/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/180610.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 10, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 160

                            Headlines

A10 TERM ASSET 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
ABACUS 2006-10: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A Notes
ALAMO RE: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on $400MM Class B Notes
BANK 2018-BNK12: Fitch Gives B- Rating on $856MM Class F Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP14: Moody's Hikes Class O Certs Rating to Ba2

BX TRUST 2018-GW: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
CALCULUS CMBS: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2006-4 Trust Units
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2015-2: Moody's Rates $3.7MM Class E-R Notes 'B1'
CASTLELAKE AIRCRAFT 2018-1: Fitch to Rate $65.5MM Cl. C Notes 'BB'
CD 2005-CD1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class H Certificates

CHEC TRUST 2004-2: Moody's Cuts Class M-1 Debt Rating to B1
CIFC FUNDING 2013-IV: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on $6.25MM F-RR Notes
CIFC FUNDING 2018-II: Moody's Rates $37.3MM Class D Notes 'Ba3'
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Fitch to Rate $6.6MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
COLT 2018-2: Fitch to Rate $8.95-Mil. Class B-2 Certificates 'B+sf'

COMM 2013-CCRE9: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certificates
COMM MORTGAGE 2015-CCRE24: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on F Certs
CSFB MORTGAGE 2006-TFL2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on $16MM Cl. L Debt
DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2018-2: S&P Rates $11MM Cl. B-2 Notes 'B'
DT AUTO 2018-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on $48MM Class E Notes

EVANS GROVE: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Notes
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-3INV: Fitch Gives B Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-3INV: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt 'Ba2'
FLATIRON CLO 2013-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on $12MM E Notes to Caa1

GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to 'Csf'
GRAMERCY REAL 2005-1: Fitch Hikes $7.8MM Class G Debt Rating to B
GRAND VIEW FINANCIAL: Seeks to Modify Terms of Keller Employment
HALCYON LOAN 2014-3: Moody's Cuts $12MM Cl. F Notes Rating to Caa1
JACKSON MILL: Moody's Rates $5.5 Million Class F-R Notes 'B3(sf)'

JP MORGAN 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on $2.8MM Class H Certs
JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Fitch Cuts Class G Certs Rating to 'CCCsf'
JP MORGAN 2018-5: S&P Assigns B+(sf) Rating on Class B-5 Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C22: Moody's Hikes Class UHP Debt to Ba1

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C3: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on G Certs
LEAF RECEIVABLES 12: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Cl. E-2 Debt
MADISON AVENUE 2013-650M: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on E Certs
MCA FUND II: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C3: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certs

NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-RPL1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'Bsf'
PSMC TRUST 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class B-4 Certs
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-6: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on B-4 Debt
STACR 2018-SPI2: Fitch to Rate $52-Mil. Class M2-B Certs 'B+sf'
THL CREDIT 2014-1: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on $11.7MM Cl. F Notes

TOWD POINT 2018-2: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class B2 Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. X-B Debt
UBS COMMERCIAL 2018-C10: Fitch Rates Class F-RR Certs 'B-sf'
WELLS FARGO 2005-11: Moody's Hikes Class II-A-4 Debt Rating to Ba3
WELLS FARGO 2013-BTC: S&P Hikes Rating on Class F Certs to BB(sf)

WELLS FARGO 2015-LC22: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class X-F Certs
[*] Beard Group 25th Annual Distressed Investing Conference Nov. 26
[*] DBRS Reviews 453 Classes From 35 US RMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Hikes $940MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.5MM Subprime RMBS Issued Before 2000

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $161.8MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $62.5MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on 8 Tranches From 3 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

A10 TERM ASSET 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-1 issued by A10 Term Asset
Financing 2016-1, LLC:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the underlying loans within the pool. The transaction consists of
15 loans secured by 16 transitional commercial real estate assets,
including office, retail, industrial, hotel and multifamily
properties. A total of seven underlying loans are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted within three separate
portfolios. According to the May 2018 remittance, there has been a
collateral reduction of 45.6% since issuance, as 13 loans have been
repaid in full. The remaining loans benefit from low leverage on a
per-unit basis, with the weighted-average debt yield based on the
most recently reported net operating income and outstanding trust
balance at 9.0%, which is considered healthy given the pool
consists of stabilizing assets.

Most loans were originally structured with two- to four-year terms
and include built-in extensions and future funding facilities
available as the properties move toward stabilization, both of
which are extended at the lender's sole discretion. The reserve
account established for future funding obligations has a current
balance of $13.2 million, with remaining future funding options of
$18.6 million. According to the most recent reporting, the
collateral assets have stable debt yields; however, the majority of
the properties continue to be in the process of stabilization in
various stages of progress as compared with the respective plans
for each loan outlined at issuance. Details on the stabilization
status for pivotal loans within the pool are provided in the Loan
Commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, as discussed below.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of the offered notes other
than the Class A-1 Senior Fixed Rate Notes and Class A-2 Senior
Fixed Rate Notes, ultimate recovery of deferred collateralized note
interest amounts (inclusive of interest payable thereon at the
applicable rate, to the extent permitted by law). The transaction
is a standard sequential-pay waterfall.


ABACUS 2006-10: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
notes issued by Abacus 2006-10, Ltd.

Cl. A, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

The Cl. A notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating of Rated Notes because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
credit quality of reference obligations has maintained stable since
last review, as evidenced by WARF. The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Abacus 2006-10, Ltd. is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (100% of the reference obligation pool balance)
issued in 2004 and 2005. As of the April 23, 2018 trustee report,
the aggregate notional balance of the transaction has decreased to
$1.06 billion, from $3.75 billion at issuance. The decrease in the
notional amount is the result of the combination of regular
amortization and the write-downs from the underlying CMBS reference
obligations.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), a primary measure of credit quality with
credit assessments completed for all of the collateral; weighted
average life (WAL); weighted average recovery rate (WARR); number
of asset obligors; and pair-wise asset correlation. These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
3691, compared to 3725 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 (16.3%
compared to 18.3% at last review), A1-A3 (7.1% compared to 1.5% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (14.6% compared 11.3%), Ba1-Ba3 (12.0%
compared to 23.1%), B1-B3 (17.0% compared to 13.5%), and Caa1-Ca/C
(32.9% compared to 32.4% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.7 years, compared to 2.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS collateral look-through reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled 25 obligors, compared to 29 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 55.6%, compared to
55.3% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The servicing decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities:

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of Rated Notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. The Rated Notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in the ratings of the underlying reference obligations and
credit assessments. Holding all other parameters constant, notching
down 100% of the reference obligation pool by -1 notch would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of one
notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Ba1). Notching up 100% of the reference obligation pool by
+1 notch would result in an average modeled rating movement on the
rated notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


ALAMO RE: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on $400MM Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following Principal At-Risk Variable
Rate Notes issued by Alamo Re Limited, a special purpose insurer
vehicle in Bermuda as follows:

  --$400,000,000 2015-1 Class B Principal At-Risk Variable Rate
Notes; scheduled maturity June 7, 2019 affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable.

The rating affirmation of the 2015-1 Class B Notes is based on
Fitch's annual surveillance review of the Notes coinciding with an
updated evaluation of the natural catastrophe risk, counterparty
exposure, collateral assets and structural performance.

Fitch expects the 2015-1 Class A Principal At-Risk Variable Rate
Notes to be paid in full on June 7, 2018, and will address the
rating at that time.

The Series 2015-1 Class A and Class B Notes had significant
potential loss exposure to Hurricane Harvey in 2017 but the insured
losses did not reach the appropriate attachment point on either
Note and did not trigger a principal loss to investors. Those
insured losses do not roll over or accumulate with any losses that
may occur in the upcoming risk period for the Class B Notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Series 2015-1 Class B Notes provide multi-year protection for
the Subject Business written by the Texas Windstorm Insurance
Association (TWIA) on an annual aggregate basis using an indemnity
trigger. The notes are exposed to insured property losses due to
'named storms' within the covered area, which solely covers the 14
first-tier, coastal counties of Texas (and a small portion of
Harris County).

On April 23, 2018, AIR Worldwide (AIR), acting as the Reset Agent,
completed a reset report for the 2015-1 Notes that provided updated
annual attachment probabilities for the Class B Notes for the
Annual Risk Period beginning June 1, 2018 using AIR's escrowed
software models and TWIA's updated Subject Business data. At each
reset date, TWIA may exercise an option to decrease (or increase)
the respective attachment levels on each of the classes within an
exceedance probability range of 4.40% to 1.00%.

Effective June 1, 2018, the Updated Attachment Level for the 2015-1
Class B Notes decreases to $4.20 billion (from $4.50 billion for
the previous Risk Period that ends May 31, 2017) and the Updated
Exhaustion Level is $4.60 billion (a decrease from $4.90 billion).
The updated probability of attachment increases slightly to 1.34%
(from 1.30%). This corresponds to an implied rating of 'BB-', per
the calibration table listed in Fitch's "Insurance-Linked
Securities Rating Criteria." There was a slight reduction in the
Updated Modeled Expected Loss to 1.21% (from 1.22%), which will
lead to a 1 bp decline in the Updated Risk Interest Spread to
4.39%.

Hannover Rueck SE (Hannover), a reinsurance company that acts as a
transformer, sits between TWIA and Alamo Re and has an Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'A+' with a Stable Outlook (affirmed on
July 17, 2017).

The Permitted Investments meet Fitch's criteria for highly-rated
U.S. money market funds.

Fitch believes the notes and indirect counterparties are performing
as required. There have been no reported early redemption notices
or events of default, and all agents remain in place.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This rating is sensitive to the occurrence of a Covered Event(s),
the counterparty rating of Hannover and the rating on the permitted
investments held in the respective collateral accounts.

If qualifying Covered Events occur that cause annual aggregate
losses to exceed the Series 2015-1 Class B Updated Attachment
Level, Fitch will downgrade the Notes reflecting an effective
default and issue a Recovery Rating.

To a much lesser extent, the Series 2015-1 Class B Notes may be
downgraded if the money market funds should 'break the buck',
Hannover fails to make timely retrocession premium payments or TWIA
materially changes its mission or operations.

The catastrophe risk element is highly model-driven and actual
losses may differ from the results of the simulation analysis. The
AIR escrow models may not reflect future methodology enhancements
by AIR, which may have an adverse or beneficial effect on the
implied rating of the notes were such future methodology
considered.


BANK 2018-BNK12: Fitch Gives B- Rating on $856MM Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the BANK 2018-BNK12 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2018-BNK12:

  -- $33,530,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $76,220,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,500,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $210,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $243,028,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $599,278,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $123,066,000b class X-B 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $83,470,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39,596,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40,665,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,455,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22,473,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,561,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,455,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22,473,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,561,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

  -- $24,613,456ab class X-G;

  -- $24,613,456a class G;

  -- $45,058,497.70ac RR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing
    no less than 5% of the estimated fair value of all
    classes of regular certificates issued by the
    issuing entity as of the closing date.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on May 9, 2018, the
rating on class X-B changed from 'AA-sf' to 'AAAsf' as there will
be no cashflow generated from the class B to the X-B notes. The
classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
May 29, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 63 loans secured by 95
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$901,169,954 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by: Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC; Wells Fargo Securities,
LLC; and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.3% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool exhibits
better leverage metrics than other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.60x is stronger than the YTD 2018 average of 1.25x and 2017
average of 1.26x. The pool's Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 89.8% is
lower than the YTD 2018 and 2017 averages of 103.6% and 101.6%,
respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion and
multifamily cooperative loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and
loan-to-value (LTV) of 1.18x and 108.5%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans comprising 23.3%
of the transaction received an investment-grade credit opinion.
Fair Oaks Mall (8.9% of the pool) received a credit opinion of
'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. 181 Fremont Street (6.4% of the
pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*'. The
Gateway (6.1% of the pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of
'BBBsf*'. Apple Campus 3 (1.9% of the pool) received a credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. Net of these loans,
the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.68x and 96.8%, respectively.

Co-op Collateral: The transaction contains a total of 22 loans
(11.9% of the pool) secured by multifamily cooperatives located
primarily within the greater New York City metro area. The weighted
average (WA) Fitch DSCR and LTV of the co-op loans as rentals are
4.39x and 33.2%, respectively. The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV net of
co-op loans are 1.18x and 108.5%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.5% below
the most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI
was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during
this period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2018-BNK12 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP14: Moody's Hikes Class O Certs Rating to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes
and affirmed the rating on one class in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP14, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-TOP14 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. N, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. O, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I Classes (L, M, N and O) were upgraded
primarily due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as
Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 19% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 27% of the
pool have either defeased or that have debt yields exceeding 12.0%
are scheduled to mature within the next 12 months.

The rating IO Class X-1 was affirmed based on the credit
performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.2% of the
current balance, compared to 0.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.4% of the original
pooled balance, and remains unchanged since Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2004-TOP14, Cl. L, Cl. M, Cl. N and Cl. O were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2004-TOP14, Cl. X1 were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017 .

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 14, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $13.3 million
from $894.5 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 2.3% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of nine, the same as at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 8.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 2.4%). There are no loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 91% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 91% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 30%, compared to
37% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.70X and 4.76X,
respectively, compared to 1.63X and 3.83X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 46% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Shops at Thoroughbred Square VI Loan ($2.6
million -- 19.5% of the pool), which is secured by a three building
strip center located in Franklin, Tennessee approximately 17 miles
south of Nashville. The property is shadow anchored by a 20-screen
movie theater, Lowe's and Walmart. The property was 93% leased as
of September 2017 compared to 100% as of December 2016 and December
2015. The loan is fully amortizing and has paid down 56% since
securitization. The loan is scheduled to mature in February 2024.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 42% and 2.72X, respectively,
compared to 46% and 2.48X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Modesto Office Park Loan ($2.0
million -- 14.7% of the pool), which is secured by five buildings
comprising 88,000 square feet (SF) of a suburban office park in
Modesto, California. The property was 94% leased as of March 2018
compared to 91% as of March 2017 and 95% in March 2016. The loan is
fully amortizing and has paid down 60% since securitization. The
loan is scheduled to mature in July 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 22% and >4.00X, respectively, compared to 26% and
>4.00X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Scarborough Lane Shoppes Loan ($1.5
million -- 10.5% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
property located in Duck, North Carolina. The property was 83%
leased as of April 2018 compared to 97% in December 2016 and 100%
in December 2015. The loan is fully amortizing and has paid down
57% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and
2.8X, respectively, compared to 42% and 2.6X at the last review.


BX TRUST 2018-GW: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-GW (the Certificates) to be issued by BX Trust 2018-GW:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

All classes have been privately placed. The Class X-CP and Class
X-EXT balances are notional, with the notional balances referencing
the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D certificates.

The subject property is an oceanfront luxury resort with an AAA
Four Diamond rating located on Wailea Beach on the island of Maui
in the state of Hawaii. Originally developed in 1991, the property
features 776 hotel keys, seven food and beverage outlets, 100,000
square feet (sf) of meeting/event space, a 50,000 sf spa and a
20,000 sf recreation outlet center for children. The resort also
features 120 third-party-owned villas, 61 of which are currently
enrolled in the hotel's rental program. Loan proceeds are being
used to facilitate the acquisition of the subject as part of a
three-property portfolio transaction that also includes the Arizona
Biltmore and the La Quinta Resort & Club. The subject financing
package totals $800.0 million, with $510.5 million structured as
first mortgage debt and $289.5 million structured as mezzanine
debt. The sponsor, Blackstone Real Estate Partners VIII-NQ L.P., is
acquiring the portfolio for an aggregate purchase price of $1.635
billion, $980 million of which is allocated to the Grand Wailea.
Inclusive of $20.0 million in closing costs, the sponsor will have
a total cost basis of $1.0 billion in the subject property. The
seller of the portfolio, The Government of Singapore Investment
Corp., acquired the portfolio out of bankruptcy in 2013 for
approximately $1.5 billion when the prior ownership, made up of a
group of junior mezzanine lenders, took over the property in a
debt-to-equity swap in January 2011. Up to that point, Morgan
Stanley Real Estate Fund had historically owned the property after
acquiring it in 2007, but struggled during the financial crisis and
ultimately lost control when the loan transferred to special
servicing in October 2009. The prior $1.0 billion portfolio
mortgage debt, which was securitized in COMM 2006-CNL2, was fully
repaid with no loss incurred.

The property has performed well over the past several years as
compared with its competitive set of luxury properties on Maui,
with overall revenue per available room (RevPAR) penetration
falling below 100.0% only in 2015 but averaging 110.0% since 2008.
The underperformance in RevPAR penetration in 2015 can largely be
attributed to the $22.6 million ($28,182 per key) guest room and
suite renovation that took place between 2014 and 2015. Since the
renovation, the average daily rate (ADR) has climbed 36.0% from
$413.19 in 2013 to $561.86 as of the trailing 12 months (T-12)
ended January 2018. The considerable rate lift corresponds with net
cash flow growth of 60.4% over the same period. Since bottoming out
in 2009 and excluding the renovation years, the subject has seen
consistent year-over-year RevPAR growth, reporting a T-12 January
2018 RevPAR 76.5% above the 2009 low. While the overall luxury
hotel market was severely affected by the Great Recession, the
subject fared well against its competitive set, reporting average
RevPAR penetration of 116.7% over the three-year period between
2008 to 2010. The overall increase in RevPAR since 2009 can largely
be attributed to a combination of property renovations, which have
averaged $12.2 million ($15,743 per key) annually over the past
five years, and general market recovery.

Given the high barriers to entry on Maui, which are reflected in
the lack of new supply and projects under construction, there is
minimal threat of over-building despite the very high RevPAR
figures achieved on the island. The two most recently delivered
hotels carry Residence Inn and Westin flags, while the only project
under construction is a 388-key Hilton Grand Vacations Club in
Kihei. None of these are expected to be directly competitive with
the subject property. Maui is served by three airports: Kahului
Airport, Kapalua Airport and Hana Airport. The island further
benefits from the increased airlift to the island, as seat capacity
to Kahului Airport rose 2.8% to 2.3 million in 2016. In addition to
the increase in airline flights, total visitor expenditures oin
Maui grew 5.2% to $4.8 billion in 2017. In addition to the senior
mortgage and mezzanine debt, the sponsor will be contributing
$200.0 million of fresh equity to close. At 0.90 times (x), the
DBRS refinance debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) on the mortgage
debt is low for a hotel loan, even one with an excellent location
and flag such as the subject. Term default risk is considered
modest, as reflected in a DBRS Term DSCR of 1.59x, which assumes a
2.72% loan margin that will contractually increase by 25 basis
points during the fourth of five one-year extension options and a
LIBOR of 3.07% based on the DBRS's "Unified Interest Rate Model for
Rating U.S. Structure Finance Transactions" methodology, which is
lower than the 3.1% LIBOR strike of the interest rate cap in place
at closing.

At a discount of 55.6%, the DBRS value of $470.2 million is
considerably below the as-is appraised value of $1.06 billion.
Further, the appraiser concludes to an as-stabilized value of $1.23
billion, which indicates further upside as the recent renovations
continue to enhance property performance. While the leverage on the
full $510.5 million mortgage loan is high at a DBRS loan-to-value
(LTV) of 108.6%, the last $25.5 million is unrated, and the
cumulative investment-grade-rated proceeds of $383.0 million have a
more modest DBRS LTV of 81.5%. Additionally, the appraiser
concluded to a land value of $232.8 million, which is well in
excess of AAA proceeds. As a result of the property's excellent
location and brand affiliation, continued increase in ADR as a
result of recent renovations, lack of competitive new supply and
strong value-add upside potential, DBRS anticipates that the
mortgage loan will perform well during its fully extended
seven-year term. At refinance, the irreplaceable location, which
drives extremely high investor appetite for an asset such as the
subject, should greatly insulate the property value from volatility
in the overall market.

Class X-CP and Class X-EXT are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


CALCULUS CMBS: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2006-4 Trust Units
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
trust units issued by Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust:

Series 2006-4 Trust Units, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19,
2017 Downgraded to C (sf)

Series 2006-4 Trust Units are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating of Rated Notes because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
While the credit quality of reference obligations has deteriorated
since last review, as evidenced by WARF and WARR, this did not
result in the downgrade of Rated Notes given their current ratings
level. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust is a static synthetic credit
linked notes transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default
swaps referencing 100% commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS).

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), a primary measure of credit quality with
credit assessments completed for all of the collateral; weighted
average life (WAL); weighted average recovery rate (WARR); number
of asset obligors; and pair-wise asset correlation. These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
5810, compared to 4629 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 (15.9%
compared to 21.0% at last review), A1-A3 (12.3% compared to 0.0% at
last review), Ba1-Ba3 (15.9% compared to 38.9%), and Caa1-Ca/C
(55.9% compared to 40.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.2 years, compared to 1.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS collateral look-through reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 4.4%, compared to 6.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled 5 obligors, compared to 6 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 60.0%, compared to
59.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The servicing decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities:

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of Rated Notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. The Rated Notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in the ratings of the underlying reference obligations and
credit assessments. Holding all other parameters constant, notching
down 100% of the reference obligation pool by -1 notch would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero
notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement
of Baa3 to Ba1). Notching up 100% of the reference obligation pool
by +1 notch would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2015-2: Moody's Rates $3.7MM Class E-R Notes 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO
2015-2, Ltd.:

US$384,000,000 Class A-1R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class A-1R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$34,100,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$3,700,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned B1 (sf)

Additionally, Moody's has taken rating actions on the following
outstanding notes issued by the Issuer on the original issuance
date (the "Original Closing Date"):

US$69,200,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 7,
2015 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$28,600,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2027 (the "Class B Notes"), Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May
7, 2015 Assigned A2 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Carlyle CLO Management L.L.C. (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected loss
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 31, 2018 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of certain
classes of notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously
issued on May 7, 2015, the Original Closing Date. On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer used the proceeds from the issuance of
the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes.

Moody's rating action on the Class A-1 Notes is primarily a result
of the refinancing, which increases excess spread available as
credit enhancement to the rated notes. Additionally, Moody's
expects the Issuer to continue to benefit from a portfolio weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) level that is higher than the
covenanted test level.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of each class of the Issuer's notes is subject to
uncertainty relating to certain factors and circumstances, and this
uncertainty could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of Moody's
ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the Manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by the Manager or other transaction parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: Investing in collateral of better credit
quality, or better than Moody's expected credit performance of the
assets collateralizing the transaction can lead to positive CLO
performance. Conversely, a negative shift in the credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: During the amortization period, the pace of
deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds is an important
source of uncertainty. Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate
owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the Manager, which could have a significant
impact on the ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO
notes, beginning with those notes having the highest payment
priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Weighted average life (WAL): The notes' ratings can be sensitive
to the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
could lengthen owing to any decision by the Manager to reinvest
into new issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can
increase the default risk horizon and assumed cumulative default
probability of CLO collateral.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.


CASTLELAKE AIRCRAFT 2018-1: Fitch to Rate $65.5MM Cl. C Notes 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Outlooks
to the notes concurrently issued by Castlelake Aircraft Structured
Trust 2018-1 (CLAS 2018-1):

  -- $731,200,000 class A asset-backed notes 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $114,600,000 class B asset-backed notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $65,500,000 class C asset-backed notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable.

CLAS 2018-1 expects to use the note proceeds to acquire the
aircraft-owning entity (AOE) series A, B and C notes issued by
CLSec Holdings 16S DAC and CLSec Holdings 17S LLC (collectively,
the AOE issuers). Each AOE issuer will use the note proceeds to
acquire 36 midlife aircraft from funds affiliated with and managed
by Castlelake, L.P (Castlelake).

The pool will be serviced by Castlelake, with the notes secured by
each aircraft's future lease and residual cash flows. This is the
first Fitch-rated aircraft ABS serviced by Castlelake (NR).
Castlelake has sponsored and serviced four prior aircraft ABS since
2014.

Funds managed by Castlelake, the sellers of the aircraft to CLAS
2018-1, will initially retain the class C notes and will also
provide equity to the transaction, consistent with similar
investments made by the funds in prior CLAS transactions.
Therefore, Castlelake will have a vested interest in performance
outside of merely collecting servicing fees. Fitch views this
positively since Castlelake will have a significant interest in
servicing the transaction adequately and generating positive cash
flows through management of the assets over the life of the
transaction.

As of the cutoff date, Castlelake funds own 13 of the pool's 36
aircraft, with the remaining 23 owned and/or managed by six other
lessors/airlines. The 23 aircraft are currently subject to executed
purchase agreements or letters of intent (LOIs) for sale to
Castlelake funds. Castlelake funds will acquire these remaining
assets and transfer to the AOE issuers and their subsidiaries
during the contribution period. Fitch views this negatively, since
the pool will be exposed to counterparty risks, particularly if any
agreements or LOIs are not finalized during the contribution
period.

The contribution period will end 360 days from closing, longer than
periods in most prior aircraft ABS that have typically lasted 270
days. Fitch views this negatively, since initial cash flows may be
lower in the first year if certain aircraft are not novated in a
timely fashion. Additionally, the longer the contribution period
is, the longer the pool will be exposed to risks associated with a
bankruptcy of Castlelake and the counterparties that own aircraft
in the proposed pool. However, if any aircraft or replacements are
not transferred, the applicable debt amount will be prepaid to
noteholders from the acquisition account, offsetting this risk.

The senior amortization schedule is among the slowest observed for
recent transactions, with a 14-year straightline schedule for the
first three years. Most recent transactions have had 12- or 11-year
schedules in the first couple of years. Additionally, there are no
partial cash sweeps available to noteholders, a feature that has
benefitted performance in many recent aircraft ABS. However, the
weighted average (WA) age of the pool is younger than most recent
transactions, and thus the pool's remaining useful life is longer.
Additionally, the stronger lessee credit quality and lease rate
factors (LRFs) partially offset risks associated with the slower
amortization schedule.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Assets, Concentrated Maturities: The pool is largely liquid,
midlife A320s and B737s with a WA age of 9.7 years. Four A330s and
one B777-300ER, widebodies prone to higher transition costs,
comprise 22.6% of the pool. No aircraft will reach lease maturity
until 2020, at which time 13 aircraft comprising 38.8% of the pool
will come to lease expiry, a factor Fitch considers negative.

Weak Lessee Credits: Most of the pool's 18 lessees are either
unrated or speculative-grade credits typical of aircraft ABS.
However, Fitch does rate five lessees, including Alaska Airlines
(BBB-), Air Canada (BB-) and Southwest (BBB+), a factor Fitch
considers positive. 'B' or 'CCC' IDRs were assumed for unrated
lessees and stressed downward in recessions.

Technological Risk Increasing: A320ceo and B737 NG aircraft face
replacement from the A320neo and B737 MAX in the next decade.
Widebody replacement technology is also on the way from both Airbus
and Boeing. Fitch expects replacement and competing technology to
pressure values over the next decade. However, the long lead time
for replacement should insulate the pool from these risks.

Adequate Structural Support: The amortization schedules and
triggers are consistent with recent midlife aircraft ABS, although
the senior note's schedules are slightly slower and there are no
partial cash sweeps, factors Fitch considers negative. All series
pay in full prior to their legal final maturity dates when applying
cash flows commensurate with the ratings.

Experienced Midlife Aircraft Servicer: CLAS 2018-1 will largely
depend on Castlelake's experience to ensure stable performance.
Fitch considers Castlelake a strong servicer of midlife to
end-of-life aircraft, evidenced by their prior ABS performance,
with all CLAS transactions performing within expectations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Due to the correlation between global economic conditions and the
airline industry, the ratings may be affected by global
macro-economic or geopolitical factors over the remaining term of
the transaction. Therefore, Fitch evaluated various sensitivity
scenarios, which could affect future cash flows from the pool and
recommended ratings for the notes.

Increased competition, largely from newly established Asia-Pacific
(APAC) lessors, has contributed to declining lease rates in the
aircraft leasing market. Additionally, certain variants have been
more prone to value declines and lease rates due to oversupply
issues. Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis assuming 15% and 25%
decreases to Fitch's lease rate factor (LRF) curve for narrow and
widebody aircraft, respectively, to observe the effect of declining
lease rates on the pool. Lease rates in this scenario are well
below market rates.

Cash flow generated in this scenario declined from the primary
scenario by 9%-10%. All three series fail the 'Asf', but class A
passes the 'BBBsf' scenario. Each series of notes would likely
receive a downgrade of two to three notches. Class C does not pass
the 'Bsf' scenario and would likely fall to 'CCCsf' or lower.

All aircraft in the pool face replacement programs over the next
decade, particularly the A320ceo and B737 NG aircraft in the form
of A320neo and B737 MAX aircraft, which have already started
delivering. Airbus plans to deliver the A330neo later this year,
which if received well, could affect the existing A330 fleet.
Certain appraisers have started to adjust market values in response
to this replacement risk; the majority of the pool's market value
appraisals are slightly lower than half-life base values. Fitch
believes current generation aircraft are well insulated due to
large operator bases and the long lead time for full replacement,
particularly when considering conservative retirement ages and
aggressive production schedules for new Airbus and Boeing
technology.

However, Fitch believes a sensitivity scenario is warranted to
address these risks. Therefore, Fitch utilized a scenario in which
the LMM of market values from each appraiser was utilized to
determine each aircraft's value. Fitch additionally utilized a 25%
residual assumption rather than the base level of 50% to stress
end-of-life proceeds for each asset in the pool. Lease rates drop
fairly significantly under this scenario, and aircraft are
essentially sold for scrap at the end of their useful lives.

This scenario is the most stressful compared with the other
scenarios, as 'Asf' cash flow drops to $980 million, compared with
$1.11 billion in the primary scenario. The class A notes barely
fail the 'BBBsf' scenario, while the class B notes only pass the
'Bsf' scenario. The class C notes would likely fall below 'Bsf', to
'CCCsf' or 'CCsf', due to the severe drop in cash flows.

Although a relevant scenario to consider, Fitch believes the
stresses are very conservative, particularly when considering
observed market values for current generation A320s and B737s.
Fitch does not expect a significant effect from the neo or MAX
variants until well into the next decade or 2026.

The pool has two aircraft on lease to Alitalia, the Italian flag
carrier currently in administration. The airline is maintaining
lease payments on time, and there have been no payment interruption
issues. However, if the airline shuts down and ceases operations,
the repossession scenario could be longer than what is typically
observed due to the complexity of Italian bankruptcy laws.
Additionally, although the airline is in stable financial
condition, Fitch assumed an immediate bankruptcy of Qatar Airways,
due to the effects of the Saudi-led block. In both scenarios, Fitch
assumed 10 additional months of downtime due to jurisdictional
issues following immediate default.

Although cash flows drop slightly in these runs due to the extended
downtime related to the assumed bankruptcies, there was no impact
on the ratings. Fitch also views this scenario as unlikely, since
it would assume an immediate bankruptcy of both airlines even
though both are current on their respective leases, per Castlelake.


CD 2005-CD1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class H Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded one class and affirmed the
ratings on three classes in CD 2005-CD1 Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CD1 as
follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. E was upgraded based primarily on an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The
deal has paid down 11% since Moody's last review and 98% since
securitization.

The rating on Cl. F was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Cl. G and Cl. H were affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 19.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $97.7 million
from $3.88 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
54% of the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 60% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Forty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $208 million (for an average loss
severity of 36%). One loan, constituting 5.0% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
2150 Joshua Path loan ($4.9 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 41,000 SF suburban office building located in
Hauppauge, Long Island, NY. The loan transferred to special
servicing in July 2012 due to payment default. The master servicer
has deemed this loan non-recoverable and Moody's anticipates a
significant loss on this loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 6.3% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $8.0 million (a 72% expected loss on average)
from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 119%, compared to 120% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 0.89X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 79% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Cedarbrook Corporate Center Portfolio Loan
($52.9 million -- 54% of the pool), which is secured by a
four-building complex consisting of three Class A research and
development buildings and one Class A office structure. The
property is located within the 1.5 million SF Cedarbrook Corporate
Center office park in Cranbury, New Jersey. The property was 60%
leased as of March 2018. The loan previously transferred to special
servicing in June 2015, was modified in June 2016 and then
subsequently returned to the master servicer in September 2016. The
loan modification included a term extension and an increased
interest only period. The loan is currently on the watchlist due to
low DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.74X,
respectively.

The second largest loan is the ConnectiCare Office Building Loan
($13.4 million -- 13.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 100,540
SF single tenant occupied office property located in Farmington,
Connecticut. As of December 2017, the property was 100% occupied by
ConnectiCare Insurance with a lease expiration in March 2023. Due
to the single tenancy, Moody's value incorporated a lit/dark
analysis. The loan passed its anticipated repayment date in July
2015 and is benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 105% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.88X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the ICI-Glidden Research Center Loan
($11.0 million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 194,600
SF single tenant office property located in Strongsville, Ohio, a
suburb of Cleveland. As of December 2017, the property was 100%
occupied by AKZO Nobel Coating, Inc. with a lease expiration in
December 2018. Due to the single tenancy, Moody's value
incorporated a lit/dark analysis. The loan passed its anticipated
repayment date in June 2014 and has benefited from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.31X, respectively,
compared to 89% and 1.13X at last review.


CHEC TRUST 2004-2: Moody's Cuts Class M-1 Debt Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of CHEC Loan
Trust 2004-2 Class M-1.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHEC Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on CHEC Loan Trust 2004-2 Class M-1 is due to
outstanding interest shortfalls on the bonds that are not expected
to be reimbursed due to a weak interest shortfall reimbursement
mechanism on the tranche. The action further reflects the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


CIFC FUNDING 2013-IV: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on $6.25MM F-RR Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by CIFC Funding 2013-IV, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$5,000,000 Class X-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$305,000,000 Class A-1-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$15,000,000 Class A-2-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-2-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$59,000,000 Class B-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$23,500,000 Class C-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$31,500,000 Class D-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class E-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class E-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

US$6,250,000 Class F-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class F-RR Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

CIFC Asset Management LLC manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes addresses the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflects the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 29, 2018 in
connection with 1) the refinancing of the Class A-1R, A-2R, B-1R,
B-2R C-1R, C-2R, C-3R and D-R of secured notes, previously issued
on February 27, 2017 and 2) the refinancing of the Class E secured
notes, previously issued on November 14, 2013. On the Refinancing
Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing
Notes to redeem in full the Existing Notes and Original Notes. On
the Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one class of
subordinated notes that will remain outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: reinstatement and extension of the
reinvestment period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call
period; changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to
the overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2796

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.10%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.16 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.


CIFC FUNDING 2018-II: Moody's Rates $37.3MM Class D Notes 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by CIFC Funding 2018-II, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$520,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$84,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$42,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$52,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$37,300,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

CIFC Funding 2018-II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

CIFC CLO Management II LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $800,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2940

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Fitch to Rate $6.6MM Class G-RR Certs 'B-sf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2018-C5 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $10,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $185,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $208,766,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,000,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $523,731,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55,965,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28,400,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29,236,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57,636,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,782,000abd class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,782,000bd class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14,300,000bcd class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,871,000bc class F-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,682,000bc class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

The following class is not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  -- $29,236,381bc class H-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.
(d) The initial certificate balances of Class D (and the notional
amount of Class X-D) and Class E-RR are unknown but expected to be
approximately $35,082,000 in the aggregate. The certificate
balances will be determined based on the final pricing of those
classes of certificates. The expected range of certificate balances
for Class D is $19,646,000 to $21,918,000. The expected range of
certificate balances for Class E-RR is $13,164,000 to $15,436,000.
Fitch's certificate balances for classes D and E-RR are assumed at
the midpoint of the range for each class.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 31, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 loans secured by 45
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$668,238,381 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citi Real Estate Funding Inc., Rialto Mortgage
Finance, LLC, Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P. and
Ladder Capital Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 80.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 86.1%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch
DSCR of 1.19x is weaker than average than the 2017 1.26x and 2018
YTD 1.25x averages for other recent Fitch rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch LTV of 101.4% is in line with the
2017 average of 101.6% and lower than the 2018 YTD average of
103.9%. Moreover, the pool contains a higher amount of
investment-grade credit opinion loans (14.52%) whose combined Fitch
DSCR of 1.38x and LTV of 64.8% are much better than average.
Excluding investment grade credit opinion loans, the pool's Fitch
DSCR and LTV are 1.16x and 107.6%, respectively.

Favorable Property Type Concentration: Ten loans representing 41.8%
of the pool are secured by multifamily properties. This is greater
than the 2017 8.1% and 2018 YTD 10.5% averages for other recent
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool has a lower
percentage of hotel loans at 4.0% of the pool as compared with 2017
and 2018 YTD averages of 15.8% and 14.0%, respectively. Multifamily
loans generally have a lower probability of default in Fitch's
multiborrower model while hotel loans generally have a higher
probability of default, all else equal.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing
14.5% of the pool have investment-grade credit opinions. 65 Bay
Street (9.0% of the pool) and DreamWorks Campus (5.5% of the pool)
have investment grade credit opinions of 'BBBsf*' and 'BBB-sf*',
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CGCMT 2018-C5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.



COLT 2018-2: Fitch to Rate $8.95-Mil. Class B-2 Certificates 'B+sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate COLT 2018-2 Mortgage Loan Trust (COLT
2018-2) as follows:

  --$275,919,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$27,512,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$35,544,000 class A-3 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$19,680,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$19,077,000 class B-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$8,950,000 class B-2 certificates 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:

  --$14,947,437 class B-3 certificates;

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Non-Prime Credit Quality (Concern): The pool has a weighted average
(WA) model credit score of 705 and a WA combined loan to value
ratio (CLTV) of 78%. Of the pool, 42% consists of borrowers with
prior credit events and 53% had a debt to income (DTI) ratio of
over 43%. Investor properties and loans to foreign nationals
account for 4% of the pool. Fitch applied default penalties to
account for these attributes, and loss severity (LS) was adjusted
to reflect the increased risk of ATR challenges.

100% Full Income Documentation (Positive): All loans in the
mortgage pool were underwritten to the comprehensive Appendix Q
documentation standards defined by ATR, which is not typical for
non-prime RMBS. Mortgage pools of all other active non-prime RMBS
issuers include a significant percentage of non-traditional income
documentation. While a due diligence review identified roughly 20%
of loans as having minor variations to Appendix Q, Fitch views
those differences as immaterial and all loans as having full income
documentation. The COLT series transactions are the only non-prime
RMBS issued with 100% full income documentation.

Strong Operational and Data Quality (Positive): Caliber has one of
the largest and most established Non-QM programs in the sector.
Fitch views the visibility into the origination programs as a
strength relative to Non-QM transactions with a high number of
originators. Fitch reviewed Caliber and Hudson Americas L.P.'s
(Hudson's) origination and acquisition platforms and found them to
have sound underwriting and operational control environments,
reflecting industry improvements following the financial crisis.
These improvements are expected to reduce risk related to
misrepresentation and data quality, and were reflected in strong
third-party due diligence results.

Alignment of Interests (Positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors. LSRMF
Acquisitions I, LLC (LSRMF), as sponsor and securitizer, or an
affiliate will retain a horizontal interest in the transaction
equal to not less than 5% of the aggregate fair market value of all
certificates in the transaction. As part of its focus on investing
in residential mortgage credit, as of the closing date, LSRMF or an
affiliate will retain at least the class B-3 and X certificates,
which represent more than a 5.00% fair market value of the
transaction. Lastly, the representations and warranties are
provided by Caliber, which is owned by LSRMF affiliates and aligns
the interest of the investors with those of LSRMF to maintain
high-quality origination standards and sound performance, as
Caliber will be obligated to repurchase loans due to rep breaches.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A
certificates while shutting out the subordinate bonds from
principal until all three classes have been reduced to zero. To the
extent that any of the cumulative loss trigger event, the
delinquency trigger event or the credit enhancement trigger event
occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates until they
are reduced to zero.

R&W Framework (Concern): As originator, Caliber will be providing
loan-level representations and warranties to the trust. While the
reps for this transaction are substantively consistent with those
listed in Fitch's published criteria and provide a solid alignment
of interest, Fitch added approximately 198bps to the expected loss
at the 'AAAsf' rating category to reflect the non-investment-grade
counterparty risk of the provider and the lack of an automatic
review of defaulted loans. The lack of an automatic review is
mitigated by the ability of holders of 25% of the total outstanding
aggregate class balance to initiate a review.

Servicing and Master Servicer (Positive): Servicing will be
performed on 100% of the loans by Caliber. Fitch rates Caliber
'RPS2-'/Negative due to its fast-growing portfolio and regulatory
scrutiny. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), rated
'RMS1'/Stable, will act as master servicer and securities
administrator. Advances required but not paid by Caliber will be
paid by Wells Fargo.

Performance Triggers (Mixed): Credit enhancement, delinquency and
loan loss triggers convert principal distribution to a straight
sequential payment priority in the event of poor asset performance.
Similar to the prior transaction, the delinquency trigger is based
only on the current month and not on a rolling six-month average.


COMM 2013-CCRE9: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE9 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance and Loss Projections: The overall pool
performance remains stable from issuance with minimal changes.
There are no delinquent loans, but one loan (0.6%) is specially
serviced after being significantly damaged by Hurricane Harvey.
Seven loans (4.9%) are on the servicer's watchlist due to upcoming
maturity in July 2018, upcoming rollover or issuer performance
hurdles, with one (0.6%) flagged as a Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC).
While not on the servicer's watchlist, North Ridge Mall (6.2%),
Valley Hills Mall (5.5%) and North Oaks (2.9%) were flagged as
FLOCs due to upcoming rollover risk or declining performance.
Fitch's base case analysis included additional cash flow stresses
on these loans; in addition, the Negative Outlooks on classes E and
F reflect an additional sensitivity test that assumed additional
losses on the Valley Hills Mall and North Oaks given declining
occupancy and performance.

Retail Concentration: The largest property-type concentration is
retail at 39% of the pool, of which 19.6% is collateralized by
regional malls, while three (14.5%) are considered FLOCs and are in
the top 15. Although credit enhancement has increased since
issuance, future upgrades may be limited due to concerns with
performance of retail and regional malls.

Increased Credit Enhancement Since Issuance: As of the May 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance was reduced 11.5%
to $1.1 billion from $1.3 billion at issuance. However, given
Fitch's Loans of Concern and retail/regional mall concentrations,
increases in credit enhancement do no not result in upgrades. Six
loans comprising 18.4% of the pool are full interest only and 19
loans representing 37.2% of the pool are partial interest only.
Three loans (1.9%; $21.4 million)) mature in 2018; Fitch modeled
losses totaled $0.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes E and F reflect potential
rating downgrades due to the high retail concentration (39%) and
FLOCs (15.6%), three of which (14.5%) are top 15 loans
collateralized by regional loans with rollover concerns and
deteriorating performance. Rating downgrades are possible if the
performance of the FLOCs continues to decline. Fitch's additional
sensitivity scenario incorporates a 25% loss on the Valley Hills
Mall and North Oaks loans to address concerns with future declines
in performance. The Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through D remain
Stable due to increasing credit enhancement and expected continued
paydown. Future rating upgrades may occur with improved pool
performance and additional defeasance or paydown.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $8.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $112.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $100 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $100 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 class A-3FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $436 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $127.8 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative from
Stable;

  -- $12.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative from Stable;

  -- $884.6 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 was repaid in full. Fitch does not rate the class G or
X-B certificates.



COMM MORTGAGE 2015-CCRE24: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2015-CCRE24 (COMM 2015-CCRE24).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Projections: Overall pool performance has remained
stable since issuance with minimal change to Fitch's loss
projection from the last rating action. All of the loans are
current as of the May 2018 distribution date, with no material
changes to pool metrics.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated two loans as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOC; 11.35% of current pool). This includes the
second largest loan, Eden Roc (7.14%), which is secured by a
full-service hotel in Miami Beach. The loan experienced a decline
in debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) resulting from the disruption
of property cash flow; the significant renovation project that was
ongoing at issuance has been expanded prolonging the project, in
addition the property was impacted by Hurricane Irma. The other
FLOC is the seventh largest loan (4.21%) and is secured by a
boutique Dossier hotel in Portland, OR formerly known as Westin
Portland. The asset underwent major renovations and downed units
associated with a flag change from Westin to a boutique flag
resulting in a decline in DSCR. Both of these loans are currently
on the servicer's watchlist.

Pool Concentration: Approximately 20.2% of the current pool
balance, including three of the top 15 loans (13.6%), consists of
hotel properties. This represents a higher hotel exposure than the
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 average of 14.2%, 17%, 16% and 15.8%,
respectively. Conversely, the pool is diverse by loan count given
the top 10 loans comprise 51.5% of the current pool and the top 15
loans comprise 62.6%. The 2017, 2016, and 2015 averages for the top
15 loan pool composition were 67%, 68%, and 60%, respectively.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the May 2018 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid down by 4.13% to
$1.33 billion from $1.39 billion at issuance. The pool is scheduled
to amortize by 14.3% through maturity, which was considered above
average at issuance. The 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 averages were
12%, 11.7%, 10.4%, and 7.9% respectively. There are 29 loans (41.1%
of current pool) with partial interest-only periods and 17 loans
(21.6%) that are full-term interest only. The remaining 34 loans
(37.3%) are amortizing balloon loans with loan terms of five to 10
years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the pool. Increased defeasance,
unscheduled paydown or significant performance improvement could
lead to future upgrades. Downgrades could be possible in the event
that the FLOCs or other loans default and Fitch's loss projections
increase. In the near term, Fitch does not foresee positive or
negative ratings migration unless a material economic or
asset-level event changes the transaction's portfolio level
metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $12.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $108.0 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $300.0 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $470.5 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $85.0 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $95.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $71.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13.9 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.1 billion class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $71.1 million class X-C* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G, H, X-E, or X-F certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the class X-B and X-D
certificates.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2006-TFL2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on $16MM Cl. L Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2006-TFL2. Since issuance,
the transaction has been reduced by nearly 98% from paydown and
dispositions. The one outstanding loan, JW Marriott Starr Pass,
remains in special servicing.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Specially Serviced Loan; Continued Litigation: One loan remains in
the transaction, with all outstanding bond balances in connection
to the loan proceeds. The JW Marriott Starr Pass loan is secured by
a 575-room full service hotel and a 27-hole Arnold Palmer-designed
championship golf course, located in Tucson, AZ. Performance did
not meet expectations from issuance, and the recession hit the
Southwest, specifically the Tucson market, particularity hard.
Resort performance improved as the U.S. lodging market rebounded
from recessionary lows, but workout momentum has not been
successfully maintained due to the open legal disputes that have
carried on for years.

The loan has remained in special servicing since April 2010, with a
receiver appointed in November 2011. The workout has met many
delays including disputes between the servicer and borrower on
payment responsibilities and conflicts over property easements. The
servicer's most recent update reported that in first quarter 2018,
the trial court had issued a final judgement order in favour of the
lender on virtually all claims and disputes. However, the borrower
had subsequently filed a special action appeal, further delaying
foreclosure. In addition, outstanding judgements remain on the
guarantor regarding the loan guaranty. The outstanding judgements
need to be settled before the servicer can move forward with the
foreclosure process. The classes may be subjected to further
downgrades should the loan not pay in full by the transactions
Final Rated Maturity date in October 2021.

Property Performance: Performance has fluctuated over the past
three years, with the year-end (YE) 2017 NCF reporting 25% above YE
2016, but remains 25% below YE 2015 NCF and 31% below YE 2014. The
trailing-12-month December 2017 occupancy reported at 69.6%, with
ADR at $164 and RevPAR at $114, compared to 68.9% occupancy, $161
ADR and $111 RevPar the prior year.

Collateral Quality; Significant Capital Improvement Plan: The
hotel, which offers 88,000 square foot (sf) of meeting space,
including a 20,000 sf ballroom, was opened in 2005 and maintains
high curb appeal and an attractive design. However, the lengthy
workout has taken a toll on property upkeep. Per the most recent
servicer inspection report, the 10-year capital plan by Marriot
indicates approximately $75.7 million to be spent from 2018 through
2027, with nearer term costs totalling $44 million from 2018
through 2020.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement; Sensitivity Analysis: The
affirmations reflect Fitch's expectations that property value
remains sufficient relative to credit enhancement for each class.
Fitch's analysis includes a sensitivity analysis with haircuts
ranging from 30% to 45% applied to the most recent servicer
provided value to account for on-going litigation costs,
significant capital improvement needs, and uncertainty surrounding
final disposition / resolution. Based on this sensitivity, the
stressed value may not be sufficient to support the rating of class
J at 'Bsf'. The Negative Outlook on class J reflects this
analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings are expected to remain stable in the near term. The
Negative Outlook assigned to class J indicates that downgrades are
possible should property value decline. Upgrades are unlikely given
the loan's defaulted status. While recovery prospects have
improved, further downgrades are possible if workout negotiations
continue to stall and the loan is not resolved by the transactions
Final Rated Maturity date in October 2021.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $949,356 class G at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20 million class H at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $19 million class J at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $22 million class K at 'CCCsf'; RE 60%;

  -- $16.1 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.


DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2018-2: S&P Rates $11MM Cl. B-2 Notes 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Deephaven Residential
Mortgage Trust 2018-2's $299.5 million mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction backed by U.S. residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework; and
-- The mortgage aggregator.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2018-2

Class   Rating   Type                    Interest       Amount
                                            rate(ii)       ($)(i)
A-1     AAA (sf) Senior                    Fixed     188,549,000
A-2     AA (sf)  Senior                    Fixed      20,667,000
A-3     A (sf)   Senior                    Fixed      39,388,000
M-1     BBB (sf) Mezzanine                 Fixed      18,121,000
B-1     BB (sf)  Subordinate               Fixed      13,628,000
B-2     B (sf)   Subordinate               Fixed      11,681,000
B-3     NR       Subordinate               Net WAC     7,488,954
XS      NR       Monthly excess cash flow (iv)         
Notional(iii)
A-IO-S  NR       Excess servicing         (v)          
Notional(iii)
R       NR       Residual                   N/A              N/A

  (i) The collateral and structural information in this report
reflects the private placement memorandum dated May 25, 2018. The
ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and principle.
(ii) Interest can be deferred on the classes. Fixed coupons are
subject to the pool's net WAC. Class B-3 equals net WAC.
(iii) Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal
balance.
(iv) Net WAC over classes with fixed coupons. (v)Excess servicing
strip minus compensating interest and advances owned to the
servicer.
  WAC--Weighted average coupon.
  N/A--Not applicable.
  NR--Not rated.


DT AUTO 2018-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on $48MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to DT Auto
Owner Trust 2018-2 's $486.02 million asset-backed notes series
2018-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 30,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 66.5%, 61.4%, 51.0%, 42.2%,
and 37.6% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
respectively, based on stressed break-even cash flow scenarios
(including excess spread). These credit support levels provide
approximately 2.20x, 2.00x, 1.65x, 1.35x, and 1.20x coverage of our
expected net loss range of 29.00%-30.00% for the class A, B, C, D,
and E notes, respectively.

-- Credit enhancement also covers cumulative gross losses of
approximately 95.0%, 87.7%, 72.9%, 60.3%, and 53.7%, respectively,
assuming a 30% recovery rate.

-- The timely interest and principal payments by the legal final
maturity dates made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios
that we deem appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would likely
not be lowered, and the class D notes would likely remain within
one category of its preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating, all else being
equal. The rating on class E would remain within two rating
categories of S&P's preliminary 'BB (sf)' rating during the first
year, though it would ultimately default in the moderate ('BBB')
stress scenario with approximately 70% principal repayment. These
potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
stability criteria.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
securitized, including a high percentage (approximately 81%) of
obligors with higher payment frequencies (more than once a month),
which S&P expects will result in a somewhat faster paydown on the
pool.

-- The transaction's sequential-pay structure, which builds credit
enhancement (on a percentage-of-receivables basis) as the pool
amortizes.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  DT Auto Owner Trust 2018-2
  Class       Rating     Type            Interest        Amount
                                         rate          (mil. $)(i)
  A           AAA (sf)   Senior          Fixed           216.01
  B           AA (sf)    Subordinate     Fixed            57.00
  C           A (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed            87.01
  D           BBB (sf)   Subordinate     Fixed            78.00
  E           BB (sf)    Subordinate     Fixed            48.00

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


EVANS GROVE: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Evans Grove CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$248,900,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$20,250,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,250,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$8,800,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F
Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Evans Grove CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 100% ramped as of
the closing date.

Tall Tree Investment Management, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's two year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has assumed by operation
of law as a result of the merger transaction between the Issuer and
Nelder Grove CLO, Ltd., all of the obligations under the
subordinated notes previously issued by the NG Issuer.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $395,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3059

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-2 (the
Issuer):

-- $137,790,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $23,710,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $27,670,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $20,900,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $12,990,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement in the form of overcollateralization (OC),
subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS-projected cumulative net loss assumption under various stress
scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The strength of the combined organization after the merger of
Flagship Credit Acceptance LLC (Flagship) and Car Finance Capital
LLC. DBRS believes the merger of the two companies provides
synergies that make the combined company more financially stable
and competitive.

-- The capabilities of Flagship with regard to originations,
underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Flagship and
considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
servicer.

-- The Flagship senior management team has considerable experience
and a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

-- DBRS used a proxy analysis in its development of an expected
loss.

-- A combination of company-provided performance data and
industry-comparable data was used to determine an expected loss.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Flagship, that the trust has a
valid first-priority security interest in the assets and the
consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured
Finance."

Flagship is an independent full-service automotive financing and
servicing company that provides (1) financing to borrowers who do
not typically have access to prime credit-lending terms for the
purchase of late-model vehicles and (2) refinancing of existing
automotive financing.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 41.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(37.75%), the Reserve Account (2.00%) and OC (1.25%). The ratings
on the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E Notes reflect 30.50%,
18.25%, 9.00% and 3.25% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-3INV: Fitch Gives B Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-3INV (FSMT
2018-3INV) as follows:

  -- $287,916,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $287,916,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $279,690,000 class A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $279,690,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $209,768,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $209,768,000 class A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69,922,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $69,922,000 class A-8 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,226,000 class A-9 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,226,000 class A-10 certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $287,916,000 class A-X-1 notional certificates 'AA+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $287,916,000 class A-X-2 notional exchangeable certificates
'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $279,690,000 class A-X-3 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $209,768,000 class A-X-4 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $69,922,000 class A-X-5 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $8,226,000 class A-X-6 notional certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $14,398,000 class RR-A exchangeable certificates 'AA+';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,581,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,010,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,885,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,745,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,633,000 class B-5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $4,277,681 class B-6-C certificates;

  -- $2,060,681 class RR-B certificates.

The notes are supported by 1,077 prime agency investor loans with
traditional conforming income documentation and a total balance of
approximately $329.0 million as of the cutoff date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

100% Investor Mortgage Pool (Negative): This will be the first
rated securitization issued by Flagstar consisting entirely of
investor loans. Relative to owner-occupied loans, Fitch assumes a
roughly 50% higher default probability for investor property loans
as well as a 10% higher loss severity (LS) on liquidated loans due
to larger market value discounts on distressed property sales.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
primarily of high-quality, 20- to 30-year, fully amortizing,
fixed-rate loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles and low
leverage. The pool has a weighted average (WA) original FICO score
of 769 and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of
65.6%.

Full Income Documentation (Positive): All loans are underwritten to
the borrower's personal income based on traditional agency
guidelines with full income documentation. Fitch views this as a
notable credit positive relative to investor loans that do not
consider the borrower's personal income.

Due Diligence Less Than 100% with Strong Results (Neutral): For
this transaction, a third-party, loan-level review was conducted on
a sample of the pool. Approximately 20% (by loan count) received a
full due diligence review for credit, compliance and property
valuation. Of the 20% sample, 99% of the loans received a grade of
'A' or 'B', indicating strong underwriting practices and sound
quality-control procedures. Fitch was able to gain comfort with
sample size due its on-site operational assessment of Flagstar's
procedures and controls as well as the very clean due diligence
results of prior Fitch-rated Flagstar transactions. An additional
mitigating consideration to the sample size was that 100% of the
loans were approved or accepted by Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's
automated underwriting systems.

High Geographic Concentration (Negative): The pool's primary
concentration is in California, representing 53.5% of the pool.
Approximately 51% of the pool is located in the top-three
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs): Los Angeles, New York and
Riverside/San Bernardino, with 29% of the pool located in the Los
Angeles MSA. Given the pool's high regional concentration, a
penalty of approximately 1.1x was applied to the pool's probability
of default (PD) expectations, resulting in an expected loss
increase of approximately 100bp in the 'AAAsf' rating scenario.

Tier 2 Representation and Warranty Framework (Mixed): While
Flagstar's representation and warranty (R&W) framework includes a
testing review process that considers materiality when determining
if a loan has a breach, there are thresholds that define
materiality, which Fitch views as a reasonable approach. In
addition, the reviewer can consider information not included in the
test, which mitigates the risk for potential breaches not being
repurchased due to flawed tests and proximate cause is not
considered. For these reasons, Fitch views the construct as a Tier
2 framework. Taken together with the financial condition of the R&W
provider, the pool received a 51bp loss adjustment at the 'AAAsf'
level.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 1.90% of the
original balance will be maintained for the senior certificates and
0.95% will be maintained for subordinate certificates.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Negative): The trust is obligated
to reimburse the breach reviewer, Inglet Blair, LLC (Inglet Blair),
each month for any reasonable, out-of-pocket expenses incurred if
the company is requested to participate in any arbitration, legal
or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings. These expenses
include Inglet Blair's legal fees and other expenses incurred
outside its reviewer fee and are not subject to a cap or
certificateholder approval.

While Fitch accounted for the potential additional costs by
upwardly adjusting its loss estimate for the pool, Fitch views this
construct as adding potentially more ratings volatility than those
that do not have this type of provision. To account for the risk of
these expenses reducing subordination, Fitch adjusted its loss
expectations upward by 25bps at 'AAAsf', 20bps at 'AAsf' and 'Asf'
and 15bps at each remaining rating category.

'Average' Originator (Neutral): Based on its review of Flagstar's
origination platform, Fitch believes the bank has adequate
processes and procedures in place and views Flagstar's ability to
originate and acquire prime loans as 'Average'. Approximately 5.8%
of the pool was originated directly through Flagstar's retail
channel, with the remaining coming from brokers (15.7%) and
Flagstar's correspondents' channels (78.5%). The due diligence
review indicated that 92% of the correspondent loans sampled were
originated through the correspondent's retail channel and the
remaining 8% through a broker channel. These results were
extrapolated to the entire pool, and retail treatment was applied
to loans originated through the correspondent's retail channel.

Fitch believes that Flagstar has robust risk management practices
in place to identify loans originated through nonretail channels.
In addition, all broker loans and a majority of correspondent loans
are non-delegated and underwritten by Flagstar.

Servicer Quality (Neutral): Flagstar is servicing 100% of the loans
in the transaction. Flagstar is a 'RPS2-' rated primary servicer
that Fitch believes has adequate servicing practices and procedures
in place and can effectively service the loans. The pool received
neutral treatment for servicer quality.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in general accordance with its
criteria, as described in its report 'U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria.'
This incorporates a review of the originator's lending platforms,
as well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originator and arranger, which were found to be consistent with the
ratings assigned to the certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from the 'U.S.
RMBS Rating Criteria,' which relates to the treatment of Flagstar's
R&W framework tier. Based on Fitch's R&W tiering scorecard,
reducing the loan-level due diligence percentage below 90% would
bring Flagstar's R&W framework down to a Tier 3 from a Tier 2.
However, Fitch considered Flagstar's R&W framework as a Tier 2. The
framework is consistent with Fitch's criteria aside from minor
materiality considerations. In addition, comparing Flagstar's R&W
framework to other R&W frameworks, Flagstar's framework is more in
line with a Tier 2. This treatment had an impact of an
approximately 50bp penalty at the 'AAA'sf' rating level.

Fitch's analysis also incorporated one criteria variation from the
'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria,' which relates to the
treatment of the loan origination channel. Approximately 5.8% of
the pool was originated directly through Flagstar's retail channel,
with the remaining coming from brokers (15.7%) and Flagstar's
correspondents' channels (78.5%). The due diligence review
indicated that 92% of the correspondent loans were originated
through the correspondent's retail channel and the remaining 8%
were originated through a broker channel. This was extrapolated on
the pool level and the retail credit was given for loans originated
through the correspondent's retail channel.

MODELING

Fitch analyzed the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral to determine base case and rating stress loss
expectations, using the residential mortgage loss model, which is
fully described in its criteria report 'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria.'

Fitch simulated transaction cash flow scenarios using various cash
flow modeling assumptions, as described in its criteria report
'U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria.' A customized cash flow
assumption workbook was used to create a default curve in order to
assume that that all liquidations occurred through a short sale and
therefore incur the servicing fee associated with a short sale.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-3INV: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 15
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-3INV ("FSMT 2018-3INV"). The ratings
range from Aaa (sf) to Ba2 (sf).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-3INV

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. RR-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary credit analysis

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using US Moody's Individual
Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level collateral
information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level adjustments to the
model results included adjustments to probability of default for
higher and lower borrower debt-to-income ratios (DTIs), for
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership association
(HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final loss estimates
also incorporate adjustments for originator assessments,
third-party review (TPR) scope and results, and the financial
strength of representation & warranty (R&W) provider. Moody's
expected loss for this pool in a base case scenario is 1.15% and
reaches 12.25% at a stress level consistent with its Aaa (sf)
scenario.

Collateral description

Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-3INV (FSMT 2018-3INV) is the third
issue from Flagstar Mortgage Trust in 2018 and the first under the
FSMT-INV shelf. Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar) is the sponsor of the
transaction.

FSMT 2018-3INV is a prime conforming RMBS transaction of 100%
first-lien investment purpose mortgage loans. All of the loans are
underwritten in accordance with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae
guidelines, which take into consideration, among other factors, the
income, assets, employment and credit score of the borrower as well
as loan-to-value (LTV). All the loans were run through one of the
government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE) automated underwriting
systems (AUS) and received an "Approve" or "Accept"
recommendation.

The mortgage loans are not subject to the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) and therefore, are not subject to the ability-to-repay (ATR)
rules. None of the mortgage loans in FSMT 2018-3INV are subject to
TILA because each mortgage loan is an extension of credit primarily
for a business or commercial purpose and is not a "covered
transaction" as defined in Section 1026.43(b)(1) of Regulation Z.

The issuer has represented that none of the mortgage loans in FSMT
2018-3INV are subject to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) or the
ability-to repay (ATR) rules because each mortgage loan is an
extension of credit primarily for a business or commercial purpose
and is not a "covered transaction" as defined in Section
1026.43(b)(1) of Regulation Z.

As of the cut-off date of May 1, 2018, the $329,047,681 pool
consisted of 1,077 mortgage loans secured by first liens on
one-to-four family residential investment properties. The average
stated principal balance is $305,522 and the weighted average (WA)
current mortgage rate is 4.654%. The majority of the loans have a
30-year term, with 7 loans with terms ranging from 20 to 25 years.
All of the loans have a fixed rate. The WA original credit score is
773 for the primary borrower only and the WA combined original LTV
(CLTV) is 65.55%. The WA original debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is
36.78%. Approximately, 4.85% of the borrowers have more than one
mortgage loan in the mortgage pool.

All of the mortgage loans were originated by Flagstar either
directly or indirectly through correspondents. The mortgage loans
have a WA seasoning of four months.

More than half of the mortgage loans by loan balance (53.48%) are
backed by properties located in California. The next largest
geographic concentration of properties is New York, which
represents 13.83% by loan balance. All other states each represent
less than 5% by loan balance. Approximately 29.58% (by loan
balance) of the pool is backed by properties that are 2-4 unit
residential properties whereas loans backed by single family
residential properties represent 40.24% (by loan balance) of the
pool.

Third-party review and representation & warranties

The credit, compliance, property valuation, and data integrity
portion of the third party review (TPR) was conducted on a random
sample of loans of 218 loans (20% by loan count) by an independent
TPR firm. With sampling, there is a risk that loans with grade C or
grade D issues remain in the pool and that data integrity issues
were not corrected prior to securitization for all of the loans in
the pool. Moreover, vulnerabilities of the R&W framework, such as
the weaker financial strength of the R&W provider, may be amplified
due to the limited TPR sample. Moody's made an adjustment to loss
levels to account for this risk.

Flagstar Bank, FSB as the sponsor, makes the loan-level
representation and warranties (R&Ws) for the mortgage loans.
Although the loan-level R&Ws themselves meet or exceed its baseline
set of R&Ws, the R&W provider is not financially strong and there
are some elements of the enforcement mechanisms that increase the
likelihood that defective loans will remain in the transaction. The
small TPR sample size further amplifies these weaknesses, since no
independent party checked for defects on approximately 80% of the
pool and the transaction must rely on the R&W framework to find any
defects and remedy them effectively. Some of the enforcement
weaknesses include materiality tests that may absolve the R&W
provider from repurchasing a defective loan. For example, data
integrity exceptions within a 10% threshold will not require
Flagstar to repurchase a loan, even if such exception causes the
loan to fail to comply with the sponsor's underwriting guidelines.
Furthermore, the test related to the loans' exemption from TILA
will not likely require a loan repurchase even if a cash out
refinance loan incurs a TILA or ATR violation. A cash-out refinance
investor loan could be subject to TILA and ATR if the borrower uses
the cash proceeds for non-business purposes. The test for this
representation only covers whether the borrower has indicated on
the mortgage loan application that the property will be for
investment use, and does not require the independent reviewer to
check the loan file to see whether the borrower has attested that
he or she will use the funds from a cash-out refinance loan for a
business purpose. Moody's made an adjustment to Moody's loss levels
to incorporate these weaknesses.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate. Flagstar will service the mortgage loans. Servicing
compensation is subject to a step-up incentive fee structure. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will be the master servicer. Flagstar will be
responsible for principal and interest advances as well as
servicing advances. The master servicer will be required to make
principal and interest advances if Flagstar is unable to do so.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base fee of $20.5 for all
performing loans and increases according to certain delinquent and
incentive fee schedules. By establishing a base servicing fee for
performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans, the
fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The fee-for-service
compensation is reasonable and adequate for this transaction. It
also better aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance
and structure. The Class B-6-C (NR) is first in line to absorb any
increase in servicing costs above the base servicing costs.
Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted from the Class
B-6-C interest payment amount first and could result in interest
shortfall to the certificates depending on the magnitude of the
delinquency and incentive fees.

Trustee and master servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The custodian functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells
Fargo, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight,
and termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. In addition, Wells Fargo is obligated to make servicing
advances if the servicer is unable to do so.

Tail risk & subordination floor

This deal has a shifting-interest structure, with a subordination
floor to protect against losses that occur late in the life of the
pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk). When the total
senior subordination is less than 1.90% of the original pool
balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any principal and all
principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In addition, if the
subordinate percentage drops below 12.50% of current pool balance,
the senior distribution amount will include all principal
collections and the subordinate principal distribution amount will
be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves benefit from a floor.
When the total current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus
the aggregate balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior
to it amount to less than 0.95% of the original pool balance, those
tranches do not receive principal distributions. Principal those
tranches would have received are directed to pay more senior
subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Moody's stressed the tail risk by assuming that the last five to 10
remaining loans are the largest loans in the pool. Given that FSMT
2018-3INV includes borrowers with more than one mortgage loan in
the pool, Moody's considered in its analysis of tail risk the
combined balance of the loans made to each unique borrower to
determine the largest loans in the pool. Based on an analysis of
scenarios where the largest five to 10 loans in the pool default
late in the life of the transaction, Moody's viewed the 1.90%
senior floor as credit neutral. Moody's viewed the 0.95%
subordination floor as credit neutral in Moody's rating analysis.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments
to the senior bond for a specified period of time, and increasing
amounts of prepayments to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but
only if loan performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

The senior support NAS certificates (Class A-10) will only receive
their pro-rata share of scheduled principal payments allocated to
the senior bonds for five years, whereas all prepayments allocated
to the senior bonds will be paid to the super senior certificates,
leading to a faster buildup of super senior credit enhancement.
After year five, the senior support NAS bond will receive an
increasing share of prepayments in accordance with the shifting
percentage schedule.

All certificates (except Class B-6-C) in this transaction are
subject to a net WAC cap. Class B-6-C will accrue interest at the
net WAC minus the aggregate delinquent servicing and aggregate
incentive servicing fee. For any distribution date, the net WAC
will be the greater of (1) zero and (2) the weighted average net
mortgage rates minus the capped trust expense rate.

Realized losses are allocated reverse sequentially among the
subordinate and senior support certificates and on a pro-rata basis
among the super senior certificates.

Exposure to extraordinary expenses

Certain extraordinary trust expenses (such as fees paid to the
reviewer, servicing transfer costs) in the FSMT 2018-3INV
transaction are deducted directly from the available distribution
amount. The remaining trust expenses (which have an annual cap of
$300,000 per year) are deducted from the net WAC. Moody's believes
there is a very low likelihood that the rated certificates in FSMT
2018-3INV will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against key
deal parties. First, the loans are prime quality and were
originated under a regulatory environment that requires tighter
controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well defined
processes in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing
basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer (Inglet
Blair, LLC), named at closing must review loans for breaches of
representations and warranties when certain clear defined triggers
have been breached, which reduces the likelihood that parties will
be sued for inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has disclosed the
results of a compliance, credit, valuation and data integrity
review covering a sample of the mortgage loans by an independent
third party (Clayton Services LLC). Moody's did not make an
adjustment for extraordinary expenses because most of the trust
expenses will reduce the net WAC as opposed to the available
funds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


FLATIRON CLO 2013-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on $12MM E Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Flatiron CLO 2013-1 Ltd.:

US$55,750,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on February 7, 2017 Assigned Aa1
(sf)

US$17,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on February 7, 2017
Assigned A1 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on December 5, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the rating on the following notes:

US$12,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on December 5, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

In addition, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$250,750,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
(current balance of $210,326,440), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
February 7, 2017 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on December 5, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Flatiron CLO 2013-1, Ltd., issued in originally issued in December
2013, is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by
a portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating actions and affirmations on the Class A-1-R,
Class A-2-R, Class B-R and Class C notes are primarily the result
of deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in the deal's
overcollateralization levels since the deal ended its reinvestment
period in January 2018. The Class A-1-R notes have been paid down
by approximately 16% or $40.2 million since that time. Based on the
trustee's May 2018 report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B,
and Class C notes are reported at 131.35%, 123.46%, and 113.44%,
respectively, versus January 2018 levels of 127.92%, 121.20%, and
112.50%, respectively.

On the other hand, the downgrade rating action on the Class E notes
primarily reflects the specific risks to the junior notes posed by
par loss and spread compression observed in the underlying CLO
portfolio. Based on the trustee's May 2018 report, the OC ratio for
the Class E notes (as reflected in the Interest Diversion Test
ratio) is 103.38%, versus 104.59% a year ago in June 2017.
Additionally, the portfolio weighted average spread is currently
reported at 3.32%, versus 3.45% in June 2017.

The affirmation of the ratings on the Class D notes reflects a
combination of the negative effects of par loss and spread
compression, which were offset by the benefits of deleveraging, as
discussed above.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, as a result of market conditions make it difficult
for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit quality in
order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the effective credit
enhancement available for the notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Moody's is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2365)

Class A-1-R: 0

Class A-2-R: 0

Class B-R: +2

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3547)

Class A-1-R: 0

Class A-2-R: -1

Class B-R: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $347.1 million, defaulted par of
$5.98 million, a weighted average default probability of 22.19%
(implying a WARF of 2956), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.38%, a diversity score of 72 and a weighted average
spread of 3.34% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Fitch Cuts Class F Certs to 'Csf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of GE Commercial
Mortgage Corporation commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2005-C1 (GECMC 2005-C1) and affirmed the remaining classes.


KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentrated Pool; Sensitivity Test Performed: Only two of the
original 129 loans remain, the largest of which is Lakeside Mall,
(89.1% of the pool) which is in special servicing. Due to the
concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity
analysis based on the likelihood of repayment and expected losses
from the liquidation of the specially serviced loan. Based on this
sensitivity test, Fitch considers it possible that Class D may
realize a loss. Losses are considered inevitable for all remaining
classes based on the most recently appraised value of Lakeside
Mall.

Specially Serviced Loan: The largest loan Lakeside Mall (89.1% of
the pool) transferred to special servicing in May 2016 and became
REO in June 2017. All outstanding classes rely on proceeds from the
specially serviced loan. An August 2017 appraisal valued the mall
well below the remaining debt amount. Current in-line occupancy is
hovering around the 80% level and sales were reported to be $257
for YE2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further downgrades are possible should the REO Lakeside Mall
asset's performance continue to decline or a prolonged workout
occurs. Downgrades to the distressed classes will occur as losses
are realized. Upgrades are not expected due to adverse selection
and significant losses anticipated on the remaining pool.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

  -- $17.7 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 85%;

  -- $14.8 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $108.0 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $14.6 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  -- $1.3 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 million class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-AB, A-1A, A-J, B and C have paid
in full. Fitch does not rate the fully depleted class P. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and
X-C certificates.


GRAMERCY REAL 2005-1: Fitch Hikes $7.8MM Class G Debt Rating to B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed three classes of
Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd./LLC (Gramercy 2005-1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class G reflects both the continued deleveraging of
the capital structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral. Total pay down to classes E through G from
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) payoffs and
amortization and diverted interest since the last rating action was
$7.7 million.

The collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is very concentrated with
only four assets from two obligors remaining. The CDO collateral is
comprised of 100% rated CMBS collateral, which consists of one bond
(28%) with credit characteristics consistent with a 'BB' rating,
one bond (15.7%) rated 'B'/Outlook Negative, and two bonds (56.2%)
considered distressed at 'CCC'.

While the principal balance of class G is fully covered by
collateral with credit characteristics at 'BB', Fitch capped its
rating at 'Bsf' due to future interest shortfall concerns on the
underlying transactions, as they are becoming increasingly
concentrated and adversely selected, which may impact timely
payments to this class.

As each class becomes the senior most class in the CDO, timely
interest payments are required. Interest shortfalls within the
underlying CMBS transactions would increase the likelihood of
insufficient interest proceeds to maintain timely interest on this
class. If available, principal proceeds held by the CDO can also be
diverted to pay interest to the senior class.

Class G is currently the senior most class. Based on a review of
the underlying collateral, the interest cushion is expected to be
sufficient to cover this class, which had interest coverage of over
three times, as of the April 2018 payment date

The affirmation of class H reflects that the class relies on
collateral rated 'CCC' for full payoff.

The CDO is currently undercollateralized by approximately $204.6
million. Classes J and below have negative credit enhancement, and
therefore default is considered inevitable at maturity. As of the
April 2018 trustee report, the CDO is failing the F/G/H
overcollateralization test resulting in the diversion of interest
payments from classes J and below to pay down the senior most
outstanding class.

As the collateral consists entirely of CMBS, the transaction was
analyzed under the framework described in the report "Structured
Finance CDOs Surveillance Rating Criteria." Due to the
concentration of the pool, a look-through analysis of the
underlying portfolio was the determining factor in the rating
actions. Cash flow modeling was not performed as it was not
expected to provide analytical value.

Gramercy 2005-1 is a commercial real estate CDO managed by
CWCapital Investments LLC, which became the successor collateral
manager in March 2013. In December 2011, $6.1 million of notes were
surrendered to the trustee for cancellation, including partial
amounts of classes E, F, G and H.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class G reflects the credit quality of the
underlying transactions as well as the expectation of further pay
down. Further upgrades to classes G and H are possible should the
credit characteristics of the underlying collateral improve;
however, any actions are expected to be limited due to concerns
over the CDO's ability to continue to make timely interest payments
to the senior most classes as the CDO and the underlying
transactions become increasingly more concentrated.

Classes J and K are expected to ultimately default at or prior to
maturity.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned a Rating Outlook to the following
class:

  --$7.8 million class G to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
assigned.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  --$ 27 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;

  --$ 63.4 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  --$ 53.6 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Class A-1 through F have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the
preferred shares.


GRAND VIEW FINANCIAL: Seeks to Modify Terms of Keller Employment
----------------------------------------------------------------
Grand View Financial LLC seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of California to modify the terms
governing the employment of its real estate broker Keller Williams
Realty and KW Commercial.

In its application, the Debtor proposes to pay the firm a
commission of 7% if the gross sale price of the property is up to
or equal to $300,000; 6% if the gross sale price is up to or equal
to $1 million; and 5% if the gross sale price is greater than $1
million.

If Keller and its associated brokers represent the Debtor and
another agent or broker represents the buyer for a particular
property, the commission will be split per agreement among them,
according to the court filing.

The term of Keller's employment will expire on Sept. 12, 2019,
subject to further extension pursuant to the agreement of the
Debtor and the firm without further order of the court.   

                   About Grand View Financial

Grand View Financial LLC is a Wyoming limited liability company in
the business of acquiring distressed real property.  Grand View
Financial was formed in 2015.

Grand View Financial sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Case No. 17-20125) on Aug. 17, 2017.  In the
petition signed by Steve Rogers, its managing member, the Debtor
disclosed $29.88 million in assets and $39.71 million in
liabilities.  Judge Julia W. Brand presides over the case.  Levene,
Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill LLP serves as the Debtor's legal
counsel.


HALCYON LOAN 2014-3: Moody's Cuts $12MM Cl. F Notes Rating to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2014-3 Ltd.:

US$67,250,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2025, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 24, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2025,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 24, 2017 Assigned Aa1
(sf)

US$26,750,000 Class C-1-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2025, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 24,
2017 Assigned A2 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class C-2-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2025, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 24, 2017
Assigned A2 (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the rating on the following notes:

US$12,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2025, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on September 29, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

In addition, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$360,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2025, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 24, 2017 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$37,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2025, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on September 29,
2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class E-1 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2025, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on September 29, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class E-2 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2025, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on September 29, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2014-3 Ltd., issued in September
2014, is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by
a portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in October 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions reflect the benefit of the limited period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
October 2018, and the expectation that deleveraging will commence
shortly. On the other hand, the downgrade action on the Class F
notes reflects the specific risks to the junior notes posed by par
loss and spread compression observed in the underlying CLO
portfolio. Based on the trustee's May 2018 report, the total
collateral par balance is $588.3 million, or $11.7 million less
than the $600 million initial par amount targeted during the deal's
ramp-up. Furthermore, the trustee-reported weighted average spread
(WAS) has been decreasing and the current level is 3.90% based on
trustee's May 2018 report, compared to 4.10% in June 2017.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

8) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The historical default rate of assets rated Caa3 with a negative
outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's
speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, is higher than the
average. Exposure to such assets subject the notes to additional
risks if these assets default.


JACKSON MILL: Moody's Rates $5.5 Million Class F-R Notes 'B3(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by Jackson Mill CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$352,000,000 Class A-R Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2027 (the
"Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class B-R Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2027 (the
"Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2027 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2027 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,500,000 Class E-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2027 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$5,500,000 Class F-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class F-R Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Shenkman Capital Management, Inc. manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 30, 2018 in
connection with the refinancing of all classes of the secured notes
previously issued on May 21, 2015. On the Refinancing Date, the
Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to
redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the non-call period
and changes to certain collateral quality tests.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $543,470,989

Defaulted par: $4,958,600

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2948

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.10%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


JP MORGAN 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-C1, as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2017 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class F was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization as well as an increase in defeasance. The deal has
paid down 12% since Moody's last review and is now 75% covered by
defeasance compared to 12% at last review. While the rating on
Class F is fully covered by defeasance, there is a risk of
potential interest shortfalls resulting from the loan in special
servicing.

The rating on the P&I class G was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class G
has already experienced a 69% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class X1 was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.2% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 6.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 8.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-C1, Cl. F and Cl. G was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
2003-C1, Cl. X1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 14, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $17.4 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 52%
of the pool. Four loans, constituting 75% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, the same as at Moody's last review.

There are currently no loans on the watchlist.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $90.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 69%). One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Blue Ash Corporate Center Loan ($2.5 million -- 14.3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 57,000 square foot (SF) office property
located in Blue Ash, Ohio approximately 17 miles northeast of
Cincinnati. The loan transferred to the Special Servicer in
December 2012 for payment default, and then subsequently maturity
default. A receiver was appointed in September 2015 and the loan
became REO in February 2016. As of April 2018, the property was 81%
leased compared to 74% in March 2017 and faces future leasing risk
in 2018.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

The one performing conduit loan is the Walgreens-Lyndon Lane Loan
($1.9 million -- 10.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000
SF retail property. Walgreens leases the entire property with a
long-term triple net lease expiring in October 2061. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 38% and 2.7X, respectively, compared to 44%
and 2.36X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on $2.8MM Class H Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2010-C2 (JPMCC 2010-C2) and revised Outlooks
on two classes to Negative from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Retail Concentration/Mall Exposure; Potential for Outsized
Losses: Eleven loans (70.1% of pool) are secured by retail
properties, including four regional malls (54.4%). Three of the
regional malls (27.7%) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs), including The Mall at Greece Ridge (11.5%), The Shops at
Sunset Place (11.3%) and Valley View Mall (4.9%). The Mall at
Greece Ridge, located in Greece, NY, faces occupancy declines with
Sears (non-collateral) recently announcing closing at the property.
The Shops at Sunset Place in South Miami, FL has experienced
occupancy declines since issuance resulting in low DSCR; the
property also faces rollover concerns, low sales and competition.
The Valley View Mall in La Crosse, WI faces occupancy declines with
Herbergers (non-collateral) expected to vacate in late 2018. Fitch
Ratings performed an additional sensitivity scenario, which assumed
the potential for outsized losses on the regional mall FLOCs and
factoring in expected paydown of the transaction from loans
maturing in 2020 that are not designated as FLOCs. The ratings and
Outlooks reflect this additional analysis.

Pool/Maturity Concentrations: The transaction is highly
concentrated. Only 16 of the original 30 loans remain. All
remaining loans mature in 2020. Only one loan (3.6%) is full-term
interest only. The remaining 15 loans (96.4%) are currently
amortizing. No loans are specially serviced and no loans are
defeased. Although the largest loan, Arizona Mills, is a regional
mall and represents 26.7% of the pool, performance is considered
stable due to strong occupancy/leasing and DSCR since issuance.

Increasing Credit Enhancement; However Upgrades Not Warranted:
Despite the increased credit enhancement resulting from the paydown
and scheduled amortization, upgrades are not warranted due to the
potential for increased losses of the six FLOCs (40.1% of the pool)
and their ability to payoff at their respective loan maturities in
2020.

As of the May 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 47.3% to $581 million from $1.1
billion at issuance. Three loans paid in full ($164.4 million)
since the last ratings action in June 2017 with no realized losses.
Class A-2 ($167.8 million) paid in full and class A-3 paid down by
$10.7 million since the last ratings action.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes D through H reflect the
high retail concentration and potential payoff risk associated with
the FLOCs, particularly the regional malls. These classes could be
subject to downgrades should the performance of The Mall at Greece
Ridge, The Shops at Sunset Place and Valley View Mall further
decline and/or the loans fail to pay at maturity. Fitch's
additional sensitivity scenario reflects an outsized loss of 50% on
the balloon balance of The Mall at Greece Ridge and The Shops at
Sunset Place and 25% on the balloon balance of the Valley View Mall
loan as well as factoring in expected paydown of the transaction
from loans maturing in 2020 that are not designated as FLOCs. All
of the remaining loans mature in 2020. The Rating Outlooks on class
A-3, class B, and class C remain Stable due to credit enhancement
resulting from payoffs and scheduled amortization.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $379.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37.2 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53.7 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Revise Outlook to Negative
from Stable;

  -- $22 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Revise Outlook to Negative
from Stable;

  -- $16.5 million class F at 'BBsf'; Maintain Outlook Negative;

  -- $13.8 million class G at 'Bsf'; Maintain Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.8 million class H at 'B-sf'; Maintain Outlook Negative;

  -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class NR or interest only class X-B certificates.




JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Fitch Cuts Class G Certs Rating to 'CCCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed eight classes
of JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s (JPMCC) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2011-C5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Loss Expectations/Potential for Outsized Losses: The
downgrade to classes F and G reflects an increase to Fitch's loss
expectations for the remaining pool since its last rating action.
The affirmation of the remaining classes reflect increased credit
enhancement, which offset Fitch's higher loss expectations.

Fitch has designated six loans (40.4% of current pool) as Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs), including four in the top 15 (37.5%), one
of which is in special servicing (5.3%) and two additional
specially serviced loans (3%). The Intercontinental Hotel in
Chicago, IL (20%) underperforms its competitive set with
penetration rates for occupancy, ADR and RevPAR below 100%, largely
due to new market supply and increased competition. The Asheville
Mall in Asheville, NC (9.9%) reported declining in-line and anchor
sales and the non-collateral Sears, which is owned by Seritage
Growth Properties, is also expected to close in July 2018 to be
redeveloped. The Verizon Alabama HQ in Huntsville, AL (2.2%), a
built-to-suit, single-tenant office building used as a call center
and training facility, will become vacant as Verizon Wireless is
closing operations at the property by the end July 2018, which is
prior to the loan's upcoming Oct. 1, 2018 maturity date. Fitch
performed an additional sensitivity scenario, which assumed the
potential for outsized losses on the Asheville Mall and Verizon
Alabama HQ loans, and the Outlooks reflect this analysis.

Specially-Serviced Loans: Since Fitch's last rating action, the
LaSalle Select Portfolio loan (5.3%), which is secured by four
class B suburban office buildings located in Norcross and Johns
Creek, GA, transferred to special servicing in December 2017 for
imminent default. The portfolio experienced a significant decline
in portfolio occupancy to 56% at year-end 2017 due to a large
tenant vacating at lease expiration. Further deterioration is
expected as the current largest tenant has confirmed plans to
vacate ahead of its lease expiration in August 2018, which would
drop occupancy to approximately 31%. The REO Fairview Heights Plaza
asset (1.6%) is a community retail center in Fairview Heights, IL.
The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2016 due to
imminent default and was unable to refinance following the loss of
Sports Authority in July 2016. The largest tenant, Gordman's, filed
for bankruptcy in March 2017; however, the receiver negotiated a
lease assumption with Stage retail stores at a reduced rent through
January 2023. The asset was 71.6% occupied as of February 2018. The
servicer indicates the plan is to continue to stabilize assets,
with expected liquidation in early 2019. The REO Shaw's Londonderry
asset (1.4%) is a grocery-anchored retail center in Londonderry,
NH. The loan transferred to special servicing in September 2016 for
payment default following TJ Maxx vacating upon its May 2016 lease
expiration. The asset, which is anchored by Shaw's Supermarket, was
44.2% occupied as of March 2018 and is reportedly under contract
for sale to a third-party purchaser currently conducting their due
diligence.

Pool and Loan Concentrations: Only 29 of the original 44 loans
remain. Loans secured by retail properties represent 59.6% of the
pool and include 10 of the top-15 loans (45.4%). The regional mall
exposure is limited to the third largest loan, Asheville Mall
(9.9%), which has exposure to non-collateral tenants, Belk,
JCPenney, Dillard's and Sears. Other large retail exposures include
two SunTrust Bank Portfolios (combined, 14.6% of pool), which are
mainly comprised of retail bank branches as loan collateral. The
largest loan is secured by a hotel property and represents 20% of
the current pool balance. Additionally, loans with scheduled loan
maturities and ARDs include 3.8% of the pool in 2018 and 96.2% in
2021.

Amortization: As of the May 2018 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has paid down by 34.2% to $677.7
million from $1.03 billion at issuance. Thirteen loans (33.1%) are
full-term interest-only, with the remaining 16 loans (66.9%)
currently amortizing. Since Fitch's last rating action, one loan
(0.9% of original pool balance) was prepaid with yield maintenance
in April 2018. There have been minimal realized losses totaling
$1,784 since issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes D, E and F reflect potential
ratings downgrades due to the high concentration of FLOCs,
including three specially serviced loans/assets, two of which are
REO, a regional mall with declining in-line and anchor sales and a
single-tenant office property that will became vacant prior to the
loan's Oct. 1, 2018 maturity date. In addition, the retail
concentration is high at 59.6%. Downgrades are possible if the
performance of the FLOCs continues to decline or losses on the
specially-serviced loans/assets exceed Fitch's expectations.
Fitch's additional sensitivity scenario reflects an outsized loss
of 50% on the balloon balance of Asheville Mall loan and a 75% loss
on the Verizon Alabama HQ loan, with factoring in expected paydown
of the transaction from loans maturing in 2021 that are not
designated as FLOCs. The Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 through C
remain Stable due to increasing credit enhancement and expected
continued paydown. Future upgrades may occur with improved pool
performance and additional defeasance or paydown.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

  -- $9 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.7 million class G to 'CCCsf'; RE 35% from 'B-sf'.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks where
indicated:

  -- $322.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $455 million class X-A* 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $86.2 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $51.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $39.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $12.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest only.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class NR or interest only X-B certificates.


JP MORGAN 2018-5: S&P Assigns B+(sf) Rating on Class B-5 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Trust 2018-5's $647.3 million mortgage pass-through certificates.

The issuance is residential mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- High-quality collateral in the pool;
-- Available credit enhancement;
-- Experienced aggregator;
-- The 100% due diligence sampling results consistent with
    represented loan characteristics; and
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-5  

  Class       Rating          Amount ($)
  A-1         AA+ (sf)       611,488,000
  A-2         AA+ (sf)       611,488,000
  A-3         AAA (sf)       572,457,000
  A-4         AAA (sf)       572,457,000
  A-5         AAA (sf)       457,966,000
  A-6         AAA (sf)       457,966,000
  A-7         AAA (sf)       114,491,000
  A-8         AAA (sf)       114,491,000
  A-9         AAA (sf)        87,642,000
  A-10        AAA (sf)        87,642,000
  A-11        AAA (sf)        26,849,000
  A-12        AAA (sf)        26,849,000
  A-13        AA+ (sf)        39,031,000
  A-14        AA+ (sf)        39,031,000
  A-15        AAA (sf)       360,648,000
  A-16        AAA (sf)       360,648,000
  A-17        AAA (sf)        97,318,000
  A-18        AAA (sf)        97,318,000
  A-X-1       AA+ (sf)       611,488,000(i)
  A-X-2       AA+ (sf)       611,488,000(i)
  A-X-3       AAA (sf)       572,457,000(i)
  A-X-4       AAA (sf)       457,966,000(i)
  A-X-5       AAA (sf)       114,491,000(i)
  A-X-6       AAA (sf)        87,642,000(i)
  A-X-7       AAA (sf)        26,849,000(i)
  A-X-8       AA+ (sf)        39,031,000(i)
  A-X-9       AAA (sf)       360,648,000(i)
  A-X-10      AAA (sf)        97,318,000(i)
  B-1         AA (sf)         11,384,000
  B-2         A (sf)          10,409,000
  B-3         BBB (sf)         7,481,000
  B-4         BB (sf)          4,553,000
  B-5         B+ (sf)          1,952,000
  B-6         NR               3,253,004
  A-IO-S      NR             345,680,677
  A-R         NR                     N/A

(i) Notional balance.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.



JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C22: Moody's Hikes Class UHP Debt to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and upgraded the rating on one class in JPMBB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-C22 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3A1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. UHP, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six pooled P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on one non-pooled rake class, Class UHP, was upgraded
due to the improved LTV metrics based on loan amortization of the
underlying collateral: the U-Haul Self-Storage Portfolio.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.0% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017.


DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 3.5% to
$1.081 billion from $1.120 billion at securitization. The pooled
certificates are collateralized by 76 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
(excluding defeasance) constituting 48% of the pool. Three loans,
constituting 1.1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities. One loan, the U-Haul Self Storage Portfolio,
has additional debt that is structured as a non-pooled single-class
rake existing inside of the trust in the amount of $15.099
million.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral score in 40. The pool has
a Herf of 29 compared to 30 at last review.

Twelve loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and there is one loan
in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 91% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 92% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average pooled conduit LTV is 112%, compared to 113% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed pooled conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and
0.99X, respectively, compared to 1.46X and 0.96X at the last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Queens Atrium Loan ($90.0 million -- 8.3% of
the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $180 million
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by two office properties in Long
Island City, New York containing 1.0 million square feet (SF). The
two buildings were 100% leased as of December 2017, of which 99%
was leased by New York City agencies. The property benefits from
three tax abatements that will fully expire in 2033. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.86X, respectively, the same as at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the One Met Center Loan ($76.1 million
-- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 15-story, Class A
office property located in East Rutherford, New Jersey. The
property was built in 1986, and is located across from MetLife
Stadium. As of December 2017, the property was 97% leased, compared
to 100% leased as of December 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 116% and 0.88X, respectively, the same at last review.

The third largest loan is the Las Catalinas Mall Loan ($75.0
million -- 6.9% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
interest in a $130 million loan. The loan is secured by a 355,385
SF component of a 494,071 SF enclosed regional mall located in
Caguas, Puerto Rico. The mall was built in 1997 and is anchored by
Sears and Kmart, however, only Kmart is contributed as collateral
for the loan. As of December 2017, the property was 92% leased
compared to 94% at last review. The property suffered extensive
damage from Hurricane Maria and as of May 2018 all but four tenants
were reopened after the property underwent $3.0 million in repairs.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 1.05X, respectively.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C3: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2005-C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P said, "For the upgrades and affirmations, our expectation of
credit enhancement was in line with the raised and affirmed rating
levels. The upgrades also reflect the reduced trust balance and
consider the classes' interest shortfall histories.

"Although the available credit enhancement levels may suggest
further positive rating movement on class E and positive rating
movement on class F, our analysis also considered the transaction's
full exposure to retail properties located predominantly in
secondary and tertiary markets, weak anchor tenants, and
substantial tenant rollover risk prior to loan maturity on four
($49.1 million, 77.4%) of the six remaining loans. In addition, the
remaining two loans are on the master servicer's watchlist."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 17, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $63.5 million, which is 3.2% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes six loans, down from 109
loans at issuance. Two loans ($14.4 million, 22.6%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist, and no loans are defeased or with the
special servicer.

S&P calculated a 1.05x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 102.6% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value ratio using an 8.23% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $84.6 million in principal
losses, or 4.3% of the original pool trust balance.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

Details on the two loans on the master servicer's (Wells Fargo Bank
N.A.) watchlist are as follows:

The Crossing loan ($8.3 million, 13.0%), the larger of the two
watchlist loans, is the third-largest loan remaining in the pool.
The loan is secured by a 95,378-sq.-ft. retail strip center in
Matthews, N.C. In addition, there is a subordinate nontrust
mortgage loan totaling $525,692.

The loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a low reported DSC
and occupancy. The reported DSC was 0.99x on the trust balance as
of year-end 2017, and occupancy was 60.1% according to the March
31, 2018, rent roll. Wells Fargo stated that the borrower is
actively marketing the vacant spaces.

The Lancaster loan ($6.1 million, 9.6%), the smallest watchlist
loan, is the fourth-largest loan remaining in the pool. The loan is
secured by a 166,358-sq.-ft. retail strip center in Manheim, Pa. In
addition, there is a subordinate nontrust mortgage loan totaling
$482,644. The loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist due to Kmart,
comprising 124,725 sq. ft. (75.0% of the net rentable area),
vacating in March 2017 even though it paid rent until its Dec. 31,
2017, lease expiration. The reported year-end 2017 DSC was 1.70x on
the trust balance. According to the March 30, 2018, rent roll, the
property was 83.7% occupied, and a new tenant, At Home, leased
93,157 sq. ft. of Kmart's former space with rent payments starting
Jan. 1, 2019, and ending on Dec. 31, 2028.

  RATINGS LIST

  LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3
                                  Rating
  Class         Identifier        To           From
  D             52108H4Z4         AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
  E             52108H5A8         A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
  F             52108H5B6         BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)
  G             52108H5D2         B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)


LEAF RECEIVABLES 12: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Cl. E-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed seven of the outstanding ratings of LEAF
Receivables Funding 12, LLC – Equipment Contract Backed Notes,
Series 2017-1. The confirmation is the result of credit enhancement
levels being sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. Additionally, two of the
outstanding ratings were discontinued due to repayment.

The DBRS ratings are based on its review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and the historical
performance of the LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc. portfolio.

The Affected Ratings are:

Debt Rated    Action                 Rating
----------    ------                 ------
Class A-3     Confirmed              AAA
Class A-4     Confirmed              AAA
Class B       Confirmed              AAA
Class C       Confirmed              AA
Class D       Confirmed              A
Class E-1     Confirmed              BBB(high)
Class E-2     Confirmed              BB(high)
Class A-1     Discontinued-Repaid    Discontinued
Class A-2     Discontinued-Repaid    Discontinued


MADISON AVENUE 2013-650M: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings for all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-650M issued by
Madison Avenue Trust 2013-650M as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The confirmations reflect the stable performance of the property
securing the underlying loan in the transaction, which remains in
line with DBRS expectations at issuance. The transaction consists
of a $675 million fixed-rate loan secured by 650 Madison Avenue, a
27-story Class A office and retail tower consisting of 523,608
square feet (sf) of office space and 70,862 sf of retail space for
a total of 594,470 sf. Constructed in 1957, the property is
considered one of the premier office towers in the Plaza District
because of its unobstructed views of Central Park, starting at the
15th floor, and its 200 feet of ground-floor retail frontage along
Madison Avenue. The loan is interest-only (IO) for the entire
seven-year term and the trust mortgage loan is supplemented by an
IO mezzanine loan in the amount of $125 million.

The loan sponsor is a joint venture between Vornado Realty L.P., OP
USA Debt Holdings L.P. and other institutional investors. The
sponsors are highly experienced real estate professionals with a
significant presence in Manhattan. At issuance, the sponsor
retained approximately $594.0 million of cash equity in the deal.

According to the April 2018 rent roll, the property was 89.6%
occupied at an average base rent of $142.40 per square foot (psf).
The occupancy rate has increased year over year over by 2.5%;
however, it has decreased since issuance by 1.7%. The office
portion of the collateral was 96.4% occupied, compared with 94.0%
in April 2017 and 90.5% at issuance. The average rental rate for
the office space was $99.42 psf, compared with $100.08 psf in April
2017. The retail space was 25.2% occupied a decline from both the
April 2017 and issuance figures of 36.2% and 100%, respectively.
Occupancy in the retail portion of the property has been depressed
since the anchor tenant in place at issuance, Crate & Barrel (C&B),
vacated the property in August 2015. C&B's exit was contemplated at
issuance, with several reserves and guarantees provided for in the
loan document to mitigate risks surrounding the C&B lease and the
tenant's potential exit. In April 2018, the average rental rate for
the retail portion was $655.66 psf, compared with the April 2017
average rental rate of $658.59 psf.

A portion of the C&B space was temporarily occupied in 2017 and
early 2018, but the only permanent tenant signed to date is
Moncler, which was signed for a space representing 14.6% of the
vacant space on a ten-year lease that began in February 2016,
paying a rental rate of $668 psf expiring August 2026. Its annual
rent of $6.0 million represents 27.7% of C&B's annual rent. The
sponsor reports that similar luxury retailers are being targeted
for the remainder of the vacant retail space; however, the sponsor
noted the retail conditions on Madison Avenue are still not ideal
in the face of a difficult retail environment, making it a slow go
for backfilling with those targets. The sponsor also reports that
restaurants have shown interest in the second-floor space, but the
cost to build out the space is unfeasible given high construction
cost and expected low rent. The property does benefit from a strong
location with desirable adjacent properties, suggesting market
improvements will be particularly beneficial for the subject.

As at May 2018, CoStar reports that the Plaza District submarket
had a vacancy rate of 10.1% and an average rental rate of $88.75
psf, suggesting that, overall, and the property is outperforming
the market. The CoStar market report also noted the area has
experienced an increase in vacancy of late, but still maintains
premium average rents as compared with other New York City
submarkets.

The three largest tenants at the property, representing 67.7% of
the net rentable area (NRA), include Ralph Lauren Corporation
(46.5% of the NRA, through December 2024), MSKCC (16.9% of the NRA,
through July 2023) and Willett Advisors (4.3% of the NRA, through
December 2024). Both Ralph Lauren Corporation and MSKCC are
investment-grade tenants. There are two tenants rolling in 2018
totaling 2.2% of the NRA, and notably, no tenants are rolling in
2019. Recent leasing activity includes three small tenants signed,
collectively representing 2.5% of the NRA.

At issuance, a reserve in the amount of $55.8 million was
established to fund the difference between the C&B rental rate and
the market rental rate through the original lease expiry in 2019.
As at the May 2018 remittance, that reserve had a balance of $14.0
million. In addition, a leasing reserve was funded with monthly
contributions required through the loan term; as of the May 2018
remittance, that reserve had a balance of $4.9 million. The sponsor
also provided a guaranty to fund the $7.5 million shortfall between
Moncler's rent and C&B's rent during Moncler's free rent period,
which burned off in March 2017, and paid an additional $6.8 million
to fund C&B's outstanding leasing costs, Moncler's tenant
improvement/leasing costs and the cost of demolishing the remaining
C&B space. Finally, a guaranty was also provided to fund all
leasing costs incurred in connection with the future re-letting of
any space previously leased by C&B.

As at YE2017, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.54x,
compared with the YE2016 DSCR of 1.17x and the DBRS Term DSCR
derived at issuance of 2.05. The YE2017 figure is reflective of a
32% increase in NCF over the prior year and a 22.8% decrease over
the issuer's UW figure. However, the borrower's reported figures,
and the servicer's analysis, do not include the distributions
provisioned by the C&B rent-restructuring reserve and the sponsor
guarantee to cover rental shortfalls for the former C&B space.
Although in-place cash flows are not expected to improve to
issuance levels in the near term given the high remaining vacancy
in the retail portion of the property, DBRS believes the healthy
submarket dynamic, as well as the property's premier location
within Manhattan, will serve to mitigate those risks in the near
term. Longer term, these factors should improve the likelihood of
replacement tenants signed for the vacant retail portion as retail
dynamics shift and stabilize with current shopper trends.

Class X-A is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating
mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MCA FUND II: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed ratings of the Class A Notes, the Class B
Notes and the Class C Deferrable Notes (together, the Notes) issued
by MCA Fund II Holding LLC pursuant to the Indenture dated as of
June 28, 2017, between MCA Fund II Holding LLC as Issuer and Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee and Calculation Agent. DBRS has also
confirmed the rating of the Liquidity Loan Facility (the Liquidity
Facility) with MCA Fund II Holding LLC as Issuer, Barclays Bank PLC
as Liquidity Lender and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee and
Calculation Agent, as follows:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class C Deferrable Notes confirmed at BB (sf)
-- Liquidity Facility confirmed at A (sf)

The ratings of the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes and the
Liquidity Facility address the timely payment of interest and the
ultimate payment of principal on or before the Final Maturity Date
(as defined in the Indenture referenced above). The rating of the
Class C Deferrable Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest
and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the Final
Maturity Date (as defined in the Indenture referenced above).

The Notes are backed by a portfolio of limited partnership
interests in leveraged buyout, mezzanine debt and venture capital
private equity funds. Each class of notes is able to withstand a
percentage of tranche defaults from a Monte Carlo asset analysis
commensurate with its respective rating.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C3: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2011-C3, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
2011-C3, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-J, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl.
F, and Cl. G were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2011-C3, Cl. X-A, were "Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to $913.2
million from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 45 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 69% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
16% of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit
assessments. Three loans, constituting 1.5% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, the same as at Moody's last review.

Four loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There is currently one loan, constituting 0.6% of the pool, in
special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and partial year 2018 operating results for 54% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 85%, compared to 87% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 17% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.56X and 1.24X,
respectively, compared to 1.55X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Park
City Center Loan ($138.5 million -- 15.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 1.2 million square foot (SF) super-regional mall
located in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The property is also encumbered
by a $42 million mezzanine loan. As of December 2017, inline and
total property vacancy was 6.2% and 2.0%, respectively, compared to
7.6% and 2.6%, respectively, in December 2016. The largest tenants
include JC Penney (20% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration July 2020) and Sears (13% of the NRA; lease expiration
April 2023). Bon Ton, an anchor at the property, is expected to
close. The property has an Apple store, with the next closest Apple
store over 49 miles away. Excluding Apple, inline sales ending 2017
for tenants less than 10,000 square feet were $394 per square foot
(PSF) compared to $414 PSF for 2016. Apple's sales increased over
4.5% from 2016 to 2017. The loan benefits from amortization and
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa2
(sca.pd) and 1.45X, respectively.

The second loan with a structured credit assessment is the 420 East
72nd Street Coop Loan ($11.0 million -- 1.2% of the pool), which is
secured by 20 story co-op building located in the Lenox Hill
neighborhood of Manhattan in New York City. Moody's structured
credit assessment is aaa (sca.pd).

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Westfield Belden Village Loan ($97.4 million --
10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 419,000 SF within a
818,000 SF regional mall located 18 miles south of Akron in Canton,
Ohio. The non-collateral anchors are Dillard's and Sears. As of
December 2017, inline and the total mall were 99% leased, unchanged
from the prior year. Retail competition consists of Chapel Hill
Mall, located 21 miles north, and The Strip, a power center located
just north of the subject property. For tenants that reported sales
data (over 65 tenants), sales declined approximately 5% from 2017
to 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.16X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Oxmoor Center Loan ($84.9 million --
9.3% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold interest in a
941,000 SF super-regional mall in Louisville, Kentucky. The center
is anchored by Macy's, Sears, Von Maur, and Dick's Sporting Goods.
All of these anchors own the improvements with the exception of
Dick's Sporting Goods. As of December 2017, inline and total mall
were 91% and 96% leased, respectively, unchanged from the prior
year. Retail competition includes Mall Saint Matthews, which has
the same owner as the subject and is located across the street, and
The Jefferson Mall, which is located approximately 12 miles south
of the subject. The property has an Apple store, with the next
closest Apple store over 60 miles away. Excluding Apple, inline
sales ending 2017 for tenants less than 10,000 square feet were
$461 per square foot (PSF) compared to $462 PSF for 2016. Apple's
sales increased over 9% from 2016 to 2017. Performance dropped
slightly in 2017 due to a decline in revenue and an increase in
expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.25X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the One BriarLake Plaza Loan ($76.6
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 502,000 SF
Class A office building located in Houston, Texas. The property is
also encumbered by a $15 million mezzanine loan. The property
includes a seven story parking garage and the building is LEED gold
certified and has received an Energy Star Award. As of December
2017, the property was 89% leased, compared to 93% in December 2016
and 93% at securitization. The property is located in the West
Chase submarket of Houston, which has a vacancy rate of over 20%.
The property has over 34% of the net rentable area (NRA) with
leases expiring by the end of 2021, with the majority of that
expiring in 2020 and 2021. Performance declined in 2017 due to a
decrease in revenue. The largest tenant, Apache Corporation
(approximately 42% of NRA), has a lease expiration in October 2024.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.25X, respectively,
compared to 83% and 1.27X at the last review.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-RPL1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2018-RPL1 (NRMLT 2018-RPL1) as follows:

  --$529,883,000 class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$30,190,000 class A-2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$28,802,000 class M-1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$26,372,000 class M-2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$26,026,000 class B-1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$21,515,000 class B-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$560,073,000 class A-3 exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$588,875,000 class A-4 exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  --$10,410,000 class B-3 notes;

  --$10,410,000 class B-4 notes;

  --$10,410,973 class B-5 notes;

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
3,055 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $694.0 million, which includes $45.1
million, or 6.5%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the
statistical calculation date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): Although 1.6% of the borrowers are
currently delinquent and 3.3% have had a delinquency in the prior
12 months, over 91% of the borrowers have been paying on time for
the past 24 months. In addition, 84% of the borrowers have been
clean for 36 months. Borrowers who have been current for at least
the past 36 months received a 35% reduction to Fitch's 'AAAsf'
probability of default (PD), while those who have been current
between 24 and 36 months received a 26.25% reduction.

Third-Party Review Results (Positive): A third-party due diligence
review (TPR) was conducted and focused on regulatory compliance,
pay history, and a tax and title lien search. Approximately 10% of
the pool was graded 'C' and 'D' (meaning the loans had material
violations or lacked documentation to confirm regulatory
compliance). The findings resulted in a lower percentage of applied
adjustments than is typically seen for most Fitch-rated RPL RMBS
transactions. Fitch increased its loss projections by only 25bps at
the 'AAAsf' level.

Sequential Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): NRZ Sponsor V LLC, as rep
provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to
breaches prior to the payment date in June 2019. Thereafter, a
reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due to noteholders
for loans identified as having material rep breaches. Amounts on
deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or material breaches occurring
on or after the payment date in June 2019. However, the rep
provider's obligation to repurchase loans with collateral
documentation issues that would impact the servicer's ability to
take action such as foreclosure, does not sunset.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
without any clawback language. Thus, Fitch increased its 'AAAsf'
expected loss by roughly 150bps to account for a potential increase
in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses in the reps.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Neutral): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severity
(LS) is lower for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' rated
class.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $45.1 million (6.5%) of the unpaid
principal balance are outstanding on 2,159 loans. Fitch included
the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there had been no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower
default behavior for these loans will resemble that of loans with
higher LTVs, as exit strategies (that is, sales or refinancings)
will be limited relative to those borrowers with more equity in the
property.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria, as
described in its report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This
incorporates a review of the originators' lending platforms, as
well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originators and arranger, which were found to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the certificates.

There were two variations from the "U.S. RMBS Seasoned,
Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating Criteria." The first
variation is in regard to sales by the related servicer of loans
that become 60 or more days delinquent or REO. Fitch looks for a
minimum sales price to be set at a minimum of Fitch's 'Bsf'
recovery rate or at a price obtained by an independent third party.
While no minimum sales price is set, there is sufficient reporting
regarding these sales in the monthly remittance reports. These
reports will include information such as the loan id, the loan's
unpaid principal balance, the related servicer's net present value
estimate for its loss mitigation approach, proceeds received from
the sale and whether the buyer was the sponsor or an affiliate of
the sponsor. If investors feel the related servicer is neither
maximizing proceeds on the mortgage loans nor following the terms
of its servicing agreement, they can act through the indenture
trustee or master servicer. Consequently, no adjustment was applied
due to this variation.

The second variation was due to a full tax and title review not
being performed on 3% of the pool. However, Fitch received a
summary of electronic search results completed using Corelogic or
ATS services. The results indicated the lien position of the loans
in question and identified outstanding property taxes and muni
liens. Given these mitigants, no rating adjustment was applied.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.9% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC)/JCIII & Associates, Inc.
(JCIII). The third-party due diligence described in Form 15E
focused on: regulatory compliance, pay history, servicing comments,
the presence of key documents in the loan file and data integrity.
In addition, AMC was retained to perform an updated title and tax
search, as well as a review to confirm that the mortgages were
recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction and the related
assignment chains. A regulatory compliance and data integrity
review was completed on 100% of the pool.

A due diligence review was completed in line with Fitch criteria on
substantially all of the loans in this transaction. A variation to
criteria exists because roughly 3% of the loan pool was not subject
to a full tax, title and lien (TTL) search. The issuer advised that
if a title issue impacts the servicer's ability to take action on
behalf of the trust (such as foreclosure), then the loan would be
repurchased from the trust. For loans not covered by the TTL
search, the issuer provided a summary of electronic search results
completed using Corelogic or ATS services. The results indicated
that the subject loans are in first lien position and also
identified a small amount of delinquent tax payments. The
delinquent taxes are included in the summary table below. Given
these mitigants and the low percentage of impacted loans, no
adjustments other than to account for delinquent taxes, were
applied for these loans.

A review of the collateral reporting from the custodian identified
a number of collateral exceptions and missing documents, consistent
with other RPL transactions. The issuer is actively working with
the loan servicers and custodian to clear the issues. Issuers
typically repurchase loans with outstanding issues after one year
from the transaction closing date but in this transaction the loans
would only be repurchased if the missing documents impact the
servicer's ability to take action such as foreclosure. Fitch does
not view this difference as significant as the seller's obligation
to repurchase these loans does not sunset. No adjustments were
applied.

Overall, the diligence findings resulted in lower applied
adjustments than the industry average for other Fitch rated RPL
transactions. Loan level adjustments were applied on a total of 202
loans that could not be reliably tested for predatory lending
compliance. This adjustment is common for RPL transactions and
increased expected losses by only 25 bps at 'AAAsf'. Eight loans
were also assigned 100% PD, as per Fitch's criteria, since they are
currently delinquent but did not receive updated servicing
comments. Servicing comments for all loans in the pool were
reviewed in January or February 2018, and a 100% PD adjustment was
applied to account for the two- to three-month lag. This did not
have any effect on the 'AAAsf' expected loss.


PSMC TRUST 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class B-4 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-2 issued by PSMC 2018-2
Trust (the Trust) as follows:

-- $364.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $364.9 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.7 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $73.0 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $73.0 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $36.5 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $36.5 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $291.9 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $91.2 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $291.9 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $91.2 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $401.4 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $401.4 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $54.7 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $54.7 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $401.4 million Class A-X1 at AAA (sf)
-- $364.9 million Class A-X2 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.7 million Class A-X3 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-X4 at AAA (sf)
-- $73.0 million Class A-X5 at AAA (sf)
-- $36.5 million Class A-X6 at AAA (sf)
-- $401.4 million Class A-X7 at AAA (sf)
-- $54.7 million Class A-X8 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class A-X9 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.9 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $7.1 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $4.9 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.2 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Classes A-X1, A-X2, A-X3, A-X4, A-X5, A-X6, A-X7, A-X8 and A-X9 are
interest-only certificates. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13, A-14,
A-15, A-16, A-17, A-18, A-X2, A-X3, A-X4, A-X5, A-X6 and A-X7 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of initial exchangeable certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-11, A-12, A-13,
A-14, A-17, A-18, A-19 and A-20 are super-senior certificates.
These classes benefit from additional protection from senior
support certificates (Classes A-9 and A-10) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect
4.20%, 2.55%, 1.40% and 0.65% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are backed
by 682 loans with a total principal balance of $429,327,369 as of
the Cut-Off Date (May 1, 2018).

The mortgage loans were originated by New Penn Financial, LLC
(7.3%); CMG Mortgage, Inc. (5.9%); and various other originators,
each comprising no more than 5.0% of the pool by principal balance.
As the aggregator, American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
purchased the mortgage loans, underwritten to its acquisition
guidelines.

Cenlar FSB will service 100% of the mortgage loans directly or
through sub-servicers. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a
Stable trend by DBRS) will act as the Master Servicer and
Securities Administrator. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB will
serve as Trustee. AIG Home Loan 2, LLC; AIG Home Loan 3, LLC; and
AIG Home Loan 4, LLC are the Sponsors, Sellers and Servicing
Administrators for this transaction and are wholly owned by
entities that are indirectly wholly owned subsidiaries of AIG.

For any mortgage loan that becomes 90 days or more delinquent, the
Servicing Administrators have the option to purchase any such loan
from the Trust at a price equal to 100% of the unpaid principal
balance of such mortgage loan, plus accrued interest.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers, a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review and strong
transaction counterparties.

The Sellers have made certain representations and warranties
concerning the mortgage loans. The enforcement mechanism for
breaches of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a
third-party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans, and
resolution of disputes may ultimately be subject to determination
in an arbitration proceeding.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-6: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on B-4 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2018-6. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans, including
217 agency-eligible high balance mortgage loans. The assets of the
trust consist of 613 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage loans,
substantially all of which have an original term to maturity of 30
years except for 2 loans which have an original term to maturity of
20 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.
CitiMortgage Inc. will serve as the master servicer for this
transaction. There are three servicers in this pool: Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (91.4%), HomeStreet Bank (6.92%), First Republic
Bank (1.67%).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-6

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.30%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.20% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-6 transaction is a securitization of 613 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $409,818,838. There are 125 originators in this pool,
including United Shore Financial Services (24.26%). None of the
originators other than United Shore contributed 10% or more of the
principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level third
party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting,
property value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has
agreed to backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of
all originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood). Moody's considers Redwood, the mortgage loan
seller, as a stronger aggregator of prime jumbo loans compared to
its peers. As of April 2018 remittance report, there have been no
losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's has rated to
date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have
strong credit profile demonstrated by strong credit scores, high
down payment percentages and significant liquid reserves. Similar
to SEMT transactions Moody's rated recently, SEMT 2018-6 has a
weighted average FICO at 774 and a percentage of loan purpose for
home purchase at 73.2%, in line with SEMT transactions issued
earlier this year, where weighted average original FICOs were
slightly above 772 and purchase money percentages were ranging from
40% to 60%.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2018-6 will incur any losses from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the loans are prime
quality and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the
subordinate classes and provides a back-stop to the representations
and warranties of all the originators except for FRB, has a strong
alignment of interest with investors, and is incentivized to
actively manage the pool to optimize performance. Third, historical
performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has been very strong to
date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably well defined processes
in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing basis. In
this transaction, an independent breach reviewer must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when a loan becomes
120 days delinquent, which reduces the likelihood that parties will
be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.20% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 613 loans, the TPR firms conducted
a review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 24 Homestreet Bank
and Primelending loans. For the 24 loans, Redwood Trust elected to
conduct a limited review, which did not include a TPR firm check
for TRID compliance.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believes that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase its Aaa loss.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's notes that
there are 5 loans with final grade 'D' due escrow holdback
distribution amounts. These loans were unable to complete its
review because the appraisal was subject to completion of
renovation work or missing evidence of disbursement of escrow
funds. In the event the escrow funds greater than 10% have not been
disbursed within six months of the closing date, the seller shall
repurchase the affected escrow holdback mortgage loan, on or before
the date that is six months after the closing date at the
applicable repurchase price. Given that the small number of such
loans and that the seller has the obligation to repurchase, Moody's
did not make an adjustment for these loans.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Chicago (FHLB Chicago). The mortgage loans
purchased by Redwood from the FHLB Chicago were originated by
various participating financial institution originators. For these
mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago will provide the loan-level R&Ws that
are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2018-6 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US
RMBS.

Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


STACR 2018-SPI2: Fitch to Rate $52-Mil. Class M2-B Certs 'B+sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Freddie Mac's transaction, Structured
Agency Credit Risk Securitized Participation Interests Trust Series
2018-SPI2 (STACR 2018-SPI2) as follows:

  -- $92,229,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52,702,000 class M2-A certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52,702,000 class M2-B certificates 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $105,404,000 class M-2 exchangeable certificates 'B+sf';
Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

  -- $0 class X certificates;

  -- $32,939,522 class B-1 certificates;

  -- $32,939,522 class B-2 certificates;

  -- $65,879,044 class B exchangeable certificates;

  -- $0 class R certificate.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-1 certificates reflects the 2.60%
subordination provided by the 0.80% class M-2A certificates, the
0.80% class M-2B certificates, the 0.50% class B-1 certificates and
the 0.50% class B-2 certificates.

This will be the third SPI transaction issued by Freddie Mac;
Freddie Mac issued its first STACR SPI deal in 2017. The SPI
program transfers credit risk on conforming and super-conforming
loans to investors. Payments from the loans are used to make
payments on the SPI certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of 23- to 30-year fully amortizing fixed-rate loans acquired by
Freddie Mac. The weighted average (WA) credit score of 756, WA
original combined loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 80% and WA
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 36% reflect the strong credit profile
of the underlying collateral. The pool is also geographically
diverse, with the top three metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
comprising only 14.7%.

Super-Conforming Loans Included (Positive): The pool consists of
roughly 10% super-conforming loans, i.e. loan amounts greater than
the single-unit property conforming limit of $424,100 but capped at
$636,150 for loans originated in 2017 and $453,100 but capped at
$679,650 for loans originated in 2018. While the WA credit score
and LTVs are comparable to the conforming loan portion,
super-conforming loans benefit from higher property values and
larger loan balances.

Transaction Structure (Neutral): The SPI transaction is
collateralized by participation interests (PIs) in 19,198 mortgage
loans, 96% of which are deposited into participation certificates
(PCs) and 4% are deposited into the SPI trust. Generally, the PI
for loans in the PCs that become 120 days delinquent are
repurchased by Freddie Mac from the PC and deposited into the SPI
trust. Freddie Mac is repaid for these advances to the PC from SPI
cash flows at the top of the waterfall, vis-a-vis the class X
certificates, from proceeds otherwise distributable to the class
M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1 and B-2 certificates.

Potential Interest Shortfalls (Negative): Classes M-1, M-2A and
M-2B may be subject to long periods of interest deferral for loans
that become 120 days delinquent due to the stop advance feature and
prioritization of accrued interest distributions to the class X
certificates ahead of the rated classes. Principal collections are
not allowed to cover interest shortfalls except in limited
circumstances.

Delinquent Loans Indemnified by Freddie (Positive): Roughly 75
loans have either multiple prior delinquencies of up to 60 days or
are currently 30 or 60 days past due. If any of the loans become a
constructive defaulted loan (CDL) before July 2021, Freddie Mac
will either repurchase the loan with interest or make an
indemnification payment for the amount of any realized losses
incurred at liquidation. Furthermore, if any of the loans that are
currently 60 days past due (five loans) roll to a 90-day status as
of May 31, 2018, Freddie Mac will repurchase the loan on the July
2018 distribution date. The repurchase obligation is viewed by
Fitch as a strong mitigant to the additional default risk posed by
these loans and no default penalty was applied.

Modification Treatment (Neutral): Rate modifications and expenses
will be absorbed by interest due to the class B-1 and B-2 first and
any excess amount may be absorbed on each distribution date by
principal up to 10bps of the aggregate class principal balance of
M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1 and B-2 classes, as long as classes B-1 and
B-2 are outstanding. Similar to other STACR actual loss
transactions, principal forbearance is treated as a realized loss
at the time of forbearance and forgiveness modifications are made
to the SPI trust by Freddie Mac, which will only be reimbursable to
Freddie Mac if a loan with principal forgiven defaults.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Freddie
Mac has a well-established and disciplined process in place for the
purchase of loans. Fitch views its lender-approval and oversight
processes for minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring sound loan
quality acquisitions as positive. Loan quality control (QC) review
processes are thorough and indicate a tight control environment
that limits origination risk. Fitch has determined Freddie Mac to
be an above-average aggregator for loans originated in 2013 and
later. Fitch accounted for the lower risk by applying a lower
default estimate for the mortgages.

Strong Alignment of Interests (Positive): Fitch believes the
transaction benefits from a solid alignment of interests. Freddie
Mac will retain the class X certificate as well as approximately 5%
of the initial balance of each of the subordinate certificates.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 28.8% of
the loans are covered either by borrower-paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI). Freddie Mac will guarantee the MI
claim amount. While the Freddie Mac guarantee allows for credit to
be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI
available due to the automatic termination provision as required by
the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance is first
scheduled to reach 78% LTV. LPMI does not automatically terminate
and remains for the life of the loan.

Satisfactory Due Diligence (Neutral): A third-party due diligence
review was completed on a statistical sample of the entire pool
(350 loans) by Clayton Services LLC (Clayton). Of the 350 loans
reviewed, six loans had material findings and were graded 'D' due
to missing documentation. All six loans remain in the pool, and are
listed on Schedule II and therefore are subject to Freddie Mac's 36
month repurchase indemnification. The diligence results generally
reflected solid manufacturing controls and, consequently, no
adjustments were made to Fitch's loss expectations.

Home Possible Exposure (Negative): Approximately 3.5% of the
reference pool was originated under Freddie Mac's Home Possible or
Home Possible Advantage program. Home Possible is a program that
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and MI coverage requirements.
Fitch anticipates higher default risk for Home Possible loans due
to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and property value),
which is reflected in increased loss expectations.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its RMBS rating
criteria, as described in its "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." An
assessment of the transaction's reps and warranties was also
completed and found to be consistent with the ratings assigned to
the certificates. Fitch assessed the reps and warranties using the
criteria described in the report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."

A criteria variation was made to 75 loans that had multiple prior
delinquencies of up to 60 days or are currently delinquent 30 or 60
days. Fitch applies a default penalty to loans that do not have
clean pay histories for 24 months or more. The penalty was not
applied to these loans because Freddie Mac is obligated to
repurchase the related loan's PI or make an indemnification payment
if the loans becomes a CDL before July 2021 and will repurchase on
the July 2018 distribution date any 60 day delinquent loan (as of
April 30, 2018) that rolls to 90 days past due by May 31, 2018.
Fitch believes that the additional default risk associated with
these delinquent loans is adequately addressed by the protection
provided by Freddie Mac's repurchase obligation. The variation had
no rating impact.

MODELING

Fitch analyzed the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral to determine base case and rating stress loss
expectations, using its residential mortgage loss model, which is
fully described in its criteria report, "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria."

A customized version of the US RMBS Cash Flow Assumptions Workbook
was created to estimate the monthly transfers of participation
interests from the PC trust to the SPI trust, increasing the
balance of the class X.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 24.5% at the 'BBB-sf' level, 21.4% at the 'BBsf' level
and 18.3% at the 'B+sf' level. The analysis indicates that there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities, which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 10%, 10% and 28% would potentially move the
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


THL CREDIT 2014-1: Moody's Gives B3 Rating on $11.7MM Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by THL Credit Wind River 2014-1 CLO
Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$5,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$384,700,000 Class A-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-RR Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$65,400,000 Class B-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B-RR Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$29,500,000 Class C-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class C-RR Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$36,500,000 Class D-RR Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$28,500,000 Class E-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$11,700,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.
THL Credit Advisors LLC manages the CLO. It directs the selection,
acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of the
Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 31, 2018 in
connection with the refinancing of the Class A-R, Class B-1-R,
Class B-2-R, Class C-R, and Class D-R secured notes previously
issued on March 10, 2017, and the Class E secured notes previously
issued on May 1, 2014. On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used
proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in
full the Refinanced Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer
issued one class of subordinated notes, which is not subject to
this refinancing and will remain outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $591,750,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


TOWD POINT 2018-2: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class B2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of notes issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust ("TPMT")
2018-2.

The notes are backed by one pool of seasoned, performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans. The collateral pool is
comprised of 9,936 first and junior lien, balloon, adjustable,
fixed and step rate mortgage loans, and has a non-zero updated
weighted average FICO score of 666 and a weighted average current
LTV of 84.0% (for junior lien loans, LTV is calculated based on
junior lien balance over current valuation) as of March 31, 2018
(the "Statistical Calculation Date"). Approximately 80.1% of the
loans, as of the Statistical Calculation Date, in the collateral
pool have been previously modified. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. and Cohen Financial are the servicers for 96.9% and 3.1% of
the loans in the pool, respectively. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC will be
the asset manager for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2018-2

Cl A1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl A2, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl A3, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl A4, Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl M1, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl M2, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl B1, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl B2, Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected losses on TPMT 2018-2's collateral pool is 14.00%
in Moody's base case scenario. Moody's loss estimates take into
account the historical performance of the loans that have similar
collateral characteristics as the loans in the pool, and also
incorporate an expectation of a continued strong credit environment
for RMBS, supported by a current strong housing price environment.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.

Collateral Description

TPMT 2018-2's collateral pool is primarily comprised of seasoned,
performing and re-performing mortgage loans. Approximately 80.1% of
the loans (as of the Statistical Calculation Date) in the
collateral pool have been previously modified. The majority of the
loans underlying this transaction exhibit collateral
characteristics similar to that of seasoned Alt-A mortgages. Of
note, approximately 4.8% of the loans by balance are backed by
manufactured housing. Moody's took these loans into account in its
loss analysis based on historical performance data of loans backed
by MH collateral. Approximately 40 loans, representing
approximately 3.5% of the pool balance are backed by multiple
investor properties which can be located in more than one state. 18
of the 40 multi-property investor loans were underwritten to
commercial standards whereas 22 loans were underwritten to
residential mortgage standards. Given the lack of transparency to
the underwriting standards, as well as the financial and
operational wherewithal of these single family rental operators,
Moody's assumed 100% default probability for these 18 loans with
35% loss severity. In addition, there are 5 loans in the pool that
are backed by empty lots. Since, these loans only represent less
than 1.0% of the total pool, Moody's did not assess additional
penalty.

Moody's based its expected losses on the pool on its estimates of
1) the default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and 2)
the principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. The two
factors that most strongly influence a re-performing mortgage
loan's likelihood of re-default are the length of time that the
loan has performed since modification, and the amount of the
reduction in monthly mortgage payments as a result of modification.
The longer a borrower has been current on a re-performing loan, the
less likely they are to re-default. As of the Statistical
Calculation Date, approximately 56.4% of the borrowers of the loans
in the collateral pool have been current on their payments for the
past 24 months.

Moody's estimated expected losses using two approaches -- (1)
pool-level approach, and (2) re-performing loan level analysis. In
the pool-level approach, Moody's estimated losses on the pool by
applying its assumptions on expected future delinquencies, default
rates, loss severities and prepayments as observed on similar
seasoned collateral. Moody's projected future annual delinquencies
for eight years by applying an initial annual default rate
assumption adjusted for future years through delinquency burnout
factors. The delinquency burnout factors reflect Moody's future
expectations of the economy and the U.S. housing market. Based on
the loan characteristics of the pool and the demonstrated pay
histories, Moody's applied an initial expected annual delinquency
rate of 11.0% for the pool for year one. Moody's then calculated
future delinquencies using default burnout and voluntary
conditional prepayment rate (CPR) assumptions. Moody's aggregated
the delinquencies and converted them to losses by applying pool
specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity assumptions.
Moody's default, CPR and loss severity assumptions are based on
actual observed performance of GSE and non-GSE seasoned performing,
re-performing modified loans and prior TPMT deals. GSE RPL loans
generally have a stronger performance relative to private-label
RPLs, owing to on average better credit quality, relatively
stricter underwriting criteria, better documentation and more
stringent servicer oversight. In applying Moody's loss severity
assumptions, it accounted for the lack of principal and interest
advancing in this transaction.

Moody's also conducted a loan level analysis on TPMT 2018-2's
collateral pool. Moody's applied loan-level baseline lifetime
propensity to default assumptions, and considered the historical
performance of seasoned loans with similar collateral
characteristics and payment histories. Moody's then adjusted this
base default propensity up for (1) adjustable-rate loans, (2) loans
that have the risk of coupon step-ups and (3) loans with high
updated loan to value ratios (LTVs). Moody's applied a higher
baseline lifetime default propensity for interest-only loans, using
the same adjustments. To calculate the final expected loss for the
pool, Moody's applied a loan-level loss severity assumption based
on the loans' updated estimated LTVs. Moody's further adjusted the
loss severity assumption upwards for loans in states that give
super-priority status to homeowner association (HOA) liens, to
account for potential risk of HOA liens trumping a mortgage.

For loans with deferred balances, Moody's assumed that 100% of the
remaining PRA amount and approximately 30% of the non-PRA deferred
principal balance on modified loans would be forgiven and not
recovered. The deferred balance in this transaction is
$177,419,909, representing approximately 11.4% of the total unpaid
principal balance (as of the Statistical Calculation Date). Loans
that have HAMP and Non-HAMP (proprietary) remaining principal
reduction amount (PRA) totaled $2,843,053, representing
approximately 1.6% of total deferred balance. The final expected
loss for the collateral pool reflects the due diligence findings of
four independent third party review (TPR) firms as well as its
assessment of TPMT 2018-2's representations & warranties (R&Ws)
framework.

Transaction Structure

TPMT 2018-2 has a sequential priority of payments structure, in
which a given class of notes can only receive principal payments
when all the classes of notes above it have been paid off.
Similarly, losses will be applied in the reverse order of priority.
The Class A1, A2, M1 and M2 notes carry a fixed-rate coupon subject
to the collateral adjusted net WAC and applicable available funds
cap. The Class A3 and A4 are variable rate notes where the coupon
is equal to the weighted average of the note rates of the related
exchange notes. The Class B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 are variable rate
notes where the coupon is equal to the lesser of adjusted net WAC
and applicable available funds cap. There are no performance
triggers in this transaction. Additionally, the servicer will not
advance any principal or interest on delinquent loans.

Moreover, the monthly excess cash flow in this transaction, after
payment of such expenses, if any, will be fully captured to pay the
principal balance of the bonds sequentially, allowing for a faster
paydown of the bonds.

Moody's coded TPMT 2018-2's cashflows using SFW, a cashflow tool
developed by Moody's Analytics. To assess the final rating on the
notes, Moody's ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios
through SFW. The scenarios encompass six loss levels, four loss
timing curves, and four prepayment curves. The structure allows for
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal with
respect to the notes by the legal final maturity.

Third Party Review

Four independent third party review (TPR) firms -- JCIII &
Associates, Inc. (subsequently acquired by American Mortgage
Consultants), Clayton Services, LLC, AMC Diligence, LLC and Westcor
Land Title Insurance Company -- conducted due diligence for the
transaction. Due diligence was performed on 97.3% of the loans by
count in TPMT 2018-2's collateral pool for compliance, 97.3% for
data capture, 96.9% for pay string history, and 96.3% for title and
tax review. The TPR firms reviewed compliance, data integrity and
key documents to verify that loans were originated in accordance
with federal, state and local anti-predatory laws. The TPR firms
conducted audits of designated data fields to ensure the accuracy
of the collateral tape.

Based on its analysis of the third-party review reports, Moody's
determined that a portion of the loans had legal or compliance
exceptions that could cause future losses to the trust. Moody's
incorporated an additional increase to its expected losses for
these loans to account for this risk. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC,
retained Westcor to review the title and tax reports for the loans
in the pool, and will oversee Westcor and monitor the loan sellers
in the completion of the assignment of mortgage chains. In
addition, FirstKey expects a significant number of the assignment
and endorsement exceptions to be cleared within the first twelve
months following the closing date of the transaction.

Representations & Warranties

Moody's ratings reflect TPMT 2018-2's weak representations and
warranties (R&Ws) framework. The representation provider, FirstKey
Mortgage, LLC is unrated by Moody's. Moreover, FirstKey's
obligations will be in effect for only thirteen months (until the
payment date in June 2019). The R&Ws themselves are weak because
they contain many knowledge qualifiers and the regulatory
compliance R&W does not cover monetary damages that arise from TILA
violations whose right of rescission has expired. While the
transaction provides a Breach Reserve Account to cover for any
breaches of R&Ws, the size of the account is small relative to TPMT
2018-2's aggregate collateral pool ($1,559 million).

Unlike prior TPMT transactions, the sponsor will not be funding the
breach reserve account at closing. On each payment date, the paying
agent will fund the reserve accounts from the Class XS2 each month
up to target balances based on the outstanding principal balance of
the Class A1, A2, M1 and M2 notes. On each Payment Date, the target
balance of TPMT 2018-2's Breach Reserve Account is equal to the
product of 0.25% and the aggregate principal balance of the Class
A1, A2, M1 and M2 notes. On the Closing Date, the initial Breach
Reserve Account Target Amount will be $3,090,513. Since Moody's
loss analysis already take into account the weak R&W framework, it
did not apply additional penalty.

Transaction Parties

The transaction benefits from a strong servicing arrangement.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and Cohen Financial will service
96.9% and 3.1% of TPMT 2018-2's collateral pool, respectively.
Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be better than average given the strength of the servicer,
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. Moody's is neutral with respect to
Cohen Financial. Furthermore, FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, the asset
manager, will oversee the servicers, which strengthens the overall
servicing framework in the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank NA and
U.S. Bank National Association are the Custodians of the
transaction. The Delaware Trustee for TPMT 2018-2 is Wilmington
Trust, National Association. TPMT 2018-2's Indenture Trustee is
U.S. Bank National Association.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that would lead to a upgrade of the rating

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Factors that would lead to a downgrade of the rating

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligors defaulting or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. X-B Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C1, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C1:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the two IO classes, Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B, were
affirmed based on the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.0% of the
original pooled balance, essentially the same as at the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
2012-C1, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-AB, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E,
and Cl. F were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.
The methodologies used in rating UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
2012-C1, Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 11, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16.5% to $1.111
billion from $1.330 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 67 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 46.5% of the pool. Nine loans,
constituting 23.5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19, the same as at Moody's last review.

Twelve loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

The Emerald Coast Hotel Portfolio loan ($17.2 million -- 1.5% of
the pool), is the only loan in special servicing. The loan is
secured by a 112-unit Hilton Garden Inn and 81-unit Hampton Inn in
Clarksburg and Elkins, West Virginia, respectively. The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2017 for imminent
non-monetary default and became real estate owned in November 2017.
Moody's has assumed a large loss on this loan.

Moody's received full or partial year 2017 operating results for
93% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 94%, compared to 96% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Dream Hotel Downtown Net Lease Loan ($120.0
million -- 10.8% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
fee simple interest in a parcel of land located at 17th Street and
9th Avenue in Chelsea, Manhattan. The collateral is encumbered by
an additional $35 million of unsecured subordinate debt. The
borrower's interest in the property is subject to the rights of the
Net Lease tenants under two separate Net Leases, Northquay
Properties, LLC (Hotel Tenant) and Northglen Properties LLC
(Banquet/Conference Space Tenant). The Net Leases are structured
with step ups in lease payments and have terms that expire in
September 2112. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 0.72X,
respectively.

The second largest loan is the Poughkeepsie Galleria Loan ($79.2
million -- 7.1% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion
of a $144.1 million senior mortgage. The loan is also encumbered by
$21 million of mezzanine debt. The loan is secured by a 691,000
square foot (SF) portion of a 1.2 million SF regional mall located
about 70 miles north of New York City in Poughkeepsie, New York.
Mall anchors include J.C. Penney, Regal Cinemas, and Dick's
Sporting Goods as part of the collateral. Non-collateral anchors
include Macy's, Best Buy, Target and Sears. As of the December 2017
rent roll, the collateral was 87% leased and in-line space
(


UBS COMMERCIAL 2018-C10: Fitch Rates Class F-RR Certs 'B-sf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings and Rating Outlooks to UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-C10 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-C10 as follows:

  -- $21,314,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23,134,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,712,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $195,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $237,135,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $511,295,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $112,302,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41,086,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33,782,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,434,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,956,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,956,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11,869,000ac class D-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,087,000ac class E-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,130,000ac class F-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:

  -- $33,782,806ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on March 14, 2018, the
expected 'A-sf' rating on the interest-only class X-B has been
revised to 'AA-sf' based on the final deal structure.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
May 30, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 57 loans secured by 87
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$730,421,807 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by: UBS AG, Societe Generale, Cantor Commercial Real
Estate Lending, L.P., KeyBank National Association, Ladder Capital
Finance LLC, and CIBC Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.3% and asset summary reviews
on 90.4% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is higher than that of recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR is 1.14x, lower than the 2017
average of 1.26x and the year to date (YTD) 2018 average of 1.25x.
The pool's Fitch LTV is 108.2%, which is higher than the 2017
average of 101.6% and the YTD 2018 average of 103.6%.

Diverse Pool: The pool is more diverse than recent Fitch-rated
transactions. The top-10 loans make up 46.2% of the pool, less than
the 2017 average of 53.1% and the 2018 YTD average of 50.0%. The
pool's average loan size of $13.0 million is lower than the average
of $20.2 million for 2017 and $19.8 million for YTD 2018. The
concentration results in an loan concentration index of 323, less
than the 2017 average of 398 and the YTD 2018 average of 366.

Limited Amortization: Seventeen loans (45.6% of the pool) are
full-term interest only, while 17 loans (26.8% of the pool) have
partial interest-only periods. Based on the scheduled balance at
maturity, the pool will pay down by 8.4%, which is higher than the
2017 average of 7.9% and the YTD 2018 average of 7.4%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow was 9.03% below the
most recent year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was
provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during this
period. Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could
result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans
and in potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the UBS
2018-C10 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.


WELLS FARGO 2005-11: Moody's Hikes Class II-A-4 Debt Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
from Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-11 Trust, a
transaction backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-11 Trust

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to the improved collateral performance
and the total credit enhancement available to the bonds. The
ratings further reflect Moody's updated loss projections on the
underlying pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver
of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to
rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


WELLS FARGO 2013-BTC: S&P Hikes Rating on Class F Certs to BB(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2013-BTC, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on two other classes from the same transaction.

For the raised and affirmed ratings on the principal- and
interest-paying classes, S&P's credit enhancement expectation was
in line with the raised or affirmed rating levels.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-A interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO security would not be higher than that
of the lowest-rated reference class. Class X-A's notional balance
references class A.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
fixed-rate IO mortgage loan secured by the borrower's fee interest
in the west parcel portion of Bergen Town Center, representing 1.0
million sq. ft. of a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. regional mall and outlet
center in Paramus, N.J. S&P said, "Our property-level analysis
included a re-evaluation of the retail property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust and considered the upward trending
servicer-reported net operating income and stable occupancy for the
past five years (2013 through 2017). In addition, we considered our
estimate of occupancy cost ratio for comparable in-line tenants of
approximately 13.9% based on our calculation of $554 per sq. ft. in
sales for the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2018. We then
derived our sustainable in-place net cash flow (NCF), which we
divided by a 6.79% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate to determine our expected-case value. This
yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio and debt
service coverage (DSC) of 77.6% and 2.42x, respectively, on the
trust balance."

According to the May 17, 2018, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $300.0 million,
pays an annual fixed interest rate of 3.56%, and matures on April
8, 2023. To date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 2.53x
on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2017, and
occupancy was 93.2% according to the Dec. 31, 2017, rent roll.
Based on the December 2017 rent roll, the five largest tenants
comprise approximately 50.1% of the collateral's total net rentable
area (NRA). In addition, 1.5%, 9.1%, 8.9%, and
10.7% of the NRA represents leases that expire in 2018, 2019, 2020,
and 2021, respectively.

  RATINGS LIST

  Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-BTC
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-BTC

                                         Rating        Rating
  Class            Identifier            To            From
  A                94988MAA8             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
  X-A              94988MAN0             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
  B                94988MAC4             AA (sf)       AA- (sf)
  C                94988MAE0             A+ (sf)       A- (sf)
  D                94988MAG5             BBB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)
  E                94988MAJ9             BB+ (sf)      BB (sf)
  F                94988MAL4             BB (sf)       BB- (sf)


WELLS FARGO 2015-LC22: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class X-F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-LC22 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Minimal Increased Credit Enhancement and Stable Loss Expectations:
The rating affirmations reflect a slight improvement in credit
enhancement to the classes and overall stable pool performance with
minimal changes since issuance. As of the April 2018 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by
1.9% to $942.2 million from $963.7 million at issuance. There are
currently no delinquent or specially serviced loans and three loans
(2%) are fully defeased. Fitch has identified seven loans (3.7%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) which are all outside of the top 20.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Six of the seven loans (2.6% of the pool)
identified as FLOCs have experienced declines in performance and
occupancy. Two (1%) are hotels located in Houston, TX, which have
suffered declines in performance as a result of economic conditions
related to the oil and gas industry. The one loan, which has not
yet reported a decline, is Tiberon Trails (1.1%), which consists of
17 multifamily buildings totaling 324 units located in
Merrillville, IN. The property suffered a fire in November 2017 and
damage to one of the 17 buildings. The building consists of 24
units, representing 6.4% of the total units. Renovations are
ongoing and a final completion date was not provided by the master
servicer.

Multifamily and Co-op Concentration: Multifamily properties,
including co-ops, comprise 29.5% of the pool. Nine loans (4.1%) are
secured by multifamily co-ops within the New York City metro area,
which typically have a lower default probability.

Esoteric Property Type Concentration: Two (3.7%) of the top 20
largest loans in the pool are secured by non-traditional property
types, which may be subject to higher volatility. The San Diego
Park N' Fly (2.3%) is secured by the interests in an airport
parking garage and surface lot located in close proximity to the
San Diego International Airport. Jellystone Park (1.4%) is secured
by a campground and waterpark located in Burleson, TX, south of
Fort Worth.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the pool. Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset-level event changes the transaction's portfolio level
metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $24.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $220.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $302.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $82.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.6 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.9 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.6 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $722.9 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.9 million class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.6 million class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $168.7 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and the interest-only class X-G
certificates.


[*] Beard Group 25th Annual Distressed Investing Conference Nov. 26
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Law firm Foley & Lardner LLP, DSI (Development Specialist Inc.),
and Longford Capital will sponsor Beard Group's 2018 Distressed
Investing (DI) Conference on Nov. 26, 2018.

Foley, DSI, provider of management consulting and financial
advisory services, and Longford Capital, a private investment
company, who have been past sponsors, will again be partnering with
Beard Group as it marks the conference's Silver Anniversary this
year. This milestone denotes the event as the oldest, influential
DI conference in U.S. The day-long program will be held at The
Harmonie Club in New York City.

For a quarter of a century, the DI Conference's focus has been on
"Maximizing Profits in the Distressed Debt Market."  The event also
serves as a forum for leaders in corporate restructuring, lending
and debt and equity investments to gather and discuss the latest
topics and trends in the distressed investing industry, as well as
exchange ideas about high-profile chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings
and out-of-court restructurings. These are distinguished
professionals who place their resources and reputations at risk to
produce stellar results by preserving jobs, rebuilding broken
businesses, and efficiently redeploying underutilized assets in the
marketplace.

The conference will also feature:

     * a luncheon presentation of the Harvey K Miller Award to
       Edward I. Altman, Professor of Finance, Emeritus, New York
       University's Stern School of Business.  The award will be
       presented by last year's winner billionaire Marc Lasry,
       Altman's  former student.

     * an evening awards dinner recognizing the 2018 Turnarounds
       & Workouts Outstanding Young Restructuring Lawyers.

To register for the one-day conference visit:

          https://www.distressedinvestingconference.com/
     Discounted early registration tickets are now available.

To learn how you can be a sponsor and participate in shaping the
day-long program, contact:

            Bernard Tolliver at bernard@beardgroup.com
                   or Tel: (240) 629-3300 x-149

To learn about media sponsorship opportunities to bring your outlet
into the view of leaders in corporate restructuring, lending and
debt and equity investments, and to expand your network of news
sources, contact:

                 Jeff Baxt at jeff@beardgroup.com
                    or (240) 629-3300, ext 150


[*] DBRS Reviews 453 Classes From 35 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 453 classes from 35 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the 453 classes
reviewed, DBRS upgraded 23 ratings, confirmed 428 ratings,
downgraded one rating and discontinued one rating.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The rating downgrade
reflects the transaction's continued erosion of credit support as
well as negative trends in delinquency and projected loss activity.
The discontinued rating is the result of full repayment of
principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of Alt-A, subprime, seasoned and
reperforming collateral.

The ratings assigned to the securities listed below differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect certain risks and historical
performance that constrain the quantitative model output.

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5, Class 6-A-2-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5, Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5, Class 6-A-2-2

-- C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-CB6, Class A-I

-- C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-CB6, Class A-II-3

-- C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-CB6, Class A-II-4

-- C-BASS 2006-CB8 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-CB8, Class A-2B

-- C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-RP1, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-RP1, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-RP1, Class B-1

-- C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-RP1, Class B-2

-- C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-2

-- C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-3

-- C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-4

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2005-WF2,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WF2, Class
MV-3

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2005-WF2,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WF2, Class
MV-4

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2005-WF2, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WF2, Class MV-5

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE3, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE3, Class M-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE3, Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE3, Class M-2

-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB2, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2004-AB2, Class M-2

-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB2, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2004-AB2, Class M-3

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH3, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-FFH3, Class M-2

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH3, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-FFH3, Class M-3

-- Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-D, Class 1-A-1

-- Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-D, Class 2-A-4

-- Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-D, Class M1

-- GSAMP Trust 2005-HE3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-HE3, Class M-3

-- GSAMP Trust 2005-HE3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-HE3, Class M-4

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
Equity Asset Trust 2005-8, Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-8, Class M-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
Equity Asset Trust 2005-8, Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-8, Class M-2

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
Equity Asset Trust 2006-4, Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-4, Class 1-A-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
Equity Asset Trust 2006-4, Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-4, Class 2-A-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 1-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 1-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 2-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 2-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 3-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 3-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 3-A-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 4-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 5-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 5-A-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 6-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 6-A-2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 7CB1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 7CB2

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 8-A-1

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 9-A-1

-- Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2005-SL1,
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-SL1, Class
B-3

-- Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC6, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC6, Class M-3

-- Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC6, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC6, Class M-4

-- Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC2, Class A-1

-- Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC2, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC2, Class A-2d

-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2004-3, Class M-1

-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-4, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2004-4, Class M-1

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B2

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B2-IO

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B3

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B3-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B3-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B4

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B4-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B4-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4,
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-SPL4, Class B5

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2017-2, Class M1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2017-2, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2017-2, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2017-2, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2017-2, Class A4

-- CSMC 2017-FHA1 Trust, Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-FHA1

-- MFA 2017-RPL1 Trust, MFA 2017-RPL1 Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2017-RPL1, Class M-1

-- MFA 2017-RPL1 Trust, MFA 2017-RPL1 Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2017-RPL1, Class M-2

-- MFA 2017-RPL1 Trust, MFA 2017-RPL1 Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2017-RPL1, Class B-1

-- MFA 2017-RPL1 Trust, MFA 2017-RPL1 Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2017-RPL1, Class B-2

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B-5

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B5-IOC

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B5-IOD

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B-5A

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B5-IOA

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B5-IOB

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B-5C

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B-5B

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2017-3, Class B-5D

The Affected Ratings is available at https://bit.ly/2sfWoii


[*] Moody's Hikes $940MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of thirty eight
tranches from nineteen transactions, backed by subprime RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-RFC1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 7, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-15

Cl. 1-AF-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-AF-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2016
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on May 7, 2018)

Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-17

Cl. MV-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-3

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. MV-7, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-4

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Developing on Jan 17, 2018.)

Cl. MV-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-7

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5W, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Developing on Jan 17, 2018.)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-1

Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-13

Cl. 2-AV, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-AV-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-AV-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-17

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-20

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-23

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-5

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC4

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-FM1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-FM1

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-3
Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions further
reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's
updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver
of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to
rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.5MM Subprime RMBS Issued Before 2000
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches issued by two subprime
RMBS transactions issued prior to 2000.

Complete list of rating actions is as follows:

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-2

A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

A-11IO, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services, Series 1999-HE2

B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

S, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed at
Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings downgrade of Cl. A-8 from ContiMortgage Home Equity
Loan Trust 1997-2 is due to the non-payment of interest. The
ratings downgrades of Cl. M and Cl. B1 from GE Capital Mtg
Services, Series 1999-HE2 are primarily due to decreasing credit
enhancement and poor performance of the collateral. The ratings
upgrades of A-11IO from ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-2
and Class S from GE Capital Mtg Services, Series 1999-HE2 are
primarily due to the recent pool performance and Moody's updated
loss expectations.

The actions reflect the recent performance and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying pools, and an update in the approach
used in analyzing the transactions' structures.

In its prior analysis, Moody's used a static approach in which it
compared the total credit enhancement for a bond, including excess
spread, subordination, overcollateralization, and other external
support, if any, to its expected losses on the mortgage pool
supporting that bond. Moody's has updated its approach to include a
cash flow analysis, wherein it runs several different loss levels,
loss timing, and prepayment scenarios using its scripted cash flow
waterfalls to estimate the losses to the different bonds under
these scenarios, as described in more detail in the "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

The principal methodology used in rating ContiMortgage Home Equity
Loan Trust 1997-2 Cl. A-8 and GE Capital Mtg Services, Series
1999-HE2 Cl. M and Cl. B1 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2017. The methodologies used in rating
ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-2 Cl. A-11IO and GE
Capital Mtg Services, Series 1999-HE2 Cl. S were "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in May 2018 from 4.3% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the updated IO methodology, based on lower or
higher realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or
decline in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $161.8MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 33 tranches
from seven transactions and downgraded the rating of one tranche
from one transaction, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-3

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. V-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2004-1 Trust

Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-X, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-X, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2017
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-12CB

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: FNBA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-2F

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2017 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6AR

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The downgrade of Class 8-A-1
from Banc of America Funding 2004-1 Trust reflects the expectation
of the bond paydown prior to its legal final maturity due to the
small number of loans backing the pool and the weighted average
maturity of the loans.

The principal methodology used in rating American Home Mortgage
Investment Trust 2004-3 Cl. II-A, Cl. III-A, Cl. IV-A, and Cl. V-A;
Banc of America Funding 2004-1 Trust Cl. 8-A-1; CSFB
Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR4 Cl.
I-A-1, Cl. II-A-1, Cl. III-A-1, Cl. IV-A-1, Cl. II-A-2, Cl. V-A-1,
Cl. V-A-2, Cl. V-A-4, Cl. V-A-5, Cl. V-M-1; CWALT, Inc. Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-12CB Cl. 3-A-1 and Cl. PO;
FNBA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1 Cl. A-1, Cl. A-2, and Cl. A-3;
Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-2F Cl. M-2 and Cl. B; Impac Secured
Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4 Cl.
M-5; Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6AR Cl. 1-A, Cl.
1-B-1, Cl. 5-A, Cl. 6-A, Cl. 2-A-1, Cl. 3-A, Cl. 4-A, Cl. 2-A-2,
and Cl. 2-A-3 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
January 2017. The methodologies used in rating CSFB Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR4 Cl. I-X and Cl. II-X
were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $62.5MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2007
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
and downgraded the ratings of four tranches from five transactions
issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R2

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE4

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2017
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-C

Cl. BV-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-5

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-OSI

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating downgrades on Structured Asset
Securities Corp Trust 2007-OSI Classes A-2 and A-3 are due to
outstanding interest shortfalls on the bonds that are not expect to
be reimbursed as the transaction is undercollateralized. The
actions also reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The rating actions on CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE4 Class
B-2, CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-5 Class
MF-1 and Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-C Class BV-2
also reflect the correction of errors in Moody's prior ratings
analysis. For CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE4 Class B-2, the
analysis in prior rating actions did not reflect the observed
cumulative loss. For CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2003-5 Class MF-1, the prior review did not take into account the
cumulative interest shortfall on the bond. For Conseco Finance Home
Equity Loan Trust 2002-C, the cash flow model used in the prior
review did not apply the appropriate stress to the excess spread in
the transaction. These errors have now been corrected, and today's
rating actions reflects these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 8 Tranches From 3 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 30, 2018, upgraded the ratings of
two tranches and downgraded the ratings of six tranches from three
transactions, backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust 2006-S1

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2006-2

Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2014
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6F

Cl. 3A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6F are due to
the relative higher credit enhancement available to the super
senior bonds. The rating downgrades are due to the weak collateral
performance and the erosion of credit enhancement available to the
bonds. The rating actions further reflect the recent performance of
the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on these
pools.

The principal methodology used in rating Chase Mortgage Finance
Trust 2006-S1 Cl. A-4 and Cl. A-5; Citicorp Mortgage Securities,
Inc. 2006-2 Cl. IA-PO; GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6F Cl. 3A-2 and
Cl. 3A-6 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
January 2017. The methodologies used in rating GSR Mortgage Loan
Trust 2005-6F Cl. 3A-4, Cl. 3A-7, and Cl. 3A-9 were "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver
of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to
rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***