its first extension period with a maturity date of
September 2019. One further one-year extension period exists.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:

  -- $58.9 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $40.1 million class C to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to
Positive from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $1.4 million class A-1A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4 million class A-1A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $97.3 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $64.3 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

  -- Interest-only class X-CP at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-EXT at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.


MAGNETITE LTD XVIII: Moody's Rates $6.89MM Class F-R Notes B3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to the following
notes issued by Magnetite XVIII, Limited:

Moody's rating actions are as follows:

US$340,260,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$59,890,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$30,210,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$30,740,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$28,090,000 Class E-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$6,890,000 Class F-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class F-R Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation.
The Refinancing Notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. manages the CLO. It directs
the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.


The Issuer issued the Refinancing Notes on November 15, 2018
connection with the refinancing of the Class A Notes, Class B
Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes and Class E Notes previously
issued on September 29, 2016. On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer
used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem
in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: amending the administrative expense
cap; and changes to the collateral quality matrix and modifiers.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $529,965,062

Defaulted par: $0

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2779

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.10%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.25 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 10 classes of Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2004-KEY2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The upgrade and Rating Outlook
revision to Stable from Negative on class D reflect increased
credit enhancement since Fitch's last rating action due to the
liquidation of the real-estate owned Grove Shopping Center asset
(37% of last rating action) at better than expected recoveries and
continued scheduled loan amortization. In addition, three loans
(13% of current pool) have been fully defeased. As of the October
2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 98.5% to $17.1 million from $1.11 billion at
issuance. Realized losses to date totaled $84.8 million (7.6% of
original pool). Cumulative interest shortfalls totalling $5.3
million are currently impacting classes F and H through Q.

Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated three loans/assets (20% of
current pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern, including the real-estate
owned (REO) Sports Authority asset (12%). The Sports Authority
asset became REO in July 2018 after initially transferring to
special servicing in December 2017 for imminent monetary default.
The sole tenant, Sports Authority, filed for bankruptcy in March
2016 and rejected its lease at the property on June 30, 2016. The
asset, which is an end unit of the Lynnhaven North Shopping Center
located in Virginia Beach, VA, has remained 100% vacant since June
2016. The special servicer continues to review the property to
determine a resolution strategy.

The 20-150 Pratt Oval loan (5.5%), which is secured by a 68,222
square foot (sf) industrial property located in Glen Cove, NY, was
flagged for significant near-term lease rollover concern. All of
the leases at the property expire prior to the loan's September
2024 maturity date, with 34.3% of the NRA currently on
month-to-month leases. The property is located in a tertiary market
within a suburban community on Long Island's north shore. The 1801
Pittsburgh Avenue loan (2.5%), which is secured by a 315,000 sf
industrial property located in Erie, PA, was flagged for
significant occupancy decline after the largest tenant, Zurn
Industries, downsized from 70.7% of the NRA to 27.6% beginning
December 2017. As a result, property occupancy declined to 50.5% as
of April 2018 from 90% at year-end (YE) 2017 and 92.7% at YE 2016.
There has been no positive leasing momentum since Zurn Industries
announced its plan to relocate in June 2015. NOI DSCR was -0.14x
for the first quarter of 2018, compared to 1.67x at YE 2017 and
1.95x at YE 2016.

Concentrated Pool; Alternative Loss Consideration: The pool is
highly concentrated with nine loans and one REO asset remaining.
Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a
sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans based on
structural features, collateral quality and performance, then
ranked them by their perceived likelihood of repayment. The rating
of class D was capped at 'Asf' to reflect the collateral quality
and adverse selection of the remaining loans/assets.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Loan Maturities: The remaining non-specially serviced assets are
scheduled to mature in 2019 (four loans, 41% of current pool), 2020
(one loan, 1.4%) and 2024 (four loans, 45.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class D reflects increased credit enhancement
and expected continued paydown from scheduled amortization and
upcoming loan maturities in 2019. An upgrade to class E may be
possible should the liquidation of the REO asset result in better
than expected recoveries. Distressed-rated classes will be
downgraded as losses are realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded and revised the Rating Outlook on the following
class:

  -- $3 million class D to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable
from Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $12.5 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 95%;

  -- $1.6 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, and C have paid in full. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XC and
XP certificates. Fitch does not rate the class Q and DA
certificates.


MONROE CAPITAL VII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Monroe Capital MML CLO VII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$4,500,000 Class X Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$222,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$46,125,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class B
Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$34,875,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$33,750,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E
Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

Monroe Capital CLO VII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by small and medium enterprise
loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured
loans and eligible investments, and up to 5% of the portfolio may
consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Monroe Capital Asset Management LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may not reinvest in new assets and all
principal proceeds, including sale proceeds, will be used to
amortize the notes in accordance with the priority of payments.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued two classes of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3660

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.30%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The Credit Rating for Monroe Capital MML CLO VII, Ltd. was assigned
in accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 31, 2017. Please note that on November 14, 2018, Moody's
released a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market
feedback on potential revisions to its Methodology for
Collateralized Loan Obligations. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, Moody's does not expect the changes to
affect the Credit Rating on Monroe Capital MML CLO VII, Ltd..
Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "Proposed
Update to Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," for further details regarding the implications of the
proposed Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

The CLO permits the manager to determine RiskCalc-derived rating
factors, based on modifications to certain pre-qualifying
conditions applicable to the use of RiskCalc, for obligors
temporarily ineligible to receive Moody's credit estimates. Such
determinations are limited to a small portion of the portfolio. Its
rating analysis included a stress scenario in which Moody's assumed
a rating factor commensurate with a Caa2 rating for such obligors.


Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-XLF2: Fitch Cuts SNMD Debt Rating to BB-
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes and affirms two classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust MSCI 2015-XLF2 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2015-XLF2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sustained Property Cash Flow Decline: Portfolio performance has
declined since issuance due to lower revenues and increased
expenses. Per the servicer year-end 2017 OSAR, total revenues
declined to $52.2 million as of year-end 2017 from $55.1 million at
issuance. Revenue declines are primarily attributed to lower
reimbursements. Fitch has requested further clarification and/or
additional information from the loan's servicer, borrower and loan
originator over the last 12 months regarding the reported decline
in revenues in addition to certain expense line items reported in
the servicer-reported statement.

Overall servicer-reported NCF as of YE 2017 has declined to $16.2
million down from $16.9 million YE 2016, $17.5 million YE 2015 and
$23.8 million at issuance; Fitch NCF at issuance was $21.5 million.
Fitch increased the cap rate in its analysis given the current
retail environment, but given the portfolio's declining net cash
flow the increased cap rate was not the leading factor in the
rating recommendations. The Negative Outlooks on all classes
reflect the decline in cash flow and refinance risk concerns.

Upcoming Loan Maturity: The loan had an initial maturity date of
Nov. 8, 2017 with two 12-month extension options subject to debt
yield (DY) requirements. Prior to the loan's maturity in November
2017, the sponsor exercised its first one-year extension
requirement and in order to meet the debt yield was required to pay
down the balance of the SNMA class by $19.8 million and reduce the
non-trust subordinate debt by $9.5 million. The sponsor recently
exercised their final extension option on Nov. 8, 2018, and the
SNMA class was paid down by an additional $5.5 million and the
non-trust subordinate debt by $2.6 million. The final maturity date
is Nov. 8, 2019.

Starwood Malls Redevelopment/Renovation: The Shops at Willow Bend
underwent an interior refresh completed in May 2018 and signed
several new leases in 2017 including the Crayola Experience (opened
in April 2018), The District (four restaurants opened in October
2018), Equinox Health Club (opening in Spring 2019), and Cinepolis
(opening 2Q 2020). At Stony Point Park a common area refresh was
completed in Fall 2017 and newly signed leases include H&M, which
opened in December 2017. While Starwood has reported that
additional renovations are planned, per the servicer, no
renovations are underway.

Inline Occupancy and Sales: As of the June 2018 rent roll, in-line
occupancy at Fairlane Town Center is 78.4% compared to 86.2% prior
year and Stony Point Park occupancy as of September 2018 is 77.7%
up from 64.1% prior year. As of the June 2018 rent roll, The Shops
at Willow Bend reported in-line occupancy of 80.6% compared to
79.2% the prior year. Reported in-line sales have been relatively
stable at two of the properties since issuance. Fairlane Town
Center reported year-end (YE 2017) in-line sales at $362 psf
compared to $375 at issuance; Stony Point Park at $311 psf down
from $418 at issuance; Shops at Willow Bend Mall at $326 psf
(excluding Apple) compared to $364 psf at issuance (excluding
Apple). Fitch did not receive YE 2017 anchor sales for any of the
properties. Fitch expects that cash flow could increase, as the
renovations may lead to continued leasing momentum.

Anchor Tenants: Fairlane Town Center has exposure to Macy's and JC
Penney, while Sears closed in September 2018. None of these anchors
are part of the collateral. The vacant former Lord & Taylor has
been re-leased to Ford Motor Company for use as office space. The
Shops at Willow Bend has exposure to Macy's, Dillard's, and Neiman
Marcus, which are not part of the collateral. The vacant former
anchor Saks Fifth Avenue is part of the collateral. Stony Point
Fashion Park anchors are Saks Fifth Avenue and Dillards, and
neither are collateral. Major tenant Dick's Sporting Goods vacated
in September 2018.

Fitch Leverage: The $135.7 million loan has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of
1.11x and 81.2%, respectively, totaling $41 psf. Starwood
contributed approximately $105.5 million of cash equity to acquire
the assets.

Sponsorship: The loan is sponsored by Starwood, which was started
in 1991 and has approximately $36 billion in assets under
management. Starwood owns and operates 31 retail properties
totaling 27 million sf.

Floating-Rate Debt: The LIBOR-based floating-rate loan has an
interest rate cap in place and must maintain a cap for any
extension options exercised.

At issuance, the transaction certificates represented the
beneficial interests in two floating-rate first lien mortgage
loans, representing 51.3% and 48.7% of the transaction,
respectively. The loans were originated by Morgan Stanley Bank,
N.A. The SNM classes represent the Starwood National Mall Portfolio
loan, which is secured by three regional malls totalling 3.3
million (1.6 million collateral) located in Plano, TX, Dearborn, MI
and Richmond, VA. The malls were purchased by Starwood from Taubman
in 2014. The AFS certificates were secured by seven hotel
properties across the U.S and were paid in full in June 2018. The
certificates follow a sequential-pay structure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on all classes reflect Fitch's concern with
the portfolio's declining cash flow and refinance risk as the final
maturity approaches in November 2019. Downgrades are possible if
property performance does not improve and if the loan appears to be
unable to refinance at maturity. If the loan defaults, a protracted
workout is possible given the overall outlook on retail.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

  -- $15.0 million class SNMC to 'BBB-sf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook
Negative;

  -- $22.0 million class SNMD to 'BB-sf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
Negative.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks:

  -- $77.7 million class SNMA at 'AAAsf' Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $21.0 million class SNMB at 'AA-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

The class AFSA, AFSB, AFSC, and AFSD certificates have been paid in
full.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-5: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on 5 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 31
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2018-5. The NRMLT 2018-5 transaction is a $410.6 million
securitization of first lien, seasoned performing and re-performing
fixed rate mortgage loans with weighted average seasoning of 160
months, a weighted average updated LTV ratio of 60.3% and a
weighted average updated FICO score of 700. Based on the OTS
methodology, 79.1% of the loans by scheduled balance have been
current every month in the past 24 months. Additionally, 36.6% of
the loans in the pool have been previously modified. New Penn
Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC , Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., TIAA, FSB, Ocwen Loan
Servicing LLC, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., PNC Mortgage and
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC will act as primary servicers.
Nationstar Mortgage will act as master servicer and successor
servicer and Shellpoint will act as the special servicer.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-5

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1C, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1B, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1C, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1D, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2B, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-2D, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3A, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3B, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3C, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3D, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4A, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4B, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4C, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5A, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5B, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5C, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5D, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. B-7, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Its losses on the collateral pool equal 5.90% in an expected
scenario and reach 27.30% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
ratings on the senior classes. Moody's based its expected losses
for the pool on its estimates of (1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances. The final expected losses for the pool
reflect the third party review (TPR) findings and its assessment of
the representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework for this
transaction. Also, the transaction contains a mortgage loan sale
provision, the exercise of which is subject to potential conflicts
of interest. As a result of this provision, Moody's increased its
expected losses for the pool.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to its surveillance approach. Under this approach, Moody's
applies expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool. Its assumptions on these variables are
based on the observed performance of seasoned modified and
non-modified loans, the collateral attributes of the pool including
the percentage of loans that were delinquent in the past 24 months,
and the observed performance of recent New Residential Mortgage
Loan Trust issuances rated by Moody's. For this pool, Moody's used
default burnout assumptions similar to those detailed in its "US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated before
2005. Moody's then aggregated the delinquencies and converted them
to losses by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency and
loss severity assumptions.

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2018-5 is a securitization of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor V LLC, has primarily purchased in connection with the
termination of various securitization trusts. Unlike prior NRMLT
transactions Moody's has rated, a significant percentage of the
collateral, 27.0% based on total balance, was sourced from a
portfolio acquisition rather than from terminated securitizations.
The transaction is comprised of 3,263 FRM loans. For the loans in
the pool, 63.4% by balance have never been modified and have been
performing while 36.6% of the loans were previously modified but
are now current and cash flowing.

The updated value of properties in this pool were provided by a
third party firm using a home data index (HDI) and/or an updated
broker price opinion (BPO). BPOs were provided for a sample of
1,457 out of the 3,263 properties contained within the
securitization. HDI values were provided for 3,260 of the
properties contained within the securitization. The weighted
average updated LTV ratio on the collateral is 60.3%, implying an
average of 39.7% borrower equity in the properties. The LTV is
calculated using the lower of the updated BPO and HDI when both
values are available.

Third-Party Review ("TPR") and Representations & Warranties ("R&W")


Two third party due diligence providers, AMC and Recovco, conducted
a compliance review on a sample of 1,419 and 389 seasoned mortgage
loans respectively for the securitization pool. The regulatory
compliance review consisted of a review of compliance with the
federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as implemented by Regulation Z,
the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) as
implemented by Regulation X, the disclosure requirements and
prohibitions of Section 50(a)(6), Article XVI of the Texas
Constitution, federal, state and local anti-predatory regulations,
federal and state specific late charge and prepayment penalty
regulations, and document review.

AMC found that 1,241 out of 1,419 loans had compliance exceptions
with 209 having rating agency grade C or D level exceptions.
Recovco identified 369 mortgage loans with grade B exceptions and 1
loan with grade D exception in its review of 389 loans. Also, based
on information provided by the seller, there were additional loans
were dropped from the securitization due to compliance exceptions.
The C or D level exceptions broadly fell into four categories:
missing final HUD-1 settlement statements/HUD errors, Texas
(TX50(a)(6)) cash-out loan violations, other state compliance
exceptions (including North Carolina CHL Tangible Net Benefit
violations), and missing documents or missing information.

Moody's applied a small adjustment to its loss severities to
account for the C or D level missing final HUD-1 settlement
statement and HUD errors. For these types of issues, borrowers can
raise legal claims in defense against foreclosure as a set off or
recoupment and win damages that can reduce the amount of the
foreclosure proceeds. Such damages can include up to $4,000 in
statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees and other actual damages.
Moody's also applied small adjustments to loss severities for
TX50(a)(6) violations, North Carolina CHL Tangible Net Benefit
exceptions, and other state law compliance exceptions. Moody's did
not apply an adjustment for missing documents or missing
information identified by the diligence provider in part because
Moody's separately received and assessed a title report and a
custodial report for the mortgage loans in the pool.

AMC and Recovco reviewed the findings of various title search
reports covering 1,412 and 426 mortgage loans respectively in the
preliminary sample population in order to confirm the first lien
position of the related mortgages. Overall, AMC's review confirmed
that 925 mortgages were in first lien position. For 486 of the
remaining loans reviewed by AMC, proof of first lien position could
only be confirmed by supplemental searches or using the final title
policy as of loan origination. For one loan, first lien position
could not be confirmed as it has a pending final title policy. This
loan will be removed from the pool if it is not confirmed. Recovco
reported that mortgage loans reviewed were in first-lien position
and for any of the remaining loans reviewed by Recovco, proof of
first lien position could only be confirmed using the final title
policy as of loan origination. Due to the title/lien results and
because the payment history review was only conducted on a sample
of the whole-loan purchased loans in the pool, Moody's applied an
adjustment to losses in its analysis.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files. To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer or depositor
has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage loan
document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding the
completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the mortgage
loan documents, and such missing document, defect or breach is
preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization against the
related mortgaged property through foreclosure or similar loss
mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title claim under the
related title insurance policy, the party with such actual
knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the seller, indenture trustee,
depositor, master servicer and related servicer. Upon notification
of a missing or defective mortgage loan file, the seller will have
120 days from the date it receives such notification to deliver the
missing document or otherwise cure the defect or breach. If it is
unable to do so, the seller will be obligated to replace or
repurchase the mortgage loan.

Moody's did not apply an adjustment for missing documents or
missing information identified by AMC in part because Moody's
separately received and assessed a title report and a custodial
report for the mortgage loans in the pool. Moody's reviewed a draft
of the custodial report and identified ten loans with note
instrument issues. Even though this exception and the missing file
exceptions noted in the compliance review are protected by the R&W
framework, Moody's assumed that 0.3% (ten out of 3,263) of the
projected defaults will have missing document breaches that will
not be effectively remedied and will result in higher loss
severities. This adjustment is due in part to its view of the
financial strength of the R&W provider.

Trustee, Custodian, Paying Agent, Servicers, Master Servicer,
Successor Servicer and Special Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., and
U.S. Bank National Association. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A. In
addition, Nationstar Mortgage, as master servicer, is responsible
for servicer oversight, termination of servicers, and the
appointment of successor servicers. Having Nationstar Mortgage as a
master servicer mitigates servicing-related risk due to the
performance oversight that it will provide. Nationstar Mortgage
will serve as the designated successor servicer for the transaction
and Shellpoint will serve as the special servicer. As the special
servicer, Shellpoint will be responsible for servicing mortgage
loans that become 60 or more days delinquent.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC(37.6%), Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(29.1%), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (10.6%), TIAA, FSB (8.5%), Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (5.8%), Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (3.6%),
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2.9%) and PNC Mortgage (1.9%)
will act as the primary servicers of the collateral pool.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met. To pass the first test, the
delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50% of
the subordinate bonds outstanding. To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 7.30% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-1
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 29.2%. These provisions
mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Other Considerations

The transaction contains a mortgage loan sale provision, the
exercise of which is subject to potential conflicts of interest.
The servicers in the transaction may sell mortgage loans that
become 60 or more days delinquent according to the MBA methodology
to any party in the secondary market in an arms-length transaction
and at a fair market value. For such sale to take place, the
related servicer must determine, in its reasonable commercial
judgment, that such sale would maximize proceeds on a present value
basis. If the sponsor or any of its subsidiaries is the purchaser,
the servicers must obtain at least two additional independent bids.
The transaction documents provide little detail on the method of
receipt of bids and there is no set minimum sale price. Such lack
of detail creates a risk that the independent bids could be weak
bids from purchasers that do not actively participate in the
market. Furthermore, the transaction documents provide little
detail regarding how servicers should conduct present value
calculations when determining if a note sale should be pursued. The
special servicer and the second largest servicer in the
transaction, Shellpoint, is an affiliate of the sponsor. The first
largest servicer in the transaction, Nationstar Mortgage, has a
commercial relationship with the sponsor outside of the
transaction. These business arrangements could lead to conflicts of
interest. Moody's took this into account and adjusted its losses
accordingly.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the indenture trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believes that NRMLT
2018-5 is adequately protected against such risk primarily because
the loans in this transaction are highly seasoned with a weighted
average seasoning is approximately 160 months. Although some loans
in the pool were previously delinquent and modified, the loans all
have a substantial history of payment performance. This includes
payment performance during the recent recession. As such, if loans
in the pool were materially defective, such issues would likely
have been discovered prior to the securitization. Furthermore,
third party due diligence was conducted on a significant random
sample of the loans for issues such as data integrity, compliance,
and title. As such, Moody's did not apply adjustments in this
transaction to account for indemnification payment risk.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from its original expectations
as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above its original expectations as
a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.


OZLM LTD VIII: Moody's Rates $31.5MM Class D-RR Notes 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by OZLM VIII, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$4,000,000 Class X-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2029
(the "Class X-RR Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$384,000,000 Class A-1-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class A-1-RR Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$69,000,000 Class A-2-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class A-2-RR Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$29,100,000 Class B-RR Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class B-RR Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$36,900,000 Class C-RR Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class C-RR Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$31,500,000 Class D-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$11,400,000 Class E-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class E-RR Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation.
The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of
broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Och-Ziff Loan Management LP manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on November 15, 2018 in
connection with the refinancing of the Class A-1a-R, A-1b-R,
A-2a-R, A-2b-R, B-R and C-R secured notes, previously issued on May
30, 2017 and the Class D and Class E secured notes, previously
issued on September 9, 2014. On the Second Refinancing Date, the
Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes,
along with the proceeds from the issuance of additional
subordinated notes, to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes
and the Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional
subordinated notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features will occur in connection with the refinancing. These
include: extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the
stated maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral
quality tests and changes to the overcollateralization test levels.


Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: 600,000,000

Diversity Score: 68

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2910

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.31%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


REALT 2007-2: S&P Raises Class L Notes Rating to BB+
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Real Estate Asset Liquidity
Trust's (REALT) series 2007-2, a Canadian commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P said, "For the upgrades, our expectation of credit enhancement
was in line with the raised rating levels. The upgrades also
reflect reduction in the trust balance. Furthermore, our rating on
class F considered its position in the capital structure, which
currently benefits from loan amortization.

"While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes F through L, our analysis also
considered the refinancing risk of the remaining loan in the pool,
which is secured by a retail property that is 100% leased to a
single tenant. The loan matures in April 2019, while the tenant's
lease expires in July 2021."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Nov. 13, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was C$9.3 million, which is 2.5% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes one loan, down from 48
loans at issuance. To date, the transaction has experienced
C$918,703 in principal losses, or 0.2% of the original pool trust
balance.

For the sole remaining Rona Eglinton & Warden loan, S&P calculated
a 1.29x S&P Global Ratings' debt service coverage (DSC) and 57.7%
S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.75% S&P
Global Ratings' capitalization rate.

The Rona Eglinton & Warden loan is secured by an 113,462-sq.-ft.
retail property that is 100% leased to Rona, a Canadian retailer of
home improvement and construction products and services, under a
lease that expires July 2021. The master servicer, First National
Financial Corp., currently does not hold any reserves for the loan,
which matures in April 2019.       

  RATINGS RAISED

  Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-2
  Rating

  Class    To                     From
  F        A+ (sf)                BB- (sf)
  G        A- (sf)                B+ (sf)
  H        BBB+ (sf)              B+ (sf)
  J        BBB (sf)               B (sf)
  K        BBB- (sf)              B (sf)
  L        BB+ (sf)               B- (sf)


RMF BUYOUT 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class M4 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by RMF
Buyout Issuance Trust 2018-1. The ratings range from (P)Aaa (sf) to
(P)Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 1,239 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages and 110 real estate owned
properties. The servicer for the deal is Reverse Mortgage Funding,
LLC . The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RMF Buyout Issuance Trust 2018-1

Class A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class M1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Class M2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Class M3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Class M4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing RBIT 2018-1 consists of first-lien inactive
HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance
secured by properties in the US along with Real-Estate Owned (REO)
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, the sale of the property is used to recover the amount
owed. The mortgage assets were acquired from Ginnie Mae sponsored
HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations or the purchase of
whole loan pools. All of the mortgage assets are covered by FHA
insurance for the repayment of principal up to certain amounts.

There are 1,349 mortgage assets with a balance of $333,718,195. The
assets are in either default, due and payable, referred for deed in
lieu, bankruptcy, foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in
default may cure or move to due and payable; due and payable loans
may cure or move to foreclosure; and foreclosure loans may cure or
move to REO. 6.9% of the assets are in default of which 0.5% (of
the total assets) are in default due to non-occupancy and 6.3% (of
the total assets) are in default due to delinquent taxes and
insurance. 9.4% of the assets are due and payable, 0.3% are in
referred for deed in lieu status, 16.5% are in bankruptcy status
and 60.3% are in foreclosure. Finally, 6.6% of the assets are REO
properties and were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure on the associated loan. This transaction has a
relatively low percentage of REO properties. All else equal, a
lower percentage of REO properties suggests that a smaller
percentage of assets will be liquidated shortly after closing and
therefore the weighted average life may be longer.

Compared to other inactive HECM transactions Moody's has rated,
RBIT 2018-1 has a high percentage of loans in bankruptcy status.
There are 197 loans, representing 16.5% of the pool balance, that
are in bankruptcy. Based on information provided by RMF, the
majority of these loans are in chapter 13 bankruptcy where timeline
to resolution can take up to five years. Moody's extended its
assumed liquidation timelines for these loans to account for this.


The initial weighted average loan-to-value-plus-insurance ratio is
59.1%, which is high compared to most other inactive HECM
transactions Moody's has rated. This implies that, all else equal,
more loans in this pool will have their insurance claims capped by
the MCA. Also, the weighted average LTV ratio is 149.2% which is
higher than in most other inactive HECM transactions Moody's has
rated. As such, borrowers in this pool tend to have less equity in
their homes compared to most prior transactions which may lead to
lower cure and repayment rates.

There are 221 loans in this transaction, 12.7% of the asset
balance, backed by properties in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican HECMs
pose additional risk due to the poor state of the Puerto Rican
economy, declining population, and bureaucratic foreclosure
process. Furthermore, Puerto Rico is still struggling to recover
from Hurricane Maria. In August 2018, HUD extended the foreclosure
moratorium in areas affected by Hurricane Maria for an additional
month. The moratorium ended on September 15, 2018. Even though the
moratorium has now been lifted, there are likely to be additional
delays due to court related backlogs, additional foreclosure
procedures for impacted properties, and difficulties in tracking
down borrowers or their heirs.

Servicing

RMF will be the named servicer for the portfolio under the sale and
servicing agreement. RMF has the necessary processes, staff,
technology and overall infrastructure in place to effectively
oversee the servicing of this transaction. RMF will use Reverse
Mortgage Solutions, Inc. ("RMS") and Compu-Link Corporation, d/b/a
Celink ("Celink") as subservicers to service the mortgage assets.
RMS will sub-service 67.3% of the pool and Celink will sub-service
32.7%. Based on an operational review of RMF, it has adequate
sub-servicing monitoring processes, a seasoned servicing oversight
team and direct system access to the sub-servicers' core systems.
In addition, a third party will review RMF's monthly servicing
reports on a quarterly basis to ensure data accuracy throughout the
life of the transaction.

RMS' corporate parent, Ditech Holding Corp. (Ditech), recently
emerged from chapter 11 bankruptcy. Although RMS was not included
in the bankruptcy filing, there is still uncertainty as to the
overall impact Ditech's financial condition going forward may have
on RMS and its servicing operations. To address this risk, RMF has
engaged Celink as a backup sub-servicer for RMS and Celink has
mapped RMS' portfolio for easier transfer. In addition, the
sub-servicing agreement between RMF and RMS automatically
terminates at the end of each successive 30-calendar-day period,
and will renew at RMF's discretion, reducing the potential
operational risk if RMS becomes bankrupt.

Unlike other inactive HECM transactions Moody's has rated, in RBIT
2018-1 a firm of independent accountants (the verification agent)
will perform quarterly procedures with respect to the monthly
servicing reports to delivered by the servicer to the trustee.
These procedures will include comparison of the underlying records
relating to the subservicers' servicing of the loans and
determination of the mathematical accuracy of calculations of loan
balances stated in the monthly servicing reports delivered to the
trustee. Any material exceptions identified as a result of the
procedures will be described in the verification agent's report. To
the extent the verification agent identifies errors in the monthly
servicing reports, the servicer will be obligated to correct them.


Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst six
classes of notes with structural subordination. All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their expected final payment dates. The subordinate notes will not
receive principal until the beginning of their respective target
amortization periods (in the absence of an acceleration event). The
notes benefit from structural subordination as credit enhancement,
and an interest reserve account funded with cash received from the
initial purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit
enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in August 2020. For the Class M1
notes, the expected final payment date is in December 2020. For the
Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is in January 2021.
For the Class M3 notes, the expected final payment date is in
February 2021. For the Class M4 notes, the expected final payment
date is in March 2021. Finally, for the Class M5 notes, the
expected final payment date is in July 2021. For each of the
subordinate notes, there are target amortization periods that
conclude on the respective expected final payment dates. The legal
final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve account may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon RMF remaining
as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related reimbursements are
subordinated to interest and principal payments while RMF is
servicer. However, servicing advances will instead have priority
over interest and principal payments in the event that RMF defaults
and a new servicer is appointed.

The transaction provides a strong mechanism to ensure continuous
advancing for the assets in the pool. Specifically, if the servicer
fails to advance and such failure is not remedied for a period of
15 days, the sub-servicers can fund their advances from collections
and from an interim advancing reserve account. Given the
significant amount of advancing required to service inactive HECMs
with tax delinquencies, this provision helps to minimize
operational disruption in the event RMF encounters financial
difficulties.

In addition, the transaction establishes a clear and efficient
process for choosing a successor servicer following the removal of
the servicer. Specifically, unlike other inactive HECM transactions
Moody's has rated, the servicer will provide a list of eligible
successor servicers to the indenture trustee on a quarterly basis
and a successor servicer will be selected based on a voting process
that does not require a supermajority of the senior noteholders to
actively consent.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of RMF. The review focused on data
integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification, accuracy of
appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status recording,
borrower age documentation, identification of excessive corporate
advances, documentation of servicer advances, and identification of
tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions
(BPOs) were ordered for 215 properties in the pool.

The third party review (TPR) firm conducted an extensive data
integrity review. Certain data tape fields, such as the mortgage
insurance premium (MIP) rate, the current UPB, current interest
rate, and marketable title date were reviewed against RMF's
servicing system. However, a significant number of data tape fields
were reviewed against imaged copies of original documents of
record, screen shots of HUD's HERMIT system, or HUD documents. Some
key fields reviewed in this manner included the original note rate,
the debenture rate, foreclosure first legal date, and the called
due date.

Certain of the TPR results were in line with recent inactive HECM
transactions that Moody's has rated including the results related
to the accuracy of reported valuations, the presence of FHA
insurance, the existence of property preservation expenses in
excess of FHA reimbursement thresholds, and the accuracy of
reported disbursements. However, other TPR results were weak
compared to previous inactive HECM transactions such as the high
rate of exceptions related to the accuracy of tape values,
recording of occupancy status, borrower age documentation, liens on
properties in Texas, and foreclosure and bankruptcy attorney fees
in excess of FHA reimbursement thresholds. RBIT 2018-1's TPR
results showed a 2.0% initial-tape exception rate related to the
accuracy of tape values and a 35.7% initial-tape exception rate
related to foreclosure and bankruptcy attorney fees. In its
analysis, Moody's applied adjustments to account for the TPR
results in certain areas.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

RMF is the loan-level R&W provider and is not rated. This
relatively weak financial profile is mitigated by the fact that RMF
will subordinate its servicing advances, servicing fees, and MIP
payments in the transaction and thus has significant alignment of
interests. Another factor mitigating the risks associated with a
financially weak R&W provider is that a third-party due diligence
firm conducted a review on the loans for evidence of FHA insurance.


RMF represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA insurance
that is in full force and effect. RMF provides further R&Ws
including those for title, first lien position, enforceability of
the lien, and the condition of the property. Although RMF provides
a no fraud R&W covering the origination of the mortgage loans,
determination of value of the mortgaged properties, and the sale
and servicing of the mortgage loans, the no fraud R&W is made only
as to the initial mortgage loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, RMF
does not provide any other R&W in connection with the origination
of the mortgage loans, including whether the mortgage loans were
originated in compliance with applicable federal, state and local
laws. Although certain representations are knowledge qualified, the
transaction documents contain language specifying that if a
representation would have been breached if not for the knowledge
qualifier then RMF will repurchase the relevant asset as if the
representation had been breached.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, RMF has to cure the
breach. If RMF is unable to cure the breach, RMF must repurchase
the loan within 90 days from receiving the notification. Moody's
believes the absence of an independent third party reviewer who can
identify any breaches to the R&W makes the enforcement mechanism
weak in this transaction. Also, RMF, in its good faith, is
responsible for determining if a R&W breach materially and
adversely affects the interests of the trust or the value the
collateral. This creates the potential for a conflict of interest.


When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the acquisition trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believes that RBIT
2018-1 is adequately protected against such risk in part because a
third-party data integrity review was conducted on a significant
random sample of the loans. In addition, the third-party due
diligence firm verified that all of the loans in the pool are
covered by FHA insurance.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the RBIT 2018-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank National
Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also serve as the
claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD mortgagee of
record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations" published in May 2015.

Its quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan modeling
of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA insurance and
with various stresses applied to model parameters depending on the
target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than its appraised value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
marketable title to the property. ABCs are filed six months after
the servicer has obtained marketable title if the property has not
yet been sold. For an SBC, HUD insurance will cover the difference
between (i) the loan balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price
and 95.0% of the latest appraisal, with the transaction on the hook
for losses if the sales price is lower than 95.0% of the latest
appraisal. For an ABC, HUD only covers the difference between the
loan amount and 100% of appraised value, so failure to sell the
property at the appraised value results in loss.

Moody's expects ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Its base case expectation is that properties will be
sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. To make
this assumption, Moody's considered industry data and the
historical experience of RMF. Moody's stressed this percentage at
higher credit rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed
that ABC appraisal haircuts could reach up to 30.0%.

In its asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed this percentage at higher credit
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that SBC
appraisal haircuts could reach up to 11.0% (i.e., 6.0% below
95.0%).

Under its analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go through
both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability. Each loan
will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. For the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that 85% of claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs.
Moody's stressed this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages
for higher rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed
that 85% of insurance claims would be submitted as ABCs.

Liquidation process: each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In
its analysis, Moody's assume loans that are in referred status to
be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed to
move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to 12 months
depending on the default reason. Foreclosure status is based on the
state in which that the related property is located and is further
stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and 12
months with respect to ABCs.

Debenture interest: the receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment. Its
base case assumption is that 90.0% of debenture interest will be
received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of debenture
interest that will be received at higher rating levels. Its
debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that RMF
(not rated) reimburse the trust for debenture interest curtailments
due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD guidelines.


Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into its analysis, including the following:

  -- In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in its analysis. However, for seasoned appraisals
Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential home price
depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the cut-off
date.

  -- Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in
their homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their
heirs rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's
estimated which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing
each loans' appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB.

  -- Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

  -- Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where RMF is no longer the
servicer. Moody's assumes the following in the situation where RMF
is no longer the servicer:

  -- Servicing advances and servicing fees: While RMF subordinates
their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing fees, and MIP
payments, a replacement servicer will not subordinate these
amounts.

  -- RMF indemnifies the trust for lost debenture interest due to
servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD guidelines. In the
event of a bankruptcy, RMF will not have the financial capacity to
do so.

  -- A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assumes a 25 bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

  -- One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse a replacement servicer (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500 per loan.

Furthermore, to account for risks posed by Puerto Rican loans,
Moody's considered the following for loans backed by properties
located in Puerto Rico:

  -- To account for delays in the foreclosure process in Puerto
Rico due to the hurricanes, Moody's assumed extended foreclosure
timelines across rating levels and assumed five years as its Aaa
foreclosure timeline.

  -- Moody's assumed that all insurance claims will be submitted as
ABCs. In addition, Moody's assumed that properties will sell for
significantly lower than their appraised values.

To account for a potential extension of timelines due to loans with
borrowers in bankruptcy, Moody's extended the assumed timelines for
these loans in the base case scenario and scaled this assumption up
for higher rating levels.

In addition, for high rating scenarios, Moody's increased
foreclosure timelines by three months for RMS sub-serviced loans.
Celink is a backup servicer for RMS. If RMS is terminated as
sub-servicer by RMF Moody's assumed it will take 90 days to
transfer servicing from RMS to Celink and liquidation timelines
will be extended as a result.

Moody's also applied a small adjustment in its analysis to account
for the risks associated with certain damaged properties that are
located in areas impacted by Hurricane Florence or Hurricane
Michael.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from its original expectations resulting in appreciation in
the value of the mortgaged property and faster property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from its original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.


SLM STUDENT 2014-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Bsf
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded SLM Student Loan Trust 2014-1 as
follows:

  -- Class A-3 to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The downgrades are driven by increasing maturity risk since the
last review with increasing income-based repayment and extended
term. Because the legal final maturity of class A-3 is less than 11
years away, and the sponsor's ability to call the notes upon
reaching 10% pool factor, Fitch believes there is a limited margin
of safety that supports a 'Bsf' rating, despite the notes failing
the base cases. Additionally, the trust has entered into a
revolving credit agreement with Navient by which it may borrow
funds at maturity in order to pay off the notes. Because Navient
has the option but not the obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch
cannot give full quantitative credit to this agreement. However,
the agreement does provide qualitative comfort that Navient is
committed to limiting investors' exposure to maturity risk.

The rating of subordinate tranches will typically not be eligible
for ratings higher than any senior tranche in the same transaction.
Given the maturity sensitivity and subsequent rating of 'Bsf' for
the A-3 notes, the class B notes were also downgraded to
'Bsf'/Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties provided by
eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued
interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Outlook
Stable.

Collateral Performance: Based on transaction specific performance
to date, Fitch assumes a base case cumulative default rate of
14.25% and a 42.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumes a sustainable constant default rate of 2.7%
and a sustainable constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) of 14.0% in cash flow modelling. Fitch applies the
standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is assumed to
be 0.50% in the base case and 3.0% in the 'AAA' case. The TTM
average of deferment, forbearance, and income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) are 7.8%, 15.3%, and 24.5%, respectively, and
are used as the starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modelled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.15%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model indicates that the class
A-3 notes do not pay off before their maturity date in the 'B'
stress cases of Fitch's modelling scenarios. If the breach of the
class A-3 maturity date triggers an event of default, interest
payments will be diverted away from the class B notes, causing them
to fail the 'B' stress cases as well.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for this transaction
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for Special Allowance Payments (SAP) and the
securities. As of October 2018, approximately 0.2% of the FFELP
loans have SAP indexed to 91-day T-Bill, with the remaining indexed
to one-month LIBOR. All notes are indexed to one-month LIBOR. Fitch
applies its standard basis and interest rate stresses to this
transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and for the class A
notes, subordination. As of October 2018, senior and total
effective parity ratios (including the reserve) are 107.2% (6.7%
CE) and 101.0% (1.0% CE), respectively. Liquidity support is
provided by a reserve account currently sized at 0.25% of the
outstanding pool balance. The transaction will continue to release
cash as long as the 101.01% total parity is maintained.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer of FFELP student
loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results should only be considered as one potential model
implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple risk
factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

  -- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

  -- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

  -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
'CCCsf';

  -- Basis Spread increase 0.5%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

  -- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

  -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

  -- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

  -- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.


TRUPS FINANCIALS 2018-2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to three
classes of notes to be issued by TruPS Financials Note
Securitization 2018-2 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$210,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2039 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

US$58,000,000 Class A-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2039 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

US$29,800,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2039 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, and the Class B Notes are
referred to herein, together, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

TFINS 2018-2 is a static cash flow CDO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of (1) trust preferred
securities issued by US community banks and their holding companies
and (2) TruPS, senior notes and surplus notes issued by insurance
companies and their holding companies. Moody's expects the
portfolio to be 100% ramped as of the closing date.

EJF CDO Manager LLC, an affiliate of EJF Capital LLC, will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer. The Manager will direct the disposition of any
defaulted securities or credit risk securities. The transaction
prohibits any asset purchases or substitutions at any time.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
preferred shares.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority. The transaction also includes an
interest diversion feature beginning on the December 2026 payment
date whereby 60% of the interest at a junior step in the priority
of interest payments is used to pay the principal on the Class A-1
Notes until the Class A-1 Notes' principal has been paid in full.

The portfolio of this CDO consists of (1) TruPS issued by 45 US
community banks and (2) TruPS, senior notes and surplus notes
issued by 17 insurance companies, the majority of which Moody's
does not rate. Moody's assesses the default probability of bank
obligors that do not have public ratings through credit scores
derived using RiskCalc™, an econometric model developed by
Moody's Analytics. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of the
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q2-2018 financial data.
Moody's assesses the default probability of insurance company
obligors that do not have public ratings through credit assessments
provided by its insurance ratings team based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance companies' annual statutory financial
reports. Moody's assumes a fixed recovery rate of 10% for both the
bank and insurance obligations.

Moody's ratings on the Rated Notes took into account a stress
scenario for highly levered bank holding company issuers. The
transaction's portfolio includes subordinated debt issued by a
number of bank holding companies with significant amounts of other
debt on their balance sheet which may increase the risk presented
by their subsidiaries. To address the risk from higher debt burden
at the bank holding companies, Moody's conducted a stress scenario
in which Moody's made adjustments to the RiskCalc credit scores for
these highly leveraged holding companies. This stress scenario was
an important consideration in the assigned ratings.

In addition, its analysis considered the concentrated nature of the
portfolio. There are 10 issuers that each constitute approximately
2.8% to 2.9% of the portfolio par. Moody's ran a stress scenario in
which Moody's assumed a two notch downgrade for up to 30% of the
portfolio par.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $351,015,000

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 697

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 2.97%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 9.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 10.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 10.5 years

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors were part of the rating committee
consideration. Moody's considers the structural protections in the
transaction, the risk of an event of default, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transaction, influenced the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: The transaction's performance could
be negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in
the general economy. Moody's currently has a stable outlook on the
US banking sector and, the US P&C insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds due to
redemptions will occur and at what pace. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations could have an impact on
the notes' ratings.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The portfolio consists
primarily of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
assessments. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2018-C14: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs BB-sf
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2018-C14 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2018-C14.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $22,465,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,533,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,722,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $194,737,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $166,162,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $455,619,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $120,414,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $59,393,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,544,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,477,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,917,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $16,272,000ab class X-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $6,509,000ab class X-G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $17,899,000a class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,018,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,272,000a class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,509,000a class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

  -- $21,153,976ab class X-NR;

  -- $21,153,976a class NR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Nov. 14, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 45 loans secured by 236
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$650,884,977 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by UBS AG, Societe Generale, Natixis Real Estate Capital
LLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance LLC, Cantor Commercial Real Estate
Lending, L.P. and CIBC, Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 80.1% and asset summary reviews
on 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch LTV is 99.4%, which is better than
the 2018 YTD and 2017 averages of 102.2% and 101.6%, respectively.
However, the pool's DSCR of 1.20x is slightly lower than the 2018
YTD and 2017 averages of 1.22x and 1.26x, respectively. Excluding
investment-grade credit opinion loans, the pool has a Fitch LTV and
DSCR of 103.5% and 1.16x, respectively.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing 9.2%
of the pool, have an investment-grade credit opinion. This is below
the 2018 YTD and 2017 averages of 13.5% and 11.7%, respectively.
Net of these loans, the Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.16x and 103.4%,
respectively for this transaction.

Above Average Pool Amortization: There are 22 loans (45.2% of the
pool) that are partial IO and 16 loans (22.9%) that are balloon
loans. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will
pay down by 10.4%, which is above the 2018 YTD average of 7.2% and
the 2017 average of 7.9%

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 11.0% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period). The
following rating sensitivities describe how the ratings would react
to further NCF declines below Fitch's NCF. The implied rating
sensitivities are only indicative of some of the potential outcomes
and do not consider other risk factors to which the transaction is
exposed. Stressing additional risk factors may result in different
outcomes. Furthermore, the implied ratings, after the further NCF
stresses are applied, are more akin to what the ratings would be at
deal issuance had those further stressed NCFs been in place at that
time.


UNITED AUTO 2018-1: DRBS Hikes Class F Notes Rating to BB
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 11 outstanding ratings from two United Auto
Credit Securitization Trust transactions. Of the 11 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, DBRS confirmed two classes,
upgraded eight classes and discontinued one class due to full
repayment. For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at the current rating levels. For the
ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such that credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses
at their new respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
performance.

The Affected Ratings are:

United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2018-1

                Action       Rating
                ------       ------
Class A Notes   Confirmed    AAA
Class B Notes   Upgraded     AAA
Class C Notes   Upgraded     AA
Class D Notes   Upgraded     A
Class E Notes   Upgraded     BBB
Class F Notes   Upgraded     BB

United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2017-1

                Action       Rating
                ------       ------
Class B Notes   Confirmed    AAA
Class C Notes   Upgraded     AAA
Class D Notes   Upgraded     A
Class E Notes   Upgraded     BBB(low)
Class A Notes   Disc.-Repaid Discontinued  


VOYA CLO 2015-3: Fitch Rates $18.4MM Class E-R Notes 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Voya CLO 2015-3, Ltd.:

  -- $478,900,000 class A-1-R notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,000,000 class A-2A-R notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,900,000 class A-2B-R notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $91,800,000 class A-3-R notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18,400,000 class E-R notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1a notes have been marked 'PIF';

The class A-1 loans notes have been marked 'PIF';

The class A-1b notes have been marked 'PIF';

The class A-2 notes have been marked 'PIF'.

Fitch does not rate the class X-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, E-R notes or the
subordinated notes.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Voya CLO 2015-3, Ltd. (the issuer) is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC
(VAAM) that originally closed in September 2015. The CLO's existing
secured notes were refinanced in whole on Nov. 16, 2018 from
proceeds of the issuance of new secured notes. The secured notes
and existing subordinated notes will provide financing on a
portfolio of approximately $798.18 million of primarily first lien
senior secured loans. After the refinancing date, the CLO will have
an approximately 4.9-year reinvestment period and 1.9-year noncall
period.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) available to
the class A-1-R, A-2A-R, A-2B-R (collectively A-2-R), A-3-R and E-R
notes (Fitch-rated notes), in addition to excess spread, is
sufficient to protect against portfolio default and recovery-rate
projections in each class's respective rating stress scenario. The
degree of CE available to the class A-1-R notes is above the
average CE of recent 'AAAsf' CLO issuances, while CE available to
class A-2-R notes is below such average. The level of CE available
to class A-3-R and E-R notes is below the average 'AAsf' and 'Bsf'
category CE of recent CLO issuances. However, cash flow modeling
results for all classes indicate performance in line with that of
other Fitch-rated CLO notes with the same respective ratings.

'B+'/'B' Asset Quality: The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B+'/'B', which is comparable to recent
CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote highly
speculative credit quality. In Fitch's opinion, each class of
Fitch-rated notes are projected to be able to withstand default
rates of up to 64.6%, 61.6%, 56.2% and 36.1%, respectively.

Strong Recovery Expectations: The indicative portfolio consists of
96.8% first lien senior secured loans and 3.2% second lien loans.
Approximately 90.3% have strong recovery prospects or a
Fitch-assigned recovery rating of 'RR2' or higher, resulting in a
base case recovery assumption of 79.2%. In determining the ratings
for rated notes, Fitch stressed the indicative portfolio by
assuming a higher portfolio concentration of assets with lower
recovery prospects and further reduced recovery assumptions for
higher rating stresses, resulting in a 40.6%, 49.3% and 77.1%
recovery-rate assumptions in Fitch's 'AAAsf', 'AAsf' and 'Bsf'
scenarios, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to the potential variability
of key model assumptions, including decreases in recovery rates and
increases in default rates. Results under these sensitivity
scenarios ranged between 'BBB-sf' and 'AAAsf' for the class A-1-R
notes, between 'BB+sf' and 'AAAsf' for the class A-2-R notes,
between 'B+sf' and 'AAsf' for the class A-3-R, between lower than
'CCCsf' and 'B-sf' for the class E-R notes.


VOYA CLO 2015-3: S&P Rates $31.9MM Class D-R Notes 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Voya CLO 2015-3 Ltd.'s
floating-rate notes. This is a reset of the transaction that
initially closed in September 2015 and was not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily of broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Voya CLO 2015-3 Ltd./Voya CLO 2015-3 LLC
  Class                Rating           Amount (mil. $)
  X-R                  AAA (sf)                    3.32
  A-1-R                AAA (sf)                  478.90
  A-2A-R               NR                         23.00
  A-2B-R               NR                         12.90
  A-3-R                AA (sf)                    91.80
  B-R (deferrable)     A (sf)                     51.80
  C-R (deferrable)     BBB- (sf)                  44.00
  D-R (deferrable)     BB- (sf)                   31.90
  E-R (deferrable)     NR                         18.40
  Subordinated notes   NR                         56.70

  NR--Not rated.


WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Hikes Class G Debt Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on five classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in WaMu Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-SL3 as follows:

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five principal and interest (P&I) classes (Cl. D,
Cl. E, Cl. F, Cl. G and Cl. H) were upgraded due to an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The
deal has paid down approximately 20% since Moody's last review and
over 94% since securitization. In addition, 85% of the deal is
fully amortizing.

The ratings on two P&I classes (Cl. J and Cl. K) were affirmed due
to Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.0% of the
current balance, compared to 7.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.3% at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July
2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 23, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $75.5 million
from $1.28 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 25.3% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 77, compared to 79 at Moody's last review.

Thirty-one loans, constituting 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One hundred and nine loans have been liquidated from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $46.9 million (for an
average loss severity of 31%). Three loans, constituting 3% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $1.5 million loss for the specially serviced loans (58%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for twenty-six
poorly performing loans, constituting 24% of the pool, and has
estimated an aggregate loss of $5.5 million (a 30% expected loss
based on a 60% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 78% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 77%, compared to 86%
at last review and 103% at securitization. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.76X and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 1.76X and 1.31X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class H Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C37 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C37 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-EF at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-H at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The collateral consists of 63
fixed-rate loans secured by 141 commercial and multifamily
properties. As of the October 2018 remittance, there has been a
collateral reduction of 1.4% since issuance, with all loans
outstanding and a current trust balance of $739.7 million. At
year-end (YE) 2017, the pool reported a weighted-average (WA)
debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.82 times (x)
and 10.2%, respectively, compared with the DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS
Debt Yield for the pool at issuance of 1.68x and 9.2%,
respectively. The top 15 loans, representing 58.9% of the pool
balance, reported a WA YE2017 DSCR of 1.87x, which reflects a net
cash flow (NCF) growth of 6.7% over the DBRS Term NCF figures
derived at issuance. The partial-year 2018 financials for the top
15 loans (14 reporting) reflected a WA annualized DSCR of 1.98x,
implying NCF growth of 3.1% over the YE2017 figures.

In addition to the overall healthy NCF growth from issuance, the
pool also benefits from a high concentration of shadow-rated loans
in the top 15, including Prospectus ID#1 - Hilton Hawaiian Village,
Prospectus ID#2 - Quantum Park and Prospectus ID#4 - Potomac Mills,
which combined account for 19.1% of the pool and were all
shadow-rated investment grade at issuance. With this review, DBRS
confirms that all three continue to exhibit characteristics in line
with the investment-grade shadow ratings.

As of the October 2018 remittance, nine loans, representing 20.1%
of the pool balance, are being monitored on the servicer's watch
list. There are four loans, including two loans in the top 15,
representing 8.5% of the pool balance, that are being monitored for
non-performance related issues in deferred maintenance. The watch
listed loans reported a WA YE2017 DSCR of 1.44x, in line with the
WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.43x derived at issuance. In the analysis for
this review, DBRS applied a conservative cash flow scenario for the
watch listed loans exhibiting increased credit risk from issuance.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-EF, X-G and X-H are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S dollars unless otherwise noted.


WELLS FARGO 2016-LC25: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-LC25 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-LC25 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The subject transaction closed in
December 2016 and consisted of 80 loans secured by 135 commercial
properties with an original trust balance of $955.0 million. As of
the October 2018 remittance, there are 79 of the original 80 loans
remaining in the pool, with a trust balance of $928.6 million,
which represents a 2.8% collateral reduction since issuance. As of
October 2018, 70 loans, representing 94.9% of the pool, reported
year-end (YE) 2017 financials and 62 loans, representing 86.8% of
the pool, provided partial-year 2018 financials. Based on the most
recent YE financials, the pool reported a weighted-average (WA) net
cash flow (NCF) growth of 6.1% over the DBRS NCF figures derived at
issuance, with a WA debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt
yield of 1.57x and 9.3% (excluding co-operative properties),
respectively. These figures compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR and
DBRS Debt Yield of 1.48x and 8.5% (excluding co-operative
properties) at issuance, respectively. DBRS has excluded the
co-operative properties from these figures as the reported cash
flows and calculated DSCRs are generally artificially low, with
minimal information provided to the servicers regarding general
operations. However, these loans, representing 6.6% of the pool
balance, are considered to be low-leveraged and have low term and
refinance default risk.

As of the October 2018 remittance, four loans, comprising 1.6% of
the pool balance, were placed on the servicer's watch list for low
DSCRs. All four of those loans are secured by co-op properties,
which exhibited strong credit characteristics at issuance.
Approximately 47.7% of the pool balance (31 loans) currently
requires interest-only (IO) payments with 12 loans, representing
11.7% of the pool, featuring full IO terms. The largest full IO
term loan (9 West 57th Street; Prospectus ID#1), which represents
46.2% of the full IO term loans, is shadow-rated investment-grade.
The partial IO loans reported an amortizing DSCR and in-place debt
yield of 1.44x and 8.6%, respectively, based on the most recent YE
NCF figures.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the 9 West 57th Street loan
investment grade, and with this review has confirmed that the
performance remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


[*] Moody's Hikes $76MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued in 2017-2018
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 15 tranches
from three Prime Jumbo transactions issued in 2017 and 2018:
Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1 (FMT 2017-1), Flagstar Mortgage
Trust 2017-2 (FMT 2017-2) and Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-1 (FMT
2018-1). All transactions are backed by first-lien, agency eligible
high balance and non-agency jumbo prime mortgage loans. All the
mortgage loans were originated by Flagstar Bank, FSB either
directly or indirectly through correspondents and serviced by
Flagstar Bank, FSB. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the master servicer.


Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE TRUST 2017-1

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Issuer: FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE TRUST 2017-2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a decrease in its projected
pool losses.

Moody's calculated losses on the pools using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Its final loss
estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator assessments,
third-party review (TPR) scope and results, and the financial
strength of representation & warranty (R&W) provider. Moody's also
considered that at the time of issuance for FMT 2018-1, an
independent TPR firm was engaged to conduct due diligence for the
credit, regulatory compliance, property valuation, and data
accuracy for a sample of 332 loans. For the remaining 427 loans,
the TPR firm was only engaged to conduct a regulatory compliance
due diligence review (which did not include compliance with ATR/QM
rules).

The action also reflects the strong performance of the underlying
pools. As of September 2018, there were minimal serious
delinquencies (loans 60 days or more delinquent) in the underlying
pools.

The rating upgrades for tranches issued by FMT 2018-1 also reflect
a reduction in the delinquency level assumptions previously used to
assess the impact of the fee for service feature in this
transaction, to better reflect historical delinquency levels. In
all Flagstar transactions Moody's has rated to date, servicing
compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee structure.
Servicing fee includes base fee plus delinquency and incentive
fees. Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted from the
interest payment amount of most junior bond first and could result
in interest shortfall to the certificates depending on the
magnitude of the delinquency and incentive fees.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in November 2018.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $519.8MM RMBS Issued in 2003-2007
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 24 tranches
from nine transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE10

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE2

Cl. II-1A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-1A-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB8

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2018 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-5

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Confirmed
at C (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CW2

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-2

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2018
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2007-RZ1 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1S, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating upgrade on CL
II-1A-2 from Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE2
also reflects a correction to the cashflow model previously used to
rate this transaction. In prior rating actions, realized loss was
incorrectly not allocated to CL. II-1A-2. This error has now been
corrected, and the rating action reflects this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.7% in October 2018 from 4.1% in
October 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 49 Classes From 14 CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 32 classes from nine
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions,
one class from one CF collateral debt obligations (CDO) backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), seven classes from
one CF collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction, and two
classes from two CF Mezzanine Structured Finance (SF) CDO
transaction.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

-- Allegro CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in September
2018.

-- ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc. (CF CDO of CMBS):
senior-most tranche paid down, other rated tranches still
outstanding.

-- BlueMountain CLO 2013-3 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption by
liquidation in October 2018.

-- BlueMountain CLO 2013-4 Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid
down.

-- BlueMountain CLO 2014-3 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
October 2018.

-- Crown Point CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

-- Fortress Credit Opportunities V CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
redemption in April 2018.

-- ICE 3: Global Credit CLO Ltd. (CF CDO): optional redemption in
October 018.

-- JFIN Revolver CLO 2014 Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid
down.

-- KVK CLO 2014-3 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in October
2018.

-- RFC CDO I Ltd. (SF CDO): senior-most tranche paid down, other
rated tranches still outstanding  RR 1 Ltd. (CF CLO): Class A-X
notes paid down, all other rated tranches remain outstanding.

-- Trainer Wortham CBO V Ltd. (CF CDO): senior-most tranche paid
down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

-- Trinitas CLO V Ltd. (CF CLO): Class X notes paid down, all
other rated tranches remain outstanding.

  RATINGS DISCONTINUED

  Allegro CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2-R               NR                  AA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  A (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  BBB- (sf)
  D                   NR                  BB- (sf)
  E                   NR                  B (sf)

  ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc.     
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-2                 NR                  B (sf)

  BlueMountain CLO 2013-3 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-1-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  B-2-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  C-R                 NR                  A (sf)/Watch Pos
  D-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)/Watch Pos
  F                   NR                  B (sf)
  
  BlueMountain CLO 2013-4 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-1-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  B-2-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  C-R                 NR                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  D-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)/Watch Pos
  F                   NR                  B (sf)

  BlueMountain CLO 2014-3 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2-R               NR                  AA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  A (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)
  D                   NR                  BB (sf)
  E                   NR                  B (sf)

  Crown Point CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1L-R              NR                  AAA (sf)

  Fortress Credit Opportunities V CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)

  ICE 3: Global Credit CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-1                 NR                  AA (sf)
  B-2                 NR                  AA (sf)
  C-1                 NR                  A- (sf)
  C-2                 NR                  A- (sf)
  D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  B+ (sf)

  JFIN Revolver CLO 2014 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

  KVK CLO 2014-3 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  AA (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  A (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
  F                   NR                  B- (sf)

  RFC CDO I Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  C                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

  RR 1 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-X(i)              NR                  AAA (sf)

  Trainer Wortham CBO V Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  CCC (sf)

  Trinitas CLO V Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  X(i)                NR                  AAA (sf)


(i)An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.
NR--Not Rated.



[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 79 Classes From 19 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 79 classes from 19 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1998 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime, re-performing, or second-lien collateral. The review
yielded 12 upgrades, 17 downgrades, and 50 affirmations.

Analytical Considerations
S&P incorporate various considerations into its decisions to raise,
lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative ratings
suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations are
based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Loan modification criteria;
-- Priority of principal payments; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/2Q4MgWK


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
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                            *********

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