/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/180701.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 1, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 181

                            Headlines

1211 AVENUE 2015-1211: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
5 BRYANT PARK 2018-5BP: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
A VOCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on $5.1MM Class E Notes to Caa1
ACCELERATED ASSETS 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on C Notes
ALLIED UNIVERSAL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Stable

AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-2: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
ANGEL OAK 2018-2: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on $15.5MM Cl. B-2 Certs
ANGEL OAK 2018-2: Fitch Gives 'Bsf' Rating on $15.4MM Cl. B-2 Certs
APIDOS CLO XXIX: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
APOLLO CREDIT IV: S&P Rates $18.5MM Class D-R Debt 'BB-'

ARBOR REALTY 2018-FL1: DBRS Gives B(low) Rating on Class F Notes
ARES XLIX: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on $20MM Cl. E Notes
ARES XLVIII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $17.5MM Class E Notes
ASHFORD HOSPITALITY 2018-KEYS: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on 2 Tranches
ATLAS SENIOR XI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $24MM Class E Notes

ATRIUM HOTEL 2018-ATRM: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Cl. F Certs
ATRIUM HOTEL 2018-ATRM: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Cl. F Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-A: Moody's Cuts Class 5-M-1 Debt Rating to B1
BANK 2017-BNK6: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs
BBCMS TRUST 2015-SRCH: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes

BBCMS TRUST 2015-STP: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
BCC FUNDING XIII: DBRS Hikes Class E Debt Rating to BB(high)
BEAR STEARNS 2002-2: Moody's Hikes Class B Debt Rating to Ba2
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR16: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Lowers Class C Certs Rating to D(sf)

BENCHMARK 2018-B4: DBRS Gives (P)B(high) Rating on Class G-RR Certs
BENCHMARK 2018-B4: Fitch to Rate $11MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
BETONY CLO 2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to $25MM Class D Notes
BETONY CLO 2: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on $25MM Class D Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2015-2: S&P Gives (P)BB- Rating on E-R Notes

BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO XXII: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on $17MM Cl. E Notes
CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Confirms 28 Tranches From 6 US ABS Deals
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2016-1: S&P Gives (P)BB- Rating on $18MM D-R Notes
CART 1: Fitch Cuts Class E Notes to Dsf, Then Withdraws Rating
CD 2006-CD3: Moody's Cuts Class A-J Debt Rating to 'Ca'

CHERRYWOOD SB 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class B-1 Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2018-C5: Fitch Rates Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
COLONY MULTIFAMILY 2014-1: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Certs Rating to Ba1
COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class G Certs
COMM 2013-LC13: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class F Certs

COMM 2014-CCRE19: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on $23.5MM Class E Certs
COMM 2014-LC17: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class F Debt to B(low)
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C05: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 29 Tranches
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2018-C04: Fitch to Rate 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
CPS AUTO: Moody's Takes Action on 14 Securities Issued 2013-2015

CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C1: Fitch Hikes $2MM Class F Certs Rating to B
CROWN POINT 5: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
CSAIL COMMERCIAL 2017-C8: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
CSMC 2008-3R: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class 2-A-1 Debt to Caa2

CSMC TRUST 2018-J1: Fitch Rates $4.79MM Class B-5 Certs 'Bsf'
DBJPM MORTGAGE 2017-C6: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E-RR Certs
DRYDEN 42: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F-R Notes
DT AUTO 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on $48MM Class E Notes
FIGUEROA CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class DRR Notes

FILLMORE PARK: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
FLAGSHIP CLO VIII: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-4: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-4: Fitch Rates $2.33MM Cl. B-5 Certs 'Bsf'
FREDDIE MAC 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class M Certs

FREDDIE MAC: Moody's Hikes $49.7MM RMBS Issued in 2017
FREED ABS 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on Class C Notes
GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: Moody's Hikes Class B5 Debt Rating to Ba2
GARRISON BSL 2018-1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $7MM Cl. F Notes
GLS AUTO 2018-2: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes

GOLDENTREE LOAN XII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC3: DBRS Hikes Rating on Class F to BB(high)
GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ9: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class X-B Certs
HALCYON LOAN 2018-1: Moody's Rates $19MM Class D Notes 'Ba3'
HERTZ VEHICLE 2018-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class D Notes

HERTZ VEHICLE II 2018-2: Fitch Rates $12.94MM Class D Notes 'BB'
HPS LOAN 12-2018: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
HPS LOAN 9-2016: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
ICG US 2018-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $18.2MM Cl. E Notes
IMSCI 2014-5: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs

INDEPENDENCE PLAZA 2018-INDP: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on HRR Certs
JAMESTOWN CLO XI: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $8MM Class E Notes
JFIN REVOLVER 2014: S&P Affirms BB+(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class A-M Debt
JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs

JP MORGAN 2018-6: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating on B-5 Certs
JP MORGAN 2018-LAQ: Fitch Gives 'BB-sf' Rating on Class HRR Debt
KKR CLO 22: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
MADISON PARK XXVIII: S&P Rates $13.5MM Class F Debt 'B-'
MARINER CLO 6: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes

MERRILL LYNCH 2007-C1: Fitch Hikes $49MM Cl. AM Certs Rating to Bsf
MERRILL LYNCH 2007-CANADA21: Moody's Hike Cl. L Certs Rating to B3
MILL CITY 2018-2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on $17.1MM Cl. B2 Notes
MILL CITY 2018-2: Fitch Rates Class B2 Notes 'B-sf'
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ9: Fitch Hikes Class E Certs to 'CCCsf'

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-IQ12: S&P Cuts Cl. A-J Certs Rating to D(sf)
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP21: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on 2 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-ALTM: S&P Affirms BB+(sf) Rating on E Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2018-H3: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) on H-RR Certs

MOUNTAIN VIEW 2014-1: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
MOUNTAIN VIEW IX: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on $8.25MM Class E Notes
NASSAU LTD 2018-1: Moody's Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-RPL1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on B-1 Notes
OCP CLO 2018-15: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes

OHA CREDIT XII: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F-R Notes
PIKES PEAK 1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $20.5MM Class E Notes
PREFERRED TERM XXII: Moody's Hikes Class C-2 Notes Rating to Ba3
RAIT TRUST 2015-FL5: DBRS Maintains B(high) Rating on Class F Notes
REGATTA FUNDING XI: Moody's Rates $24.5MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'

RESIDENTIAL ASSET 2005-A11CB: Moody's Rates Class 1-A-6 Debt 'C'
SEQUIOA MORTGAGE 2018-6: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt 'Ba3'
SLM STUDENT 2003-10: Moody's Confirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. B Notes
SORIN REAL ESTATE IV: S&P Hikes Class C Notes Rating to BB+(sf)
SOUND POINT X: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating on $22MM Class E-R Notes

SOUND POINT XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $40MM Class E Notes
STACR 2018-DNA2: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on $246MM Cl. B-1 Notes
TIAA BANK 2018-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class B-4 Certs
TIAA BANK 2018-2: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating on Class B-4 Notes
TOWD POINT 2018-3: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class B1 Notes

TOWD POINT 2018-3: Fitch to Rate Class $31MM B2 Notes 'Bsf'
VIBRANT CLO IX: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $24MM Cl. D Notes
VOYA CLO 2018-2: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class IO Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C11: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Tranches

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C18: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class H Certs
WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL2: Moody's Cuts Class X Certs Rating to Ca
WELLFLEET CLO 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
WELLS FARGO 2005-AR5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class A-2 Debt
WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs

WELLS FARGO 2016-BNK1: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-C35: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2018-C45: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. G-RR Notes
WELLS FARGO 2018-C45: Fitch to Rate Class H-RR Debt 'B-sf'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C9: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt

[*] Beard Group 25th Annual Distressed Investing Conference Nov. 26
[*] DBRS Reviews 809 Classes From 41 US RMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $113.5MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $174MM RMBS Issued in 2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $85.9MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2006

[*] Moody's Takes Action on 20 Tranches From 7 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 31 Tranches From Eight CDO Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Seven 'D ' Ratings on Six U.S. CMBS Deals
[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 42 Classes From 15 US RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 39 Classes From 18 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 57 Classes From 19 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 73 Classes From 9 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

1211 AVENUE 2015-1211: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of 1211 Avenue of the
Americas Trust 2015-1211 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable to improved cash flow since issuance: The Fitch stressed
cash flow improved from issuance. As of the March 2018 rent roll,
occupancy has improved to 95.5% from 91.5% at issuance and Fitch
cash flow has improved to $101.6 million from $95.5 million at
issuance.

Above Average Property Quality in Strong Location: 1211 Avenue of
the Americas consists of a 45-story, class A office building
located in Midtown Manhattan. The property is adjacent to
Rockefeller Center and in close proximity to subway lines and major
transportation hubs.

Strong Historical Occupancy: The top five tenants account for
approximately 87.8% of net rentable area (NRA) and include 21st
Century Fox (60.1% of NRA; rated BBB+), Ropes & Gray (16.4% of
NRA), Axis Reinsurance (6.1% of NRA; rated A+), RBC (3.1% of NRA;
rated AA) and Nordea (2.1% of NRA; rated AA-). Tenants with
investment-grade credit ratings account for 71.4% of the NRA
Major Tenant Lease Expiration: The property faces the expiration of
51.7 % of the NRA in 2020, which is leased to 21st Century Fox. The
tenant has one five-year renewal option; notice to extend is
required by November 2018. It leases an additional 7.5% through
2025.

Sponsorship and Property Manager: The loan sponsor is Ivanhoe
Cambridge Inc. The property is sub managed by Cushman & Wakefield
and Callahan Capital Properties LLC.
Asset Concentration: The transaction is secured by a single
property and is, therefore, more susceptible to single-event risk
related to the market, sponsor or the largest tenants occupying the
property.

Interest only loan for the entire term: As of the June 2018
distribution date, the transaction's balance remained at $1.035
billion, unchanged from issuance. The 10-year, fixed-rate,
interest-only loan matures in August 2025.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks remain Stable for all classes. Overall loan
performance has been stable to improving since issuance. Occupancy
increased to 95.5% as of the March 2018 rent roll from 91.5% at
issuance. Although cash flow has improved, upgrades are not
warranted until there is more clarity regarding the lease of the
largest tenant, 21st Century Fox and News Corp, of which most
expires in 2020.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $100,000,000 class A-1A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $490,000,000 class A-1A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $590,000,000 class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $119,000,000 class X-B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $119,000,000 class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $79,000,000 class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $110,800,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $136,200,000 class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional Amount and interest only.


5 BRYANT PARK 2018-5BP: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to 5 Bryant Park 2018-5BP
Mortgage Trust's $463.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2018-5BP.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a two-year, floating-rate commercial mortgage
loan totaling $463.0 million, with five, one-year extension
options, secured by a first lien on the borrower's interest in Five
Bryant Park, a 682,988-sq.-ft. class A office building located
within Midtown Manhattan's Sixth Avenue/Rock Center office
submarket.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  5 Bryant Park 2018-5BP Mortgage Trust  

  Class       Rating(i)            Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)            200,156,000
  B           AA- (sf)             44,479,000
  C           A- (sf)              33,359,000
  D           BBB- (sf)            40,921,000
  E           BB- (sf)             55,599,000
  F           B- (sf)              53,820,000
  G           NR                   11,516,000
  HRR         NR                   23,150,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
NR--Not rated.


A VOCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on $5.1MM Class E Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by A Voce CLO, Ltd.:

US$28,800,000 Class B-R Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2026 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on April 4, 2017 Assigned A2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also downgraded the rating on the
following notes:

US$5,100,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
on July 15, 2014 Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$386,400,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2026 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
April 4, 2017 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$69,100,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2026 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on
April 4, 2017 Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$33,700,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Affirmed Baa3 (sf);
previously on July 15, 2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$34,200,000 Class D Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on
July 15, 2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

A Voce CLO, Ltd. issued in July 2014, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in July
2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade and affirmation rating actions reflect the benefit of
the limited period of time remaining before the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in July 2018, and the expectation that
deleveraging will commence shortly. The rating downgrade on the
Class E Notes is primarily due to a decrease in the weighted
average spread (WAS) of the underlying loan portfolio and
deterioration of the notes' overcollateralization (OC) ratio since
February 2017. Based on the trustee's May 2018 report, the WAS is
currently reported at 3.1%, versus the February 2017 level of 3.6%.
The interest diversion test ratio, in effect the Class E OC ratio,
is currently reported at 104.63%, versus the February 2017 level of
105.74%, primarily reflecting portfolio par loss due to an increase
in defaulted assets.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen owing to any decision by the Manager to reinvest into new
issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can increase the default
risk horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
collateral.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

8) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.


ACCELERATED ASSETS 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Accelerated Assets
2018-1 LLC's $130.142 million timeshare loan-backed notes series
2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by vacation ownership interval (timeshare) loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion of the credit enhancement
available in the form of subordination, overcollateralization, a
reserve account, and available excess spread. S&P's ratings also
reflect its view of Bluegreen Corp.'s servicing ability and
experience in the timeshare market.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Accelerated Assets 2018-1 LLC

  Class     Rating         Amount (mil. $)
  A         A (sf)                  77.872
  B         BBB (sf)                26.242
  C         BB- (sf)                26.028


ALLIED UNIVERSAL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on Allied
Universal Topco LLC to 'B-' from 'B+'. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "We also lowered our issue-level ratings on the company's
first-lien credit facilities to 'B-' from 'B+'. The recovery
ratings remain '3', indicating our expectation for meaningful (50%
to 70%; rounded estimate 55%) recovery in the event of a payment
default.

"Additionally, we lowered our issue-level rating on the company's
second lien term loan to 'CCC' from 'B-'. The recovery rating on
the second-lien term loan remains '6', indicating our expectation
of negligible (0% to 10%; rounded estimate 0%) recovery in the
event of a payment default."

Allied Universal is the leading provider of manned security in the
U.S. with an estimated 20% market share, followed by Securitas AB,
G4S PLC, and U.S. Security Associates Holdings Inc. S&P said, "We
view the manned security industry to be highly fragmented with low
barriers to entry and countercyclical in nature. We estimate there
are over thousands of local and regional providers as well as
in-house operations, which limits pricing power because customers
have low switching costs. We believe the industry will continue to
be pressured by low unemployment rates that will affect employee
turnover, potentially translating to weaker service quality and
higher costs. We also view this industry as vulnerable to event
risk that would harm a company's brand and reputation."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that credit metrics
will continue to be elevated; however, we expect the company will
modestly expand EBITDA margins, maintain retention rates in the
low-90% area, and grow revenues organically in the low- to
mid-single-digit percent range such that it has sufficient
liquidity to manage operations.

"Over the next 12 months we could lower the ratings if the company
generates insufficient liquidity as a result of sustained negative
FOCF and has a large reliance on revolver borrowings to fund
operations. This could occur if competition increases, result in
higher customer attrition or an inability to win new contracts, or
if the company continues to incur one-time costs, is unable to
successfully pass higher wage rates to its customers, or is unable
to realize cost synergies.

"While unlikely over the next 12 months, we could raise the ratings
if the company is able to delever to below 7.5x and generate FOCF
to debt in the mid-single-digit percent area on a sustained basis.
This could occur if the company outperforms our base case
scenario."


AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-2: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to American Credit
Acceptance Receivables Trust 2018-2's $248 million asset-backed
notes series 2018-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction
backed by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 66.1%, 59.6%, 49.6%, 41.3%,
37.0%, and 34.5% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
scenarios (including excess spread). These credit support levels
provide coverage of approximately 2.30x, 2.05x, 1.67x, 1.35x,
1.20x, and 1.10x our 28.00%-29.00% expected net loss range for the
class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes, respectively.

-- S&P said, "The timely interest and principal payments made to
the rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under our
stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that we believe are
appropriate for the assigned ratings. The expectation that under a
moderate ('BBB') stress scenario, all else being equal, the ratings
on the class A, B, and C notes would remain within the same rating
category as our 'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings; the
ratings on the class D notes would remain within two rating
categories of our 'BBB (sf)' rating; and the rating on the class E
and F notes would remain within two rating categories of our 'BB-
(sf)' and 'B (sf)' ratings, respectively, in the first year, though
the E and F classes are expected to default by their legal final
maturity date with approximately 65%-100% and 0%-3% repayment,
respectively. These potential rating movements are consistent with
our credit stability criteria, which outline the outer boundaries
of credit deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade
within the first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities, a
two-rating category downgrade within the first year for 'A' through
'BB' rated securities, and a downgrade to 'D' within the first year
for 'B' rated securities under moderate stress conditions. An
eventual default for a 'BB' and 'B' rated class under a moderate
('BBB') stress scenario is also consistent with our credit
stability criteria.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction.

-- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

-- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures.

-- The transaction's legal structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2018-2

  Class     Rating       Type            Interest        Amount
                                         rate          (mil. $)(i)
  A         AAA (sf)     Senior          Fixed           98.090
  B         AA (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed           27.630
  C         A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed           49.740
  D         BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           39.376
  E         BB- (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           19.340
  F         B (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed           13.824


ANGEL OAK 2018-2: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on $15.5MM Cl. B-2 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2018-2 (the Certificates)
issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2018-2 (AOMT 2018-2 or
the Trust):

-- $261.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.2 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $33.0 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $21.3 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $18.5 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $15.5 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Certificates reflects the
34.95% of credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates
in the pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf)
ratings reflect 26.45%, 18.25%, 12.95%, 8.35% and 4.50% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of primarily
first-lien fixed- and adjustable-rate, non-prime and prime
residential mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 1,096 loans
with a total principal balance of $402,009,899 as of the Cut-Off
Date (June 1, 2018).

Angel Oak Home Loans LLC (AOHL), Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC
(AOMS) and Angel Oak Prime Bridge LLC (AOPB) (together, Angel Oak)
originated 95.3% of the portfolio (1,050 loans). The Angel Oak
first-lien mortgages were originated under the following eight
programs:

(1) Portfolio Select (41.9%) – Made to borrowers with near-prime
credit scores who are unable to obtain financing through
conventional or governmental channels because (a) they fail to
satisfy credit requirements, (b) they are self-employed and need an
alternate income calculation using or 12 or 24 months' bank
statements to qualify, (c) they may have a credit score that is
lower than that required by government-sponsored entity
underwriting guidelines or (d) they may have been subject to a
bankruptcy or foreclosure 24 or more months prior to origination.
(2) Platinum (27.7%) – Made to borrowers who have prime or
near-prime credit scores but who are unable to obtain financing
through conventional or governmental channels because (a) they fail
to satisfy credit requirements, (b) they are self-employed and need
alternative income calculations using 12 or 24 months of bank
statements or (c) they may have been subject to a bankruptcy or
foreclosure 48 or more months prior to origination.

(3) Non-Prime General (10.3%) – Made to borrowers who have not
sustained a housing event in the past 24 months, but whose credit
reports show multiple 30+- and/or 60+-day delinquencies on any
reported debt in the past 12 months.

(4) Prime Jumbo (6.8%) – Made to borrowers who have prime credit
scores and cleaner housing history with no bankruptcy or
foreclosure in the 60 months prior to origination. The loan amounts
will also allow high balance-conforming loan limits. Interest-only
feature is allowed. The income documentation requirements follow
Appendix Q.

(5) Investor Cash Flow (2.7%) – Made to real estate investors who
are experienced in purchasing, renting and managing investment
properties with an established five-year credit history and at
least 24 months of clean housing payment history, but who are
unable to obtain financing through conventional or governmental
channels because (a) they fail to satisfy the requirements of such
programs or (b) may be over the maximum number of properties
allowed. Loans originated under the Investor Cash Flow program are
considered business-purpose and are not covered by the
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) rules or TRID rule.

(6) Non-Prime Foreign National (2.5%) – Made to investment
property borrowers who are citizens of foreign countries and who do
not reside or work in the United States. Borrowers may use
alternative income and credit documentation. Income is typically
documented by the employer or accountant, and credit is verified by
letters from overseas credit holders.

(7) Non-Prime Recent Housing (2.6%) – Made to borrowers who have
completed or have had their properties subject to a short sale,
deed-in-lieu, notice of default or foreclosure. Borrowers who have
filed bankruptcy 12 or more months prior to origination or have
experienced severe delinquencies may also be considered for this
program.

(8) Non-Prime Investment Property (0.4%) – Made to real estate
investors who may have financed up to four mortgaged properties
with the originators (or 20 mortgaged properties with all
lenders).

In addition, the pool contains 0.3% second-lien mortgage loans,
which were originated under the guidelines established by the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and overlaid by
Angel Oak.

Of the 1,050 Angel Oak mortgage loans, 124 loans, representing 8.2%
of the aggregate pool balance, were previously securitized by the
Co-Sponsor (Angel Oak Strategic Mortgage Income Master Fund, Ltd.)
in AOMT 2015-1. On the Closing Date, the Co-Sponsor will effectuate
an optional redemption of the securitization and direct the
trustee, U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), to assign
certain performing loans to the Depositor to be sold to the
Trustee.

The remaining 46 mortgage loans (4.7% of the aggregate pool
balance) were originated by two third-party originators. Of the
third-party origination loans, 30 loans (2.9% of the aggregate pool
balance) were originated by Sterling Bank & Trust, FSB (Sterling).

Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. (SPS) is the servicer for all loans
not originated by Sterling. Sterling will be the servicer for
Sterling-originated loans. AOHL, AOMS and Sterling will act as
Servicing Administrators, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo)
will act as the Master Servicer. U.S. Bank will serve as Trustee
and Custodian.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ATR rules, they were made to
borrowers who generally do not qualify for agency, government or
private-label non-agency prime jumbo products for the various
reasons described above. In accordance with the CFPB Qualified
Mortgage (QM) rules, 5.3% of the loans are designated as QM Safe
Harbor, 1.0% are designated as QM Rebuttable Presumption and 84.6%
are designated as Non-QM. Approximately 9.1% of the loans are for
investment properties and thus are not subject to QM rules.

The servicing administrators or servicer will generally fund
advances of delinquent principal and interest on any mortgage until
such loan becomes 180 days delinquent, and they are obligated to
make advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums and
reasonable costs incurred in the course of servicing and disposing
of properties.

On or after the earlier of the distribution date in July 2020 or
the date on which the principal balance of the mortgage loans has
been reduced to 30% of its Cut-Off Date balance, the Depositor has
the option to purchase all of the outstanding Certificates at a
price equal to the outstanding class balance plus accrued and
unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full. Further, excess spread can be used to cover realized losses
first before being allocated to unpaid cap carryover amounts up to
Class B-2.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

(1) Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-prime
mortgages, underwriting standards have improved significantly from
the pre-crisis era. All of the mortgage loans (except for Investor
Cash Flow, Investment Property and Foreign National) were
underwritten in accordance with the eight underwriting factors of
the ATR rules, although they may not necessarily comply with
Appendix Q of Regulation Z.

(2) Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:

-- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have robust loan
attributes, as reflected in the combined loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios, borrower household incomes and liquid reserves, including
the loans in the Non-Prime programs that have weaker borrower
credit.

-- LTV ratios gradually reduce as the programs move down the credit
spectrum, suggesting the consideration of compensating factors for
riskier pools.

-- Although a small portion of the pool (0.2%) comprises hybrid
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with shorter teaser periods of
three years, most of the hybrid ARMs included in this pool have
longer initial fixed periods. The pool comprises 70.3% hybrid ARMs
with an initial fixed period of five to ten years, allowing
borrowers sufficient time to credit cure before rates reset. The
remaining 29.5% of the pool comprises fixed-rate mortgages, which
have the lowest default risk because of the stability of monthly
payments.

(3) Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party
due diligence firm conducted property valuation and credit reviews
on 100% of the loans in the pool. For 97.1% of the loans (i.e., the
entire pool, excluding 78 Investor Cash Flow loans), a third-party
due diligence firm performed a regulatory compliance review. Data
integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

(4) Strong Servicer: SPS, a strong residential mortgage servicer
and a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse AG, services 97.1%
of the pool. In this transaction, AOHL, AOMS and Sterling, as the
servicing administrators, or SPS, as the servicer, are responsible
for funding advances to the extent required. In addition, the
transaction employs Wells Fargo, which is rated AA by DBRS, as the
Master Servicer. If the servicing administrators or the servicer
fail in their obligations to make principal and interest advances,
Wells Fargo will be obligated to fund such servicing advances.

(5) Current Loans and Faster Prepayments: Angel Oak began
originating non-agency loans in Q4 2013. Since the first
transaction was issued in December 2015, voluntary prepayment rates
have been relatively high, as these borrowers tend to credit cure
and refinance into lower-cost mortgages. Also, the loans in the
AOMT 2018-2 portfolio are 100% current. Although 9.1% of the pool
has experienced prior delinquencies, these loans have all cured.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

(1) Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:
Although slightly stronger than other comparable Non-QM
transactions rated by DBRS, the R&W framework for AOMT 2018-2 is
weaker compared with post-crisis prime jumbo securitization
frameworks. Instead of an automatic review when a loan becomes
seriously delinquent, this transaction employs a mandatory review
upon less immediate triggers. In addition, the R&W provider,
guarantor or backstop provider are unrated entities, have limited
performance history in Non-QM securitizations and may potentially
experience financial stress that could result in the inability to
fulfill repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following mitigating
factors:

-- Satisfactory third-party due diligence was conducted on 100% of
the loans included in the pool with respect to credit, property
valuation and data integrity. A regulatory compliance review was
performed on all but 78 Investor Cash Flow loans. A comprehensive
due diligence review mitigates the risk of future R&W violations.

-- An independent third-party R&W reviewer, Recovco Mortgage
Management, is named in the transaction to review loans for alleged
breaches of representations and warranties.

-- DBRS conducted an on-site originator review of AOHL, AOMS and
Sterling and deems the mortgage companies to be operationally
sound.

-- The sponsor, an affiliate of Angel Oak, will retain an eligible
horizontal interest in a portion of the Class B-3 certificates and
all of the Class XS certificates, which collectively represent at
least 5% of the fair value of all the certificates, aligning
sponsor and investor interest in the capital structure.

-- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator scores
downward to account for the potential inability to fulfill
repurchase obligations, the lack of performance history and the
weaker R&W framework. A lower originator score results in increased
default and loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for
the rated securities.

(2) Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans: As
compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this portfolio
contains mortgages originated to borrowers with weaker credits or
who have prior derogatory credit events, as well as QM-Rebuttable
Presumption or Non-QM loans. In addition, certain loans were
underwritten to 24-month bank statements for income (31.8%),
12-month bank statements (14.4%), one-month bank statements (2.9%)
or as business purpose loans (2.9%). DBRS notes the following
mitigating factors:

-- All loans subject to the ATR rules were originated to meet the
eight required underwriting factors.

-- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the
pre-crisis era.

-- Bank statements as income and business-purpose loans are
treated as less-than-full documentation in the RMBS Insight model,
which increases expected losses on those loans.

-- All one-month bank statement loans were originated by Sterling.
DBRS conducted operational risk reviews on Sterling's origination
and servicing platforms and deems them to be acceptable.

-- The RMBS Insight model incorporates loss severity penalties for
Non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans, as explained further in
the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the related rating
report.

-- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the
Non-Prime General and Non-Prime Recent Housing Event programs,
borrower credit events had generally happened, on average, 48
months and 35 months, respectively, prior to origination. In its
analysis, DBRS applies additional penalties for borrowers with
recent credit events within the past two years.

(3) Geographic Concentration: Compared with other recent
securitizations, the AOMT 2018-2 pool has a high concentration of
loans located in Florida (24.6% of the pool). Mitigating factors
include the following:

-- Although the pool is concentrated in Florida, the loans are
well-dispersed among the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The
largest Florida MSA, Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, represents only
4.7% of the entire transaction. DBRS does not believe the AOMT
2018-2 pool is particularly sensitive to any deterioration in
economic conditions or to the occurrence of a natural disaster in
any specific region.

-- DBRS's RMBS Insight model generates an elevated asset
correlation for this portfolio, as determined by the loan size and
geographic concentration, compared with pools with similar
collateral, resulting in higher expected losses across all rating
categories.

(4) Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest: The
servicing administrators or servicer will advance scheduled
principal and interest on delinquent mortgages until such loans
become 180 days delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss
severities to the transaction because advanced principal and
interest will not have to be reimbursed from the Trust upon the
liquidation of the mortgages but will increase the possibility of
periodic interest shortfalls to the Certificate holders. Mitigating
factors include the fact that (a) principal proceeds can be used to
pay interest shortfalls to the Certificates as the outstanding
senior Certificates are paid in full and (b) subordination levels
are greater than expected losses, which may provide for payment of
interest to the Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that
incorporated principal and interest advancing up to 180 days for
delinquent loans; the cash flow scenarios are discussed in more
detail in the Cash Flow Analysis section of the related report.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf)
and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Certificates.


ANGEL OAK 2018-2: Fitch Gives 'Bsf' Rating on $15.4MM Cl. B-2 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC
2018-2 (AOMT 2018-2) as follows:

-- $261,507,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $34,171,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $32,965,000 class A-3 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $21,307,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $18,492,000 class B-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $15,477,000 class B-2 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

-- $18,090,898 class B-3 certificates.

The 'AAAsf' for AOMT 2018-2 reflects the satisfactory operational
review conducted by Fitch of the originators, 100% loan-level due
diligence review with no material findings, a Tier 2 representation
and warranty framework, and the transaction's structure.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

AOMT 2018-2 is backed mainly by non-qualified mortgages (Non-QM) as
defined by the Ability to Repay rule (ATR). Over 95% of the loans
were originated by several Angel Oak entities, which include Angel
Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (AOMS; 76.7%), Angel Oak Home Loans LLC
(AOHL 17.6%) and Angel Oak Prime Bridge LLC (AOPB; 1.0%). The
remaining 4.7% of the loans were originated by Sterling Bank &
Trust, FSB (Sterling) and a third party originator. Approximately
84.6% of the pool is designated as Non-QM, 1.0% as a higher priced
QM (HPQM), 5.3% as safe harbor QM (SHQM) and the remaining 9.1% is
not subject to ATR.

Initial credit enhancement (CE) for the class A-1 certificates of
34.95% is higher than Fitch's 'AAAsf' rating stress loss of 29.50%.
The additional initial CE is primarily driven by the pro rata
principal distribution between the A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates,
which will result in a significant reduction of the class A-1
subordination over time through principal payments to the A-2 and
A-3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Nonprime Credit Quality (Negative): The pool has a weighted average
(WA) model credit score of 701 and WA original combined
loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 76.7%. Approximately 28% consists of
borrowers with prior credit events, 2.5% are foreign nationals and
0.3% are second lien loans. Roughly 3% have been delinquent in the
past 24 months. Approximately 32% was made to self-employed
borrowers underwritten to a 24-month bank statement program, 14% to
a 12-month bank statement program, and 3% to a one-month bank
statement program from Sterling Bank & Trust, FSB (Sterling). Fitch
applied default penalties to account for these attributes and the
loss severity (LS) was adjusted to reflect the increased risk of
ATR challenges and loans with TILA RESPA Integrated Disclosure
(TRID) exceptions.

Bank Statement Loans Included (Negative): Roughly 49% of the pool
(453 loans) was made to borrowers underwritten to either a
24-month, 12-month or one-month bank statement income documentation
program. While employment is fully verified and assets partially
confirmed, the limited income verification resulted in application
of a probability of default (PD) penalty of approximately 1.5x and
Fitch's assumed probability of ATR claims was doubled to account
for potentially higher ATR claims.

Satisfactory Originator Review and Track Record (Positive): Fitch
conducted an operational review of AOMS and AOHL and assessed them
as Average based on the companies' seasoned management team and
extensive nonprime mortgage experience, a comprehensive sourcing
strategy and sound underwriting and risk management practices. AOHL
(retail platform) commenced agency loan originations in 2011 and
ramped up its nonprime business in 2012. Correspondent and broker
originations are conducted by AOMS, which began operations in
2014.

Solid Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party loan-level due
diligence was performed on 100% of the pool, the results of which
generally reflect sound underwriting and operational controls. Of
the 1,018 loans subject to consumer compliance testing (789 of
which were subject to TRID), two were assigned 'C' grades due to
variance in the property value review. There was no adjustment to
Fitch's expected losses.

High Investor Property Concentration (Negative): Approximately 9%
of the pool comprises investment properties, 2.9% of which were
originated through the originators' investor cash flow program that
targets real estate investors qualified on a property cash flow
ratio basis. Fitch assumes investor property loans in U.S. RMBS
transactions that do not consider the borrower's personal debt to
income ratio (DTI) carry greater risk than traditionally
underwritten investor loans. Fitch applied documentation and debt
ratio penalties to reflect the higher risk.

R&W Framework (Negative): While the loan-level representations and
warranties (R&Ws) for this transaction are substantially consistent
with a Tier I framework, the lack of an automatic review for loans,
other than those with ATR realized loss, and the nature of the
prescriptive breach tests, which limit the breach reviewers ability
to identify or respond to issues not fully anticipated at closing,
resulted in a Tier 2 framework. Fitch increased its loss
expectations (215 bps at the 'AAAsf' rating category) to mitigate
the limitations of the framework and the non-investment-grade
counterparty risk of the providers.

Alignment of Interests (Positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors. Angel Oak
REIT I as sponsor and securitizer, or an affiliate will retain a
combination of horizontal and vertical interest in the transaction
equal to not less than at least 5% of the aggregate fair market
value of all certificates in the transaction. As part of its focus
on investing in residential mortgage credit, as of the closing
date, Angel Oak REIT I and Angel Oak Strategic Mortgage Income
Master Fund, Ltd., as co-sponsor, will retain the class B-2, B-3
and XS certificates. Lastly, the reps and warranties are provided
by Angel Oak REIT I or the originators in the event the REIT ceases
operations, which aligns their interests with those of investors to
maintain high quality origination standards and sound performance.
The non-Angel Oak originators will be making the reps for their
respective loans, which account for less than 5% of the pool.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until all
three classes have been reduced to zero. To the extent that either
the cumulative loss trigger event or the delinquency trigger event
occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds until they are
reduced to zero. The transaction benefits from a relatively tight
cumulative loss trigger.

Servicing and Master Servicer (Positive): Select Portfolio
Servicing (SPS), rated 'RPS1-'/Stable, will be the primary servicer
on 97.1% of the loans, while Sterling Bank will be servicing the
remaining 2.9%. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), rated
'RMS1'/Stable, will act as master servicer. Advances required but
not paid by SPS will be paid by Wells Fargo. Fitch does not rate
any primary servicer higher than SPS and does not rate any master
servicer higher than Wells Fargo.


APIDOS CLO XXIX: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Apidos CLO XXIX/Apidos
CLO XXIX LLC's $531.70 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Apidos CLO XXIX/Apidos CLO XXIX LLC
  Class                 Rating         Amount
                                     (mil. $)
  X                     AAA (sf)         2.50
  A-1A                  AAA (sf)       369.00
  A-1B                  NR              21.00
  A-2                   AA (sf)         66.00
  B (deferrable)        A (sf)          42.00
  C (deferrable         BBB- (sf)       30.00
  D (deferrable)        BB- (sf)        22.20
  Subordinated notes    NR              63.00

  NR--Not rated.


APOLLO CREDIT IV: S&P Rates $18.5MM Class D-R Debt 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1A-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Apollo Credit Funding IV
Ltd., a broadly syndicated collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in April 2015 and managed by Apollo ST Fund
Management LLC. S&P did not rate the original transaction.

The ratings assigned to the $411 million floating notes reflect our
assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans
(those rated 'BB+ (sf)' or lower) that are governed by collateral
quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through the collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Apollo Credit Funding IV Ltd./Apollo Credit Funding IV LLC

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)

  A-1A-R                    AAA (sf)             284.00
  A-1B-R                    NR                    20.00
  A-2-R                     AA (sf)               38.00
  B-R                       A (sf)                42.50
  C-R                       BBB- (sf)             28.00
  D-R                       BB- (sf)              18.50
  Sub notes                 NR                    43.75

  NR--Not rated.


ARBOR REALTY 2018-FL1: DBRS Gives B(low) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned new ratings to the following classes of Secured
Floating-Rate Notes to be issued by Arbor Realty Commercial Real
Estate Notes 2018-FL1, Ltd. (the Issuer):

-- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Secured Floating Rate Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E Floating Rate Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Floating Rate Notes at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The transaction is a managed collateralized loan obligation pool
that totals $560.0 million. The initial collateral consists
primarily of multifamily properties, though there is also one
self-storage property, one office property and one health-care
property, with the vast majority having some level of transition or
stabilization, which is the premise for seeking floating-rate
short-term debt. The transaction has a reinvestment period expected
to expire in June 2022. Reinvestment is subject to Eligibility
Criteria that includes a rating agency condition (RAC) by DBRS. The
initial pool consists of 28 loans totaling $494.4 million. Most of
the loans are secured by current cash-flowing assets in a period of
transition, though there are two loans with no current in-place
cash flow; however, all loans have viable plans and a viable loan
structure to stabilize and improve the asset value. DBRS analyzed
and modeled the existing loan pool in addition to loans that can be
purchased subject to the Eligibility Criteria in the reinvestment
period; DBRS assumes that the loans purchased within the
reinvestment period will migrate to the least-favorable criteria,
as defined in the Eligibility Criteria, with consideration given to
the initial pool as well. DBRS also anticipates that the pool could
become more concentrated in the future in terms of sponsor
concentrations or additional concentrations (property type, loan
size and geography); as a result, DBRS will have the ability to
provide an RAC on loans that are being added to the pool during the
reinvestment period in order to evaluate any credit drift caused by
loan concentrations. Following the reinvestment period, the
transaction will have a sequential-pay structure.

The floating-rate mortgages were analyzed to determine the
probability of loan default over the term of the loan and its
refinance risk at maturity based on a fully extended loan term. As
a result of the floating-rate nature of the loans, the index DBRS
used (one-month LIBOR) was the lower of a DBRS stressed rate that
corresponded to the remaining fully extended term of the loans or
the strike price of the interest rate cap with the respective
contractual loan spread added to determine a stressed interest rate
over the loan term. When the cut-off balances were measured against
the DBRS In-Place Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their respective stressed
constants, 96.6% of loans in the initial pool have term debt
service coverage ratios (DSCRs) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold
indicative of a higher likelihood of term default. Additionally, to
assess refinance risk, DBRS applied its refinance constants to the
balloon amounts, resulting in 22 loans, or 85.0% of the initial
pool balance, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x, relative to the
DBRS Stabilized NCF. The properties are often transitioning with
potential upside in the cash flow; however, DBRS does not give full
credit to the stabilization if there are no holdbacks or if other
loan structural features in place were insufficient to support such
treatment. Furthermore, even with the structure provided, DBRS
generally does not assume the assets to stabilize above market
levels.

The Issuer, servicer, mortgage loan seller and advancing agent are
related parties and non-rated entities. Arbor Realty SR Inc. has a
proven track record with several collateralized loan obligation
platforms that performed well in 2004, 2005 and 2006. In addition
to recently issued transactions in 2012 and 2013, DBRS rated seven
transactions: Arbor Realty Collateralized Loan Obligation 2014-1,
Ltd.; Arbor Realty Commercial Real Estate Notes 2015-FL1, Ltd.;
Arbor Realty Commercial Real Estate Notes 2015-FL2, Ltd.; Arbor
Realty Commercial Real Estate Notes 2016-FL1, Ltd.; Arbor Realty
Commercial Real Estate Notes 2017-FL1, Ltd.; Arbor Commercial Real
Estate Notes 2017-FL2, Ltd; and Arbor Commercial Real Estate Notes
2017-FL3, Ltd. DBRS has reviewed Arbor Multifamily Lending, LLC's
servicing platform (and special servicing) and finds it to be an
acceptable servicer. The Class E and F Notes and the preferred
shares will be retained by ARMS Equity, an affiliate of the trust
asset seller. The non-offered notes and preferred shares represent
21.3% of the transaction balance.

All but three loans in the initial pool are secured by multifamily
properties. Exposure to industrial properties, retail properties,
office properties, self-storage properties, hospitality properties
or health-care properties in the trust is capped at 30.0% during
the reinvestment period per the Eligibility Criteria. Eighteen
loans, totaling 52.2% of the initial pool balance, represent
acquisition financing with borrowers contributing equity to the
transaction. The overall weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term DSCR and
DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCR of 0.72x and 0.88x, respectively, and
corresponding DBRS Debt Yield and Exit Debt Yield of 5.2% and 7.6%,
respectively, are considered very high leverage financing. The DBRS
Term DSCR and DBRS Refi DSCR are based on the DBRS In-Place NCF and
debt service calculated using a stressed interest rate,
respectively. The WA stressed rate used of 7.35% is 0.96% greater
than the current WA interest rate of 6.28% (based on WA mortgage
spread and an assumed 1.93% one-month LIBOR index). Regarding the
significant refinance risk indicated by the DBRS Refi DSCR of
0.88x, the credit enhancement levels are reflective of the
increased leverage that is substantially higher than in recent
fixed-rate transactions. The assets are generally well positioned
to stabilize, and any realized cash flow growth would help to
offset a rise in interest rates and also improve the overall debt
yield of the loans. DBRS associates its probability of default
based on the assets' in-place cash flow, which does not assume that
the stabilization plan and cash flow growth will ever materialize.


ARES XLIX: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on $20MM Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Ares XLIX
CLO Ltd./Ares XLIX CLO LLC's $425.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 27,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Ares XLIX CLO Ltd./Ares XLIX CLO LLC

  Class                  Rating             Amount
                                          (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)           290.00
  A-2                    NR                  35.00
  B                      AA (sf)             55.00
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)              31.00
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)           29.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)            20.00
  Subordinate notes      NR                  51.60

  NR--Not rated.


ARES XLVIII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $17.5MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Ares XLVIII CLO
Ltd./Ares XLVIII CLO LLC's $422.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Ares XLVIII CLO Ltd./Ares XLVIII CLO LLC
  Class                 Rating           Amount
                                       (mil. $)
  A-1                   AAA (sf)         290.00
  A-2                   NR                35.00
  B                     AA (sf)           47.50
  C (deferrable)        A (sf)            36.00
  D (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)         31.00
  E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)          17.50
  Subordinated notes    NR                55.75

  NR--Not rated.


ASHFORD HOSPITALITY 2018-KEYS: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-KEYS to
be issued by Ashford Hospitality Trust 2018-KEYS:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-CP at B (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

The Class X-CP and X-EXT balances are notional.

The subject transaction is collateralized by six loans, which are
not cross-collateralized, that contain a total of 34 hotels, of
which 24 operate under various Marriott flags, seven are affiliated
with Hilton, one is flagged by Hyatt and two operate as independent
hotels. The hotels have a combined total room count of 7,270 keys,
consisting of 19 full-service hotels with 4,767 keys, ten
select-service hotels with 1,160 keys and five extended-stay hotels
containing 893 keys. Furthermore, the portfolio is diversified
across 16 states, with the largest concentration by allocated loan
amount in California (34.7%), Texas (11.9%) and Florida (9.5%).
Sponsorship for the loan is Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc.
(Ashford), a well-established owner and operator of approximately
120 hotel assets across the United States. Management for the
hotels is provided by five proven firms: Remington Lodging and
Hospitality, LLC (Remington), an affiliate of the borrower;
Marriott International (Marriott); Hyatt; Starwood; and Hilton
Worldwide Holdings Inc. (Hilton). Remington manages more than 90
hotels across 27 states under 16 different brands, including 21
hotels in this portfolio. Marriott, which manages ten hotels in
this portfolio, is a global lodging firm with more than 6,500
properties located in 127 countries and over 90 years of
experience. The sponsor has displayed consistent commitment to the
subject properties, investing roughly $227.7 million ($29,256 per
key) between 2013 and 2017, with $26.7 million ($3,677 per key)
budgeted to be spent in 2018. All but three hotels were previously
securitized in either the MSCI 2015-XLF1, MSCI 2015-XLF2 or JPMCC
2016-ASH transactions and have paid as agreed with no
delinquencies. Senior mortgage loan proceeds of $982.0 million plus
$288.2 million of mezzanine financing will refinance prior existing
debt of $1,067.0 million, fund $29.8 million of upfront reserves
and closing costs, and facilitate a $163.4 million cash-equity
distribution. The portfolio's appraised value is $1,587.8 million
($218,404 per key) on a single-asset basis, or $1,683.0 million
($231,499 per key) on a portfolio basis, with a net cash flow (NCF)
of $127.1 million as of the trailing 12 months (T-12) ending
February 28, 2018. The loan is a two-year floating-rate
interest-only (IO) loan (one-month LIBOR plus 2.85%, subject to an
interest rate cap, with a 12.5-basis point (bps) extension fee or
rate increase on the fourth and fifth extension options) with five
one-year extension options.

Overall, DBRS considers the properties to be in established
suburban or peripheral urban areas with generally stable demand
sources. Occupancy has averaged 75.9% since 2013, increasing every
year through the T-12 ending February 28, 2018, albeit at a
decreasing rate. The average daily rate (ADR) has also been solid,
increasing every year since 2013 at an average rate of 4.0%;
however, the T-12 ending February 28, 2018, ADR is only 0.8%
greater than the 2016 figure. These figures produced strong annual
revenue per available room (RevPAR) growth of 10.7% in 2014, 8.1%
in 2015, 6.6% in 2016 and 1.8% as of the T-12 ending February 28,
2018, reflecting an overall tightening of the national lodging
market. To mitigate this downside risk of declining RevPAR once the
cycle turns, DBRS concluded to individual property RevPAR
assumptions that were generally between the 2015 and 2016 actual
figures.

The as-is portfolio's appraised value is $1,587.8 million, assuming
individual sales, based on an average cap rate of 8.4%, which
equates to a high appraised loan-to-value (LTV) of 80.0%, based on
total debt, or 62.1% based on the mortgage. Based on a portfolio
valuation of $1,683.0 million, the LTV drops to 75.5%. The
DBRS-concluded value of $1,082.0 million ($148,835 per key)
represents a significant 31.9% discount to the individual appraised
value and results in a DBRS total financing LTV of 117.4%, which is
indicative of high-leverage financing; however, the DBRS value is
based on a blended reversionary cap rate of 10.95%, which
represents a significant stress over the current prevailing market
cap rates. According to the PWC Q3 2017 report, residual cap rates
for full-service hotels ranged from 7.0% to 10.0% with an average
of 8.44%. Based on total financing, the DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS
Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) at 9.3% and 1.58 times (x),
respectively, are considered somewhat weak considering the
portfolio is primarily securitized by suburban to urban
full-service hotels.

The portfolio is geographically diverse, as the 34 hotel assets are
located across 16 states and 21 metropolitan statistical areas.
Furthermore, the portfolio represents three different hotel brands
spread across ten different flags, plus two unflagged hotels. The
sponsor acquired or constructed the hotels between 1998 and 2015,
with most assets acquired between 2003 and 2007. The loan sponsor
invested substantial capital between 2013 to 2017, totaling $212.7
million ($29,256 per key). The cumulative investment-grade-rated
proceeds per key exposure is $115,089 – well below the estimated
replacement cost of the underlying assets (excluding land value),
which is closer to $205,000 per key overall. In addition, the
associated DBRS Debt Yield through the investment-grade level is
very attractive at 14.0%.

The portfolio is concentrated by property type, as all properties
are hotels. Hotels have the highest cash flow volatility of all
property types because of the short lease/length of stay compared
with commercial properties and their higher operating leverage.
These dynamics can lead to rapidly deteriorating cash flow in a
declining market, and with nationwide RevPAR in its seventh
consecutive year of growth, relatively easy RevPAR gains appear to
be gone. The portfolio's lowest reported annual NCF was $25.7
million at YE2013, which is 33.6% lower than the T-12 ending
February 2018 NCF. Performance was rebounding in 2013 from the
overall poor lodging environment following the Great Recession. If
cash flows were to decline to the YE2013 level, the DBRS Term DSCR
on the senior mortgage debt would still be 1.33x, based on the
DBRS-stressed interest rate of 6.07%. Furthermore, given that a
substantial portion of the mortgage is rated below investment grade
or unrated, the portion of the loan considered to be investment
grade would have an effective DSCR of 1.42x based on this extremely
low NCF level.

Based on the DBRS-concluded value of $1,082.0 million ($148,835 per
key), the portfolio's leverage based on the senior mortgage loans
is considered high, with a DBRS LTV of 90.8%. Furthermore, the DBRS
LTV increases to 117.4% with the addition of the mezzanine
financing. While the DBRS LTV is high, it is based on a stressed
valuation that assumes a significant increase in market cap rates.
The DBRS cap rate for the portfolio allows for significant
reversion to the mean in the lodging valuation metrics, as it is
approximately 251 bps higher than the current market cap rate for
full-service hotels (per the PwC Real Estate Investor Survey) and
251 bps above the appraiser's concluded bulk-sale portfolio cap
rate. Additionally, the last dollar of debt that reflects the 90.8%
DBRS LTV is rated below investment grade at B (low), whereas the
BBB-rated exposure reflects a much more modest 78.0% DBRS LTV.

Lodging industry revenues have been trending upward for eight
years, and RevPAR gains have generally been very robust since the
bottom of the market in 2010. The length of recovery, combined with
substantial new supply nationwide, could signal a cyclical downturn
in the near future. The relatively high cap rates applied to the
hotel properties by DBRS reflect the substantial cash flow
volatility inherent in the asset class. In addition, the DBRS
RevPAR for the portfolio is 4.3% lower than the T-12 ending
February 28, 2018, and 2.5% lower than YE2016. Furthermore, the
concluded DBRS NCF is between the YE2015 and YE2016 levels, which
represents a more normalized stage in the lodging cycle.

Of the 32 flagged hotels, eight hotels, representing 15.6% of the
total financing, have franchise agreements that expire within the
fully extended loan term. The loan is not structured with any cash
flow sweep or covenant to guarantee future capital funds are
available prior to the franchise expiration. If a franchise
agreement expires, and the borrower fails to enter into a
replacement franchise agreement with a qualified franchisor, this
would cause an event of default and would create several
limitations, including limiting Ashford's ability to extend the
loan term. Ashford Hospitality Limited Partnership, the main
operating partnership through which Ashford (a public real estate
investment trust with a market capitalization of $625.4 million,
according to Bloomberg) owns its assets. Ashford has generally
owned the assets for over ten years and has invested approximately
$212.7 million in improvements since 2013. Furthermore, on the
first Payment Date of every year, the borrower is required to
deposit the aggregate amount of all approved property improvement
plan (PIP) expenses for a calendar year. Furthermore, $5,126,176
for required PIPs are included in the upfront reserves at closing.

Classes X-CP and X-EXT are IO certificates that reference multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.


ATLAS SENIOR XI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $24MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by Atlas Senior Loan Fund XI, Ltd.

US$1,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$267,500,000 Class A-1L Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1L Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class A-1F Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class A-1F Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class A-2F Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class A-2F Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$32,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$31,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1L Notes, the Class A-1F Notes, the
Class A-2F Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D
Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Atlas Senior Loan Fund XI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

Crescent Capital Group LP will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2906

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.08 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2906 to 3342)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1L Notes: 0

Class A-1F Notes: 0

Class A-2F Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2906 to 3778)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1L Notes: -1

Class A-1F Notes: -1

Class A-2F Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


ATRIUM HOTEL 2018-ATRM: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Cl. F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-ATRM issued by Atrium Hotel Portfolio Trust 2018-ATRM:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-FP at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X-CP, Class X-FP and Class X-NCP balances are notional.

The $635.0 million mortgage loan is secured by the fee and
leasehold interest in 24 limited-service, extended-stay and
full-service hotels, totaling 5,734 keys, located in 12 different
states across the United States. While geographically diverse, the
portfolio has a high exposure to properties located in markets
deemed tertiary by DBRS. All hotels, except for one, operate as
Hilton Hotels & Resorts– (Hilton) or Marriott
International–branded hotels under six different flags, the
majority of which, or 68.9% of the allocated loan balance, operate
as Embassy Suites by Hilton. The 24 collateral assets are being
acquired by the sponsor, Atrium Holding Company (Atrium), as part
of a 35-hotel portfolio and with other various assets out of a
bankruptcy reorganization of John Q Hammons Revocable Trust, JQH
Entities and its affiliates (collectively, JQH). In 2005, JD
Holdings, LLC (JD Holdings), an affiliate of Atrium, acquired
properties from JQH and, as part of the agreement, was given a
right of first refusal (ROFR) applicable to additional properties
held by JQH Entities. Commencing in 2015, JD Holdings and JQH had
engaged in litigation over the validity of the ROFR to purchase the
35 hotels, including the 24 collateral assets and the other various
assets valued by JQH at approximately $400.0 million. To halt
proceedings, JQH filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June
2016. After a number of motions and proceedings, a reorganization
plan was confirmed by the court on May 11, 2018, whereby JD
Holdings, one of the largest unsecured creditors to JQH, would
acquire all of JQH's assets out of bankruptcy, repay existing
creditors and assume certain liabilities. On May 17, 2018, trustees
on behalf of four commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS)
lenders filed an appeal of the reorganization confirmation as the
CMBS lenders held mortgage loans made to JQH Entities that were
secured by liens on nine of the properties. While the liens have
been released, the appeal by the CMBS lenders is primarily
additional claims on default interest summing to approximately
$77.6 million and not to the reorganization itself. As part of the
proceedings, JD Holdings has filed a commitment letter to fund up
to $200 million, if required to fund plan distributions, with $90.0
million designated for the CMBS disputed claims. In addition, as
part of the confirmation, the bankruptcy court required JD Holdings
to deposit an additional $25.0 million for disputed claims in an
escrow account that cannot be released without further order by the
bankruptcy court. In addition to the CMBS disputed claims, there
are approximately $54.0 million in other disputed claims that have
been asserted against JQH and remain subject to resolution and,
pursuant to the plan, payment in full to the extent such claims are
allowed. The CMBS lenders have until June 6, 2018, to file the
Statement of Issues and Designation of Record on Appeal. As part of
this financing, JD Holdings was required to contribute its $495.9
million claim, in addition to the $635.0 million mortgage loan and
$112.4 million sponsor equity contribution, to purchase JQH. In
conjunction with the acquisition of the assets, all franchise
agreements for all flagged properties were extended to at least
2028 and are required to go through an estimated $101.0 million
($4.4 million per flagged hotel, or $18,481 per flagged key).

The subject financing of $635.0 million along with a $112.4 million
equity infusion from the sponsor will go to retire $672.2 million
of existing debt, establish $61.9 million of upfront reserves and
cover closing costs of $13.3 million. Included in the upfront
reserves are a $16.0 million ($2,790 per key) upfront property
improvement plan (PIP) reserve and a $44.6 million delayed advance
holdback for the allocated loan amount of Embassy Suites – San
Marcos. The delayed advance holdback is in relation to a $1.5
million mortgage loan held by the City of San Marcos, Texas, and
secured by the property. The funds will be released upon the
delivery of a subordination agreement from the City of San Marco in
respect to the $1.5 million outstanding loan. Once the funds are
released, the sponsor is required to establish a $1.5 million San
Marcos Reserve to repay the full amount. If a subordination
agreement is not received, the reserve will be used to pay down the
loan. The loan is a two-year floating-rate (one-month LIBOR plus
2.29% per annum) interest-only IO) mortgage loan with five one-year
extension options.

Since 2011, prior ownership invested $119.5 million ($20,836 per
key) of capital expenditures (capex) across the collateral
portfolio, including $29.2 million ($5,099 per key) and $30.4
million ($5,308 per key) injected in the portfolio in 2016 and
2017, respectively. Recently completed capital improvements include
upgrades to guest rooms, lobbies, meeting spaces, public spaces,
amenities and exteriors. Furthermore, all assets except for one
will be required to go through PIP renovations as a result of the
change in ownership estimated at $101.0 million for the portfolio.
In addition to the $16.0 million upfront PIP reserve, the sponsor
is required to deposit an additional $51.0 million over the first
five years ($40.0 million in the first 12 months) and make ongoing
furniture, fixtures and equipment reserve deposits equal to 4.0% of
gross revenue. The properties were built between 1983 and 2009,
averaging 14 years. DBRS assessed the overall portfolio quality to
be Average based on the site inspections, but individual property
quality assessments ranged from Average (+) to Average (-). While
the portfolio does not consist of old assets, a common theme among
the properties inspected by DBRS was that the properties were dated
but still well maintained.

The portfolio is concentrated by property type, as all properties
are hotels. Hotels have the highest cash flow volatility of all
property types because of the relatively short lease/length of stay
compared with commercial properties, as well as higher operating
leverage. These dynamics can lead to rapidly deteriorating cash
flow in a declining market, and with nationwide revenue per
available room (RevPAR) in its eighth consecutive year of growth,
relatively easy RevPAR gains appear to be gone. The portfolio has
reported only modest gains in average daily rates and occupancy,
resulting in RevPAR gains as at the trailing 12 months ended
February 2018 period of only 12.2% since 2012, which is
underwhelming compared with the nationwide hotel RevPAR growth of
28.2% from 2012 to 2017, according to the “U.S. Lodging Industry
Overview.” The portfolio has experienced recent cash flow
declines, which can be attributed to a number of factors, including
rooms being taken off line during renovations, a number of aging
properties with a lack of capital investment and decreasing cash
flow margins; however, it may also be a signal of a late phase in
the lodging cycle. While the $59.7 million invested in 2016 and
2017 combined is a substantial amount of capex for the portfolio's
property types in their respective markets, $47.8 million, or 80.2%
of total renovations, is attributed to only ten properties with
2,792 keys, or 48.7% of the total keys, and the remaining
properties on average received only $2,209 per key annually over
the past seven years.

The as-is portfolio appraised value is $1.0 billion, assuming a
bulk sale, based on an applied cap rate of 7.2%, which equates to a
moderate appraised loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 63.2%. The
DBRS-concluded value of $634.2 million ($100,612 per key)
represents a significant 36.9% discount to the bulk sale appraised
value and results in a DBRS LTV of 100.1%, which is indicative of
high-leverage financing; however, the DBRS value is based on a
reversionary cap rate of 11.50%, which represents a significant
stress over current prevailing market cap rates. Furthermore, the
loan's DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Term Debt Service Coverage Ratio of
11.5% and 2.04 times, respectively, are moderate considering the
portfolio is primarily securitized by suburban full- and
limited-service hotels and the portfolio's insurable replacement
cost of $1.2 billion (excluding land value) is substantially higher
than the whole-loan amount of $635.0 million.

Classes X-CP, X-FP and X-NCP are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

All ratings will be subject to ongoing surveillance, which could
result in ratings being upgraded, downgraded, placed under review,
confirmed or discontinued by DBRS.


ATRIUM HOTEL 2018-ATRM: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Atrium Hotel Portfolio
Trust 2018-ATRM's $603.250 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial mortgage loan with
five, one-year extension options totaling $635.0 million, secured
by a first-lien mortgage on the borrower's fee simple and/or
leasehold interests in 24 full-service and limited-service hotel
properties.

The ratings reflect S&P views of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Atrium Hotel Portfolio Trust 2018-ATRM

  Class(i)      Rating(ii)             Amount ($)
  A             AAA (sf)              200,879,000
  X-CP          BBB- (sf)             313,000,800(iii)
  X-FP          BBB- (sf)              78,250,200(iii)
  X-NCP         BBB- (sf)             391,251,000(iii)
  B             AA- (sf)               69,845,000
  C             A- (sf)                51,919,000
  D             BBB- (sf)              68,608,000
  E             BB- (sf)              108,166,000
  F             B- (sf)                95,473,000
  G             NR                      8,360,000

(i)Excludes a non-offered eligible vertical interest class totaling
$31.750 million.
(ii)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(iii)Notional amounts.
NR--Not rated.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-A: Moody's Cuts Class 5-M-1 Debt Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one bond,
downgraded the rating of one bond, withdrawn the ratings of two
underlying components, and re-assigned the rating on one bond from
Banc of America Funding 2005-A Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-A Trust

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3B, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The rating
upgrade on Class 5-A-1 is a result of an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The rating action on Class 5-M-1 is driven by the correction of an
error. The prior rating action for this bond did not consider the
outstanding unpaid interest shortfall. Moody's rating downgrade of
Class 5-M-1 corrects this error and reflects the $27,638
outstanding interest shortfall as of May 2018 reporting period.

Moody's rating actions on Class 5-A-3, Class 5-A-3A and Class
5-A-3B are driven by the correction of a different error. At
closing Moody's assigned ratings to Class 5-A-3 amongst other
certificates issued by Banc of America Funding 2005-A Trust. Class
5-A-3 has two components, identified in the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement as Class 5-A-3A and Class 5-A-3B Component Certificates,
which generate the cash-flows supporting the Class 5-A-3 bond.
After the assignment of the initial rating on Class 5-A-3, Moody's
erroneously began publishing ratings on the underlying components
but not on Class 5-A-3-itself. Moody's is now correcting this error
and re-assigning a rating to Class 5-A-3, the certificate
originally rated by us and issued by Banc of America Funding 2005-A
Trust. Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings on Class 5-A-3A and
Class 5-A-3B. Hereafter, Moody's will only publish the rating for
Class 5-A-3 at the certificate level and will not publish ratings
for the related underlying components.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BANK 2017-BNK6: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all ratings for the followings classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK6
(the Certificates), issued by BANK 2017-BNK6:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained generally in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The collateral consists of 72 loans
secured by 189 properties. As at the May 2018 remittance, the pool
has an aggregate principal balance of $923.8 million, representing
a collational reduction of 0.4% since issuance. At issuance, the
transaction had a weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) and DBRS Debt Yield of 1.95x and 9.9%,
respectively, reflective of a generally strong credit profile for
the underlying loans, three of which are shadow-rated investment
grade, representing 22.6% of the pool. Given the pool's recent
vintage, just 17.5% of the pool is reporting updated financials,
with a WA DSCR and debt yield for those loans of 2.60x and 10.2%,
respectively.

One loan, Hall Office G4 (Prospectus ID #16), representing 2.1% of
the pool, is on the servicer's watch list. This loan is being
monitored for hail damage to the property. The servicer notes
repairs have been made and once a site inspection is completed to
confirm, the loan will be removed from monitoring.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.


BBCMS TRUST 2015-SRCH: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed seven classes of
BBCMS Trust 2015-SRCH Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Upgrade to the Interest-Only Notional Class X-B: The X-B class
references classes B, C and D , which are rated 'AA-sf' and 'A-'sf'
and 'BBB-sf', respectively. Class D has a WAC pass-through rate,
therefore, does not contribute cash flow to the interest-only (IO)
class X-B as there is no excess spread. Based on Fitch's criteria,
IO bonds are capped at the rating of the lowest bond that
contributes cash flow to the IO. Class X-B is capped at the rating
of class C.

Stable Performance and Property Cash Flow: Property level
performance is stable and the year end (YE) 2017 net cash flow
(NCF) is in line with issuance expectations. The most recent
servicer reported DSCR as of YE 2017 is 1.97x.

Superior Collateral Quality in Strong Location: The loan is secured
by the fee simple interest in three newly constructed,
single-tenant office buildings, totaling 943,056 square feet (sf),
leased to Google, Inc. (Google) in Sunnyvale, CA. The three
buildings hold a LEED-Gold designation and will be some of the most
technologically advanced in the area. The complex also includes a
52,500-square foot amenities building for the sole use of tenants,
which includes fitness and weight equipment, studios for classes,
full locker rooms and an outdoor pool.

Single-Tenant Lease Exposure: The three buildings are leased by a
single tenant: Google. The company has no outs in its lease, and
has invested approximately $188.6 million ($200 per square foot
[psf]) in their buildout. Google is one of the world's largest
technology companies with an estimated market capitalization of
$797 billion as of June 2018. It is also one of the largest
landlords and occupiers of space in the Silicon Valley market. The
company has already leased the next three office buildings in the
development (Phase II).

Amortization: The loan is interest-only for the first four years
and eight months and then amortizes on a 30-year schedule,
resulting in seven years of amortization. At maturity, the trust
balloon balance is estimated to be $372.1 million ($395/sf),
resulting in an approximate 13.5% reduction to the initial loan
amount.

Reserves: Up-front reserves of approximately $71 million were
funded to address all outstanding landlord obligations, including
tenant improvements, leasing costs and free rent periods. The
current reserve balance is $10.2 million ($10.81 psf). The loan
includes a cash flow sweep to be used to build reserves to $25 psf
during the final two years of the lease term if Google does not
give notice to renew.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee a positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has upgraded the following rating:

  -- $140.0 million interest-only class X-B* notes to 'A-sf' from
'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $58.0 million class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $202.0 million class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $260.0 million interest-only class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $46.0 million class B notes at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39.0 million class C notes at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55.0 million class D notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30.0 million class E notes at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest only.


BBCMS TRUST 2015-STP: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class B commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from BBCMS Trust 2015-STP, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from
the same transaction.

S&P said, "For the upgrade and affirmations on the principal- and
interest-paying certificates, our expectation of credit enhancement
was in line with the raised or affirmed rating levels. The upgrade
also reflects deleveraging of the trust balance due primarily to
recent property releases.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class X-A and class X-B
interest-only (IO) certificates based on our criteria for rating IO
securities, in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be
higher than that of the lowest-rated reference class. The notional
balance of the class X-A certificates references class A, and the
notional balance of the class X-B certificates references the
aggregate of the certificate balances of classes B and C.

"In addition, we reviewed the transaction's insurance provision and
determined that they are, for the most part, consistent with our
property insurance criteria. It is our understanding from the
master servicer that the insurance providers adhere to the normal
market standards, however, did not confirm that all of the current
providers were rated by S&P Global Ratings. We generally expect
insurance providers to be rated by S&P Global Ratings no lower than
two rating categories below the highest-rated securities backed by
the loan, with a 'BBB' rating category floor. As such, we increased
our minimum credit enhancement levels at each rating category."

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
fixed-rate IO loan, which is currently secured by a first-priority
mortgage encumbering the borrowers' fee-simple and leasehold
interests in 258 single-tenant retail, office, and industrial
properties totaling 8.1 million sq. ft. located across 36 U.S.
states. Our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of the
collateral properties that secures the mortgage loan in the trust
and considered the stable servicer-reported net operating income
and occupancy for the past three years (2015 through 2017). S&P
then derived its sustainable in-place net cash flow (NCF), which we
divided by an 8.36% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average
capitalization rate to determine our expected-case value. This
yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio and debt
service coverage (DSC) of 86.3% and 2.22x, respectively, on the
trust balance.

According to the June 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $587.2 million,
down from $649.5 million at issuance due primarily to the release
of 10 properties totaling 533,676 sq. ft. between February 2017 and
May 2018. The loan pays an annual fixed interest rate of 4.296% and
matures on Sept. 6, 2020. To date, the trust
has not incurred any principal losses.

The master servicer, Midland Loan Services, reported a 2.88x DSC
for year-end 2017, and occupancy was 99.3% according to the March
31, 2018, rent roll. Based on the March 31, 2018, rent roll, the
five largest tenants make up 60.1% of the collateral's total net
rentable area (NRA). In addition, 4.6% and 9.2% of the NRA have
leases that expire in 2020 and 2021, respectively.

  RATINGS LIST

  BBCMS Trust 2015-STP
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2015-STP
                                         Rating
  Class            Identifier            To             From
  A                05547GAA1             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
  X-A              05547GAQ6             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
  X-B              05547GAS2             A- (sf)        A- (sf)
  B                05547GAC7             AA (sf)        AA- (sf)
  C                05547GAE3             A- (sf)        A- (sf)
  D                05547GAG8             BBB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
  E                05547GAJ2             BB- (sf)       BB- (sf)
  F                05547GAL7             B+ (sf)        B+ (sf)


BCC FUNDING XIII: DBRS Hikes Class E Debt Rating to BB(high)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 12 ratings from two U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the 12 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, nine were upgraded and three were
confirmed. For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at their current respective rating levels.
For the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such
that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's
expected losses at their new respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
performance.

The ratings are:

BCC Funding XIII LLC
Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2016-1

Class A-2   Confirmed      AAA(sf)
Class B     Upgraded       AAA(sf)
Class C     Upgraded       AA(high)(sf)
Class D     Upgraded       A(low)(sf)
Class E     Upgraded       BB(high)(sf)
Class F     Upgraded       B(high)(sf)

BCC Funding X LLC
Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2015-1

Class A-2   Confirmed      AAA(sf)
Class B     Confirmed      AAA(sf)
Class C     Upgraded       AAA(sf)
Class D     Upgraded       AA(sf)
Class E     Upgraded       A(sf)
Class F     Upgraded       BBB(sf)


BEAR STEARNS 2002-2: Moody's Hikes Class B Debt Rating to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches from one transaction, backed by Subprime RMBS loans,
issued by Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2018 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2018 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pool and Moody's updated loss
expectation on this pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver
of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to
rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of this transaction.



BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR16: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms four classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR16, as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes C, D, E and F were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with expected recovery of principal and
interest from specially loans. Loans in special servicing currently
represent 94% of the pool.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 38.5% of the
current balance compared to 31.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 94% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 13, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $87.3 million
from $3.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
39% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with investment-grade
structured credit assessments and no defeased loans.

One loan, constituting 6% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Forty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $257 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%). Eight loans, constituting 94% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is The Shops at Northern Boulevard Loan ($33.6 million -- 38.5% of
the pool). The loan is secured by the leasehold interest in a
218,000 square foot retail property in Long Island City, New York,
in the New York City borough of Queens. Retailers at the property
include grocer Stop & Shop, Marshall's, Old Navy, Party City,
Guitar Center, and Chuck E Cheese's. The property was 97% occupied
as of December 2017. The loan matured on June 1, 2017 and was
transferred to the special servicer in June 2017 for maturity
default.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the Kingwood Office
Loan ($14.4 million -- 16.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
199,999 square feet Class B suburban office property in Kingwood,
Texas, a suburb of Houston. The loan has passed its scheduled
maturity date in June 2017 and transferred to special servicing
June 2017. The property was 84% leased as of March 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Canal Farms
Shopping Center loan ($10.1 million -- 11.5% of the pool) which is
secured by a 110,535 square foot shopping center in Los Banos,
California. The property was transferred to special servicing April
2017 for imminent default. The property was 82% leased as of
December 2017.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $33.6 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (41% expected loss on average).

The only performing non-specially serviced loan is the MSC
Industrial Building Loan ($5.1 million -- 5.8% of the pool). The
loan is secured by a 50,000 square feet Class B suburban office
property in Southfield, Michigan. The property was 100% leased as
of December 2017, the same as since securitization. The loan has
amortized 14% since securitization.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Lowers Class C Certs Rating to D(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P
lowered its rating on class C to 'D (sf)' from the same
transaction.

S&P said, "For the upgrades, our credit enhancement expectation was
in line with the raised rating levels. The upgrades also reflect
significant reduction in the trust balance.

"While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movements on classes A-J, AJ-A, and B, our analysis
also considered the classes' interest shortfall history and
repayment timing as well as susceptibility to reduced liquidity
support from the four specially serviced loans ($96.3 million,
73.0%).

"The downgrade on class C to 'D (sf)' reflects accumulated interest
shortfalls that we expect will remain outstanding in the near term.
Class C had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 13
consecutive months. According to the June 13, 2018, trustee
remittance report, the current net monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $18,934 and resulted primarily from special servicing fees
of $20,767 offset by an appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
recovery of $3,706."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the June 13, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $132.0 million, which is 5.3% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 10 loans, down from 185
loans at issuance. Five of these loans are with the special
servicer, the DRA/Colonial Office Portfolio loan ($20.8 million,
15.8%) is on the master servicer's watchlist, and no loans are
defeased.

S&P calculated a 0.99x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 103.0% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 9.08% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate. The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude four ($24.6 million,
18.7%) of the five specially serviced loans and one loan ($20.8
million, 15.8%) that the master servicer indicated has repaid in
full subsequent to the June 2018 trustee remittance report.

To date, the transaction has experienced $208.6 million in
principal losses, or 8.3% of the original pool trust balance. S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 8.6% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of
four of the five specially serviced loans. The remaining specially
serviced loan ($71.7 million, 54.3%) is expected to be modified.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the June 13, 2018, trustee remittance report, five loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III). Details of the three largest specially serviced loans, are
as follows:

The Marriott Houston Westchase loan ($71.7 million, 54.3%) is the
largest loan in the pool and the largest loan with the special
servicer. The loan, which has a performing matured balloon payment
status, has a total reported exposure of $71.7 million and is
secured by a 600-room full service hotel in Houston. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on July 24, 2017, due to
imminent default. The loan matured on Nov. 1, 2017. C-III indicated
that the property purchase and the loan assumption and modification
transaction closed on June 1, 2018. The reported year-to-date July
31, 2017, DSC and occupancy were 0.61x and 60.1%, respectively. S&P
will continue to monitor the property's
performance.

The Concord Plaza and Mall loan ($9.9 million, 7.5%) is the
third-largest loan in the pool and has a total reported exposure of
$10.6 million. The loan is secured by a 588,971-sq.-ft. retail
property, built in 1972, in Elkhart, Ind. The loan, which has a
foreclosure in process payment status, was transferred to the
special servicer on Nov. 17, 2017, due to maturity default. The
loan matured on Nov. 5, 2017. C-III stated that it is currently
evaluating the borrower's discounted payoff offer. The reported DSC
for the six months ended June 30, 2017, was 0.83x and the reported
occupancy as of May 31, 2018, was 55.3%. S&P expects a significant
loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Middlesex Business Center II loan ($6.4 million, 4.8%) is the
fourth-largest loan in the pool and has a total reported exposure
of $6.6 million. The loan is secured by a 90,000-sq.-ft. office
property, built in 1982 in South Plainfield, N.J. The loan, which
has a foreclosure in process payment status, was transferred to the
special servicer on Oct. 12, 2017, due to maturity default. The
loan matured on Oct. 5, 2017. C-III indicated that the borrower was
unable to refinance the loan because the sole tenant had not yet
provided notice of intent to renew its lease. The reported DSC and
occupancy for the year ended Dec. 31, 2017 were 1.49x and 100.0%,
respectively. S&P expects a minimal loss upon this loan's eventual
resolution.

The two remaining loans with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 4.1% of the total pool
trust balance. S&P estimated losses for the four specially serviced
loans, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 31.0%.

  RATINGS LIST

  Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-PWR18
                                 Rating
  Class       Identifier         To             From
  AJ          07401DAH4          BB+ (sf)       B- (sf)
  AJ-A        07401DAJ0          BB+ (sf)       B- (sf)
  B           07401DAL5          B (sf)         CCC (sf)
  C           07401DAM3          D (sf)         CCC (sf)


BENCHMARK 2018-B4: DBRS Gives (P)B(high) Rating on Class G-RR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-B4 (the
Certificates) to be issued by Benchmark 2018-B4 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X‑A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)

Classes X-B, X-D, D, E-RR, F-RR and G-RR will be privately placed.
The Classes X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 44 fixed-rate loans secured by 60
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. Trust assets contributed from six loans,
representing 34.1% of the pool, are shadow-rated investment grade
by DBRS. Proceeds for the shadow-rated loans are floored at their
respective rating within the pool. When the combined 34.1% of the
pool has no proceeds assigned below the rating floor, the resulting
pool subordination is diluted or reduced below that rated floor.
When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS
Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, two loans, representing 1.6% of the total pool, had a
DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x),
a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current
low-interest-rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants
to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 28 loans, representing
61.2% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x, and 17
loans, representing 44.3% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
0.90x. Aventura Mall, The Gateway and 65 Bay Street, which
represent 17.7% of the transaction balance and are three of the
pool's loans with a DBRS Refi DSCR below 0.90x, are shadow-rated
investment grade by DBRS and have a large piece of subordinate
mortgage debt outside the trust.

Eleven loans, representing 30.5% of the pool, are located in urban
and super-dense urban gateway markets with increased liquidity that
benefit from consistent investor demand, even in times of stress.
Urban markets represented in the deal include Chicago, San
Francisco, New York, Jersey City, Los Angeles, Miami and
Philadelphia. Six loans – Aventura Mall, 181 Fremont Street,
Marina Heights State Farm, AON Center, The Gateway and 65 Bay
Street – representing a combined 34.1% of the pool, exhibit
credit characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow
ratings. Aventura Mall exhibits credit characteristics consistent
with a BBB (high) shadow rating, 181 Fremont Street exhibits credit
characteristics consistent with an AA shadow rating, Marina Heights
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with an AA shadow
rating, The Gateway exhibits credit characteristics consistent with
an A shadow rating, AON Center exhibits credit characteristics
consistent with an A (high) shadow rating, and 65 Bay Street
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with an A (high) shadow
rating. Term default risk is moderate, as indicated by the
relatively strong DBRS Term DSCR of 1.72x, and when measured
against A-note balances only, the DBRS Term DSCR increases to
1.90x. In addition, 21 loans, representing 60.8% of the pool, have
a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. Even when excluding the six
investment-grade shadow-rated loans, the deal exhibits an
acceptable DBRS Term DSCR of 1.49x.

Eighteen loans, representing 53.4% of the pool, including ten of
the largest 15 loans, are structured with full-term interest-only
(IO) payments. An additional 15 loans, comprising 26.9% of the
pool, have partial IO periods ranging from ten months to 83 months.
As a result, the transaction's scheduled amortization by maturity
is only 5.9%, which is generally below other recent conduit
securitizations. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated using the
amortizing debt service obligation, and the DBRS Refi DSCR is
calculated considering the balloon balance and lack of amortization
when determining refinance risk. DBRS determines the probability of
default based on the lower of term or refinance DSCRs; therefore,
loans that lack amortization are treated more punitively. Ten of
the full-term IO loans, representing 27.0% of the full-IO
concentration in the transaction, are located in urban markets.
Additionally, all six of the loans that are shadow-rated investment
grade by DBRS are full-term IO, and they represent 63.9% of the
full-term IO concentration.

Eight loans, representing 22.6% of the transaction balance, are
secured by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to
a single tenant. This includes four of the largest 15 loans: 181
Fremont Street, Marina Heights State Farm, 636 11th Avenue and Best
Buy – Sherman Oaks. Loans secured by properties occupied by
single tenants have been found to suffer higher loss severities in
an event of default. All four of the largest single-tenant loans
are leased to tenants that are rated investment grade or have
investment-grade-rated parent companies. In addition, DBRS applied
a penalty for single-tenant properties that resulted in higher
loan-level credit enhancement. The majority of the loans have been
structured with cash flow sweeps prior to tenant expiry if the
lease expires during, at, or just beyond loan maturity.

There are eight loans, totaling 16.6% of the pool, secured by
hotels, which are vulnerable to having high NCF volatility because
of their relatively short-term leases compared with other
commercial properties, which can cause the NCF to quickly
deteriorate in a declining market. Three of the largest 15 loans
are secured by either hospitality or self-storage properties. Such
loans exhibit a weighted-average (WA) DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Exit
Debt Yield of 10.3% and 11.6%, respectively, which compare
favorably with the overall deal. Additionally, the vast majority,
or 86.2%, of such loans are located in established urban or
suburban markets that benefit from increased liquidity and more
stable performance.

The transaction's WA DBRS Refi DSCR is 0.94x, indicating higher
refinance risk on an overall pool level. In addition, 27 loans,
representing 60.0% of the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs below 1.00x,
including four of the top ten loans and nine of the top 15 loans.
Seventeen of these loans, comprising 44.3% of the pool, have DBRS
Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x, including five of the top ten loans and
seven of the top 15 loans. These credit metrics are based on
whole-loan balances. Three of the pool's loans with a DBRS Refi
DSCR below 0.90x – Aventura Mall, The Gateway and 65 Bay Street
– which represent 17.7% of the transaction balance and are three
of the pool's loans with a DBRS Refi DSCR below 0.90x, are
shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS and have a large piece of
subordinate mortgage debt outside the trust. Based on A-note
balances only, the deal's WA DBRS Refi DSCR improves materially to
1.03x, and the concentration of loans with DBRS Refi DSCRs below
1.00x and 0.90x reduces to 49.1% and 26.6%, respectively.

Classes X-A, X-B, and X-D are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The ratings assigned to Class G-RR materially deviate from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers
a material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviations are warranted given expected dispersion
of loan level cash flows post issuance.


BENCHMARK 2018-B4: Fitch to Rate $11MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Benchmark 2018-B4
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
Series 2018-B4.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $22,568,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $137,057,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,328,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $192,500,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $387,483,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $922,439,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $111,503,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55,028,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $49,236,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55,028,000ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,335,000ab class X-D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,335,000b class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,589,000bc class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,721,000bc class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11,585,000bc class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:

  -- $40,547,279bc class H-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

The initial certificate balances of class A-4 and class A-5 are
unknown and expected to be $579,983,000 in aggregate plus or minus
5%. The certificate balances will be determined based on the final
pricing of those classes of certificates. The expected class A-4
balance range is $125,000,000 to $260,000,000 and the expected
class A-5 balance range is $319,983,000 to $454,983,000.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of June 20, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 44 loans secured by 60
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,158,480,279 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by German American Capital Corporation, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, National Association, and Citi Real Estate Funding Inc.

Fitch received a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.3% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 91.8%, and asset summary reviews
of 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch LTV Than Recent Transactions: The pool exhibits better
LTV metrics than recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch LTV of 98.2% is lower than the 2017 and YTD 2018
averages of 101.6% and 103.6%, respectively. Despite the relatively
strong Fitch LTV, the pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is weaker than the
2017 and YTD 2018 averages of 1.26x and 1.25x, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans comprising 28.9%
of the transaction received an investment-grade credit opinion.
Aventura Mall (9.9% of the pool) received a credit opinion of
'Asf*' on a stand-alone basis. 181 Fremont Street (6.9% of the
pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*'. The
Gateway (4.3% of the pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of
'BBBsf*'. AON Center (4.3% of the pool) received a stand-alone
credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*'. 65 Bay Street (3.5% of the pool)
received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBBsf*'. Net of these
loans, the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.14x and 110.6%,
respectively.

Weak Amortization: Eighteen loans (53.4% of the pool) are full-term
interest-only, and 15 loans (26.9% of the pool) are partial
interest-only. The pool is scheduled to amortize 5.9% of the
initial pool balance by maturity, which is lower than the 2017 and
YTD 2018 averages of 7.9% and 7.3%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 9.4% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
BMARK 2018-B4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


BETONY CLO 2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to $25MM Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Betony CLO 2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$325,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Betony CLO 2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 5.0% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior unsecured
loans and first-lien last-out loans. Moody's expects the portfolio
to be approximately 100% ramped as of the closing date.

Invesco RR Fund L.P. will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.05%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


BETONY CLO 2: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on $25MM Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Betony CLO 2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$325,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Betony CLO 2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 5.0% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior unsecured
loans and first-lien last-out loans. The portfolio is approximately
100% ramped as of the closing date.

Invesco RR Fund L.P. will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.05%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2015-2: S&P Gives (P)BB- Rating on E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from BlueMountain
CLO 2015-2 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2015 that is managed by BlueMountain Capital Management
LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture. The original class F notes are not included
in this refinancing.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 28,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 18, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the ratings
on the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement
notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm
the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its preliminary
ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also include an extension of the weighted
average life test extended by 0.5 years.  S&P said, "Our review of
this transaction included a cash flow analysis, based on the
portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee report, to
estimate future performance. In line with our criteria, our cash
flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected
timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under
various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated
tranches."

S&P said, "We will continue to review whether, in our view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and we will take further
rating actions as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  BlueMountain CLO 2015-2 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2015-2 LLC    
  Replacement class   Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R               AAA (sf)             311.38
  B-R                 AA (sf)               56.75
  C-R                 A (sf)                44.63
  D-R                 BBB (sf)              23.25
  E-R                 BB- (sf)              24.00

  OTHER OUTSTANDING RATING
  BlueMountain CLO 2015-2 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2015-2 LLC
  Class               Rating
  F                   B- (sf)


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO XXII: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on $17MM Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BlueMountain
CLO XXII Ltd./BlueMountain CLO XXII LLC's $357.05 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 27,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  BlueMountain CLO XXII Ltd./BlueMountain CLO XXII LLC

  Class                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)                 250.00
  A-2                    NR                        10.00
  B                      AA (sf)                   30.30
  C                      A (sf)                    39.75
  D                      BBB- (sf)                 20.00
  E                      BB- (sf)                  17.00
  Subordinated notes     NR                        40.90

  NR--Not rated.


CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Confirms 28 Tranches From 6 US ABS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the rating of 28 securities from six series
issued by the Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust U.S.
asset-backed security transaction. Performance for the securities
is such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's loss expectations at their respective rating levels.

The transactions reviewed were:

-- Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2013-I
-- Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2013-II
-- Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2014-II
-- Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2015-I
-- Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2015-II
-- Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2016-I

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Amendments made to the transaction.

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
performance.

The Affected Ratings is available at https://bit.ly/2KiYrcq


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2016-1: S&P Gives (P)BB- Rating on $18MM D-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Carlyle
Global Market Strategies CLO 2016-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2016 that is managed by
Carlyle Investment Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 25,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 20, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to fully redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also extend the weighted average life test
by one year.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on portfolio and transaction details, to estimate
future performance. In line with our criteria, our cash flow
scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected
timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under
various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated
tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2016-1 Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             246.40
  A-2-R                     AA (sf)               56.80
  B-R                       A (sf)                28.80
  C-R                       BBB- (sf)             17.60
  D-R                       BB- (sf)              18.40
  Subordinate notes         NR                    34.90

  NR--Not rated.


CART 1: Fitch Cuts Class E Notes to Dsf, Then Withdraws Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded CART 1 Limited and withdrawn the
rating as follows:

Class E (XS0295193311): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf' and
withdrawn.

Fitch is withdrawing the ratings of CART 1 Limited class E notes as
the notes have defaulted. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for CART 1 Limited.

CART 1 Limited is a synthetic CDO referencing a pool of loans to
German mid-caps, originated by Deutsche Bank AG. The class A+ to F
were cash-collateralised, while the super senior swap was not
collateralised. Scheduled maturity was reached on June 15, 2015, on
which date the class A+ through D notes were paid in full. Only the
'CCsf' rated class E notes and the un-rated class F notes remained
outstanding.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Legal Maturity

The transaction reached its legal maturity date on June 15, 2018.
At this date, the class E notes were not redeemed in full. As per
Information Report dated June 15, 2018, EUR8.5 million losses and
EUR18 million redemption amount were determined for the class E
notes. Fitch understands that the redemption amount has not been
paid out on June 15, 2018 but will be paid out at a later date.


CD 2006-CD3: Moody's Cuts Class A-J Debt Rating to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in CD 2006-CD3 Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates,
Series 2006-CD3, as follows:

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2017 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2017 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XS, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. A-M was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on Cl. A-J was downgraded due to realized losses plus
Moody's expected losses from specially serviced loans. Cl. A-J has
already experienced a 6% realized loss as a result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on Cl. A-1A was affirmed because that rating is
consistent with the total realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans that could impact this class. Cl. A-1A
current balance has been reduced by 87% from its original
certificate balance and it has experienced a 0.4% realized loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class XS, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 37.2% of the
current balance, compared to 41.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 18.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating CD 2006-CD3 Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Cl. A-M, Cl. A-J and Cl. A-1A was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating CD
2006-CD3 Commercial Mortgage Trust, Cl. XS were "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 44% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to $503.4
million from $3.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 27% of the pool. One loan, representing 35% of the pool
defeased and is secured by US Government Securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four compared to six at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Fifty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $437.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%). Ten loans, constituting 44% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Fair Lakes Office Portfolio Loan ($135.8 million -- 27% of
the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $252.3
million first mortgage loan secured by a 1.25 million square foot
(SF) office park located in Fairfax, Virginia. The complex is
located 15 miles west of Washington D.C., and consists of nine
remaining class A buildings ranging in size from 75,000 SF to
275,000 SF. The loan transferred to special servicing in June 2015
for imminent default; due to the anticipated loss of the largest
tenant at the time and the remaining three largest tenants having
lease expiration dates within the next two years. As per the
December 2017 rent roll, the property was 74% leased, compared to
56% at last review and 99% at securitization. The special servicer
is working on leasing up vacant space and marketing properties for
sale.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Greendale Mall
Loan ($45.0 million -- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
309,000 SF enclosed shopping center in Worcester, MA, 40 miles west
of Boston. The loan transferred to special servicing in September
2015 due to imminent default and became REO in June 2016. Property
performance has declined significantly since securitization. As of
the March 2018 rent roll, the property was 80% leased compared to
86% at last review.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Summit Square
Retail Plaza loan ($14.8 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 133,798 SF shopping center located in Warwick, Rhode
Island. As of March 2018, the property was 78% leased.

The remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $182 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (80% expected loss on average).

Based on the remaining certificates outstanding, losses will be
allocated between Cl. A-M and Cl. A-J combined (the "Combined
Certificates") collectively on the one hand, and the Cl. A-1A
Certificates on the other, pro rata, with the losses allocated to
the Combined Certificates allocated first, to the Cl. A-J
Certificates and then, to the Cl. A-M Certificates, in that order.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 110%, compared to 130% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component includes only four loans and
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 19% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.01X and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 1.07X and 0.87X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Hay-Adams Loan ($68 million -- 13.5% of the
pool), which is secured by an 145-key, full service, luxury hotel
located in Washington, D.C.; one block north of the White House.
The April 2018 trailing twelve month occupancy was 72%, with an
average daily rate (ADR) of $494 and revenue per available room
(RevPAR) of $356. The loan benefits from amortized and has
amortized 9.4% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 114% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.93X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Home Depot Jersey City loan ($18.5
million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 105,000 SF
single tenant building located in Jersey City, New Jersey. The
property is fully occupied by The Home Depot with a lease expiring
in 2033. The tenant is responsible for all real estate taxes,
operating expenses and capital expenditures. This loan benefits
from amortization and has amortized 21% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.85X, respectively,
compared to 106.3% and 0.81X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Spring Industries Pool 3 Loan ($17.6
million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured three separate
industrial buildings totaling 1.4 million SF located in Georgia (2)
and Alabama (1). This loan has amortized 19.9% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 113% and 0.93X at last review.


CHERRYWOOD SB 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class B-1 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-1 (the
Certificates) issued by Cherrywood SB Commercial Mortgage Loan
Trust 2016-1 as follows:

-- Class A-FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class M-1 at AA (sf)
-- Class M-2 at A (sf)
-- Class M-3 at BBB (sf)
-- Class M-4 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class B-2 at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since the last surveillance review, conducted in
June 2017, and since issuance in 2016. At issuance, the collateral
consisted of 151 individual loans secured by 205 commercial and
multifamily properties, with a deal balance of approximately $112.5
million. Because 15 of the loans are sponsored by
cross-collateralized borrowing groups, those loans were analyzed as
six portfolio loans. As of the May 2018 remittance report, 117
loans remain in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of
$86.2 million, representing a collateral reduction of 23.2% since
issuance and 12.0% since the June 2017 surveillance review, due to
scheduled amortization and loan repayments.

Of the remaining 117 loans, all but eight loans (4.7% of the pool)
are fully amortizing, with term lengths ranging between 12 and 28
years. In addition, all of the loans have a floating interest rate
structure. Of the loans in the pool, 114 loans (97.7% of the pool)
have a fixed interest rate for the first five years of the loan
term, two loans (1.1% of the pool) have a fixed interest rate for
the first seven years of the loan term and one loan (1.2% of the
pool) has a fixed interest rate of the first 15 years of the loan
term. After the fixed-rate periods, the interest rate floats over
the six-month LIBOR index and resets every six months. The loans
are structured with interest rate floors ranging from 5.75% to
9.25% with a weighted-average (WA) of 7.64% and interest rate caps
ranging from 11.75% to 15.25%, with a WA of 13.64%. For these
loans, DBRS applied a stress to the index (six-month LIBOR) that
corresponded to the remaining fully extended term of the loans and
added the respective contractual loan spread to determine a
stressed interest rate over the loan term. DBRS looked to the
greater of the interest rate floor or the DBRS stressed index rate
when calculating stressed debt service. The loans all amortize on a
360-month basis with terms ranging from 15 to 30 years.

The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, as the top 15
loans represent a relatively small 40.2% of the pool, with an
average loan size for the pool of $763,294. The pool is
concentrated by property type, as 60 loans, representing 60.4% of
the pool, are secured by multifamily properties, and 32 loans
(19.0% of the pool) are secured by retail properties. Mitigating
the risks associated with the property type concentration, the pool
also has a fairly high concentration of properties located in urban
and suburban markets (given the small balance nature of the loans),
which represent 19.4% and 58.4% of the pool, respectively. The
sponsors are generally less sophisticated operators of commercial
real estate with limited real estate portfolios and experience, but
all loans are structured with full recourse to the sponsor.

As of the May 2018 remittance, four loans (2.6% of the pool) are 30
to 90+ days delinquent. According to the servicer, each borrower is
regularly late on payments with funds typically received prior to
month's end. Two of the loans, representing 1.6% of the pool, are
in special servicing, with the strategy for both being to continue
collection efforts while pursuing all legal remedies available. The
largest loan, 184 Salem Avenue (0.8% of the pool) has been listed
for sale twice, but both sales have fallen through. The borrower
has since filed for Chapter 11, and subsequently, counsel has begun
negotiations regarding interest-only payments while reorganization
occurs. DBRS has applied a significant probability of default
penalty to all four of these loans and other loans with delinquent
pay histories.

The rating assigned to Class M-2 materially deviates from the
higher rating implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviations are warranted given loan level event
risk, as the underlying loans do not report ongoing financials.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2018-C5: Fitch Rates Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following final ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-C5 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2018-C5:

  -- $10,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $185,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $208,766,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,000,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $523,731,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55,965,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,400,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29,236,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,400,000ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,651,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,651,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,431,000bc class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,871,000bc class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,682,000bc class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not rated:

  -- $29,236,381bc class H-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on May 31, 2018, the
following changes have occurred. Class X-B now references only the
class B certificates, and its notional amount has decreased to
$28,400,000 (previously referenced both the class B and C
certificates with an initial notional amount of $57,636,000). Fitch
has updated its rating for class X-B to AA-sf (from A-sf).
Additionally, the balance of class D increased to $21,651,000 (from
Fitch's assumed balance of $20,782,000) and balance of class E-RR
decreased to $13,431,000 (from Fitch's assumed balance of
$14,300,000). Finally, the notional amount of class X-D has
increased to $21,651,000 (from Fitch's assumed amount of
$20,782,000). There are no other changes since Fitch published its
expected ratings. The classes reflect the final ratings and deal
structure.

The final ratings are based on information provided by the issuer
as of June 21, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 loans secured by 45
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$668,238,381 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citi Real Estate Funding Inc., Rialto Mortgage
Finance, LLC, Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P. and
Ladder Capital Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 80.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 86.1%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch
DSCR of 1.19x is weaker than average and than the 2017 1.26x and
2018 YTD 1.25x averages for other recent Fitch rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch LTV of 101.4% is in line with the
2017 average of 101.6% and lower than the 2018 YTD average of
103.9%. Moreover, the pool contains a higher amount of
investment-grade credit opinion loans (14.52%) whose combined Fitch
DSCR of 1.38x and LTV of 64.8% are much better than average.
Excluding investment grade credit opinion loans, the pool's Fitch
DSCR and LTV are 1.16x and 107.6%, respectively.

Favorable Property Type Concentration: Ten loans representing 41.8%
of the pool are secured by multifamily properties. This is greater
than the 2017 average of 8.1% and 2018 YTD average of 10.5% for
other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool has a
lower percentage of hotel loans at 4.0% of the pool as compared
with 2017 and 2018 YTD averages of 15.8% and 14.0%, respectively.
Multifamily loans generally have a lower probability of default in
Fitch's multiborrower model while hotel loans generally have a
higher probability of default, all else equal.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing
14.5% of the pool have investment-grade credit opinions. 65 Bay
Street (9.0% of the pool) and DreamWorks Campus (5.5% of the pool)
have investment grade credit opinions of 'BBBsf*' and 'BBB-sf*',
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-C5 certificates and found
that the transaction displays average sensitivities to further
declines in NCF. In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20%
from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB+sf' could result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf' could result.


COLONY MULTIFAMILY 2014-1: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Certs Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes
and affirmed the ratings on three classes in Colony Multifamily
Mortgage Trust 2014-1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-1, as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the four P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to
an increase in credit support resulting from paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 29% since Moody's last review
and 65% since securitization.

The rating of Cl. A and Cl. F was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating of the IO class, Cl. X, was affirmed because of the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 9.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Colony Multifamily
Mortgage Trust 2014-1, Cl. A, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, and Cl. F
was "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Colony
Multifamily Mortgage Trust 2014-1, Cl. X were "Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 22, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 65.3% to $109.6
million from $315.9 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 124 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 2.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 21.5% of the pool. The pool is comprised
of seasoned small balance loans secured by multifamily,
manufactured housing, and mixed-use (multifamily with ground floor
retail) properties.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 84, compared to 112 at Moody's last review.

Twenty loans, constituting 14.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool at a loss,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $1.8 million (for an
average loss severity of 23%). Four loans, constituting 4.9% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Elm Grove Garden Apartments Loan ($2.3 million
-- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 84-unit, garden-style
multifamily property located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The
property was transferred to the special servicer in November 2014
for payment default. The property operates under the Louisiana
Housing Finance Authority Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP)
program. The foreclosure action is pending. The loan is due to
mature in December 2036 and is structured with partial recourse to
the borrower.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a multifamily
property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $2.9 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (54% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 12 poorly
performing loans, constituting 9.8% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.7 million (a 25% expected loss based on
average) from these troubled loans.

The average current principal balance of the remaining loans is
less than $1 million. Small loans bring an assortment of risks that
Moody's addresses in its analysis, the most important of which
relates to a correlation between property size and value
volatility. Smaller loans, particularly loans less than $2.0
million, have historically exhibited higher default and severity
rates.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 55% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 52% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 98% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 28% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.27X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 7.5% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Saddle Creek Apartments Loan ($3.1 million --
2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 107-unit, garden-style,
multifamily property located in Cincinnati, Ohio, approximately 25
miles north of the Cincinnati CBD. The property was 86% leased as
of December 2015. The loan matures in June 2037 and is full
recourse to the borrower. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123%
and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 126% and 0.84X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is The Orchard Apartments Loan ($2.9
million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 97-unit,
garden-style, multifamily property located in Tehachapi, California
approximately 120 miles north of Los Angeles and 40 miles east of
Bakersfield. The loan was 98% occupied at securitization. The loan
matures in July 2035 and was structured with partial recourse to
the borrower. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.59X,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.54X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Park Villa Apartments Loan ($2.3
million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 96-unit,
garden-style, multifamily property located in San Bernardino,
California. The property was 96% leased as of December 2017. The
loan is due to mature in June 2035 and is non-recourse to the
borrower. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 2.13X,
respectively, compared to 61% and 2.06X at the last review.


COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the rating on one class in COMM 2005-C6 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of Cl. E was upgraded due to the class being
fully-covered by defeasance and the rating of Cl. F was upgraded
due to an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns
and amortization. The deal has paid down 16% since Moody's last
review and 98% since securitization.

The rating of the Cl. G was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl. G
has already experienced a 29% realized loss as a result of
previously liquidated loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 18.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 12.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 11, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $44.8 million
from $2.27 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans. Two loans, constituting 5.8%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, compared to three at Moody's last review.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool at a loss,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $109.8 million (for
an average loss severity of 49%). Three loans, constituting 23.8%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced exposure is the Petco -- Canton, OH and Petco --
Mentor, OH Loans ($5.9 million -- 13.1% of the pool), which is
secured by two cross-collateralized single-tenant retail properties
that were originally 100% leased to Petco. The loan transferred to
the special servicer in August 2015 due to imminent maturity
default after failing to refinance their loans in June 2015. The
trust took title to the assets after a foreclosure auction in
December 2016. Both properties failed to trade in a July 2017
auction. Both properties are shadow anchored by a Toys 'R' Us,
which is in the process of closing its stores due to the bankruptcy
of their corporate parent. The Petco -- Canton, OH loan is
currently vacant and The Petco -- Mentor, OH is still 100% leased
to Petco, which has a lease that expires in October 2018.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Saddlewood Center
($4.8 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by 40,478 SF
mixed-use property located in Naperville, Illinois. The property
contains a mix of retail, office, and medical office co-tenants and
is located along a major retail corridor. The loan was transferred
to the special servicer in March 2015 due to imminent default. The
loan has been deemed non-recoverable by the special servicer.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $8.4 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (79% expected loss on average).

The top three performing loans represent 68.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the MacArthur Portfolio Loan ($27.0 million --
60.2% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of seven retail
properties located in the New York City boroughs of Manhattan (6)
and Queens (1). The collateral consists of the fee interests in
grade-level retail and second-floor professional office units
within seven larger commercial/residential buildings. The portfolio
was 82% leased as of December 2017. The loan benefits from
amortization and has paid down 48% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 52% and 1.86X, respectively, compared to
62% and 1.58X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens (Greenville) Loan ($2.5
million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 14,550 SF
stand-alone Walgreens located in Simpsonville, SC, approximately
100 miles southwest of Charlotte, NC. The property is 100% leased
to Walgreens through March 2030. Moody's analysis incorporated a
Lit/Dark approach to account for the single-tenant exposure. The
loan benefits from amortization and has paid down 34% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.05X,
respectively.

The third largest loan is the 9701 Apollo Drive Loan ($1.4 million
-- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 93,585 SF, Class A,
office building located in Largo, Maryland approximately 13 miles
east of Washington, DC. The property was 94% leased as of December
2017. The loan is fully amortizing and has paid down 81% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 10% and greater
than 4.00X, respectively.


COMM 2013-LC13: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2013-LC13 Mortgage
Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 other
classes from the same transaction.

For the upgrades and affirmations, S&P's expectation of credit
enhancement was in line with the raised or affirmed rating levels.
The upgrades also reflect a reduction in the trust balance.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-A and 'BBB- (sf)'
rating on the class X-B interest-only (IO) certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class. Class X-A references classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5,
A-AB, and A-M and class X-B references classes B, C, and D.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the June 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $874.6 million, which is 81.1% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 53 loans down from 57
loans at issuance. Three of these loans ($67.5 million, 7.7%) are
with the special servicer, two ($16.6 million, 1.9%) are defeased,
one ($30.0 million, 3.4%) is a residential cooperative loan, and 10
($91.4 million, 10.5%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.

S&P calculated a 1.79x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 78.2% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.79% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate. The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the specially serviced
loans and the defeased loans. The top 10 loans have an aggregate
outstanding pool trust balance of $466.9 million (53.4%). Using
adjusted servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global
Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 2.09x and 77.4%,
respectively, for nine of the top 10 loans. The remaining loan is
specially serviced and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has not experienced any principal losses.
S&P expects losses to reach approximately 1.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses it expects upon the
eventual resolution of the three specially serviced loans.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the June 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, three loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors
LLC. Details of the two largest specially serviced loans, one of
which is a top 10 loan, are as follows:

The NorthPointe Apartments loan ($37.8 million, 4.3%) is the
sixth-largest loan in the pool and has a reported total exposure of
$39.7 million. The loan is secured by a 949-unit multifamily
property, built in 1970, in Euclid, Ohio. The loan, which has a
foreclosure in process payment status, was transferred to the
special servicer on Nov. 27, 2017, due to imminent default. The
special servicer indicated that the borrower has signed the
pre-negotiation letter, but attempts to discuss resolutions with
the borrower have been unsuccessful. Legal counsel has been engaged
and foreclosure/receiver petition has been filed. Additionally, the
special servicer indicated that there are several immediate capital
expenditure items that are being identified and addressed through
the receiver. The reported DSC and occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2017,
were 0.84x and 69.0%, respectively. A $9.4 million appraisal
reduction amount is in effect against this loan. S&P expects a
moderate loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The DP II Portfolio loan ($26.9 million, 3.1%) has a reported total
exposure of $27.0 million. The loan is secured by five
office/industrial properties totaling 649,586 sq. ft. in Florida
and Illinois. The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
May 31, 2018. The special servicer indicated that it is working
with the borrower to pay off the loan. Recent performance data was
not available for the loan. S&P expects a minimal loss upon this
loan's eventual resolution.

The remaining loan with the special servicer represents less than
0.4% of the total pool trust balance. S&P estimated losses for the
three specially serviced loans, arriving at a weighted average loss
severity of 20.1%.

  RATINGS LIST

  COMM 2013-LC13 Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass through certificates series 2013-LC13
                                     Rating
  Class        Identifier            To              From
  A-2          12626GAB9             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  A-3          12626GAD5             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  A-4          12626GAE3             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  A-5          12626GAF0             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  X-A          12626GAG8             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  A-AB         12626GBH5             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  X-B          12626GAH6             BBB- (sf)       BBB- (sf)
  A-M          12626GAM5             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  B            12626GAP8             AA (sf)         AA- (sf)
  C            12626GAR4             A (sf)          A- (sf)
  D            12626GAT0             BBB- (sf)       BBB- (sf)
  E            12626GAV5             BB- (sf)        BB- (sf)
  F            12626GAX1             B+ (sf)         B+ (sf)


COMM 2014-CCRE19: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on $23.5MM Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2014-CCRE19 Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through
Certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance for the majority of the pool and
stable loss expectations since issuance, with minimal paydown or
changes to credit enhancement. As of the June 2018 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate balance has paid down by 4.8% to $1.12
billion from $1.17 billion at issuance. Since Fitch's last rating
action, one previously specially serviced loan, which accounted for
0.4% of the original pool balance, was liquidated in April 2018
with better than expected recoveries. Two loans (1.3% of current
pool) are fully defeased. There are currently no specially serviced
loans.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated five loans (7.9% of
pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), which include the
fifth-largest loan (4.5%) and four loans outside the top 15 (3.4%).
Property occupancy declined to 46% as of TTM December 2017 and NOI
dropped 34% between 2016 and 2017 for the Post Ranch Inn (4.5%), a
39-room luxury hotel resort located in Big Sur, CA, due to natural
disasters in the area. Most notably, mudslides resulted in the
closure of the Pfeiffer Canyon Bridge, the only vehicular access
route to the property in February 2017. Performance has yet to
fully stabilize since the new steel bridge replacement opened in
October 2017. The loan has an anticipated repayment date (ARD) in
August 2019.

One of the two office buildings located in Woodcliff Lake, NJ in
the Chestnut Ridge Road Office Portfolio (1.3%) lost its single
tenant in March 2018. A replacement tenant for 85% of the vacated
space executed a new lease and is expected to take occupancy in
July 2018. The second-largest tenant (22% of NRA) at the Executive
Park at East Gate office property (0.8%) in Mount Laurel, NJ
vacated upon its October 2017 lease expiration; in addition, the
sole remaining tenant has a lease rolling in January 2019. The
Gateway Oaks Office (0.8%) in Sacramento, CA experienced an
occupancy decline to 49.2% in January 2018 after the largest tenant
significantly downsized to 38% of the NRA from 72%. The Cypress
Shopping Center (0.6%) in Boiling Springs, SC lost its Bi-Lo
grocery anchor (59% of the NRA) in June 2017; Bi-Lo continued to
make rental payments through its March 2018 lease expiration. The
borrower confirmed there are currently no commitments for the
vacant anchor space.

Pool Concentrations: The pool is considered diverse relative to
similar vintage transactions; the top-10 loans represent 40.3% of
the current pool balance. Loans secured by office properties
represent 26.3% of the pool, including three of the top-15 loans
(11.5%). The largest loan, Bridgepoint Tower, which is secured by a
single tenant office property located in San Diego, is occupied by
a for-profit education company that has a lease rolling in 2020. In
addition, the pool has a high hotel concentration at 21.3% of the
pool, including five of the top-15 loans (12.8%). Hotel performance
is considered more volatile; hotels have the highest probability of
default in Fitch's multiborrower model.

Pool Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 12.9% prior
to maturity. Four loans (11.2%) are full-term interest only, eight
loans (7.4%) are still currently within their partial interest-only
periods and the remaining 56 loans (81.4%) are currently
amortizing. Eight loans (15.2% of pool) have an upcoming scheduled
maturity or ARD in 2019 and one loan (1.5%) matures in 2021. The
remaining 59 loans (83.3%) mature in 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
pool performance and expected continued paydown. Future upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades may be possible should overall performance
of the FLOCs decline significantly.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $17.0 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $168.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $94.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $190 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $283.1 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $858.5 million (a) class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $108.6 million (a) class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $89.5 million (b) class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55.8 million (b) class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52.8 million (b) class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $198.1 million (b) class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $64.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a)Notional amount and interest only.

(b)Class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for class
A-M, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class F, G and H certificates or the
interest-only X-C and X-D certificates.


COMM 2014-LC17: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class F Debt to B(low)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded two classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC17 (the Certificates)
issued by COMM 2014-LC17 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class F downgraded to B (low) (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-E downgraded to B (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the following classes:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at CCC (sf)

In addition, Negative trends were assigned to Classes E and X-D and
maintained on Classes F, X-E and X-F to reflect DBRS's ongoing
concerns with the loans in special servicing. All other trends are
Stable, with the exception of Class G, which has been assigned a
rating that does not carry a trend and has an Interest in Arrears
designation, which was initially assigned in February 2018.

The Class PEZ certificates are exchangeable with the Class A-M,
Class B and Class C certificates (and vice versa).

The rating downgrades and Negative trend assignments reflect DBRS's
expectation of losses to the trust for five loans in special
servicing: World Houston Plaza (Prospectus ID #20, 1.5% of the
pool), Eagle Ford (Prospectus ID #17, 1.3% of the pool), Georgia
Multifamily Portfolio (Prospectus ID #35, 0.9% of the pool),
Cincinnati Portfolio Pool B (Prospectus ID #59, 0.4% of the pool)
and the RSRT Properties (Prospectus ID#62, 0.3% of the pool).
Collectively, these loans represent 4.3% of the outstanding pool
balance. Three of the loans have been in special servicing for at
least two years and two of the loans, World Houston Plaza and RSRT
Properties, were transferred to special servicing in December 2017.
With this review, DBRS assumed a liquidation scenario resulting in
losses to the trust for all five loans in special servicing, with a
weighted-average (WA) loss severity of approximately 80.0%. For
detail on the analyzed loss by loan and updated commentary on the
status of the workout and DBRS viewpoint, please see the loan
commentary for these loans in the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for
which information has been provided below.

As of the June 2018 remittance, there has been a collateral
reduction of 3.6% as a result of scheduled loan amortization, with
all of the original loans remaining in the pool and a current trust
balance of $1.22 billion. There is one loan, representing 1.7% of
the current pool that is defeased. As of the year-end (YE) 2017
financials (88.7% of the pool reporting), the transaction had a WA
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA in-place debt yield of
1.74x) and 10.5%, respectively, compared to the WA DBRS Term DSCR
of 1.57x and WA DBRS Debt Yield of 9.0%, respectively for those
same loans. As of the most recent YE financials, the top 15 loans
reported a WA DSCR and WA in-place debt yield of 1.72x and 10.1%,
respectively.

There are currently 13 loans, representing 14.5% of the pool
balance (including three loans in the top 15), on the servicer's
watch list. The majority of the loans on the watch list are being
monitored for occupancy and/or tenant-related items including
upcoming rollover and occupancy fluctuations in the most recent
reporting, with a WA YE2017 DSCR of 1.36x for the 14 loans
reporting cash flows for that period.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C, X-D, X-E and X-F are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

The ratings assigned to Class E materially deviate from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviations are warranted given uncertain loan
level event risk.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C05: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 29 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 29 tranches
from one Agency Risk Transfer transaction issued by Connecticut
Avenue Securities, Series 2017-C05. This transaction is an
actual-loss credit risk transfer (CRT) transaction issued by Fannie
Mae.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2017-C05

CL. 1A-I1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1A-I2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1A-I3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1A-I4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1B-I1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1B-I2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1B-I3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1B-I4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1E-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1E-A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1E-A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1E-A4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

CL. 1E-B1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1E-B2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1E-B3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1E-B4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL. 1E-D1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

CL. 1E-D2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

CL. 1E-D3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

CL. 1E-D4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

CL. 1E-D5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL.1-X1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL.1-X2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL.1-X3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

CL.1-X4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds and a reduction in the expected losses on
the underlying pool owing to strong collateral performance. The
outstanding rated bonds in this transaction have continued to
benefit both from a steady increase in the credit enhancement as a
result of sequential principal distributions among the subordinate
bonds and higher than expected voluntary prepayment rates since
issuance.

The risk transfer transactions provide credit protection against
the performance of a "reference pool" of mortgages guaranteed by
Fannie Mae. The notes are direct, unsecured obligations of Fannie
Mae and are not guaranteed by nor are they obligations of the
United States Government. Unlike a typical RMBS transaction, note
holders are not entitled to receive any cash from the mortgage
loans in the reference pool. Instead, the timing and amount of
principal and interest that Fannie Mae is obligated to pay on the
Notes is linked to the performance of the mortgage loans in the
reference pool. Principal payments to the notes relate only to
actual principal received from the reference pool with pro-rata
payments between senior and subordinate bonds, provided some
performance triggers are met, and sequential among subordinate
bonds.

The bonds have benefited from sustained prepayment rates and
continued increases in credit enhancement. The May 2018 remittance
data shows a three month average conditional prepayment rate (CPR)
of 6.3%. Although delinquencies underlying the pool have recently
risen due to impact of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the percentage
of loans that are 60-plus days delinquent is low, at about 30 bps
of the original balance as May 2018. Additionally, there are no net
losses.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool incorporates, amongst
other factors, its assessment of the representations and warranties
frameworks of the transaction, the due diligence findings of the
third party review received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

The principal methodology used in rating Connecticut Avenue
Securities, Series 2017-C05 Cl. 1M-2A, Cl. 1M-2B, Cl. 1M-1, Cl.
1M-2, Cl. 1E-A1, Cl. 1E-B1, Cl. 1E-A2, Cl. 1E-B2, Cl. 1E-A3, Cl.
1E-B3, Cl. 1E-A4, Cl. 1E-B4, Cl. 1E-D1, Cl. 1E-D2, Cl. 1E-D3, Cl.
1E-D4, and Cl. 1E-D5 was "Moody's Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS"
published in February 2015. The methodologies used in rating
Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2017-C05 Cl. 1A-I1, Cl.
1B-I1, Cl. 1A-I2, Cl. 1B-I2, Cl. 1A-I3, Cl. 1B-I3, Cl. 1A-I4, Cl.
1B-I4, Cl. 1-X1, Cl. 1-X2, Cl. 1-X3, and Cl. 1-X4 were "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
this transaction.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2018-C04: Fitch to Rate 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2018-C04:

-- $187,893,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $598,908,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2A-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2A-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2A-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2A-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2B-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2B-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2B-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2B-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2C-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2C-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2C-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $199,636,000 class 2C-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-X1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-X2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-X3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-X4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-Y1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-Y2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-Y3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $399,272,000 class 2-Y4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $23,610,277,363 class 2-AH reference tranche;

-- $9,889,428 class 2M-1H reference tranche;

-- $10,507,830 class 2M-AH reference tranche;

-- $10,507,830 class 2M-BH reference tranche;

-- $10,507,830 class 2M-CH reference tranche;

-- $152,663,000 class 2B-1 notes;

-- $8,035,223 class 2B-1H reference tranche;

-- $123,614,017 class 2B-2H reference tranche;

-- $31,523,490 class 2M-2H reference tranche.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
(AAA/Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
the mortgage loan reference pools of certain residential mortgage
loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 2M-1 notes reflects the 3.70% subordination provided
by the 0.85% class 2M-2A and its corresponding reference tranche,
the 0.85% class 2M-2B and its corresponding reference tranche, the
0.85% class 2M-2C and its corresponding reference tranche, the
0.65% class 2B-1 and its corresponding reference tranche, as well
as the 0.50% 2B-2H reference tranche.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2018-C04 (CAS 2018-C04) is
Fannie Mae's 27th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2018 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The CAS 2018-C04 transaction consists of 103,753 loans with
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 80% and less than or equal
to 97%.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
but are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors based on the payment priorities
set forth in the transaction documents.

Given the structure and counterparty dependence on Fannie Mae,
Fitch's ratings on the 2M-1 and 2M-2 notes will be based on the
lower of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and
credit enhancement (CE) available through subordination; or Fannie
Mae's Issuer Default Rating (IDR). The notes will be issued as
uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and carry a 12.5-year legal final
maturity. This will be an actual loss risk transfer transaction in
which losses borne by the noteholders will not be based on a fixed
loss severity (LS) schedule. The notes in this transaction will
experience losses realized at the time of liquidation or
modification that will include both lost principal and delinquent
or reduced interest.

Under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into
receivership if it determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less
than its obligations for more than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing, as well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae if it is
determined that the termination of such contract would promote an
orderly administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that
the U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in its current rating of Fannie Mae. However, if at some
point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and receivership
likely, Fannie Mae's ratings could be downgraded and the
2M-1,2M-2A,2M-2B, and 2M-2C notes' ratings affected.

The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating-rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating-rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Fannie Mae
between October 2017 and January 2018. The reference pool will
consist of loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 80%
and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference pool's
collateral characteristics are similar to recent CAS transactions
and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

HomeReady Exposure (Negative): Approximately 17% of the reference
pool was originated under Fannie Mae's HomeReady program, which
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
HomeReady loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and
property value), which is reflected in increased CE.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or modification
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. Fitch accounted
for the 12.5-year hard maturity in its default analysis and applied
a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Fannie Mae has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its
lender-approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty
risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan
quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a
tight control environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has
determined Fannie Mae to be an above-average aggregator for its
2013 and later product. Fitch accounted for the lower risk by
applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will retain credit risk in the transaction by holding
the 2A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial loss
protection of 4.50%, as well as the first loss 2B-2H reference
tranche, sized at 0.50%. Fannie Mae is also retaining a vertical
slice or interest of approximately 5% in each reference tranche
(2M-1H, 2M-AH, 2M-BH, 2M-CH, 2B-1H and 2B-2H).

Limited Size and Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): Fitch
received third-party due diligence on a loan production basis, as
opposed to a transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that
regular, periodic third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan
production basis are sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality
control processes. Fitch views the results of the due diligence
review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence. See the
Third-Party Due Diligence section of this report for more details.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae; this is reflected in its current
rating of Fannie Mae. However, if, at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the ratings of
Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C,
and 2M-2 notes' ratings affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected sMVD. It indicates there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


CPS AUTO: Moody's Takes Action on 14 Securities Issued 2013-2015
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded six and affirmed eight
securities from CPS Auto Receivables Trusts issued between 2013 and
2015. The transactions are serviced by Consumer Portfolio Services,
Inc.

Complete rating actions are as follow:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-D

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-D

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Affirmed B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are based on the build-up of credit enhancement due to
non-declining reserve accounts, overcollateralization and the
sequential pay structure of the transactions. Weak deal performance
has been offset in part by the build-up of credit enhancement for
these transactions.

The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectations were increased
for the 2014-A and 2015-A transactions from 18.00% to 18.50% and
from 19.00% to 20.00% for the 2014-D transaction. The CNL
expectation was unchanged at 19.00% for the 2013-D transaction. The
increased CNL expectations were due to worse than expected
collateral performance.

Provided are key performance metrics (as of the May 2018
distribution date) and credit assumptions for each affected
transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL expected loss expressed as a percentage of the original pool
balance; Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation and Moody's Aaa
(sf) level, both expressed as a percentage of the current pool
balance. The Aaa level is the level of credit enhancement
consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for the given asset pool.
Performance metrics include pool factor or the ratio of the current
collateral balance to the original collateral balance at closing;
total credit enhancement, which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and per
annum excess spread.

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-D

Lifetime CNL expectation - 19.00%; prior expectation (January 2018)
-- 19.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 16.22%

Aaa (sf) level - 40.00%

Pool factor -- 11.84%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class C Notes 87.17%, Class D Notes
44.94%, Class E Notes 21.69%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 11.40%

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.50%; prior expectation (January 2018)
-- 18.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 18.75%

Aaa (sf) level - 40.00%

Pool factor -- 14.96%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class C Notes 72.31%, Class D Notes
38.89%, Class E Notes 20.52%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 12.54%

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-D

Lifetime CNL expectation - 20.00%; prior expectation (January 2018)
-- 19.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 20.10%

Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

Pool factor -- 25.78%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class B Notes 81.46%, Class C Notes
40.75%, Class D Notes 23.30%, Class E Notes 10.68%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 12.07%

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.50%; prior expectation (January 2018)
-- 18.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 18.89%

Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

Pool factor -- 31.20%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class B Notes 68.13%, Class C Notes
34.46%, Class D Notes 20.05%, Class E Notes 9.62%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 12.40%

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of
payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US job
market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C1: Fitch Hikes $2MM Class F Certs Rating to B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed seven classes of Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2005-C1 (CSFB
2005-C1), commercial mortgage pass-through securities.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Credit Enhancement/Rating Cap: The upgrade to class F reflects
the class' high credit enhancement and the class being fully
covered by fully amortizing low leveraged loans. While Fitch
expects the likely full repayment of the class, the class F has
been capped at 'B' due to the concentrated nature of the pool and
low quality of the remaining collateral. Fitch modeled losses of
19% of the remaining pool; expected losses based on the original
pool balance are 5.6%, including $83.5 million (5.5% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.

Concentrated Pool; Sensitivity Test Performed: The pool is highly
concentrated with only four of the original 166 loans remaining. Of
the remaining loans, three are fully amortizing (61% of the pool
balance) and one is a Real Estate Owned (39%) retail property
located in Easton, MD. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool,
Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis which grouped the remaining
loans based on loan structural features, collateral quality and
performance, which ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment. The ratings reflect this sensitivity analysis.

As of the June 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 99.5% to $7.2 million from
$1.5 billion at issuance.

REO Asset: The largest loan in the pool, Staples Plaza (39% of the
pool balance), is secured by a 33,912-square-foot anchored retail
center located in Easton, MD. The loan had transferred to special
servicing in November 2014 for imminent default and has been in
payment default since April 2015. Per servicer updates, the lender
was the winning bidder at the August 2016 foreclosure sale, which
was fully ratified in April 2017 and closed the following month. As
of the December 2017 rent roll, the property was 80% occupied. The
largest tenant, Staples (71% NRA), recently executed a five-year
lease renewal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlook on class F is due to the class' high
credit enhancement and the class being fully covered by fully
amortizing low leveraged loans. The rating has been capped at 'Bsf'
due to the concentrated nature of the pool and low quality of the
remaining collateral. Rating changes to this class are considered
unlikely over the remaining life of the pool.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following class:

  -- $2 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Assign Stable
Outlook;

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-AB, A-3, A-4, A-J, B, C, D and E certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.
Fitch had previously withdrawn the ratings on the $5.1 million
class G certificates, and the interest-only class A-X and class
A-SP certificates.


CROWN POINT 5: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Crown Point
CLO 5 Ltd./Crown Point CLO 5 LLC's $376.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 25,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Crown Point CLO 5 Ltd./Crown Point CLO 5 LLC

  Class                  Rating           Amount (mil. $)
  A                      AAA (sf)                 256.000
  B                      AA (sf)                   48.000
  C                      A (sf)                    25.250
  D                      BBB- (sf)                 19.000
  E                      BB- (sf)                  19.750
  F                      B- (sf)                    8.000
  Subordinated notes     NR                        29.875

  NR--Not rated.



CSAIL COMMERCIAL 2017-C8: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of CSAIL Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2017-C8 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The overall pool performance remains stable
from issuance and Fitch's loss expectations remain unchanged since
issuance. As of the May 2018 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate balance has been reduced by 0.2% to $809.4 million from
$811.1 million at issuance. Credit enhancement levels remain
unchanged. There are no delinquent or specially serviced loans. One
loan (1.6%) is reported on the master servicer's watchlist for
decline in performance resulting from the single tenant, Labcorp,
receiving six months of free rent in 2017. The property's net
operating income (NOI) is expected to improve in 2018 once the free
rent concession burns off.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans, representing
31.6% of the pool, have investment-grade credit opinions. 85 Broad
Street (10.2%), 245 Park Avenue (9.1%) and Apple Sunnyvale (8.0%)
each have an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf' on a
stand-alone basis. Urban Union Amazon (4.3%) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'AAsf' on a stand-alone basis.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans represent 63.0% of
the pool, which is higher than the Fitch average top 10
concentrations for 2017 of 53% and YTD 2018 of 51%. The pool is
concentrated in the New York Metro area with 35% of the properties
located in NYC and surrounding suburbs in New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down 6.4%. Ten loans, representing (54.9%) of the
pool, are full-term, interest-only, and 10 loans (26.5%) are
partial interest only. There is one ARD loan (3.1%). The remainder
of the pool consists of 11 balloon loans representing 15.5% of the
pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the pool. Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset-level event changes the transaction's portfolio level
metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $16.2 million class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $163.6 million class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $142.3 million class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $213.5 million class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30.5 million class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $651.9b million class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $78.1b million class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $84.1 million class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $650.3e million class V1-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.6 million class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33.5 million class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $78.1e million class V1-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32.4a million class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32.4ae million class V1-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.2a million class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.1ac million class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 0.79%
($29,133,000) of the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(e) Exchangeable classes.

Fitch does not rate the $23,318,563ac class NR, $48,663,563ae class
V1-E and $809,432,954ae class V2. The transaction structure also
includes non-pooled, non-offered, loan-specific certificates
entitled to receive distributions from the 85 Broad Street trust
subordinate companion loan.

VRR Interest - The amount of the VRR Interest represents 4.22%
($29,133,000) of the pool balance (as of the closing date).


CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
CSFB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-through Certificates, Series 2006-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2017 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. A-J was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected plus realized losses. Cl. A-J has
already experienced a 35% realized loss from previously liquidated
loans.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 15.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $2.6 million
from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan.

Thirty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $222.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 68%).

The one remaining loan in the pool is currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Norgate Shoppes Loan
($2.6 million -- 100.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 14,820
square foot unanchored retail center in Indianapolis, IN
approximately 10 miles northeast of the Indianapolis CBD. The
property was 100% leased as of March 2018 but only 57% occupied.
Two of the six tenants are dark. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in March 2015 due to payment default. The special
servicer proceeded with foreclosure in March 2018 with the Trust
being the highest bidder and the loan became REO in April 2018. The
master servicer deemed the loan non-recoverable in June 2016.


CSMC 2008-3R: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class 2-A-1 Debt to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class 2-A-1
from CSMC Series 2008-3R.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSMC Series 2008-3R

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade is a result of the bond not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current rating when compared to the
updated loss expectation on the underlying certificate (Class 1A1
from Banc of America Funding 2006-2 Trust).


CSMC TRUST 2018-J1: Fitch Rates $4.79MM Class B-5 Certs 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates CSMC 2018-J1 Trust (CSMC 2018-2) as follows:

  -- $1,367,216,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,482,216,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $820,330,000 class A-3 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,361,000 class A-4 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,361,000 class A-5 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,361,000 class A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,025,413,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,361,000 class A-8 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,361,000 class A-9 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $273,442,000 class A-10 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $115,000,000 class A-11 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $115,000,000 class A-12 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,093,774,000 class A-13 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $341,803,000 class A-14 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,093,774,000 class A-15 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $205,082,000 class A-16 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,360,000 class A-17 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,025,413,000 class A-18 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $957,052,000 class A-19 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $888,691,000 class A-20 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $410,164,000 class A-21 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $478,525,000 class A-22 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $546,886,000 class A-23 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $177,737,000 class A-24 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $95,705,000 class A-25 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $963,440,000 class A-26 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $518,776,000 class A-27 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,111,662,000 class A-28 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $370,554,000 class A-29 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,482,216,000 class A-X1 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,025,413,000 class A-X2 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,361,000 class A-X3 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $115,000,000 class A-X4 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,093,774,000 class A-X5 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11,180,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55,903,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,166,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14,375,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,792,000 class B-5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $9,583,648 class B-6 certificates;

  -- $28,750,648 class B-7 exchangeable certificates;

  -- $1,597,215,648 class A-IO-S notional certificates.

Following the publication of Fitch's presale and expected ratings,
the issuer changed the offered notes and exchangeable combinations.
Fitch has withdrawn the ratings on the exchangeable classes below
that are no longer being issued in connection with this
transaction:

  -- Class A-30 certificates

  -- Class A-31 certificates

  -- Class A-32 certificates

  -- Class A-33 certificates

  -- Class A-34 certificates

  -- Class A-35 certificates

  -- Class A-X6 certificates

  -- Class A-X7 certificates

  -- Class A-X8 certificates

  -- Class A-X9 certificates

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
2,131 prime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) acquired from a single
originator in a bulk purchase with a total balance of approximately
$1.597 billion of the cut-off date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A notes reflects the 7.20%
subordination provided by the 0.70% class B-1, 3.50% class B-2,
1.20% class B-3, 0.90% class B-4, 0.30% class B-5 and 0.60% class
B-6 notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Performance (Positive): Up to 36 months of paystrings were
provided for all loans seasoned over 24 months (as applicable based
on loan seasoning), and none of the loans have experienced a
delinquency during this time period. While specific performance
history for the originator is not available for this collateral,
similar loans backing securitizations issued post-crisis have
performed well, with no post-crisis vintage RMBS experiencing
defaults of 30bps or more. To account for the clean pay history on
the loans that were provided 24 months or more of paystrings, a
credit was applied that reduced the 'AAAsf' by 63bps.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool
comprises high-quality, 30-year fully amortizing conforming
fixed-rate loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles and low
leverage. The pool, which was acquired by the issuer in a secondary
market transaction, has a weighted average (WA) FICO score of 771
and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 74.6%. The
collateral attributes of the pool are comparable with other prime
jumbo transactions recently rated by Fitch. Roughly 40% are
seasoned over 24 months.

Operational Risk (Concern): Despite its strong collateral profile,
the pool was subject to a number of operational adjustments,
including a representation and warranty (R&W) adjustment and
originator and due diligence adjustments that resulted in an
increase in the probability of default (PD). The originator
adjustment was applied to account for the absence of an operational
review Fitch conducts for pools backed by newly originated loans.
The lack of an opinion for the originator, along with the limited
diligence scope and Tier 3 R&W framework, led to an increase in the
expected losses at the 'AAAsf' rating category by between 100bps
and 125bps.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Concern): Fitch
believes the value of the R&W framework is weakened by the lack of
an automatic review for potential breaches and instead relies on
the decision of the controlling holder, which is defined as the
majority owner of the most subordinate class still outstanding.
While Fitch believes the high credit-quality pool is a key
strength, the limited diligence scope might not fully mitigate this
incremental risk. As a result, the weaker R&W framework, together
with the counterparty rating of the rep provider, resulted in an
addition of 22 bps to the 'AAAsf' loss.

Geographic Concentration (Concern): While the pool is well
diversified on a state basis, it is vulnerable to more specific
geographic concentrations. The single largest contributing state is
California at just 19% and two other separate metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) contribute more than 15% to the pool. Over
20% is located in the New York City MSA and 16% is located in the
Washington, D.C. MSA, which led to a geographic concentration
penalty of 1.04x, or approximately 17bps, to the 'AAAsf' expected
loss.

Limited Due Diligence (Concern): The due diligence review conducted
was in line with what Fitch expects for a seasoned performing
transaction. Diligence was completed on approximately 20% of the
loans and focused on compliance. The findings identified exceptions
typical for loans of similar credit and origination timeframe (i.e.
TRID exceptions). Additionally, as the diligence review did not
confirm the QM status for all of the loans, Fitch relied on the
transaction's Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) R&W and assumed
the loans to be Higher Priced Qualified Mortgages (QM), increasing
the AAAsf loss by close to 20bps.

Broker price opinions (BPOs) were provided on loans seasoned more
than two years; however, no desktop review was performed on the
original appraisals for the unseasoned loans. For this reason,
Fitch did not apply any home price indexation benefit to loans
where an updated BPO was not provided. Lastly, an updated tax and
title search was not conducted, but a life-of-loan R&W was provided
by an investment-grade entity, which mitigates the risk of realized
losses allocated to the pool due to the existence of prior liens
that would have otherwise been identified and addressed had the
search been conducted by transaction's closing date.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocations are based on a traditional senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The applicable
credit support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal
to classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained

No Servicer P&I Advances (Neutral): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of principal and interest
(P&I), which reduce liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I
advances made on behalf of loans that become delinquent and
eventually liquidate reduce proceeds to the trust, the loan-level
loss severity (LS) is lower for this transaction than for those
where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural
provisions and cash flow priorities, together with increased
subordination, are expected to mitigate the risk of interest
shortfalls to 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' the rated classes. Lower
investment-grade classes may incur temporary interest shortfalls
but are expected to be repaid in full at maturity.

Low Servicing Fee (Concern): The servicing fee of three basis
points is the lowest of any Fitch-rated transaction to date and
raises questions about appropriate incentives for the initial
servicer and potential successor servicers. Fitch views the primary
mitigating factor to this risk as the ability of the Paying Agent
to increase the servicing fee for potential successor servicers.
Fitch conducted an analysis assuming an increase in the servicing
fee to 15bps in its investment-grade stresses (with the increase
coming from available funds and not a reduction to the Net WAC) and
determined the current credit enhancement is enough to support the
bonds. When assessing the fee, Fitch also considered the relatively
low projected defaults, the high average loan balances and the
initial servicer's scale.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria
report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This incorporates a review of
the originators' lending platforms, as well as an assessment of the
transaction's R&Ws provided by the originators and arranger, which
were found to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from the "U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria." Fitch's criteria states that a pool is considered
seasoned performing if it is aged 24 months or more while this pool
has a weighted average seasoning since origination of 23.7 months.
The diligence that was performed for this transaction was in line
with what Fitch would expect for a Seasoned Performing pool and not
recent origination.

While the total impact of operational adjustments to account for
the limited due diligence scope and originator review was a
100bp-125bp increase to loss expectations, it is hard to quantify
the exact rating impact if the transaction was analysed in
accordance with what is expected for recently originated loans. The
adjustments reflect the lack of a full scope due diligence and
operational review of the originator for the sample of loans
seasoned less than 24 months that is expected to be conducted for
newly originated loans.

Fitch also applied a variation to its "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria"
as it relates to pools backed by newly originated loans with a tax
and title search that is aged over six months. Fitch expects an
updated search to be conducted if these loans comprise over 10% of
the pool. Because Fitch looked to the life-of loan R&W to address
the missing tax and title search on the loans seasoned 6-24 months,
which is consistent with its "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing,
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria," there was no rating impact.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 6.5%. The analysis indicates there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


DBJPM MORTGAGE 2017-C6: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E-RR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of DBJPM Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2017-C6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The overall pool
performance remains stable from issuance. No loans have transferred
to special servicing. One loan (0.91% of the pool balance) is 30+
days delinquent and has been designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern
(FLOC).

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement: As of the June 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
0.27% to $1.129 billion, from $1.132 billion at issuance. At
issuance, based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is
expected to pay down 5.6%. Fourteen full-term interest-only loans
comprise 59.4% of the pool, and 14 loans representing 22.7% of the
pool are partial interest-only. There are two ARD loans
representing 8.4% of the pool. The remainder of the pool consists
of 13 balloon loans representing 17.9% of the pool.

Above-Average Hotel Exposure: Hotel properties represent 17.4% of
the pool by balance, which is higher than the YE 2017 average of
15.8%. Loans secured by hotel properties have an above-average
probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans representing 15.3%
of the pool had investment-grade credit opinions at issuance. The
largest loan in the pool, 245 Park Avenue (8.3%), had a credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf' on a stand-alone basis. The third largest loan
in the pool, Olympic Tower (7.1%), had a credit opinion of 'BBBsf'
on a stand-alone basis.
Low Mortgage Coupons: The pool's weighted average coupon (WAC) is
4.26%, which is below historical averages. Fitch accounted for
increased refinance risk in a higher interest rate environment by
reviewing an interest rate sensitivity that assumes an interest
rate floor of 5% for the term risk for most property types, 4.5%
for multifamily properties and 6% for hotel properties, in
conjunction with Fitch's stressed refinance rates, which were 9.16%
on a weighted average (WA) basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics. For more information on rating
sensitivities please refer to Fitch's original presale, dated June
7, 2017.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $21 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $96.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $151 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $200 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $263.9 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $104.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $49.6 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26.2 million class E-RR at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11 million class F-RR at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $873* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $97.8* million class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53.7* million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G-RR or class VRR.

  * Notional amount and interest-only


DRYDEN 42: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, E-R, and F-R replacement notes from Dryden 42
Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund LLC, a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in May 2016 that is managed
by PGIM Inc. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 21,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 16, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance (see table). In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund LLC  
  (Refinancing And Extension)

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-R                       AAA (sf)             248.00
  B-R                       AA (sf)               56.00
  C-R                       A (sf)                24.00
  D-R                       BBB- (sf)             24.00
  E-R                       BB- (sf)              15.75
  F-R                       B- (sf)                7.00
  Subordinated notes        NR                    35.75

  NR--Not rated.


DT AUTO 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on $48MM Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2018-2 (DTAOT 2018-2
or the Issuer):

-- $216,010,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $57,000,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $87,010,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $78,000,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $48,000,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- DTAOT 2018-2 provides for Class A, B, C, D and E coverage
multiples slightly below the DBRS range of multiples set forth in
the criteria for this asset class. DBRS believes that this is
warranted given the magnitude of expected loss and structural
features of the transaction.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of the provided historical static
pool data for Drive Time originations and the performance of the
Drive Time auto loan portfolio.

-- The November 19, 2014, settlement of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade
practices.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Drive Time, that the trust has a
valid first-priority security interest in the assets and the
consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured
Finance."

The DTAOT 2018-2 transaction represents a securitization of a
portfolio of motor vehicle retail installment sales contracts
originated by Drive Time Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator).
The Originator is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Drive Time.
Drive Time is a leading used vehicle retailer in the United States
that focuses primarily on the sale and financing of vehicles to the
subprime market.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 65.50% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.50%) and overcollateralization (19.00%). The
ratings on the Class B, C, D and E Notes reflect 56.00%, 41.50%,
28.50% and 20.50% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.


FIGUEROA CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class DRR Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class XRR, A1RR,
A2RR, BRR, CRR, and DRR replacement notes from Figueroa CLO 2013-2
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued
in 2013 that is managed by TCW Asset Management Co. LLC. S&P
withdrew its ratings on the class X-R, A-1R, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and
D-R notes from this transaction following payment in full on the
June 20, 2018, refinancing date.

On the June 20, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
XRR, A1RR, A2RR, BRR, CRR, and DRR replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the class X-R, A-1R, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R as
outlined in the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the class X-R, A-1R, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and
D-R notes in line with their full redemption, and it are assigning
ratings to the class XRR, A1RR, A2RR, BRR, CRR, and DRR replacement
notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a supplemental
indenture. The supplemental indenture outlines that the XRR, A1RR,
A2RR, BRR, CRR, and DRR replacement notes will be issued at lower
spreads than the X-R, A-1R, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"The assigned ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Figueroa CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
  Replacement class    Rating          Amount (mil $)
  XRR                  AAA (sf)        1.00
  A1RR                 AAA (sf)        245.00
  A2RR                 AA (sf)         48.00
  BRR                  A (sf)          25.50
  CRR                  BBB (sf)        20.50
  DRR                  BB (sf)         18.00

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  Figueroa CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class                To              From
  X-R                  NR              AAA (sf)
  A-1R                 NR              AAA (sf)
  A-2R                 NR              AA (sf)
  B-R                  NR              A (sf)
  C-R                  NR              BBB (sf)
  D-R                  NR              BB (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


FILLMORE PARK: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Fillmore
Park CLO Ltd./Fillmore Park CLO LLC's $440.6 million floating- and
fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 25,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Fillmore Park CLO Ltd./Fillmore Park CLO LLC

  Class                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)                 305.00
  A-2                    NR                        21.80
  B-1                    AA (sf)                   30.70
  B-2                    AA (sf)                   12.50
  C                      A (sf)                    37.30
  D                      BBB- (sf)                 30.20
  E                      BB- (sf)                  19.00
  F                      B- (sf)                    5.90
  Subordinated notes     NR                        47.40

  NR--Not rated.


FLAGSHIP CLO VIII: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-RR, B-RR,
C-RR, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Flagship CLO VIII Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014 that
is managed by Deutsche Asset and Wealth Management. S&P withdrew
its ratings on the original class A-R, B-R, C-R, D, E, and F notes
following payment in full on the June 26, 2018, refinancing date.

On the June 26, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-R, E-R, and F-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A-R, B-R, C-R, D, E, and F notes
as outlined in the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and it is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"The assigned ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Flagship CLO VIII Ltd.
  Replacement class          Rating         Amount (mil $)
  A-RR                       AAA (sf)              275.000
  B-RR                       AA (sf)                54.500
  C-RR                       A (sf)                 30.125
  D-R                        BBB (sf)               22.750
  E-R                        BB- (sf)               20.800
  F-R                        NR                      8.000

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  Flagship CLO VIII Ltd.
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-R                  NR              AAA (sf)
  B-R                  NR              AA (sf)
  C-R                  NR              A (sf)
  D                    NR              BBB (sf)
  E                    NR              BB- (sf)
  F                    NR              B (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-4: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-4 (the
Certificates) issued by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-4 (the
Trust):

-- $437.8 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $396.9 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $317.5 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.2 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $61.3 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $140.7 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $79.4 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $60.3 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.0 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.9 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $437.8 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $4.2 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $10.5 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $6.5 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $4.0 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Class A-X-1 is an interest-only certificate. The class balance
represents a notional amount.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-6 and A-7 are exchangeable certificates.
These classes can be exchanged for a combination of initial
exchangeable certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8 and A-9 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
senior support certificates (Class A-10) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.25% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect
5.35%, 3.10%, 1.70% and 0.85% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 750 loans with a total principal balance of $466,934,643
as of the Cut-off Date (June 1, 2018).

Flagstar Bank, FSB is the originator and servicer of the mortgage
loans and the sponsor of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
will act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator,
Certificate Registrar and Custodian. Wilmington Trust, National
Association will serve as Trustee. IngletBlair, LLC will act as the
Representation and Warranty (R&W) Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years. Approximately
52.3% of the pool are agency-eligible mortgage loans which were
eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Unique to this transaction, the servicing fee payable to the
Servicer comprises three separate components: the base servicing
fee, the aggregate delinquent servicing fee and the aggregate
incentive servicing fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency
status of the related loan and will be paid from interest
collections before distribution to the securities. The base
servicing fee will reduce the net weighted-average coupon (WAC)
payable to certificate holders as part of the aggregate expense
calculation. However, the delinquent and incentive servicing fees
will not be included in the reduction of Net WAC and will thus
reduce available funds entitled to the certificate holders (except
for the Class B-6-C Net WAC). To capture the impact of such
potential fees, DBRS ran additional cash flow stresses based on its
60+-day delinquency and default curves, as detailed in the Cash
Flow Analysis section of the related report.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets and well-qualified borrowers.

This transaction exhibits certain challenges such as limited
third-party due diligence as well as a R&W framework that contains
materiality factors, an unrated R&W provider, knowledge qualifiers
and sunset provisions that allow for certain R&Ws to expire within
three to six years after the Closing Date. The framework is
perceived by DBRS to be limiting compared with traditional lifetime
R&W standards in certain DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the
perceived weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator score in this
pool. A lower originator score results in increased default and
loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-4: Fitch Rates $2.33MM Cl. B-5 Certs 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-4 (FSMT 2018-4) as
follows:

  -- $437,751,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $396,894,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $317,500,000 class A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $256,220,000 class A-4 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $61,280,000 class A-5 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $140,674,000 class A-6 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $79,394,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $60,347,000 class A-8 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,047,000 class A-9 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40,857,000 class A10 certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $437,751,000 class A-X-1 notional certificates 'AA+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,202,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,506,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,537,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3,969,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,335,000 class B-5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $1,634,643 class B-6-C certificates;

  -- $0 class R certificates;

  -- $0 class LT-R certificates.

The notes are supported by 750 jumbo prime, high-balance
conforming, and conforming fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) originated
by Flagstar Bank, FSB with a total balance of approximately $466.93
million as of the cut-off date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
primarily of 30-year, fully amortizing, high-balance conforming and
jumbo fixed-rate loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles and
low leverage. All loans are designated as Safe Harbor Qualified
Mortgages (SHQMs) or Temporary Qualified Mortgages. The pool has a
weighted average (WA) original FICO score of 762 and an original
combined loan to value (CLTV) ratio of 68.3%. The collateral
attributes of the pool are generally consistent with recent prime
transactions.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. Flagstar is experienced in
originating and securitizing prime-quality loans and is considered
an 'Average' originator. The results of 30% due diligence for this
transaction confirm a sound loan origination process. The solid
representation and warranty (R&W) framework (classified by Fitch as
Tier 1) coupled with Flagstar (RPS2-) as servicer also contribute
to the low operational risk for this transaction.

High Geographic Concentration (Negative): The pool's primary
concentration is in California, representing 53.5% of the pool.
Approximately 48% of the pool is located in the top three
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs; Los Angeles, San Francisco
and New York), with 28% of the pool located in the Los Angeles MSA.
The pool's high regional concentration, added approximately of 50
basis points (bps) to the Fitch's 'AAAsf' loss expectations.

Tier 1 R&W Framework (Positive): Fitch views Flagstar's framework
as a full framework since the company removed minor loan-level R&W
variations that previously existed. While the framework still
contains materiality factors, which the reviewer must consider when
determining if a loan has a material failure, there are thresholds
that define materiality, which Fitch views as a key mitigant. In
addition, the reviewer can consider information not included in the
test, which reduces the tests' prescriptiveness that could limit
the reviewer's ability to identify a breach. Fitch believes the R&W
features support the investors' ability to put back loans due to
misrepresentation or manufacturing defects. Because of the Tier 1
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) framework and
financial condition of the R&W provider, the pool received neutral
treatment at the 'AAAsf' level.

Strong Due Diligence Results (Positive): A loan-level due diligence
review was conducted on 30% of the pool, in accordance with Fitch's
criteria and focused on credit, compliance and property valuation.
All of the loans that received a due diligence review and are in
the final pool received a grade of 'A' or 'B', indicating strong
underwriting practices and sound quality-control procedures. The
majority of the 'B' graded loans were due to non-material
compliance issues related to TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure
(TRID) findings, which were all corrected or cleared/canceled.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 1.25% of the
original balance will be maintained for the senior certificates and
a balance of $3,969,643 will be maintained for subordinate
certificates.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Negative): The trust is obligated
to reimburse the breach reviewer, Inglet Blair, LLC (Inglet Blair),
each month for any reasonable, out-of-pocket expenses incurred if
the company is requested to participate in any arbitration, legal
or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings. These expenses
include Inglet Blair's legal fees and other expenses incurred
outside its reviewer fee and are not subject to a cap or
certificate holder approval.

While Fitch accounted for the potential additional costs by
upwardly adjusting its loss estimate for the pool, Fitch views this
construct as adding potentially more ratings volatility than those
that do not have this type of provision. To account for the risk of
these expenses reducing subordination, Fitch adjusted its loss
expectations upward by 10bps at each rating category.

Extraordinary Expense Adjustment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon (WAC) of the loans,
which does not affect the contractual interest due on the
certificates. Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust
are capped at $300,000 per annum, which can be carried over each
year, subject to the cap until paid in full.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in general accordance with its
criteria, as described in its report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
This incorporates a review of the originator's lending platforms,
as well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originator and arranger, which were found to be consistent with the
ratings assigned to the certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from the "U.S.
RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria," which relates to the treatment of
the loan origination channel. Approximately 12% of the pool was
originated directly through Flagstar's retail channel, with the
remaining from brokers (13.89%) and Flagstar's correspondents'
channels (73.72%). The due diligence review indicated that 93% of
the correspondent loans were originated through the correspondent's
retail channel and the remaining 7% were originated through a
broker channel. This was extrapolated to the pool and the retail
credit was given for loans originated through the correspondent's
retail channel. The result of this variation resulted in a 10 bp
difference in the 'AAAsf' rating level.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 7.5%. The analysis indicates there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


FREDDIE MAC 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class M Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional rating on the following
Asset-Backed Security, Series 2018-2 (the Certificate) issued by
Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust (SCRTT), Series
2018-2 (the Trust):

-- $51.7 million Class M at B (low) (sf)

The B (low) (sf) rating on the Certificate reflects 4.75% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the pool.

Other than the specified class above, DBRS does not rate any other
classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
re-performing first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the certificates, which are backed by 8,628 loans with
a total principal balance of $1,592,058,636 as of the Cut-Off Date
(April 30, 2018).

The mortgage loans were either purchased by Freddie Mac from
securitized Freddie Mac Participation Certificates or retained by
Freddie Mac in whole-loan form since their acquisition. The loans
are currently held in Freddie Mac's retained portfolio and will be
deposited into the Trust on the Closing Date (June 13, 2018).

The portfolio contains 100% modified loans. Each mortgage loan was
modified under either a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) or a GSE non-HAMP
modification program. Within the pool, 3,186 mortgages have
forborne principal amounts as a result of modification, which
equates to 10.7% of the total unpaid principal balance as of the
Cut-Off Date. For 90.1% of the modified loans, the modifications
happened more than two years ago. The loans are approximately 139
months seasoned, and all are current as of the Cut-Off Date.
Furthermore, 82.7% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30
days delinquent for at least the past 24 months under the Mortgage
Bankers Association delinquency methods. None of the loans are
subject to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Qualified
Mortgage rules.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing,
LLC. There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or
interest on any mortgages by the Servicer; however, the Servicer is
obligated to advance to third parties any amounts necessary for the
preservation of mortgaged properties or real estate¬-owned
properties acquired by the Trust through foreclosure or a loss
mitigation process.

Freddie Mac will serve as the Sponsor, Seller and Trustee of the
transaction, as well as Guarantor of the senior certificates (Class
HT, Class HA, Class HB, Class HV, Class HZ, Class MT, Class MA,
Class MB, Class MV, Class MZ, Class M55C, Class M55D, Class M55E
and Class M55I Certificates). Wilmington Trust, National
Association will serve as the Trust Agent. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
will serve as the Custodian for the Trust. U.S. Bank National
Association will serve as the Securities Administrator for the
Trust and will act as paying agent, registrar, transfer agent and
authenticating agent.

Freddie Mac, as the Seller, will make certain representations and
warranties (R&Ws) with respect to the mortgage loans. It will be
the only party from which the Trust may seek indemnification (or in
certain cases, a repurchase) as a result of a breach of R&Ws. If a
breach review trigger occurs, the Trust Agent, Wilmington Trust,
will be responsible for the enforcement of R&Ws. The warranty
period will only be effective through June 11, 2021 (approximately
three years from the Closing Date), for substantially all R&Ws
other than the real estate mortgage investment conduit R&W.

The mortgage loans will be divided into three loan groups: Group H,
Group M and Group M55. The Group H loans (26.8% of the pool) were
subject to step-rate modifications. Group M loans (64.2% of the
pool) and Group M55 loans (9.0% of the pool) were subject to either
fixed-rate modifications or step-rate modifications that have
reached their final step dates and the borrowers have made at least
one payment after such loans reached their final step dates as of
the Cut-Off Date. Each Group M loan has a mortgage interest rate
less than or equal to 5.5% or has forbearance. Each Group M55 loan
has a mortgage interest rate greater than 5.5% and has no
forbearance. Principal and interest (P&I) on the senior
certificates (the Guaranteed Certificates) will be guaranteed by
Freddie Mac. The Guaranteed Certificates will be backed by
collateral from each group, respectively. The remaining
Certificates, including the subordinate, non-guaranteed
interest-only, mortgage insurance and residual Certificates will be
cross-collateralized among the three groups.

The transaction employs a pro rata pay cash flow structure with a
sequential-pay feature among the subordinate certificates. Certain
principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
rated Class M certificates. Senior classes benefit from guaranteed
P&I payments by the Guarantor, Freddie Mac; however, such
guaranteed amounts, if paid, will be reimbursed to Freddie Mac from
the P&I collections prior to any allocation to the subordinate
certificates. The senior principal distribution amounts vary
subject to the satisfaction of a step-down test. Realized losses
are allocated reverse sequentially.

The rating reflects transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis (82.7%
of the pool has remained consistently current in the past 24
months), good credit quality relative to other re-performing pools
reviewed by DBRS and a strong servicer. Additionally, a third-party
due diligence review, albeit on less than 100% of the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance and payment histories, was
performed on a sample that exceeds DBRS's criteria. The due
diligence results and findings on the sampled loans were
satisfactory.

This transaction employs a relatively weak R&W framework that
includes a 36-month sunset without an R&W reserve account,
substantial knowledge qualifiers (with claw back) and fewer
mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for
seasoned pools. DBRS increased loss expectations from the model
results to capture the weaknesses in the R&W framework. Other
mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and very
clean performance history in the past two years, (2) stringent and
automatic breach review triggers, (3) Freddie Mac as the R&W
provider and (4) a satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

The lack of P&I advances on delinquent mortgages may increase the
possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the note holders;
however, certain principal proceeds can be used to pay interest to
the rated Certificate, and subordination levels are greater than
expected losses, which may provide for interest payments to the
rated Certificate.

The DBRS rating addresses the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related certificates.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


FREDDIE MAC: Moody's Hikes $49.7MM RMBS Issued in 2017
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
from Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust ("FWLS") 2017-SC01 and
2017-SC02. These transactions are securitizations of fixed-rate,
first lien, super conforming prime residential mortgage loans. The
collateral pools consist of loans acquired by Freddie Mac from
multiple sellers pursuant to the terms of the Freddie Mac
Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide (the Guide). In addition,
Freddie Mac, as master servicer, monitors the servicers who service
the loans according to the Guide.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2017-SC01

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2017-SC02

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a decrease in Moody's
projected pool losses. High voluntary prepayment rates since
issuance have contributed to fast pay downs and increases in
percentage credit enhancement levels for the upgraded bonds. As of
April 2018, the 3-month average prepayment rate for FWLS 2017-SC01
collateral pool was 9% and for FWLS 2017-SC02 collateral pool was
9.5%. Similarly, the pool factor as of April 2018 for FWLS
2017-SC01 was 90% and for FWLS 2017-SC02 was 88%. While prepayments
have been high for both transactions, the underlying pools have
seen some delinquencies with loans sixty or more days delinquent
(including loans in foreclosure and real estate owned) as a
percentage of current pool balance as of April 2018 at 0.19% and
1.31% for FWLS 2017-SC01 loan pools 1 and 2 respectively and at
0.59% and 0.20% for FWLS 2017-SC02 loan pools 1 and 2
respectively.

The transactions feature a pro-rata payment structure whereby
principal payments on the mortgage loans are generally allocated on
a pro rata basis between the senior and subordinate certificates,
provided certain performance and collateral tests are met. Within
the subordinate certificates, principal payments are allocated
sequentially. The performance tests include a "Minimum Credit
Enhancement Test" which measures the credit enhancement to the
senior certificates and a "Step-Down Test" that measures the levels
of delinquencies and losses on the collateral. If these tests are
breached, scheduled and/or unscheduled principal amounts will be
distributed to the senior certificates only. Compared to a shifting
interest structure where the subordinate bonds are locked out of
unscheduled payments for five years, this structure benefits the
subordinates bonds through principal payments on the bonds when the
performance tests are met.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, its assessment of the representations and warranties
framework of the transaction, the due diligence findings of the
third party reviews received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


FREED ABS 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes (the Notes) issued by FREED ABS Trust 2018-1
(FREED 2018-1):

-- $222,150,000 Class A Notes at A (sf)
-- $34,200,000 Class B Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $13,650,000 Class C Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

(1) The transaction's form and sufficiency of available credit
enhancement.

-- Subordination, overcollateralization, amounts held in the
Reserve Fund and excess spread create credit enhancement levels
that are commensurate with the proposed ratings.

-- Transaction cash flows are sufficient to repay investors under
all A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (high) (sf) stress scenarios in
accordance with the terms of the FREED 2018-1 transaction
documents.

(2) Structural features of the transaction that require the Notes
to enter into full turbo principal amortization if certain triggers
are breached or if credit enhancement deteriorates.

(3) The experience, underwriting and servicing capabilities of
Freedom Financial Asset Management, LLC.

(4) The experience, underwriting and origination capabilities of
Cross River Bank.

(5) The ability of Portfolio Financial Servicing Company to perform
duties as a Backup Servicer.

(6) The legal structure and legal opinions that address the true
sale of the personal loans, the non-consolidation of the trust,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance."


GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: Moody's Hikes Class B5 Debt Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 18 tranches
from Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1. This transaction is a
securitization of fixed rate mortgage loans with an original term
to maturity of 30 years. The loans were sourced from multiple
originators and acquired by GMRF Mortgage Acquisition Company LLC
(Galton). Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing is the servicer of the
loans in the pool while Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the Master
Servicer.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. AX11, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX12, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX31, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A31, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A32, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX32, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX33, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A33, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. BX2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. BX1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. BX3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. X3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a decrease in Moody's
projected pool losses. The actions reflect the strong performance
of the underlying pool. As of May 2018, there were minimal serious
delinquencies (loans 60 days or more delinquent) in the underlying
pool.

Further, high voluntary prepayment rates since issuance resulted in
fast pay downs and increases in percentage credit enhancement
levels for the upgraded bonds. As of May 2018, the 3-month average
prepayment rates for the underlying pool averaged approximately 21%
with the pool factor at 69.7%.

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility as fewer loans remain in pool ("tail risk"). The
transaction provides for a credit enhancement floor of $
$6,363,861.98 to the senior bonds which mitigates tail risk by
protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, its assessment of the representations and warranties
framework of the transaction, the due diligence findings of the
third party reviews received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

The principal methodology used in rating Galton Funding Mortgage
Trust 2017-1 Cl. A33 , Cl. A31 , Cl. A32, Cl. B1, Cl. B2 , Cl. B3 ,
Cl. B4 and Cl. B5 was "Moody's Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS"
published in February 2015. The methodologies used in rating Galton
Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1 Cl. AX32 ,Cl. AX33 , Cl. X3 , Cl.
AX11 , Cl. AX12,Cl. AX13 ,Cl. AX31 , Cl. BX1 , Cl. BX2 and Cl. BX3
were "Moody's Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in
February 2015 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities " published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


GARRISON BSL 2018-1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $7MM Cl. F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to nine classes of
notes issued by Garrison BSL CLO 2018-1 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$2,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$177,380,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$57,620,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-3 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$19,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$7,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class A-3 Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D
Notes, the Class E Notes, and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Garrison 2018-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 7.5% of
the portfolio may consist of second-lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is approximately 87% ramped as of the closing date.

Garrison BSL CLO 2018-1 Manager LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's two year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2852

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2852 to 3280)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class A-3 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2852 to 3708)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class A-3 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3




GLS AUTO 2018-2: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to GLS Auto Receivables
Issuer Trust 2018-2's $299.39 million automobile receivables-backed
notes series 2018-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 51.27%, 41.43%, 32.61% and
25.85% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including
excess spread). These credit support levels provide coverage of
approximately 2.50x, 2.00x, 1.55x, and 1.22x S&P's 19.50%-20.50%%
expected cumulative net loss (ECNL) for the class A, B, C, and D
notes, respectively.

-- S&P said, "The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario (1.55x our expected loss level), all else being equal, our
rating on the class A and B notes will remain within one rating
category of the assigned 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings and our
rating on the class C notes will remain within two rating
categories of the assigned 'BBB (sf)' rating." The class D notes
will remain within two rating categories of the assigned 'BB- (sf)'
rating during the first year but will eventually default under the
'BBB' stress scenario. These rating movements are within the limits
specified by our credit stability criteria.

-- S&P's analysis of over four years of origination static pool
data and securitization performance data on Global Lending
Services' (GLS') four Rule 144A securitizations.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction, including the representation in
the transaction documents that all contracts in the pool have made
at least one payment.

-- The notes' underlying credit enhancement in the form of
subordination, overcollateralization (O/C), a reserve account, and
excess spread for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made to the notes
under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which it
believes are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust 2018-2

  Class       Rating          Type            Interest    Amount
                                              Rate        (mil. $)
  A           AA (sf)         Senior          Fixed        176.69
  B           A (sf)          Subordinate     Fixed         52.84
  C           BBB (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed         39.59
  D           BB- (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed         30.27


GOLDENTREE LOAN XII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
X-R, A-R, A-J-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes
from GoldenTree Loan Opportunities XII Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in July 2016 that is managed by
GoldenTree Asset Management L.P. The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels. The
preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 22, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 23, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- The replacement class X-R, A-R, A-J-R, C-R, and D-R are
expected to be issued at a lower spread than the original notes.

-- The class A-R and A-J-R notes will replace the original class
A-1 notes.

-- The replacement class B-1-R and B-2-R will replace the original
class A-2 notes. The class B-1-R notes are expected to be issued at
a lower floating spread, and the class B-2-R notes are expected to
be issued at a fixed coupon.

-- A new class E-R notes will be issued.

-- The par amount rated by S&P Global Ratings will increase to
$356.50 million from $246.80 million as it only rated the class A
notes from the original transaction. There will be no change to the
target initial par amount of $400.00 million. The first payment
date following the refinancing will be Oct. 21, 2018.

-- The issuer will extend the reinvestment period to July 21,
2023, from Jan. 21, 2021.

-- The issuer will extend the weighted average life test to July
21, 2027, from Oct. 21, 2024.

-- The issuer will extend the legal final maturity date on the
rated and income notes to July 21, 2031, from April 21, 2027.

-- The issuer will issue additional class X floating-rate notes,
which are expected to be paid using proceeds in quarterly
installments beginning January 2019.

-- The issuer will change the required minimum thresholds for the
coverage tests.

-- The issuer will incorporate the recovery rate methodology and
updated industry classifications outlined in our August 2016 CLO
criteria update.

-- 92.41% of the underlying collateral obligations have credit
ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- 98.38% of the underlying collateral obligations have recovery
ratings issued by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  GoldenTree Loan Opportunities XII Ltd.
  Replacement class        Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  X-R                      AAA (sf)                5.00
  A-R                      AAA (sf)              245.00
  A-J-R                    NR                     15.00
  B-1-R                    AA (sf)                16.50
  B-2-R                    AA (sf)                15.00
  C-R                      A (sf)                 34.20
  D-R                      BBB- (sf)              24.30
  E-R                      BB- (sf)               16.50
  Subordinated notes       NR                     41.35

  NR--Not rated.


GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC3: DBRS Hikes Rating on Class F to BB(high)
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded four classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2011-GC3 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust, Series 2011-GC3 as follows:

-- Class D to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class X to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the ratings of three classes as follows:

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AAA (sf)

DBRS has assigned a Positive trend for classes D, E, X, and F. All
other trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the continued strong performance of the
transaction, which has experienced collateral reduction of 49.3%
since issuance, with 35 of the original 57 loans remaining in the
pool as of the May 2018 remittance report. The majority of the
remaining loans in the pool were structured with ten-year terms and
will mature in 2020 and 2021. A total of 12 loans, representing
15.5% of the pool, including four of the top 15 loans, are fully
defeased. Loans representing 58.3% of the pool reported YE2017
financials. These loans reported a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 2.05 times (x) and
16.4%, respectively.

As of the May 2018 remittance, there were five loans, representing
34.7% of the pool, on the servicer's watch list and no loans in
special servicing. All five loans on the watch list are being
monitored for deferred maintenance. At issuance, DBRS assigned an
investment-grade shadow rating on Oxford Valley Mall (Prospectus ID
#7), representing 8.7% of the pool. DBRS has confirmed that the
performance of this loan remains consistent with investment-grade
loan characteristics. For additional information on this loan,
please see the loan commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for
which information is provided below.

Class X is an interest-only (IO) certificate that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

All ratings will be subject to ongoing surveillance, which could
result in ratings being upgraded, downgraded, placed under review,
confirmed or discontinued by DBRS.

The ratings assigned to Classes D, E, X and F materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviations are warranted given loan-level
event risk.


GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ9: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class X-B Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-GCJ9, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-GCJ9 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the eight P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.6% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating GS Mortgage Securities Trust
2012-GCJ9, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-AB, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E
and Cl. F were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating GS Mortgage Securities Trust
2012-GCJ9, Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B, were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $1.1 billion
from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 67 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 58.6% of the pool. Ten loans, constituting
5.1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

Thirteen loans, constituting 25.8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans that have been liquidated from the pool. Three
loans, constituting 1.9% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by office and
lodging property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $13 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (62% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2016 and full or partial 2017 operating
results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and
defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96.4%,
compared to 93.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 8.9% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.65X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.68X and 1.15X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 30.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Bristol Portfolio Loan ($140 million --
12.7% of the pool), which is secured by two multifamily properties
located at 200 East 65th Street and 336 East 71st Street in New
York City. The property on 200 East 65th Street, also known as
Bristol Plaza, contains 297 residential condominiums, medical
office and retail space, of which 173 condominium units and the
commercial space serve as collateral for the loan. The property at
336 East 71st Street is a 30-unit apartment building built in 1910.
As of December 2017 the portfolio was 98% occupied, compared to 82%
as of December 2016. The loan is interest only for the full term.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.04X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Pinnacle I Loan ($127.7 million --
11.6% of the pool), which is secured by a Class A, six-story,
393,000 square foot (SF) office building that includes a four-level
sub-grade parking garage located in Burbank, California. The
largest tenants include; Warner Music Group (50% of NRA; lease
expiration December 2019) and Clear Channel Communications (19% of
NRA; lease expiration July 2027). As per the December 2017 rent
roll, the property was 97% leased, compared to 100% leased as of
March 2017. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 111.9% and
0.92X, respectively, compared to 113.1% and 0.91X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Jamaica Center Loan ($72.9 million --
6.6% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold interest in a
3-story mixed-use complex containing 215,806 SF located in Jamaica
Queens, NY. The improvements were constructed in 2002 and contain
95,295 SF of retail space, 83,000 SF of theater space, and 37,511
SF of office space. In addition, there is a two-level, below grade
parking garage providing 375 parking spaces. As per the March 2018
rent roll the property was 88% leased, compared to 100% leased as
of December 2016. The loan benefits from amortization and has
amortized 10% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 96.4% and 1.00X, respectively, compared to 91.5% and 1.05X at
the last review.


HALCYON LOAN 2018-1: Moody's Rates $19MM Class D Notes 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2018-1 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$306,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$59,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$29,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$19,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Halcyon 2018-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 95% ramped as of the closing
date.

Halcyon Loan Advisors 2018-1 LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $475,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2767

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


HERTZ VEHICLE 2018-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
medium-term notes issued by Hertz Vehicle Financing II LP:

-- Series 2018-2, Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2018-2, Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Series 2018-2, Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2018-2, Class D Notes at BB (sf)

-- Series 2018-3, Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2018-3, Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Series 2018-3, Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2018-3, Class D Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement in the transaction is dynamic, depending on
the composition of the vehicles in the fleet and certain market
value tests.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities to effectively manage
rental car operations and disposition of the fleet to the extent
necessary.

-- Collateral credit quality and residual value performance.

-- The legal structure and its consistency with the DBRS "Legal
Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology and the presence
of legal opinions (to be provided) that address the treatment of
the operating lease as a true lease, the non-consolidation of the
special-purpose vehicles with Hertz Corporation and its affiliates
as well as that the trust has a valid first-priority security
interest in the assets.


HERTZ VEHICLE II 2018-2: Fitch Rates $12.94MM Class D Notes 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
the series 2018-2 and series 2018-3 ABS notes issued by Hertz
Vehicle Financing II LP (HVF II):

HVF II, Series 2018-2

  -- $153,712,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35,365,000 class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,923,000 class C notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,944,000 class D notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,592,000 class RR notes 'NRsf'.

HVF II, Series 2018-3

  -- $153,890,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35,173,000 class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10,937,000 class C notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,194,000 class D notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,608,000 class RR notes 'NRsf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Diverse Vehicle Fleet: HVF II is deemed diverse under Fitch's
criteria due to the high degree of OEM, model, segment and
geographic diversification in Hertz and Dollar Thrifty's rental
fleets. Concentration limits, based on a number of characteristics,
are present to help mitigate the risk of individual OEM
bankruptcies or failure to honor repurchase agreement obligations.

Fluctuating Fleet Performance: Hertz's fleet depreciation has been
volatile since 2014 for risk vehicles and remains elevated due to
weaker residual values, particularly for compact cars. Despite
this, vehicle disposition losses have been minimal. Fitch has taken
recent performance into account and adjusted the risk depreciation
assumption higher to 2.0%.

OEM Financial Stability: OEMs with PV concentrations in HVF II have
all improved their financial position in recent years and are well
positioned to meet repurchase agreement obligations. Fitch affirmed
the Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of Nissan, the largest OEM in HVF
II, at 'BBB+' in October 2017 and upgraded the IDR for Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles N.V., the third largest OEM, to 'BB' in
December 2017.

Enhancement Versus Expected Losses: Credit enhancement (CE) is
dynamic and based on the fleet mix, with maximum and minimum
required levels. The levels for the series cover or are well within
range of Fitch's maximum and minimum expected loss levels. Fitch's
expected losses for risk vehicles have increased due to the
adjustment to the risk vehicle depreciation assumptions.

Structural Features Mitigate Risk: Vehicle market

value/disposition proceeds tests, amortization triggers and events
of default all mitigate risks stemming from ongoing vehicle value
volatility and weakness, ensuring parity between asset values and
ongoing market conditions, resulting in low historical fleet
disposition losses and stable depreciation rates.

Adequate Fleet Servicer and Fleet Management: Hertz is deemed an
adequate servicer and administrator, as evidenced by its historical
fleet management and securitization performance to date. Automotive
Solutions, Inc. (Fiserv) is the backup disposition agent, while
Lord Securities Corporation (Lord Securities) is the backup
administrator.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
provides that a bankruptcy of Hertz would not impair the timeliness
of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's rating sensitivity analysis focuses on two scenarios
involving potentially extreme market disruptions that would force
the agency to redefine its stress assumptions. The first examines
the effect of moving Fitch's bankruptcy/liquidation timing scenario
to eight months at 'AAAsf' with subsequent increases to each rating
level. The second considers the effect of moving the disposition
stresses to the higher end of the range at each rating level for a
diverse fleet. For example, the 'AAAsf' stress level would move
from 24% to 28%. Finally, the last example shows the impact of both
stresses on the structure. The purpose of these stresses is to
demonstrate the potential rating impact on a transaction if one or
a combination of these scenarios occurs.

Fitch determined ratings by applying expected loss levels for
various rating scenarios until the proposed CE exceeded the
expected losses from the sensitivity. For all sensitivity
scenarios, the class A notes show little sensitivity under each of
the scenarios with potential downgrades only occurring under the
combined stress scenario. Two-notch to one-level downgrades would
occur to the subordinate notes under each scenario with greater
sensitivity to the disposition stress scenario. Under the combined
scenario, the subordinate notes would be placed under greater
stress and could experience multiple-level downgrades.


HPS LOAN 12-2018: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to HPS Loan Management
12-2018 Ltd./HPS Loan Management 12-2018 LLC's $430.75 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  HPS Loan Management 12-2018 Ltd. /HPS Loan Management 12-2018
  LLC  
  Class                 Rating           Amount
                                     (mil. $)
  A1A                   AAA (sf)         287.50
  A1B                   NR                22.50
  A2                    AA (sf)           52.50
  B                     A (sf)            42.50
  C                     BBB- (sf)         30.75
  D                     BB- (sf)          17.50
  Subordinated notes    NR                57.30

  NR--Not rated.


HPS LOAN 9-2016: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1AR, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from HPS Loan
Management 9-2016 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2016 that is managed by HPS Investment
Partners LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 25,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Aug. 2, 2018 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
our ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-1AR, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes are
expected to be issued at a lower spread than the original notes.

-- The stated maturity will be extended by three years.

-- The reinvestment period will be extended by 2.5 years.

-- The non-call period will be extended by two years.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  HPS Loan Management 9-2016, Ltd.   
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1AR                     AAA (sf)            451.875
  A-1BR                     NR                   28.125
  A-2R                      AA (sf)              76.500
  B-R                       A (sf)               58.500
  C-R                       BBB- (sf)            45.000
  D-R                       BB- (sf)             30.000
  Subordinated notes        NR                   71.705
  
  NR--Not rated.


ICG US 2018-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $18.2MM Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by ICG US CLO 2018-2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$49,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$18,400,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$26,200,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$18,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

ICG 2018-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second-lien loans and unsecured
loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 80% ramped
as of the closing date.

ICG Debt Advisors LLC - Manager Series will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.


IMSCI 2014-5: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Institutional Mortgage
Securities Canada Inc.'s (IMSCI) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2014-5. All currencies are denominated in
Canadian dollars (CAD).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Limited Changes in Loss Expectations Since Issuance: The overall
pool performance has been stable since Fitch's last rating action.
The ratings reflect strong Canadian commercial real estate loan
performance including positive loan attributes such as short
amortization schedules, recourse to the borrower, and additional
guarantors. Of the remaining pool, 83.32% of the loans feature full
or partial recourse to the borrowers and/or sponsors. The pool has
no delinquent or specially serviced loans. There are nine loans
(25.18%) on the servicer's watch list; four loans (18%) are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern due to declines in performance
and/or upcoming maturity. However, Fitch considered the significant
recourse to the borrowers in its analysis.

Increase in Credit Enhancement: As of the May 2018 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced
29.93% from $311.8 million at issuance to $218.5 million with 31
loans remaining. There are no full or partial interest only loans
in the pool. As the A-1 class continues to amortize, Fitch expects
a modest improvement in credit enhancement. However, given the pool
concentrations including energy market exposure, future upgrades
may be limited.

Pool Concentrations: The transaction is concentrated with only 31
loans remaining. The top 10 and 15 loans (including crossed loans)
account for 62.89% and 80.76% of the pool, respectively. Retail
properties back 50.82% of the pool while multifamily loans comprise
21.54% of the pool. There is sponsor concentration with two crossed
and seven other loans (14.8%) sponsored by Skyline REIT and three
loans backed by Alberta properties (12.46%) with the same sponsor
group, Lanesborough REIT (LREIT) and related entities. The pool has
22 properties (70.97%) located in Ontario; however, Ontario is
Canada's most populous province and accounts for approximately 40%
of the country's population and GDP.

Energy Market Exposure: The pool has three loans (12.46%) backed by
multifamily properties in Alberta, three of which are in the top 15
(11.77%). The market has experienced volatility from the energy
sector in the past few years. The two largest are located in
Calgary and have experienced declining occupancy. The pari passu
Nelson Ridge Pooled Loan (3%), secured by a 225-unit multifamily
property in Fort McMurray, AB, was transferred to special servicing
in early 2016 due to a decrease in operating performance. Prior to
the transfer, the property operations were affected by the decline
in oil prices and reached an occupancy of only 45% in 2015.
Subsequently, the property was affected by the area wildfires in
May 2016. However, the loan returned to master servicing in January
2017 and is current and occupancy has increased to 76.5% as of
April 2018. The loan matures in December 2018. Although losses
remain unlikely as these loans have full recourse to the borrower,
sponsor and manager, the base case losses reflect actual
performance. Fitch performed an additional sensitivity test which
assumed higher losses on the two loans backed by the properties in
Calgary to address potential further declines in performance. The
Negative Outlook on class G reflects these concerns, as well as the
deal concentrations and small class size of the non-rated class.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class G remains Negative. A downgrade could
be possible if the volatility in energy markets has a prolonged
impact on Fitch Loans of Concern and performance continues to
decline and impacts the ability for loans to refinance. However,
any potential losses could be mitigated by loan recourse
provisions. The Rating Outlooks on the senior classes remain Stable
as the classes have benefited from an increase in credit
enhancement from loan payoffs though upgrades may be limited as the
pool is becoming more concentrated.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $58.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $119 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.2 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.4 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.2 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.1 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.1 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X or the non-offered
$5.8 million class H certificate.


INDEPENDENCE PLAZA 2018-INDP: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on HRR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-INDP to
be issued by Independence Plaza Trust 2018-INDP:

-- Class A at AAA(sf)
-- Class X-CP at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-ECP at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-ENP at B (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

All classes other than Class HRR will be privately placed. The
X-CP, X-NCP, X-ECP and X-ENP balances are notional. Classes X-CP
and X-NCP reference Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D. Classes
X-ECP and Class X-ENP reference Class E and Class HRR.

The collateral for the transaction consists of the fee and
leasehold interests in a 1.5 million sf mixed-use residential and
commercial complex located in the Tribeca neighborhood of Manhattan
in New York City. The property consists of three 39-story apartment
towers and connecting townhomes in addition to commercial space.
The towers are at 310 Greenwich Street, 40 Harrison Street and 80
North Moore Street. The fee interest covers the entire property,
while the leasehold interests relate to three parcels – the South
Podium, North Podium and Tower Development – which contain a mix
of parking, retail and apartment units. Collateral for the loan
consists of both the fee and leasehold interests that cover these
three parcels, with the fee owner signing the mortgage loan
documents. Loan proceeds of $675 million are being used to retire
outstanding debt of $551.6 million ($444.0 million commercial
mortgage-backed security mortgage loan securitized in BAMLL 2014-IP
and $110.0 million mezzanine loan), return $112.8 million of equity
to the sponsor and cover closing costs of $10.6 million.

The three 39-story towers soar above many surrounding low-rise
structures in Tribeca, providing tremendous city views as well as
great views of the Hudson River, depending on the unit. Adjacent to
the property to the north is Citigroup Inc.'s world headquarters
and Washington Square Park is directly to the south. It is within
blocks of the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. world headquarters, the
World Financial Center and Tribeca Film Center. In addition, the
financial district is within walking distance from the subject and
the property is serviced by a reputable public elementary school
and an abundance of trendy restaurants, cafes and boutiques. The
subject is conveniently located proximate to public transportation,
with access to the A, C and E lines as well as the 1, 2 and 3
trains at the Chambers Street station roughly three blocks south of
the asset and a Metropolitan Transportation Authority bus stop two
blocks east of the collateral.

The property was originally built in 1975 under the Mitchell-Lama
Housing Program, an affordable housing initiative for lower- and
middle-income families offered through tax breaks and subsidized
mortgages. The property exited the program in June 2004, at which
time the borrower offered the Landlord Assistance Program (LAP) to
any tenants who did not qualify for the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development's Section 8 Enhanced Voucher program (Section
8). The LAP provides an initial below-market rent and annual rent
increases based on the New York City Rent Guidelines Board index
plus a supplemental growth factor. The strategy for the building is
to substantially renovate and roll to market rents both the Section
8 units and the LAP units as they become available. Since exiting
the program in 2004, the borrower has invested $58.1 million in
renovations to all apartments and has converted 671 units
(including units currently vacant and in the process of being
renovated), or 50.7% of the residential unit count, into
market-rate apartments. Additionally, the borrower overhauled all
three lobbies, installed new windows and boilers throughout and
added a gym and a children's playroom at a total cost of $36.6
million. By offering a combination of affordable housing (26.1%
Section 8 units and 23.1% LAP) as well as market rent units
(50.5%), the property draws in an eclectic mix of old and young,
singles and family residents and provides a sense of community in a
very urban, affluent neighborhood.

Although there is upside in the attrition of Section 8 units upon
renovation, the significant value boost is when LAP units are
vacated. The LAP provided tenants with below-market rent upon the
property's exit of the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program and while
those units started off lagging the market rent initially, they
continue to do so today. The LAP units are and have historically
been subject to the New York Rent Guidelines Board index annual
rent bumps (plus a supplemental growth factor), but the
programmatic increases have never caught up to the market rents
achievable in Tribeca. There has been nominal attrition in the LAP
units historically; however, the appraiser is expecting this to
increase if the regulated rental rate increases continue to exceed
the inflation rate. DBRS assumed a 2.7% New York Rent Guidelines
Board index annual rent bump, which is equivalent to the 15-year
average increase going back to 2003, plus a supplemental growth
factor annually until loan maturity.

Management has been able to further increase value by renovating
rent-regulated apartments that are vacated and re-leasing them at
market rents following a significant renovation. They intend to
continue this strategy as these units turn over. In order to
compete with the more luxurious products in the Tribeca submarket,
the unit renovations are substantial. The kitchens and bathrooms
have been completely overhauled with new stainless-steel
appliances, cabinetry and tile work, and the rest of the units have
received new flooring, new lighting and base and crown molding,
among other items. Since January 2015 and as of May 2018,
management had renovated 91 apartments, increasing the total
renovated unit count to 671. With that said, unrenovated units
could vary in condition depending on the degree to which the
tenants care for them and their average stay. Based on the
unrenovated unit inspected by DBRS, a major gut rehab is necessary
prior to re-tenanting. Although no reserves have been set aside to
complete ongoing unit renovations once units do become available,
DBRS did not give credit to the potential turning over of units.
Furthermore, based on the DBRS net cash flow (NCF) and the
resulting DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.49
times (x), the subject is generating a significant amount of excess
cash flow that could be used to fund renovations. Since the prior
loan was securitized in June 2014, 43 units have been converted
from LAP to fair market and 78 units have been converted from
Section 8 to fair market. The total share of fair market units has
grown to 50.7% from 39.6%.

In addition to the apartments, DBRS considers there to be
substantial upside in the existing retail space. Vornado Realty
Trust is an experienced retail landlord and one of the largest in
Manhattan. Plans have been discussed to alter the streetscape of
the existing ground-floor space, including signage, lighting and
seating, to maximize the rents of the rolling retail leases while
improving the overall feel of the subject to help transform it to a
luxury product consistent with the renovated apartment units. This
would not only increase the revenue generated from the square
footage but would improve the overall impression of the subject.
Market rents for retail along Greenwich Street are reported to be
approximately $185 per square foot (psf) to $250 psf, per a
borrower representative; however, this exceeds the overall average
rent identified by the appraiser of $155 psf for grade-level
retail. Either way, both reports lead to the same conclusion that
the current rents at the subject, ranging from $7.52 psf to $142.38
psf, are below market. While a renovation and re-programming of the
retail footprint may indeed bring tenants who better complement the
upscale fair market tenant base, the loan has been structured in a
way that eliminates the upside potential from a credit perspective.
The three leasehold parcels, which contain all of the retail and
parking, can be released subject to the repayment of a portion of
the loan based on a release price formula anchored essentially to
the greater of in-place cash flow attributable to the released
parcel or the cash flow of such parcel at the time of release. As
such, the borrower would be incentivized to release the parcels
prior to re-stabilization and leverage them separately. DBRS gave
no NCF or sizing credit to the upside potential associated with the
retail and parking components.

The DBRS value of $644.6 million is a 49.8% discount to the
appraised value of $1.285 billion. The appraisal assumes that
approximately 18 Section 8 apartments and approximately eight LAP
apartments, or 5.0% per year, will turn over per year in its
analysis. This turnover rate is consistent with the prior year's
turnover rates. DBRS analysis conservatively assumes that no
additional rent-regulated units turn over to market rents. DBRS
does make the assumption that the rent-regulated units do, however,
achieve estimated programmatic rent increases annually until
maturity in 2025. Given the embedded upside in the rollover of
affordable rent units, an aggressive 6.75% cap rate was used to
determine value. DBRS's value per unit of $485,753, ignoring retail
and parking space, which contribute over $7 million of base rent
and $4 million of estimated net operating income, translates to an
average psf figure of $546 psf, well below average condo sales psf
in Manhattan even after adjusting for the lower quality.

Classes X-CP, X-NCP, X-ECP, X-ENP are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

All ratings will be subject to ongoing surveillance, which could
result in ratings being upgraded, downgraded, placed under review,
confirmed or discontinued by DBRS.


JAMESTOWN CLO XI: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $8MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Jamestown CLO XI Ltd.  

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$260,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$19,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$23,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$21,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Jamestown CLO XI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 80% ramped
as of the closing date.

Investcorp Credit Management US LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 68

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2815

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.


JFIN REVOLVER 2014: S&P Affirms BB+(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class C and D notes
from JFIN Revolver CLO 2014 Ltd. S&P said, "At the same time, we
affirmed our rating on the class E notes from the same transaction.
We removed our ratings on the class C, D, and E notes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
April 27, 2017."

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the May 9, 2018, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $206.26 million in paydowns
to the class A, B, C, and D notes since our April 27, 2017, rating
actions. These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the March 8, 2017, trustee
report, which S&P used for its April 27, 2017, rating actions:

-- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 804.04% from 162.35%.
-- The class C O/C ratio improved to 218.53% from 134.71%.
-- The class D O/C ratio improved to 150.63% from 121.87%.

S&P said, "The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the
prior rating levels and the affirmation reflects our view that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
level.

"The results of the cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings on
the class D and E notes. However, our rating actions on the class D
and E notes reflect the residual portfolio's increasing proportion
of 'CCC' rated collateral obligations as well as the decline in the
portfolio's overall diversity. The top five largest obligors in the
transaction currently make up more than 43% of the portfolio's
performing collateral balance.

"Additionally, as part of our affirmation on the class E notes, we
considered that these notes continue to fund interest shortfalls on
the class C and D notes, and that the notes are not likely to
receive any interest or principal payments until the class C and D
notes are paid down in full."

There is an interest reserve account balance that was initially
intended to provide interest coverage to the class A and B notes,
but both have already been paid off in full. As the portfolio
delevers below 15% of the target initial par amount, at the sole
discretion of the portfolio manager, the remaining proceeds in the
interest reserve account may be transferred into the principal
collection account, and in turn, may be used to pay down the rated
notes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary.

  RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

  JFIN Revolver CLO 2014 Ltd.
                  Rating
  Class         To          From
  C             AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  D             A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

  RATING AFFIRMED    
  
  JFIN Revolver CLO 2014 Ltd.
  
  Class         Rating
  E             BB+ (sf)


JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class A-M Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series 2008-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Loss Expectations: Actual deal loss has increased from 16.34% to
18.1% since prior review. Fitch is currently modelling losses in
excess of $78 million. This is due largely to the specially
serviced Westin Portfolio loan. In addition, Fitch assumed a 40%
haircut on The Woodlands, a loan collateralized by a multifamily
property in St. Louis, MO. The loan transferred to special
servicing in March of 2018 due to a maturity default after the
borrower failed to close on a sale in time. As of June, the special
servicer is monitoring for full payoff; however, if the payoff does
not occur soon the strategy will be to foreclose.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Although credit enhancement for class
A-M has improved since Fitch's last rating action, the distressed
rating reflects the concentrated nature of the pool, with over 96%
of the remaining collateral in special servicing. As of the June
2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 90.27% to $113.4 million from $1.166 billion at
issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes T
through A-J. Since the last rating action in July 2017, 52 loans
totaling $499 million have been liquidated or paid in full.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only three
loans remaining, of which, two are in specially servicing and
account for approximately 96% of the pool. The largest remaining
loan, Westin Portfolio (92% of the pool) is secured by two Westin
resort hotels: the 487-room Westin La Paloma in Tucson, AZ and the
416-room oceanfront Westin Hilton Head, in Hilton Head, SC. Both
resorts offer numerous restaurants, pools and over 100,000 sf of
meeting space. The loan, which transferred to special servicing
soon after securitization (due to a borrower bankruptcy), fell
short of performance expectations as a result of the recession and
the impact it had on the hotels' performance. The loan was modified
in 2012 to a 30-year loan term, of which fixed monthly payments are
made by the present sponsor, Southwest Value Partners.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An upgrade to class A-M is possible should the loans in special
servicing get resolved with lower than expected losses, or should
the Westin portfolio stabilize, conversely a downgrade is possible
if pool performance deteriorates and/or expected losses increase
significantly.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $98.7 million class A-M at 'CCsf'; RE 25%;

  -- $14.6 million class A-J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class T at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class 'NR' is not rated.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8 commercial
pass-through certificates series 2012-C8 (JPMCC 2012-C8) and
revised Outlooks on three classes to Negative from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement; Base Case Loss Increase: The
affirmations reflect the sufficient credit enhancement relative to
the slight increase in Fitch Ratings' base case loss expectations
since the last rating action in July 2017. As of the June 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 26% to $839.4 million from $1.1 billion at issuance and
there have been no realized losses. One loan (2.8% of pool) is
fully defeased and one loan ($24.7 million) paid in full at
maturity since the last rating action in July 2017. One loan (1.6%
of pool) is specially serviced and three non-specially serviced
loans (26.3% of pool) were designated as Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs).

Fitch Loans of Concern: Three non-specially serviced loans (26.3%
of pool), all in the top 10, were designated as FLOCs due to
performance declines and/or refinance concerns.

  - Battlefield Mall (14.2% of pool), Springfield, MO, anchor
rollover concerns and potential sale or future vacancy of the
non-collateral Sears.

  - Ashford Office Complex (6.6% of pool), Houston, TX, declines in
occupancy and performance stemming from the impact of energy sector
volatility.

  - Hotel Sorella CITYCENTRE (5.5% of pool), Houston, TX, declines
in performance stemming from the impact of energy sector volatility
and new competition for the hotel.

Fitch performed an additional sensitivity test whereby a 25%, 50%
and 25% loss severity was applied to the maturity balances of the
Battlefield Mall, Ashford Office Complex and Hotel Sorella
CITYCENTRE, respectively. The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes E
through G reflect this scenario.

Specially Serviced Loan: One loan, Main Street Tower (1.6% of
pool), which is secured by an approximately 200,000-sf, Class B
high-rise office property in Norfolk, VA, was transferred to
special servicing in January 2016 for imminent monetary default.
The property has experienced cash flow shortfalls, driven by
occupancy declines from tenants vacating in 2015 prior to lease
expiration. NOI DSCR declined to 0.96x at YE 2015 and further to
0.88x at YE 2016 from 2.07x at YE 2014. It has since rebounded
slightly, reaching 1.00x at YE 2017 due to positive leasing
activity. The loan is cash managed with a hard lock box for monthly
P&I, PPAs and Special Servicing Fees. Cushman & Wakefield was
engaged in April 2018 to market the property for sale, and the
forbearance agreement was most recently extended through October
2018.

Pool/Maturity Concentrations: Thirty-seven of the original 43 loans
remain. Office, retail and mixed-use properties comprise 35.6%,
33.5% and 17.1% of the pool, respectively. Loan maturities are
concentrated in 2022 (97.5% of pool). One loan (2.5% of pool)
matures in 2020. Five loans (7.5% of pool) are full-term
interest-only. Six loans (33.1% of pool) that had a partial-term
interest-only period at issuance have all begun amortizing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks for classes A-3 through D reflect the
stable performance of the majority of the underlying pool and
expected continued paydown and increasing credit enhancement from
amortization. The Negative Rating Outlooks for classes E through G
reflect performance declines and/or refinance concerns with the
FLOCs. Fitch's analysis included a stress scenario whereby
additional losses were assumed on these loans. A 25%, 50% and 25%
loss severity was applied to the maturity balances of the
Battlefield Mall, Ashford Office Complex and Hotel Sorella
CITYCENTRE, respectively. Rating upgrades, although unlikely due to
pool concentrations, could occur with significantly improved pool
performance and additional credit enhancement through paydown or
defeasance. Rating downgrades could occur if overall pool
performance declines or the FLOCs default.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $407.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $91.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $102.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.8 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --  $44 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $35.5 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --  $32.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $15.6 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $17 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $203.2 million class EC at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class NR or interest only class X-B certificates. The
class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for a related
amount of class EC certificates, and the class EC certificates may
be exchanged for class A-S, B and C certificates.


JP MORGAN 2018-6: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating on B-5 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Trust 2018-6's $933.9 million mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The issuance is an RMBS transaction backed by prime jumbo and loans
conforming to government-sponsored entity underwriting standards.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 22,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The high-quality collateral in the pool;
-- The transaction's available credit enhancement;
-- An experienced aggregator;
-- The 100% due diligence sampling results consistent with
represented loan characteristics; and
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-6
  Class       Rating              Amount ($)

  1-A-1        AA+ (sf)           810,822,000
  1-A-2        AAA (sf)           759,068,000
  1-A-3        AAA (sf)           569,274,000
  1-A-4        AAA (sf)           448,711,000
  1-A-5        AAA (sf)           120,563,000
  1-A-6        AAA (sf)           310,357,000
  1-A-7        AAA (sf)           189,794,000
  1-A-8        AAA (sf)           151,314,000
  1-A-9        AAA (sf)            38,480,000
  1-A-10       AA+ (sf)            51,754,000
  1-AX-1       AA+ (sf)           810,822,000(i)
  2-A-1        AAA (sf)            71,041,000
  2-A-2        AAA (sf)            66,506,000
  2-A-3        AAA (sf)             4,535,000
  2-AX-1       AAA (sf)            71,041,000(i)
  A-M          AA+ (sf)            56,289,000
  B-1          AA (sf)             16,418,000
  B-2          A- (sf)             16,417,000
  B-3          BBB (sf)             9,851,000
  B-4          BB- (sf)             7,036,000
  B-5          B (sf)               2,345,000
  B-6          NR (sf)              4,222,649
  A-IO-S       NR (sf)            198,176,002(i)
  A-R          NR (sf)                      0

(i)Notional balance.
NR--Not rated.



JP MORGAN 2018-LAQ: Fitch Gives 'BB-sf' Rating on Class HRR Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-LAQ Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-LAQ.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $486,000,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $331,600,000a class X-CP 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $414,500,000a class X-EXT 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $127,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $86,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $130,000,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $111,000,000 class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $95,000,000b class HRR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of June 25, 2018.

The JPMCC 2018-LAQ Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
represent the beneficial interest in a trust that holds a $1.0
billion, two-year, floating-rate, interest-only mortgage loan with
five, one-year extension options. The loan is secured by the
borrower's fee interest in 295 properties, fee and leasehold
interest in four properties, leasehold interest in eight properties
and cash flow pledges from seven properties composing the La Quinta
Portfolio, a 40,184-room hotel portfolio with 314 locations across
41 states.

Mortgage loan proceeds were used to refinance approximately $1.0
billion of existing debt, fund upfront reserves of $15.2 million
and pay closing costs. The certificates will follow a
sequential-pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Geographic Diversity: The portfolio benefits from strong geographic
diversity across 138 distinct metropolitan areas in 41 states.
Texas has the largest state concentration with a total of 9,335
guestrooms (23.2% of total guestrooms) across 69 properties,
accounting for approximately 22.5% of the portfolio's net cash flow
(NCF) for the trailing 12-month (TTM) period ended March 2018. The
largest metropolitan concentration is within the San Antonio, TX
metropolitan area, which contains 10 properties and 1,770 keys
(4.4% of total guestrooms and 5.0% of TTM NCF).

Experienced Management: The portfolio is entirely managed by an
affiliate of Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (Wyndham) under
long-term management agreements. Wyndham is a leading provider of
hotel management services and the world's largest hotel franchising
company with a portfolio of 20 brands and nearly 9,000 franchised
hotels located in 80 different countries; including the acquisition
of La Quinta's franchising and hotel management businesses on May
31, 2018.

Single-Borrower Hotel Concentration: The transaction is secured by
314 owned hotel properties under the La Quinta and Baymont brands.
Hotel performance is considered to be more volatile due to the
operating nature.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF is 13% below the TTM ended March
2018 net cash flow. Included in Fitch's presale report are numerous
Rating Sensitivities that describe the potential impact given
further NCF declines below Fitch's NCF. Fitch evaluated the
sensitivity of the 'AAAsf' rated class and found that a 30% decline
would result in a downgrade to 'Asf'.

Fitch performed a break-even analysis to determine the amount of
value deterioration the pool could withstand prior to $1 of loss on
the 'AAAsf' rated class. The break-even value decline was performed
using both the appraisal values at issuance and the Fitch-stressed
value. Based on the as-is cumulative appraised value of $2.4
billion, break-even value represents a decline of 80.0% for the
'AAAsf' class.

Similarly, Fitch estimated the 'AAAsf' break-even value decline
using the Fitch adjusted property value of $1.3 billion, which is a
function of the Fitch NCF and a stressed capitalization rate, in
relation to the class balance. The break-even value decline
relative to the 'AAAsf' balance is 62.7%, which corresponds to an
equivalent decline to Fitch NCF, as the Fitch capitalization rate
is held constant.


KKR CLO 22: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by KKR CLO 22 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$390,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$63,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

KKR CLO 22 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2922

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


MADISON PARK XXVIII: S&P Rates $13.5MM Class F Debt 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Madison Park Funding
XXVIII Ltd./Madison Park Funding XXVIII LLC's $596.00 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Madison Park Funding XXVIII Ltd./Madison Park Funding XXVIII LLC

  Class                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)                 399.00
  A-2                    NR                        56.00
  B                      AA (sf)                   70.00
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)                    43.00
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)                 44.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                  26.50
  F (deferrable)         B- (sf)                   13.50
  Subordinated notes     NR                        60.20

  NR--Not rated.


MARINER CLO 6: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Mariner CLO
6 Ltd./Mariner CLO 6 LLC's $459 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 21,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Mariner CLO 6 Ltd./Mariner CLO 6 LLC

  Class               Rating    Interest                  Amount
                                rate                    (mil. $)
  A                   AAA (sf)  Three-month LIBOR + 1.10  310.00
  B                   AA (sf)   Three-month LIBOR + 1.68   59.50
  C (deferrable)      A (sf)    Three-month LIBOR + 1.95   40.50
  D (deferrable)      BBB- (sf) Three-month LIBOR + 2.95   27.00
  E (deferrable)      BB- (sf)  Three-month LIBOR + 6.00   22.00
  Subordinated notes  NR        N/A                        51.85

  NR--Not rated. N/A--Not applicable.


MERRILL LYNCH 2007-C1: Fitch Hikes $49MM Cl. AM Certs Rating to Bsf
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded two, and affirmed 13
classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2007-C1 (MLMT 2007-C1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement to Cover High Loss Expectations: The
upgrade to class AM is primarily due to the large paydown of
approximately $316 million from the Empirian Multifamily Portfolio
Pool 1 & 3 A-notes. Credit enhancement has improved since Fitch's
last rating action from Empirian Multifamily Portfolio paydown,
amortization and better than expected recoveries on specially
serviced loans/assets. Losses are no longer expected on class A-M.
The downgrades of classes A-J and A-JFL are due to losses realized
from the Empirian Multifamily Portfolio Pool 1 & 3 B-notes, which
took a full loss. In February 2013, both Empirian Portfolios were
modified with a bifurcation into an A and a B note with a 70/30
split.

High Concentration, Adverse Selection: The pool is concentrated
with only 12 of the original 267 loans/assets remaining. The
remaining loans consist of 34.4% retail properties and 27.4%
manufactured homes in secondary and tertiary locations. The pool
has one fully amortizing U-Haul portfolio with an ARD date of July
2019 and a final maturity date of July 2037.

Specially Serviced Loans; Fitch Loans of Concern: A majority of the
loans in pool are considered Fitch Loans of Concern at 86.7%. Ten
(76.3%) of the remaining 12 loans/assets are in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan, Columbia/Brook Park MHC Rollup
(27.4%), is secured by two manufactured housing community
properties with 1,208 pads located in Olmstead and Cleveland, Ohio.
The borrower was unsuccessful in refinancing the properties at
maturity in June 2017 and the loan transferred to the special
servicer in August 2017 due to maturity default. The borrower has
been uncooperative and the special servicer is proceeding towards
foreclosure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class AM reflects the sufficient credit
enhancement which is expected to increase from continued
amortization, expected payoffs from non-specially serviced loans,
and recoveries from specially serviced loans. Further upgrade to
the class is unlikely due to the portfolio's concentration, adverse
selection and significant percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades and assigns an Outlook to the following class:

  -- $49.0 million class AM to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades the following classes:

  -- $60.9 million class AJ to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 45%;
  -- $38.6 million class AJ-FL to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 45%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $0 class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-2FL, A-3, A-3FL, A-SB, A-4, and A-1A
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class Q and
AJ-FX certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


MERRILL LYNCH 2007-CANADA21: Moody's Hike Cl. L Certs Rating to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on seven classes
and affirmed the ratings on one class in Merrill Lynch Financial
Assets Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-Canada 21 as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 30% since Moody's last review
and 95% since securitization.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. XC, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, compared to 7.7% at the prior review. Moody's does
not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Our ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 0.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Merrill Lynch Financial
Assets Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-Canada 21, Cl. E, Cl. F, Cl. G, Cl. H, Cl. J, Cl. K, and Cl. L
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc. Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-Canada 21, Cl. XC were
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $17.2 million
from $385.2 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and the transaction has
not incurred any realized losses.

The largest remaining loan is the 550 - 11th Avenue Office Building
Loan ($9.1 million -- 53% of the pool), which is secured by an
11-story, 97,000 square feet (SF) office property located in the
financial district of downtown Calgary, Alberta. As of December
2017, the property was 59% leased compared to 43% as of December
2016 and 76% leased in December 2015. Due to the downturn in
Calgary's office market following the decline for the energy
sector, the property's occupancy had steadily decreased between
2012 and 2016. A loan modification in February 2018 included a
principal pay down of nearly $6 million, and the maturity date was
extended to September 2020 with a new 20-year amortization period.
The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to the low
occupancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 129% and 0.80X at the last review.

The other remaining loan is the La Tour Dauteuil Loan ($8.1 million
-- 47% of the pool), which is secured by a 156-unit multi-family
housing complex located in Downtown Montreal, Quebec. This property
is located close to Dawson College, LaSalle College, Atwater Metro
Station, and Place Alexis Nihon Shopping Center. As of March 2018,
the property was 98% occupied compared to 95% as of February 2017.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.25X, respectively,
compared to 76% and 1.21X at the last review.


MILL CITY 2018-2: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on $17.1MM Cl. B2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2018-2 (the Notes) issued by Mill City Mortgage
Loan Trust 2018-2 (the Trust) as follows:

-- $202.9 million Class A1A at AAA (sf)
-- $50.7 million Class A1B at AAA (sf)
-- $253.6 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $302.2 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $329.5 million Class A3 at A (sf)
-- $352.8 million Class A4 at BBB (sf)
-- $48.6 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $27.4 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $23.2 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $19.9 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class B2 at B (sf)

Classes A1, A2, A3 and A4 are exchangeable notes. These classes can
be exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as specified in the
offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 42.10% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 31.00%,
24.75%, 19.45%, 14.90% and 11.00% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of primarily
first-lien, seasoned, performing and re-performing residential
mortgages and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) mortgage loans
funded by the issuance of asset-backed notes. The Notes are backed
by 2,847 loans with a total principal balance of approximately
$437,940,190 as of the Cut-Off Date (May 31, 2018).

The loans are approximately 125 months seasoned. As of the Cut-Off
Date, 99.0% of the pool is current, 0.9% is 30 days delinquent and
0.2% is 60 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association
delinquency method. Forty-four loans (1.4% of the pool) are in
bankruptcy (all bankruptcy loans are performing, except for one
loan, which is 60 days delinquent). Approximately 54.6% of the pool
has been zero times 30 (0 x 30) days delinquent for the past 24
months, 73.0% has been 0 x 30 for the past 12 months and 81.9% has
been 0 x 30 for the past six months.

Modified loans comprise 66.2% of the portfolio. The modifications
happened more than two years ago for 80.7% of the modified loans.
Within the pool, 766 loans have non-interest-bearing deferred
amounts, which equates to 6.7% of the total principal balance.
Included in the deferred amounts are Home Affordable Modification
Program principal reduction alternative amounts, which comprise
less than 0.1% of the total principal balance. In accordance with
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Qualified Mortgage (QM)
rules, 8.6% of the loans are designated as QM Safe Harbor, 0.1% as
QM Rebuttable Presumption and 1.7% as non-QM (including one loan
for which the QM designation is not available). Approximately 89.5%
of the loans are not subject to the QM rules.

Approximately 2.8% of the pool comprises first-lien HELOCs. These
loans have a fixed credit limit for a 120-month draw period and
then amortize for the remaining 240 months subject to a decreasing
credit limit. HELOC borrowers may make draws on their mortgage up
to the credit limit until maturity, which will increase the current
principal balance of such loans. Approximately 5.8% of the pool
comprises non-first-lien loans.

As of the Closing Date, Mill City Depositor, LLC (the Depositor)
will fund a HELOC Draw Reserve Account to purchase future draws
from the related services.

Through a series of transactions, Mill City Holdings, LLC (Mill
City) will acquire the mortgage loans on the Closing Date. Prior to
the Closing Date, the loans were held in one or more trusts that
acquired the mortgage loans between August 2013 and April 2018.
Such trusts are entities of which the Representation Provider or an
affiliate thereof holds an indirect interest. Upon acquiring the
loans, Mill City, through a wholly owned subsidiary (the
Depositor), will contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor,
Mill City, through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and
retain a 5.0% eligible vertical interest in each class of
securities to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to
satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. These loans were originated and previously serviced by
various entities through purchases in the secondary market. As of
the Cut-Off Date, the loans are serviced by Shell point Mortgage
Servicing, LLC (79.0%); Fay Servicing, LLC (16.2%); and Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (4.8%).

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M2 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Note holders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially, and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

A satisfactory third-party due diligence review was performed on
the portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance, payment
history and data capture as well as a title and lien review.
Updated broker price opinions or exterior appraisals were provided
for 100.0% of the pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed
on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
provider (CVI CVF III Lux Master S.à.r.l.), certain knowledge
qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS
criteria for seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1)
significant loan seasoning and relative clean performance history
in recent years, (2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including a
delinquency review trigger and a breach reserve account.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


MILL CITY 2018-2: Fitch Rates Class B2 Notes 'B-sf'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2 (MCMLT 2018-2) as
follows:

  -- $202,854,000 class A1A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50,713,000 class A1B notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48,611,000 class M1 notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27,371,000 class M2 notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,211,000 class M3 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19,927,000 class B1 notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17,079,000 class B2 notes 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $253,567,000 class A1 exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $302,178,000 class A2 exchangeable notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $329,549,000 class A3 exchangeable notes 'A-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $352,760,000 class A4 exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

  -- $8,759,000 class B3 notes;

  -- $19,707,000 class B4 notes;

  -- $19,708,189 class B5 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
2,847 seasoned re-performing mortgages with a total balance of
approximately $438.05 million (which includes $29.3 million, or
6.7%, of the aggregate pool balance in non-interest-bearing
deferred principal amounts) as of the statistical calculation
date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A1A and A1B notes reflects the
42.10% subordination provided by the 11.10% class M1, 6.25% class
M2, 5.30% class M3, 4.55% class B1, 3.90% class B2, 2.00% class B3,
4.50% class B4 and 4.50% class B5 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral; the quality of the servicers: Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) rated 'RPS1-', Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (Shellpoint) and Fay Servicing, LLC (Fay), both rated
'RSS3+'; the representation (rep) and warranty framework; minimal
due diligence findings and the sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as "clean current" (57.6%), and
loans that are current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete
paystrings, identified as "dirty current" (39.2%). Additionally, 1%
of the loans are 30 or 60 days delinquent; 66.2% of the loans
received modifications. Fitch excluded any delinquencies caused by
servicing transfer issue.

Due Diligence Findings (Negative): The third-party review (TPR)
firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 602 loans
(21% by loan count) graded 'C' and 'D'. While the percentage of
loans graded 'C' and 'D' for compliance is high compared with the
industry average, most of the exceptions do not carry assignee
liability and did not warrant a loss adjustment. Adjustments were
made to account for an indeterminate HUD1, the missing modification
agreement, the missing servicing comment review, ATR risk and the
missing compliance review. The overall impact of all due diligence
adjustments is 175bps at the 'AAAsf' loss level.

Historical Performance (Positive): CarVal has issued seven
re-performing RMBS from its Mill City Mortgage Trust shelf since
December 2015. Overall, the MCMLT transactions have been performing
well compared with their cohort. Delinquencies and losses to date
have been low compared with other RPL transactions rated by Fitch.

Inclusion of Loans with Ability-to-Repay (ATR) Issues (Negative):
The due diligence review resulted in 13 loans in the pool (1% by
loan count) with issues regarding ATR compliance. All of these
borrowers have fixed-rate mortgages and have been current for the
life of the loan. All but three loans were underwritten to full
documentation. For the 10 full documentation loans, given that the
borrower's payment will not change and has been paying for the life
of the loan, there is a very unlikely chance the borrower's
challenge to the ability-to-pay rule would hold up in court. No
adjustment was applied to these loans. However, for the three
non-full documentation loans, a 300% loss severity (LS) was applied
to account for the possibility of legal costs to the trust due to a
challenge.

Servicing Fee Stress (Negative): Fitch determined that the
servicing fee may be insufficient to attract subsequent servicers
under a period of poor performance and high delinquencies. To
account for the potentially higher fee needed to obtain a
subsequent servicer, Fitch's cash flow analysis assumed a 60bp
servicing fee for investment-grade rating stresses, which resulted
in higher credit enhancement requirements.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $29.3 million (6.7% of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 766 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited
relative to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

R&W Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the representation,
warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct for this
transaction to be generally consistent with a Tier 2 framework due
to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers without clawback
provision, limited life of the rep provider and weak enforcement
mechanism. CVI CVF III Lux Master S.a.r.l., as rep provider, will
only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to breaches prior to the
payment date in July 2019. Thereafter, a reserve fund will be
available to cover amounts due to noteholders for loans identified
as having material rep breaches. Fitch applied a breach reserve
account credit to account for the initial deposit, which lowered
Fitch's loss expectations by approximately 25bps.

For 50 loans that are seasoned less than 24 months, Fitch viewed
the framework as Tier 3 because the reps related to the origination
and underwriting of the loan, which are typically expected for
newly originated loans, were not included. Thus, Fitch increased
its 'AAAsf' loss expectations by approximately 267bps to account
for a potential increase in defaults and losses arising from
weaknesses in the reps.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Neutral): The servicers will not advance
delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces liquidity to the
trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become
delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to
the trust, the loan-level LS is less for this transaction than for
those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural
provisions and cash flow priorities, together with increased
subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): A review
to confirm that the mortgage and subsequent assignments were
recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction was performed. The
review confirmed that all mortgages and subsequent assignments were
recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction or were being
recorded.

While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, the obligation of CVI CVF III Lux
Master S.a.r.l. to repurchase loans, for which assignments are not
recorded and endorsements are not completed by the payment date in
May 2019, aligns the issuer's interests regarding completing the
recordation process with those of noteholders. While there will not
be an asset manager in this transaction, the indenture trustee will
review the custodian reports. The indenture trustee will request
CVI CVF III Lux Master S.a.r.l. to purchase any loans with
outstanding assignment and endorsement issues two days prior to the
July 2019 payment date.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Mill City
Holdings, LLC, will acquire and retain a 5% interest in each class
of the securities to be issued. In addition, the rep provider is an
indirect owner of the sponsor.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria, as
described in its report "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This
incorporates a review of the originators' lending platforms, as
well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originators and arranger, which were found to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Rating Criteria".

The variation to the "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria" relates to 50
loans (approximately 4.6% by balance) in the pool that are seasoned
less than 24 months and considered newly originated. On average,
these loans are approximately 19 months seasoned. The due diligence
scope for these loans was not consistent with Fitch's scope for
newly originated loans. Fitch is comfortable with the due diligence
that was completed on these loans as the loans made up a small
percentage of the pool. In addition, conservative assumptions were
made on the collateral analysis for these loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 5.7% at the base case. The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment-grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis are discussed in its
presale report 'Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Meridian Asset Services (Meridian), Clayton Services
LLC, and AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC)/JCIII & Associates, Inc. (JCIII).
The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on:
regulatory compliance, pay history, the presence of key documents
in the loan file and data integrity. In addition, Meridian was
retained to perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a
review to confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant
local jurisdiction and the related assignment chains.

Loss adjustments were applied to 475 loans in total. Of this, 126
loans have indeterminate HUD1s with final 'C' or 'D' grades,
material violations or lack loan documentation confirming
compliance. The remainder of the other 'C' or 'D' grades reflects
nonmaterial violations such as HUD deficiencies, state specific
issues where the TPR could not confirm that certain disclosures
were provided to the borrowers, late charge discrepancies and loans
that were tested but were not subject to such testing. Fitch does
not expect these violations to invalidate the note. However, they
could be used as a defense to foreclosure and could delay the
foreclosure process. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a 100% LS
for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's 'do not
purchase' list of high cost or 'high risk.'

104 of 393 loans without a compliance review are 1st lien mortgages
and a 100% LS adjustment was applied. This had an impact of roughly
100bps at the AAAsf expected loss levels. The remaining loans not
reviewed for compliance are 2nd lien mortgages that were originated
and previously securitized by Flagstar in transactions that were
later collapsed. Carval acquired these loans in a larger pool of
Flagstar originated collateral, and reviewed a 10% sample for
compliance. MCMLT 2018-2 includes 73 2nd liens that were part of
that Flagstar acquisition and were reviewed for due diligence. The
diligence results for this subset indicate good loan quality.

Additionally, the pay histories for the non-reviewed Flagstar loans
indicate that only one loan has been delinquent within the past 6
months and only 24 loans have ever been delinquent since the
acquisition. Fitch applied a 200% LS adjustment to non-reviewed 2nd
liens located in the 14 states where Freddie Mac does not purchase
high-cost mortgages despite the presence of the diligence and
paystring analysis; however, no additional adjustments were applied
to the remaining non-reviewed loans, as a 100% LS is already
applied for 2nd lien loans.

Substantially all loans not covered by the tax and title lien
search were 2nd lien mortgages. No additional adjustments are
recommended to compensate for the missing tax and title searches
since 100% LS is already applied to all 2nd liens.

There were 184 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.

A servicing comment review was not performed for the 36 delinquent
loans. As such, Fitch assumed a 100% PD for these loans.

This transaction includes 13 loans that were identified as a
potential ATR risk. The loans were 1st lien fixed rate mortgages
with clean pay history since origination. Fitch applied a 300% LS
to three loans which were underwritten to non-full documentation
standards.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ9: Fitch Hikes Class E Certs to 'CCCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 11 classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2006-HQ9 (MSC 2006-HQ9).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The upgrade reflects increasing
credit enhancement and continuing paydown to the senior class as
well as stabilization of the third largest loan in the pool. Since
the prior review, the pool has paid down an additional 3.57% of the
original pool balance or $92.5 million. The pool has six assets
remaining, of which, one is in special servicing (9.1% of the
pool). The transaction has incurred $184 million (7.1% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.

As of the June 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.44% to $40.3 million from
$2.6 billion at issuance.

Decreased Loss Expectations: Fitch's loss expectations have
declined since its prior review primarily due to the stabilization
of the third largest loan in the pool, The University of Phoenix
Building. The property was originally fully leased to the
University of Phoenix, however, in 2016 the tenant downsized to 35%
of NRA. In October of 2017, Coral Academy of Science moved into the
space and now occupies 100% of the building. The lease expires in
2028.

Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only six of the
original 219 assets remaining, of which one (9.1% of the pool
balance) is in special servicing. Due to the concentrated nature of
the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis which grouped the
remaining loans based on loan structural features, collateral
quality and performance, which ranked them by their perceived
likelihood of repayment. The ratings reflect this sensitivity
analysis.

Loan in Special Servicing: Bradford Oaks (9.1% of the pool) is a 44
unit student housing property located in Tallahassee, FL. The
property serves the Florida State University campus. Due to an
oversaturation of the student housing market, performance has
declined. In December of 2017, an offer to purchase the property
was approved and signed, however, after the buyer conducted due
diligence, the potential buyer terminated the offer. Per the
servicer, the asset will be remarketed for sale again once the Fall
2018 semester has concluded.

Loan Maturities: Of the remaining loans, a single interest-only
loan (14%) matures in October of 2018, two loans (65.1%) mature in
2020, two loans (11.7%) mature in 2021 and beyond, and one loan
(9.1%) is currently REO.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The upgrade reflects the increasing paydown and performance of the
remaining assets.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has upgraded the following rating:

  -- $18.7 million class E to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $21.6 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

  -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-4FL, A-M, A-J, X-RC, B,
C, D, ST-A, ST-B, ST-C, ST-D, and ST-E have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class S, ST-F and DP certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X and
X-MP certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-IQ12: S&P Cuts Cl. A-J Certs Rating to D(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class A-J
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction.

The downgrade reflects principal losses impacting the class, as
detailed in the June 15, 2018, trustee remittance report.

The June 2018 trustee remittance report reported $30.0 million in
realized losses, which resulted primarily from the liquidation of
the specially serviced Gateway Center IV ($27.8 million loss) and
Quality Inn & Suites – Danville ($2.2 million loss) loans.
According to the trustee remittance report, the Gateway Center IV
loan liquidated at a 50.1% loss severity of its $55.6 million
beginning balance while the Quality Inn & Suites – Danville loan
liquidated at an 83.6% loss severity of its $2.6 million beginning
balance. Consequently, class A-J experienced a 3.8% loss of its
$242.3 million original principal balance, class B lost 100% of its
$17.1 million original balance, and class C (not rated by S&P
Global Ratings) lost 100% of its $3.7 million beginning balance.

  RATINGS LIST

  Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-IQ12
                                         Rating
  Class        Identifier        To                 From
  A-J          61750WAZ6         D (sf)             CCC (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP21: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and downgraded the ratings on six classes in Morgan Stanley Capital
I Trust 2006-TOP21 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Downgraded
to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2018 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, classes A-J through E, were
downgraded due to anticipated losses from the loan in specially
servicing as well as single tenant concentration risk on two
performing loans. The REO loan constitutes 49% of the pool.

The ratings on the P&I classes, classes F and G, were affirmed due
to anticipated losses from the loan in special servicing and
realized losses from previously liquidated loans. Class G has
already experienced a 12.3% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Its rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on March 22, 2018.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 44% of the
current pooled balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.1% of the original
pooled balance.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2006-TOP21, Cl A-J, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, and
Cl. G was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
2006-TOP21, Cl. X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 49% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91.4% to $118.1
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 49.1% of the pool. One loan, constituting 11.9% of the pool,
have investment-grade structured credit assessments.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 0.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $46 million (for an average loss
severity of 53.1%). One loan, constituting 49% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing.

The specially serviced loan is the SBC -- Hoffman Estates Loan ($58
million -- 49.1% of the pool), represents a pari-passu portion of a
$113.7 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.7
million square foot (SF), three-building corporate office campus
located in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, approximately 25 miles
northwest of the Chicago CBD. SBC Communications, which developed
the property between 1988 and 1995, was acquired by AT&T, which
subsequently vacated the property at the end of their lease in
August 2016. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
June 2016 due to imminent default stemming from AT&T's intention to
vacate their space. The property is composed of the main building
(1.3 million SF), Lakewood Building (300,000 SF), and the Institute
Building (50,000 SF), which houses the property's conference
facilities. Amenities at the property include a food court with
space for several vendors, a fitness center and spa, and executive
parking garage, and space for retail services. The property is now
100% vacant with the exception of a 10,000 SF suite that AT&T has
an easement to occupy at no-cost in perpetuity. The loan is now REO
and the most recent December 2017 appraisal valued the property at
$21 million, compared to the $338.9 million appraisal value at
securitization. As per the Special Servicer the property is under
contract to sell with closing anticipated by year end.

As of the June 12, 2018 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $4.59 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 55% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 89.5%, compared to 90.9% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 33.9% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.19%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.44X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 45 East 89th
Street Condop Loan ($14 million -- 11.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 249-unit residential co-op located at East 89th Street
and Madison Avenue in Manhattan. Moody's structured credit
assessment is aaa (sca.pd), the same as at Moody's last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 36.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Anthem Health Loan ($22.7 million -- 19.2%
of the pool), which is secured by a 234,000 square foot (SF) office
building built in 2005 and located in Louisville, Kentucky. The
loan had an anticipated repayment date (ARD) in December 2015. The
property is 100% leased to Anthem Health through August 2020.
Moody's incorporated a Lit/Dark analysis to account for the
single-tenant exposure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 125% and
0.8X, respectively, compared to 127% and 0.8X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Huntsman R&D Facility Loan ($18.5
million -- 15.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 176,000 SF R&D
facility located on a 17-acre campus approximately 35 miles north
of Houston, Texas. The property is 100% occupied by Huntsman
International LLC through August 2022. Moody's incorporated a
Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant exposure. The
loan benefits from amortization and has amortized 30.2% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.69X,
respectively, compared to 61.5% and 1.67X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Amberwood Garden Apartments Loan
($1.7 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 72-unit
multifamily property located in Hayward, California approximately
15 miles south of the Oakland CBD. The loan is fully amortizing and
has paid down 46.5% since securitization. As per the January 2018
rent roll, the property was 100% occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 23.8% and 3.77X, respectively, compared to 24.4% and 3.68X
at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes
and affirmed the ratings on ten classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. PST, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-3, A-4, A-S, D, E, F, G, H were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes B and C were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 12% since Moody's
last review and 30% since securitization.

The ratings on the IO classes X-A and X-C were affirmed based on
the credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the IO classes X-B was upgraded based on an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating on class PST was upgraded due to the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) of the exchangeable classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.7% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl.
C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, Cl. G, and Cl. H were "Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The principal methodology
used in rating Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2012-C6, Cl.PST was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged
Securities" published in June 2015. The methodologies used in
rating Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6,
Cl. X-A, Cl. X-B, and Cl. X-C were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" methodology
published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15th, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to $785 million
from $1.12 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 61% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. No loans are currently
in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for a poorly
performing loan, constituting 1% of the pool, and has estimated a
moderate loss from the troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2018 operating results for 63% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 86% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 17.5% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.85X and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 1.86X and 1,25X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 1880 Broadway/15 Central Park West Retail Loan
($125.0 million -- 15.9% of the pool), which is secured by an
84,240 square feet(SF), four-level (two levels below grade),
multi-tenant retail condominium located on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan. The property has 232 feet of frontage along the east
side of Broadway. The property was 100% leased as of March 2018.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.92X, respectively, the
same as Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Chelsea Terminal Building Loan
($75.0 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by 1.05
million SF mixed-use property located in New York City's Chelsea
neighborhood. The property consists of 25 interconnected
seven-to-nine story commercial buildings originally constructed as
a warehouse and distribution center. Approximately 50% of the NRA
is utilized as a self-storage facility, 22% as leasable office, 16%
as general warehouse, 8% as retail, and 4% as miscellaneous
storage. The property sustained damage during Hurricane Sandy but
the borrower completed the insurance loss repairs. The property was
87% leased as of December 2017, compared to 93% leased as of
December 2016. The loan is interest-only throughout the loan term.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.26X, respectively, the
same as Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Greenwood Mall Loan ($62.1 million --
7.9% of the pool), which is secured by 575,000 SF component of an
851,500 SF super-regional mall located in Bowling Green, Kentucky.
The mall, which is owned by GGP Inc., is anchored by a Dillard's,
J.C. Penney, Sears, and a 10-screen Regal Cinema. The property was
previously also anchored by Macy's, however, Macy's vacated the
property and sold their box to GGP. The former Macy's space is
reported to have been leased to Belk, which opened its doors to
shoppers in October 2017. Greenwood Mall is the only regional mall
within a 50-mile radius. The property was 97% leased as of December
2017, with in-line occupancy of 94%. Inline sales ending 2017 for
comparable tenants less than 10,000 SF were $286 per square foot
(PSF) compared to $307 PSF for 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 73% and 1.56X, respectively, compared to 69% and 1.53X at the
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-ALTM: S&P Affirms BB+(sf) Rating on E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2013-ALTM, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

For the affirmations, S&P's expectation of credit enhancement was
in line with the affirmed rating levels.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-A interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than that
of the lowest rated reference class. Class X-A's notional balance
references classes A-1 and A-2.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
partial IO fixed-rate mortgage loan secured by Altamonte Mall, a
1.2 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Altamonte Springs, Fla., which
secures the mortgage loan in the trust. Of the total mall square
footage, 641,199 sq. ft. serves as the loan's collateral.

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the collateral mall property that secures the mortgage loan in the
trust and considered the stable to slightly increasing
servicer-reported net operating income and stable occupancy for the
past five years (2013 through 2017). Our analysis also considered
the decreasing in line sales per sq. ft. (PSF) and increasing
occupancy cost at the property, per our calculation. We then
derived our sustainable in-place net cash flow, which we divided by
a 7.00% S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate to determine our
expected-case value. This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings
loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC) of 75.9% and
1.66x, respectively, on the trust balance."

S&P will continue to monitor the reported performance at the
property.

According to the June 7, 2018, trustee remittance report, the
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $159.3 million,
down from $160.0 million at issuance, and pays an annual fixed
interest rate of 3.72%. The mortgage loan began amortizing on a
30-year amortization schedule starting in March 2018, and will
continue through its Feb. 1, 2025, maturity.

The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported a
DSC of 2.66x on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2017,
and occupancy was 98.1% according to the Dec. 31, 2017, rent roll.
Based on the rent roll, the five largest tenants make up 48.1% of
the collateral's total net rentable area (NRA). In addition, 36.5%
of the NRA have leases that expire throughout 2019, and 10.0% of
the NRA have leases that expire in 2020, including S&P's largest
collateral tenant, JCPenney (158,658 sq. ft., 25.0%), with a lease
expiring in January 2019.

S&P said, "Based on our calculation, we noted that in line tenant
sales (using the servicer-provided year-end 2017 tenant sales
report) have declined to approximately $396 PSF, down from an
issuance value of $419 PSF (both of which exclude Apple sales).
Additionally, occupancy cost has increased to 15.4% from
14.1% at issuance.

S&P noted that the area of the mall occupied by Sears, a
non-collateral anchor tenant, was sold by Sears Holding Corp. to
Seritage Properties as part of a larger divesture of assets. It is
our understanding that Sears will continue to operate in its
existing store location, but has entered into a new lease with
Seritage that allows for a "right sizing" of its footprint. As
noted in our J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2015-SGP presale, starting in July 2016, and subject to certain
restrictions, Sears can terminate its master lease with Seritage on
any unprofitable property (where earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, amortization, and rent is less than the annual base
rent) by making a lease termination payment equal to one year's
rent and expenses from that property. Conversely, Seritage, as the
new landlord, can restructure its lease with Sears. Seritage has
the right to recapture up to 50% of the store's square footage to
reposition it for third-party tenancy. At this time Sears still
occupies the space.

  RATINGS LIST

  Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2013-ALTM
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-ALTM
                                Rating
  Class        Identifier       To             From
  A-1          61690LAA8        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
  A-2          61690LAC4        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
  X-A          61690LAE0        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
  B            61690LAJ9        AA- (sf)       AA- (sf)
  C            61690LAL4        A- (sf)        A- (sf)
  D            61690LAN0        BBB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
  E            61690LAQ3        BB+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2018-H3: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) on H-RR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-H3 to be
issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2018-H3:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)
-- Class H-RR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, D, E-RR, F-RR, G-RR and H-RR will be privately placed.
The Class X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 66 fixed-rate loans secured by 120
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, five loans, representing 5.4% of the
aggregate pool balance, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance
risk given the current low-interest-rate environment, DBRS applied
its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 31
loans, representing 60.3% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x, and 19 loans, representing 45.7% of the pool, with refinance
DSCRs below 0.90x.

Twelve loans, comprising 48.0% of the DBRS sample (35.8% of the
pool), were considered to be of Above Average or Average (+)
property quality based on physical attributes and/or a desirable
location within their respective markets. Six of these loans are
within the top ten (Griffin Portfolio II, Rittenhouse Hill,
SunTrust Center, Shoppes at Chino Hills, Playa Largo and Crowne
Plaza Dulles Airport). Higher-quality properties are more likely to
retain existing tenants/guests and more easily attract new
tenants/guests, resulting in a more stable performance. Only one
loan, comprising 1.0% of the DBRS sample (0.7% of the pool), was
considered to be of Below Average property quality.

Ten loans, comprising 17.6% of the transaction balance, are secured
by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to a single
tenant. This includes three of the largest 15 loans: 6330 West Loop
South, Torrance Technology Campus and New York Film Academy. Loans
secured by properties occupied by single tenants have been found to
suffer higher loss severities in an event of default. The 6330 West
Loop South property is primarily leased to subsidiaries of Texas
Children's Health Plan and Texas Children's Hospital (together), as
an investment-grade tenant, which accounts for 76.5% of the DBRS
occupied total rent. The Torrance Technology Campus is primarily
leased by L-3, a long-term credit tenant (LTCT) that accounts for
89.3% of the DBRS occupied total rent with leases that expire in
2031. Additionally, the loans have been structured with cash flow
sweeps prior to tenant expiry and/or lease termination options. The
appraisers' dark value of $90.3 million for Torrance Technology
Campus and $28.9 million for New York Film Academy imply low
appraised dark loan-to-values based on the $93.8 million and the
$21.6 million senior notes, respectively. While the appraiser did
not conclude a dark value for 6330 West Loop South, the sponsor
contributed $23.2 million of cash equity at funding for the
acquisition, representing 31.3% of the total acquisition proceed
sources.

The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 35
equal-sized loans, though the top ten represent 43.7% of the pool.
Diversity is further enhanced by ten loans, representing 21.3% of
the pool, that are secured by multiple properties (64 in total).
Increased pool diversity insulates the higher-rated classes from
event risk. Eleven loans, representing 22.4% of the pool, are
secured by properties located in tertiary markets, including two of
the top ten loans (Griffin Portfolio II and Playa Largo).
Properties located in tertiary and rural markets were analyzed with
significantly higher loss severities than those located in urban
and suburban markets. The two largest loans secured by properties
in tertiary and rural markets are The Griffin Portfolio II and
Playa Largo. The Griffin Portfolio II benefits from geographic
diversity, as it is secured by four properties across four states.
Additionally, the Griffin Portfolio is leased to four separate
tenants, and two of these properties are fully leased by LTCTs
(Southern Company Services and Amazon). Playa Largo is the first
hotel built in the Florida Keys in approximately 20 years, which is
primarily due to a Florida state-enforced moratorium on commercial
beach-side development to address ecological concerns.

The deal appears concentrated by property type, with 17 loans,
representing 40.8% of the pool, secured by DBRS office property
type classified properties. Of the office property concentration,
80.8% of the loans are located in suburban or super dense urban
markets, and one loan, Griffin Portfolio II, is predominately
secured by properties in tertiary markets. The largest loan
analyzed with a DBRS office property type classification, Griffin
Portfolio II, representing 19.2% of the office concentration, is
secured by a mixed-used portfolio. Based on allocated loan amount,
the Griffin Portfolio II is secured by 42.0% industrial properties.
Excluding the Griffin Portfolio II from the total DBRS office
concentration would lower the total DBRS office concentration to
32.9% from 40.8%. Additionally, DBRS sampled 78.5% of the pool,
representing 80.8% coverage of the total office loan cut-off
balance, thereby providing comfort for the DBRS NCF. There are
eight loans, representing 10.9% of the pool, secured by multifamily
proprieties, none of which are student housing or military housing
properties. Student and military housing often exhibits higher cash
flow volatility than traditional multifamily properties

Twenty-four loans, representing 47.8% of the pool, including eight
of the largest ten loans, are structured with full-term
interest-only (IO) payments. An additional 21 loans, comprising
23.1% of the pool, have partial IO periods. The DBRS Term DSCR is
calculated by using the amortizing debt service obligation, and the
DBRS Refi DSCR is calculated by considering the balloon balance and
lack of amortization when determining refinance risk. DBRS
determines probability of default based on the lower of Term or
Refi DSCR; therefore, loans that lack amortization will be treated
more punitively. Including ARD loans, the DBRS expected
amortization by maturity is 6.4%.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.


MOUNTAIN VIEW 2014-1: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-RR, B-RR,
C-RR, and D-R replacement notes from Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014
that is managed by Seix Investment Advisors LLC. S&P said, "We
withdrew our ratings on the original class A-R, B-R, C-R, and D
notes following payment in full on the June 28, 2018, refinancing
date. At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class E and
F notes, and removed the class F notes from CreditWatch, where we
placed them with negative implications in April 2018."

S&P said, "On a standalone basis, the results of our cash flow
analysis indicated a lower rating on the class F notes. However, we
view the overall lower cost of capital to be a benefit to the
transaction and also took in account additional sensitivity
analysis. We affirmed our rating on the class F notes as we do not
feel this class currently represents our definition of 'CCC' risk."
However, continued deterioration in the underlying collateral could
lead to potential negative rating actions in the future.

On the June 28, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, and D-R replacement note issuances were used to
redeem the original class A-R, B-R, C-R, and D notes as outlined in
the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P withdrew our
ratings on the original notes in line with their full redemption,
and it is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd.

  Replacement class          Rating        Amount (mil $)
  A-RR                       AAA (sf)              316.75
  B-RR                       AA (sf)                47.25
  C-RR                       A (sf)                 48.00
  D-R                        BBB (sf)               25.50

  RATING AFFIRMED

  Original class        Rating
  E                     BB- (sf)            

  RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  F                    B- (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Neg

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-R                  NR              AAA (sf)
  B-R                  NR              AA (sf)
  C-R                  NR              A (sf)
  D                    NR              BBB (Sf)

  NR--Not rated.


MOUNTAIN VIEW IX: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on $8.25MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by Mountain View CLO IX Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$5,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$355,000,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)


US$62,000,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)


US$30,500,000 Class B-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$27,300,000 Class D-R Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

US$8,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)


The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Seix Investment Advisors LLC manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.


The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on June 26, 2018 in
connection with the refinancing of all classes of the secured notes
previously issued on June 25, 2015. On the Refinancing Date, the
Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to
redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $549,225,000

Defaulted par: $5,547,673

Diversity Score: 80

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


NASSAU LTD 2018-1: Moody's Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes and two classes of repack notes issued by Nassau 2018-I Ltd.


Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$323,700,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$56,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$28,300,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$31,600,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$20,100,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$32,600,000 Rated Repack A Notes due 2031 ("Rated Repack A
Notes"), Assigned A3 (sf), solely with respect to the ultimate
repayment of the Repack Note Rated Principal Balance by the stated
maturity

US$32,600,000 Rated Repack B Notes due 2031 ("Rated Repack B
Notes"), Assigned Baa2 (sf), solely with respect to the ultimate
repayment of the Repack Note Rated Principal Balance by the stated
maturity

The Rated Repack A Notes are composed of components representing
U.S.$5,000,000 of Class B Notes, U.S.$16,500,000 of Class C Notes,
U.S.$1,700,000 of Class D Notes and U.S.$9,400,000 of Subordinated
Notes due 2031 (the "Subordinated Notes") (collectively, the
"Repack A Underlying Components").

The Rated Repack B Notes are composed of components representing
U.S.$11,800,000 of Class C Notes, U.S.$11,300,000 of Class D Notes
and U.S.$9,500,000 of Subordinated Notes (collectively, the "Repack
B Underlying Components").

The Rated Repack A Notes and the Rated Repack B Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Repack Notes."

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

The Rated Repack Notes' structure includes several notable
features. The Rated Repack Notes do not bear a stated rate of
interest. The rated promise on the Rated Repack Notes is solely
with respect to the ultimate repayment of their respective Repack
Note Rated Principal Balance by the stated maturity of the Rated
Repack Notes. In addition to the Rated Repack Notes, the Issuer
issued two classes of residual repack notes (the "Residual Repack
Notes"). Any proceeds from the Repack A Underlying Components and
Repack B Underlying Components (collectively, the "Underlying
Components") will be first applied respectively to the payment of
principal of the Rated Repack Notes until their Repack Note Rated
Principal Balance is reduced to zero, and, second, to distributions
on the Residual Repack Notes. The Rated Repack Notes and the
Residual Repack Notes, collectively, are referred to herein as the
"Repack Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Moody's ratings of the Rated Repack Notes address solely the
ultimate repayment of their respective Repack Note Rated Principal
Balance by the stated maturity of the Rated Repack Notes. Moody's
ratings of the Rated Repack Notes does not address any other
payments or additional amounts that a holder of the Rated Repack
Notes may receive pursuant to the underlying documents.

Nassau 2018-I is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, and eligible investments, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 84% ramped as of
the closing date.

NCC CLO Manager LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes and the Repack Notes, the Issuer
issued subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1,
Section 3.4 and Appendix 14 ("Approach to Rating Instruments that
Are Backed by CLO Secured Debt Tranches and Equity, and CLO
Instruments with non-Standard Promises") of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2948

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes and the Rated Repack Notes is
subject to uncertainty. The performance of the Rated Notes and the
Rated Repack Notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes and the Rated Repack Notes. In addition, the
performance of the Rated Repack Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the Underlying Components.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-RPL1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on B-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2018-RPL1 (the Notes) issued by New Residential
Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-RPL1 (NRMLT or the Trust):

-- $529.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.2 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $28.8 million Class M-1 at A (sf)
-- $26.4 million Class M-2 at BBB (sf)
-- $26.0 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $21.5 million Class B-2 at B (sf)
-- $560.1 million Class A-3 at AA (sf)
-- $588.9 million Class A-4 at A (sf)

Classes A-3 and A-4 are exchangeable notes. These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable notes as
specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects the 23.65% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The
AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect
19.30%, 15.15%, 11.35%, 7.60% and 4.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 3,055 loans with a total principal balance of
$694,018,973 as of the Cut-Off Date (April 30, 2018).

The portfolio is approximately 137 months seasoned and contains
99.4% modified loans. The modifications happened more than two
years ago for 85.6% of the modified loans. Within the pool, 2,159
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equate
to 6.5% of the total principal balance.

The majority of the loans in the pool (97.4%) are current as of the
Cut-Off Date. Approximately 1.5% of the loans in the pool are 30
days delinquent, and 1.1% are bankruptcy loans, which are either
performing or 30 days delinquent. Approximately 91.2% of the
mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent for at least
the past 24 months under the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)
delinquency method. As a result of the seasoning of the collateral,
none of the loans are subject to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC (NRZ), acquired the loans prior to
the Closing Date and, through an affiliate, New Residential Funding
2018-RPL1 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute the loans to the
Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp., or a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5.0% eligible
horizontal residual interest to satisfy the credit risk retention
requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans were
originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, the loans will be serviced by Nation star
Mortgage LLC (Nation star Mortgage, 98.3%), Fay Servicing LLC
(1.1%) and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (0.5%). The servicing
of 96.7% of the aggregate pool that is initially serviced by Nation
star Mortgage is scheduled to transfer to Shell point Mortgage
Servicing (SMS) by July 2, 2018. SMS will also act as Special
Servicer for any loan that becomes 60 days delinquent under the MBA
method.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
with respect to the preservation, inspection, restoration,
protection and repair of a mortgaged property, including delinquent
tax and insurance payments, the enforcement or judicial proceedings
associated with a mortgage loan and the management and liquidation
of properties (to the extent such advances are deemed recoverable
by the related servicer).

NRZ, as the Seller, will have the option to repurchase any loan
that becomes 60 or more days delinquent under the MBA method or any
real estate-owned property acquired in respect of a mortgage loan
at a price equal to the principal balance of the loan (Optional
Repurchase Price), provided that such repurchases will be limited
to 10.0% of the principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the
Cut-Off Date.

As a loss mitigation alternative, each Servicer has the right to
sell (or cause to be sold) mortgage loans that become 60 or more
days delinquent under the MBA method to any party in the secondary
market in an arm's-length transaction at fair market value to
maximize proceeds on such loan on a present value basis.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds and excess interest can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M-1
and more subordinate bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds
until the more senior classes are retired.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Note holders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially, and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review was performed on the
portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history
and data capture as well as title and tax review. Servicing
comments were reviewed for a large sample of loans. Updated broker
price opinions were provided for all the loans; however, a
reconciliation was not performed on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 12-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and
fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for
seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan
seasoning and clean performance history, (2) a comprehensive due
diligence review and (3) certain representation and warranty
mechanisms such as a loss review trigger and a breach reserve
account.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


OCP CLO 2018-15: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings today assigned its ratings to OCP CLO 2018-15
Ltd./OCP CLO 2018-15 LLC's $529.20 million floating-rate notes.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OCP CLO 2018-15 Ltd./OCP CLO 2018-15 LLC
  Class                     Rating          Amount
                                        (mil. $)
  A-1                       AAA (sf)        369.00
  A-2                       NR               21.00
  A-3                       AA (sf)          63.00
  B (deferrable)            A (sf)           42.00
  C (deferrable)            BBB- (sf)        33.00
  D (deferrable)            BB- (sf)         22.20
  Subordinated securities   NR               63.90

  NR--Not rated.


OHA CREDIT XII: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class X, A-1R, B-R,
C-R, D-R, E-R, and F-R replacement notes from OHA Credit Partners
XII Ltd./OHA Credit Partners XII LLC, a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2016 that is managed by Oak
Hill Advisors L.P. The replacement notes were issued via a
supplemental indenture.

The ratings reflects S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating level.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture,
which, in addition to outlining the terms of the replacement notes,
will also issue an additional class X notes. All the replacement
classes of notes were issued at lower spreads than the original
notes, with the class C-R notes' floating-rate spread replacing the
current fixed coupon of the original class C-1 notes.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OHA Credit Partners XII Ltd./OHA Credit Partners XII LLC   

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X                         AAA (sf)               6.20
  A-1R                      AAA (sf)             342.00
  A-2R                      NR                    45.00
  B-R                       AA (sf)               70.80
  C-R                       A (sf)                35.40
  D-R                       BBB- (sf)             36.60
  E-R                       BB- (sf)              22.20
  F-R                       B- (sf)               10.80
  Subordinated notes        NR                    39.00

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  OHA Credit Partners XII Ltd./OHA Credit Partners XII LLC

                     Rating
  Class                To           From
  A-1                  NR           AAA (sf)
  B                    NR           AA (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


PIKES PEAK 1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $20.5MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Pikes Peak CLO 1.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$19,250,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$24,250,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$20,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Pikes Peak 1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second-lien loans, first-lien last-out
loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70%
ramped as of the closing date.

Partners Group US Management CLO LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions. This is the Manager's first CLO.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2766

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.10%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


PREFERRED TERM XXII: Moody's Hikes Class C-2 Notes Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd.:

US$65,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes due September
22, 2036 (current balance of $60,960,815), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$50,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes due
September 22, 2036 (current balance of $46,892,935), Upgraded to A2
(sf); previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$30,300,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes due
September 22, 2036 (current balance of $28,417,118), Upgraded to A2
(sf); previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$77,250,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes due September
22, 2036 (current balance of $73,880,766), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

US$71,650,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes due
September 22, 2036 (current balance of $68,525,008), Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$762,500,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due September
22, 2036 (current balance of $373,095,701), Affirmed Aa1 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$201,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due September
22, 2036 (current balance of $189,259,884), Affirmed Aa2 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2017 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio and the deleveraging of
the Class A, Class B and Class C notes since June 2017. According
to Moody's calculations, the weighted average rating factor (WARF)
improved to 717 from 888 in June 2017. The Class A-1 notes have
paid down by approximately 9.69% or $40.02 million. The Class A-2,
Class B-1, Class B-2, Class B-3, Class C-1 and Class C-2 have paid
down by 0.73%, or $1.40 million, $0.45 million, $0.35 million,
$0.21 million, $0.54 million, and $0.51 million, respectively.
These notes benefited from the diversion of interest proceeds due
to the failure of the Class C OC test until December 2017 on which
payment date the Class C OC cured. Since then, excess interest has
been used to pay the Class D current and deferred interest. The
Class A-1 notes continue to receive the proceeds from all
redemption in the underlying collateral pool.

The ratings on the Class A-2, Class C-1 and Class C-2 notes also
reflect the correction of an error in the June 2017 rating action.
One bank with par of $20.0 million was incorrectly reported by the
trustee as deferring and was therefore treated in Moody's analysis
as performing because it met certain criteria. However, the asset
was defaulted at that time and should not have been given par
credit. The error has now been corrected, and Moody's actions
reflect this change.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking and
insurance sectors.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit estimates.
Because these are not public ratings, they are subject to
additional uncertainties.


RAIT TRUST 2015-FL5: DBRS Maintains B(high) Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited maintained all classes of the Floating Rate Notes
issued by RAIT 2015-FL5 Trust, RAIT 2016-FL6 Trust and RAIT
2017-FL8 Trust Under Review with Negative Implications as follows:

RAIT 2015-FL5 Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class C at A (high) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative  
     Implications
-- Class F at B (high) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications

RAIT 2016-FL6 Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class C at A (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative  
     Implications
-- Class E at BB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class F at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

RAIT 2017-FL8 Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class C at A (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
     Implications
-- Class E at BB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications
-- Class F at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

DBRS maintained the referenced classes Under Review with Negative
Implications citing concerns over the current servicing of the
transactions.

On February 20, 2018, RAIT Financial Trust (RAIT or the Company),
parent of the issuer, mortgage loan seller and servicer/special
servicer for RAIT 2015-FL5, RAIT 2016-FL6 and RAIT 2017-FL8 Trusts,
announced the conclusion of a Strategic and Financial Alternative
Review Process conducted by a special committee of RAIT's
independent trustees.

On March 5, 2018, DBRS spoke with members of the RAIT management
team to determine the effect of the announcement on the securitized
transactions, including the servicing and special servicing. Given
the lack of information regarding the future of the Company, DBRS
is concerned about the servicing and special servicing of these
transactions. Hence, DBRS is placing the bonds under review with
the expectation that additional information will be available in
the near term to provide a clearer picture of the future of the
Company and, specifically, its servicing and asset management
teams.

On May 23, 2018, DBRS met with RAIT's servicing personnel and
senior management in its Philadelphia office. Based on this
meeting, the servicing and asset management teams in place appear
to be sufficient to service and specially service its commercial
real estate collateralized loan obligation transactions. However,
several experienced real estate and capital markets professionals
have recently left the company, thereby diminishing RAIT's employee
bench. Therefore, DBRS remains concerned about the effect of
potential prospective employee turnover as RAIT determines a clear
direction regarding its future.

RAIT continues to explore its options and expects to have a firmer
idea of its future business plans and company structure later this
summer. To date, the company has been responsive to all DBRS
inquiries and DBRS expects this open communication will continue.
Therefore, DBRS is maintaining the Under Review with Negative
Implications for all classes and will revisit the ratings once
additional information becomes available.


REGATTA FUNDING XI: Moody's Rates $24.5MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Regatta XI Funding Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$15,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$24,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)


The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the
Class C-2 Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Regatta XI Funding is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second-lien loans, unsecured loans and
first-lien last out loans. The portfolio is approximately 85%
ramped as of the closing date.

Regatta Loan Management LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.


In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 80

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2811

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


RESIDENTIAL ASSET 2005-A11CB: Moody's Rates Class 1-A-6 Debt 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the rating of one
underlying component, and re-assigned the rating on one bond from
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A11CB.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A11CB

Cl. 1-A-6, Assigned C (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6-A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions on Class 1-A-6 and Class 1-A-6-A are driven
by the correction of an error. At closing Moody's assigned ratings
to Class 1-A-6 amongst other certificates issued by Residential
Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A11CB Trust. Class 1-A-6 has two
components, identified in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement as
Class 1-A-6-A and Class 1-A-6-B Component Certificates, which
generate the cash-flows supporting the Class 1-A-6 bond. After the
assignment of the initial rating on Class 1-A-6, Moody's
erroneously began publishing ratings on the underlying components
but not on Class 1-A-6 itself. Moody's is now correcting this error
and re-assigning a rating to Class 1-A-6, the certificate
originally rated by us and issued by Residential Asset
Securitization Trust 2005-A11CB Trust. Moody's rating action on
Class 1-A-6 reflects recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools.

Moody's has also withdrawn the rating on Class 1-A-6-A; the rating
on the other underlying component, Class 1-A-6B, was previously
withdrawn. Hereafter, Moody's will only publish the rating for
Class 1-A-6 at the certificate level and will not publish ratings
for the related underlying components.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SEQUIOA MORTGAGE 2018-6: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2018-6. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans, including
217 agency-eligible high balance mortgage loans. The assets of the
trust consist of 613 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage loans,
substantially all of which have an original term to maturity of 30
years except for 2 loans which have an original term to maturity of
20 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.
CitiMortgage, Inc. will serve as the master servicer for this
transaction. There are three servicers in this pool: Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (91.39%), HomeStreet Bank (6.94%), First
Republic Bank (1.68%).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-6

Cl. A-1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.30%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.20% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-6 transaction is a securitization of 613 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $408,909,936. There are 125 originators in this pool,
including United Shore Financial Services (24.22%). None of the
originators other than United Shore contributed 10% or more of the
principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level third
party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting,
property value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has
agreed to backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of
all originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood). Moody's considers Redwood, the mortgage loan
seller, as a stronger aggregator of prime jumbo loans compared to
its peers. As of April 2018 remittance report, there have been no
losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's has rated to
date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have
strong credit profile demonstrated by strong credit scores, high
down payment percentages and significant liquid reserves. Similar
to SEMT transactions it rated recently, SEMT 2018-6 has a weighted
average FICO at 774 and the percentage of purchase loans at 73.15%,
in line with SEMT transactions issued earlier this year, where
weighted average original FICOs were slightly above 772 and
purchase money percentages were ranging from 40% to 60%.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2018-6 will incur any losses from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the loans are prime
quality and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the
subordinate classes and provides a back-stop to the representations
and warranties of all the originators except for FRB, has a strong
alignment of interest with investors, and is incentivized to
actively manage the pool to optimize performance. Third, historical
performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has been very strong to
date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably well defined processes
in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing basis. In
this transaction, an independent breach reviewer must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when a loan becomes
120 days delinquent, which reduces the likelihood that parties will
be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.20% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 613 loans, the TPR firms conducted
a review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 24 HomeStreet
Bank, and Primelending loans. For the 24 loans, Redwood Trust
elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a TPR
firm check for TRID compliance.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believes that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase its Aaa loss.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's notes that
there are 5 loans with final grade 'D' due escrow holdback
distribution amounts. These loans were unable to complete its
review because the appraisal was subject to completion of
renovation work or missing evidence of disbursement of escrow
funds. In the event the escrow funds greater than 10% have not been
disbursed within six months of the closing date, the seller shall
repurchase the affected escrow holdback mortgage loan, on or before
the date that is six months after the closing date at the
applicable repurchase price. Given that the small number of such
loans and that the seller has the obligation to repurchase, Moody's
did not make an adjustment for these loans.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago were originated by various participating financial
institution originators. For these mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago
will provide the loan-level R&Ws that are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2018-6 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US
RMBS.

Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


SLM STUDENT 2003-10: Moody's Confirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. B Notes
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Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two classes of notes and
confirmed one class of notes from two SLM Student Loan Trust
transactions. The underlying collateral consists of loans
originated under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP),
which are guaranteed by the US government for a minimum of 97% of
defaulted principal and accrued interest. Navient Solutions, LLC.,
is the sponsor, administrator and servicer of the transactions.

The complete rating actions are as follows

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-10

Cl. B, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2018 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's actions conclude the review actions announced on March 28,
2018. The downgrade actions reflect the correction of an error in
Moody's prior rating analyses for the SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2
transaction.

Previous Moody's analyses had used the Aa2 rating of CDC Ixis's
guaranteed senior unsecured debt when assessing the currency swap
counterparty of the transactions. CDC Ixis Capital Markets, a
wholly owned subsidiary of CDC Ixis that was merged into its parent
in 2002, was the original swap counterparty for these transactions.
Servicer reports for the transactions, including the most recent
reports, indicate that CDC Ixis Capital Markets has remained as the
swap counterparty for the transactions. However, through a series
of mergers and acquisitions starting in 2004, CDC Ixis and its
successors are now known as Natixis, A1(cr), and the servicer has
confirmed that Natixis is the current swap counterparty for the
transactions.

During the review period, Moody's assessed documentation relating
to a set of guaranty agreements issued by both the Caisse des
dépôts et consignations (CDC) and CDC Ixis to counterparties of
financial contracts, including swaps, entered into with CDC Ixis
and CDC Ixis Capital Markets. The CDC is a Government-Related
Issuer whose credit profile is intrinsically related to the
Government of France, (Aa2 positive). CDC Ixis was a 2001 spin-off
of all of the CDC's non-public service financial activities.

Moody's concluded that two cascade guaranty agreements issued by
the CDC and CDC Ixis in 2000 and 2001 remain in effect and provide
support for the 2003-10 transaction's swap. Under these guaranties,
the CDC is the ultimate guaranty provider. As a result, Moody's
utilized the senior unsecured rating of the CDC, (Aa2), to assess
the probability of the transaction becoming unhedged.

For the 2004-2 transaction, the deal's swaps are covered by a
different set of guarantees issued in 2004. Under these guarantees,
the CDC is not the guaranty provider. While these guarantees do
afford support from another entity, the rating of that entity is no
higher than that of Natixis, the current swap counterparty. Moody's
therefore utilized the rating of Natixis to assess the probability
of the transaction becoming unhedged, which led to Moody's
downgrade actions.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in August 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the loan
pool increases as a result of declining borrower usage of
deferment, forbearance and IBR, increasing voluntary prepayment
rates, or prepayments with proceeds from sponsor repurchases of
student loan collateral. Moody's could also upgrade the rating
owing to a build-up in credit enhancement and upgrades of ratings
or CR Assessments on the swap counterparties. In addition, Moody's
could upgrade the ratings if CFTC extends the scope of its no
action relief to swaps executed in response to counterparty
default, or Moody's receives new information showing that new swaps
executed by Navient's SPVs will not be subject to initial margin
requirements.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if Moody's could not obtain the
proof of guarantee on the affected swaps or the swap counterparty.
Moody's could also downgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of
the loan pool declines as a result of low voluntary prepayments,
and high deferment, forbearance and IBR rates, which would threaten
full repayment of the classes by their final maturity dates. In
addition, because the US Department of Education guarantees at
least 97% of principal and accrued interest on defaulted loans,
Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if it were to
downgrade the rating on the United States government. Moody's could
also downgrade the rating owing to downgrades of ratings or CR
Assessments on the swap counterparties.


SORIN REAL ESTATE IV: S&P Hikes Class C Notes Rating to BB+(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class C notes from
Sorin Real Estate CDO IV Ltd., a U.S. commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction predominately
backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities, to 'BB+ (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)'.

S&P said, "The rating action follows our review of the
transaction's performance using data from the May 31, 2018, trustee
report. The upgrade follows increased credit support since our
previous review.

"The transaction has paid $71.88 million in collective paydowns to
the class A1 through C notes since our December 2015 rating action.
Since then, the class A1, A2, A3, and B notes have been completely
paid down, and the class C notes have started to receive paydowns;
they currently have less than 15.0% of their original balance.

"In addition, as a result of positive rating migration in the
portfolio, the class C notes are currently backed by higher-quality
assets. This allows the class to now pass the top obligor test at
the 'BB+' category (it was failing this test at the 'CCC' category
in the last review).

"Because the coverage ratios are currently tested first only at the
class D level, the class D notes, which we no longer rate, will
continue to receive their current and deferred interest out of any
available interest proceeds remaining after paying the class C
interest.

"For this analysis, we relied on the supplemental test calculations
and did not run cash flows due to the small amount of obligors
remaining in the underlying asset pool. The rating was affected by
the application of our top obligor test.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the rating
assigned to the notes remains consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and will take further rating
actions as we deem necessary."


SOUND POINT X: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating on $22MM Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
five classes of CLO refinancing notes issued by Sound Point CLO X,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$292,500,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$49,500,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A1 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa2 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba2 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Sound Point Capital Management, LP manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on June 19, 2018 in
connection with the refinancing of certain classes of the secured
notes previously issued on December 17, 2015. On the Refinancing
Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing
Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of each class of the Issuer's notes is subject to
uncertainty relating to certain factors and circumstances, and this
uncertainty could lead Moody's to change its ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the Manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by the Manager or other transaction parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: Investing in collateral of better credit
quality, or better than Moody's expected credit performance of the
assets collateralizing the transaction can lead to positive CLO
performance. Conversely, a negative shift in the credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: During the amortization period, the pace of
deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds is an important
source of uncertainty. Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate
owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the Manager, which could have a significant
impact on the ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO
notes, beginning with those notes having the highest payment
priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings can be sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen owing to any decision by the Manager to reinvest into new
issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can increase the default
risk horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
collateral.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.


SOUND POINT XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $40MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Sound Point CLO XX, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$520,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$88,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Sound Point CLO XX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien senior secured loans, and eligible
investments, and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 60%
ramped as of the closing date.

Sound Point Capital Management, LP will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $800,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2625

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.75%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2625 to 3019)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2625 to 3413)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


STACR 2018-DNA2: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on $246MM Cl. B-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Freddie Mac STACR Trust
2018-DNA2's $1.050 billion notes issued out of the Freddie Mac
STACR Trust 2018-DNA2.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by residential mortgage loans, deeds of trust,
or similar security instruments encumbering mortgaged properties
acquired by Freddie Mac.

The ratings reflect

-- The credit enhancement provided by the subordinated reference
tranches, as well as the associated structural deal mechanics;

-- The credit quality of the collateral included in the reference
pool;

-- A credit-linked note structure that reduces the counterparty
exposure to Freddie Mac for periodic principal payments but, at the
same time, relies on credit premium payments from Freddie Mac (a
highly rated counterparty) to make monthly interest payments and to
make up for any investment losses;

-- The issuer's aggregation experience and alignment of interests
between the issuer and noteholders in the deal's performance,
which, in S&P's view, enhances the notes' strength; and

-- The enhanced credit risk management and quality control
processes Freddie Mac uses in conjunction with the underlying
representations and warranties framework.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Freddie Mac STACR Trust 2018-DNA2  

  Class                   Rating             Amount ($)
  A-H(i)                  NR             47,618,555,528
  M-1                     BBB+ (sf)         350,000,000
  M-1H(i)                 NR                143,456,533
  M-2                     B+ (sf)           525,000,000
  M-2R                    B+ (sf)           525,000,000
  M-2S                    B+ (sf)           525,000,000
  M-2T                    B+ (sf)           525,000,000
  M-2U                    B+ (sf)           525,000,000
  M-2I(ii)                B+ (sf)           525,000,000
  M-2A                    BB+ (sf)          262,500,000
  M-2AR                   BB+ (sf)          262,500,000
  M-2AS                   BB+ (sf)          262,500,000
  M-2AT                   BB+ (sf)          262,500,000
  M-2AU                   BB+ (sf)          262,500,000
  M-2AI(ii)               BB+ (sf)          262,500,000
  M-2AH(i)                NR                107,592,400
  M-2B                    B+ (sf)           262,500,000
  M-2BR                   B+ (sf)           262,500,000
  M-2BS                   B+ (sf)           262,500,000
  M-2BT                   B+ (sf)           262,500,000
  M-2BU                   B+ (sf)           262,500,000
  M-2BI(ii)               B+ (sf)           262,500,000
  M-2BH(i)                NR                107,592,400
  B-1                     B- (sf)           175,000,000
  B-1H(i)                 NR                 71,728,268
  B-2H(i)                 NR                246,728,268

(i)Reference tranche only and will not have corresponding notes.
Freddie Mac retains the risk of each of these tranches.
(ii)Interest-only classes with notional principal amounts.
NR--Not rated.


TIAA BANK 2018-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class B-4 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-2 (the
Certificates) issued by TIAA Bank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2 (the
Trust):

-- $280.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $280.9 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $280.9 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $210.7 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $210.7 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $210.7 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.2 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.2 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.2 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.7 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.7 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.7 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $56.2 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $56.2 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $56.2 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-21 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-22 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-23 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-24 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $280.9 million Class A-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $280.9 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $280.9 million Class A-IO4 at AAA (sf)
-- $210.7 million Class A-IO5 at AAA (sf)
-- $210.7 million Class A-IO6 at AAA (sf)
-- $210.7 million Class A-IO7 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.2 million Class A-IO8 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.2 million Class A-IO9 at AAA (sf)
-- $70.2 million Class A-IO10 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.7 million Class A-IO11 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.7 million Class A-IO12 at AAA (sf)
-- $224.7 million Class A-IO13 at AAA (sf)
-- $56.2 million Class A-IO14 at AAA (sf)
-- $56.2 million Class A-IO15 at AAA (sf)
-- $56.2 million Class A-IO16 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class A-IO17 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class A-IO18 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.0 million Class A-IO19 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-IO20 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-IO21 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A-IO22 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-IO23 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-IO24 at AAA (sf)
-- $297.4 million Class A-IO25 at AAA (sf)
-- $4.6 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $4.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $3.5 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $2.0 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO6, A-IO7, A-IO8,
A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14, A-IO15, A-IO16,
A-IO17, A-IO18, A-IO19, A-IO20, A-IO21, A-IO22, A-IO23, A-IO24 and
A-IO25 are interest-only certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12,
A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-22, A-23, A-24, A-IO2, A-IO3,
A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO8, A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14,
A-IO17, A-IO20, A-IO23, A-IO24 and A-IO25 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
exchange certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11,
A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-16, A-17 and A-18 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
senior support certificates (Classes A-19, A-20 and A-21) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 5.25% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect
3.80%, 2.35%, 1.25% and 0.60% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are backed
by 450 loans with a total principal balance of $313,856,445 as of
the Cut-Off Date (June 1, 2018).

TIAA, FSB (formerly known as Ever Bank, FSB) originated the
mortgage loans directly or through correspondents and is the
Sponsor and Servicer of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as Master Servicer,
Securities Administrator, Paying Agent and Certificate Registrar.
U.S Bank National Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend
by DBRS) will serve as Trustee and Custodian.

For any mortgage loan that becomes 90 days or more delinquent, the
Servicer has the option to purchase such loan from the Trust at the
repurchase price (the unpaid principal balance of such mortgage
loan, plus accrued interest and other fees and expenses), subject
to a maximum of 10.0% of the Cut-Off Date principal balance.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
financially strong transaction counterparties, high-quality
underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers, a satisfactory
third-party due diligence review and a traditional lifetime
representations and warranties framework.

Although TIAA, FSB, as Ever bank, issued two post-crisis prime
jumbo residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions in
2013 under the EBMLT shelf, the Trust re-entered the market in 2018
with its first deal in several years. As a result, TIAA, FSB has
limited performance history on securitized loans. However, the
available historical performance on TIAA, FSB's non-securitized
prime jumbo production has been stellar with minimal delinquencies
and no losses. Also, DBRS conducted operational risk assessments on
TIAA, FSB's origination and servicing platforms and deemed them to
be acceptable.

The DBRS ratings address the timely payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Certificates.


TIAA BANK 2018-2: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating on Class B-4 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 28
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
TIAA Bank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2 (TBMLT 2018-2). The ratings
range from Aaa (sf) to Ba2 (sf).

TIAA Bank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2 (TBMLT 2018-2) is the second
transaction entirely backed by loans originated by TIAA, FSB since
2013. In June 2017, EverBank Funding, LLC was acquired by Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America (Aa1). TIAA, FSB
(TIAA) is the successor to EverBank. TBMLT 2018-2 consists of prime
jumbo pools underwritten to TIAA's underwriting standards and
serviced by TIAA. All of the mortgage loans in TBMLT 2018-2 are
designated as qualified mortgage (QM) safe harbor loans. TIAA will
service the loans and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2) will be the
master servicer.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: TIAA Bank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.35% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

TBMLT 2018-2 is a securitization of 450 primarily 30-year
fixed-rate prime residential mortgages (one loan is 25-year fixed).
Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have
strong credit profile demonstrated by strong credit scores, high
percentage of equity and significant liquid reserves. The credit
quality of the transaction is in line with recent prime jumbo
transactions that Moody's has rated.

Moody's decreased its loss levels due to TIAA's strength as an
originator of prime jumbo loans. Moody's believes that TIAA is
stronger than its peers due to its conservative underwriting
standards, solid performance history and strong quality control
policies and procedures.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have a
demonstrated ability to save and to manage credit. On average,
borrowers have 26.1% equity in the properties backing the mortgage
loans. In addition, approximately 72.4% of borrowers have more than
24 months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to pay the
mortgage for two years should there be an interruption to the
borrower's cash flow. Consistent with prudent credit management,
the borrowers have high FICO scores, with a weighted average score
of 774. In general, the borrowers have high income, significant
liquid assets and a stable employment history, all of which have
been verified as part of the underwriting process and reviewed by
the TPR firm.

The transaction includes mortgage loans backed by properties
located in areas designated by the Federal Emergency Management
Authority (FEMA) for federal assistance in the last 12 months. The
sponsor ordered inspections of mortgaged properties located in
counties where borrowers were eligible for individual assistance
from FEMA. No material damage was discovered. However, the sponsor
did not order inspections on properties located in areas designated
by FEMA as public assistance areas. Moody's notes that mortgage
loans backed by properties located in areas affected by Hurricane
Harvey, Hurricane Irma and wildfires show zero delinquencies.
Moreover, the transaction includes an unqualified representation
that the pool does not include properties with material damage that
would adversely affect the value of the mortgaged property.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

One third-party due diligence firm verified the accuracy of the
loan level information that the sponsor gave us. This TPR firm
conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data accuracy and
compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage loans in the collateral
pool. The TPR results indicate that the majority of reviewed loans
were in compliance with originator's underwriting guidelines, no
material compliance or data issues, and no material appraisal
defects.

Moody's considers the strength of the R&W framework in TBMLT 2018-2
to be adequate. Moody's analysis of the R&W framework considers the
R&Ws, enforcement mechanisms and creditworthiness of the R&W
provider. The sponsor is TIAA, FSB whose parent, TIAA has an
insurance financial strength rating at Aa1 and a long-term issuer
rating at Aa2. The sponsor has provided unambiguous representations
and warranties (R&Ws) with no material knowledge qualifiers and not
subject to a sunset. There is a provision for binding arbitration
in the event of a dispute between investors and the R&W provider
concerning R&W breaches.

However, the R&W framework in TBMLT 2018-2 differs from other prime
jumbo transactions because breach review is not automatic. Once a
review trigger has been hit (i.e. 120-day delinquency), it is the
responsibility of the controlling holder, which is the holder of
majority of the most subordinate certificates, and subsequently the
senior holder group to engage an independent reviewer and to bear
the costs of the review, even if a breach is discovered (unless the
R&W is an "intrinsic representation," then the sponsor will bear
the cost of review). If the controlling holder and the senior
holder group elect not to engage an independent reviewer to conduct
a breach review, the loan will not be reviewed, which may result in
systemic defects to go undetected. In its analysis, Moody's
considered the incentives of the controlling holder and the senior
holder group, that a third-party due diligence firm has performed a
100% review of the mortgage loans as well as the early payment
default protection in this transaction.

Trustee/Custodian and Master Servicer/Securities Administrator

U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) (A1) will act as the
trustee for this transaction. In its capacity as custodian, U.S.
Bank will hold the collateral documents, which include, the
original note and mortgage and any intervening assignments of
mortgage.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) (Aa2) provides oversight of
the servicer. Moody's considers Wells Fargo as a strong master
servicer of residential loans. Wells Fargo's oversight encompasses
loan administration, default administration, compliance and cash
management. Wells Fargo will also act as securities administrator,
whose role includes paying the issued securities.

Other Considerations

Servicer optional purchase of delinquent loans: The servicer, TIAA,
has the option to purchase any mortgage loan which is 90 days or
more delinquent, which may result in the step-down test used in the
calculation of the senior prepayment percentage to be satisfied
when otherwise it would not have been. Moreover, because the
purchase may occur prior to the breach review trigger of 120 days
delinquency, the loan may not be reviewed for breaches of
representations and warranties and thus, systemic defects may go
undetected. In its analysis, Moody's considered that the loans will
be purchased by the servicer at par, the servicer is limited to
purchasing loans up to 10% of the aggregate cut-off date balance
and that a third-party due diligence firm has performed a 100%
review of the mortgage loans. Moreover, the reporting for this
transaction will list the mortgage loans purchased by the
servicer.

Extraordinary expenses and risk of trustee holdback: Extraordinary
trust expenses in the TBMLT 2018-2 transaction are deducted from
Net WAC as opposed to available distribution amount. We believe
there is a very low likelihood that the rated certificates in TBMLT
2018-2 will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against key
deal parties. First, the loans are prime quality, 100% qualified
mortgages and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well
defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on an
ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
must review loans for breaches of representations and warranties
when certain clearly defined triggers have been breached which
reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.
Third, the issuer has disclosed the results of a credit, compliance
and valuation review of all of the mortgage loans by an independent
third party. 100% of the loans were included in the due diligence
review. Finally, the performance of past EBMLT transactions have
been well within expectation.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction has a shifting interest structure that allows
subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under certain
defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure allows
subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks,
senior bonds are exposed to increased performance volatility, known
as tail risk. The transaction provides for a senior subordination
floor of 1.80% of the closing pool balance, which mitigates tail
risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement
over time. Additionally there is a subordination lock-out amount
which is 1.35% of the closing pool balance.

Transaction Structure

The transaction is structured as a one pool shifting interest
structure in which the senior bonds benefit from a senior floor and
a subordination floor. Funds collected, including principal, are
first used to make interest payments to the senior bonds. Next
principal payments are made to the senior bonds and then interest
and principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in
sequential order, subject to the subordinate class percentage of
the subordinate principal distribution amounts.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next realized losses
are allocated to the super senior bonds until their principal
balances are written off.

As in all transactions with shifting-interest structures, the
senior bonds benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all
prepayments to the senior bonds for a specified period of time, and
allocates increasing amounts of prepayments to the subordinate
bonds thereafter only if loan performance satisfies both
delinquency and loss tests.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


TOWD POINT 2018-3: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class B1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Asset-Backed
Securities Series 2018-3 (the Notes) issued by Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2018-3 (the Trust):

-- $779.4 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.0 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $63.2 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $51.7 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $39.1 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $31.0 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $848.4 million Class A3 at AA (sf)
-- $911.6 million Class A4 at A (sf)

Classes A3 and A4 are exchangeable notes. These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as specified in the
offering documents.

The AAA (sf) rating on the Class A1 Notes reflects the 32.20% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The
AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect
credit enhancement of 26.20%, 20.70%, 16.20%, 12.80% and 10.10%,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first- or second-lien residential
mortgages. The Notes are backed by 7,519 loans with a total
principal balance of $1,149,579,227 as of the Statistical
Calculation Date (April 30, 2018). Unless specified otherwise, all
the statistics regarding the mortgage loans in this press release
are based on the Statistical Calculation Date.

The portfolio is approximately 144 months seasoned and contains
80.1% modified loans. The modifications happened more than two
years ago for 70.4% of the modified loans. Within the pool, 2,864
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equate
to 13.2% of the total principal balance. Included in the deferred
amounts are proprietary principal forgiveness and Home Affordable
Modification Program principal reduction alternative amounts, which
comprise less than 0.1% of the total principal balance.

As of the Statistical Calculation Date, 95.9% of the pool is
current, 4.1% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) delinquency method and 1.1% is in bankruptcy (all
bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).
Approximately 74.0% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30
days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least the past 24 months under the
MBA delinquency method. All the loans in this pool are exempt from
the Ability-to-Repay (ATR)/Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules.

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from
various transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and
2018 and are beneficially owned by funds managed by affiliates of
Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. Upon acquiring the loans from the
transferring trusts, FirstKey, through a wholly owned subsidiary,
Towd Point Asset Funding, LLC (the Depositor), will contribute
loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, FirstKey, through a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than any residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements. These loans were originated and previously
serviced by various entities through purchases in the secondary
market.

As of the Closing Date, all the loans will be serviced by Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of homeowner association fees, taxes and insurance,
installment payments on energy improvement liens and reasonable
costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing and
disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
non-performing loans or real estate owned (REO) properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. The asset
sale price has to equal a minimum reserve amount to maximize
liquidation proceeds of such loans or properties. The minimum
reserve amount equals the product of 65.05% and the then-current
principal amount of the mortgage loans or REO properties. In
addition, on any payment date on or after the first payment date
when the aggregate pool balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to
less than 30.0% of the Cut-Off Date balance, the holders of more
than 50% of the Class X Certificates will have the option to cause
the Issuer to sell all of its remaining property (other than
amounts in the Breach Reserve Account) to one or more third-party
purchasers so long as the aggregate proceeds meet a minimum price.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds and excess interest can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1
and more subordinate bonds will not be paid from principal proceeds
until the more senior classes are retired.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Note holders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that generally performed well through the crisis, a strong
servicer and Asset Manager oversight. Additionally, a satisfactory
third-party due diligence review was performed on the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history and data
capture, as well as title and tax review. Servicing comments were
reviewed for a sample of loans. Updated broker price opinions or
exterior appraisals were provided for most of the pool; however, a
reconciliation was not performed on the updated values.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


TOWD POINT 2018-3: Fitch to Rate Class $31MM B2 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2018-3
(TPMT 2018-3) as follows:

  -- $779,414,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68,975,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $63,227,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $51,731,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,086,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,038,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $848,389,000 class A3 exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $911,616,000 class A4 exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $40,235,000 class B3 notes;

  -- $40,236,000 class B4 notes;

  -- $35,637,226 class B5 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
7,519 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $1.15 billion (which includes $151.3
million, or 13.2%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the
statistical calculation date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as "clean current" (74%).
Additionally, 4% of the pool was 30 days delinquent as of the
cutoff date, and the remaining 22% of loans are current but have
recent delinquencies or incomplete pay strings, identified as
"dirty current". Of the loans, 70.4% have received modifications.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): The operational risk is well
controlled for this transaction. FirstKey has a well-established
track record in RPL activities and carries an 'average' aggregator
assessment from Fitch. The loans are approximately 144 months
seasoned, reducing the risk of misrepresentation at origination.
Additionally, the transaction benefits from third party due
diligence on nearly 100% of the pool and the diligence results
indicate low risk for an RPL transaction. The solid representation
and warranty framework (classified by Fitch as tier '2') and the
issuer's retention of at least 5% of the bonds help ensure an
alignment of interest between issuer and investor.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Concern): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted and focused on regulatory compliance, pay
history and a tax and title lien search. The third-party review
(TPR) firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 10% 'C'
and 'D' graded loans, meaning the loans had material violations or
lacked documentation to confirm regulatory compliance. See the
Third-Party Due Diligence section of the presale report for
additional details.

Representation Framework (Concern): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings. Thus, Fitch increased its
'AAAsf' PD expectations by roughly 179bps to account for a
potential increase in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses
in the reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
(FirstKey), as rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a
loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in July 2019.
Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due
to noteholders for loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts
on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or
after the payment date in July 2019.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severity
(LS) is less for this transaction than for those where the servicer
is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow
priorities, together with increased subordination, provide for
timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated
classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $151.3 million (13.2%) of the unpaid
principal balance are outstanding on 2,864 loans. Fitch included
the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited
relative to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria
report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This incorporates a review of
the originators' lending platforms, as well as an assessment of the
transaction's R&Ws provided by the originators and arranger, which
were found to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated two criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria." The first variation is that an updated tax/title review
was not completed on 23 loans, all of which are second liens. While
a tax/title review was not completed, Fitch's analysis already
assumed that these loans were not in first lien position and Fitch
assumes 100% LS for all second liens. Additionally, 11 of the 23
loans are closed-end, second lien loans that do not have an
associated first lien in the pool. Since little or no information
was available regarding the first liens associated with the
closed-end seconds, a conservative assumption was made, and the
first lien was run assuming a 100% LTV, making the stand-alone
second lien underwater.

The second variation relates to a 25bp penalty that was applied to
the expected losses at each rating category to account for
potential delinquencies prior to closing. Fitch analyzed the
collateral pool, which was based off of the statistical calculation
date, however, the collateral will be updated and rolled by
one-month prior to closing, meaning there will be an additional pay
period between marketing and closing. Fitch analyzed previous Towd
transactions to determine the percentage of loans that typically go
delinquent in the first period and the 25bp penalty ensures that a
potential increase in delinquencies before closing is accounted
for.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.5% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivity analysis to determine the stresses
to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by WestCor Land Title Insurance Company (WestCor), Clayton
Services LLC, and AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC)/JCIII & Associates, Inc.
(JCIII). The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E
focused on: regulatory compliance, pay history, servicing comments,
the presence of key documents in the loan file and data integrity.
In addition, AMC and Westcor were retained to perform an updated
title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that the
mortgages were recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction and the
related assignment chains. A regulatory compliance and data
integrity review was completed on 99.7% of the pool.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis, and, based on
the findings, Fitch made several adjustments to its analysis.

For 376 of the 'C' or 'D' graded loans, Fitch adjusted its loss
expectation at the 'AAAsf' level by approximately 30bps reflecting
missing documents that prevented testing for predatory lending
compliance. The inability to test for predatory lending may expose
the trust to potential assignee liability, which creates added risk
for bond investors. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a 100% LS
for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not
purchase list of 'high cost' or 'high risk'; 66 loans were affected
by this approach. For the remaining 310 loans, where the properties
are not located in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not
purchase list, the likelihood of all loans being high cost is low.
However, Fitch assumes the trust could potentially incur notable
legal expenses. Fitch increased its loss severity expectations by
5% for these loans to account for the risk.

Other causes for the remaining 370 'C' and 'D' grades include
missing Final HUD1's that are not subject to predatory lending,
missing state disclosures, and other compliance related missing
documents. Fitch believes these issues do not add material risk to
bondholders since the statute of limitations has expired. No
adjustment to loss expectations were made for these 370 loans.

For the 397 loans where a servicing comment review was not
performed or was outdated, Fitch applied 100% PD.

There were 310 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.


VIBRANT CLO IX: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $24MM Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Vibrant CLO IX, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$320,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$57,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$31,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Vibrant CLO IX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.

DFG Investment Advisers, Inc. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2740

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2740 to 3151)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2740 to 3562)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1



VOYA CLO 2018-2: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Voya CLO 2018-2
Ltd./Voya CLO 2018-2 LLC's $566.34 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Voya CLO 2018-2 Ltd./Voya CLO 2018-2 LLC
  Class                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)                 360.00
  A-2                    NR                        30.00
  B-1                    AA (sf)                   49.70
  B-2                    AA (sf)                   16.30
  C-1 (deferrable)       A (sf)                    25.40
  C-2 (deferrable)       A (sf)                    10.60
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)                 36.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                  22.50
  F (deferrable)         B- (sf)                   10.50
  Subordinated notes     NR                        51.10
  Combination notes      A-p (sf)                  35.34

  NR--Not rated. p--Principal-only.


WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class IO Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one interest
only (IO) class of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C6,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C6 as
follows:

Cl. IO, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.5% of the
current balance, compared to 22.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 0.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

An IO class may be subject to ratings upgrades if there is an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes,
subject to the limits and provisions of the updated IO
methodology.

An IO class may be subject to ratings downgrades if there is (i) a
decline in the credit quality of the reference classes and/or (ii)
paydowns of higher quality reference classes, subject to the limits
and provisions of the updated IO methodology.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $8.7 million
from $953 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
46% of the pool.

Two loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, it reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss, resulting
in (or contributing to) an aggregate realized loss of $6.8 million
(19% loss severity on average). One loan, the Trader Joe's Plaza
Loan ($4.0 million -- 46.5% of the pool), is currently in special
servicing. The loan was secured by a retail property in Las Vegas,
Nevada and the property was sold in May 2018.

Moody's was provided with full year 2016 operating results for 100%
of the pool and full or partial year 2017 operating results for
100% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 89% compared to 75% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 34% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.63X and 1.57X,
respectively, compared to 0.76X and 1.55X at the prior review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 51.8% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Rite Aid -- Las Vegas, Nevada Loan ($1.8
million -- 20.9% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
17,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The property is fully leased to Rite Aid, which subleases
the space to Dollar General, through June 2023. The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in June 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 66% and 1.64X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Bailey Building Loan ($1.8 million
-- 20.4% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 45,000
SF office building located in Montgomery, Alabama. As of December
2017, the property was 52% leased, down from 88% as of December
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.78X,
respectively, compared to 92% and 1.12X at the prior review.

The third largest loan is the Rite Aid -- Bayville, New Jersey Loan
($909,314 -- 10.5% of the pool), which is secured by an
approximately 11,000 SF retail property located in Bayville, New
Jersey. The property is leased to Rite Aid through September 2018.
The loan has amortized 59% since securitization and matures in
September 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.68X,
respectively, compared to 75% and 1.44X at the prior review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C11: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C11, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C11 as follows:

Cl. J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes J, K, and L were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with expected recovery of principal and
interest from the pool's remaining loan.

The rating on the IO class X-C was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 25.6% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 2.4% of the original pooled balance, compared to 2.2%
at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2004-C11, Cl. J, Cl. K, and Cl. L was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C11, Cl. X-C were
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since there is only one
remaining loan and Moody's has identified the loan as a troubled
loan. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of default
for each specially serviced and troubled loan that it expects will
generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from the troubled
loan to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of
principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15th 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $15 million
from $1.04 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one remaining mortgage loan.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 1, the same as at Moody's last review.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21 million (for an average loss
severity of 55%).

Moody's received full year 2016 and 2017 operating results for the
remaining loan.

The sole remaining loan is the University Mall Loan ($14.9 million
-- 100% of the pool), which is secured by a 653,600 square feet
(SF) regional mall located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The property is
located three miles southeast of downtown Tuscaloosa and two miles
south of the University of Alabama. The mall was anchored by JC
Penney, Belk, and Sears (Sears & JC Penny own their stores). As of
December 2017, the total mall was 89% leased, compared to 91%
leased as of March 2017. However, Sears closed its store at this
location in January 2018. The loan has an anticipated repayment
date(ARD) on March 11th, 2019 and a final maturity date of March
11th, 2034. Moody's has identified the loan as a troubled loan and
estimated a moderate loss from this loan.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C18: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class H Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C18 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.2% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 30.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 4.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $8.1 million
from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan.

The remaining loan is on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $63.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%).

The remaining loan in the pool is the Market Square -- Phase II
Loan ($8.1 million), which is secured by a 66,000 square foot (SF)
retail property in Fort Myers, Florida. The loan was added to the
master servicer's watchlist in February 2015 for an upcoming
Anticipated Repayment Date (ARD) in May 2015. The loan has since
passed its ARD without payoff. As of December 2017, the property
was 100% leased, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.90X, respectively, compared to 112%
and 0.92X at the prior review.


WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL2: Moody's Cuts Class X Certs Rating to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
ratings on one class in Wamu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2007-SL2, Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SL2 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes, Cl. B, Cl. C and Cl. D, were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 24%
since Moody's last review.

The ratings on three P&I classes, Cl. E, Cl. F and Cl. G, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO Class, Cl. X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.5% of the
current balance, compared to 10.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.6% of the original
pooled balance, essentially the same as at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Wamu Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-SL2, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D. Cl. E, Cl. F and
Cl. G was "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Wamu
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL2, Cl. X were "Approach
to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July
2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 25, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $77.1 million
from $842.1 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 118 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 4.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 24.5% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 74, compared to 78 at Moody's last review.

Twenty-eight loans, constituting 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $31.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%). Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loans are
secured by a multifamily and mixed use property types. Moody's has
also assumed a high default probability for 17 poorly performing
loans, constituting 21% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate
loss of $6.3 million (a 35% expected loss on average) from these
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 85% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 56% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 78%, compared to 86% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.84X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.84X and 1.31X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


WELLFLEET CLO 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Wellfleet CLO 2018-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$260,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$42,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$21,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Wellfleet CLO 2018-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans, senior unsecured loans, and first-lien last out loans.
The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Wellfleet Credit Partners, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 68

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2872

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2872 to 3303)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2872 to 3734)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


WELLS FARGO 2005-AR5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class A-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of two
underlying components, and re-assigned the rating on one bond from
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR5 Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR5 Trust

Cl. A-2, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2018 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2018 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions on Class A-2, Class I-A-2 and Class II-A-2
are driven by the correction of an error. At closing Moody's
assigned ratings to Class A-2 amongst other certificates issued by
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR5 Trust. Class A-2
has two components, identified in the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement as Class I-A-2 and Class II-A-2 Component Certificates,
which generate the cash-flows supporting the Class A-2 bond. After
the assignment of the initial rating on Class A-2, Moody's
erroneously began publishing ratings on the underlying components
but not on Class A-2 itself. Moody's is now correcting this error
and re-assigning a rating to Class A-2, the certificate originally
rated by us and issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities
2005-AR5 Trust. Moody's rating action on Class A-2 reflects recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings on Class I-A-2 and Class
II-A-2. Hereafter, Moody's will only publish the rating for Class
A-2 at the certificate level and will not publish ratings for the
related underlying components.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017..

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust (WFCM) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2012-LC5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Loss Expectations; Sufficient Credit Enhancement: The
affirmations reflect the sufficient credit enhancement (CE)
relative to Fitch's base case loss expectations for the pool.
Overall loss expectations have declined since Fitch's prior review
in June 2017 due to the pending defeasance of the $139.8 million
Westside Pavillion loan with current loss expectations relatively
in line with issuance. Credit enhancement (CE) has improved with
20% of the pool paid down since issuance. Six loans are currently
defeased (4.8% of the pool). No losses have been incurred to date,
and interest shortfalls are currently impacting class NR.

Pending Defeasance of Largest Loan; Specially Serviced: The
Westside Pavillion loan (13.7% of the pool), secured by a regional
mall in Los Angeles, CA, is in process of completing a full
defeasance. The loan was previously identified as a Fitch Loan of
Concern (FLOC) due to vacating anchor tenants and low DSCR. Since
the loans transfer to special servicing in September 2017, the
loans sponsor (Macerich Partnership, L.P.,) had announced
redevelopment plans for the property, which includes formation of a
joint venture partnership. Fitch now expects minimal losses to the
loan given the pending defeasance, which is expected to close in
July 2018 according to the servicer. The loan is still with the
special servicer, but has remained current since issuance.

The second specially serviced loan, Belle Foods Portfolio (0.89%),
was originally secured by nine Belle Foods affiliated supermarkets
(Food World and Piggly Wiggly) throughout AL (7) and GA (2). Belle
Foods had filed for bankruptcy in 2013, and the collateral was
released and replaced by two Gander Mountain properties located in
Lubbock, TX and College Station-Bryan, TX. Gander Mountain also
filed for bankruptcy in 2017, and both buildings subsequently
became vacant. The loan became REO in April 2018. The special
servicer had disposed of the College Station-Bryan property in May
2018, providing a paydown of $3.6 million to the outstanding
principal balance. The Lubbock property remains vacant, and is
currently listed for sale.

Fitch Loans of Concern; Potential for Outsized Losses: Three
non-specially serviced loans (7.9% of the pool) have been
identified as FLOCs, including two secured by office properties in
the greater Washington D.C. Metro area. Expected losses in Fitch's
base case analysis have increased on the $19.5 million Walker
Building loan (1.9%), secured by a 78,514 sf office building in
Washington, D.C. The property has experienced significant vacancy's
and low DSCR since 2014 and continues to perform significantly
below the submarket metrics. The $35 million Rockville Corporate
Center loan (3.4%), secured by two contiguous office buildings
totaling 220,539 sf in Rockville, MD, faces significant refinancing
risks. The property is 99% leased; however, 50% of the collateral
is being marketed for sub-lease that would mirror the master lease
and expire six months prior to the loans maturity. Fitch performed
an additional stressed sensitivity scenario on this loan in which
loss severity was increased to 40% to address the potential for
outsized losses from leasing risks upon the loans maturity. The
ratings and Negative Outlooks on class F reflect this analysis.

The remaining non-specially serviced FLOC is the Rooney Ranch
(4.8%), secured by a 221,000-sf power center in Oro Valley, AZ. The
loan has been flagged due to vacant anchor space; property
performance and Fitch's loss expectations have been relatively
unchanged over the past 12 months.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for classes A-2 through E are Stable due to
sufficient CE, which is expected to improve with continued
amortization and defeasance. Upgrades to senior classes may be
possible with improved pool performance and additional pay-down or
defeasance. The Negative Outlook on class F reflects the concerns
with the FLOCs, particularly the $35 million Rockville Corporate
Center loan and $19.5 million Walker Building loan, whose
collateral both face leasing and/or vacancy risks. Fitch's
additional sensitivity scenario incorporates a 40% loss on the
Rockville Corporate Center loan to reflect the potential for
outsized losses. Downgrades to junior classes are possible if these
loans' performance continue to deteriorate

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the ratings and Outlooks for the following
classes:

  -- $552.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $85.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $124.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest Only class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $76.6 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $49.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.8 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 and class A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class G certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2016-BNK1: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage
(WFCM) Trust 2016-BNK1 commercial mortgage pass through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations
are based on the stable performance of the underlying collateral.
There have been no material changes to the pool since issuance, and
therefore the original rating analysis was considered in affirming
the transaction. Fitch has designated one loan as a Fitch Loan of
Concern (1.6% of the remaining pool balance) and there have been no
realized losses to date. Interest shortfalls are currently
impacting class G.

Minimal Credit Enhancement Improvement/Limited Amortization: As of
the May 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has paid down by 1.1% to $860.7 million from $870.6 million
at issuance.

The pool is scheduled to amortize by 11.3% of the initial pool
balance through maturity, which was considered above average
compared to other similar Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The 2015 and 2016 averages were 11.7% and 10.4%,
respectively. Of the current pool, 12 loans (37.9%) are full-term
interest only and 10 loans (29.3%) are partial-term interest-only.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The 20th loan in the pool, Southland Terrace
(1.6%), is on the watchlist and also a Fitch Loan of Concern. The
loan is collateralized by a 220,000 sf grocery-anchored shopping
center in Louisville, KY where Kroger (23.4% net rentable area)
went dark in November 2016. Despite vacating, Kroger is still
paying rent so occupancy and net operating income (NOI) have
remained stable. Per the 1Q 2018 rent roll, the property is 53%
occupied by tenants that are open and operating. The borrower is
working to lease up vacant space and the lender recently approved a
lease for 7.2% NRA.

Potentially Volatile Retail Properties: Loans collateralized by
retail properties account for 26% of the pool including one
regional mall (9.3%), a portfolio of three outlet malls in tertiary
markets (4.2%), and one Fitch Loan of Concern (1.6%).

The largest loan in the pool is The Shops at Crystals (9.3%), a
high-end regional mall located in Las Vegas, NV. YE 2017 NOI has
improved marginally due to an increase in occupancy to 91% at YE
2017 compared to 88% at YE 2016. Total mall sales for 2016 were
$1,450 psf compared to $1,330 psf at YE 2015. The largest tenants,
Louis Vuitton and Gucci, reported YE 2016 sales of $4,705 psf and
$1,272 psf compared to $2,140 psf and $1,380 psf at YE 2015,
respectively.

Simon Premium Outlets (4.2%) is a portfolio of three outlet malls,
none of which have reported sales since issuance. As of the 1Q 2018
rent roll, Gaffney Premium Outlets, located approximately 45 miles
northeast of Greenville, SC, is 75% occupied compared to 90.5% at
issuance. Lee Premium Outlets, located in western Massachusetts,
and Calhoun Premium Outlets, located in northwestern Georgia are
93% and 94% occupied, respectively. 1Q 2018 debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) NOI has declined to 2.76x compared to 2.94x at YE 2017
and 3.07x at YE 2016.

Higher Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 59% of the
pool, which is greater than the full-year 2016 and 2015 respective
averages of 54.8% and 49.3%. Loans collateralized by office
properties account for 31.6% of the pool. Properties occupied by a
single tenant account for 25.5%, three (17.7%) of which are office
properties and four (7.8%) of which are industrial distribution
centers.

Maturity Concentration: Maturities for the pool are as follows:
2025 - one loan (1.8%); 2026 - 38 loans (97.5%); and 2031 - one
loan (0.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $26.4 million class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45.8 million class A-SB notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $230 million class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $267 million class A-3 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $67.2 million class A-S notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- 569.2 million class X-A* notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.5 million class B notes at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150.9 million class X-B* notes at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39.3 million class C notes at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39.3 million class D notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39.3 million class X-D* notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.6 million class E notes at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.6 million class X-E* notes at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.3 million class F notes at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.3 million class X-F* notes at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G, X-G, or RRI certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C35: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2016-C35, and revised the Rating Outlook to Negative on two
classes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relatively Stable Overall Performance/Increase in Loss
Expectations: The affirmations are a result of the majority of the
pool continuing to perform as expected. However, there is one
specially serviced loan (2.3% of remaining pool balance) and 19
loans (15.2%) on the servicer's watchlist, mostly due to occupancy
declines, increases in expenses and deferred maintenance. All loans
remain current, including the specially serviced loan. The increase
in loss expectations is a result of the specially serviced loan and
the stressed scenario for the Mall at Turtle Creek loan.

High Retail and Hotel Concentration: Loans backed by retail
properties represent 34.3% of the pool, including six (23.8%) in
the top 15. The largest loan in the pool, Epps Bridge Center
(6.4%), is a 336,554-square foot (sf) retail property anchored by
Dick's Sporting Goods (expires 2024), Best Buy (expires 2025),
Marshall's (expires 2023), Ross (expires 2027), and Bed Bath &
Beyond (expires 2026) located in Athens, GA. As of year-end (YE)
2017, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and occupancy were
reported to be 1.67x and 99%, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Mall at Rockingham Park (6%), which
is secured by 540,867-sf of inline space within a regional mall
located in Salem, NH. Non-collateral mall anchors include Macy's,
Sears and JCPenney. Dick's Sporting Goods recently entered into a
78,900 sf sublease of the Sears box, and Sears utilizes the
remainder of its space. Collateral tenants include Lord & Taylor,
Forever 21 and Apple. Comparable in-line sales were $520/sf
($960/sf including Apple) as of TTM December 2017 compared to
$501/sf ($931/sf including Apple) as of the TTM ended March 2016.

Hotel loans represent 19.5% of the pool, including two (7.5%) in
the top 15.

Specially Serviced Loan: The one loan in special servicing is
secured by a 118,611-sf retail property located in Sylmar, CA
(approximately 25 miles to the south of Los Angeles). The property
was previously anchored by Sam's Club (82% of the net rentable
area) until it was announced that the store would be one of the 63
stores closing. A liquidation sale was held in January 2018 and the
space is now vacant. The Sam's Club lease runs through November
2006. The property is part of a larger development and adjacent to
a Home Depot. The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2018 for a non-monetary default and has remained current. Given the
large vacancy, Fitch ran a scenario assuming a 75% loss severity
for this loan.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The fifth largest loan in the pool is the
Mall at Turtle Creek and it has been designated as a Fitch Loan of
Concern. The loan is secured by 329,398-sf of inline space within
an enclosed mall located in Jonesboro, AR (approximately 60 miles
northwest of Memphis). Non-collateral anchor tenants include
JCPenney, Dillard's and Target. Largest collateral tenants include
Barnes and Noble, Bed Bath & Beyond, Best Buy and H&M. At issuance,
in-line sales at the property were $349/sf as of the March 2016.
Updated sales information was not available. Occupancy has declined
to 84% as of March 2018 compared to 91% at YE 2016. Fitch also ran
a scenario for this loan assuming a 25% loss severity. The
additional loss scenarios for this loan and the specially serviced
loan resulted in the Outlooks on classes E and F being revised to
Negative.

Minimal Credit Enhancement Improvement: As of the June 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by
1.6% to $1.006 billion from $1.023 billion at issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently impacting class G.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for classes E and F have been revised to
Negative due to concerns with the specially serviced loan, the
Fitch Loan of Concern and the overall retail concentration in the
top 15. Downgrades are possible if any of the retail loans
experience significant performance declines or if losses from the
specially serviced loan are greater than expected. Outlooks for
classes A-1 through D remain Stable due to overall stable
performance and continued amortization. Upgrades may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $31.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $58.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $265 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $227.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $67.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 class A-4FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69 million class at A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $49.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48.6 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-Only class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $11.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and interest-only class X-B
certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2018-C45: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. G-RR Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-C45 (the
Certificates) to be issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2018-C45:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X‑A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at BB (sf)
-- Class H-RR at B (high) (sf)

Classes X-D, D, E-RR, F-RR, G-RR and H-RR will be privately placed.
The Class X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 49 fixed-rate loans secured by 89
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The trust asset contributed
from one loan, representing 3.0% of the pool, is shadow-rated
investment grade by DBRS. Proceeds for the shadow-rated loan are
floored at the respective rating within the pool. When 3.0% of the
pool has no proceeds assigned below the rated floor, the resulting
pool subordination is diluted or reduced below the rated floor. The
conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the stabilized NCF and their respective
actual constants, two loans, representing 11.2% of the total pool,
had a DBRS Term DSCR below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative
of a higher likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess
refinance risk, given the current low interest rate environment,
DBRS applied its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This
resulted in 25 loans, representing 70.9% of the pool, having
refinance DSCRs below 1.00x, and ten loans, representing 31.1% of
the pool, with refinance DSCRs below 0.90x. These credit metrics
are based on whole-loan balances.

The hotel concentration of five loans, representing 6.7% of the
pool balance, is at a lower level than recent transactions that
typically have concentrations around 13.0% or more. Hotel
properties have higher cash flow volatility than traditional
property types, as their income, which is derived from daily
contracts rather than multi-year leases, and their expenses, which
are often mostly fixed, are quite high as a percentage of revenue.
These two factors cause revenue to fall swiftly during a downturn
and cash flow to fall even faster because of the high operating
leverage. Only six loans, totaling 9.9% of the transaction balance,
are secured by properties that are either fully or primarily leased
to a single tenant. The largest of these loans is 181 Fremont
Street, which represents 3.0% of the pool balance and 30.7% of the
single tenant concentration, and is shadow-rated investment grade.
Additionally, 181 Fremont Street is a mission-critical space for
Facebook, as it serves as the company's headquarters. Loans secured
by properties occupied by single tenants have been found to suffer
higher loss severities in an event of default. Term default risk is
low, as indicated by the relatively strong DBRS Term DSCR of 1.50x.
Only one loan, representing 1.7% of the pool balance, has a DBRS
Term DSCR below 1.10x. Additionally, eight of the largest 15 loans,
totaling 28.7% of the pool balance, have a DBRS Term DSCR above
1.50x. The tenth-largest loan in the pool – 181 Fremont Street
– exhibits credit characteristics consistent with a shadow rating
of AA. This loan represents 3.0% of the transaction balance.

Nineteen loans, representing 27.9% of the pool, are secured by
properties located in tertiary or rural markets, including three of
the top 15 loans. Properties located in tertiary and rural markets
are modeled with significantly higher loss severities than those
located in urban and suburban markets. Further, the
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Exit Debt Yield for
such loans are 9.0% and 10.0%, respectively, which are somewhat,
though not materially, higher than the overall pool metrics.

The DBRS Refi DSCR is 0.99x, indicating a higher refinance risk on
an overall pool level. In addition, 25 loans, representing 70.9% of
the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs below 1.00x. Ten of these loans,
comprising 31.1% of the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x,
including three of the top ten loans and five of the top 15 loans.
The pool's DBRS Refi DSCRs for these loans are based on a WA
stressed refinance constant of 9.87%, which implies an interest
rate of 9.24% amortizing on a 30-year schedule. This represents a
significant stress of 4.34% over the WA contractual interest rate
of the loans in the pool. DBRS models the probability of default
(POD) based on the more constraining of the DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS
Refi DSCR.

Ten loans, representing 25.5% of the pool, including five of the
largest 15 loans, are structured with interest-only (IO) payments
for the full term. An additional 21 loans, representing 56.8% of
the pool, have partial IO periods remaining that range from 24
months to 60 months. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by using the
amortizing debt service obligation, and the DBRS Refi DSCR is
calculated by considering the balloon balance and lack of
amortization when determining refinance risk. DBRS determines POD
based on the lower of the Term or Refi DSCR; therefore, loans that
lack amortization will be treated more punitively. This
concentration includes the shadow-rated loan, which totals 3.0% of
the pool and is full-term IO.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.


WELLS FARGO 2018-C45: Fitch to Rate Class H-RR Debt 'B-sf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2018-C45 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2018-C45.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $14,405,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5,559,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,388,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $180,000,000d class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $223,783,000d class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $461,135,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $110,344,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46,114,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,115,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,115,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,174,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,174,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14,234,000ac class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,235,000ac class F-RR 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,881,000ac class G-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7,411,000ac class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:

  -- $26,351,419 class J-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

(d) The initial certificate balances of Class A-3 and Class A-4 are
unknown and expected to be $403,783,000 in aggregate. The
certificate balances will be determined based on the final pricing
of those classes of certificates. The expected Class A-4 balance
range is $150,000,000 to $200,000,000 and the expected Class A-4
balance range is $203,783,000 to $253,783,000.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of June 20, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 49 loans secured by 89
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$658,765,419 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Barclays Bank
PLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC and C-III Commercial Mortgage
LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 68.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.0% and asset summary reviews
on 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The subject pool's leverage is higher than that of
recent Fitch-rated U.S. private label multiborrower transactions.
The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.12x is well below the YTD 2018 average
of 1.25x and the 2017 average of 1.26x. The Fitch LTV of 108.2% is
also above the YTD 2018 average of 103.8% and a 2017 average of
101.6%.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans make up 54.6% of the pool,
which is above the YTD 2018 average of 51.2% and slightly above the
2017 average of 53.1%. The pool has an LCI of 412 and a SCI of 412,
indicating a higher loan concentration than the YTD 2018 and 2017
LCI averages of 379 and 398, respectively. There was no additional
sponsor concentration.

Credit Opinion Loan: One loan in the pool, 181 Fremont Street (3.0%
of the pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of
'BBB-sf'. Excluding the credit opinion loan, the pool has a Fitch
DSCR and LTV of 1.12x and 109.4%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 9.9% below the most recent
year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period.
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the WFCM
2018-C45 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined further to 30% below Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C9: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 10 classes in
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C9, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-C9:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2012-C9, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-SB, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl.
E, and Cl. F was "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C9, Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $842 million
from $1.05 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 65 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 45% of the pool. Nine loans, constituting
18% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to a Herf of 28 at Moody's last
review.

Five loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $378,887 (for an average loss severity
of 1.1%).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan constituting 0.2% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 92%, compared to 91% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 1.71X and 1.24X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 24.0% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Chesterfield Towne Center Loan ($101.7
million -- 12.1% of the pool), which is secured by a nearly one
million square foot (SF) regional mall plus an adjacent 72,000 SF
retail property located in North Chesterfield, Virginia. The malls
anchors are Macy's, Garden Ridge, Sears and JC Penney. Sears and JC
Penney occupy their spaces on ground leases, while the Macy's and
Garden Ridge boxes are owned by the borrower. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 101%
and 1.04X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Town Pavillion Loan ($55.0 million
-- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by 844,000 SF of office
space and two parking garages in downtown Kansas City, Missouri.
The loan consists of four office buildings, two parking garages and
includes the 38-story Town Pavilion office tower, the second
tallest building in Kansas City. As of December 2017, occupancy was
92% compared to 88% as of March 2017 and 85% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.14X, respectively,
compared to 94% and 1.12X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Christina Center Loan ($45.1 million
-- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 303,000 SF power center
located in Newark, Delaware. The collateral consists of 162,000 SF
of owned retail space plus the land beneath a Costco store. In
addition to Costco, anchors include Dick's Sporting Goods (lease
expiration: November 2023) and Michaels (lease expiration: February
2028). As of December 2017, the property was 98% leased. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.00X, respectively, compared to
102% and 0.96X at the last review.


[*] Beard Group 25th Annual Distressed Investing Conference Nov. 26
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Conway MacKenzie is the latest sponsor for Beard Group's 2018
Distressed Investing (DI) Conference on Nov. 26, 2018.

Conway, a global management consulting and financial advisory firm,
joins law firm Foley & Lardner, DSI (Development Specialist Inc.),
provider of management consulting and financial advisory services,
and Longford Capital, a private investment company, in partnering
with the DI Conference, as it marks its Silver (25th) Anniversary
this year. This milestone denotes the event as the oldest,
influential DI conference in U.S. The day-long program will be held
at The Harmonie Club in New York City.  All four firms have been
supporting the DI Conference in past.

For a quarter of a century, the DI Conference's focus has been on
"Maximizing Profits in the Distressed Debt Market."  The event also
serves as a forum for leaders in corporate restructuring, lending
and debt and equity investments to gather and discuss the latest
topics and trends in the distressed investing industry, as well as
exchange ideas about high-profile chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings
and out-of-court restructurings. These are distinguished
professionals who place their resources and reputations at risk to
produce stellar results by preserving jobs, rebuilding broken
businesses, and efficiently redeploying underutilized assets in the
marketplace.

The conference will also feature:

     * a luncheon presentation of the Harvey K. Miller Award to
       Edward I. Altman, Professor of Finance, Emeritus, New York
       University's Stern School of Business.  The award will be
       presented by last year's winner billionaire Marc Lasry,
       Altman's  former student.

     * an evening awards dinner recognizing the 2018 Turnarounds
       & Workouts Outstanding Young Restructuring Lawyers.

To register for the one-day conference visit:

          https://www.distressedinvestingconference.com/
     Discounted early registration tickets are now available.

To learn how you can be a sponsor and participate in shaping the
day-long program, contact:

            Bernard Tolliver at bernard@beardgroup.com
                   or Tel: (240) 629-3300 x-149

To learn about media sponsorship opportunities to bring your outlet
into the view of leaders in corporate restructuring, lending and
debt and equity investments, and

To expand your network of news sources, contact:

                 Jeff Baxt at jeff@beardgroup.com
                    or (240) 629-3300, ext 150


[*] DBRS Reviews 809 Classes From 41 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 809 classes from 41 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the 809 classes
reviewed, DBRS upgraded 19 ratings, confirmed 789 ratings and
discontinued one rating.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The discontinued rating is
the result of full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of “RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology,” published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, agency credit,
seasoned and reperforming collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities listed below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect certain structural features
and historical performance that constrain the quantitative model
output.

-- Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2014-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-2, Class B-4
  
-- Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2014-3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-3, Class B-4

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-J1, Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2014-J1, Class B-3

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-J1, Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2014-J1, Class B-4

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-J2, Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2014-J2, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN1, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN1, Class IO-S-1

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN1, Class IO-S-2

-- CSMC Trust 2014-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2014-WIN1, Class A-IO-S

-- CSMC Trust 2015-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2015-WIN1, Class B-4

-- CSMC Trust 2015-WIN1, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2015-WIN1, Class A-IO-S

-- Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-5

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2014-OAK4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-OAK4, Class B-4

-- Onslow Bay Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-3

-- Onslow Bay Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-4

-- Onslow Bay Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-5

-- Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-3

-- Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2015-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-1, Class B-4

-- WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-3, Class B-4

-- Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-2, Mortgage-Backed
Certificates, Series 2017-2, Class A-3

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B2

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B2-IO

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B3

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B3-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B3-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B4

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B4-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B4-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL5,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL5, Class B5

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-2, Class A3

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-2, Class M2

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-2, Class M3

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-2, Class B1

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-2, Class B2

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B-5

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B-5A

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B5-IOA

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B-5B

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B5-IOB

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B-5C

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B5-IOC

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B-5D

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B5-IOD

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-4, Class B-7

-- APS Resecuritization Trust 2016-3, REMIC Certificates, Series
2016-3, Class 1-A

-- APS Resecuritization Trust 2016-3, REMIC Certificates, Series
2016-3, Class 2-A

-- Banc of America Funding 2015-R7 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class 1A1

-- Banc of America Funding 2015-R8 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class 1A1

-- Banc of America Funding 2016-R1 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class M2

-- Banc of America Funding 2016-R1 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Class A5

-- CSMC Series 2015-10R, CSMC Series 2015-10R, Class 3-A-2

-- CSMC Series 2015-10R, CSMC Series 2015-10R, Class 3-A-4

-- CSMC Series 2015-10R, CSMC Series 2015-10R, Class 3-A-10

-- CSMC Series 2015-12R, CSMC Series 2015-12R, Class 2-A-1

-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2015-6R, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Series 2015-6R, Class B

-- J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2015-4, Series
2015-4 Trust Certificates, Class 1-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2015-4, Series
2015-4 Trust Certificates, Class 1-A-4

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2015-R6, Resecuritization
Pass-Through Securities, Series 2015-R6, Class 1-A2

-- Nomura Resecuritization Trust 2015-8R, Resecuritization Trust
Securities, Series 2015-8R, Class 2A1


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $113.5MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from eight
transactions, backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM2

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-FM1

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2014
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-EC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrade on the IO
bond is a result of the pay down on the underlying bonds. The
rating downgrades on the remaining bonds are a result of the
erosion of enhancement available to the bonds and the pro rata pay
structure after credit support depletion date.

The principal methodology used in rating Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1 Cl. A-1 and Cl. A-2B; Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3 Cl. M-2; Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC4 Cl. M-2; MASTR Asset Backed
Securities Trust 2006-AM2 Cl. A-3; Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors
Trust 2006-FM1 Cl. A-2B; Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
Series 2006-HE1 Cl. M-1; Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4
Cl. A-3; and Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust
2005-EC1 Cl. M-2 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published
in January 2017. The methodologies used in rating Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1 Cl. S were "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $174MM RMBS Issued in 2005
------------------------------------------------------
oody's takes action on $174 Million of RMBS issued in 2005

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches, withdrawn the ratings of two underlying components, and
assigned the rating on one bond from two residential mortgage
backed securities transactions issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2

Cl. II-A-3, Assigned Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3-C, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3-NC, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Structured Securities Corp. Series 2005-1

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2018
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The
ratings downgraded reflect the weaker performance of the underlying
pools and bonds.

Moody's rating actions on Class II-A-3, Class II-A-3-C and Class
II-A-3-NC from American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2 are
driven by the correction of an error. Class II-A-3 has two
components, identified in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement as
Class II-A-3-C and Class II-A-3-NC Component Certificates, which
generate the cash-flows supporting the Class II-A-3 bond. At
closing Moody's erroneously assigned ratings to the components
Class II-A-3-C and Class II-A-3-NC instead of assigning a rating to
the Class II-A-3 certificates issued by American Home Mortgage
Investment Trust 2005-2 Trust. Moody's is now correcting this error
and assigning a rating to Class II-A-3, the certificate originally
issued by American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2 Trust.
Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings on Class II-A-3-C and Class
II-A-3-NC. Hereafter, Moody's will only publish the rating for
Class II-A-3 at the certificate level and will not publish ratings
for the related underlying components.

The principal methodology used in rating American Home Mortgage
Investment Trust 2005-2 Class II-A-3 and III-A was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. The
methodologies used in rating Lehman Structured Securities Corp.
Series 2005-1 Class IO were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Resecuritizations" published in February 2014 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities"
published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Takes Action on $85.9MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2006
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
and downgraded the ratings of two tranches from two transactions
issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)


Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2002-2

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)


RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions also reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The rating downgrades on Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2002-2
Classes AF-5 and AF-6 are due to outstanding interest shortfalls on
the bonds that Moody's does not expect to be reimbursed as interest
distributions amongst the collateral groups is not
cross-collateralized.

The rating action on HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust
2006-OPT3 Class III-A-4 also reflects the correction of an error.
In prior reviews, the cash flow model for HSI Asset Securitization
Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3 incorrectly cross-collateralized
principal collections between collateral groups, thus making more
cash available to pay Class III-A-4. This error has now been
corrected, and Moody's rating action reflects the corrected cash
flow allocation for the transaction.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May 2017.
Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to 4.5% for
the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver
of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to
rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 20 Tranches From 7 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 19 tranches and
downgraded one tranche from seven US residential mortgage backed
transactions (RMBS), backed by Alt-A and Option ARM loans, issued
by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-31

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-6

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-1

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-2XS

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 1-A5A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR11

Cl. 2A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and it updated loss expectations on those pools.
Moody's rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of credit
enhancement available to the bonds and total credit enhancement and
improvement in pool performances.

Moody's downgrade action on CL. M-1 from Sequoia Mortgage Trust
2004-3 is due to the level of the outstanding interest shortfall on
the bond, which is not expected to be recouped due to weak interest
recoupment mechanism on the bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in May
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 31 Tranches From Eight CDO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 29 classes from six
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions
and two classes from two CF collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

-- Apidos CLO X (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid down.
-- Cent CLO 18 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in June 2018.
-- CIFC Funding 2013-IV Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in May
2018.
-- LCM XIV Ltd. Partnership (CF CLO): optional redemption in May
2018.
-- Mach One 2004-1 LLC (CF CMBS): senior-most tranche paid down;
other rated tranches still outstanding.
-- Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd. (CF CMBS): senior-most tranche paid
down; other rated tranches still outstanding.
-- OZLM Funding V Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in February
2018.
-- THL Credit Wind River 2014-1 CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
redemption in May 2018.

  RATINGS DISCONTINUED                      
  
   Apidos CLO X
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
  D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
  
   Cent CLO 18 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-1                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
  B-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
  C-1                 NR                  A+ (sf)
  C-2                 NR                  A+ (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB- (sf)
   
   CIFC Funding 2013-IV Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2R                NR                  AAA (sf)
  C-2R                NR                  A- (sf)

   LCM XIV Ltd. Partnership
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AA (sf)
  C                   NR                  A (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
  F                   NR                  B (sf)

   Mach One 2004-1 LLC
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  K                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

   Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  C                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

   OZLM Funding V Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2-R               NR                  AA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  A (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)
  D                   NR                  BB (sf)
  E                   NR                  B (sf)

   THL Credit Wind River 2014-1 CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)


[*] S&P Discontinues Seven 'D ' Ratings on Six U.S. CMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on seven
classes from six U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions.

S&P said, "We discontinued these ratings according to our
withdrawal policy. We had previously lowered the ratings on these
classes to 'D (sf)' because of principal losses and/or accumulated
interest shortfalls that we believed would remain outstanding for
an extended period of time. We view a subsequent upgrade to a
rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely under the relevant
criteria for the classes within this review."

  RATINGS DISCONTINUED
                                              Rating
  Issuer         Series         Class       To          From

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
                 2004-LN2        B          NR          D (sf)

  Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-3                

                 2006-3          A-M        NR          D (sf)

  CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust
                 2006-CD3        A-J        NR          D (sf)
                 2006-CD3        A-1A       NR          D (sf)

  Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-TOP27                
                 2007-TOP27      D          NR          D (sf)

  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-FL6
                 2014-FL6        MTP2       NR          D (sf)

  CG-CCRE Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-FL2
                 2014-FL2        SSS        NR          D (sf)

  NR--Not rated.



[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 42 Classes From 15 US RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, in late May 2018, completed its review of 42
classes from 15 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2002 and 2005. All of these
transactions are backed by prime jumbo and Alternative-A
collateral. The review yielded 42 downgrades.

Analytical Considerations

S&P said, "The lowered ratings on 39 classes are based on the
implementation of our tail risk analysis per our criteria, "U.S.
RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash Flow Analysis For Pre-2009
Originations," published March 2, 2016. We apply this analysis when
the transaction contains fewer than 100 loans on the structure
level or on the group level (group level analysis is performed only
if the transaction has multiple groups and cross-subordination is
depleted).

As RMBS transactions season, the number of outstanding mortgage
loans backing them declines as loans are prepaid and default. As a
result, a liquidation and subsequent loss on one or a small number
of remaining loans at the tail end of a transaction's life may have
a disproportionate impact on remaining credit enhancement, which
could result in a level of credit instability that is inconsistent
with high ratings. According to S&P's criteria, additional minimum
loss projection estimations are calculated at each rating category
based on a certain number of loans defaulting and liquidating. To
address the potential that greater losses could result if the loans
with higher balances defaulted, the criteria use the largest
liquidation amounts for each rating category.

S&P said, "If the transaction's structure contains multiple
collateral groups and cross-subordination remains outstanding, we
will apply our tail risk analysis on the structure level because
cross-subordination is shared among all groups. In this situation,
we would calculate tail risk caps using the structure-level loan
count regardless of the groups' loan counts.

"If the transaction's structure contains multiple collateral groups
and cross-subordination no longer remains outstanding, we will
apply our tail risk analysis on the respective group because
group-level losses are not absorbed from cross-subordination. In
this situation, we would calculate tail risk caps using the
group-level loan count regardless of the structure loan count.

"Three of the rating actions are the result of implementing our
criteria, "U.S. RMBS Principal-Only Strip Securities For Pre-2009
Originations," published Oct. 11, 2016. Per our criteria, the
creditworthiness of these three principal-only strip classes are
equal to the weakest principal and interest senior class in the
structure. As a result, we lowered our ratings on three classes to
reflect the new ratings on the weakest principal and interest
senior class in the respective structure."


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 39 Classes From 18 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 39 classes from 18 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime and alternative-A collateral. The review yielded 18
upgrades, one downgrade, and 20 affirmations.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporate various considerations into its decisions to raise,
lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative ratings
suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations are
based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Expected short duration;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Priority of principal payments; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

The upgrades on the majority of the classes whose ratings were
raised by three or more notches reflect an increase in credit
support. The classes have benefitted from the failure of
performance triggers and/or reduced subordinate principal
distribution amounts, which has built credit support for these
classes. S&P believes that the increase in credit support for the
affected classes will be sufficient to withstand a higher level of
projected losses than previously anticipated.

The upgrade on class M-1 from GSAMP Trust 2004-SEA2 reflects its
expected shorter duration. S&P anticipates this class to be paid
down within the next 12 months. Additionally, credit support for
this class increased to 94.59% from 72.51% as of S&P's last review.
The projected pay down period and increase in credit support limit
the class' exposure to projected losses.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/2K1B3DA


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 57 Classes From 19 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 57 classes from 19 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2005 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed by a
mix of collateral. The review yielded 27 upgrades, one downgrade,
24 affirmations, three withdrawals, and two discontinuances.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends,
-- Historical interest shortfalls,
-- Priority of principal payments,
-- Virtual certainty of default,
-- Expected short duration until pay down,
-- Proportion of re-performing loans in the pool, and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

RATING ACTIONS

The rating affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support and collateral performance on these classes have
remained relatively consistent with our prior projections.

The upgrades on most of the classes with ratings raised by three or
more notches reflect an increase in credit support, decreased
delinquencies, or expected short duration until the bond is paid in
full. The classes have benefitted from the failure of performance
triggers or reduced subordinate principal distribution amounts,
which have built their credit support. S&P believes the increase in
credit support for the affected classes will be sufficient to
withstand a higher level of projected losses than previously
anticipated.

Further, the decrease in delinquencies lessens the projected losses
of the classes, which increases the available credit support.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           https://bit.ly/2JRtjVq


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 73 Classes From 9 US RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 73 classes from nine
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transactions
issued between 2008 and 2010. All of these transactions are backed
by prime and Alternative-A collateral. The review yielded 38
upgrades, one downgrade, 26 affirmations, and eight
discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Underlying collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"We raised our ratings on 28 classes because of increased credit
support. These classes benefited from sequential principal
allocation, which resulted in locking out principal to subordinate
classes and building credit support for these classes. Ultimately,
we believe these classes have credit support that is sufficient to
withstand losses at higher rating levels.

"We raised our ratings on three classes by two or more categories
due to expected short duration. Based on these classes' average
recent principal allocation, they are projected to pay down in a
short time period relative to projected loss timing, limiting their
exposure to potential losses."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/2KjhLKV


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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