TCR_Public/180311.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 11, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 68

                            Headlines

ANCHORAGE CREDIT 5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
ANTHRACITE CDO III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ba1
ATLAS SENIOR IX: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
BAMLL TRUST 2016-SS1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: Fitch Hikes Cl. E Certs Rating to Bsf

BEAR STEARNS 2006-PWR13: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Class C Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Fitch Hikes Class F Notes Rating to BBsf
BOMBARDIER CAPITAL 2001-A: Moody's Ups Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Caa3
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-4: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on E-RR Notes
CEDAR FUNDING VII: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC29: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs.
CITIGROUP TRUST 2017-B1: DBRS Corrects Aug. 29 Press Release
COLT 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Ratings on Class B-1 Certs
COMM 2000-C1: S&P Lowers Class G Certs Rating to 'B-(sf)'
COMM TRUST 2013-CCRE6: DBRS Hikes Cl. E Certs Rating to BB(high)

COMM TRUST 2014-LC15: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Certs
COMM TRUST 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Corrects May 12 Press Release
COMM TRUST 2016-CCRE: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. X-E Certs
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2018-C02: Fitch to Rate 19 Note Classes 'Bsf'
CPS AUTO 2017-A: DBRS Confirm BB(low) Rating on Class E Debt

CPS AUTO 2018-A: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings on 3 Tranches
CSFB MORTGAGE 2003-C3: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 2 Tranches
CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C3: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class C Certs
CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Series A-2 Certs

DT AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2018-1: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to F Notes
FREDDIE MAC: Moody's Takes Action on $29.9MM RMBS Issued 2015-2016
GALAXY CLO XXI: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F-R Notes

GREENWOOD PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: DBRS Corrects July 7 Press Release
GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2018-CHILL: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. F Certs
HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class D Notes

HPS LOAN 6-2015: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 3 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B1
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Affirms Csf Ratings on 6 Tranches

JP MORGAN 2014-C19: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
MADISON PARK XIX: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class E-R Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HE1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Ca
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C7: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on E Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C14: DBRS Corrects October 23 Press Release

MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C20: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. X-F Certs
NATIONSTAR HECM 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to M4 Certs
NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-TECH: DBRS Assigns (P)BB(low) on F Certs
NEUBERGER BERMAN 27: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Ratings on 7 Tranches

OCTAGON INVESTMENT 35: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
OFSI FUND VI: S&P Affirms BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED 2004-1: Moody's Cuts A-2 Notes Rating to Ba1
RETL 2018-RVP: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
SEASONED CREDIT 2018-1: Fitch to Rate Class M Notes 'B-sf'

VIBRANT CLO VIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C24: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class B Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-C32: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class X-E Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2018-C43: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-sf'

[*] DBRS Confirm 15 Ratings From 4 Flag Credit Auto Trust Deals
[*] DBRS Review 59 Classes From 2 U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Hikes $16MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2001 & 2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $102MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $181.5MM of Alt-A Loans Issued in 2004

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $815.4MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] S&P Takes Various Action on 131 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Action on 141 Classes From 27 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 152 Classes From 19 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 161 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals

[*] US CMBS Loss Severities Lower in 2017, Moody's Says

                            *********

ANCHORAGE CREDIT 5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Anchorage Credit Funding 5, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$244,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2036
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$63,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2036 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2036 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2036 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2036 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes".

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Anchorage Credit Funding 5 is a managed cash flow CDO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by corporate bonds and
loans. At least 30% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured
loans, senior secured notes and eligible investments, and up to 5%
of the portfolio may consist of letters of credit. The portfolio is
approximately 30% ramped as of the closing date.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 37

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3183

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.70%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 38.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 11.4 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3183 to 3660)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3183 to 4138)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: 0


ANTHRACITE CDO III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings on the following
notes issued by Anthracite CDO III Collateralized Debt Obligations
("Anthracite CDO III"):

Cl. D-FL, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

The Class D-FL Notes, the Class D-FX Notes, the Class E-FL Notes,
and the Class E-FX Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of two classes of Rated Note due
to changes in the key transaction metrics. The upgraded classes are
now the senior-most classes in the transaction and benefit from
cash flow as a result of interest proceeds from defaulted assets
reclassified as principal. Additionally, the credit profile of the
outstanding pool of assets has improved as evidenced by weighted
average rating factor (WARF) and weighted average recovery rate
(WARR). This more than offset the increased concentration of assets
in the pool as evidenced by the reduction in the number of
obligors. Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of two classes of
notes because key transaction metrics are commensurate with the
existing ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO & Re-REMIC) transactions.

Anthracite CDO III is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of i) commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) (70.7%
of the collateral pool balance), and ii) one credit tenant lease
asset (CTL) (29.3%). As of the January 23, 2018 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, was $193.4 million, compared to $435.3 million as at
issuance. The paydowns are a result of a combination of regular
amortization and prepayments.

The collateral pool contains five CMBS assets totaling $8.8 million
(23.4% of the collateral pool balance) listed as defaulted
securities as of the January 23, 2018 trustee report. There have
been over 35.8% of implied losses on the underlying collateral to
date since securitization and Moody's does expect moderate/high
severity of losses on the current defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: i) weighted
average rating factor (WARF), a primary measure of credit quality
with credit assessments completed for all of the collateral; ii)
weighted average life (WAL); iii) weighted average recovery rate
(WARR); iv) number of asset obligors; v) and pair-wise asset
correlation. These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2351,
compared to 3066 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 76.6% compared to 69.5% at
last review, B1-B3 and 0.0% compared to 0.7% at last review,
Caa1-Ca/C and 23.4% compared to 29.8% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.8 years, compared to 3.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS collateral look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 23.4%, compared to 19.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled 9 obligors, compared to 14 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 52.1%, compared to
48.7% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The servicing decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of Rated Notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. The Rated
Notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the recovery rates
of the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Increasing the
recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by +10% would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to
two notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement
of Baa3 to Baa2). Decreasing the recovery rate of 100% of the
collateral pool by -10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch downward (e.g.,
one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


ATLAS SENIOR IX: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Atlas Senior
Loan Fund IX Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund IX LLC's $374.70 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 2,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Atlas Senior Loan Fund IX Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund IX LLC

  Class                  Rating            Amount
                                         (mil. $)
  X                      AAA (sf)            3.20
  A                      AAA (sf)          254.00
  B                      AA (sf)            53.00
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)             25.00
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)          22.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)           17.50
  Subordinated notes     NR                 48.95

  NR--Not rated.


BAMLL TRUST 2016-SS1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-SS1 issued by BAMLL 2016-SS1
Mortgage Securities Trust as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which remains in line with DBRS's expectations at
issuance. This transaction closed in February 2016 and is secured
by the fee and leasehold interests in One Channel Center. The
property is located in the Seaport submarket of Boston and
comprises a recently constructed 501,650 sf Class A office building
and the adjacent Channel Center Garage containing 965 parking
spaces. The loan is interest-only (IO) for the ten-year term.

The property was constructed in 2014 and is fully occupied by State
Street Corporation (State Street), an investment-grade tenant rated
AA (low) by DBRS. State Street's lease runs through December 2029,
which is over three years past loan maturity with no early
termination options available. State Street is currently paying a
triple net (NNN) rental rate of $26.50. The Channel Center Garage
is under a three-year lease with VPNE Parking Solutions Inc. (VPNE)
through to December 2018. VPNE pays an annual base rent of $2.2
million and 50.0% of annual gross revenue above $2.7 million. State
Street leases 250 of the 965 parking spaces in the garage. DBRS has
asked the servicer for information on the tenant's plans for the
December 2018 lease expiry and the response is pending as of the
date of this press release. At issuance, DBRS noted that the
development boom in the area in recent years has reduced the number
of available surface lots, a factor that combines with the
relatively limited parking structure development in the area to
suggest significant upside for income from the parking structure as
the area continues to grow and parking demands increase.

At Q2 2017, the in-place debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
1.92 times (x), compared with the in-place YE2016 DSCR of 1.83x and
the DBRS Term DSCR derived at issuance of 2.05x. The Q2 2017 figure
is reflective of a 4.4% net cash flow growth over YE2016, resulting
from a 2.1% increase in effective gross income and a 1.4% decrease
in operating expenses. The NCF declines from the DBRS issuance
figure are attributable to DBRS's long-term credit tenant (LTCT)
treatment of State Street, with the contractual rent included on a
straight-line basis in the DBRS analysis. According to CoStar,
Class A office properties in the Seaport submarket reported a
vacancy rate of 5.8% and availability rate of 5.2% as of January
2018, compared with the Q1 2017 vacancy rate of 4.4% and
availability rate of 4.2%.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: Fitch Hikes Cl. E Certs Rating to Bsf
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes and affirmed 10 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust (BACM) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-4.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Performance and Better than Expected Recoveries: The pool
has exhibited improved performance since Fitch's last rating
action. The upgrades reflect the increasing credit enhancement
relative to the remaining pool balance as a result of amortization
and loan dispositions. Since Fitch's last rating action, the pool
has received paydown of $53.5 million and losses of approximately
$831,000, resulting in significantly better than expected
recoveries. Additionally, the single tenant at the property
securing the largest performing loan in the pool renewed its lease
making payoff at the upcoming maturity more likely. As of the
February 2018 distribution date, the transaction has paid down 95%
since issuance to $107.5 million from $2.2 billion. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting class J.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only 10
loans remaining. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans
based on loan structural features, collateral quality and
performance and ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment. This includes fully amortizing loans, balloon loans, and
Fitch loans of concern. The ratings reflect this sensitivity
analysis.

Specially Serviced/Watchlist Loans: Approximately 48.4% of the
remaining collateral is in special servicing and Fitch considers
65.5% of the pool a Fitch Loan of Concern.

Maturity Schedule: Loans totaling approximately $39 million mature
in the next 12 months. Additionally, two loans totaling $14.3
million will pass their ARD dates in September 2017. The remainder
of the pool does not mature until 2022.

The two largest specially serviced loans in the pool are secured by
adjacent properties with common sponsorship; however, the loans are
not cross collateralized. Both properties are three-story suburban
office buildings located in Rockville, MD. The loans transferred to
the special servicer due to imminent maturity default in May 2017
as several large tenants had upcoming lease expirations.
Discussions are ongoing between the borrower and special servicer
regarding workout options.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes D through E remain Stable due to high
credit enhancement and continued delivering of the pool. Further
upgrades to the most senior classes are possible with additional
paydown and resolutions of loans in special servicing. Ratings on
the distressed classes may be subject to further downgrades as
losses are realized.

Fitch has upgraded following classes:
-- $19.5 million class D to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.3 million class E to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.9 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:
-- $16.7 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $27.9 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 50%.
-- $7.1 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate class S. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-SB, A-4,
A-1A, A-M, A-J, B and C have paid in full. The rating on class XW
was previously withdrawn.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-PWR13: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P
affirmed its rating on the class D certificates from the same
transaction.

S&P said, "The raised ratings on classes B and C, and affirmed
rating on class D reflect our expectation of the available credit
enhancement for these classes, which we believe is in line with the
raised and affirmed rating levels. The raised ratings also reflect
the reduction in trust balance, as well as the volume of defeased
loans (3; $47.4 million, 31.9%) remaining in the transaction.

"While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes B and C and positive rating movement on
class D, our analysis also considered the magnitude of the
specially serviced assets (6; $74.7 million, 50.3%), susceptibility
to reduced liquidity support from these six specially serviced
assets, as well as refinancing concerns with four of the performing
loans ($16.2 million, 10.9%) due mainly to reported declining
performance and/or single tenant rollover risk."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $148.4 million, which is 5.1% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 14 loans and two real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 303 loans at issuance. Six of
these assets are with the special servicer, three loans are
defeased, and one ($2.2 million, 1.5%) is on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Excluding the specially serviced assets and defeased loans, we
calculated a 1.28x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service
coverage (DSC) and 58.3% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
loan-to-value ratio using a 7.90% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average capitalization rate for the performing loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $190.4 million in
principal losses, or 6.6% of the original pool trust balance. We
expect losses to reach approximately 7.1% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
six specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, six assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III). Details of the two largest specially serviced assets are
as follows:

The First Industrial Portfolio loan ($47.5 million, 32.0%), the
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, has a total reported exposure
of $49.3 million. Following the release of two industrial flex
properties totaling 80,462 sq. ft., the loan is currently secured
by 21 industrial flex properties totaling 880,329 sq. ft. in
Georgia. The loan, which has a 90-plus days delinquent status, was
transferred to special servicing on June 18, 2014, due to imminent
default. The reported overall DSC for the six months ended June 30,
2017, was 0.76x and occupancy was 75.5% as of July 2017 for the
portfolio. C-III indicated that it is pursuing foreclosure. A $4.9
million appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against the
loan and we expect a minimal loss (less than 25%) upon its eventual
resolution.

The Jasper Mall REO asset ($10.5 million, 7.1%), the second-largest
nondefeased asset in the pool, has a reported $11.1 million total
exposure. The asset is a 288,577-sq.-ft. enclosed mall in Jasper,
Ala. The loan was transferred to special servicing on April 1,
2016, due to imminent maturity default (matured on July 1, 2016),
and the property became REO on Nov. 2, 2017. Although reported
occupancy was 93.0% according to the Dec. 31, 2017, rent roll, the
anchors, JCPenney and Kmart, representing 48.1% of the total sq.
ft. are dark. An ARA of $7.4 million is in effect against the asset
and we expect a significant loss (60% or greater) upon its eventual
resolution.

The four remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 3.8% of the total pool
trust balance. We estimated losses for the six specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 22.7%.

RATINGS LIST

  Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-PWR13
                                      Rating
  Class       Identifier        To             From
  B           07388LAL4         AA (sf)        BB+ (sf)
  C           07388LAM2         BB+ (sf)       B+ (sf)
  D           07388LAN0         B- (sf)        B- (sf)


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Fitch Hikes Class F Notes Rating to BBsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed nine classes of Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. (BSCMSI) series
2006-TOP22 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Additional Paydown and Defeasance: The upgrades to classes D, E,
and F reflect improved credit enhancement. Since the prior rating
action in July 2017, three loans have been paid in full and the
largest remaining loan in the pool (18.4% of the remaining pool
balance) has been defeased. The pool has 16 assets remaining, five
of which have been defeased (41.1%). As of the February 2018
remittance report, the pool has paid down by 94.2% to $98.3 million
from $1.7 billion at issuance. The pool has suffered $31.7 million
in realized losses, accounting for 1.9% of the original pool
balance.

Pool Concentration/Adverse Selection: The transaction is highly
concentrated with only 16 of the original 224 loans remaining. Of
the 16 remaining loans, one (2.5%) is performing specially serviced
and seven (34.6%) are performing but on the master servicer's
watchlist. Fitch has designated four loans (22%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern. Due to the pool's concentrated nature, a sensitivity
analysis was performed which grouped and ranked the remaining loans
by their structural features, performance, estimated likelihood of
repayment, and estimated loss on the specially serviced asset. The
ratings reflect this sensitivity analysis. Classes C and D are
fully covered by defeased collateral. Class E is partially covered
by defeased collateral and is also reliant on payment from fully
amortizing loans and a Manhattan
co-op loan.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The four Fitch Loans of Concern have been
flagged due to declining net operating income (NOI), low debt
service coverage ratios (DSCR), high vacancy rates, upcoming tenant
rollover, or borrower issues resulting in the loan transferring to
special servicing.

Maturity Profile: The remainder of the pool matures as follows:
2019 - 1 loan (4.6%); 2020 - 7 loans (56.9%); 2021 - 6 loans
(35.1%); 2026 - 1 loan (2.5%); 2029 - 1 loan - (0.9%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks for classes C, D, and F reflect
increased credit enhancement, additional defeasance, and expected
continued amortization. The Positive Rating Outlook on Class E
reflects partial coverage from defeasance and potential for further
upgrades with additional paydown, defeasance, or improvements in
collateral performance. Downgrades are possible if the collateral
quality deteriorates or loans transfer to special servicing. The
distressed classes may be subject to further downgrades as
additional losses are realized.

Fitch upgrades the following classes:

-- $25.6 million class D notes to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $14.9 million class E notes to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
    Positive from Stable;
-- $14.9 million class F notes at 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $11.1 million class C notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14.9 million class G notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $8.5 million class H notes at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $8.8 million class J notes at 'Dsf'; RE 40%;
-- $0 class K notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the $0.0 million class P. Classes A-1, A-2,
A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-J, and B have repaid in full. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X.


BOMBARDIER CAPITAL 2001-A: Moody's Ups Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of ten tranches
from seven transactions, issued by multiple issuers from 1997 to
2002. The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily
of manufactured housing units.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp 2001-A

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitizations Corp. Series 2002-1

Class M-1-A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Class M-1-F, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Financial Capital Securitization LLC, Series
1997-I

Class M, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GreenPoint Credit Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-2

Cl. II A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2014
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Greenpoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1999-5

Cl. M-1A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 1998-A

M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2017 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-C

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-4: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on E-RR Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-RR, B-RR,
C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement notes from Carlyle Global Market
Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in November 2013 and partially refinanced in July
2016, that is managed by Carlyle CLO Management LLC. S&P withdrew
its ratings on the prior outstanding class A-1, A-2-R, B-1, B-2-R,
C, D, E, and F notes following payment in full on the March 1,
2018, refinancing date.

On the March 1, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes were used to redeem the prior
outstanding class A-1, A-2-R, B-1, B-2-R, C, D, E, and F notes.
Therefore, S&P withdrew the ratings on the prior outstanding notes,
and it is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, provide that:

-- The replacement class A-1-RR, A-2-RR, C-RR, and D-RR notes are
being issued at lower spreads than the current outstanding notes.

-- The replacement class E-RR notes are being issued at a higher
spread than the current outstanding notes.

-- The replacement class B-RR notes replace the current
outstanding class B-1 and B-2-R notes.

-- The current outstanding class F notes are being redeemed and
not replaced.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment periods are extended by
5.25 years.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd.
  Replacement class     Rating     Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-RR                AAA (sf)           234.000
  A-2-RR                NR                  16.500
  B-RR                  AA (sf)             56.500
  C-RR                  A (sf)              22.500
  D-RR                  BBB- (sf)           24.000
  E-RR                  BB- (sf)            14.500
  Subordinated notes    NR                  55.505

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd.
  Prior outstanding                  Rating
  class                         To          From
  A-1                           NR          AAA (sf)
  A-2-R                         NR          AAA (sf)
  B-1                           NR          AA (sf)
  B-2-R                         NR          AA (Sf)
  C                             NR          A (sf)
  D                             NR          BBB (sf)
  E                             NR          BB (sf)
  F                             NR          B (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


CEDAR FUNDING VII: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Cedar Funding VII CLO
Ltd./Cedar Funding VII CLO LLC's $451.25 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect S&P'S view of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Cedar Funding VII CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding VII CLO LLC  
  Class                Rating          Amount
                                     (mil. $)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)        297.50
  A-2                  NR               17.50
  B                    AA (sf)          65.00
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)           30.00
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)        25.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)         23.00
  F (deferrable)       B- (sf)          10.75
  Subordinated notes   NR               41.75

  NR--Not rated.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC29: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2015-GC29 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance in Line with Issuance: As of the February 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 2.6% to $1.09 billion from $1.12 billion at issuance.
Two loans (0.86% of the pool balance) are designated as Fitch Loans
of Concern, one of which (0.3%) is 30 days delinquent. As
property-level performance is generally in line with issuance
expectations, the original rating analysis was considered in
affirming the transaction. Interest shortfalls of $2033 are
currently affecting the non-rated class H.

Limited Hotel and Retail Exposure: Only 6.1% of the pool by balance
consists of hotel properties, which is below the 2015 average of
17.0% and the 2014 average of 14.2% noted at issuance. Retail
properties make up 17.1% of the pool balance, which is also below
the averages from 2014 to 2017, and none are considered regional
malls.

Concentration & Leverage: The largest 10 loans account for 58.6% of
the pool by balance. At issuance, the top 10 represented a larger
share than those typical of its vintage. Many of the largest loans
have high leverage, but four of the largest six loans (29.8% of the
pool) are secured by properties located in New York City.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by only
8.4% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is lower
relative to similar transactions of its vintage. Five loans (40.0%)
are full-term interest only and 45 loans (43.3%) are partial
interest only. At issuance, Fitch-rated transactions from 2015 and
2014 had average full-term, interest-only percentages of 23.3% and
20.1%, respectively, and partial interest-only percentages of 43.1%
and 42.8%, respectively.

Pari Passu Loans: Six loans comprising 28% of the pool are part of
a pari passu loan combination: Selig Office Portfolio (11.5% of the
pool), 3 Columbus Circle (9.2% of the pool), 170 Broadway (4.6% of
the pool), Crowne Plaza Bloomington (1.2% of the pool), Eastmont
Town Center (1.1% of the pool) and Commerce Pointe I & II (0.5% of
the pool). The Selig Office Portfolio, 170 Broadway and Crowne
Plaza Bloomington loan combinations are serviced under the pooling
and servicing agreement for this transaction. The controlling notes
for the 3 Columbus Circle, Eastmont Town Center and Commerce Pointe
I & II loan combinations are held outside the trust.

Maturity Schedule: Five loans (11.8% of the pool) are scheduled to
mature in 2020. The next scheduled loan maturities are in 2024
(five loans, 3.4% of the pool) with the remainder of the pool
maturing in 2025 (74 loans; 84.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics. Future upgrades may occur should stable
performance continue and loans pay off at their 2020 maturity
dates.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $146,156,519 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220,000,000 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $334,415,000 class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,822,000 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $809,319,519* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72,704,000* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,926,000(a) class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72,704,000(a) class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $180,362,000(a) class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,732,000(a) class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,713,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,713,000* class X-D at 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,769,000 class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,185,000 class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.
(a) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
exchanged for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates
may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C
certificates.

Class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class G and H
certificates.


CITIGROUP TRUST 2017-B1: DBRS Corrects Aug. 29 Press Release
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited corrected an August 29, 2017, press release that
stated the incorrect rating on Class X-B in the Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-B1 transaction. The rating on the
Class X-B notes was upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf) after
DBRS assigned its provisional ratings. The press release has been
amended with the correct rating and is available below and on the
DBRS website.

On August 29, 2017, DBRS, Inc. (DBRS) finalized its provisional
ratings on the following classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-B1 (the Certificates) to be
issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-B1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, X-E, X-F, D, E, F and G have been privately placed.
The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 48 fixed-rate loans secured by 69
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. Trust assets contributed
from four loans, representing 23.9% of the pool, are shadow-rated
investment grade by DBRS. Proceeds for each shadow-rated loan are
floored at their respective ratings within the pool. When 23.9% of
the pool has no proceeds assigned below the rated floor, the
resulting pool subordination is diluted or reduced below the rated
floor. The conduit pool has been analyzed to determine the ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and
their respective actual constants, only one loan, comprising 1.0%
of the pool balance, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance
risk given the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied
its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 26
loans, representing 57.4% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x and 14 loans, representing 31.4% of the pool, having
refinance DSCRs below 0.90x.

Four loans, representing 23.9% of the transaction balance, exhibit
credit characteristics consistent with an investment-grade shadow
rating: General Motors Building, Lakeside Shopping Center, Two
Fordham Square and Del Amo Fashion Center. Term default risk is
low, as indicated by a strong weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term DSCR
of 1.95x. In addition, 30 loans, representing 70.9% of the pool,
have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. Based on A-note balances
only, the DBRS Term DSCR increases substantially to a robust 2.10x.
Even when excluding the four loans shadow-rated investment grade,
the majority of which have large pieces of subordinate mortgage
debt held outside the trust, the deal continues to exhibit a strong
DBRS Term DSCR of 1.77x. Eight loans that comprise 47.3% of the
DBRS sample (37.8% of the pool) have favorable property quality
based on physical attributes and/or a desirable location within
their respective markets. One loan (General Motors Building),
representing 12.3% of the DBRS sample, was considered to be of
Excellent property quality, and three loans (Chateau Marmont Hotel,
327-331 East Houston Street and Del Amo Fashion Center), totaling
13.8% of the DBRS sample, were considered to be of Above Average
property quality. Four additional loans (Lakeside Shopping Center,
411 East Wisconsin Center and the McNeill Hotel Portfolio),
representing 21.1% of the DBRS sample, received Average (+)
property quality. Higher-quality properties are more likely to
retain existing tenants/guests and more easily attract new
tenants/guests, resulting in more stable performance.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
non-traditional property types, such as self-storage, hospitality
and manufactured housing community (MHC) assets, which, on a
combined basis, represent 30.0% of the pool across 17 loans. There
are five loans totaling 17.7% of the pool secured by hotels, ten
loans totaling 10.5% of the transaction balance secured by
self-storage properties and two loans comprising 1.7% of the pool
secured by MHC properties. Each of these asset types is vulnerable
to high NCF volatility because of their relatively short-term
leases compared with other commercial properties that can cause the
NCF to quickly deteriorate in a declining market. Four of the
largest 15 loans, comprising 16.6% of the pool balance, are secured
by hospitality or self-storage properties; however, such loans
exhibit a WA DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 10.0% and
11.4%, respectively, which compare favorably with the overall deal.
Twenty loans, representing 58.8% of the pool, including ten of the
largest 15 loans, are structured with interest-only (IO) payments
for the full term. An additional 16 loans, representing 19.6% of
the pool, have partial IO periods ranging from 12 months to 60
months; however, ten of the full- or partial-term IO loans,
representing 49.7% of the IO concentration in the transaction, have
excellent locations in super-dense urban markets that benefit from
steep investor demand. The transaction's WA DBRS Refinance (Refi)
DSCR of 0.99x indicates higher refinance risk at an overall pool
level. There is an elevated concentration of loans that exhibit
refinance risk. Twenty-six loans, representing 57.4% of the pool,
have DBRS Refi DSCRs below 1.00x; however, these credit metrics are
based on whole-loan balances. Two of the loans with a DBRS Refi
DSCR below 1.00x (General Motors Building and Del Amo Fashion
Center), representing 12.0% of the pool, have large pieces of
subordinate mortgage debt outside the trust. Based on A-note
balances only, the deal's WA DBRS Refi DSCR increases to 1.05x and
the concentration of loans with DBRS Refi DSCRs below 1.00x and
0.90x reduces to 45.4% and 21.5%, respectively.

The DBRS sample included 24 of the 48 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 31 of the 69 properties in the
portfolio (61.6% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -11.0% and ranged from -26.6%
(General Motors Building) to -0.9% (327-331 East Houston Street).

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.

The rating assigned to Class F materially deviates from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviations are warranted given the expected
dispersion of loan level cash flows post issuance.


COLT 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Ratings on Class B-1 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the COLT 2018-1
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-1 (the
Certificates) issued by COLT 2018-1 Mortgage Loan Trust (the Trust)
as follows:

-- $264.6 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.7 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $34.3 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $22.9 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)
-- $14.2 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) rating on the Certificates reflects the 34.05% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 26.40%, 17.85%, 12.15%, 7.05% and 3.50% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, prime and non-prime first-lien residential
mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 865 loans with a total
principal balance of $401,210,769 as of the Cut-Off Date (January
1, 2018).

Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (Caliber) is the originator and servicer
for 100% of the portfolio. The Caliber mortgages were originated
under the following five programs:

(1) Premier Access (61.7%)  Generally made to borrowers with
unblemished credit. These loans may have interest-only features,
higher debt-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios or lower
credit scores compared with those in traditional prime jumbo
securitizations.

(2) Homeowner's Access (23.8%)  Made to borrowers who do not
qualify for agency or prime jumbo mortgages for various reasons,
such as loan size in excess of government limits, alternative or
insufficient credit or prior derogatory credit events that occurred
more than two years prior to origination.

(3) Fresh Start (10.7%)  Made to borrowers with lower credit and
significant recent credit events within the past 24 months.

(4) Investor (3.7%)  Made to borrowers who finance investor
properties where the mortgage loan would not meet agency or
government guidelines because of such factors as property type,
number of financed properties, lower borrower credit score or a
seasoned credit event.

(5) Foreign National (0.2%)  Made to non-resident borrowers
holding certain types of visas who may not have a credit score.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA with a Stable trend
by DBRS) will act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator
and Certificate Registrar. U.S. Bank National Association (rated AA
(high) with a Stable trend by DBRS) will serve as Trustee.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ability-to-repay (ATR) rules,
they were made to borrowers who generally do not qualify for
agency, government or private-label non-agency prime jumbo products
for the various reasons described above. In accordance with CFPB
Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 1.3% of the loans are designated as
QM Safe Harbor, 24.2% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and 70.8% as
non-QM. Approximately 3.7% of the loans are not subject to the QM
rules.

The Servicer will generally fund advances of delinquent principal
and interest on any mortgage until such loan becomes 180 days
delinquent, and it is obligated to make advances in respect of
taxes, insurance premiums and reasonable costs incurred in the
course of servicing and disposing of properties.

On or after the earlier of (1) the two-year anniversary of the
Closing Date or (2) the date when the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans is reduced to 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the Depositor has the option to purchase all of the
outstanding Certificates at a price equal to the outstanding class
balance, plus accrued and unpaid interest, including any cap
carry-over amounts.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full.

For four loans (0.2% of the pool) in the mortgage pool, the
Servicer provided payment holidays of no more than five months and
extended the maturity terms post-Hurricane Harvey and
post-Hurricane Irma to provide relief to these borrowers. All four
loans are currently making their respective principal and interest
payments as of the Cut-Off Date. In its analysis, DBRS did not
treat these loans as modifications but nonetheless ran additional
scenarios to stress these loans so the rated bonds can withstand
the additional stress.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

(1) ATR Rules and Appendix Q Compliance: All of the mortgage loans
were underwritten in accordance with the eight underwriting factors
of the ATR rules. In addition, Caliber's underwriting standards
comply with the Standards for Determining Monthly Debt and Income
as set forth in Appendix Q of Regulation Z with respect to income
verification and the calculation of DTI ratios. All the loans in
the portfolio meet the standard for income verification in
accordance with Appendix Q, although certain loans may have
non-material deviations from Appendix Q.

(2) Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-prime
mortgages, underwriting standards have improved significantly from
the pre-crisis era. The Caliber loans were underwritten to a full
documentation standard with respect to verification of income
(generally through two years of Form W-2s or tax returns),
employment and assets. Generally, fully executed Form 4506-Ts were
obtained and tax returns were verified with Internal Revenue
Service transcripts if applicable.

(3) Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:

-- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have robust loan
attributes as reflected in combined LTV ratios, borrower household
income and liquid reserves, including the loans in Homeowner's
Access and Fresh Start, the two programs with weaker borrower
credit.

-- The pool contains low proportions of cash-out and investor
properties.

-- As the programs move down the credit spectrum, certain
characteristics, such as lower LTV ratios or DTI ratios, suggest
the consideration of compensating factors for riskier pools.

-- The pool is composed of 33.1% fixed-rate mortgages, which have
the lowest default risk because of the stability of monthly
payments. The pool is composed of 66.9% hybrid adjustable-rate
mortgages with an initial fixed period of five to seven years,
allowing borrowers sufficient time to credit cure before rates
reset.

(4) Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party
due diligence firm conducted property valuation, credit and
compliance reviews on 100% of the loans in the pool. Data integrity
checks were also performed on the pool.

(5) Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Caliber
began originating similar loans in Q4 2014. Since the first
transaction issued in November 2015, the historical performance for
the COLT shelf has been satisfactory, albeit short. For previous
COLT non-QM transactions rated by DBRS, as of December 2017, 60+
day delinquency rates ranged from 0.0% to 2.4% and cumulative
losses were no higher than 0.01%. Additionally, one unrated
transaction (COLT 2015-1) exhibited a higher 60+ day delinquency
rate of 4.9%. Finally, voluntary prepayment rates have been
relatively high, as these borrowers tend to credit cure and
refinance into lower-rate mortgages.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

(1) Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:
The R&W framework is considerably weaker compared with that of a
post-crisis prime jumbo securitization. Instead of an automatic
review when a loan becomes seriously delinquent, this transaction
employs an optional review only when realized losses occur (unless
the alleged breach relates to an ATR or TILA-RESPA integrated
disclosure violation). In addition, rather than engaging a
third-party due diligence firm to perform the R&W review, the
Controlling Holder (initially the Sponsor or a majority-owned
affiliate of the Sponsor) has the option to perform the review
in-house or use a third-party reviewer. Finally, the R&W provider
(the originator) is an unrated entity, has limited performance
history of non-prime non-QM securitizations and may potentially
experience financial stress that could result in the inability to
fulfill repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following mitigating
factors:

-- The holders of the Certificates representing a 25% interest in
the Certificates may direct the Trustee to commence a separate
review of the related mortgage loan, to the extent they disagree
with the Controlling Holder's determination of a breach.

-- Third-party due diligence was conducted on 100% of the loans
included in the pool. A comprehensive due diligence review
mitigates the risk of future R&W violations.

-- DBRS conducted an on-site originator (and servicer) review of
Caliber and deems it to be operationally sound.

-- The Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor will retain the
Class B-3 and Class X Certificates, which represent at least 5% of
the fair value of all the Certificates, aligning Sponsor and
investor interest in the capital structure.

-- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator scores
downward to account for the potential inability to fulfill
repurchase obligations, the lack of performance history and the
weaker R&W framework. A lower originator score results in increased
default and loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for
the rated securities.

(2) Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans: As
compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this portfolio
contains some mortgages originated to borrowers with weaker credit
and prior derogatory credit events, as well as QM-rebuttable
presumption or non-QM loans.

-- All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
factors as required by the ATR rules and were also underwritten to
comply with the standards set forth in Appendix Q.

-- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the
pre-crisis era.

-- The DBRS RMBS Insight model incorporates loss severity
penalties for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans, as
explained further in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the
related rating report.

-- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the
Homeowner's Access and Fresh Start programs, borrower credit events
had generally happened, on average, at 40 months and 20 months,
respectively, prior to origination. In its analysis, DBRS applied
additional penalties for borrowers with recent credit events within
the past two years.

(3) Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest: The
servicer will advance scheduled principal and interest on
delinquent mortgages until such loans become 180 days delinquent.
This will likely result in lower loss severities to the transaction
because advanced principal and interest will not have to be
reimbursed from the trust upon the liquidation of the mortgages but
will increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to
the Certificateholders. Mitigating factors include the fact that
principal proceeds can be used to pay interest shortfalls to the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full and that subordination levels are greater than expected
losses, which may provide for payment of interest to the
Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that incorporated
principal and interest advancing up to 180 days for delinquent
loans; the cash flow scenarios are discussed in more detail in the
Cash Flow Analysis section of the related rating report.

(4) Servicer's Financial Capability: In this transaction, Caliber,
as the Servicer, is responsible for funding advances to the extent
required. The servicer is an unrated entity and may face financial
difficulties in fulfilling its servicing advance obligations in the
future. Consequently, the transaction employs Wells Fargo as the
Master Servicer. If the servicer fails in its obligation to make
advances, Wells Fargo will be obligated to fund such servicing
advances.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf)
and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Certificates.


COMM 2000-C1: S&P Lowers Class G Certs Rating to 'B-(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class G commercial
mortgage pass-through certificate from COMM 2000-C1 Mortgage Trust,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to
'B- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)'.

The downgrade on class G reflects the fact that the transaction is
collateralized by a single remaining loan: the Saks  Stratford
Square loan ($8.2 million, 100%) is secured by a 147,000 sq.-ft.
anchor store attached to the Stratford Square Mall located in
Bloomingdale, Ill. The sole tenant, Carson Pirie, is owned by The
Bon-Ton Stores Inc. (Bon-Ton) and has a lease at the property that
expires in January 2024. S&P Global Ratings recently lowerd its
rating on Bon-Ton, which recently filed for bankruptcy, to 'D'.

Effective Feb. 22, 2018, the loan transferred to the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, due to imminent default.
Following Bon-Ton's bankruptcy filing, it has requested a period of
free rent at the property. Without rental payments from Bon-Ton,
the borrower may not be able to pay the mortgage debt service
payments. This could potentially cause this class to incur interest
shortfalls if the servicer does not advance on the mortgage loan.

Given the potential for Bon-Ton to reject the lease at this
property in bankruptcy, we analyzed the property assuming Bon-Ton
will vacate the property and the property will be re-tenanted.
Using this assumption, S&P calculated a 0.42x S&P Global Ratings'
debt service coverage (DSC) and 157.4% S&P Global Ratings'
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using an 8.5% S&P Global Ratings'
capitalization rate for the loan. To date, the transaction has
experienced $45.2 million in principal losses, or 5.0% of the
original pool trust balance.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 15, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $8.2 million, which is 0.9% of the pool balance at
issuance. The pool currently has one loan remaining (discussed
above), down from 112 loans at issuance. The master servicer,
KeyBank N.A., reported 2016 year-end financial information for the
remaining loan.


COMM TRUST 2013-CCRE6: DBRS Hikes Cl. E Certs Rating to BB(high)
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE6
issued by COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage Trust:

    -- Class D to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
    -- Class E to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the ratings on the following classes:

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
   -- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
   -- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
   -- Class C at A (high) (sf)
   -- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
   -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable, including Class D, which previously had a
Positive trend.

The rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction and the increased credit support to the bonds as a
result of the successful repayment of Class A-1 and significant
paydown of Class A-2. At issuance, the pool consisted of 48 loans
secured by 80 commercial and multifamily properties. As of the
December 2017 remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of
25.3% as a result of scheduled loan amortization and the successful
repayment of six loans within the pool. There are 41 loans,
representing 99.3% of the pool balance, reporting YE2016 net cash
flow; these loans reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 2.36 times (x) and
12.7%, respectively, compared with a YE2015 WA DSCR and WA debt
yield of 2.33x and 11.2%, respectively. The pool is concentrated,
as the top 15 loans represent 82.4% of the current pool balance.
However, the performance of these loans has been healthy overall.
Based on YE2016 financials, these loans reported a WA DSCR and debt
yield of 2.43x and 12.4%, respectively, reflecting a WA 13.8%
improvement in cash flows over the DBRS cash flows derived at
issuance and a 3.7% improvement in cash flows year over year. As of
the December 2017 remittance, there are no loans with partial-term
interest-only (IO) payments remaining, and three of the remaining
loans, representing 27.8% of the current pool balance, were
structured with full-term IO payments.

As of the December 2017 remittance, there are eight loans,
representing 19.9% of the pool, on the servicer's watchlist,
including the largest loan in the pool. Two of these loans are
being monitored for non-performance-related issues limited to
deferred maintenance. The largest loan in the pool is being
monitored for the upcoming lease expiration of the General Services
Administration Department of State; however, because the tenant has
since extended its lease through to January 2021, DBRS expects the
loan will be removed from the watchlist in the near term. The
Streets of Brentwood loan (Prospectus ID#12; 3.5% of the pool
balance) is currently in special servicing for imminent maturity
default after the loan matured on January 6, 2018. The loan
reported a YE2016 DSCR of 2.82x and, based on those cash flows, a
DBRS Refinance DSCR of 1.97x. The borrower is currently working
with the special servicer on a resolution.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Federal Center Plaza loan
(Prospectus ID#1; 11.6% of the current pool balance) investment
grade. With this review, DBRS confirms that the performance of that
loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

Classes X-A and X-B are IO certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one notch if
senior in the waterfall.


COMM TRUST 2014-LC15: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings for all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC15 (the
Certificates), issued by COMM 2014-LC15 Mortgage Trust (the Trust)
as follows:

     -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
     -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
     -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
     -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
     -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
     -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
     -- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
     -- Class B at AA (sf)
     -- Class PEZ at A (sf)
     -- Class C at A (sf)
     -- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
     -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
     -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
     -- Class X-C at B (high) (sf)
     -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 48
fixed-rate loans secured by 197 commercial properties. As of the
December 2017 remittance, all loans remained in the pool with an
aggregate principal balance of $892.6 million, representing a
collateral reduction of 4.1% since issuance as a result of
scheduled loan amortization. There are currently three loans (12.5%
of the pool) with remaining partial interest-only (IO) periods,
ranging from one to 14 months, while two loans (9.1% of the pool)
are structured with full IO terms. Two loans (1.4% of the pool) are
secured by collateral that has been fully defeased. To date, 41
loans (86.0% of the pool) reported partial-year 2017 financials,
while 45 loans (97.7% of the pool) reported YE2016 financials.
Based on the most recent year-end financial reporting, the
transaction had a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and WA Debt Yield of 1.54 times (x) and 10.3%, respectively,
compared with the DBRS WA Term DSCR and WA Debt Yield of 1.37x and
9.1%, respectively.

The pool is concentrated by property type, as 14 loans,
representing 31.4% of the pool, are secured by retail properties,
while seven loans (20.9% of the pool) are secured by office
properties and ten loans (19.2% of the pool) are secured by
multifamily properties. By loan size, the pool is also
concentrated, as the top ten and top 15 loans represent 62.8% and
75.2% of the pool, respectively. Based on the most recent cash
flows available, the top 15 loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.41x,
compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.33x, which is reflective
of a 6.8% net cash flow growth over the DBRS issuance figures.

As of the December 2017 remittance, there are two loans (1.1% of
the pool) in special servicing and nine loans (9.6% of the pool) on
the servicer's watchlist. The two loans in special servicing, the
Holiday Inn Express Snyder (Prospectus ID#33, 0.6% of the pool) and
the La Quinta Inn & Suites Floresville (Prospectus ID#41, 0.5% of
the pool), are each secured by limited-service hotels located in
heavily energy-dependent markets. Based on the most recent
appraisals (May 2017 and October 2017), property values have
dropped by approximately 75% since issuance. Of the nine loans on
the servicer's watchlist, four loans (4.4% of the pool) were
flagged as a result of deferred maintenance, while the remaining
five loans (5.2% of the pool) were flagged because of occupancy
declines and/or near-term tenant rollover. Based on the most recent
financials, the five loans with potential increases in vacancy had
a WA DSCR of 1.48x, compared to the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.25x.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-C are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO ratings
mirror the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.


COMM TRUST 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Corrects May 12 Press Release
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited corrected a May 12, 2017, press release that stated
the incorrect rating on Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-CCRE23, Class X-B in the COMM 2015-CCRE23
Mortgage Trust transaction. The press release has been amended with
the correct rating and is as follows:

On May 12, 2017, DBRS confirmed the ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2015-CCRE23 issued by COMM 2015-CCRE23 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-X-EXT at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS upgraded one class of COMM 2015-CCRE23 Mortgage
Trust as follows:

-- Class CM-B to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

These rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction since issuance in May 2015. The transaction consists of
83 fixed-rate loans secured by 220 commercial properties. The pool
has experienced a collateral reduction of 1.2% since issuance as a
result of scheduled amortization, with all of the original 83 loans
outstanding. Approximately 99.5% of the pool reported YE2015
financials, including a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.79 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 9.4%. The
DBRS issuance WA DSCR and WA debt yield were 1.92x and 9.5%,
respectively.

As at the April 2017 remittance, there were two loans, representing
2.9% of the pool balance, on the servicer's watch list and no loans
in special servicing. One loan was flagged for performance dropping
below the DSCR threshold of 1.20x as at Q2 2016 reporting but has
since improved to 1.21x as at the YE2016 financials. The other loan
was watch listed for failing a covenant-compliance stressed DSCR
test, and as such, a lockbox has been activated and the loan is
being monitored. The two loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.24x and WA
debt yield of 8.4%.

The Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#2; 7.4% of
the current pool) is secured by a portfolio of 65 Courtyard by
Marriott hotels, totaling 9,590 keys. The collateral includes the
fee and leasehold interest in 49 hotels, the fee interest in nine
hotels and the leasehold interest in seven hotels. The subject loan
consists of the $33.5 million A-1 piece and $100.0 million A-2A
piece of the whole Senior A-note debt of $315.0 million, as well as
the controlling subordinate B-note debt of $355.0 million. The A-1
piece and B-note debt are included in the trust as non-pooled rake
bonds, while the A-2A piece is pooled in the trust. At issuance,
DBRS shadow-rated this loan as investment grade. DBRS confirms with
this review that the performance of this loan remains consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics.

Class CM-B is a non-pooled rake bond backed by the $355.0 million
Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio B-note. This class was upgraded
with this review in accordance with the changes in the "North
American Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Methodology" published in
March 2017.


COMM TRUST 2016-CCRE: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. X-E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings for all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-CCRE28 (the
Certificates) issued by COMM 2016-CCRE28 Mortgage Trust (the Trust)
as follows:

  -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-HR at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-HR at AAA (sf)
  -- Class XP-A at AAA (sf)
  -- Class B at AA (sf)
  -- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
  -- Class C at A (sf)
  -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
  -- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
  -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
  -- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
  -- Class X-E at B (sf)
  -- Class H at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class J.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 49
fixed-rate loans secured by 119 commercial properties. As of the
December 2017 remittance, all loans remained in the pool with an
aggregate principal balance of $1.02 billion, representing a
collateral reduction of approximately 0.6% since issuance as a
result of scheduled loan amortization. There are currently 15 loans
(29.7% of the pool) with remaining interest-only (IO) periods,
ranging from eight to 36 months, while 11 loans (40.8% of the pool)
are structured with full IO terms. To date, 40 loans (84.4% of the
pool) reported partial-year 2017 financials, while 46 loans (96.9%
of the pool) reported YE2016 financials. Based on the most recent
year-end financial reporting, the transaction had a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
Debt Yield of 1.62 times (x) and 9.1%, respectively, compared with
the DBRS WA Term DSCR and WA Debt Yield of 1.51x and 8.5%,
respectively.

The pool is concentrated by property type, as 17 loans,
representing 28.9% of the pool, are secured by retail properties,
while ten loans (28.5% of the pool) are secured by office
properties and eight loans (16.4% of the pool) are secured by hotel
properties. Additionally, thirteen loans (32.2% of the pool) are
secured by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to
single tenants. However, four of the six loans (14.2% of the pool)
secured by single-tenant properties in the Top 15 are leased to
investment-grade tenants. By loan size, the pool is concentrated,
as the top 15 loans represent 66.7% of the pool. Based on the most
recent cash flows available, the top 15 loans reported a WA DSCR of
1.75x, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.55x, which is
reflective of the 12.9% net cash flow growth over the DBRS issuance
figures.

As of the December 2017 remittance, there are five loans (6.1% of
the pool) on the servicer watchlist. The two largest loans on the
watchlist, Place Apartments (Prospectus ID#16, 2.4% of the pool)
and Emerald Beach Resort (Prospectus ID#21, 0.7% of the pool), were
flagged because of hail and hurricane damage, respectively. Both
borrowers have opened insurance claims and the servicer is
monitoring the loans. Of the remaining loans on the watchlist, one
loan (1.2% of the pool) was flagged because of deferred
maintenance, while two loans (1.1% of the pool) were flagged due to
tenant rollover.

Classes X-A, X-HR, XP-A, X-B, X-C, X-D, X-E and X-F are IO
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO ratings mirror the lowest-rated reference
tranche, adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2018-C02: Fitch to Rate 19 Note Classes 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2018-C02:

-- $188,817,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2M-2A exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2M-2B exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2M-2C exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $667,152,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2A-I1 notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2A-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2A-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2A-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2B-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2B-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2B-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2B-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2C-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2C-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2C-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2C-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,384,000 class 2E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2X-1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2X-2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2X-3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2X-4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2Y-1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2Y-2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2Y-3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $444,768,000 class 2Y-4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $25,308,153,117 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $9,938,129 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $11,705,374 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $11,705,374 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $11,705,374 class 2M-CH reference tranche;
-- $151,053,000 class 2B-1 notes;
-- $7,951,103 class 2B-1H reference tranche;
-- $132,503,421 class 2B-2H reference tranche.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
(AAA/Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
the mortgage loan reference pools of certain residential mortgage
loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 2M-1 notes reflects the 3.75% subordination provided
by the 0.88% class 2M-2A, the 0.88% class 2M-2B, the 0.88% class
2M-2C, the 0.60% class 2B-1 and its corresponding reference
tranche, as well as the 0.50% 2B-2H reference tranche.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2018-C02 (CAS 2018-C02) is
Fannie Mae's 25th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2018 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The CAS 2018-C02 transaction consists of 112,133 loans with
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 80% and less than or equal
to 97%.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
but are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors based on the payment priorities
set forth in the transaction documents.

Given the structure and counterparty dependence on Fannie Mae,
Fitch's ratings on the 2M-1 and 2M-2 notes will be based on the
lower of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and
credit enhancement (CE) available through subordination; or Fannie
Mae's Issuer Default Rating (IDR). The notes will be issued as
uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and carry a 12.5-year legal final
maturity. This will be an actual loss risk transfer transaction in
which losses borne by the noteholders will not be based on a fixed
loss severity (LS) schedule. The notes in this transaction will
experience losses realized at the time of liquidation or
modification that will include both lost principal and delinquent
or reduced interest.

Under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into
receivership if it determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less
than its obligations for more than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing, as well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae if it is
determined that the termination of such contract would promote an
orderly administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that
the U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in Fitch current rating of Fannie Mae. However, if at
some point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, Fannie Mae's ratings could be downgraded and
the 2M-1,2M-2A,2M-2B, and 2M-2C notes' ratings affected.

The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating-rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating-rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Fannie Mae
in 2Q17, 3Q17 and October 2017. The reference pool will consist of
loans with LTV ratios greater than 80% and less than or equal to
97%. Overall, the reference pool's collateral characteristics are
similar to recent CAS transactions and reflect the strong credit
profile of post-crisis mortgage originations.

Clean Pay History for Loans in Disaster Areas (Positive): Fannie
Mae will not remove loans in counties designated as natural
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, any loans with a prior delinquency were removed from the
reference pool, per the eligibility criteria. Therefore, all loans
in the reference pool in the disaster areas have had clean pay
histories since the occurrence of the natural disaster events.

HomeReady Exposure (Negative): Approximately 12.5% of the reference
pool was originated under Fannie Mae's HomeReady program, which
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
HomeReady loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and
property value), which is reflected in increased CE.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or modification
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. Fitch accounted
for the 12.5-year hard maturity in its default analysis and applied
a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Fannie Mae has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its
lender-approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty
risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan
quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a
tight control environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has
determined Fannie Mae to be an above-average aggregator for its
2013 and later product. Fitch accounted for the lower risk by
applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will retain credit risk in the transaction by holding
the 2A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial loss
protection of 4.50%, as well as the first loss 2B-2H reference
tranche, sized at 0.50%. Fannie Mae is also retaining a vertical
slice or interest of approximately 5% in each reference tranche
(2M-1H, 2M-AH, 2M-BH, 2M-CH, 2B-1H and 2B-2H).

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae; this is reflected in Fitch current
rating of Fannie Mae. However, if, at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the ratings of
Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C,
and 2M-2 notes' ratings affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected sMVD. It indicates there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


CPS AUTO 2017-A: DBRS Confirm BB(low) Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the outstanding publicly rated classes of CPS
Auto Receivables Trust 2017-A. The confirmations are based on
performance trends where credit enhancement levels are sufficient
to cover DBRS's expected losses at their current respective rating
levels.

Debt Rated         Rating Confirmed
----------         ----------------
Class A                AAA(sf)
Class B                AA(high)(sf)
Class C                A(sf)
Class D                BBB(low)(sf)
Class E                BB(low)(sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
     origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
     performance.


CPS AUTO 2018-A: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2018-A (CPS 2018-A or
the Issuer):

-- $88,466,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $31,457,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $26,908,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $23,133,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $20,036,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
     subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
     spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
     the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
     under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
     addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
     and the payment of principal by the legal final maturity
     date.

-- The capabilities of Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS)
     with regard to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of CPS and considers
     the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of  
     subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
     servicer.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and

     a successful track record within the auto finance industry,
     having managed the company through multiple economic cycles.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

     data for CPS originations and performance of the CPS auto
     loan portfolio.

-- The May 29, 2014, settlement of the Federal Trade Commission
     (FTC) inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade practices.

-- CPS paid imposed penalties and restitution payments to
     consumers.

-- CPS has made considerable improvements to the collections   
     process, including management changes, upgraded systems and
     software as well as implementation of new policies and
     procedures focused on maintaining compliance.

-- CPS will be subject to ongoing monitoring of certain processes

     by the FTC.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that
     the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the

     assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
     U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The CPS 2018-A transaction represents the 28th securitization
completed by CPS since 2010 and offers both senior and subordinate
rated securities. The receivables securitized in CPS 2018-A are
subprime automobile loan contracts secured primarily by used
automobiles, light-duty trucks, vans and minivans.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 55.30% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(52.45%), the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization
(1.85%). The ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E
Notes reflect 39.05%, 25.15%, 13.20% and 2.85% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C1:

Cl. A-M, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-M, A-MFL and A-MFX were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the P&I class A-J was affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class A-X was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 46% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 43% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 17.9% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
A-X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 32% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 39% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $410 million
from $3.37 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 28% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 97% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, compared to 8 at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventy-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $391 million (for an
average loss severity of 26%). Eight loans, constituting 32% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Pinnacle at Tutwiler Loan ($49 million -- 12%
of the pool), which is secured by a 249,000 square foot (SF)
anchored, lifestyle shopping center located in Trussville, Alabama,
roughly 15 miles northeast of downtown Birmingham. The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2016 due to imminent
maturity default and became REO in February 2018. The property was
89% leased as of November 2017 compared to 94% at year-end 2016.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Shoreham Hotel
Loan ($33 million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a
174-key, unflagged full-service hotel located on West 55th Street
between 5th and 6th Avenues in Midtown Manhattan. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2014 due to imminent
maturity default and became REO in June 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Rambling Oaks Loan
($12 million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by two senior
living facilities located in Norman, Oklahoma and Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2014 due
to imminent maturity default and became REO in June 2017. As of
March 2016, the properties were collectively 75% occupied.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $75 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (59% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 39% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $70 million (a 44% expected loss based on a
82% probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the February 2018 remittance statement, cumulative interest
shortfalls were $75 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 66% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Koger Center Loan ($111
million -- 28% of the pool), which is secured by an office complex
located in Tallahassee, Florida consisting of 18 buildings. The
loan was transferred to Special Servicing in January 2017 and was
returned to the master servicer in September 2017, following an
August 2017 modification of the maturity date which was extended by
36 months to February 2020. The largest tenant is the State of
Florida, which occupies 68% of the net rentable area (NRA) with a
scheduled lease expiration in October 2019. The collateral property
was 88% leased as of October 2016, compared to 92% leased as of
March 2016.

The second and third largest loans are the City Place-A note and
B-note ($100 million and $50 million -- 25% and 13% of the pool,
respectively) , which are secured by a 756,000 square foot (SF)
portion of a 1.3 million SF mixed-use complex located in West Palm
Beach, Florida. City Place is a multi-level mixed use property
which includes an open air retail and entertainment component, The
loan was modified in April 2011. The modification extended the
lease term and resulted in the creation of a $50 million B-Note.
The loan subsequently transferred back to special servicing in
February 2016 and was modified again in July 2017, reducing the
B-Note interest rate to 0%. Macy's closed its store at the
collateral property in late 2017 and approximately 10% of the NRA
expires over the next six months. The loan transferred back to the
master servicer in September 2017. As of September 2017, the retail
component was 93% leased, compared to 95% leased at year-end 2016.
Moody's considers these troubled loans and has assumed a high
expected loss on the combined notes.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2003-C3: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
in CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mtge Pass-Through
Ctfs. 2003-C3:

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of Classes J and K were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the interest-only (IO) Class A-X was affirmed based
on the credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating IO class A-Y was affirmed based on the credit quality of
the referenced loan.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 38.4% of the
current balance, compared to 22.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses remain the same as last
review at 3.3%. Moody's provides a current list of base expected
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
A-X and Cl. A-Y were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 55% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.2% to $14.5
million from $1.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 28% of the pool. The pool includes one loan, representing
less than 0.5% of the pool, that is secured by a residential co-op
located in New York.

One loan, constituting less than 0.5% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $51.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 62%). Two loans, constituting 55.2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Buffalo Square Shopping Center Loan ($4.1 million -- 28.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold interest in a 177,000
SF retail center located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The collateral is
subject to a sandwich ground lease and the sandwich ground lease is
subject to a master ground lease of the entire retail center. The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in July 2014 due to
the borrower changing the property manager without noteholder
consent. The property was 65% occupied in November 2017, compared
to 95% in November 2016.

The second largest specially serviced loan is The Crossroads Loan
($3.9 million -- 26.8% of the pool), which is secured by a Class B
office building located in Elmsford, New York, near White Plains.
The loan was first transferred to the special servicer in December
2012 due to maturity default. The loan was extended through January
2015 but returned to the special servicer due to maturity default.
The property was reported to be in fair condition and was 57%
occupied as of November 2016.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.6 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (70% expected loss on average).

The top three performing loans represent 44.8% of the pool balance.
The largest performing loan is the Polar Plastics Loan ($3.8
million -- 26.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 385,000 SF
manufacturing facility located in Mooresville, North Carolina
approximately 30 miles north of Charlotte. The property is 100%
leased to Pactiv Corporation through March 2023. Moody's value
incorporated a Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant
risk. The loan is fully amortizing and is scheduled to pay-off in
March 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 31% and 3.39X,
respectively.

The second largest loan is the ParkRidge at McPherson Loan ($1.5
million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 72 unit
multifamily property located in McPherson, Kansas, approximately 60
miles north of Wichita. The property was 97% occupied as of
September 20017, compared to 96% in June 2016. The loan has
amortized 24% and is scheduled to mature in April 2018. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.48X, respectively, compared to 68%
and 1.43X at the last review.

The third largest loan is The Veranda at Twin Creek Apartments Loan
($1.1 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by an 88 unit
multifamily property located in Killeen, Texas, approximately 50
miles north of Austin. The property was 93% occupied as of
September 2017, compared to 99% in September 2016. The loan has
amortized nearly 17% since securitization and is scheduled to
mature in January 2021. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and
2.48X, respectively, compared to 40% and 2.43X at the last review.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C3: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on five classes in CSFB Mortgage Securities
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-C3:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2017 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2017 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Classes B was upgraded based primarily due to an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 10% since Moody's last review
and 97% since securitization.

The ratings on the Classes C, D and E were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized
losses.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. A-Y, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced loans (residential cooperatives).

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 36.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 26.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. A-X and Cl. A-Y were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since approximately 39% of the
pool is in special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines
a probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16th, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $58 million
from $1.64 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22% of the pool. Nine loans ($26.7 million -- 47% of the
pool) are secured by residential co-ops located primarily in New
York City, and have structured credit assessments of aaa (sca.pd).

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7, compared to 8 at Moody's last review.

Seven loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $111 million (for an average loss
severity of 42%). Two loans, constituting 39% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Tri-Pointe Plaza Loan ($12.5 million -- 22% of the pool),
which is secured by six office buildings totaling 152,500 square
feet (SF) and located in Tucson, Arizona. The loan transferred to
special servicing in July 2012 and became real estate owned (REO)
in July 2013. As of December 2017, the weighted average occupancy
was only 49%, compared to 56% as of September 2016 and 49% in
2014.

The other specially serviced loan is the University Park Loan ($9.8
million -- 17% of the pool), which is secured by a 109,000 SF
retail center located in Clive, Iowa. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2014 for imminent payment default and
became REO in October 2015.

Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $18.8 million (an 84%
expected loss on average) from these specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 38% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 102%. Only four remaining loans are
included in the conduit component, Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 34% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.81X and 1.24X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 13% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Foxcroft Mobile Home Community Loan ($4.0
million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 321-unit mobile
home community located in Loch Sheldrake, New York, approximately
100 miles north of NYC. The loan is on the watchlist for low DSCR
as a result of increased expenses and low occupancy. Per the most
recent rent roll, occupancy was 78%. The loan is currently in 60
days payment delinquency due to major plumbing repairs as a result
of the winter weather. The loan is fully amortizing and has
maturity date in February 2025. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
124% and 0.83X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Fishers Gateway Shops Loan ($2.8
million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by an unanchored
retail center in Fishers, Indiana. As of December 2016, the
property was 90% leased to eight tenants, including Starbucks,
compared to 75% leased as of March 2016. The loan has amortized
approximately 23% since securitization and has a maturity date in
April 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.21X,
respectively.

The third largest loan is the 750 New York Ave Loan ($616,877 --
1.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 7,200 SF single-tenant
retail building. The property is 100% occupied by a Duane Reade
pharmacy on a lease scheduled to expire in October 2040. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.33X, respectively.


CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Series A-2 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of CVS Credit Lease
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series A-1 and Series A-2:

Series A-2, Affirmed Ba1; previously on Mar. 23, 2017 Affirmed Ba1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating was affirmed based on the balloon risk at the
certificate's final distribution date and support of the long term
triple net lease guaranteed by CVS Health (CVS, Moody's senior
unsecured debt rating Baa1, on watch -- possible downgrade). The
rating on the A-2 Certificate is lower than CVS's rating due to the
size of the loan balance at maturity relative to the value of the
collateral assuming the existing tenant is no longer in occupancy
(the dark value). CVS's lease obligations are not sufficient to
repay the A-2 Certificate principal in full and the residual value
insurance policies provider, Royal Indemnity Company, is unrated by
Moody's.

In December 2017 Moody's placed CVS Health's (CVS) Baa1 senior
unsecured rating on review for downgrade following its announcement
that it will acquire Aetna, Inc (Baa2, stable outlook). The balloon
risk of the transaction is unchanged by the placement of CVS
Health's rating on review for downgrade.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are generally based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a lower
loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease Financings"
published in October 2016.

No model was used in this review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

The Certificate is supported by 96 single-tenant, stand-alone
retail buildings leased to CVS. Each building is subject to a fully
bondable triple net lease guaranteed by CVS. The properties are
located across 17 states. The rated final distribution date is
January 10, 2023.

During the term of the transaction, the A-2 Certificate is
supported by CVS Health Corp. (CVS) lease obligations. The balloon
payment is insured under residual value insurance policies.


DT AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to DT Auto
Owner Trust 2018-1's $480 million asset-backed notes series
2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 1,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 66.9%, 61.5%, 51.0%, 42.5%,
and 36.9% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
respectively, based on stressed break-even cash flow scenarios
(including excess spread). These credit support levels provide
approximately 2.20x, 2.00x, 1.65x, 1.35x, and 1.20x coverage of
S&P's expected net loss range of 29.00%-30.00% for the class A, B,
C, D, and E notes, respectively.

-- Credit enhancement also covers cumulative gross losses of
approximately 95.6%, 87.9%, 72.9%, 60.7%, and 52.6%, respectively,
assuming a 30% recovery rate.

-- The timely interest and principal payments by the legal final
maturity dates made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios
that S&P deems appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.

-- S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would likely
not be lowered, and the class D notes would likely remain within
one category of our preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating, all else being
equal. The rating on class E would remain within two rating
categories of our preliminary 'BB (sf)' rating during the first
year, though it would ultimately default in the moderate ('BBB')
stress scenario with approximately 63% principal repayment. These
potential rating movements are consistent with our credit stability
criteria."

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
securitized, including a high percentage (approximately 77%) of
obligors with higher payment frequencies (more than once a month),
which S&P expects will result in a somewhat faster paydown on the
pool.

-- The transaction's sequential-pay structure, which builds credit
enhancement (on a percentage-of-receivables basis) as the pool
amortizes.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  DT Auto Owner Trust 2018-1

  Class       Rating      Type           Interest    Amount
                                           rate     (mil. $)(i)
  A           AAA (sf)    Senior          Fixed       210.00
  B           AA (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed        57.00
  C           A (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed        87.00
  D           BBB (sf)    Subordinate     Fixed        69.00
  E           BB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed        57.00

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2018-1: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following Series
2018-1 notes issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1
(the Issuer):

-- $261,640,000, Class A rated AAA (sf)
-- $86,240,000, Class B rated AA (sf)
-- $81,020,000, Class C rated A (sf)
-- $92,060,000, Class D rated BBB (sf)
-- $29,040,000, Class E rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The transaction
     benefits from credit enhancement in the form of
     overcollateralization, subordination, amounts held in the
     reserve fund and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are

     sufficient to support DBRS-projected expected cumulative net
     loss assumptions under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
     address the timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and

     principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- Exeter Finance LLC's (Exeter) capabilities with regard to
     originations, underwriting, servicing and ownership by The
     Blackstone Group L.P., Navigation Capital Partners, Inc. and
     Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Exeter and
     considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and
     servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts with an
     acceptable backup servicer.

-- Exeter's senior management team has considerable experience
     and a successful track record within the auto finance
     industry.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
     Exeter's auto loan portfolio.

-- A third-party entity that is unaffiliated with Exeter
     purchased a pool of automobile loan contracts from Exeter and

     is subsequently selling certain of those contracts to EFCAR
     LLC, the depositor, to be included as collateral in the
     transaction.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Exeter,
     that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
     in the assets and the consistency with the DBRS methodology
     "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."


FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables
Trust 2018-1 (FCRT 2018-1). This is the first auto loan transaction
of the year for Foursight Capital LLC (Foursight; Unrated) and the
first transaction rated by Moody's. The notes will be backed by a
pool of retail automobile loan contracts originated by Foursight,
who is also the servicer and administrator for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1

Class A-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Class F Notes, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of Foursight as the
servicer and administrator and the backup servicing arrangement.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2018-1 pool
is 9.25% and the Aaa level is 40.0%. The Aaa level is the level of
credit enhancement consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating. Moody's based
its cumulative net loss expectation and Aaa level on an analysis of
the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the historical
performance of similar collateral, including securitization
performance and managed portfolio performance; the ability of
Foursight to perform the servicing functions; and current
expectations for the macroeconomic environment during the life of
the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes, Class
D notes, Class E notes and Class F notes are expected to benefit
from 36.25%, 25.05%, 18.55%, 14.55%, 10.55% and 5.35%, of hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the
notes consists of a combination of overcollateralization, a
non-declining reserve account, and subordination, except for the
Class F notes, which do not benefit from subordination. The notes
may also benefit from excess spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the subordinated notes if, given current
expectations of portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are
consistent with higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such
as the one in this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a
percentage of the collateral balance as collections pay down senior
notes. Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note
principal payments will accelerate this build of enhancement.
Moody's expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a
lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of
the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio
losses also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for
used vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud.


FREDDIE MAC: Moody's Takes Action on $29.9MM RMBS Issued 2015-2016
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
from two transactions, backed by conforming prime residential
mortgage loans, issued by Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2015-SC02

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2016-SC01

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds and low levels of delinquencies in these
transactions. The transactions have had significant prepayment and
the current balance has reduced to below 70% of the original deal
balance. The actions also reflect Moody's updated loss projections
on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


GALAXY CLO XXI: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Galaxy
XXI CLO, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is:

US$2,000,000 Class X Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2031 (the
"Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$260,000,000 Class A-R Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2031 (the
"Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class B-R Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2031 (the
"Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Due 2031 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class E-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class F-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class F-R Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans. PineBridge
Investments LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes addresses the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on March 1, 2018 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on December 8, 2015 (the "Original Closing
Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional subordinated
notes, to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional
subordinated notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features have occured in connection with the refinancing. These
include: extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the
stated maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral
quality tests; changes to the overcollateralization test levels;
and changes to certain concentration limits.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $399,268,855

Defaulted par: $1,462,290

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.10%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (2850 to 3278)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: 0

Class F-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (2850 to 3705)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -4

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: -1

Class F-R Notes: -2


GREENWOOD PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Greenwood Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$225,750,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$451,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$126,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$55,650,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$67,200,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$40,950,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Greenwood Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of non senior secured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 85% ramped as of the closing
date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,050,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: DBRS Corrects July 7 Press Release
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited corrected a July 7, 2017, press release that stated
the incorrect rating on Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-GCJ14, Class X-C in the GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2013-GCJ14 transaction. The press release has been
amended with the correct rating and is as follows:

On July 7, 2017, DBRS confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-GCJ14 (the Certificates)
issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GCJ14 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

Class PEZ is exchangeable with Classes A-S, B and C and vice versa.
All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has experienced a collateral reduction of
6.3% since issuance with 81 of the original 84 loans remaining in
the pool as at the June 2017 remittance report. There are two
loans, representing 2.7% of the pool, that are fully defeased and
scheduled to mature in July 2018. The remainder of the loans in the
pool are scheduled to mature in 2023.

Based on the reported figures for YE2016, the transaction benefits
from a healthy in-place weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.80 times (x) and debt yield of 11.4% compared
with the issuance levels of 1.70x and 10.4%, respectively, for the
pool. The performance for the largest 15 non-defeased loans has
also been strong since issuance with WA net cash flow growth of
14.3% over the DBRS issuance figures and a WA DSCR of 1.86x based
on YE2016 reporting.

As at the June 2017 remittance report, there are nine loans,
representing 19.9% of the pool (including three in the Top 15),
that are on the servicer's watch list. Two of those loans, both in
the Top 15 and representing 13.0% of the pool, are on the watch
list for non-performance issues and are expected to be removed from
the watch list with the July 2017 remittance. An additional five
loans, representing 6.3% of the pool (including one in the Top 15),
are being monitored for performance issues related to occupancy and
upcoming tenant rollover. The remainder of the watch listed loans
are being monitored for cash flow declines.

The ratings assigned to the Class C, D, E, F and G notes materially
deviate from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative
results. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a rating
differential of three or more notches between the assigned rating
and the rating implied by the quantitative results that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology. The deviations are
warranted, given the undemonstrated sustainability of loan
performance trends.


GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2017-GS5 pass-through certificates (GSMS 2017-GS5).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Overall performance remains stable with no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance. No loans have
transferred to special servicing since issuance. As of the February
2018 distribution date, all loans are current and the pool's
aggregate balance has been reduced by 0.2% to $1.060 billion from
$1.062 billion at issuance. One loan (4.5% of pool) is on the
servicer's watchlist due to damage suffered from flooding as a
result of Hurricane Harvey.

Hurricane Exposure: Lyric Centre (4.5% of pool), which is secured
by a 382,046 sf office building in Houston, TX, suffered damage
from flooding as a result of Hurricane Harvey. According to the
master servicer's most recent watchlist comment in February 2018,
the basements, underground garage and lobby suffered water damage.
An insurance claim will be filed when damage assessments have been
completed. No tenants were relocated due to the flooding. The
borrower is currently working with the servicer to receive Reserve
funds to repair damages. As of February 2018, the borrower has
approximately $444,000 in reserves of which $112,500 are designated
for repairs. Occupancy and NOI debt service coverage ratio were 90%
and 2.79x at issuance and 89% and 1.64x for YTD September 2017.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans make up 64.3% of the pool,
which is above the respective 2016 and 2015 averages of 54.8% and
49.3%. Loans secured by office, retail and hotel properties
represent 41.9%, 19.9% and 2.6%, respectively. The largest loan,
350 Park Avenue, which is secured by a 570,831 sf office property
in New York, NY, comprises 9.4% of the pool.

Very Low Amortization: Based on the loans' scheduled maturity
balances, the pool is expected to amortize 4.4% during the term. 15
loans (63.8% of pool) are full-term, interest-only and 12 loans
(21.8%) have a partial-term, interest-only component.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three
loans representing 14.3% of the pool have investment-grade credit
opinions. The proportion of investment-grade credit opinion loans
in this securitization exceeds the 2016 average concentration of
8.4%. The credit opinion loans are the largest loan, 350 Park
Avenue (9.4%), the 14th largest loan, AMA Plaza (2.8%), and the
18th largest loan, 225 Bush Street (2.1%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $12.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $248 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $381.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.3 million class F at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and RR Interest certificates.


GS MORTGAGE 2018-CHILL: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2018-CHILL, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-CHILL.:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. X-CP*, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. X-FP*, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to a portfolio of 13
temperature controlled properties. The single borrower underlying
the mortgage is comprised of 2 special-purpose bankruptcy-remote
entities, each of which is indirectly wholly owned and controlled
by Blackstone Capital Partners VII NQ L.P.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of Moody's Single Borrower and Interest-Only
methodologies. The rating approach for securities backed by a
single loan compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying
property with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely driven
by the LTV of the underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $365,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 105.9%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 2.66X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.17X.

Loan collateral is comprised of the borrower's fee interest in 13
temperature-controlled properties located within 6 states.
Construction dates range between 1964 and 1999 and reflect an
average age of 30 years.

Property subtypes based on Moody's classification include
Production Attached/Advantaged (4 properties; 37.0% of TTM NCF;
39.3% of the allocated loan balance) and public warehouse (9
properties; 63.0% of TTM NCF; 60.7% of the allocated loan balance).
Most of the facilities are well-suited for their use, exhibiting a
weighted average clear height of 32 feet. For the twelve months up
to December, 2017 the portfolio's average utilization rate was
73.2%.

Moody's analysis for temperature controlled portfolios
predominantly focuses on five main factors. These include the
assessment of (1) a facility's proximity to a Global Gateway
Industrial Market, agricultural and/or food producers, (2) Building
Size, (3) Functionality of a facility, (4) Property Subtype which
is categorized into three distinct subgroups mainly Public
Warehouse, Production Attached/Advantaged, and Distribution/Port
Facilities and (5) Utilization and Contracts with food producers,
pharmaceutical companies, manufactures and farmers. With respect to
the portfolio collateral, Moody's assessment of the portfolio's
value centers was positive with respect to facility size,
functionality metrics, and proximity to agricultural demand
generators.

Revenues for the underlying 13 properties are effectively
cross-collateralized. Loans secured by multiple properties benefit
from lower cash flow volatility given that excess cash flow from
one property can be used to augment another's cash flow to meet
debt service requirements. The loan also benefit from the pooling
of equity from each underlying property.

There are 2 borrowers which are all special purpose entities that
are 100% directly or indirectly owned by the Sponsor, who is the
non-recourse guarantor. The Borrowers are special purpose entities
whose primary business is the performance of the obligations under
the loan documents and the ownership and operation of the
properties.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-CP and Cl. X-FP were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which it uses for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type. These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's and (b) must be construed solely
as a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
medium-term notes issued by Hertz Vehicle Financing II LP:

    -- Series 2018-1, Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
    -- Series 2018-1, Class B Notes at A (sf)
    -- Series 2018-1, Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
    -- Series 2018-1, Class D Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

    -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form
       and sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

    -- Credit enhancement in the transaction is dynamic depending
       on the composition of the vehicles in the fleet and
       certain market value tests.

    -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
       flow assumptions and repay investors according to the
       terms under which they have invested. For this
       transaction, the ratings address the timely payment of
       interest on a monthly basis and principal by the legal
       final maturity date.

    -- The transaction parties' capabilities to effectively manage

       rental car operations and dispose of the fleet to the
       extent necessary.
    -- Collateral credit quality and residual value performance.

    -- The legal structure and its consistency with the DBRS
       "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology,
       the presence of legal opinions (to be provided) that
       address the treatment of the operating lease as a true
       lease, the non-consolidation of the special-purpose
       vehicles with The Hertz Corporation (rated BB (low) with a
       Negative trend by DBRS) and its affiliates and that the
       trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
       assets.


HPS LOAN 6-2015: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to HPS Loan Management
6-2015 Ltd.'s $517.85 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans governed by collateral
quality tests. The transaction is a proposed refinancing of HPS
Loan Management 6-2015 Ltd. issued in April 2015, which S&P did not
rate.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

  HPS Loan Management 6-2015 Ltd.
  Class                   Rating        Amount
                                      (mil. $)
  X                       AAA (sf)        3.60
  A1-R                    AAA (sf)      319.00
  A2-R                    AA (sf)        96.25
  B-R (deferrable)        A (sf)         31.63
  C-R (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)      35.75
  D-R (deferrable)        BB- (sf)       19.25
  E-R (deferrable)        B- (sf)        12.38
  Subordinated note       NR             49.75

  NR--Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed three classes of JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation (JPMC)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-CIBC5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and High Credit Enhancement (CE): The pool has
exhibited stable performance since Fitch's last rating action. The
upgrades reflect the increasing CE relative to the remaining pool
balance as a result of amortization and loan payoffs. All remaining
assets are either defeased or fully amortizing performing loans.
There are no specially serviced or servicer watchlist loans. The
transaction has paid down approximately $4.7 million since Fitch's
last rating action.

Concentrated Pool: Only eight of the original 118 loans remain. Due
to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a
sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans based on loan
structural features, collateral quality, and performance, then
ranked them by the perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes
defeased loans, fully amortizing loans, and a performing fully
amortizing loan with binary performance risk. The ratings reflect
this sensitivity analysis.

Defeasance: Three loans (47% of the pool balance) have fully
defeased. Based on the February 2018 balances, class J is fully
covered by defeasance and class K is 96% covered by defeased
collateral. Based on the current amortization schedule of the
remaining loans, class K is expected to be fully covered by
defeased collateral over the next three months. Interest shortfalls
are considered unlikely for either class.

Fully Amortizing Loans with Binary Risk: The five non-defeased
loans (53% of the pool) are fully amortizing loans secured by
single-tenant properties. Risks associated with the loans include
secondary market exposure and/or leases that expire prior to the
loan maturity. The largest loan in the pool (45%) is a 384,763 sf
industrial/mixed-use property located in Las Vegas, NV. The
property is 100% leased to Southern Glazers Wine and Spirits, whose
lease expires approximately 12 months prior to the loans maturity
in November 2022. The loan has remained current since issuance, and
reported a net operating income debt service coverage ratio of
1.52x as of third quarter 2017. The remaining four loans (8.3%) are
secured by retail properties with triple-net leases to CVS (6.4%;
three properties located in TX) and Walgreens (1.9%; one property
in IL). Leases for one CVS property in Corpus Christi, TX (3.2%)
and the Walgreens property in Alsip, IL (1.95%) both expire prior
to their loan maturity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks are considered Stable due to defeasance,
sufficient CE, and stable performance of the pool. Upward rating
migration for class L is limited due to binary risks associated
with the non-defeased collateral; however, further upgrades to the
class are possible with continued stable pool performance and
increased CE from additional paydown and/or defeasance. While
downgrades are not expected, they are possible should an
asset-level or economic event cause a decline in pool performance.

Fitch upgrades the following classes:
-- $5 million class K to to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5 million class L to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:
-- $5 million class J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.4 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 60%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and the interest-only X-2
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X-1 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 3 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC12:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-J was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Classes C and D were affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on Class B was downgraded due to higher anticipated and
realized losses from specially serviced loans.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 47.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 42.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 10.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 55.5% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced to the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down
of principal to the most senior class.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $119.6
million from $2.17 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 29.5% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, the same as at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 6.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Forty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $182.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 36%). Two loans, constituting 55.5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Fort Steuben Mall Loan ($35.3 million -- 29.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a Class B regional mall in Steubenville, Ohio.
The mall was originally anchored by Sears, JC Penney, Walmart,
Dick's Sporting Goods, and Macy's, and is the only regional mall
within a 30 miles radius. The loan transferred to special servicing
in January 2016 when the borrower stated it will no longer cover
the debt service. Sears vacated the property in June 2016 and
Macy's closed its location in March 2017. As of December 2017 the
mall was 71% leased, but only 55% occupied as a result of Macy's
closure. Foreclosure occurred in February 2017 and the loan became
REO in April 2017. Moody's anticipates a significant loss on this
loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the South Brunswick
Square Loan ($31.1 million -- 26.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a 142,800 square foot portion (SF) of a 260,980 SF retail center
located on Route 1 in South Brunswick / Monmouth Junction, New
Jersey. The property is shadow anchor by Home Depot. The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2014 due to imminent
default after the former grocery anchor tenant, Stop & Shop,
vacated at its lease expiration in July 2014. The special servicer
indicated they are working to complete foreclosure of the
collateral. All property cash flow is currently directed to a
lender-controlled lockbox. The property was 61% leased as of August
2017, compared to 75% at Moody's last review. Moody's anticipates a
significant loss on this loan.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $56.1 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (85% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 97.0%, compared to 93.4% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component includes five loans and
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 21.1% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.13X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.17X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three non-defeased performing loans represent 28.8% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Discovery Channel Building
Loan ($25.0 million -- 20.9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
148,530 SF office property located in downtown Silver Spring,
Maryland. The property is 100% leased to Discovery Communications,
a mass media company, through March 2025. The loan matures in July
2020. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's value incorporates
a dark/lit analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and
0.99X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Lewisville Town Center Loan ($4.9
million -- 4.1% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 47,698 SF
retail center located in Lewistown, a suburb of Dallas-Fort Worth,
Texas. The property is located in a major retail corridor. The
largest tenants include JP Morgan Chase, Korner Caf, and
Batteries Plus Bulbs. As of September 2017, the property was 81%
leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.42X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.41X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Fairway Park Manor Loan ($4.6 million
-- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 100-unit apartment
complex located in Reno, Nevada, about three miles south of the
downtown area. As of September 2017, the property was 96% occupied,
the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130%
and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 135% and 0.72X at the last
review.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2005-LDP4:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2017 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2017 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes B and C were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization. The pool has paid down by 33.5%
since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class D was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 26% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 9.3% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97.7% to $60.3
million from $2.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 44.7% of the pool. One loan, constituting 0.6% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 6 at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 10.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $229.2 million (for an
average loss severity of 54.1%). One loan, constituting 13.1% of
the pool, is currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Inverness Regional Shopping Center ($7.9
million -- 13.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 204,000 square
foot (SF) regional shopping center located in Inverness, Florida.
At securitization, the property was anchored by a K-Mart (lease
expiration; May 2016); Publix (lease expiration; May 2009); Beall's
Outlet (lease expiration; January 2021), of which, only Beall's
Outlet remains. The property was transferred to the special
servicer in December 2014 due to imminent monetary default and the
property became REO in December 2015. As per the December 2017 rent
roll, the property was 21% occupied by five tenants.

As of the February 15, 2018 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $8.7 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 and full or partial year 2017
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 83.6%, compared to 89.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
24.7% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.26X and 1.62X,
respectively, compared to 1.24X and 1.57X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 72.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 23 Main Street Loan ($26.9 million -- 44.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 350,000 square foot (SF)
single-tenant office building located in Holmdel, New Jersey and
serves as the corporate headquarters for Vonage. The property had
previously been transferred to the special servicer due to
uncertainty surrounding the renewal of the Vonage lease. Vonage
elected to extend their lease through October 2023 and the loan was
returned to the master servicer in May 2016. Moody's value
incorporates a Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant
exposure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99.2% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 113% and 1.0X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Silver Hills Apartments Loan ($9.4
million -- 15.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 273 unit
multifamily property located in Orlando, Florida approximately
eight miles northwest of the Orlando CBD. The property was 98%
leased as of September 2017, compared to 99% leased as of December
2016. The loan benefits from amortization and has amortized 16.8%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69.3% and
1.29X, respectively, compared to 72.4% and 1.24X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Owens Corning Loan ($7.2 million --
12% of the pool), which is secured by a 421,000 square foot (SF)
warehouse facility located in Chester, North Carolina,
approximately 45 miles southwest of Charlotte and 60 miles north of
Columbia, South Carolina. The property is 100% leased to Boral
Stone Products, a subsidiary of Boral Limited. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 48% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.90X, respectively, compared to
59.7% and 1.72X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Affirms Csf Ratings on 6 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of JP Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2006-LDP9 (JPMCC 2006-LDP9).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Specially Serviced Assets/Fitch Loans of Concern: The distressed
ratings on classes A-J and below reflect the significant percentage
of the pool in special servicing and high percentage of Fitch Loans
of Concern (FLOCs). Fitch has designated 27 loans/assets (66.2% of
current pool) as FLOCs, including 24 loans/assets in special
servicing (53.8%). Of the assets in special servicing, 20 of them
(47.2%) are real estate owned. The non-specially serviced loans
identified as FLOCs are generally due to high leverage (when
current cash flow is considered) or tenancy-related issues.
Identified risks include modified debt, low debt service coverage
ratio, near term rollover and underperforming properties in
secondary markets.

Pool Concentrations: The pool is concentrated with only 35 of the
original 253 loans remaining. Office and retail loans/assets
comprise 49.4% and 34% of the current pool, respectively. The
largest loan, 131 South Dearborn, comprises 24.8% of the pool and
was modified into A/B notes. The top five loans represent 56.5% of
the pool and the top 15 loans represent 87.4%. Due to the
concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity
analysis that grouped the remaining loans based on loan structure
features, collateral quality, and performance, then ranked them by
the perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes defeased
loans, fully amortizing loans, and a performing fully amortizing
loan with binary performance risk. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

High Credit Enhancement: The senior classes benefit from high
credit enhancement.

Loan Maturities: The loan maturities for the non-specially serviced
loans include 17.5% of the current pool in 2018, 1.4% in 2019, and
27.3% in 2021. The one loan (1.4%) maturing in 2019 has been
defeased.

The largest performing loan in the pool is 131 South Dearborn
(26.4%), which is secured by a 1.5 million square foot office
property located in the Central Loop submarket of Chicago, IL. The
loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2014 for imminent
default. The borrower requested for loan modification discussions
due to the primary tenant at that time, JPMorgan Chase wanting to
downsize, the announcement of another large tenant, Seyfarth Shaw
LLC, planning to vacate in 2017, ahead of its 2022 lease
expiration, and the upcoming expiration of another large tenant,
Citadel, in October 2017.

The loan was modified in July 2016, along with the formation of a
new ownership structure in Angelo Gordon and Hines. Modification
terms included the bifurcation of the trust debt into a $200
million A-note and a $36 million B-note, the extension of loan
maturity for five years through December 2020 and the reduction of
the current pay interest rate on the A-note to 4.50%. In exchange
for the loan modification, the new borrower contributed $27 million
of guaranteed new equity, funded a $7.5 million additional reserve
account for leasing and capital cost, paid $9.8 million in closing
costs and spent $10 million to buyout the prior sponsor.

The loan was returned to the master servicer in November 2016. As
of the September 2017 rent roll, the property was 75% occupied.
Recent leasing updates include Constellation Brands signing a new
lease for a portion of the former Seyfarth Shaw space (11% of the
net rentable area [NRA]) commencing in March 2018 and expiring
February 2033; JPMorgan Chase extending its lease on 17% of the NRA
through December 2023, Holland and Knight extending its lease on
6.9% of the NRA through July 2019, Sprout Social entering into a
direct lease on the seventh floor (4.2%) through January 2028 and
Citadel entering into a direct lease on the ninth and 11th floors
(5.7%) through December 2023. With the new leasing the property is
projected to be approximately 86% occupied. Overall the property
appears to be stabilizing.

The second largest performing loan in the pool is the Discover
Mills (12.1%). The full term interest-only loan is secured by the
1.2 million sf Discover Mills Mall located in Lawrenceville, GA.
The loan was previously in special servicing when it defaulted at
its December 2013 maturity date. It was subsequently modified and
extended and now matures in December 2018. Loan principal has been
reduced due to cash trap provisions requiring that all excess cash
go to pay down loan principal. As of September 2017, inline sales
were $283 psf, similar to the prior year. Fitch remains concerned
about the loan refinancing at its upcoming maturity.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Colony IV Portfolio loan
(15.2% of pool). The asset consists of 20 cross-collateralized
industrial and office properties, which are located across
Illinois, Virginia, Massachusetts and New Jersey. All of the
foreclosures have been completed with the exception of the Illinois
properties which are still pending.

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 81% to $895 million from
$4.89 billion at issuance. Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$48.5 million are affecting classes AJ and A-JS through NR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The affirmation of classes A-3SFL and A-3SFX reflect the high
credit enhancement and expected continued paydown. The affirmations
of classes A-M and A-MS reflect stable pool metrics since Fitch's
last rating action. Upgrades to these classes are possible should
the Discover Mills loan pay in full at its upcoming maturity.
Distressed classes (those rated below 'Bsf') may be subject to
further rating actions as losses are realized.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $25.3 million class A-3SFL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.2 million class A-3SFX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $179.2 million class A-M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $121.4 million class A-MS at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $318.5 million class A-J at 'Csf'; RE 40%;
-- $106.3 million class A-JS at 'Csf''; RE 40%;
-- $72.8 million class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.3 million class B-S at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $22.8 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.6 million class C-S at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.1 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.4 million class D-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1S, A-2, A-2S, A-2SFL, A-2SFX, A-3 and A-1A
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2014-C19: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on all 13 classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (JPMBB)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-C19.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Retail Concentration: Loans secured by retail properties
represent 42.2% of the pool, including nine loans in the top 15
(37.9%). Regional mall and outlet exposure consists of four top-15
loans (19.1%): The Outlets at Orange (9.3%; Orange, CA), Arundel
Mills & Marketplace (6.7%; Hanover, MD), Muncie Mall (2.6%; Muncie,
IN) and the Northtowne Mall (0.5% allocated pool balance; Defiance,
OH) in the Gumberg Retail Portfolio.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated six loans (13.3% of
current pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), which includes
four top-15 loans (11.8%) and one specially serviced loan (0.6%).
The Northtowne Mall property in the Gumberg Retail Portfolio (4.6%)
will lose another anchor tenant - Elder-Beerman recently announced
in January 2018 it will close its store at the property within the
next few months. In addition, Sears vacated in August 2016, ahead
of its lease expiration. Occupancy at the property is expected to
decline further to approximately 60%. The Muncie Mall (2.6%) has
continued to experience declining anchor and inline sales. Sears,
which has an upcoming lease expiration in August 2019, reported
weak sales of $34 psf in 2017. The Residence Inn Anaheim (2.5%) has
experienced declining NOI over the past two years due to an influx
of new supply. The Four Points Centre (2.1%) is subject to
significant near-term lease roll, including the largest tenant
(23.2% of NRA), which has already provided notice it will be
vacating in spring of 2019. The FLOC outside of the top 15 (0.9%)
is a multifamily property in Dublin, OH that has been flagged for
declining NOI since 2014.

Specially Serviced Loans: The Grand Williston Hotel and Conference
Center loan (0.6%), which is secured by a 147-key full-service
hotel located adjacent to the Sloulin Field International Airport
in Williston, ND, transferred to special servicing in March 2017
for payment default. Property performance saw the negative effect
of the economic stress of the Bakken oil and shale region. Per the
November 2017 STR report, property occupancy, ADR and RevPAR for
the TTM period were 33.5%, $61.22 and $20.53, respectively. RevPAR
penetration rate was 65.4%. The special servicer has hired an
experienced marketing manager and general manager in the local
market to improve performance prior to marketing the property for
sale in spring 2018.

Pool Concentrations: Loans secured by office properties represent
27.3% of the pool, including two of the top five properties located
in New York. Loans secured by hotel properties represent 10.1% of
the pool, including two of the top 15 properties located in the
Anaheim, CA market (4.7%).

Limited Amortization: As of the February 2018 remittance reporting,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid down by 5% to $1.34
billion from $1.41 billion at issuance. Full-term interest-only
loans comprise 37.8% of the current pool and loans that still have
a partial interest-only component during their remaining loan term
comprise 0.9%, compared to 29.4% of the original pool at issuance.
Two loans (2.1% of current pool) have been defeased.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class F reflects potential downgrade
concerns if performance of the Muncie Mall declines further and/or
losses on the specially serviced Grand Williston Hotel exceed
Fitch's expectations. In addition, the transaction's retail
concentration is high at 42%. Fitch ran an additional sensitivity
scenario on the Muncie Mall to reflect the potential for higher
losses given declining inline and anchor sales and Sears' upcoming
lease rollover in August 2019. The Rating Outlooks on classes A-2
through E remain Stable due to the relatively stable performance of
the majority of the remaining pool, sufficient credit enhancement
and expected continued amortization. Rating upgrades, although
unlikely due to pool concentrations, may occur with improved pool
performance and additional paydown or defeasance.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:
-- $464.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $112.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $276.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.01* billion class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $98.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89.9* million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $252 class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

*Notional and interest-only.

The class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR,
CSQ and the interest-only X-C certificates. Class A-S, B, and C
certificates may be exchanged for a related amount of class EC
certificates, and class EC certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B, and C certificates.


MADISON PARK XIX: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class E-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Madison Park
Funding XIX, Ltd.:

US$37,400,000 Class C-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2028
(the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$28,500,000 Class D-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2028
(the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$12,100,000 Class E-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2028
(the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected loss
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on March 2, 2018 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of certain
classes of notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously
issued on December 29, 2015. On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer
used the proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to
redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of each class of the Issuer's notes is subject to
uncertainty relating to certain factors and circumstances, and this
uncertainty could lead Moody's to change its ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the Manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by the Manager or other transaction parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: Investing in collateral of better credit
quality, or better than Moody's expected credit performance of the
assets collateralizing the transaction can lead to positive CLO
performance. Conversely, a negative shift in the credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: During the amortization period, the pace of
deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds is an important
source of uncertainty. Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate
owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the Manager, which could have a significant
impact on the ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO
notes, beginning with those notes having the highest payment
priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings can be sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen owing to any decision by the Manager to reinvest into new
issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can increase the default
risk horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
collateral.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions described below,
Moody's conducted additional sensitivity analyses, which were
considered in determining the ratings assigned to the rated notes.
In particular, in addition to the base case analysis, Moody's
conducted sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of
default probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results. Below is a summary of the impact of different
default probabilities, expressed in terms of WARF level, on the
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches difference
versus the base case model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Moody's Assumed WARF - 20% (2306)

Class C-R: +3

Class D-R: +1

Class E-R: +1

Moody's Assumed WARF + 20% (3458)

Class C-R: -1

Class D-R: -2

Class E-R: -3

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
recovery rate, and weighted average spread, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following
base-case assumptions

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $596,160,283

Defaulted par: $7,679,432

Diversity Score: 67

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2882 (corresponding to a
weighted average default probability of 24.53%)

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.74%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.11%

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HE1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches,
from one transaction issued by Morgan Stanley 2006-HE1.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating action on Morgan Stanley Capital
I Inc. Trust 2006-HE1, Class M-1 also reflects a correction to the
cash-flow model previously used by Moody's in rating this
transaction. In prior rating actions, the cash flow modeling did
not reimburse losses and arrears after the tranches reached a zero
balance, thus overestimating the projected losses on some tranches.
This error has now been corrected, and rating action reflects this
change. The actions also reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in January
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C7: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C7 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C7 as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. As of the December 2017 remittance,
56 of the original 64 loans remained in the pool with an aggregate
principal balance of $1.12 billion, representing a collateral
reduction of 19.5% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization and successful loan repayments. One loan, Oakridge
Office Park (Prospectus ID#25; approximately 1.3% of the
outstanding pool balance at disposition), has been liquidated from
the pool since issuance. The loan was disposed in January 2017 at a
loss of $2.8 million (loss severity of 17.8%), all of which was
contained to the unrated Class H certificate.

Of the remaining loans, 54 are reporting YE2016 financials; based
on these figures, the pool reported a weighted-average debt service
coverage ratio and in-place debt yield of 1.84 times and 10.8%,
respectively. Both performance metrics are in line with the figures
reported for YE2015.

As of the December 2017 remittance, there were three loans on the
servicer's watchlist representing 4.4% of the pool and no loans in
special servicing. Two of the loans on the watch list are being
monitored for cash flow declines, and the third loan is on the
watch list for the borrower's failure to comply with a lockbox
activation triggered by an upcoming rollover for a significant
tenant.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C14: DBRS Corrects October 23 Press Release
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited corrected an October 23, 2017, press release that
stated the incorrect rating on Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-C14, Class X-B in the Morgan Stanley Bank
of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C14 transaction. The press
release has been amended with the correct rating and is as
follows:

On October 23, 2017, DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on all
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2014-C14 issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Trust 2014-C14 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be exchanged
for the Class PST certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained stable year over year since
issuance. As at the September 2017 remittance, 56 of the original
58 loans remain in the transaction, as there has been a collateral
reduction of 4.6% since issuance. Based on the most recent YE2016
financials, the pool reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio and WA debt yield of 1.90 times (x) and 11.9%,
respectively. In comparison, these figures in YE2015 were 1.89x and
11.6%, respectively.

As at the September 2017 remittance, there are eight loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 9.9% of the current pool
balance. While four loans, cumulatively representing 1.9% of the
current pool balance, have been flagged for non-performance-related
reasons, the largest loan on the servicer's watch list continues to
exhibit declined performance. The Aspen Heights  Columbia loan
(3.6% of the current pool balance) is secured by a student housing
property in Columbia, Missouri, home to the University of Missouri.
The subject continues to struggle year over year because of
declining occupancy and rental rates.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the JW Marriott and Fairfield Inn
loan (Prospectus ID#5; 5.3% of the current pool balance) and the
Courtyard Isla Verde Beach Resort loan (Prospectus ID#19; 2.0% of
the current pool balance) as investment grade. DBRS has confirmed
that the performance of these loans remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics. The Courtyard Isla Verde
Beach Resort loan is secured by a hotel property in Puerto Rico,
which was recently affected by Hurricanes Irma and Maria. DBRS was
able to confirm that the property was not listed on any Significant
Insurance Event report provided by the servicer and that the
subject remains open as it did not suffer major damage as a result
of either storm.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-C are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C20: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. X-F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C20 (the
Certificates) issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Trust 2015-C20:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the pool consisted of 88
fixed-rate loans secured by 102 commercial and multifamily
properties. As of the December 2017 remittance, all loans remained
in the pool, with an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.12 billion, representing a collateral reduction of 2.3% since
issuance as a result of scheduled amortization. There are currently
15 loans (26.3% of the pool) with remaining partial interest-only
(IO) periods, ranging from one to 24 months, while eight loans
(9.1% of the pool) were structured with full IO terms. One loan
(0.9% of the pool) is secured by collateral that has been fully
defeased. To date, 61 loans (69.3% of the pool) reported
partial-year 2017 financials, while 86 loans (97.7% of the pool)
reported YE2016 financials. Based on the most recent year-end
financial reporting, the transaction had a weighted-average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.63 times
(x) and 10.0%, respectively, compared with the DBRS WA Term DSCR
and WA DBRS Debt Yield derived at issuance of 1.47x and 8.9%,
respectively.

The pool is concentrated by property type, as 11 loans,
representing 38.1% of the pool, are secured by office properties,
while 14 loans (15.9% of the pool) are secured by multifamily
properties and 18 loans (20.5% of the pool) are secured by hotel
properties. By loan size, the pool is relatively diverse, as the
largest 15 loans represent 49.1% of the pool, a lower concentration
as compared with transactions of similar vintage to the subject.
Based on the most recent cash flows available, the top 15 loans
reported a WA DSCR of 1.72x, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR of
1.40x, which is reflective of a 21.1% net cash flow growth over the
DBRS issuance figures.

As of the December 2017 remittance, there is one loan (0.6% of the
pool) in special servicing and one loan (0.6% of the pool) on the
servicer's watch list. The loan in special servicing, Holiday Inn
Express  Syracuse (Prospectus ID#53), transferred to special
servicing in September 2017 because of payment default. Based on
the October 2017 appraisal, property value has dropped by
approximately 56.4% since issuance. The loan on the servicer's
watch list, Dover Pointe (Prospectus ID#59), was flagged because of
property damage sustained during Hurricane Harvey. For further
information on these loans, please see the DBRS Loan Commentary on
the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which registration information is
provided below.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


NATIONSTAR HECM 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to M4 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2018-1 (NHLT 2018-1). The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P) Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 1,558 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages (HECMs) and 233 real estate owned
(REO) properties. The servicer for the deal is Nationstar Mortgage
LLC (Nationstar). The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2018-1

Class A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class M1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Class M2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Class M3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Class M4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing NHLT 2018-1 consists of first-lien inactive
HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance
secured by properties in the US along with Real-Estate Owned (REO)
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, the sale of the property is used to recover the amount
owed. Nationstar acquired the mortgage assets from Ginnie Mae
sponsored HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations. All of the
mortgage assets are covered by FHA insurance for the repayment of
principal up to certain amounts. 17.1% of the collateral is from
the recently collapsed NHLT 2016-2 transaction and 24.1% of the
collateral is from the recently collapsed NHLT 2016-3 transaction.

There are 1,791 mortgage assets with a balance of $443,229,218. The
assets are in either default, due and payable, referred,
foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default may move to
due and payable; due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and
foreclosure loans may move to REO. 26.7% of the assets are in
default of which 10.0% (of the total assets) are in default due to
non-occupancy and 16.8% (of the total assets) are in default due to
delinquent taxes and insurance. 14.7% of the assets are due and
payable, 44.4% of the assets are in foreclosure and 2.2% of the
assets are in referred status. Finally, 12.0% of the assets are REO
properties and were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure on the associated loan. If the value of the related
mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount, some of these
loans may be settled by the borrower or their estate.

As with most NHLT transactions Moody's has rated, the pool has a
significant concentration of mortgage assets backed by properties
in New York, New Jersey and Florida. Such states are judicial
foreclosure states with long foreclosure timelines. Up to 2.3% of
the assets are backed by properties that are in areas affected by
Hurricane Harvey (based on information from FEMA, Texas governor
declarations, and local disaster declarations). Up to 11.0% of the
assets are backed by properties in areas affected by Hurricane Irma
(based on information from FEMA and governor declarations). Also,
6.8% of the assets are backed by properties in California, parts of
which have recently been hit by wildfires. Finally, there are 27
assets (1.0% of the asset balance) in NHLT 2018-1 that are backed
by properties in Puerto Rico, which is still recovering from
Hurricane Maria and suffering from poor economic conditions due to
a public debt crisis and continued out-migration. Moody's credit
ratings reflect state-specific foreclosure timeline stresses as
well as adjustments for risks associated with the recent hurricanes
and the real estate market in Puerto Rico.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst six
classes of notes with structural subordination. All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their expected final payment dates. The subordinate notes will not
receive principal until the beginning of their respective target
amortization periods (in the absence of an acceleration event). The
notes benefit from structural subordination as credit enhancement,
and an interest reserve account funded with cash received from the
initial purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit
enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in February 2020. For the Class
M1 notes, the expected final payment date is in July 2020. For the
Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is in September
2020. For the Class M3 notes, the expected final payment date is in
December 2020. For the Class M4 notes, the expected final payment
date is in April 2021. Finally, for the Class M5 notes, the
expected final payment date is in September 2021. For each of the
subordinate notes, there are target amortization periods that
conclude on the respective expected final payment dates. The legal
final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve account may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer. However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults and a new servicer is appointed.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar. The review focused on
data integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification, accuracy of
appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status recording,
borrower age documentation, identification of excessive corporate
advances, documentation of servicer advances, and identification of
tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions
(BPOs) were ordered for 302 properties in the pool and full
appraisals were ordered for two properties in the pool.

The TPR firm conducted an extensive data integrity review. Certain
data tape fields, such as the mortgage insurance premium (MIP)
rate, the current UPB, current interest rate, and marketable title
date were reviewed against Nationstar's servicing system. However,
a significant number of data tape fields were reviewed against
imaged copies of original documents of record, screen shots of
HUD's HERMIT system, or HUD documents. Some key fields reviewed in
this manner included the original note rate, the debenture rate,
foreclosure first legal date, and the called due date.

The results of the third-party review (TPR) are comparable to
previous NHLT transactions in many respects. However, the number of
exceptions related to data integrity, accuracy of reported
valuations, and foreclosure and bankruptcy attorney fees was higher
than in other recently rated NHLT transactions. NHLT 2018-1's TPR
results showed a 1.6% initial-tape exception rate related to data
integrity, a 25.8% initial-tape exception rate related to the
accuracy of reported valuations, and a 29.4% initial-tape exception
rate related to foreclosure and bankruptcy attorney fees. This
compares to 0.4%, 2.4% and 24.2% initial-tape exception rates for
NHLT 2017-2 in these categories respectively. In Moody's analysis
of the pool, Moody's applied adjustments to account for the TPR
results in certain areas.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider and is rated B2 (Stable).
This relatively weak financial profile is mitigated by the fact
that Nationstar will subordinate its servicing advances, servicing
fees, and MIP payments in the transaction and thus has significant
alignment of interests. However, unlike in previous NHLT
transactions, Nationstar will not commit to retaining a 5.0% net
economic interest in the securitization. Another factor mitigating
the risks associated with a financially weak R&W provider is that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect. Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is made only as to the initial mortgage
loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar does not provide any
other R&W in connection with the origination of the mortgage loans,
including whether the mortgage loans were originated in compliance
with applicable federal, state and local laws. Although certain
representations are knowledge qualified, the transaction documents
contain language specifying that if a representation would have
been breached if not for the knowledge qualifier then Nationstar
will repurchase the relevant asset as if the representation had
been breached.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, Nationstar has to cure
the breach. If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification. Moody's believe the absence of an independent third
party reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction. Also, Nationstar,
in its good faith, is responsible for determining if a R&W breach
materially and adversely affects the interests of the trust or the
value the collateral. This creates the potential for a conflict of
interest.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the acquisition trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believe that NHLT
2018-1 is adequately protected against such risk in part because a
third-party data integrity review was conducted on a significant
random sample of the loans. In addition, the third-party due
diligence firm verified that all of the loans in the pool are
covered by FHA insurance.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2018-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank National
Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also serve as the
claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD mortgagee of
record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016, and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations" published in May 2015.

Moody's quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan
modeling of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA
insurance and with various stresses applied to model parameters
depending on the target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than its appraised value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
marketable title to the property. ABCs are filed six months after
the servicer has obtained marketable title if the property has not
yet been sold. For an SBC, HUD insurance will cover the difference
between (i) the loan balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price
and 95.0% of the latest appraisal, with the transaction on the hook
for losses if the sales price is lower than 95.0% of the latest
appraisal. For an ABC, HUD only covers the difference between the
loan amount and 100% of appraised value, so failure to sell the
property at the appraised value results in loss.

Moody's expect ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Moody's base case expectation is that properties will
be sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. This is
based on the historical experience of Nationstar. Moody's stressed
this percentage at higher credit rating levels. At a Aaa rating
level, Moody's assumed that ABC appraisal haircuts could reach up
to 30.0%.

In Moody's asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed this percentage at higher credit
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that SBC
appraisal haircuts could reach up to 11.0% (i.e., 6.0% below
95.0%).

Under Moody's analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go
through both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability.
Each loan will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. Based on the historical experience of
Nationstar, for the base case scenario Moody's assumed that 85% of
claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs. Moody's stressed
this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that 85% of
insurance claims would be submitted as ABCs.

Liquidation process: each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In
Moody's analysis, Moody's assume loans that are in referred status
to be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed
to move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to 12 months
depending on the default reason. Foreclosure status is based on the
state in which that the related property is located and is further
stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and 12
months with respect to ABCs.

Debenture interest: the receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment.
Moody's base case assumption is that 95.0% of debenture interest
will be received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of
debenture interest that will be received at higher rating levels.
Moody's debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that
Nationstar (B2, Stable) reimburse the trust for debenture interest
curtailments due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD
guidelines.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into Moody's analysis, including the following:

* In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in Moody's analysis. However, for seasoned
appraisals Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential
home price depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the
cut-off date.

* Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in
their homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their
heirs rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's
estimated which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing
each loans' appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB.

* Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

* Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where Nationstar is no longer the
servicer. Moody's assume the following in the situation where
Nationstar is no longer the servicer:

* Servicing advances and servicing fees: While Nationstar
subordinates their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing
fees, and MIP payments, a replacement servicer will not subordinate
these amounts.

* Nationstar indemnifies the trust for lost debenture interest due
to servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD guidelines. In
the event of a bankruptcy, Nationstar will not have the financial
capacity to do so.

* A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assume a 25 bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

* One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse a replacement servicer (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500 per loan.

To account for risks posed by the recent hurricanes and wildfires,
Moody's assumed the following:

* To account for potential delays in the foreclosure process,
Moody's added three months to the foreclosure timeline in the base
case scenario for foreclosure-status properties that are located in
hurricane and wildfire affected areas. At a Aaa (sf) rating level,
this timeline stress is multiplied by 1.6x and so this equates to
adding an additional 4.8 months to foreclosure timelines in a Aaa
(sf) scenario.

* For certain properties located in hurricane and wildfire impacted
areas, Moody's assumed that a higher percentage of insurance claims
would be submitted as ABCs as a result of the hurricanes and
wildfires.

* For certain properties located in hurricane impacted areas,
Moody's increased the amount of non-reimbursable expenses that
Moody's expect would be incurred by a replacement servicer
following a servicer termination event.

* For certain properties located in hurricane and wildfire impacted
areas, Moody's assumed that the loans would complete the
foreclosure process rather than being paid off by the borrowers or
their heirs regardless of how much equity there was in the
properties.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from Moody's original expectations resulting in
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and faster
property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from Moody's original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.



NATIXIS COMMERCIAL 2018-TECH: DBRS Assigns (P)BB(low) on F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-TECH to
be issued by Natixis Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-TECH
(the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X-CP, Class X-EXT and Class X-F balances are notional.

The subject loan is secured by a 626,233 sf complex comprising
seven Class B office and research and development (R&D) buildings
located in Santa Clara, California, just outside an area known as
the Golden Triangle. Built between 1970 and 1998, the collateral is
situated within the Scott Boulevard Corridor submarket, which is
part of the greater South Bay/San Jose, California, market. The
seven buildings that serve as loan collateral are spread across a
37.6-acre parcel of land and range in size from 46,338 sf to
200,000 sf. The site is improved with expansive landscaped areas
and surface/garage parking for up to 1,880 vehicles.

The property is currently 100.0% occupied and has been since 2009.
Tenancy at the property is concentrated between two tenants: NVIDIA
Corporation (NVIDIA), the largest tenant that leases 60.7% of the
total NRA and contributes 57.7% of the total DBRS Base Rent, and
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei), which occupies 39.3% of the
total NRA and contributes 42.3% of the total DBRS Base Rent. NVIDIA
has had a presence at the property  specifically, the 2880 Scott
Boulevard building  since 1997, while Huawei has been in
occupancy since 2009. Both tenants have shown strong commitment to
the subject by having collectively invested approximately $14.0
million ($22.36 psf) into their respective build-outs. Furthermore,
NVIDIA is in the process of converting the 99,800 sf of office
space at the 2770-2800 Scott Boulevard property into additional lab
space at a cost of $150 psf, or nearly $15.0 million. In addition
to conventional office space, the collateral houses critical R&D
facilities for both NVIDIA and Huawei, which utilize these
specialized labs for research, design and implementation purposes
across several sectors of both companies' product lines. The
collateral ultimately serves a mission-critical role for both
tenants.

The loan is sponsored by Preylock Real Estate Holdings, a Los
Angelesbased real estate investment and development firm that
has acquired 1.0 million sf of commercial space since its
inception, primarily in major West Coast submarkets. The company
was founded by two of the guarantors for the loan, Brett Lipman and
Farshid Shokouhi, who have substantial real estate experience in
land acquisitions, asset management and development. The third
guarantor for the loan, Ivan Reitman, is a well-known Hollywood
producer and director who has been involved with many popular
films, including Ghostbusters (1984). The guarantors have a
combined net worth and liquidity of $225.3 million and $23.5
million, respectively, and no credit history of foreclosures,
defaults or bankruptcies.

Cushman & Wakefield has determined the as-is value of the property
to be $261.2 million ($417 psf) based on a direct capitalization
method utilizing a 6.0% overall cap rate. The DBRS value is
substantially lower at $166.5 million ($266 psf) and was calculated
by applying an 8.0% cap rate to the DBRS NCF, resulting in a DBRS
LTV of 90.1%. While the DBRS LTV on the $150.0 million mortgage
loan is relatively high, the leverage is reflected in the
below-investment-grade last-dollar rating of B (high). The
cumulative investment-grade-rated proceeds of $123.5 million
reflect a more modest 74.2% DBRS LTV and represent just 51.4% of
the purchase price. Further, the investment-grade exposure psf of
$197 is considered very favorable compared with the five-year
average sales price of $372 psf for properties in the surrounding
area, according to Real Capital Analytics. The average sales price
for the past 12 months is far higher at $553 psf and reflects the
extremely high investor interest in the market, though these prices
may ultimately be unsustainable.

The property benefits from a favorable location in Santa Clara,
which is part of Silicon Valley, the premier market for
high-technology companies. The subject has favorable access and
visibility, as it is located at the junction of Central Expressway
and San Tomas Expressway, two highly trafficked thoroughfares that
facilitate access to several demand generators in the local area.

The collateral was in good physical condition and aesthetically
appealing at the time of the DBRS site inspection. Although the
improvements were built between 1970 and 1998, no significant
deferred maintenance was noted at the site. It was evident that the
facilities are well maintained because of the fact they house
mission-critical R&D space for both NVIDIA and Huawei.

The property has a concentrated tenant roster, with NVIDIA and
Huawei leasing 100.0% of the total NRA. Of the seven buildings that
serve as loan collateral, three are fully occupied by NVIDIA and
the remaining four are leased to Huawei. Essentially, the subject
property operates as a single-tenant office and R&D complex. Both
tenants have been in occupancy for many years. NVIDIA has had a
presence at the property since 1997, while Huawei has been at the
site since 2009. Over the years, the tenants have renewed their
leases and expanded their spaces on several occasions,
demonstrating the subject's desirability and strong historical
performance. More importantly, NVIDIA and Huawei appear to be
growing their businesses and are financially sound, as indicated by
recent performance results.

NVIDIA's three leases at the property expire in 2020, 2021 and 2023
with a WA of 4.7 years remaining. The three leases expire well
within the seven-year fully extended loan term. Additionally, the
company recently built new 500,000 sf headquarters across the
street from the collateral, increasing the risk of the tenant
consolidating at another location upon lease expiry. Headquartered
in Santa Clara, NVIDIA's need for additional office space has been
increasing over the past few years as the company's various
businesses have experienced substantial growth. The company
currently employs nearly 5,000 employees in Santa Clara and plans
to grow its payroll to 13,000 employees over the next five to seven
years. Reportedly, NVIDIA is currently hiring 120 new engineers per
month.

NVIDIA is in the process of converting certain office space to
additional labs at the property, including the $15.0 million
reconfiguration of the 2770-2800 Scott Boulevard building. It is
expected that the collateral's importance to NVIDIA's R&D efforts
will continue to grow over time, while more corporate and
administrative functions will be transitioned into the new
headquarters across the street. Recently, NVIDIA entered into a
direct lease with the landlord for 200,000 sf at the 2880 Scott
Boulevard building, which the tenant had been subleasing from
Renesas Electronics Corporation since 2013.

Although R&D areas were off limits during the property tour, DBRS
noted that most labs had specialized equipment and layouts that
could potentially be difficult to re-tenant and may require
considerable capital investment to reconfigure for alternate uses.
The collateral serves a very unique market that is home to numerous
technology companies that rely on specialized R&D spaces to conduct
and grow their various business lines. If NVIDIA or Huawei vacate
or reduce the size of their spaces, the sponsor could potentially
find other similar tenants to occupy the buildings without
necessarily having to convert every suite back to conventional
office space.

Classes X-CP, X-EXT and X-F are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


NEUBERGER BERMAN 27: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Neuberger Berman Loan
Advisers CLO 27 Ltd./Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 27 LLC's
$447.50 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 27 Ltd./Neuberger Berman Loan
  Advisers CLO 27 LLC
  Class                Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)                 300.00
  A-2                  NR                        15.00
  B                    AA (sf)                   60.00
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                    35.00
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)                 30.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)                  22.50
  Subordinate notes    NR                        48.30

  NR--Not rated.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Ratings on 7 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2018-1 (the Notes) issued by New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-1 (NRMLT or the Trust):

-- $546.4 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A-1B at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A-1C at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A1-IOA at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A1-IOB at AAA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A1-IOC at AAA (sf)
-- $581.6 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $546.4 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B1-IO at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B-1B at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B-1C at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B-1D at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)
-- $35.2 million Class B1-IOC at AA (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B-2B at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B-2C at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B-2D at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B2-IOA at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B2-IOB at A (sf)
-- $29.0 million Class B2-IOC at A (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B3-IO at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B-3D at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-4A at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-4B at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-4C at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B4-IOB at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B4-IOC at BB (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-5 at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-5A at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-5B at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-5C at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B-5D at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B5-IOA at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B5-IOB at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B5-IOC at B (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class B5-IOD at B (sf)
-- $39.9 million Class B-7 at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, B1-IO, B1-IOA, B1-IOB,
B1-IOC, B2-IO, B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B3-IO, B3-IOA, B3-IOB,
B3-IOC, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B4-IOC, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B5-IOC and B5-IOD
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, A-2, A, B-1A,
B-1B, B-1C, B-1D, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B1-IOC, B-2A, B-2B, B-2C, B-2D,
B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B-3A, B-3B, B-3C, B-3D, B3-IOA, B3-IOB,
B3-IOC, B-4A, B-4B, B-4C, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B4-IOC, B-5A, B-5B, B-5C,
B-5D, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B5-IOC, B5-IOD and B-7 are exchangeable
notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of initial
exchangeable notes as specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 24.70% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 19.85%,
15.85%, 12.00%, 9.25% and 6.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 8,110 loans with a total principal balance of
$725,654,377 as of the Statistical Calculation Date (December 1,
2017). The class balances and mortgage loan statistics in this
press release are based on the Statistical Calculation Date. The
final class balances will be lower than those shown in the table
above to reflect the aggregate stated principal balance of the
mortgage loans as of the Cut-Off Date (January 1, 2018).

The loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted-average (WA)
age of 174 months. As of the Statistical Calculation Date, 89.4% of
the pool is current, 9.4% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency method and 1.2% is in
bankruptcy (all bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days
delinquent). Approximately 61.6% and 70.7% of the mortgage loans
have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for the past 24
months and 12 months, respectively, under the MBA delinquency
method. The portfolio contains 41.7% modified loans. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 75.6% of the
modified loans. As a result of the seasoning of the collateral,
none of the loans are subject to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor IX LLC (NRZ), acquired the loans prior to
the Closing Date in connection with the termination of various
securitization trusts. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2018-1 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute the loans to
the Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp.,
through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
(other than the residual notes) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Statistical Calculation Date, 43.5% of the pool is
serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS), 34.9% by Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), 17.6% by Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar), 2.7% by Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo) and 1.4% by
PNC Mortgage (PNC). Nationstar will also act as the Master Servicer
and the Special Servicer.

The Seller will have the option to repurchase any loan that becomes
60 or more days delinquent under the MBA method or any REO property
acquired in respect of a mortgage loan at a price equal to the
principal balance of the loan (Optional Repurchase Price), provided
that such repurchases will be limited to 10% of the principal
balance of the mortgage loans as of the Cut-Off Date.

Unlike other seasoned re-performing loan securitizations, the
Servicers in this transaction will advance principal and interest
on delinquent mortgages to the extent such advances are deemed
recoverable. The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting
interest cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis
structure.

As of the Statistical Calculation Date, approximately 3.0%, 9.2%
and 1.6% of the properties securing the loans in the pool are
located in zip codes identified by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), as affected by Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma or
California Wildfires, respectively. The seller will provide a
representation and warranty that, to its knowledge, properties have
no damage/condemnation that materially adversely affects the value
of the property and is expected to repurchase loans which breach
this representation. DBRS ran additional scenario analyses to
stress the FEMA loans and test that the rated bonds can withstand
further property value declines.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates and satisfactory deal performance.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.

Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance, title/lien, payment history and data
integrity. Updated Home Data Index and/or broker price opinions
were provided for the pool; however, a reconciliation was not
performed on the updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 35: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Octagon Investment
Partners 35 Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners 35 LLC's $431.5
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Octagon Investment Partners 35 Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners  

  35 LLC

  Class                              Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1a                               AAA (sf)             290.000
  A-1b                               NR                    27.500
  A-2                                AA (sf)               55.000
  B (deferrable)                     A (sf)                35.500
  C (deferrable)                     BBB- (sf)             32.000
  D (deferrable)                     BB- (sf)              19.000
  Subordinated notes (deferrable)    NR                    52.200
  Combination notes(i)               A-p (sf)              58.875

(i)Combination notes comprise $14.50 million of class A-1a, $1.38
million of class A-1b, $2.75 million of class A-2, $31.95 million
of class B, $1.60 million of class C, $950,000 of class D, and
$5.75 million of the subordinated notes.
NR--Not rated.
P--Principal-only.


OFSI FUND VI: S&P Affirms BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1R, A-2R,
B-R, and C-R replacement notes from OFSI Fund VI Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014 that
is managed by OFS Capital Management LLC. S&P said, "We withdrew
our ratings on the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and combo notes
following payment in full on the March 1, 2018, refinancing date.
At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class D and E
notes."

On the March 1, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1R, A-2R, B-R, and C-R replacement note issuances were used to
redeem the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and combo notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.


S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.

"In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's ability to
pay timely interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the
rated tranches.

"The assigned ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OFSI Fund VI, Ltd.
  Replacement class          Rating        Amount (mil $)
  A-1R                       AAA (sf)      232.00
  A-2R                       AA (sf)       51.00
  B-R                        A (sf)        30.00
  C-R                        BBB (sf)      20.50

  RATINGS AFFIRMED
                             Rating
  D                          BB (sf)
  E                          B (sf)

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-1                  NR              AAA (sf)
  A-2                  NR              AA (sf)
  B                    NR              A (sf)
  C                    NR              BBB (sf)
  Combo                NR              AA (sf)


REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED 2004-1: Moody's Cuts A-2 Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by Regional Diversified Funding 2004-1
Ltd.:

US$62,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2034
(current balance, including interest shortfall of $62,359,012.93),
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on January 14, 2016 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

US$144,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2034
(current balance of $45,231,826.96), Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously
on January 14, 2016 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Regional Diversified Funding 2004-1 Ltd., issued in March 2004, is
a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the acceleration of
the notes directed by the Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes on December
6, 2017. The acceleration of the notes follows an event of default
(EoD) that previously occurred on November 23, 2009 due to missed
interest payments on the Class B-1 and Class B-2 notes. As a result
of the acceleration, on the February 2018 payment date, the Class
A-1 notes received all interest and principal proceeds and the
Class A-2 notes did not receive their interest payment due.

Based on Moody's calculations, the Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes'
overcollateralization (OC) ratios are 294.0% and 123.6%,
respectively. If the requisite note holders direct a liquidation of
the trust estate, the likelihood of full principal repayment on the
Class A-2 notes will be highly sensitive to the liquidation prices
of the assets in the portfolio.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 392)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 948)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par and of $133.0 million,
defaulted par of $111.0 million, a weighted average default
probability of 6.4% (implying a WARF of 632), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.


RETL 2018-RVP: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to RETL
2018-RVP's $1.35 billion commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a three-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $1.350 billion, with two, one-year extension
options, secured by first-mortgage liens on the fee, leasehold, and
partial leasehold interests in 38 retail properties in the
continental U.S., along with a pledge of all cash flows, insurance
proceeds, and a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) pledge of the direct
equity interests in the owners of 12 retail properties in Puerto
Rico.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 2,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect our view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  RETL 2018-RVP

  Class       Rating(i)           Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)           524,000,000
  X-CP(ii)    BBB- (sf)          121,900,000(iii)
  X-EXT(ii)   BBB- (sf)          121,900,000(iii)
  B           AA (sf)            159,200,000
  C           A- (sf)            137,900,000
  D           BBB- (sf)          121,900,000
  E           BB- (sf)           165,500,000
  F           B- (sf)            160,300,000
  G(iv)       NR                  13,400,000
  HRR(iv)     NR                  67,800,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii)Interest-only class.
(iii)Notional balance. The class X-CP and X-EXT certificates'
notional amount will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the class
D certificates.
(iv)The initial certificate balance of classes G and HRR is subject
to change based on the final pricing of all certificates and the
final determination of the class HRR certificates, which will be
retained by Western Asset Mortgage Capital Corp. as third-party
purchaser.
NR--Not rated.


SEASONED CREDIT 2018-1: Fitch to Rate Class M Notes 'B-sf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Freddie Mac's risk-transfer
transaction, Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust Series 2018-1
(SCRT 2018-1):

-- $73,297,000 class M notes 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $419,650,000 class HT notes;
-- $314,738,000 class HA exchangeable notes;
-- $104,912,000 class HB exchangeable notes;
-- $52,456,000 class HV exchangeable notes;
-- $52,456,000 class HZ exchangeable notes;
-- $784,211,000 class MT notes;
-- $588,159,000 class MA exchangeable notes;
-- $196,052,000 class MB exchangeable notes;
-- $98,026,000 class MV exchangeable notes;
-- $98,026,000 class MZ exchangeable notes;
-- $258,975,000 class M45T exchangeable notes;
-- $132,807,693 class M45D exchangeable notes;
-- $126,167,307 class M45F exchangeable notes;
-- $126,167,307 class M45S exchangeable notes;
-- $258,975,000 class M45C exchangeable notes;
-- $258,975,000 class M45I exchangeable notional notes;
-- $186,346,000 class M60T exchangeable notes;
-- $186,346,000 class M60F exchangeable notes;
-- $186,346,000 class M60S exchangeable notes;
-- $186,346,000 class M60C exchangeable notes;
-- $186,346,000 class M60I exchangeable notional notes;
-- $1,649,182,000 class A-IO notional notes;
-- $1,832,425,340 class XS-IO notional notes;
-- $109,946,340 class B notes;
-- $183,243,340 class B-IO notional notes;
-- $109,946,340 class BX notional notes;
-- $109,946,340 class BBIO notional notes.

The 'B-sf' rating for the M notes reflects the 6.00% subordination
provided by the class B notes.

SCRT 2018-1 represents Freddie Mac's sixth seasoned credit risk
transfer transaction issued. SCRT 2018-1 consists of four
collateral groups backed by 10,983 seasoned performing and
re-performing mortgages with a total balance of approximately
$1.832 billion, which includes $192.5 million, or 10.5%, of the
aggregate pool balance in non-interest-bearing deferred principal
amounts, as of the cutoff date. The four collateral groups are
distinguished between loans that have additional interest rate
increases outstanding due to the terms of the modification and
those that are expected to remain fixed for the remainder of the
term. Among the loans that are fixed, the groups are further
distinguished by both loans that include a portion of principal
forbearance as well as the interest rate on the loans. The
distribution of principal and interest (P&I) and loss allocations
to the rated note is based on a senior subordinate, sequential
structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage re-performing loans (RPLs), all
of which have been modified. Roughly 73% of the pool has been
paying on time for the past 24 months per the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) methodology and none of the loans have
experienced a delinquency within the past 12 months. The pool has a
weighted average sustainable loan-to-value ratio (WA sLTV) of 86.7%
and the WA model FICO is 673.

Interest Payment Risk (Negative): In Fitch's timing scenarios the M
class incurs temporary shortfalls in the 'B-sf' rating category but
is ultimately repaid prior to maturity of the transaction. The
difference between Fitch's expected loss and the credit enhancement
(CE) on the rated class is due to the repayment of interest
deferrals. Interest to the rated classes is subordinated to the
senior notes as well as repayments made to Freddie Mac for prior
payments on the senior classes. Timely payments of interest are
also a potential risk, as principal collections on the underlying
can only be used to repay interest shortfalls on the rated classes
after the balance has been paid off.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Neutral): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted on a sample basis of approximately 20% of the
pool as it relates to regulatory compliance and 11% for pay history
and a tax and title lien search was conducted on 100%. The
third-party review (TPR) firms' due diligence review resulted in 3%
of the sample loans remaining in the final pool graded 'C' or 'D'
(less than 1% graded 'C'), meaning the loans had material
violations or lacked documentation to confirm regulatory
compliance. While the diligence grades are better than average, the
scope of the review was more narrow than a typical private-label
RPL transaction.

Regular Issuer (Neutral): This is Freddie Mac's sixth-rated RPL
securitization and the third that Fitch has been asked to rate.
Fitch has conducted multiple reviews of Freddie Mac and is
confident that it has the necessary policies, procedures and
third-party oversight in place to properly aggregate and securitize
RPLs.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction as weaker than other Fitch-rated RPL deals.
The weakness is due to the exclusion of a number of reps that Fitch
views as consistent with a full framework as well as the limited
diligence that may have otherwise acted as a mitigant.
Additionally, Freddie Mac as rep provider will only be obligated to
repurchase a loan, pay an indemnity loss amount or cure the
material breach prior to March 12, 2021. However, Fitch believes
that the defect risk is lower relative to other RPL transactions
because the loans were subject to Freddie Mac's loan level review
process in place at the time the loan became delinquent. Therefore,
Fitch treated the construct as Tier 3 and increased its 'B-sf'
Probability of Default expectations by 74 bps to account for the
weaknesses in the reps

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
similar to Freddie Mac's STACR transactions. Once the initial CE of
the senior notes has reached the target and if all performance
triggers are passing, principal is allocated pro rata among the
seniors and subordinate classes with the most senior subordinate
bond receiving the full subordinate share. This structure is a
positive for the rated notes, as it results in a faster paydown and
allows them to receive principal earlier than under a traditional
sequential structure. However, to the extent any of the performance
triggers are failing, principal is distributed sequentially to the
senior notes until triggers pass.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severities
(LS) are less for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for ultimate payments of interest to the rated classes.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria, as
described in its June 2017 report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
This incorporates a review of the aggregator's lending platforms,
as well as an assessment of the transaction's R&W and due diligence
results, which were found to be consistent with the ratings
assigned to the notes.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria," which is described below.

The variation (to "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and
Non-Performing Loan Rating Criteria") relates to increasing the
maximum PD credit that a loan can receive for having a clean pay
history. Fitch will typically apply the maximum clean current
credit for loans that have clean pay histories for at least 36
months and three-quarters of the maximum credit for loans that have
clean pay histories of 24 months-35 months. Based on a historical
data analysis of legacy RPL and RPL 2.0 performance to date, RPL
collateral has outperformed Fitch's initial expectations.

In RPL 2.0, the cohort of clean current loans at deal closing are
performing substantially better than the weaker cohort of loans at
deal closing that had a delinquency in the previous 24 months. This
historical data supports increasing the maximum PD credit from 35%
to 50% for loans that are at least 36 months clean current, as well
as increasing the maximum PD credit to 36% from 26% for loans that
are 24 month-35 month clean current.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected 12.1% at the 'B-sf' level. The analysis indicates
that there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs,
compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities that determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 4% would potentially move the 'B-sf' rated class
down to 'CCCsf' respectively.


VIBRANT CLO VIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Vibrant CLO VIII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$352,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$8,250,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-1B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$22,750,000 Class B-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$7,500,000 Class B-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$35,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes and the
Class D Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Vibrant CLO VIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of
the closing date.

Vibrant Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $550,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2672

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2672 to 3073)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2672 to 3474)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -3

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B-1 Notes: -4

Class B-2 Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C24: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class B Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C24:

Cl. B, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.
Class E has already experienced a 26% realized loss as result of
previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-C, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 32.0% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 34.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 10.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-C were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 10.3% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 85.1% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97.0% to $59.7
million from $2.00 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 5% to 80% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 89.7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $186.6 million (for an average
loss severity of 48%). The only specially serviced loan is the
Union Square Loan ($6.2 million -- 10.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 75,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Monroe, North Carolina. Two anchor tenants, representing a combined
55% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated the property in 2015
and the loan subsequently transferred to special servicing in
January 2016 for imminent default and is now REO.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 85% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $19.2 million (a 34% expected loss on average)
from these specially serviced and troubled loans.

The three performing loans not in special servicing represent 89.7%
of the pool balance. The largest loan is the Bank of America --
Pasadena, CA Loan ($47.9 million -- 79.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 346,000 SF office building in Pasadena, California.
The property operates on a triple net basis and is 100% occupied by
Bank of America through October 2019. The Borrower was unable to
pay off the loan by the September 2015 anticipated repayment date
(ARD). Starting in October 2015, the loan entered into a
hyper-amortization period through the final maturity date in
December 2019. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's value
incorporates a "lit/dark" analysis. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR and Moody's has identified
this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the St. Laurent Warehouses Pool Loan
($2.91 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five flex industrial buildings constructed in various
years between 1973 and 2003. As of September 2017, the overall
portfolio was 99% leased, virtually unchanged from 2016. The
fully-amortizing loan has amortized 45% since securitization and
matures in March 2026. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and
1.51X, respectively, compared to 69% and 1.38X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens -- East Ridge, TN Loan
($2.94 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000
SF single tenant retail property constructed in 2001 and located in
East Ridge, Tennessee. The property is leased and occupied by
Walgreens through 2060. The loan, which did not pay off by its ARD
in December 2015, has a final maturity in December 2035. Within two
miles of the subject, there is a CVS and Rite Aid. Moody's value
incorporated a "lit/dark" analysis due to the single tenant
exposure. The loan remains on the master servicer's watchlist for
passing its ARD and Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.



WELLS FARGO 2016-C32: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class X-E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C32 (the
Certificates) issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2016-C32 (the Trust) as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 112
fixed-rate loans secured by 152 commercial properties. As of the
December 2017 remittance, all loans remained in the pool with an
aggregate principal balance of $948.8 million, representing a
collateral reduction of approximately 1.2% since issuance as a
result of scheduled loan amortization. There are currently 24 loans
(35.4% of the pool) with remaining interest-only (IO) periods,
ranging from eight to 60 months, while four loans (15.7% of the
pool) are structured with full IO terms. To date, 107 loans (97.3%
of the pool) reported partial-year 2017 financials, while 75 loans
(82.5% of the pool) reported YE2016 financials. At issuance, the
transaction had a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and WA Debt Yield of 1.64 times (x) and 8.5%, respectively.

Thirty-one loans, representing 12.7% of the pool, are secured by
cooperative housing properties and are very low-leverage, with
minimal term and refinance default risk. The pool is relatively
diverse in terms of loan size, as the top 15 loans represent only
51.8% of the pool. Based on the most recent cash flows available,
the top 15 loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.72x, compared with the WA
DBRS Term DSCR of 1.50x, which is reflective of 16.2% net cash flow
growth over the DBRS issuance figures.

As of the December 2017 remittance, there are 15 loans (17.6% of
the pool) on the servicer's watchlist. Of these 15 loans, three
loans (12.1% of the pool) were flagged as a result of deferred
maintenance, six loans (4.3% of the pool) were flagged because of
either occupancy declines and/or near-term tenant rollover, while
the remaining six loans (1.3% of the pool; secured by cooperative
properties) were flagged for various reasons.

Classes X-A, X-D, X-E and X-F are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO ratings
mirror the lowest-rated reference tranche, adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C33 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance with No Material Changes: The overall pool
performance remains stable from issuance. As property level
performance is generally in line with issuance expectations, the
original rating analysis was considered in affirming the
transaction.

As of the February 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1.3% to $702.9 million from
$712.2 million at issuance. No loans have transferred to special
servicing since issuance. There are eight loans (7.56%) on the
servicer's watch list. Fitch has designated one loan (1.49%) as a
Fitch Loan of Concern (FLOC), due to declining occupancy and DSCR.

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 14 loans (5.5% of the pool)
secured by multifamily co-ops; 12 are in New York City metro area;
one is in Washington, D.C.; and one is in Atlanta, GA.

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest property type
concentrations are office (32.6% of the pool), retail (18.5%),
self-storage (14%) and hotel (13%) of the pool.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The third largest loan in the
pool, 225 Liberty Street, representing 5.7% of the pool balance,
was assigned an investment-grade credit opinion at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $21.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $191 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.4 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $542.7* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.3* million class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.6* million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.9* million class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.1* million class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.9 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.1 class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or class X-G certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2018-C43: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2018-C43 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, Series 2018-C43.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $22,182,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,539,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,193,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $223,916,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $493,830,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135,803,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73,192,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,628,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,983,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,455,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,455,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,519,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,818,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

-- $22,046,433b class G;
-- $16,977,551.15bc VRR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 5, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 63 loans secured by 132
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$722,448,985 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Bank PLC, Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, BSPRT Finance, LLC, C-III Commercial Mortgage LLC, and
Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 74.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.3%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing
11.6% of the transaction, are credit assessed. The largest loan,
Moffett Towers II-Building 2 (7.5% of the pool) has a stand-alone
credit opinion of 'BBB-sf', with a Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of
1.26x and 70.4%, respectively. The seventh largest loan, Apple
Campus 3 (4.2% of the pool) has a stand-alone credit opinion of
'BBB-sf', with a Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.25x and 71.4%,
respectively.

Higher Fitch Leverage: The transaction has lower Fitch coverage
relative to other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.
The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is below the 2017 and 2016 averages
of 1.26x and 1.21x, respectively. The pool's Fitch LTV of 100.9% is
in line with the 2017 average of 101.6% and below the 2016 average
of 105.2%. Excluding credit opinion loans, the pool's normalized
Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.19x and 104.9%.

High Single-Tenant Exposure: Thirteen loans, representing 34.0% of
the pool, are designated full or partial single-tenant properties
by Fitch, including seven of the top 10 loans. The pools' single
tenant concentration is above the 2017 and 2016 averages of 19.3%
and 15.7%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the WFCM
2018-C43 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


[*] DBRS Confirm 15 Ratings From 4 Flag Credit Auto Trust Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., in January 2018, confirmed 15 ratings and upgraded six
ratings following review of 21 outstanding publicly rated classes
from four U.S. structured finance asset-backed securities
transactions. For the ratings that were confirmed, performance
trends are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to
cover DBRS's expected losses at their current respective rating
levels. For the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are
such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's
expected losses at their new respective rating levels.

The issuer's ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
     origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
     performance.

A copy of the Affected Ratings is available at:
                    
                http://bit.ly/2BJ0dP0


[*] DBRS Review 59 Classes From 2 U.S. RMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., in January 2018, reviewed 59 classes from two U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the
59 classes reviewed, DBRS confirmed 36 ratings, upgraded 13 ratings
and discontinued ten ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The discontinued ratings
are the result of full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, Alt-A and subprime
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect the structural features and
historical performance that constrain the quantitative model
output.

   -- Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1, Asset-Backed
      Certificates, Series 2005-WL1, Class I/II-M3

   -- Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1, Asset-Backed
      Certificates, Series 2005-WL1, Class III-M1

   -- Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1, Asset-Backed
      Certificates, Series 2005-WL1, Class III-M2

   -- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC
      Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 1-A4

   -- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC
      Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 9-A4

A copy of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                    http://bit.ly/2Erug0u


[*] Moody's Hikes $16MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2001 & 2004
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from five transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2004-SD1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-A

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MESA Trust Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2001-5

Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
ratings upgraded are a result of an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $102MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2005
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of thirteen
tranches and downgraded the ratings of four tranches from five
transactions, backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-44

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Developing on Jan 17, 2018.)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-1

Cl. II-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 21, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-4A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2015
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR8
Trust

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2015
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-DD Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR5 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools. The
rating upgrades from Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-DD
Trust and Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR5 Trust are
primarily due to an increase in the credit enhancement available to
the bonds. The rating upgrades from Thornburg Mortgage Securities
Trust 2004-1 are due to the strong collateral performance and the
total credit enhancement available to the bonds. The rating
upgrades from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2003-AR8 Trust reflect the receipt of a $672,700 subsequent
recovery in September 2017. The rating downgrades are due to the
deterioration of collateral performance and the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.Finally, performance of RMBS continues to
remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change
resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory
change can impact the performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Takes Action on $181.5MM of Alt-A Loans Issued in 2004
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 28 tranches from
five US residential mortgage backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
Alt-A loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-5

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-4 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-4

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-8

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2004-7

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-16

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2015
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. The
rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds and/or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $815.4MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of 51
tranches issued by 19 transactions, backed by subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2005-B

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2005-C

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2006-B

Cl. 1A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-FRE1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC2 Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC3 Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS8 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ2 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ4 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX2 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX4 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS9 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-DO1

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-10HE

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improved performance of the
related pools and an increase in credit enhancement available to
the bonds. The rating downgrade of Class M-4 issued by IndyMac Home
Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2005-B is primarily
the result of interest shortfalls on the bond that are unlikely to
be reimbursed. In addition, the rating downgrade of Class M-4
issued by RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust is due to higher expected
losses on the underlying pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Takes Various Action on 131 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on March 1, 2018, completed its review of 131
classes from 25 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
issued between 2003 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed
by Alternative-A and/or negative amortizing collateral. The review
yielded 46 upgrades, 11 downgrades, 73 affirmations, and one
discontinuance.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Tail risk;
-- Expected short duration; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

     http://bit.ly/2F7V9KJ


[*] S&P Takes Various Action on 141 Classes From 27 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 141 classes from 27 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions,
including one U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit (re-REMIC), issued between 2003 and 2005. The re-REMIC
transaction is backed by subprime collateral. The other
transactions are backed by alternative-A collateral. The review
yielded 57 upgrades, nine downgrades, 71 affirmations, three
withdrawals, and one discontinuance.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Expected short duration;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Loan modification criteria; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"On Feb. 5, 2018, we placed our ratings on four classes from Nomura
Asset Acceptance Corp. Alternative Loan Trust series 2003-A3 on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to potential interest
shortfalls reported by the trustee in the November 2014, December
2014, and June 2017 remittance periods.  The
downgrades of these ratings resolve the CreditWatch placements.
Following the CreditWatch placements, we verified with the trustee
the outstanding interest shortfall amounts on these classes, as
well as the application of reimbursement based on the deal
documents. We determined that these classes do not receive
additional compensation beyond the imputed interest due as direct
economic compensation for the delay in interest payments.
Accordingly, pursuant to our interest shortfall criteria, we apply
a maximum potential rating (MPR) to these classes, resulting in
their downgrade.

"We lowered our ratings on classes M-1 and M-2 from GSAA Home
Equity Trust 2004-4, and class M-1 from GSAA Home Equity Trust
2004-8 after assessing the impact of missed interest payments on
these classes. These downgrades are based on our cash flow
projections used in determining the likelihood that the missed
interest payments would be reimbursed under various scenarios,
because these classes received additional compensation for
outstanding missed interest payments.

"We withdrew our rating on class 2-A3A from Lehman XS Trust series
2005-2 that is insured by a bond insurer that we no longer rate.
The withdrawal reflects the absence of relevant information
regarding the insurers' creditworthiness that is needed to maintain
a rating on this class. To date, there is a current draw amount on
the insurance policy. Additionally, the rating on this class
depends solely on whether the insurer continues to make payments
when required and we do not have the relevant information to make
such a determination.

"We also withdrew our ratings on classes I-A3B and I-X from AAA
Trust 2005-2 because the related underlying classes paid down in
the January 2017 remittance period. AAA Trust 2005-2 is insured by
U.S. government affiliated entity, Fannie Mae; however, the trustee
continues to report outstanding, de minimis principal and notional
balances on classes I-A3B and I-X, respectively. We reached out to
the trustee, Deutsche Bank, to confirm the reporting of these class
balances and if they will remain outstanding, since there are no
additional funds available from the underlying classes; however,
after unsuccessful attempts to verify this with the trustee, and
due to the de minimis amount of the remaining balances, we are
withdrawing our ratings for these classes due to a lack of market
interest."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2FC9D4I


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 152 Classes From 19 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 152 classes from 19 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2005. All of these transactions are backed by
prime jumbo and alternative-A collateral. The review yielded 58
upgrades, 15 downgrades, and 79 affirmations.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows. These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2oOJ6I0


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 161 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 161 classes from 25 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
mixed collateral. The review yielded 94 upgrades, one downgrade,
and 66 affirmations.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           http://bit.ly/2oVTe0E


[*] US CMBS Loss Severities Lower in 2017, Moody's Says
-------------------------------------------------------
US CMBS loan loss severity decreased for loans liquidated in 2017,
as compared to the prior year, Moody's Investors Service says in
its latest report on losses in US commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS). The decrease in 2017 was attributable to lower
loss severities for maturity default liquidations from 2007 vintage
loans.

"The total loss severity for the 686 loans liquidated in 2017 was
43.0%, lower than the loss severity of 45.8% for the 766 loans
liquidated in 2016," says Vice President -- Senior Analyst, Matthew
Halpern. "The lower loss severity in 2017 was largely due to the
higher share of loan liquidations from 2007 vintage maturity
defaults, which represented 69% of the 2007 vintage disposition
balance and had an average loss severity of 19.8%. This was
significantly lower than the loss severity of 61.1% for the 2007
vintage liquidations from term defaults."

Moody's quarterly report on US CMBS loss severities covers all US
conduit and fusion transactions, regardless of whether Moody's
rates them, and provides both point-in-time and cumulative
estimates of loss severity. The current report details losses for
the 1998 to 2017 vintages based on liquidations that took place
from 1 January 2000 to December 31, 2017.

Despite the overall decrease in loss severities in 2017, the
quarterly weighted average loss severity rose significantly, to
55.6% for the 170 loans liquidated in the final quarter of the
year, from 42.8% for the 154 loans liquidated in the prior three
months.

Among the five major property types, retail continued to be the
worst-performer in terms of loss severity in 2017, Halpern adds.
The 264 retail loans liquidated last year had an average loss
severity of 55.1%. Nineteen loans backed by troubled malls made up
42% of the total dollar loss from retail properties in 2017 and had
a weighted average loss severity of 68.0%.

On average loans liquidated in major metropolitan statistical areas
had lower loss severities than those in secondary and tertiary
markets. Among the top 25 metropolitan areas, Detroit had the
highest cumulative loss severity, at 57.3% and Portland, the
lowest, at 24.2%.


                            *********

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for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
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                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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