TCR_Public/180218.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 18, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 48

                            Headlines

ACIS CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
AMAC CDO I: Moody's Withdraws C(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
AVID AUTOMOBILE 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class C Debt
BANK 2018-BNK10: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating to Class E Notes
BANK OF AMERICA 2003-2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. L Certs

BCC FUNDING XIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class E Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class D Debt
BENEFIT STREET VIII: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) on Class D-R Notes
C-BASS CBO IX: S&P Lowers Class D Notes Rating to D(sf)
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-4: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on E-RR Notes

CEDAR FUNDING VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Cl. F Notes
CFCRE TRUST 2018-TAN: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
CHILDREN'S TRUST: S&P Affirms BB Ratings on Three 2002 Tranches
CHT 2017-COSMO: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on Class F Certs
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2018-RP1: Fitch Assigns B Rating to B-2 Notes

COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Lowers Class E Certs Rating to B-
COMM 2015-CCRE22: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
CONNECTICUT AVE 2018-C01: Fitch Gives B Ratings to 19 Note Classes
CONSECO FINANCE 2001-3: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-4 Debt Rating to B1
CREDIT SUISSE 2003-C4: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class L Certs to Ba1

CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C2: S&P Raises Class A-J Debt Rating to B+(sf)
CRYSTAL RIVER 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 9 Tranches
CW CAPITAL II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Debt to Ca(sf)
DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: S&P Assigns B Rating to B-2 Notes
DRIVE AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB+(sf) Rating on Class E Notes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Debt
FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Takes Action on $438MM of Subprime RMBS
FREDDIE MAC 2017-4: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class M Certs
GAHR COMMERCIAL 2015-NRF: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on F-FX Certs
GERMAN AMERICAN 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Affirms B Rating to Cl. G Certs

GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. K Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Tranches
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE 2005-1: Moody's Hikes 2-A1A Debt Rating to B3
HELLER FINANCIAL 2000-PH1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches

ICG US 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
IOWA TOBACCO: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two 2005 Tranches
JFIN CLO 2013: S&P Affirms BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
JP MORGAN 2003-ML1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class L Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC4: S&P Hikes Rating on Class A-J Certs From B+

KILIMANJARO RE: S&P Hikes Series 2014-B Notes Rating to 'BB-(sf)'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Cuts Class X Certs Rating to C
MAGNETITE LTD VII: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
MAGNETITE LTD VII: S&P Assigns Prelim B Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
MAGNETITE LTD VIII: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes

MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CKI1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Debt
MICHIGAN TOBACCO: S&P Affirms 7 Ratings on 2006/2007 Bonds
MIDOCEAN CREDIT CLO I: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Cl. D-RR Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C32: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs
MORGAN STANLEY I 2007-TOP17: DBRS Cuts Class D Debt Rating to Csf

OCP CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on 16 Classes From 4 Deals
PATRONS' LEGACY 2003-IV: Moody's Cuts LILAC 03-A Debt Rating to Ba3
RAIT TRUST 2015-FL5: DBRS Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B(high)

SACRAMENTO TOBACCO: S&P Hikes Ratings on Two 2007 Tranches
SAN DIEGO TOBACCO: S&P Affirms 5 Ratings on 2006 Bonds
SATURNS TRUST 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on $60.192MM Units to 'CC'
SAXON ASSET 2001-2: Moody's Lowers Cl. AF-6 Debt Rating to B1
SBL COMMERCIAL 2016-KIND: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Certs

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to B-4 Debt
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-CH1: Moody's Cuts B-5 Certs Rating to (P)Ba3
TRITON AVIATION: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to Dsf
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Certs
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Certs

UBSCM 2018-NYCH: S&P Assigns Prelim. B(sf) Rating in Class F Certs
VENTURE CLO XXII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E-R Notes
VIRGINIA TOBACCO: S&P Affirms B- Ratings on Three 2007 Tranches
VOYA CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
WAMU MORTGAGE 2006-AR5: Moody's Assigns Ca Rating to DX-PPP Certs

WELLS FARGO 2014-LC18: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class X-F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS1: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
ZAIS CLO 8: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
[*] Fitch Cuts/Withdraws Rating on Distressed Bonds in 4 CMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 7 Bond From 5 Option ARM RMBS Loans

[*] Moody's Lowers Ratings on 23 Bonds From 16 US RMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $110.3MM of RMBS Issued 2003 & 2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $146.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003 & 2008
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $624MM of Alt-A Loans Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on 26 US RMBS IO Bonds From 24 Deals

[*] Moody's Takes Action on 36 US RMBS Bonds Issued Prior to 2009
[*] Moody's Takes Action on 52 Bonds From 42 U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Completes Review on 100 Classes From 17 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 22 Classes From 6 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues 39 Classes From 12 CDO Deals on Note Paydowns

[*] S&P Takes Actions on 39 Classes From 13 US RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 87 Classes From 17 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

ACIS CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, D, and
combo notes from ACIS CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by ACIS Capital Management, an affiliate
of Highland Capital Management L.P. S&P said, "We also removed
these ratings from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive
implications on Nov. 15, 2017. At the same time, we affirmed our
ratings on the class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, E, and F notes from the same
transaction."

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the January 2018 trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $173.23 million in paydowns to the class A-1
and A-2A notes since the transaction exited its reinvestment period
in April 2017. Despite these paydowns, the reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio change is mixed since the July
2016 trustee report, which S&P used for its previous rating
actions, with the test improving at the senior levels but dropping
at the junior level:

-- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 138.02% from 130.74%.
-- The class C O/C ratio improved to 120.65% from 118.40%.
-- The class D O/C ratio improved to 112.91% from 112.62%.
-- The class E O/C ratio declined to 106.70% from 107.85%.

S&P said, "The reported O/C ratio decline at the class E level
reflects an increase in defaulted collateral held since our last
rating actions and some additional decline in the portfolio's
aggregate principal balance beyond the amount of collateral that
has amortized.

"The collateral portfolio's credit quality has deteriorated some
since our last rating actions. The par amount of defaulted
collateral has increased to $14.84 million as of the January 2018
trustee report from $1.99 million as of the July 2016 trustee
report. Over the same period, collateral obligations with ratings
in the 'CCC' category have improved to $17.80 million from $46.58
million. The increased exposure to defaulted collateral as a
proportion of the total portfolio is currently slightly outweighing
the decreased exposure to 'CCC' rated collateral and holding the
weighted average rating of the portfolio stable as the exposure to
'B' rated collateral has also increased.

"The transaction has benefited from a drop in the weighted average
life due to underlying collateral's seasoning, with 3.51 years
reported as of the January 2018 trustee report, compared with 4.72
years reported in the July 2016 trustee report. This decrease in
the portfolio's weighted average life has contributed to some
reduction of the overall credit risk profile of the collateral
portfolio.

"Although our cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C, D, and combo notes, our rating actions consider the
increased exposure to defaulted collateral and declines in
aggregate principal balance of the portfolio. In addition, these
ratings also reflect additional consideration for the exposure to
specific distressed industries. There are increased concentration
risks in the portfolio from large exposures to defaulted assets and
assets from the distressed specialty retail industry contribute to
higher market value risk of the portfolio as it continues to
amortize. The portfolio has become significantly concentrated and
experienced a significant decrease in diversification with only 98
unique obligors remaining in the portfolio and the top five
obligors now represent approximately 15.65% of the remaining
performing portfolio.

"Our cash flow analysis also indicated a lower rating for the class
F notes; however, our rating actions considered that there is still
sufficient collateral value covering this class, and that overall
the transaction's credit quality has maintained a steady weighted
average rating since our last rating actions. We also considered
that this class is not currently vulnerable to nonpayment or is
dependent on favorable market conditions in line with our "Criteria
For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published
Oct. 1, 2012. We will continue to monitor whether this transaction
experiences additional par losses or credit quality deterioration
that may affect this junior note first.

"Our review of this transaction also considered the current
litigation being faced by the collateral manager, Highland Capital
Management L.P., and how this transaction may be affected by any
disruptions Highland may face in their ability to act as the
collateral manager. This transaction has exited its reinvestment
period, and the portfolio is now static, which lessens the
manager's active participation with the portfolio, with our overall
assessment of the operational risk remaining low. We will monitor
any impact to this transaction that may result from this ongoing
litigation or its resolution and take rating actions we deem
necessary.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

  RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

  ACIS CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                     Rating
  Class         To          From
  B             AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
  C             AA (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
  Combo         AA (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
  D             BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

  RATINGS AFFIRMED
  ACIS CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
  Class         Rating
  A-1           AAA (sf)
  A-2A          AAA (sf)
  A-2B          AAA (sf)
  E             BB (sf)
  F             B (sf)


AMAC CDO I: Moody's Withdraws C(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings on the
following notes issued by AMAC CDO Funding I:

Cl. F, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


AVID AUTOMOBILE 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class C Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Avid Automobile
Receivables Trust 2018-1's $114.04 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

- The availability of approximately 35.4%, 27.6%, and 22.5% of
   credit support for the class A, B, and C notes, respectively,
   based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including excess
   spread). These credit support levels provide coverage of
   approximately 2.4x, 1.9x, and 1.5x S&P's 14.00%-15.00% expected

   cumulative net loss for the class A, B, and C notes,
   respectively.

- The timely interest and full principal payments made under the
   stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate for the
   assigned ratings.

- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
   scenario, all else being equal, the ratings on the class A and
   B notes will not decline by more than two rating categories
   over a one-year period (and over the life of the bonds). The
   class C notes ('BB- (sf)') will eventually default, having
   received approximately 63% of their principal. This is
   consistent with S&P's rating stability criteria, which
   indicates that S&P would not assign 'A (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)'
   ratings if such ratings would fall by more than two categories
   in one year or three categories over three years. Under S&P's
   criteria, the rated class C notes are allowed to default over a

   three-year period.

- The transaction's credit enhancement in the form of
   subordinated notes; a nonamortizing reserve account;
   overcollateralization that is 5.00% of initial receivables and
   is expected to build to a target level of 9.00%; a cumulative
   net loss trigger, which if violated causes the required
   overcollateralization percentage to increase to 100%; and
   excess spread.

- S&P's view of the securitized pool of subprime auto loans,
   which has a weighted average FICO score of 546 and weighted
   average seasoning of approximately 13 months. The collateral
   pool includes no loans with original maturity terms greater
   than 72 months.

- S&P's view of the prefunding eligibility criteria and the
   expected collateral composition of the final pool under these
   criteria.

- The loss performance of Avid Acceptance Corp.'s origination
   static pools and managed portfolio; its deal-level collateral
   characteristics and comparison with its subprime auto finance
   company peers; and S&P's forward-looking view of the economy.

- S&P's view of the transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Avid Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1  

Class       Rating          Type          Interest     Amount
                                          rate       (mil. $)
A           A (sf)          Senior        Fixed        91.65
B           BBB (sf)        Subordinate   Fixed        12.42
C           BB- (sf)        Subordinate   Fixed         9.96


BANK 2018-BNK10: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following final ratings and Rating
Outlooks to BANK 2018-BNK10 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-BNK10:

-- $31,307,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,822,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,623,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,452,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $602,750,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $855,954,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $215,517,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $103,937,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,025,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,555,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62,668,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,512,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62,668,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,512,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

-- $19,871,000ab class X-F;
-- $19,871,000a class F;
-- $41,269,474ab class X-G;
-- $41,269,474a class G;
-- $64,357,446.03ac RR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Feb. 13, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 68 loans secured by 181
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,287,148,920 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Bank of America, National Association; Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holding LLC; Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association; and National Cooperative Bank, National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.7% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is higher than recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch LTV of 106.5% is higher than 2017
and 2016 averages of 101.6% and 105.2%, respectively. The pool's
Fitch DSCR of 1.37x is higher than the 2017 and 2016 averages of
1.26x and 1.16x, respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit
opinion and multifamily cooperative loans, the pool has a Fitch
DSCR and LTV of 1.16x and 114.9%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: There are two
investment-grade credit opinion loans representing 10.5% of the
transaction. Apple Campus 3 (7.3% of the pool), has a credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. Moffett Towers II -
Building 2 (3.2%), has a credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis.

Limited Amortization: There are 24 loans (53.6% of the pool) that
are full-term interest-only and 12 loans (21.0%) that are partial
interest-only. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool
will pay down by 7.4%, which is below both the 2017 average of 7.9%
and the 2016 average of 10.4%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2018-BNK10 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


BANK OF AMERICA 2003-2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. L Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of Bank of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. (BACM) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2003-2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Defeasance: The remaining pool is collateralized by five fully
defeased loans. The remaining classes are expected to pay in full
as the loans mature in July 2018 ($2.2 million; 4.20% of pool) and
October 2018 ($50.5 million; 95.8% of pool).

Incurred Losses: As of the January 2018 distribution date the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced 96.9% to $52.7
million from $1.68 billion at issuance, which includes incurred
losses of $52.7 million (or 3.1% of the original pool balance).
Over the past 12 months one loan was liquidated while in special
servicing with a $2.0 million loss, absorbed by class L. Interest
shortfalls are currently impacting class L ($732,382) and class P
($2.2 million).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes H, J, and K remain Stable as the
collateral is defeased and therefore a direct-pass through to the
rating of the U.S. government. A full recovery for the remaining
balance of class L is also expected from the defeased collateral,
however the ratings for classes L through O remain at 'Dsf' due to
incurred losses. Future rating actions are not anticipated for the
remaining life of this transaction.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Recovery
Estimates as indicated:

-- $17.3 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.9 million class J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.5 million class K at 'AAAsf; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE to 100% from 80%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D, E, F, G, and BW Rakes
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P and
HS Rake certificates.

Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XC
and XP certificates.


BCC FUNDING XIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by BCC Funding XIV LLC, Series 2018-1 (BCC
2018-1). This will be Balboa Capital Corporation's (BCC) first
transaction of the year. The notes will be backed by a pool of
small- and mid-ticket equipment loans and leases primarily
originated by BCC, who will also act as servicer and administrator
for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BCC Funding XIV LLC, Series 2018-1

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2018-1, Class A-2, Assigned
(P)Aa2 (sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2018-1, Class B, Assigned
(P)A1 (sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2018-1, Class C, Assigned
(P)Baa2 (sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2018-1, Class D, Assigned
(P)Ba2 (sf)

Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2018-1, Class E, Assigned
(P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying equipment
contract pool and its expected performance, the strength of the
capital structure, and the experience and expertise of BCC as the
servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the BCC 2018-1
collateral pool is 3.75%, 25 basis points higher than the initial
cumulative net loss expectation of the 2016-1 pool. Moody's based
its cumulative net loss expectation for the BCC 2018-1 pool on the
credit quality of the underlying collateral; the historical
securitization performance and managed portfolio performance of
similar collateral for which the 2015 and 2016 vintages have
experienced higher net loss levels to date than prior vintages; the
ability of BCC to perform the servicing functions; and Moody's
expectations of the macroeconomic environment during the life of
the transaction.

At closing the Class A-2, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
notes will benefit from 25.90%, 18.70%, 14.55%, 9.80%, and 7.35%,
of hard credit enhancement respectively. Hard credit enhancement
for the notes consists of overcollateralization of 5.85%, a
non-declining reserve account of 1.50% and subordination. The notes
will also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the equipment that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. As the primary drivers of performance, positive changes in
the US macro economy and the performance of various sectors where
the lessees operate could also affect the ratings.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors of the contracts or
a greater than expected deterioration in the value of the equipment
that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the primary
drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro economy
could also affect Moody's ratings. Other reasons for worse
performance than Moody's expectations could include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class D Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR7:

Cl. B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on P&I Cl. B & Cl. C were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on P&I Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F and Cl. G, were affirmed
because the rating is consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Cl. X-1 was affirmed due to the credit
performance of the referenced class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 26.9% of the
current balance, compared to 45.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.9% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 11, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93.6% to $71.5
million from $1.12 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 68% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 3.2% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 2.7% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of approximately $58.6
million (for an average loss severity of 46%). One loan,
constituting 68% of the pool, is currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loan is Shops at Boca Park ($48.3 million --
67.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 139,000 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Las Vegas, Nevada approximately 12 miles
northwest of the Vegas strip. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2015 due to imminent maturity default. The
special servicer is proceeding with foreclosure while dual-tracking
negotiations with the borrower.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $17.8 million loss for the specially
serviced loan (a 37% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2017 operating results for 75% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97% compared to 89% at last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 21%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.96X and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 1.03X and 1.49X, at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 33 Route 304 Loan ($6.4 million -- 9.0% of
the pool), which is secured by a 120,000 SF retail property in
Nanuet, New York. The property was 100% leased as of September
2017, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
82% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.13X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Mission Paseo Loan ($6.9 million --
9.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 61,000 SF retail property
in Las Vegas, Nevada. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2015 for maturity default and returned to master servicing
after a term and rate modification in February 2016. The Property
was 88% leased as of September 2017, compared to 84% leased as of
June 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 134% and 0.85X,
respectively, compared to 136% and 0.83X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Best Buy Plaza Loan ($5.7 million --
7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 109,000 SF retail property
in Melbourne, Florida. The largest tenant is Best Buy, which leases
approximately 42% of the net rentable area through February 2020.
The property was 92% leased as of January 2017, compared to 100%
leased as of September 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64%
and 1.51X, respectively, compared to 68% and 1.44X, at the last
review.


BENEFIT STREET VIII: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) on Class D-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned ratings to the class A-1A-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Benefit Street Partners
CLO VIII Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued on Nov. 15, 2015, that is managed by Benefit Street Partners
LLC.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available
is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

On the Feb. 9, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1A-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original notes as outlined in the transaction
document provisions. Therefore, S&P withdrew its rating on the
original class A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, B, C, and D notes in line
with their full redemption, and assigned ratings to the replacement
class A-1A-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis based on an identified portfolio of assets provided by the
arranger, as well as some unidentified hypothetical assets. At the
time of our cash flow analysis, 91.17% of the underlying collateral
was identified; further, 94.26% and 95.36% of the identified
collateral maintained an S&P Rating and an S&P Recovery Rating,
respectively. The purpose of conducting these cash flow analyses
was to estimate future performance of the CLO. In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review this transaction through the
refinancing date, at which point we will assign final ratings,
based on the credit enhancement available to support the notes at
that time."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Benefit Street Partners VIII CLO Ltd.
  Replacement class       Rating        Amount (mil $)
  A-1A-R                  AAA (sf)              351.00
  A-1B-R                  NR                     27.50
  A-2-R                   AA (sf)                42.50
  B-R                     A (sf)                 42.25
  C-R                     BBB- (sf)              33.60
  D-R                     BB- (sf)               22.95

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  Benefit Street Partners VIII CLO Ltd.
                               Rating
  Original class         To             From
  A-1A                   NR             AAA (sf)
  A-1B                   NR             AAA (sf)
  A-1C                   NR             AAA (sf)
  A-2                    NR             AA (sf)
  B                      NR             A (sf)
  C                      NR             BBB (sf)
  D                      NR             BB (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


C-BASS CBO IX: S&P Lowers Class D Notes Rating to D(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class D notes from
C-BASS CBO IX Ltd., a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
backed predominantly by residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS), manufactured housing securities, and other asset-backed
securities (ABS) securities. At the same time, S&P affirmed its
rating on the class C notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 29, 2017, trustee report.

Though the class D notes received a portion of their current
interest on the Jan. 8, 2018, payment date, the total outstanding
balance of the class C and the D notes (including deferred
interest) is $13.48 million. Since there are $11.42 million of
assets (including cash), the class D note rating was lowered to 'D
(sf)', as even 100% recovery of the defaulted assets will be
inadequate to pay the class D note outstanding balance and is
deferred interest.

S&P said, "For this analysis, we relied on the supplemental test
calculations and did not run cash flows due to the small amount of
obligors remaining in the underlying asset pool. Though the
supplemental tests indicated a higher rating for the class C notes
(the most senior note), we affirmed our rating on the class because
of concerns over the concentration risk and possible risk of future
interest payment disruption that could arise if liquidity is
affected.  

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  RATING LOWERED
  
  C-BASS CBO IX Ltd.
                   Rating
  Class         To          From
  D             D (sf)      CC (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED

  C-BASS CBO IX Ltd.

  Class        Rating   
  C            CC (sf)   


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-4: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on E-RR Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement notes from Carlyle
Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in November 2013, and partially
refinanced in July 2016, that is managed by Carlyle CLO Management
LLC (see list). The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture. The current outstanding class F notes will
be redeemed and not replaced.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels. The replacement class A-1-RR, A-2-RR, C-RR, and D-RR notes
are expected to be issued at a lower spread than the current
outstanding notes. The replacement class E-RR notes are expected to
be issued at a higher spread than the current outstanding notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 9,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 1, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes." The replacement
notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental indenture,
which, in addition to outlining the terms of the replacement notes,
provide that:

-- The replacement class A-1-RR, A-2-RR, C-RR, and D-RR notes are
expected to be issued at a lower spread than the current
outstanding notes.

-- The replacement class E-RR notes are expected to be issued at a
higher spread than the current outstanding notes.

-- The replacement class B-RR notes will replace the current
outstanding B-1 and B-2-R notes.

-- The current outstanding class F notes will be redeemed and not
replaced.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended by
5.25 years.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance (see table). In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd.

  Replacement           Rating           Balance
  class                                 (mil. $)
  A-1-RR                AAA (sf)         234.000
  A-2-RR                NR                16.500
  B-RR                  AA (sf)           56.500
  C-RR                  A (sf)            22.500
  D-RR                  BBB- (sf)         24.000
  E-RR                  BB- (sf)          14.500
  Subordinated notes    NR                55.505

  NR--Not rated.


CEDAR FUNDING VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Cedar
Funding VII CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding VII CLO LLC's $451.25 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 31,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P' view of:

- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the

performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cedar Funding VII CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding VII CLO LLC  

Class                Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A-1                  AAA (sf)        297.50
A-2                  NR               17.50
B                    AA (sf)          65.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)           30.00
D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)        25.00
E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)         23.00
F (deferrable)       B- (sf)          10.75
Subordinated notes   NR               41.75

NR--Not rated.


CFCRE TRUST 2018-TAN: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CFCRE Trust 2018-TAN's
$195.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
securitization backed a first-lien mortgage on the borrowers'
leasehold interest in the Aruba Marriott and Stellaris Casino
hotel, totaling 411 guestrooms, in Palm Beach, Aruba. The
fixed-rate loan has a five-year term.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure. S&P's ratings on the certificates were capped at its
transfer and convertibility assessment of 'BBB+' on Aruba.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  CFCRE Trust 2018-TAN

  Class       Rating(i)          Amount ($)
  A           NR                 61,500,000
  X(ii)       BB (sf)           133,500,000(iii)
  B           NR                 26,500,000
  C           BBB- (sf)          24,500,000
  D           BB (sf)            21,000,000
  E           NR                 37,000,000
  F           NR                 12,000,000
  HRR         NR                 12,500,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii)The notional amount of the class X certificates will be equal
to the total class A, B, C, and D certificate balances.
(iii)Notional amount.
LTV--Loan-to-value.
NCF--Net cash flow.
N/A—Not applicable.
NR--Not rated.


CHILDREN'S TRUST: S&P Affirms BB Ratings on Three 2002 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Children's Trust's tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series
2002 are backed by tobacco settlement revenues due to Puerto Rico
as part of a master settlement agreement between participating
tobacco companies and the settling states.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed its three 'BB (sf)' ratings on
Children's Trust's series 2002, a tobacco fee settlement
transaction. The ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications following their initial April 25, 2016, placement. On
that date, S&P lowered the ratings on two bonds and placed the
ratings on the three outstanding bonds on CreditWatch negative,
reflecting its view of the increased risk to the transaction
following legislation passed in Puerto Rico on April 6, 2016.

In January 2017, per Act No. 5-2017, a state of financial emergency
was declared in Puerto Rico, during which the governor can issue
executive orders designating the priority in which available
resources will be used to pay for essential services necessary to
preserve the health, safety, and wellbeing of Puerto Rico's
residents, and at the same time acknowledging the government's
monetary obligations and instrumentalities, among other things. All
of the Puerto Rican government's obligations are subject, including
the Children's Trust bonds.

Children's Trust made its scheduled payments on the three bonds on
the 2016 and 2017 payment dates in May and November. Additionally,
the transaction continues to have a substantial liquidity reserve
of $83 million to cover noteholder payments if collections are
insufficient. The ratings on the bonds remain on CreditWatch
negative, reflecting the uncertainty surrounding Puerto
Rico's state of financial emergency.

S&P said, "We intend to resolve the CreditWatch negative placements
on all three outstanding series of bonds after observing how the
developments in the situation evolve. We will continue to follow
further developments in Puerto Rico, including new legislations,
any legal actions undertaken by investors, the indenture trustee,
or any other transaction parties, and we will take actions as we
deem appropriate."

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Children's Trust
US$1.171 billion tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2002
  

Class     Maturity     Rating               
2033      5/15/2033    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
2039      5/15/2039    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
2043      5/15/2043    BB (sf)/Watch Neg


CHT 2017-COSMO: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-COSMO to be issued by CHT 2017-COSMO Mortgage Trust.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has withdrawn the rating on the following
Certificates issued by CHT 2017-COSMO Mortgage Trust as the classes
were not issued:

-- Class X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

All classes have been privately placed.

The subject property is a 3,027-room luxury hotel and casino
completed in 2010 and situated in an excellent mid-strip location
between the Bellagio and CityCenter. The subject is one of the
newest hotel casinos in Las Vegas and compares favorably with the
higher-end properties on The Strip. The collateral amenities
include, but are not limited to, over 250,000 square feet (sf) of
convention and banquet space facilities, 111,500 sf of casino
space, 96,000 sf of entertainment space (including a 3,200-capacity
multi-use entertainment venue), 23,500 sf of retail space, 50,000
sf of spa and fitness facilities and a five-level underground
parking garage. The original developer defaulted on its
construction loan with Deutsche Bank, which ultimately foreclosed
on the property in 2008 and brought in the related companies to
reposition the asset, manage the development process and assist in
retail leasing. Deutsche Bank's reported cost basis in the subject
property was $3.8 billion, which equates to $1.3 million per key
(and over $612 psf), which seems extremely high, though it is
supported by the appraiser's estimate of a replacement cost
(including furniture, fixtures and equipment (FF&E)) of $4.10
billion. The construction cost was high in part because of the fact
that the property was originally intended to be a hotel-condo with
condominium-quality finishes. Of the condo units, 1,821 were
originally put under contract to individuals, with all but 17 such
contracts cancelled. There are currently 14 condominiums owned by
separate individual third parties unaffiliated with the borrower,
and three that have been purchased in the past few years. The 14
units are not part of the collateral and are not included in the
overall key count. The borrower owns all other residential units,
the hotel unit and the podium parcel (which is a five-story
component containing the casino, retail space and
convention/meeting space, among other things).

The condo-quality build-out is evident within the guest rooms,
which are extremely spacious and showed very well on the site
inspection. While the non-renovated keys inspected appeared modern,
and DBRS did not note any deferred maintenance to any of the soft
goods or hard goods, the sponsor began a $135.0 million ($46,632
per key) renovation in June 2017 on 2,895 keys, which excludes the
newly constructed rooms and penthouses. As of August 2017, the
sponsor had spent $34,700,000 ($117,627 per key) on renovations for
295 keys. The sponsor is planning to spend the remaining $103.0
million budgeted for room renovations ($39,615 per key) on
renovating 2,600 keys. The renovated rooms feature new carpeting,
wall coverings, soft goods, hard goods, artwork, televisions,
lighting controls and complete LED conversion. While the sponsor
invested $117,627 per key renovating 295 keys, which is more than
the $39,615 per key renovation budget for the remaining 2,600 keys,
the scope of the renovation for the remaining 2,600 keys is
expected to be in line with the quality and upgrades to the
previously renovated keys. The sponsor expects the room renovations
to be completed by the end of 2018 and is minimizing disruption to
hotel operations by completing two floors at a time. With
consideration to these upgrades, the management on the site
inspection conveyed that the property will continue offering the
newest and highest-quality product on The Strip. Of the large hotel
casinos on The Strip, the traditional room product at the subject
is, in DBRS's opinion, the best, and is reflected in the subject's
high revenue per available room of $300.13 for the trailing
12-month (T-12) period ending August 2017, a level which puts it at
the top of its competitive set. Keeping guest room quality at this
high standard will be quite expensive, given occupancy rates in
excess of 90.0% and the high cost of the furnishings, but the DBRS
FF&E allocated to non-gaming revenue is also high at $28.2 million
($9,329 per key).

Promotions (discounted/free rooms, food and beverage, etc.) are
used at all casinos to entice customers to gamble at specific
properties, and the amount of promotions as a percentage of gaming
revenue is a commonly used metric to evaluate performance. At the
subject, promotions represented 56.8% of gaming revenue during the
T-12 period ending August 2017. According to management, and
verified by DBRS research, properties on The Strip typically
operate in the 25.0% to 35.0% range on this metric. As such, the
subject is significantly underperforming its competitors but has
been able to reduce promotions percentages down from 85.0%, 69.5%
and 65.7% in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively. This reduction in
promotions expense is a primary driver of the substantial net cash
flow (NCF) margin expansion from 15.2% in YE2014 to 26.0% as of the
T-12 period. Such margin growth has resulted in a 94.4% increase in
NCF during a time frame where revenue only grew by 9.5%. Further,
while promotions expense as a percentage of gaming revenue has
dropped substantially, it is still approximately double the average
for The Strip.

The sponsor representative conveyed that one of the Cosmopolitan's
highest-paid employees was its baccarat marketer, who has
significant ties to a circle of high-net worth baccarat players in
China. The addition of the high-roller suites and The Reserve, as
well as the baccarat marketing professional hire, is expected to
increase gaming revenue at the property. DBRS believes that this
figure will remain above competitors that are part of larger gaming
companies with loyalty programs, but there could still be further
upside. The property has exposure to a substantial amount of
revenue derived from international guests, who could be potentially
more volatile than domestic guests. While there is not a consistent
measure for the property to accurately assess the amount of revenue
and room nights from international guests, the sponsor uses
baccarat revenue relative to non-baccarat revenue as an indicator
for international guests. As of the T-12 period ending August 2017,
baccarat win revenue, at $82.3 million, comprised 41.2% and 24.8%
of gross table game wins and gross table game and slot wins
combined, respectively. The property representative relayed on the
site inspection that he would estimate that approximately 30.0% of
guests at the Cosmopolitan are international. If DBRS were to
reduce its occupancy assumption by 30.0%, from 91.5% to 61.5%, the
resulting DBRS NCF would still result in a DBRS Term debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.72 times (x) on the mortgage debt, which
is a fairly high DSCR given the conservative hypothetical
assumption.

With a 2.73x DBRS Term DSCR, there is low term-default risk, even
though hotels typically exhibit high cash flow volatility compared
with other property types. The DBRS Refi DSCR is adequate at 1.28x,
considering the rating assigned, with the lowest-rated class of
debt below investment grade at BB (high), and with such DSCR based
on an implied refinance interest rate of 11.50%. This allows for
significant reversion to the mean in market interest rates, as the
refinance rate is 831 basis points (bps) greater than the assumed
interest rate based on a 1.25% LIBOR. In addition, the DBRS cap
rate of 11.25% is 360 bps above the cap rate implied by the $2.92
billion August 2017 appraised value and the Issuer's NCF of $223.3
million, allowing for significant reversion to the mean in lodging
valuation metrics. At BBB (low), the DBRS loan-to-value is
considered quite low at 64.8%, and the cumulative debt of $1.17
billion at that rating category represents a small fraction of the
appraiser's estimated $4.1 billion replacement cost. Total
leverage, inclusive of the $420 million of mezzanine debt, is
104.0% of the sponsor's initial purchase price in May 2014 but just
61.7% of the August 2017 appraised value. Given the property's
excellent quality and location, limited new supply anticipated in
the coming years and sponsorship's continued emphasis and
investment in improving gaming performance, DBRS expects loan
performance to be strong during the seven-year, fully extended
term, and the ability to refinance the mortgage loan at maturity
should be high.

The ratings assigned to Class C, Class D and Class E differ from
the higher rating implied by the DBRS direct sizing hurdles. DBRS
considers these differences to be a material deviation from the
methodology caused by the issuer's final determined capital
structure and class sizes, in addition, DBRS assessed the
historical performance of the collateral and prior ratings assigned
to the Cosmopolitan Hotel Trust 2016-COSMO transaction when
assigning the ratings for the subject transaction.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2018-RP1: Fitch Assigns B Rating to B-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-RP1 (CMLTI 2018-RP1)
as follows:

-- $181,372,000 class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $181,372,000 class A-IO1 notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $181,372,000 class A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $30,033,000 class M-1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,519,000 class M-2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,310,000 class M-3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,133,000 class B-1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,128,000 class B-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,244,000 class B-3 notes 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate 100%.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

-- $273,279,258 class A-IO2 notional notes;
-- $9,716,000 class B-4 notes;
-- $8,981,186 class B-5 notes;
-- $273,279,258 class A-IO-S notional notes;
-- $294,436,186 class C notional notes;
-- $802,558 class SA notes;
-- $301,654 class PRA notes;
-- $10,085,398 class BC exchangeable notes;
-- Class R REMIC residual notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 957 loans totaling $294.4
million (comprising 953 seasoned performing and re-performing loans
[RPLs] and four newly originated loans), including $21.2 million in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, and excluding $0.3
million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal reduction
amounts (PRA), as of the cutoff date. Distributions of principal
and interest (P&I) and loss allocations are based on a
sequential-pay, senior-subordinate structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A-1 notes reflects the 38.40%
subordination provided by the 10.20% class M-1, 5.95% class M-2,
5.20% class M-3, 4.80% class B-1, 3.10% class B-2, 2.80% class B-3,
3.30% class B-4, and 3.05% class B-5 notes.

Subsequent to assigning expected ratings on Jan. 31, 2018, Fitch
will be assigning a new rating of 'CCCsf' for the B-3 class, which
was not previously assigned an expected rating.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Fay Servicing,
LLC, RSS3+), the representation (rep) and warranty (R&Ws)
framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the sequential pay
structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Recent Delinquencies (Negative): While almost all of the loans have
been current on their mortgage payments during the prior 12 months,
only 35% have been clean for more than 24 months. The majority
(97%) of the loans have received a modification due to performance
issues, including 57% that were completed as recent as 2015 and
2016. Although the borrowers tend to be chronic late payers, the
seasoning of roughly 11 years indicates a willingness to make their
payment.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch views the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanisms as consistent with a Tier I framework. Any loan that
incurred or incurs a realized loss or is 120 or more days
delinquent after cumulative realized losses plus the 120+
delinquency bucket exceeds 50% of the aggregate original credit
enhancement (CE) of the class B-3, B-4 and B-5 notes will be
reviewed for a breach. In addition, the controlling noteholder,
which cannot be the seller or an affiliate of the seller, has the
ability to cause a third-party review (TPR) on any loans that
liquidated with a realized loss. Fitch believes the performance
trigger for causing an automatic review is sufficient for
identifying breaches before significant deterioration in pool
performance occurs.

The transaction benefits from life-of-loan R&Ws from the sponsor,
Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. (CGMRC), which is a
subsidiary of Citigroup, Inc. (A/F1).

Due Diligence Findings (Negative): A third-party review (TPR) firm
conducted diligence on 100% of the pool, which resulted in 10.3%
(or 99 loans) graded 'C' or 'D'. For 39 loans, the due diligence
results showed issues regarding high-cost testing - the loans were
either missing the final HUD1, used alternate documentation to test
or had incomplete loan files, and, therefore, a slight upward
revision to the model output LS was applied, as further described
in the Third-Party Due Diligence section in this report. In
addition, timelines were extended on 54 loans that were missing
final modification documents or where the modification documents
could not be confirmed (excluding two loans that were already
adjusted for HUD1 issues).

Recent Natural Disasters (Mixed): The servicer, Fay Servicing, LLC,
is conducting inspections on properties located in counties
designated as major disaster areas by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) as a result of the recent natural
disasters. In addition, CGMRC is reviewing servicing comments.

CGMRC, the sponsor, is obligated to repurchase loans that have
incurred property damage due to water, flood or hurricane that
materially and adversely affects the value of the property prior to
the transaction's closing. Fitch currently does not expect the
effect of the natural disasters to have rating implications due to
the repurchase obligation of the sponsor and due to the limited
exposure to affected areas relative to the credit enhancement (CE)
of the rated bonds.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse sequential order.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): Given that there is no
external P&I advancing mechanism, Fitch analyzed the collateral's
cash flows using its standard prepayment and default timing
assumptions to assess the cash flow stability of the high
investment grade-rated bonds. Fitch considered the borrower's pay
histories in comparison to its timing assumptions and found that
the subordination is expected to be sufficient to cover timely
payment of interest on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' notes. In addition,
principal otherwise distributable to the notes may be used to pay
monthly interest, which also helps provide stability in cash flows.
However, the lower-rated bonds may experience long periods of
interest deferral and will generally not be repaid until the note
becomes the most senior outstanding.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances, which are made on
behalf of loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate,
reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are
less for this transaction than for those where the servicer is
obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow
priorities, together with increased subordination, provide for
timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated
classes.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $21.2 million (7.1%) of the unpaid
principal balance are outstanding on 476 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV
despite the lower payment and amounts not owed during the term of
the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than if there
were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior
for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit
strategies (i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to
those borrowers with more equity in the property. Additionally,
$0.3 million in non-interest-bearing deferred PRA will be
securitized into a separate non-rated class PRA.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, CGMRC, will
acquire and retain a 5% vertical interest in each class of the
securities to be issued.


COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Lowers Class E Certs Rating to B-
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and removed from Rating
Watch Negative two classes of Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.'s COMM
2012-CCRE4 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2012-CCRE4. Fitch has also affirmed eight classes.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Loss Expectations/Potential for Outsized Losses: Fitch's
loss expectations for the remaining pool have increased
significantly since its last rating action, in which two classes
were placed on Negative Rating Watch. The primary driver of the
elevated loss expectation is the specially serviced Fashion Outlets
of Las Vegas loan, which, as expected, did not refinance at its
scheduled maturity in late 2017. Fitch performed additional
sensitivity scenarios, which assumed outsized losses on this loan,
and the ratings and Outlooks reflect this additional analysis.

Retail and Regional Mall Concentration: Loans secured by retail
properties represent 39.1% of the current pool by balance and
include seven of the top 20 loans (33.7%). There are two enclosed
regional malls in the top 10 loans: Eastview Mall and Commons in
Victor, NY (12.4%) and Emerald Square Mall (3.8%) in North
Attleboro, MA. Both include anchor tenants Sears, JCPenney and
Macy's. The third largest loan is the specially serviced loan,
which is secured by an outlet mall, Fashion Outlets of Las Vegas
(6.9%), located in Primm, NV. Each of these assets is located in a
secondary or tertiary market. Fitch's base case losses assume
conservative value assumptions on each asset given the outlook for
retail and secondary regional malls.

Loan Concentration: The largest 10 loans represent 62.1% of the
current pool and the largest 15 loans represent 76.2% of the pool.
Thirty-nine of the original 48 loans remain. There are three
defeased loans (3.6%).

Energy Exposure: The pool has two under-performing hotel assets
located in the Permian Basin region of Texas totaling 2.6% of the
pool. TownePlace Suites Odessa (1.1%) is specially serviced and
REO. The most recent reported occupancy was 55%. The other hotel is
a performing loan: the Residence Inn Midland (1.5%), a 131-key
hotel in nearby Midland, TX. Though recent loan metrics have
improved, volatility in the in the energy markets coupled with
supply increases have led to a decline in loan performance.

Limited Amortization: The pool has experienced 12.9% paydown and
amortization since issuance. Of the non-specially serviced assets,
the pool's scheduled amortization is 7.8% from January 2018 through
each loan's maturity. Full-term interest-only loans represent 34.3%
of the pool and partial-interest-only loans are an additional 17%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on Classes C through E and interest-only X-B
reflect possible additional downgrades given the concerns with the
workout and valuation of the Fashion Outlets of Las Vegas in
addition to the transaction's regional mall and energy market
exposure. Downgrades are possible if expected losses increase or if
additional loans transfer to special servicing. The Outlooks on the
senior classes are Stable at this time as credit enhancement
remains sufficient due to paydown and defeasance. Upgrades are
unlikely due to the concentrated nature of the pool in addition to
limited amortization and defeasance.

Fitch has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch Negative the
following classes:

-- $19.4 million class E to 'B-sf' from 'BBsf'; assigned a
    Negative Outlook;

-- $18.1 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded the following class:

-- $45.8 million class D to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $66.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $499.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $111.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

Class A-1 is paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class G
certificates.


COMM 2015-CCRE22: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2015-CCRE22 (COMM 2015-CCRE22).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance In-Line with Issuance: As of the January 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 2.1% to $1.270 billion from $1.296 billion at issuance.
Two loans (1.12% of the pool balance) are designated as Fitch Loans
of Concern, one of which (0.4%) is in special servicing. Excluding
the specially serviced loan, all loans were current as of the
January 2018 distribution date, with no material changes to pool
metrics. As property-level performance is generally in line with
issuance expectations, the original rating analysis was considered
in affirming the transaction. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting the non-rated class H.

Largest Loan Performance Stabilized: At issuance, Fitch noted that
the largest loan in the pool, 26 Broadway (7.9%), an office
property in New York City, was in the process of leasing up after
occupancy dropped to 69.1% in 2013. As the property has stabilized,
NOI has improved from $12 million in 2015, to $15.1 million in
2016, and $9.1 million for the first half of 2017. Occupancy has
increased to 87% per the third quarter 2017 rent roll.

New York City and Leased Fee Concentration: Seven loans (28.5%) are
secured by properties located in New York City, including the
largest loan in the pool. In addition, three loans in the pool
(10.2%) are secured by leased fee properties located in New York
City and Portland, OR.

Limited Amortization: Eight loans, representing 30.7% of the pool,
are full term interest-only, and 26 loans, representing 41.9% of
the pool, are partial interest-only. The remainder of the pool
consists of 30 balloon loans representing 27.4% by balance, with
loan terms of five to 10 years. Based on the scheduled balance at
initial loan maturity, the pool will pay down 10.7%.

Hurricane and Wildfire Exposure: Two loans (8.1%) have exposure to
Hurricane Harvey, one of which (6.3%) suffered major damage during
Hurricane Harvey. The damage included water on the basement and
first floor forcing the property to close for a period of time, but
per media reports, the repairs have been completed. One loan (0.4%)
is collateralized by a property located in the Virgin Islands that
suffered damage during Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria. There
are no loans with exposure to the California wildfires.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $19.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $178.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $109 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $293.5 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $79.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $961.7 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $132.9 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $213.9 million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56.7 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.6 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class F, G, H, and X-D certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the class X-C certificates.


CONNECTICUT AVE 2018-C01: Fitch Gives B Ratings to 19 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2018-C01:

-- $384,186,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $853,746,000 class 1M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1X-1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1X-2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1X-3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1X-4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1Y-1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1Y-2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1Y-3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1Y-4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

-- $43,136,761,759 class 1A-H reference tranche;
-- $20,221,141 class 1M-1H reference tranche;
-- $14,829,237 class 1M-AH reference tranche;
-- $14,829,237 class 1M-BH reference tranche;
-- $15,278,062 class 1M-CH reference tranche;
-- $256,124,000 class 1B-1 notes;
-- $13,480,761 class 1B-1H reference tranche;
-- $224,670,634 class 1B-2H reference tranche.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
(AAA/Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
the mortgage loan reference pools of certain residential mortgage
loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 1M-1 notes reflects the 3.10% subordination provided
by the 0.66% class 1M-2A, the 0.66% class 1M-2B, the 0.68% class
1M-2C, the 0.60% class 1B-1 and its corresponding reference
tranche, as well as the 0.50% 1B-2H reference tranche.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2018-C01 (CAS 2018-C01) is
Fannie Mae's 24th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2018 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The CAS 2018-C01 transaction consists of 186,525 loans with
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 60% and less than or equal
to 80%.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
but are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors based on the payment priorities
set forth in the transaction documents.

Given the structure and counterparty dependence on Fannie Mae,
Fitch's ratings on the 1M-1 and 1M-2 notes will be based on the
lower of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and
credit enhancement (CE) available through subordination; or Fannie
Mae's Issuer Default Rating (IDR). The notes will be issued as
uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and carry a 12.5-year legal final
maturity. This will be an actual loss risk transfer transaction in
which losses borne by the noteholders will not be based on a fixed
loss severity (LS) schedule. The notes in this transaction will
experience losses realized at the time of liquidation or
modification that will include both lost principal and delinquent
or reduced interest.

Under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into
receivership if it determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less
than its obligations for more than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing, as well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae if it is
determined that the termination of such contract would promote an
orderly administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that
the U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in Fitch current rating of Fannie Mae. However, if at
some point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, Fannie Mae's ratings could be downgraded and
the 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, and 1M-2C notes' ratings affected.

The 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, 1M-2C and 1B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating-rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating-rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Fannie Mae
in second quarter 2017 (2Q17) and 3Q17. The reference pool will
consist of loans with LTV ratios greater than 60% and less than or
equal to 80%. Overall, the reference pool's collateral
characteristics are similar to recent CAS transactions and reflect
the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage originations.

Clean Pay History for Loans in Disaster Areas (Positive): Fannie
Mae will not be removing loans in counties designated as natural
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, any loans with a prior delinquency were removed from the
reference pool, as per the Eligibility Criteria. Therefore, all
loans in the reference pool in the disaster areas have had clean
pay histories since the natural disaster events occurred.

HomeReady Exposure (Negative): Approximately 1.6% of the reference
pool was originated under Fannie Mae's HomeReady program, which
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down-payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
HomeReady loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and
property value), which is reflected in increased CE.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or modification
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. Fitch accounted
for the 12.5-year hard maturity in its default analysis and applied
a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Limited Size and Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): Fitch
received third-party due diligence on a loan production basis, as
opposed to a transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that
regular, periodic third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan
production basis are sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality
control processes. Fitch views the results of the due diligence
review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence. See the
Third-Party Due Diligence section of this report for more details.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 1A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as the first loss 1B-2H reference
tranche, sized at 0.50%. Fannie Mae is also retaining a vertical
slice or interest of approximately 5% in each reference tranche
(1M-1H, 1M-AH, 1M-BH, 1M-CH and 1B-1H).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected sMVD. It indicates there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 36% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


CONSECO FINANCE 2001-3: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-4 Debt Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from six transactions, issued by multiple issuers from
1995 to 2001. The collateral backing these transactions consists
primarily of manufactured housing units.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitizations Corp. Series 2001-3

Class A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-10

B-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1996-07

M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2017 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-04

A-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

A-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

A-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-05

A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2006 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-07

A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CREDIT SUISSE 2003-C4: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class L Certs to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-C4:

Cl. K, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as a significant increase
in defeasance. The pool has paid down by 26% since Moody's last
review. In addition, loans constituting 78% of the pool have
defeased, up from 62% at the last review.

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current pooled balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.7% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
A-X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 18, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $14.4 million
from $1.34 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 53% of the pool. Four loans, constituting 78% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one, compared to a Herf of two at Moody's last
review.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
or contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $37.8 million (for
an average loss severity of 25%).

Moody's received full year 2016 and partial year 2017 operating
results for the one non-defeased loan in the pool.

The conduit loan represents 21.5% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Pemstar, Inc. Headquarters Loan ($3.1 million -- 21.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 260,000 square foot
office/industrial property approximately one hour south of
Minneapolis in Rochester, Minnesota. In 2007, Benchmark Electronics
acquired Pemstar, Inc. and the property is now 100% occupied by
Benchmark. The loan is fully amortizing and performance has been
stable. Due to the single tenant nature of this loan, a lit/dark
analysis was incorporated in the analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 31% and 3.47X, respectively, compared to 30% and 3.65X at
the last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C2: S&P Raises Class A-J Debt Rating to B+(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class A-J commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'B+ (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.

For the upgrade, S&P's credit enhancement expectation was in line
with the raised rating level.

S&P said, "The rating on the class A-J certificates was previously
lowered to 'D (sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls that we
expected to remain outstanding for a prolonged period of time. We
raised our rating on the certificates because the interest
shortfalls have been resolved in full and we do not believe, at
this time, a further default is virtually certain.

"While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on the class A-J certificates, our analysis also
considered the interest shortfall history and its repayment timing
as well as the class' susceptibility to reduced liquidity support
from the six specially serviced assets ($123.2 million, 44.2%). In
addition, our analysis considered the refinancing risk of the
largest loan in the pool, the Two North LaSalle loan ($127.4
million, 45.7%). The loan was modified in March 2017, has a
reported low occupancy of 57.0% as of Sept. 30, 2017, and is
currently scheduled to mature in November 2019 with two one-year
extension options, subject to debt-yield hurdles."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 18, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $279.0 million, which is 8.5% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes eight loans (reflecting
the specially serviced 300-318 East Fordham Road A and B notes as
one loan) and three real estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 207
loans at issuance. Six of these assets are with the special
servicer, and two loans ($26.1 million, 9.4%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.

S&P said, "Excluding the specially serviced assets, we calculated a
0.70x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service coverage and
183.7% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value ratio
using a 7.47% S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization
rate for the remaining performing loans.

"To date, the transaction has experienced $151.1 million in
principal losses, or 4.6% of the original pool trust balance. We
expect losses to reach approximately 6.7% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
six specially serviced assets."

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the trustee remittance report, six assets in the pool were
with the special servicer, Torchlight Loan Services LLC
(Torchlight). Details of the three largest specially serviced
assets are as follows:

The Metro Square 95 Office Park loan ($48.0 million, 17.2%) has a
total reported exposure of $50.4 million. The loan is secured by a
472,322-sq.-ft. suburban office park in Jacksonville, Fla. The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 8, 2011, due to
imminent default and the master servicer has deemed this loan
non-recoverable. Torchlight indicated that the borrower was unable
to meet conditions of a proposed loan modification and the lender
is now considering other options. The reported occupancy as of June
2016 was 80.4%. S&P expects a moderate loss upon this loan's
eventual resolution.

The 300-318 East Fordham Road A/B loan (aggregate $47.7 million,
17.1%) has a total reported exposure of $51.3 million. The loan is
secured by a 71,540-sq.-ft. unanchored retail center in Bronx
County, N.Y. The loan transferred to the special servicer on April
27, 2015, due to delinquency and the master servicer also deemed
this loan non-recoverable. Torchlight indicated that while there is
ongoing litigation with the borrower and resolution timing is
unknown at this time, the note is being widely marketed. No updated
financial data is available at this time. S&P expects a
moderate loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Duke University Medical Complex REO asset ($12.7 million, 4.6%)
has a total reported exposure of $15.8 million. The asset is a
79,202-sq.-ft. medical office building in Durham, N.C. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on May 27, 2015, due to
imminent monetary default, and the property became REO on March 22,
2016. The master servicer also deemed the asset non-recoverable.
Torchlight indicated that it is marketing the asset for sale and
expect a disposition by the end of the first quarter of 2018. S&P
expects a significant loss upon this asset's eventual resolution.

The three remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 3.5% of the total pool
trust balance. S&P estimated losses for the six specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 55.6%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
moderate loss is 26%-59% and a significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

  Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C2
                                        Rating      
  Class        Identifier       To                  From    
  A-J          22545YAG6        B+ (sf)             D (sf)  


CRYSTAL RIVER 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 9 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.
("Crystal River 2006-1"):

Moody's rating action is:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

The Cl. A, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, Cl. G, Cl. J and Cl.
K notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the Rated Notes because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

Crystal River 2006-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance) issued between 2005 and 2007. As of the
January 22, 2018 trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $385.9
million, from $390.3 million at issuance. The transaction is
currently under-collateralized by $358.3 million, with implied
losses through the senior-most outstanding class of notes.

The pool contains eight assets totaling $27.5 million (100.0% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the January 22, 2018 trustee report. While there
have been realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: i) weighted
average rating factor (WARF); weighted average life (WAL); weighted
average recovery rate (WARR); number of asset obligors; and
pair-wise asset correlation. These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000,
same as that at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-Ca/C (100.0%, same as that at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 2.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS collateral look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled 8 obligors, compared to 12 obligors at last
review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 0% as all of the
collateral is rated or credit assessed Ca/C, same as that at last
review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The loan obligations manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of Rated Notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. The Rated
Notes are particularly sensitive to changes in in the recovery
rates of the underlying collateral and credit assessments. However,
in light of the performance indicators noted above, Moody's
believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced are
sensitive to further change.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


CW CAPITAL II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Debt to Ca(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by CW Capital COBALT II, Ltd.:

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

The Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, Cl. G, Cl. H, Cl. J and Cl.
K notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of one class of notes due to the
deterioration in credit quality of the underlying collateral pool
as evidenced by the weighted average rating factor (WARF) and the
weighted average recovery rate (WARR). Moody's has affirmed the
ratings on eight classes of notes because the key transaction
metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic)
transactions.

CW Capital COBALT II, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (90.1% of
the pool balance), and CRE CDO (9.9%). As of the January 26, 2018
note valuation report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $194.0
million from $600.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the senior most outstanding class of notes, as a result of
regular amortization of the underlying collateral combined with
principal proceeds generated from the failure of certain par value
tests.

The pool contains six assets totaling $47.2 million (90.1% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the January 19, 2018 trustee report. While there have been
realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's does
expect high losses to occur on the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: i) weighted
average rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), number of asset obligors; and
pair-wise asset correlation. These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9631,
compared to 3944 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 10.1% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 44.1% at last review), B1-B3
(0.0% compared to 6.3% at last review), and (100.0% compared to
39.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.7 years, compared to 1.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS collateral look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, compared to 5.4% at last
review.

Moody's modeled 7 obligors, compared to 13 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 44.3%, compared to
43.3% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The loan obligations manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of Rated Notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. The Rated
Notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the recovery rates
of the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Holding all
other parameters constant, increasing the recovery rates of 100% of
the collateral pool by 10% would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of zero notches upward (e.g.,
one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: S&P Assigns B Rating to B-2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Deephaven Residential
Mortgage Trust 2018-1's $305.4 million mortgage pass-through
notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and
adjustable-rate, and interest-only residential mortgage loans
secured by single-family residences, planned-unit developments,
two- to four-family residences, and condominiums.

The ratings reflect our view of:

- The pool's collateral composition;
- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
- The transaction's representation and warranty framework; and
- The mortgage aggregator.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2018-1

Class       Rating(i)         Amount ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)         197,714,000
A-2         AA (sf)           21,266,000
A-3         A (sf)            35,906,000
M-1         BBB (sf)          20,804,000
B-1         BB (sf)           16,797,000
B-2         B (sf)            12,945,000
B-3         NR                 2,774,425
XS          NR                  Notional(ii)
A-IO-S      NR                  Notional(ii)
R           NR                       N/A

  (i) The ratings address ultimate principal and interest
      payments, as interest can be deferred on the classes.
(ii) Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal

      balance.
   N/A--Not applicable.
   NR--Not rated.


DRIVE AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB+(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Drive Auto
Receivables Trust 2018-1's $938 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 8,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The availability of 65.7%, 59.0%, 49.2%, 38.6%, and 35.7% of
credit support for the class A (consisting of classes A-1, A-2, and
A-3), B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash
flow scenarios (including 100% credit to excess spread), which
provide coverage of approximately 2.35x, 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.35x, and
1.27x for S&P's 26.50%-27.50% expected cumulative net loss (CNL).
These break-even scenarios cover total cumulative gross defaults of
94%, 84%, 70%, 59%, and 55%, respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
cash flow modeling scenarios are appropriate to the assigned
preliminary ratings.

-- S&P said, "The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario (1.35x our expected loss level), all else being equal, our
ratings on the class A, B, and C notes will remain at the assigned
preliminary 'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings,
respectively, and our rating on the class D notes would not decline
by more than two rating categories of the assigned preliminary 'BBB
(sf)' rating while they are outstanding." The class E notes will
remain within two rating categories of the assigned preliminary
'BB+ (sf)' rating during the first year but will eventually default
under the front-loaded 'BBB' stress scenario, after having received
73% of its principal, and will be repaid in full under the
back-loaded 'BBB' stress. These rating movements are within the
limits specified by our credit stability criteria.

-- The originator/servicer's history in the subprime/specialty
auto finance business.

-- S&P's analysis of 10 years of static pool data on Santander
Consumer USA Inc.'s (SC's) lending programs.

-- The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2018-1
  Class        Rating     Type         Interest          Amount
                                        rate(i)         (mil.
$)(i)
  A-1          A-1+ (sf) Senior        Fixed                
155.00
  A-2-A/A-2-B  AAA (sf)  Senior        Fixed/floating(ii)   
174.26
  A-3          AAA (sf)  Senior        Fixed                 
86.05
  B            AA (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed                 133.60

  C            A (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed                
168.45
  D            BBB (sf)  Subordinate   Fixed                
162.64
  E            BB+ (sf)  Subordinate   Fixed                 
58.08

(i)The tranches' coupons and sizing will be determined on the
pricing date.
(ii)The class A-2-A notes will be issued as fixed-rate notes, and
the class A-2-B notes will be issued as floating-rate notes. The
initial principal balance allocation between the class A-2-A and
A-2-B notes will be determined on the pricing date. The sponsor
doesn't expect the initial principal balance of the class A-2-B
notes to exceed $87.13 million.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Exeter Automobile
Receivables Trust 2018-1's automobile receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

- The availability of approximately 60.0%, 52.6%, 44.0%, 34.5%,
   and 29.4% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,

   respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including
   excess spread), which provide coverage of approximately 2.90x,
   2.50x, 2.05x, 1.55x, and 1.27x our 20.00%-21.00% expected
   cumulative net loss range. These break-even scenarios withstand

   cumulative gross losses of approximately 92.4%, 80.9%, 70.4%,
   55.2%, and 47.0%, respectively.

- The timely interest and principal payments that S&P believes
   will be made to the rated notes under stressed cash flow
   modeling scenarios that S&P believes are appropriate for the
   assigned ratings.

- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
   (1.55x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, S&P's
   ratings on the class A notes will not be lowered and the
   ratings on the class B and C notes will remain within one
   rating category of the assigned 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings,

   respectively, for the deal's life; the class D and E notes will

   remain within two rating categories of the assigned 'BBB (sf)'
   and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively, for the deal's life with
   respect to class D, but the class E notes will eventually
   default under the 'BBB' stress scenario. These rating movements

   are within the limits specified by S&P's credit stability
   criteria.

- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans

   securitized in this transaction.

- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
   structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1

Class       Rating        Type            Interest     Amount
                                          rate        (mil. $)
A           AAA (sf)      Senior          Fixed        261.64
B           AA (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed         86.24
C           A (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed         81.02
D           BBB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed         92.06
E           BB (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed         29.04


FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Takes Action on $438MM of Subprime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of three tranches
from First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF3 and two tranches
from First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8, and downgraded
the rating of two tranches issued by First Franklin Mortgage Loan
Trust 2006-FF13.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF13

Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF3

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The upgrades
are primarily due to the total available credit enhancement to the
bonds. The downgrades are primarily due to the weak performance of
the collateral.

The cash flow model used by Moody's in rating First Franklin
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF13 reflects the current allocations of
cash flows actually being made by the trustee, not the allocations
as provided in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) of the
transaction. The PSA for First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-FF13 states that all the Class A certificates shall receive
principal pro-rata beginning on the date the subordinate and
Class-X certificates have been reduced to zero. The subordinate and
Class-X certificates for this transaction have previously been
reduced to zero; however, the trustee is distributing group II
principal payments pro-rata to the Class A-2C and Class A-2D
certificates rather than aggregating these payments with group I
principal payments and then distributing them to all Class A
certificates pro-rata.

The PSAs for First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF3 and First
Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8 incorporate similar language
for cash flow allocation. Although Moody's do not expect losses in
these transactions to exceed the balance of the subordinate
certificates, Moody's analysis and related cash flow modeling
consider stress scenarios where this would occur.

The PSAs for these deals have similar principal waterfall language
and the same trustee as First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-FF13, and Moody's cash flow models for these two transactions
reflect a similar allocation of principal payments, in the event
that their subordinate and Class-X certificates are reduced to
zero, as that being made by the trustee in First Franklin Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-FF13.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in January
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


FREDDIE MAC 2017-4: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class M Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional rating on the Asset-Backed
Security, Series 2017-4 (the Certificate) issued by Freddie Mac
Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2017-4 (the Trust) as
follows:

-- $46.3 million Class M at B (low) (sf)

The B (low) (sf) rating on the Certificate reflects 5.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the pool.

Other than the specified class above, DBRS does not rate any other
classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
re-performing first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the certificates, which are backed by 9,977 loans with
a total principal balance of $1,852,436,659 as at the Cut-Off Date
(October 31, 2017).

The mortgage loans were either purchased by Freddie Mac from
securitized Freddie Mac Participation Certificates or retained by
Freddie Mac in whole-loan form since their acquisition. The loans
are currently held in Freddie Mac's retained portfolio and will be
deposited into the Trust on the Closing Date (December 13, 2017).

Modified loans comprise 100% of the portfolio. Each mortgage loan
was modified under either a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) or a GSE non-HAMP
modification program. Within the pool, 995 mortgages have forborne
principal amounts as a result of modification, which equates to
4.1% of the total unpaid principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date.
For 92.1% of the modified loans, the modifications happened more
than two years ago. The loans are approximately 130 months
seasoned, and all are current as of the Cut-Off Date. Furthermore,
86.6% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent
for at least the past 24 months under the Mortgage Bankers
Association delinquency methods. Because of the seasoning of the
collateral, none of the loans are subject to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau's Qualified Mortgage rules.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by Nationstar Mortgage LLC
doing business as Mr. Cooper. There will not be any advancing of
delinquent principal or interest on any mortgages by the servicer;
however, the servicer is obligated to advance to third parties any
amounts necessary for the preservation of mortgaged properties or
real estate–owned properties acquired by the Trust through
foreclosure or a loss mitigation process.

Freddie Mac will serve as the Sponsor, Seller and Trustee of the
transaction as well as Guarantor of the senior certificates (the
Guaranteed Certificates; the Class HT, Class HA, Class HB, Class
HV, Class HZ, Class MT, Class MA, Class MB, Class MV, Class MZ,
Class M45T, Class M45F, Class M45D, Class M45S, Class M45C, Class
M45I, Class M60T, Class M60F, Class M60S, Class M60C and Class M60I
certificates). Wilmington Trust, N.A. (Wilmington Trust) will serve
as Trust Agent. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a Stable
trend by DBRS) will serve as the Custodian for the Trust. U.S. Bank
National Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS)
will serve as the Securities Administrator for the Trust and will
act as Paying Agent, Registrar, Transfer Agent and Authenticating
Agent.

Freddie Mac, as the Seller, will make certain representations and
warranties (R&Ws) with respect to the mortgage loans. It will be
the only party from which the Trust may seek indemnification (or in
certain cases, a repurchase) as a result of a breach of R&Ws. If a
breach review trigger occurs, the Trust Agent, Wilmington Trust,
will be responsible for the enforcement of the R&Ws. The warranty
period will only be effective through December 4, 2020
(approximately three years from the Closing Date), for
substantially all R&Ws other than the real estate mortgage
investment conduit R&Ws.

The mortgage loans will be divided into four loan groups. The Group
H loans (40.2% of the pool) were subject to step-rate
modifications. Group M loans (31.0% of the pool), Group M45 loans
(21.4% of the pool) and Group M60 loans (7.4% of the pool) were
subject to either fixed-rate modifications or step-rate
modifications that have reached their final step dates and the
borrowers have made at least one payment after such loans reached
their final step dates as of the Cut-Off Date. Each Group M loan
has a mortgage interest rate less than or equal to 4.5% or has
forbearance. Each Group M60 loan has a mortgage interest rate
greater than 5.5% and has no forbearance. Each Group M45 loan has a
mortgage interest rate greater than 4.5% but less than or equal to
5.5% and has no forbearance. Principal and interest (P&I) on the
Guaranteed Certificates will be guaranteed by Freddie Mac. The
Guaranteed Certificates will be backed by collateral from each
group, respectively. The remaining certificates, including the
non-guaranteed subordinate, interest-only, mortgage insurance and
residual certificates, will be cross-collateralized among the four
groups.

The transaction employs a pro rata pay cash flow structure with a
sequential-pay feature among the subordinate certificates. Certain
principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
rated Class M certificates. Senior classes benefit from guaranteed
P&I payments by the Guarantor, Freddie Mac; however, such
guaranteed amounts, if paid, will be reimbursed to Freddie Mac from
the P&I collections prior to any allocation to the subordinate
certificates. The senior principal distribution amounts vary
subject to the satisfaction of a step-down test. Realized losses
are allocated reverse sequentially.

As a result of certain natural disasters (Hurricane Maria, the
California wildfires and Hurricane Irma), Freddie Mac has removed
(1) loans that were located in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin
Islands, (2) loans located in areas that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has designated as a major disaster area
affected by the California wildfires and (3) loans located in
FEMA-designated major disaster areas that have been on forbearance
plans with the Servicer at the borrower's request. Neither the
Trustee, the Trust Agent nor the Servicer has made or will inspect
the mortgaged properties in these affected areas. However, Freddie
Mac provides a representation that properties have no
damage/condemnation that materially adversely affects the value of
the property and is expected to repurchase loans that breach this
representation. As of the Cut-Off Date, approximately 10.4% of the
properties securing the loans in the pool are located in zip codes
identified by FEMA as having been affected by Hurricane Irma. DBRS
ran additional scenario analyses to stress the FEMA loans and test
that the rated bonds can withstand further property value
declines.

The rating reflects transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis (86.6%
of the pool has remained consistently current in the past 24
months), good credit quality relative to other re-performing pools
reviewed by DBRS and a strong servicer. Additionally, a third-party
due diligence review, albeit on less than 100% of the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance and payment histories, was
performed on a sample that exceeds DBRS's criteria. The due
diligence results and findings on the sampled loans were
satisfactory.

Although improved from Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer
Trust, Series 2016-1 (SCRT 2016-1), the transaction employs a
relatively weak R&W framework that includes a 36-month sunset (as
opposed to 12 months in SCRT 2016-1) without an R&W reserve
account, substantial knowledge qualifiers (with clawback) and fewer
mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for
seasoned pools. DBRS increased loss expectations from the model
results to capture the weaknesses in the R&W framework. Other
mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and very
clean performance history in the past two years, (2) stringent and
automatic breach review triggers, (3) Freddie Mac as the R&W
provider and (4) a satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

The lack of P&I advances on delinquent mortgages may increase the
possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the noteholders;
however, principal proceeds can be used to pay interest to the
rated certificates and subordination levels are greater than
expected losses, which may provide for interest payments to the
rated certificates.

The DBRS rating addresses the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related certificates.


GAHR COMMERCIAL 2015-NRF: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on F-FX Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed eight classes of
GAHR Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-NRF certificates (GAHR
2015-NRF).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect improving credit enhancement from property
releases and the continued overall stable performance of the
underlying pool. Despite increasing credit enhancement, Fitch did
not upgrade the non-interest only classes due to concerns about the
redistribution of the portfolio towards less stable property types
and potential volatility within the healthcare sector.

The transaction is currently secured by interests in 174 medical
office and healthcare related properties. Since issuance, 41
properties have been released from the pool. The collateral
currently consists of 103 medical office buildings (MOBs), 57
healthcare properties NNN leased to third party operators as
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), long-term acute care hospitals
(LTACHs), and senior housing, and 14 healthcare properties subject
to operating leases that are tied directly to free cash from the
underlying property operations (RIDEA Properties). The MOBs had an
average occupancy of 84% as of September 2017 rent rolls, with one
MOB fully vacant. All but one of the NNN leased properties remain
100% leased with one LTACH now fully vacant. Further, per the
September 2017 rent rolls, four RIDEA properties are also now
vacant.

The portfolio exhibits significant geographic diversity with assets
located in 28 states and no individual state representing more than
10.3% of the allocated loan balance. By allocated loan balance, 14%
of the pool is secured by leasehold interests in MOBS; all other
loans are secured by fee simple interests.

Released Properties; Improved Credit Enhancement: There has been
significant pay down to the senior floating rate classes from a
total of 41 releases since issuance, including one SNF and 39 MOBs
released in 2017 at 115% release premium. The other release, which
involved another SNF, was anticipated at issuance and permitted to
be released at par, thereafter.

Release Structure: Individual property releases are permitted
subject to, among other things, 115% paydown of the allocated loan
amount. However, there are no provisions to ensure the property
type distribution at issuance is maintained. Therefore,
disproportionate MOB property releases result in the redistribution
of the remaining portfolio toward a larger weighting of collateral
with material operating risk. Fitch's debt sizing hurdles have been
adjusted higher to reflect the migration to more volatile property
types.

Portfolio Redistribution: The collateral is diversified among
multiple asset types; however, due to the releases, which were
primarily MOBs, the portfolio's weighting by asset type has
changed. Fitch analyzed the most recently available cash flows
provided by the servicer (generally YE 2016 or YTD Sept. 2017). The
current Fitch NCF attributed to the more traditionally stable
medical office property type has decreased to 30.8% from 32.1% at
last review and 49.5% at issuance, while Fitch NCF attributed to
more volatile asset types has improved with NNN healthcare
properties (SNFs, LTACH, and Senior Housing) now at 49% compared to
47.8% at last review and 35.7% at issuance, and RIDEA properties at
20.3% compared to 20% and last review and 14.8% at issuance.

Operational Aspects of RIDEA Properties: 20.3% (by NCF) of the
portfolio is secured by RIDEA properties whose cash flows are
directly tied to the operations of independent living and assisted
living facilities. These RIDEA properties are considered to have a
greater risk of cash flow volatility due to the operational nature
of the underlying assets. Further, the medical nature of the
business the RIDEA Properties operates within poses a higher risk
of liability claims given the large number of elderly residents and
large number of employees. Additionally, changes to the Affordable
Care Act could adversely affect these properties.

Leverage Metrics; Additional Debt: The $1.3 billion mortgage loan
has a Fitch Ratings DSCR and LTV of 0.89x and 106.4%,
respectively.

In addition to the trust debt there is a $268.5 million senior
mezzanine loan, a $680,984 senior junior mezzanine loan, and a
$289.4 million junior mezzanine loan. All mezzanine loans are fully
subordinate to the mortgage loan and are subject to subordination
and standstill agreements as well as an intercreditor agreement.
The all in Fitch Ratings DSCR and LTV are 0.62x and 152.4%.

Experienced Sponsorship: The loan is sponsored by NorthStar Realty
Finance Corp. The affiliated NorthStar Healthcare Income Inc. (NHI)
is a public, non-traded REIT that was formed to originate and
acquire assets in healthcare real estate. Based on the portfolio's
acquisition price, the sponsors had approximately $1.3 billion of
equity in the transaction at issuance.

Interest Only Class X-FX Upgrade: The upgrade to class X-FX is a
result of the update to Fitch's "Global Structured Finance Rating
Criteria," published May 3, 2017, which now states that IO bond
ratings will be capped at the rating of the lowest referenced
tranche that contributes cash flow to the IO. Class X-FX is a
"strip" IO bond that references the class A-FX and B-FX
certificates, with the fixed-rate class A-FX contributing cash flow
to the IO; class B-FX has a weighted average coupon (WAC)
pass-through rate and does not contribute cash flow to the IO
bond.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable as a result of the
improved credit enhancement to the pool and overall stable
performance of the underlying assets. Future upgrades may be
limited due to concerns that the current pattern of releases, which
involved primarily the more traditionally stable medical office
properties, will continue. Further, Fitch expects to see a period
of sustained improved performance prior to any upgrades. Downgrades
to the classes are possible should an asset level or economic event
cause a decline in pool performance.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction and also serves as
the backup advancing agent. Fitch downgraded Deutsche Bank's Issuer
Default Rating to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A-'/'F1' on Sept. 28, 2017.
Fitch relies on the master servicer, Wells Fargo & Company (A+/F1),
which is currently the primary advancing agent, as a direct
counterparty. Fitch provided ratings confirmation on
Jan. 24, 2018.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:
-- $324.5 class X-FX* to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:
-- $63.8 million A-FL1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.5million class A-FL2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $119 million class A-FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $202.4 million class B-FX at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $151.2 million class C-FX at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $192.2 million class D-FX at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $215.5 million class E-FX at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $180 million class F-FX at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Interest only class

Fitch does not rate classes X-EXT and G-FX.


GERMAN AMERICAN 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Affirms B Rating to Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of German American Capital
Corp. commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2012-CCRE1 (COMM 2012-CCRE1).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Retail Concentration and Regional Malls; Upgrades Not
Warranted: Despite the increasing credit enhancement since Fitch's
last rating action from 12 loan repayments (15.3% of original pool
balance) and continued scheduled amortization, upgrades were not
warranted due to the pool's high retail concentration. Loans
secured by retail properties represent 52.4% of the pool, including
two of the top three loans (22%), which are secured by regional
malls located in secondary markets: Crossgates Mall (15.1%; Albany,
NY) and RiverTown Crossings Mall (6.9%; Grandville, MI). Fitch
performed an additional sensitivity scenario on the two regional
malls and the ratings reflect this analysis.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Three loans (10.1% of pool) have been
identified as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs). The second largest
loan, Creekside Plaza (7.5%), which is secured by a 227,707 sf
office property in San Leandro, CA, was flagged for declining
occupancy and significant near-term rollover. TriNet Employer Group
(21.4% of NRA) will be vacating the property upon its April 14,
2018 lease expiration. According to servicer updates, leases have
already been issued for approximately half of the vacating space
with additional interest for the remainder. The FLOCs outside of
the top 20 loans include Heald Colleges Portfolio (1.6%), which is
secured by an 89,713 sf two-building office portfolio located in
Milpitas and Stockton, CA. Portfolio occupancy has declined to 62%
(compared to 100% at issuance) after the tenant occupying the
Stockton property filed for bankruptcy and vacated in early 2017.
The master servicer is in the process of springing cash management
and the borrower is cooperating. The Abby (1%), which is secured by
a 48,888 square foot retail center in Austin, TX, was also flagged
as a FLOC for occupancy decline and upcoming rollover risk.

Amortization: The majority of the pool (41 loans; 94.5% of current
pool) is currently amortizing. One loan, Westgate Shopping Center
(5.5%), is full-term, interest-only. As of the January 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has paid
down by 21.8% to $729.4 million from $932.8 million at issuance.
Three loans (6.7% of pool) have been defeased.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks reflect the stable performance of the
majority of the underlying pool and expected continued paydown and
increasing credit enhancement from amortization. Rating upgrades,
although unlikely due to pool concentrations, may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance.
Rating downgrades may be possible should overall pool performance
decline significantly.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $387.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.6 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.2 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class H or interest only class X-B certificates.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. K Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-C2
(GMAC 1998-C2).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Defeasance and High Credit Enhancement: The affirmations of the
senior classes reflect the significant defeasance (32.3% of the
pool) and substantial credit enhancement to the classes. Class H is
completely covered by defeased collateral.

Highly Concentrated Pool: Only 26 of the original 405 loans remain.
Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a
sensitivity analysis, which grouped the remaining loans based on
loan structural features, collateral quality and performance and
ranked them by their perceived likelihood of repayment.

As of the January 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.3% to $43.2 million from
$2.53 billion at issuance, and an additional $9.2 million or 0.4%
since the last rating action. Interest shortfalls are currently
impacting classes L and below.

Maturity Concentration: The current pool's loan maturity schedule
is: 47.5% (2018), 3.3% (2021) and 49.2% (2023).

Largest Loan in the Pool: The largest loan in the pool, the D'Amato
Portfolio (33.7%), is collateralized by a portfolio of 37
unanchored retail and industrial properties totalling 716,298 SF
and located in Connecticut (90% NRA) and Rhode Island (10% NRA).
The servicer reported NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
1.46x as of June 2017. As of September 2017, the portfolio was
89.6% occupied. However, lease maturity information was not
provided by the servicer. The loan was previously in special
servicing in 2014 due to imminent default as a result of cash flow
issues. The loan was modified in December 2014, whereby loan
payments were temporarily converted to interest-only, which expired
in October 2016. The loan is scheduled to mature in July 2023.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Seven loans (24.9% of the pool) are
currently designated as Fitch Loans of Concern due to poor
performance and/or significant imminent lease rollover. Two loans
(12.5% of the pool) are currently in special servicing, including
the Georgetown Plaza Shopping Center loan (12.0%), which is secured
by an 111,600 SF unanchored retail center located in Indianapolis,
IN. The loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2017 due
to a borrower bankruptcy and ongoing environmental remediation. As
of December 2017, occupancy had declined to 58.8% from 76.0% at YE
2016. The loan was previously modified in March 2015, whereby,
among other conditions, the loan was bifurcated into a hope note
structure, the term was extended, and payments were temporarily
converted to interest-only (which expired in July 2017). The
special servicer reported that the environmental remediation is now
complete, and they are awaiting a no-further-action letter from the
lender's environmental counsel before they can market the property
for sale.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks assigned to the senior classes reflect the
significant defeasance and substantial credit enhancement of the
classes. An upgrade to class J could occur should significant
additional paydown occur or if positive performance information is
received on the D'Amato Portfolio. Class K remains at 'Dsf' as it
previously incurred a loss; although the class subsequently fully
recovered its principal, it relies on recoveries from specially
serviced assets for full payoff.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $2.0 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.0 million class J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 100%;
-- $3.3 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0.0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, and G certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class N certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. Series 2004-C2
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C2:

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Downgraded to
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the four P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 90.9% of the
current balance, compared to 99.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 14.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 99% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced [and troubled loans] to the most junior
classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 10, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94.3% to $52.9
million from $933.7 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans. There are no loans in the
pool that are defeased.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one, the same as at Moody's last review.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $85.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 54.6%). One loan, constituting 99% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Military Circle Mall Loan ($52.3 million -- 98.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a regional mall located in Norfolk, Virginia.
The mall was formerly anchored by Macy's (dark), JC Penney's
(dark/not part of the collateral) and Sears (dark). The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2013 due to imminent
default and became REO in September 2015. On average, incoming
tenants have signed one year lease terms. Due to the March 2016
departure of Macy's, co-tenancy clauses were triggered and there
are currently nine tenants (20,993 SF) in violation of their
co-tenancy clauses. Moody's estimates a significant loss on this
loan.

As of the January 10, 2018 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $7.7 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

The only conduit loan in the pool represents 1% of the pool
balance. The loan is the Cove Terrace Shopping Center Loan
($665,142-- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 160,377 SF
retail shopping center located in Copperas Cove, Texas. As per the
September 2017 rent roll the property was 76% leased, compared to
84% leased in September 2016. The loan is fully amortizing with a
loan maturity in June 2019. This loan has paid down 85% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 10% and >4X,
respectively, compared to 15% and 5.99X at the last review.



GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust
2013-GC10 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The DBRS analysis is based on the November 2017
remittance. DBRS notes that as of the December 2017 remittance,
Class A-2 has been fully repaid and will be subsequently
discontinued.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited by the transaction since issuance. As of the November
2017 remittance, 59 of the original 61 loans remained in the pool
with an aggregate principal balance of $771.2 million, representing
a collateral reduction of 10.1% since issuance as the result of
scheduled loan amortization and two loans repaying from the trust.

The pool benefits from defeasance collateral, as five loans,
representing 6.2% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased.
Of the remaining 54 loans, 51 are reporting YE2016 financials, and
based on these figures, the pool reported a YE2016 weighted-average
(WA) DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and DBRS Debt
Yield of 1.70 times (x) and 10.9%, respectively. Comparatively, the
YE2015 WA DSCR and debt yield were 1.73x and 10.9%, respectively.

As of the November 2017 remittance, there was one loan in special
servicing, representing 0.5% of the current pool balance. However,
the loan is performing and reported a YE2016 DSCR of 1.80x and is
expected to be transferred back to the master servicer.
Additionally, there are 11 loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 15.9% of the current pool balance. Based on the most
recent year-end financials, the loans on the watchlist reported a
WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.68x and 10.3%, respectively.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
ratings mirror the lowest-rated reference tranche and may be
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

All ratings will be subject to ongoing surveillance, which could
result in ratings being upgraded, downgraded, placed under review,
confirmed or discontinued by DBRS.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE 2005-1: Moody's Hikes 2-A1A Debt Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one bond,
withdrawn the ratings of three underlying components, and
re-assigned the rating on one bond from HarborView Mortgage Loan
Trust 2005-1. The action resolves the review of Class X - IO, an
interest-only (IO) bond that was among those placed on review
August 29, 2017 in connection with a reassessment of Moody's
internal linkage of certain IO bonds to their reference bond(s) or
pool(s).

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-PO-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-PO-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X - IO, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. X, Assigned Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The rating
upgrade is a result of the improving performance of the related
pools and an increase in credit enhancement available to the bond.

The rating actions on Class X, Class X-IO, Class X-PO-1, and Class
X-PO-2 are driven by the correction of an error. At closing Moody's
assigned ratings on the following certificates issued by HarborView
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Class 1-A, Class 2-A1A, Class 2-A1B, Class 2-A2, Class X, Class
A-R, Class B-1, Class B-2, and Class B-3

Class X is an IO PO bond, which has both an IO component and two
principal-only (PO) components. After the assignment of the initial
ratings to this certificate , Moody's erroneously stopped
publishing the rating on Class X and instead began publishing
ratings only on the underlying IO and PO payment components that
generate the cashflow supporting Class X.

Moody's has now corrected this error and has re-assigned a rating
to Class X, the certificate originally rated by Moody's and issued
by HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1. Moody's has also
withdrawn the ratings on the underlying components. The rating
history of the underlying payment components will remain on
moodys.com. Hereafter, Moody's will only publish the rating at the
certificate level and will not publish ratings for the related
underlying payment components.

The action resolves the review of Class X-IO which was among those
placed on review for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages
captured in Moody's internal database, prompted by the
identification of errors in that database. The factors that Moody's
considers in rating an IO bond depend on the type of referenced
securities or assets to which the IO bond is linked. For IO PO
bonds, which have both an IO component and a PO component, Moody's
determines the rating using a weighted average of the ratings of
the two different types of components.

Moody's has reassessed the linkage for Class X-IO, and determined
that it was linked to the appropriate pools. However, prior
analysis incorrectly omitted the rating of the PO components and
treated them as separate bonds. The rating action on Class X
reflects the updated bond composition, the linkage reassessment,
and updated performance of the underlying pools and bonds.

The principal methodology used in rating Class 2-A1A was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. The
methodologies used in rating Class X were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


HELLER FINANCIAL 2000-PH1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
of Heller Financial Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp. Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-PH-1:

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 10, 2017 Affirmed
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 9, 2017 Downgraded to
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class H was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected plus realized loss. Class H has already
experienced a 66% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced class.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.1%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased to $388,534 from $957
million at securitization. The certificates are collateralized by
two mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 39% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one, compared to two at Moody's last review.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $67.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 48.3%).

The remaining non-defeased loan is the Walgreens-Vegas Loan
($236,104 -- 61% of the pool), which is secured by a 13,905 square
foot (SF) single tenant retail building located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The Walgreens lease expiration is in 2048; however, the
tenant has termination options every five years starting in 2018.
The loan has amortized approximately 94% since securitization and
matures in August 2018. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's
value incorporated a lit / dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 7% and greater than 4.00X, respectively, compared to 13%
and greater than 4.00X at the last review.


ICG US 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by ICG US CLO 2018-1, Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "ICG US 2018-1").

Moody's rating action is:

US$256,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

ICG US 2018-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90 % of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expect the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

ICG Debt Advisors LLC -- Manager Series (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2956

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2956 to 3399)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2956 to 3843)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


IOWA TOBACCO: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two 2005 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Tobacco Settlement Authority's series 2005 is backed by tobacco
settlement revenues due to Iowa as part of a master settlement
agreement between participating tobacco companies and the settling
states.  Tobacco settlement bonds are supported only by the pledged
payments from the master settlement agreements and are not linked
to the rating on the municipal.

S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class 2005A and class
2005B bonds, lowered its ratings on the most subordinate tranche of
the 2005C bonds and the 2005D bonds, and affirmed its ratings on
the two remaining class 2005C bonds from Tobacco Settlement
Authority's series 2005. The bonds were originally issued in 2005.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of the transaction's
performance under a series of stressed cash flow scenarios,
including:

- A cigarette volume decline test that assesses if the transaction
can withstand annual declines in cigarette shipments;

- Payment disruptions by the largest of the participating
manufacturers, by market share, at various points over the
transaction's term to reflect a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing; and

- A liquidity stress test to account for settlement amount
disputes by participating manufacturers, as a result of changes to
their market share, which has generally shifted to nonparticipating
manufacturers.

S&P raised its ratings on the class 2005A and 2005B bonds because
they are able to make timely interest and principal payments at the
higher rating levels. The affirmations and downgrades reflect S&P's
view of the bonds' ability to pay timely interest and principal
payments under various stress scenarios.

The rated portion of Tobacco Settlement Authority's series 2005
consists of four turbo term bonds, one convertible capital
appreciation bond (converted to turbo in 2008), and one
subordinated capital appreciation bond maturing between 2023 and
2046. Capital appreciation bonds generally capitalize interest
until all senior notes have been paid in full and therefore tend to
have the most risk. The senior notes also benefit from a fully
funded debt service reserve account, which is invested under a
collateralized investment contract.

S&P said, "Our analysis also reflects developments within the
tobacco industry. We view the U.S. tobacco industry as having a
stable ratings outlook based on the high brand equity and pricing
power of the top three manufacturers' conventional cigarette
brands. In our view, this should help offset ongoing cigarette
volume declines and allow for sustained cash flows. However,
changing regulations and ongoing litigation risk are constraining
factors the industry faces."

RATINGS RAISED

Tobacco Settlement Authority (Iowa)
$838.962 million tobacco settlement authority (Iowa)
series 2005 A B C D       
                      
                                        Rating
Class   CUSIP       Maturity         To           From
2005A   888805AP3   June 1, 2023     BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)
2005B   888805AH1   June 1, 2034     BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)

RATINGS LOWERED

Tobacco Settlement Authority (Iowa)
$838.962 million tobacco settlement authority
series 2005 A B C D

                                        Rating
Class     CUISP       Maturity     To           From
2005C     888805AL2   6/1/2046     B (sf)       B+ (sf)
2005D     888805AM0   6/1/2046     CCC (sf)     CCC+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Tobacco Settlement Authority (Iowa)
$838.962 million tobacco settlement authority (Iowa)
series 2005 A B C D

Class     CUSIP       Maturity         Rating
2005C     888805AJ7   6/1/2038         B+ (sf)
2005C     888805AK4   6/1/2042         B+ (sf)


JFIN CLO 2013: S&P Affirms BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, and C
notes from JFIN CLO 2013 Ltd. S&P said, "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class A-1 and D notes from the same
transaction. We also removed the ratings on classes A-2, B, C, and
D from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications
on Nov. 15, 2017."

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 9, 2018, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's roughly $141.51 million in
collective paydowns to the class A-1 notes since S&P's July 19,
2016, rating actions. These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for classes A-2, B, and C since
the June 8, 2016, trustee report, which S&P used for its previous
rating actions:

-- The class A-2 O/C ratio improved to 146.59% from 139.04%.
-- The class B O/C ratio improved to 127.40% from 124.86%.
-- The class C O/C ratio improved to 116.20% from 116.14%.
-- However, the class D O/C ratio deteriorated to 107.31% from
108.96%.

S&P said, "The collateral portfolio's credit quality has slightly
deteriorated since our last rating actions. Collateral obligations
with ratings in the 'CCC' category have increased, with about
$37.28 million reported as of the Jan. 9, 2018, trustee report,
compared with about $34.27 million reported as of the June 2016
trustee report, representing an increase of 4.66 percentage points
to 12.47% of the aggregate principal balance of the collateral debt
securities. However, despite the larger concentration in the 'CCC'
category, the transaction has benefited from a drop in weighted
average life due to the underlying collateral's seasoning, with
3.78 years reported as of the January 2018 trustee report, compared
with 4.29 years reported at the time of our previous rating
actions.

"The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmations reflect our view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels."

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated higher ratings on the class C and D notes. However,
because the transaction currently has significant exposure to 'CCC'
rated collateral obligations, S&P's rating actions considered
additional sensitivity runs and S&P limited the upgrade on the
class C notes and affirmed the rating on the class D notes to
offset future potential credit migration in the underlying
collateral.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.
In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

  JFIN CLO 2013 Ltd.

                       Rating
  Class         To             From
  A-2           AAA (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Pos
  B             AA+ (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Pos
  C             A- (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

  RATING AFFIRMED
  JFIN CLO 2013 Ltd.             
  
  Class         Rating
  A-1           AAA (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

  JFIN CLO 2013 Ltd.
                      Rating            
  Class         To             From
  D             BB (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Pos


JP MORGAN 2003-ML1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class L Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classs,
upgraded the rating on one class and downgraded the rating on one
class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-ML1:

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class, Class K, was upgraded based primarily
on an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 45.3% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the P&I class, Class L, was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the P&I class, Class M, was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the P&I class, Class N, was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized
losses. Class N has already experienced a 20% realized loss as
result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 46.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 26.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 57.8% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior classes and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98.2% to $16.6
million from $929.8 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 8 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 57.8% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 13.1% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 3 at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 12.5% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $16 million (for an average loss
severity of 26%). One loan, constituting 57.8% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
High Ridge Center ($9.6 million -- 57.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 261,000 square foot (SF) community shopping center
located behind the Regency Mall located in Racine, Wisconsin. The
loan transferred to special servicing in December 2012 and the
trust took title in February 2015. Kmart (35% of NRA; lease
expiration January 2018) vacated it's space upon lease expiration.

As of the January 12, 2018 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $1.4 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 75% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 40.1%, compared to 50.1% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.4% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.24%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.95X and 2.65X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 2.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Eastgate Village Apartments Loan ($2
million -- 12.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 182-unit
multifamily property located in Greenville, North Carolina, less
than 2.5 miles from East Carolina University. The property serves
students and its occupancy can fluctuate throughout the year. As
per the September 2017 rent roll, the property was 99% leased,
compared to, 97% leased as of September 2016 and 75% in December
2015. The loan is on the watchlist due to being affected by a major
casualty, the property sustained a loss from Hurricane Matthew in
October 2016. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 62%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36.7% and
2.65X, respectively, compared to 40% and 2.4X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens -- Hike Point Loan ($1.6
million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is secured by a single-tenant
retail property located in Louisville, Kentucky. Walgreen's lease
expires in 2060; however, the tenant has a termination option every
five years starting in 2020. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 61.5% since securitization. Due to the single-tenant
exposure, Moody's value incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 51.2% and 2.01X, respectively, compared
to 52.6% and 1.93X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Brendan Court Loan ($0.7 million --
4.2% of the pool), which is secured by an eleven building, two
story apartment complex totaling 83 units located in North
Olmstead, Ohio. The property is located approximately 12.2 miles
from downtown Cleveland. As per the November 2017 rent roll, the
property was 96% leased, compared to 89% as of year-end 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 32.2% and 3.02X, respectively,
compared to 37.4% and 2.57X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC4: S&P Hikes Rating on Class A-J Certs From B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class A-J commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates fromJPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

For the upgrade, credit enhancement expectation was generally in
line with theraised rating level. The upgrade also reflects the
significant reduction in trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on the class A-J certificates, S&P's analysis also
considered the susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
two specially serviced assets ($11.9 million, 40.9%), including the
significant servicing advances outstanding (approximately $2.2
million) on the Wyckford Commons Apartments
real estate owned (REO) asset, which the master servicer has deemed
non-recoverable.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $29.1 million, which is 1.1% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes four loans and one REO
asset, down from 198 loans at issuance. Two of these assets are
with the special servicer, one loan ($4.1 million, 14.1%) is
defeased, and none are on the master servicer's watchlist.

S&P said, "We calculated a 1.41x S&P Global Ratings weighted
average debt service coverage (DSC) and a 31.1% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using an 8.05% S&P
Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate. The DSC, LTV,
and capitalization rate calculations exclude the two specially
serviced assets and the defeased loan.

"To date, the transaction has experienced $317.4 million in
principal losses, or 11.6% of the original pool trust balance. We
expect losses to reach approximately 11.7% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, basedon losses incurred to date and
additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the two
specially serviced assets."

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Jan. 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, two assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III). Details ofthe specially serviced assets are as follows:

The Wyckford Commons Apartments REO asset ($7.0 million, 24.2%) is
the second-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and has a total
reported exposure of $9.5 million. The asset is a multifamily
property consisting of 248 units in Indianapolis, Ind. The loan was
transferred to the specialservicer on Dec. 5, 2013, because of
payment default and the property became REO on July 20, 2016 (title
transferred effective Aug. 2, 2016). C-III anticipates that the
property will be marketed for sale in early 2018. The reported DSC
and occupancy for the six months ended June 30, 2017, were 0.62x
and 84.7%, respectively. This asset has been deemed
non-recoverable and has approximately $2.2 million of outstanding
serviceradvancing. S&P expects moderate loss upon this asset's
eventual resolution.

The 101-01 Foster Avenue loan ($4.9 million, 16.8%) has a total
reported exposure of $5.2 million. The loan is secured by the
borrower's leasehold interests in a 314,375-sq.-ft. industrial
building in Brooklyn, N.Y. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Jan. 15, 2016, because of maturity default. The loan,
which has a reported nonperforming matured balloon payment status,
matured on Jan. 1, 2016. C-III indicated that the borrower is still
engaged in ground lease negotiations with the fee owner.
The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2016 were 1.26x and
97.1%, respectively. An appraisal reduction amount of $1.3 million
is in effect against this loan. S&P expects a minimal loss upon
this loan's eventual resolution.

S&P estimated losses for the two specially serviced assets,
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 25.3%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25% and a moderate loss is 26%-59%.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC14

                                   Rating
Class             Identifier       To         From   
A-J               46625YA37        A+ (sf)    B+ (sf)


KILIMANJARO RE: S&P Hikes Series 2014-B Notes Rating to 'BB-(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it raised its rating on Kilimanjaro Re
Ltd.'s Series 2014-1 Class B Notes to 'BB-(sf)' from 'B-(sf)' and
removed the rating from CreditWatch Developing, where it was
initially placed Sept. 29, 2017. The two primary drivers for this
rating action are lower Property Claims Services (PCS) loss
estimates than initially expected for hurricanes Harvey, Irma and
Maria and the conclusion of the hurricane season, both of which
significantly reduce the likelihood of the bond triggering between
now and its maturity in April 2018.

The rating is based on the lowest of the natural-catastrophe risk
factor ('bb-') for the notes, the rating on the assets in the
reinsurance account ('AAAm'), and the rating on the ceding insurer
('A+').

RATINGS LIST

  Upgraded; CreditWatch Action                            
                           To            From
  Kilimanjaro Re Ltd.
   Series 2014-B notes     BB-(sf)       B-(sf)/Watch Dev


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Cuts Class X Certs Rating to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes and downgraded the rating on one class in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C6:

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on ten P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with expected recovery of principal and interest
from specially and troubled loans as well as losses from previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 46.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 17.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 80% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 18, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 83% to $514.3
million from $2.98 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 48% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 90% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to eleven at Moody's last
review.

Fiour loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $158.7 million (for an average
loss severity of 44%). Fifty-three loans, constituting 80% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan or portfolio is the PECO Portfolio Loans ($244.7
million -- 47.6% of the pool), which is secured by 39
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans. The loans are
secured by 39 retail properties totaling 4.3 million square feet
(SF) and located across 13 states. The average property size is
109,000 SF with no individual asset representing more than 6% of
the total SF or 7% of the total portfolio balance. The loans
transferred to special servicing in August 2012 due to imminent
default. All 39 PECO loans have become became real-estate owned
(REO) with thirteen properties having already been sold.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 707 Broad Street
Loan ($40.1 million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
544,000 SF office building located in the Central Business District
(CBD) of Newark, New Jersey. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2017 for imminent default. The occupancy dropped
to 62% in November 2017 after a major tenant vacated the property.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Lakeland Town
Center Loan ($25.1 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 304,000 SF grocery-anchored retail center in Lakeland,
Florida. The loan transferred to special servicing in October 2016
for imminent default. As of March 2017, the property was 58%
leased, down from 76% at year-end 2015.

The remaining 12 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's has also assumed a high default probability
for one poorly performing loan, constituting 2% of the pool, and
has estimated an aggregate loss of $237.4 million (a 57% expected
loss based on a 99% probability default) from these specially
serviced and troubled loans.

As of the January 18, 2018 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $31.9 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 115%, compared to 104% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6.0% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.96X and 0.79X,
respectively, compared to 1.21X and 0.95X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 18.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Islandia Shopping Center -- A Note Loan
($60.8 million -- 11.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 377,000
SF anchored retail center located in Islandia, New York. The
property is anchored by a Wal-Mart and a Stop & Shop. The property
was 95% leased as of September 2017. In 2014 the loan was modified
as an A/B note split. The B note is $10.1 million and is also held
within the pool. Moody's A Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and
0.78X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.77X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Portsmouth Station Shopping Center
Loan ($19.6 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
147,000 SF anchored retail shopping center in Manassas, Virginia.
As of September 2017 rent roll, the property was 96% leased.
Approximately 38% of the leases are scheduled to roll within the
next three years. This loan has amortized 6% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 112% and 0.82X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Tower Square Retail Loan ($14.0
million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 71,000 SF
shadow-anchored retail center in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. The
property is located across the street from a Wal-Mart Supercenter
and is shadow-anchored by a Target. As of June 2017, the property
was 82% leased, down from 90% at year-end 2016. Approximately 37%
of the leases are scheduled to roll within the next year. This loan
has amortized 6% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 138% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.90X
at the last review.


MAGNETITE LTD VII: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the replacement class
A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, and D-R2 notes and the new class E-R2
notes from Magnetite VII Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) that is managed by BlackRock Financial Management Inc. The
transaction was originally issued in December 2012 and subsequently
refinanced in October 2016. S&P withdrew its ratings on the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes following payment in full on
the Feb. 13, 2018, refinancing date.

On the Feb. 13, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the class A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, D-R2, and E-R2
notes were used to redeem the class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R
notes as outlined in the transaction document provisions.
Therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on these notes in line with
their full redemption, and S&P assigned ratings to the replacement
notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture. Based on the provisions in the amended and restated
indenture, the following changes will be made, among others:

-- The replacement class A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, D-R2 notes
are expected to be issued at a lower spread than the original
notes.

-- New class E-R2 notes are being added.

-- The replacement class A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, D-R2, and
E-R2 notes are expected to be issued at a floating spread,
replacing the current floating spread.

-- The stated maturity, reinvestment period, non-call period, and
weighted average life test date will all be extended.

-- The manager has an option to use the formula-based Standard &
Poor's CDO Monitor.

-- 91.49% of the identified underlying collateral obligations have
credit ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- 95.63% of the identified underlying collateral obligations have
recovery ratings issued by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Magnetite VII Ltd./Magnetite VII Corp.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R2                    AAA (sf)             420.00
  A-2-R2                    AA+ (sf)              64.20
  B-R2 (deferrable)         A+ (sf)               36.00
  C-R2 (deferrable)         BBB (sf)              33.00
  D-R2 (deferrable)         BB (sf)               25.00
  E-R2 (deferrable)         B (sf)                 9.80

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  Magnetite VII Ltd./Magnetite VII Corp.
                           Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-1-R                NR              AAA (sf)
  A-2-R                NR              AA+ (sf)
  B-R                  NR              A+ (sf)
  C-R                  NR              BBB (sf)
  D-R                  NR              BB (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


MAGNETITE LTD VII: S&P Assigns Prelim B Rating on Class E-R2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the
replacement class A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, and D-R2 notes and
the new class E-R2 notes from Magnetite VII Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in December 2012 that is
managed by BlackRock Financial Management Inc. This is a proposed
refinancing of the original December 2012 transaction, which had
subsequently refinanced in October 2016. The replacement notes will
be issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 9,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Feb. 13, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the previously
refinanced and original notes. At that time, we anticipate
withdrawing the ratings on the A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R
notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes. However, if
the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the ratings on those
notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings on the replacement
notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture. Based on the provisions in the amended and restated
indenture, the following changes will be made, among others:

-- The replacement class A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, D-R2 notes
are expected to be issued at a lower spread than the original
notes.

-- New class E-R2 notes are being added.

-- The replacement class A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, D-R2, and
E-R2 notes are expected to be issued at a floating spread,
replacing the current floating spread.

-- The stated maturity, reinvestment period, non-call period, and
weighted average life test date will all be extended.

-- The manager has an option to use the formula-based Standard &
Poor's CDO Monitor.

-- 91.49% of the identified underlying collateral obligations have
credit ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.

-- 95.63% of the identified underlying collateral obligations have
recovery ratings issued by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Magnetite VII Ltd./Magnetite VII Corp.

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R2                    AAA (sf)             420.00
  A-2-R2                    AA+ (sf)              64.20
  B-R2 (deferrable)         A+ (sf)               36.00
  C-R2 (deferrable)         BBB (sf)              33.00
  D-R2 (deferrable)         BB (sf)               25.00
  E-R2 (deferrable)         B (sf)                 9.80

  NR--Not rated.


MAGNETITE LTD VIII: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Magnetite VIII, Limited:

US$76,500,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
November 10, 2016 Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
on November 10, 2016 Assigned A2 (sf)

US$34,890,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
May 15, 2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$367,500,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
November 10, 2016 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$36,750,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May
15, 2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$5,580,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 15,
2014 Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Magnetite VIII, Limited, issued in May 2014, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
April 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
April 2018. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's
assumed that the deal will benefit from lower WARF compared to the
covenant level. Furthermore, the transaction's reported collateral
quality and OC ratio have been stable.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2092)

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: 0

Class C-R Notes: +2

Class D Notes: +2

Class E Notes: +1

Class F Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3138)

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $590.9 million, defaulted par of $1.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.37% (implying
a WARF of 2615), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.11%, a diversity score of 66 and a weighted average spread of
3.07%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CKI1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1:

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2017 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 50.5% of the
current balance, compared to 46.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.7% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 62% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified an additional troubled
loan representing 14% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced and troubled loans to the most junior classes and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $90.1 million
from $3.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 4% to 43% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Thirty loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $162.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 34%). Three loans, constituting 61.7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the EDS Portfolio Loan ($39.1 million -- 43.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of three office properties totaling
388,000 square feet (SF) across three states. The properties are
located in East Pennsboro, Pennsylvania; Auburn Hills, Michigan;
and Rancho Cordova, California. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2015 for imminent maturity default due to
upcoming lease expiration dates. The properties were occupied by a
single tenant that vacated upon lease expiration in September 2015.
The property in Auburn Hills, Michigan sold from the trust in May
2017. The Camp Hill property in East Pennsboro, Pennsylvania was
100% vacant as of December 2017. The Rancho Cordova Property was
63% occupied as of December 2017. CBRE is currently managing and
leasing the properties.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Orchard Hardware
Plaza Loan ($13.3 million -- 14.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 146,000 SF retail center in Rancho Cucamonga, California. The
loan transferred to special servicing in September 2012, following
a drop in occupancy from 93% to 57% in 2011. As of November 2017,
the property was 94% leased compared to 92% in December 2016.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Waterfall Plaza
Loan ($3.6 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
43,000 SF unanchored retail property in Waterford, Michigan. The
loan transferred to special servicing in August 2015 due to
maturity default. As of January 2017 the property was 69% leased
compared to 67% in 2016. The Special Servicer is proceeding towards
foreclosure. At this time the expected foreclosure date is in April
2018.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $43.0 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (77% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 14% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $2.5 million (a 20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

The largest conduit loan is the 901 South Central Expressway Loan
($21.7 million -- 24.1% of the pool), which is secured by two
adjacent office properties totaling 517,000 SF, located in
Richardson, Texas. The buildings are 100% leased to Blue Cross Blue
Shield through December 31, 2020 and subleased to Fossil. Moody's
used a "lit/dark" approach to account for the single-tenant risk of
the property. There is uncertainty surrounding the lease expiration
and subsequent loan maturity in January 2021. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 79% and
1.27X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Green Valley Technical Plaza
33 Loan ($12.6 million -- 14.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
108,000 SF suburban office property in Fairfield, California. As of
September 2017, the property was 48% leased to two tenants,
compared to 46% at year-end 2016. The loan had an anticipated
repayment date (ARD) in October 2015 and has a final maturity in
October 2035. Moody's considers this a troubled loan.


MICHIGAN TOBACCO: S&P Affirms 7 Ratings on 2006/2007 Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Michigan Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority's asset-backed bonds
series 2006 and 2007 are backed by tobacco settlement revenues due
to Michigan as part of a master settlement agreement between
participating tobacco companies and the settling states. Tobacco
settlement bonds are supported only by the pledged payments from
the master settlement agreements and are not linked to the rating
on the municipal.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on one tranche from
Michigan Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority's series 2006 A and
six tranches from series 2007.

Class 2006 A from series 2006 was originally issued and rated in
2006 and is a current interest turbo term bond maturing in June
2034. The six outstanding classes from series 2007 were originally
issued and rated in 2007 and consist of four current interest turbo
term bonds and two capital appreciation turbo term bonds maturing
between 2022 and 2052. Capital appreciation bonds
generally capitalize interest until all senior notes have been paid
in full, so they tend to have the most risk.

The rating actions reflect S&P'S view of the transactions'
performance under a series of stressed cash flow scenarios,
including:

-- A cigarette volume decline test that assesses if the
    transaction can withstand annual declines in cigarette
    shipments;

-- Payment disruptions by the largest of the participating
    manufacturers, by market share, at various points over the
    transaction's term to reflect a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing;
    and

-- A liquidity stress test to account for settlement amount
    disputes by participating manufacturers, as a result of
    changes to their market share, which continues to shift to
     nonparticipating manufacturers.

The affirmations reflect S&P'S view of the likelihood of making
timely interest and principal payments under stress scenarios
commensurate with the current ratings.

S&P'S analysis also reflects developments within the tobacco
industry. S&P views the U.S. tobacco industry as having a stable
rating outlook based on the high brand equity and pricing power of
the top three manufacturers' conventional cigarette brands. In
S&P's view, this should help offset ongoing cigarette volume
declines and allow for sustained cash flows. However, changing
regulations and ongoing litigation risk are constraining factors
the industry faces.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Michigan Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority

$490.501 million taxable tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
series 2006 A

Class     CUSIP         Maturity     Rating
2006 A    594751AB5     6/1/2034     B- (sf)

Michigan Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority

$522.99 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2007

Class     CUSIP         Maturity     Rating
2007-A    594751AE9     6/1/2022     B- (sf)
2007-A    594751AD1     6/1/2022     B- (sf)
2007-A    594751AF6     6/1/2034     B- (sf)
2007-A    594751AG4     6/1/2048     B- (sf)
2007-B    594751AH2     6/1/2052     CCC+ (sf)
2007-C    594751AJ8     6/1/2052     CCC (sf)


MIDOCEAN CREDIT CLO I: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Cl. D-RR Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-RR,
A-2-RR, B-RR, C-RR, and D-RR replacement notes from MidOcean Credit
CLO I, a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by MidOcean Credit Fund Management L.P. S&P withdrew its
ratings on the refinanced class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R
notes from this transaction following payment in full on the Feb.
13, 2018, refinancing date.

On the Feb. 13, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-RR, A-2-RR, B-RR, C-RR, and D-RR replacement note issuances
were used to redeem the class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes
as outlined in the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the refinanced notes in line with their
full redemption, and it is assigning final ratings to the new
notes.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"The assigned ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  MidOcean Credit CLO I

  Replacement class    Rating          Amount (mil $)
  A-1-RR               AAA (sf)                210.50
  A-2-RR               AA (sf)                  39.00
  B-RR                 A (sf)                   22.00
  C-RR                 BBB (sf)                 13.50
  D-RR                 BB (sf)                  11.40

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN
  MidOcean Credit CLO I
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-1-R                NR              AAA (sf)
  A-2-R                NR              AA (sf)
  B-R                  NR              A (sf)
  C-R                  NR              BBB (sf)
  D-R                  NR              BB (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C32: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C32
issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2016-C32:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained generally in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The collateral consists of 56
fixed-rate loans secured by 76 commercial and multifamily
properties. The original trust balance was approximately $907.0
million, and as at the November 2017 remittance, all loans remain
in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of $902.6 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 0.5% since issuance. The
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR)
and WA DBRS Debt Yield for the pool at issuance were 1.93 times (x)
and 9.7%, respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool
collectively represent 64.0% of the transaction balance. Based on
the most recent financial reporting provided, 12 loans in the top
15, representing 49.0% of the pool balance, have exhibited WA net
cash flow growth of 4.9% over the DBRS issuance WA DSCR of 1.92x.

Three loans, representing 2.7% of the pool balance, are on the
servicer's watchlist. One loan is flagged for an outstanding
deferred maintenance item, one is flagged for damages caused by
Hurricane Irma and the remaining loan was added to the watchlist
because of a decline in cash flow driven by a rent abatement
provided in early 2017.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche and may be
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MORGAN STANLEY I 2007-TOP17: DBRS Cuts Class D Debt Rating to Csf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the rating on the following class of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP27
issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Series 2007-TOP27 as
follows:

-- Class A-J to A (low) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)

DBRS also downgraded the rating on the following class:

-- Class D to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

In addition, DBRS confirmed the ratings on the following classes:

-- Class B at BB (sf)
-- Class C at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class D, which is
assigned a rating category that does not carry a trend.

The rating upgrade for Class A-J reflects the increased credit
support to the bond as a result of the successful repayment of
Classes A-4, A-1A, A-M and A-MFL. With those repayments, the Class
A-J certificate is now the most senior class outstanding. Over the
past year, 145 loans have been repaid, representing a principal
paydown of approximately $1.4 billion. As of the November 2017
remittance, only seven loans remain in the trust, with an
outstanding balance of $289.4 million. This represents a collateral
reduction of 89.4% since issuance as a result of successful loan
repayments, scheduled amortization and realized losses and
recovered proceeds from loans liquidated from the pool.

As of the November 2017 remittance, all loans are reporting YE2016
financials and, based on those figures, the weighted-average (WA)
debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield were 1.41
times (x) and 10.8%, respectively. The pool is concentrated as the
largest loan, Prospectus ID#1 – 360 Park Avenue South, represents
75.2% of the current pool balance. The loan is scheduled to mature
in June 2022 and reported a stable YE2016 DSCR and debt yield of
1.50x and 11.7%, respectively. The loan is secured by a 451,800 sf
Class B office property located in the Kips Bay area of Manhattan,
New York. The collateral is fully leased to investment-grade tenant
and lease guarantor, RELX Group (formerly known as Reed Elsavier
Inc.). The property is currently 100% subleased, which has been the
case for several years. Although the lease for RELX Group expires
within close proximity of the loan's maturity date, the stable
physical occupancy rate that has been historically maintained, as
well as the stability of the larger market, provide mitigants to
that heightened refinance risk.

There are currently four loans in special servicing, representing
20.9% of the current pool balance. Three of those loans were
recently transferred to the special servicer for maturity default.


OCP CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from OCP CLO
2014-5 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation originally issued in
2014 that is managed by Onex Credit Partners LLC. The replacement
notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 12,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Feb. 26, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes." The original
combination notes will no longer be outstanding as of the
refinancing date.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, provide that:

-- As of the refinancing date, the original combination notes
issued at closing will no longer be outstanding.

-- The replacement class A-2-R, B-R, and C-R notes are expected to
be issued at a lower spread than the original notes.

-- The replacement class A-1-R, D-R, and E-R notes are expected to
be issued at a higher spread than the original notes.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended
five years. The non-call period will be extended four years.

-- The transaction adds to ability to use the non-model version of
S&P Global Ratings' CDO Monitor as an alternative to the
model-based approach.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OCP CLO 2014-5 Ltd./OCP CLO 2014-5 Corp.

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R                     AAA (sf)            237.000
  A-2-R                     AA (sf)              60.000
  B-R                       A (sf)               26.000
  C-R                       BBB- (sf)            22.400
  D-R                       BB- (sf)             15.600
  E-R                       B- (sf)               7.500

  NR--Not rated.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to OneMain
Financial Issuance Trust 2018-1's $525.74 million personal consumer
loan-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by personal consumer loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 15,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 51.45%, 44.63%, 40.00%,
33.44%, and 26.87% credit support to the class A, B, C, D, and E
notes, respectively, in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread. These
credit support levels are sufficient to withstand stresses
commensurate with the preliminary ratings on the notes based on our
stressed cash flow scenarios.

-- S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, our 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)'
ratings on the class A and B notes will remain within one rating
category of the assigned preliminary ratings in the next 12 months,
and our 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings on the class C,
D, and E notes, respectively, will remain within two rating
categories of the assigned preliminary 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and
'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively, in the next 12 months, based on
our credit stability criteria."

-- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to be
made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
assigned preliminary ratings.

-- The characteristics of the pool being securitized and
receivables expected to be purchased during the revolving period.

-- The operational risks associated with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s
hybrid business model.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-1

  Class     Rating      Type            Interest        Amount
                                        rate          (mil. $)(i)
  A         AAA (sf)    Senior          Fixed          367.640
  B         AA (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           47.640
  C         A (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed           30.600
  D         BBB (sf)    Subordinate     Fixed           32.220
  E         BB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           47.640

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on 16 Classes From 4 Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on 16 classes and affirmed
its ratings on 21 classes from OneMain Financial Issuance Trust's
(OMFIT's) series 2015-3, 2016-1, 2016-2, 2016-3, and 2017-1, and
Springleaf Funding Trust (SLFT's) series 2015-A, 2015-B, 2016-A,
and 2017-A.

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect collateral performance to
date and our expectations regarding future collateral performance,
as well as each transaction's structure and credit enhancement. Our
analysis also incorporated secondary credit factors, including
credit stability, payment priorities under various scenarios, and
sector- and issuer-specific analyses. Considering all of these
factors, we believe the notes' creditworthiness is consistent with
the raised and affirmed rating levels.

"In addition, we recently reassessed the 'AA (sf)' maximum
potential rating that we had placed on OneMain Holdings Inc.'s
(OneMain's) transactions from its unsecured consumer loan platform.
After reviewing OneMain's operational history, we have determined
that we can now rate OMFIT and SLFT transactions as high as 'AAA
(sf)'." Prior limiting factors have been sufficiently mitigated,
including a successful integration of legacy Springleaf and OneMain
platforms, a centrally controlled credit scoring model and
underwriting information technology system, and fewer in-branch
collections for OneMain's personal loan payments, which are down to
approximately 15.4% as of third-quarter 2017.

All five OMFIT transactions are in their revolving periods and are
scheduled to enter amortization between 2018 and 2021: OMFIT 2015-3
on Aug. 31, 2020; OMFIT 2016-1 on Dec. 31, 2018; OMFIT 2016-2 on
Feb. 28, 2018; OMFIT 2016-3 on April 30, 2021; and OMFIT 2017-1 on
Sept. 30, 2019. Three of the four SLFT transactions are in their
revolving periods and are scheduled to enter amortization between
2018 and 2020: SLFT 2015-B on March 31, 2020; and SLFT 2016-A and
SLFT 2017-A on Nov. 30, 2018. SLFT 2015-A entered amortization on
Jan. 31, 2018 (legal maturity Nov. 15, 2024); performance data
related to this will be first reported on the February 2018
distribution date.

Although pool concentrations for 19 of the 21 transactions have
migrated toward the lower-performing risk levels since closing, all
are within the concentration limits dictated by the transactions'
structures. S&P said, "In addition, our original base-case modeling
assumed each pool would revolve to a worst-case composition.
However, the pool compositions are currently stronger than the
worst-case concentrations, as shown by each pool's loss
performance. As of the January 2018 distribution date, the
annualized three-month net loss percentages for OMFIT 2015-3,
2016-1, 2016-2, 2016-3, and 2017-1 were 7.82%, 8.65%, 8.93%, 8.59%,
and 0.51%, respectively, while the annualized three-month net loss
percentages for SLFT 2015-A, 2015-B, 2016-A, and 2017-A were 7.39%,
7.39%, 8.04%, and 3.05%, respectively. These are all well below the
reinvestment criteria event triggers of 17.00% for each
transaction. In our review, we considered the lower loss
performance relative to our original base-case modeling
assumptions."

Further, as of the January 2018 distribution date, the weighted
average coupons of the receivables pools for OMFIT 2015-3, 2016-1,
2016-2, 2016-3, and 2017-1 were 24.84%, 24.99%, 25.10%, 24.90%, and
25.76%, respectively--well above each trust's respective
reinvestment criteria event triggers of 23.0%, 22.0%, 22.0%, 22.0%,
and 22.5%. Similarly, the weighted average coupons of the
receivables pools for SLFT 2015-A, 2015-B, 2016-A, and 2017-A are
26.47%, 26.38%, 26.23%, and 26.50%, respectively--also well above
each trust's respective reinvestment criteria event trigger of
20.50%, 21.50%, 22.0%, and 22.0%.

Each OMFIT and SLFT transaction contains a sequential principal
payment structure in which the notes are paid principal by
seniority. The transactions also benefit from credit enhancement in
the form of a nonamortizing reserve account, overcollateralization,
subordination for the higher-rated tranches, and excess spread.
Each transaction's credit enhancement is at, or above, the
specified target or floor:

Hard Credit Support (%)
As of the January 2018 distribution date

  ONEMAIN FINANCIAL ISSUANCE TRUST

                         Total hard    Current total hard
                     credit support        credit support
  Series     Class   at issuance(i)     (% of current)(i)
  2015-3     A                37.28                36.41
  2015-3     B                29.20                 28.21
  2015-3     C                21.11                 20.02
  2015-3     D                12.04                 10.82

  2016-1     A                38.99                 37.46
  2016-1     B                28.31                 26.51
  2016-1     C                20.40                 18.41
  2016-1     D                13.19                 11.01

  2016-2     A                38.95                 38.50
  2016-2     B                28.18                 27.66
  2016-2     C                19.99                 19.40
  2016-2     D                12.64                 12.01

  2016-3     A                38.33                 37.41
  2016-3     B                28.58                 27.51
  2016-3     C                21.14                 19.96
  2016-3     D                12.81                 11.50

  2017-1     A-1              26.20                 26.20
  2017-1     A-2              26.20                 26.20
  2017-1     B                20.30                 20.31
  2017-1     C                13.85                 13.86
  2017-1     D                 4.60                  4.61

  SPRINGLEAF FUNDING TRUST

                         Total hard    Current total hard
                     credit support        credit support
  Series     Class   at issuance(i)     (% of current)(i)
  2015-A     A                26.50                 26.51
  2015-A     B                17.45                 17.46
  2015-A     C                13.25                 13.26
  2015-A     D                 8.00                  8.01

  2015-B     A                26.51                 26.52
  2015-B     B                17.11                 17.12
  2015-B     C                13.31                 13.32
  2015-B     D                 7.31                  7.32

  2016-A     A                25.40                 25.41
  2016-A     B                17.25                 17.26
  2016-A     C                11.60                 11.61
  2016-A     D                 5.80                  5.81

  2017-A     A                25.05                 25.06
  2017-A     B                19.80                 19.81
  2017-A     C                13.75                 13.76
  2017-A     D                 5.35                  5.36

(i)Calculated as a percentage of the total gross receivable pool
balance, consisting of a reserve account, overcollateralization,
and subordination.

S&P said, "The upgrades and affirmations reflect our view that the
total credit support as a percentage of the pool balances, compared
with our expected remaining losses, is commensurate with each
raised and affirmed rating. With the removal of our restriction on
the maximum potential rating, the observed stronger-than-expected
performance, and giving consideration to the remaining revolving
periods for each transaction, we raised our ratings on the class A,
B, C, and D notes from OMFIT's series 2015-3, 2016-1, 2016-2, and
2016-3.

"Taking into account the same factors, we affirmed our ratings on
the class A, B, C, and D notes from SLFT's series 2015-A, 2015-B,
2016-A, and 2017-A. We also affirmed our ratings on OMFIT 2017-1's
class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes based on the same considerations,
in addition to noting the limited performance data available for
the series, which closed on Sept. 6, 2017.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in our view, to cover our net loss expectations
under our stress scenarios for each of the rated classes."

  RATINGS RAISED

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-3
                      Rating
  Class          To            From
  A              AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
  B              A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
  C              BBB (sf)      BB (sf)
  D              BB+ (sf)      B (sf)
      
  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-1
                      Rating
  Class          To            From
  A              AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
  B              A (sf)        BBB (sf)
  C              BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)
  D              BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2
                      Rating
  Class          To            From
  A              AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
  B              A (sf)        BBB (sf)
  C              BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)
  D              BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-3
                      Rating
  Class          To            From
  A              AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
  B              A+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
  C              BBB (sf)      BB (sf)
  D              BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2017-1
               Rating
  Class          
  A-1            AA (sf)       
  A-2            AA (sf)       
  B              A (sf)        
  C              BBB (sf)     
  D              BB            

  Springleaf Funding Trust 2015-A
               Rating
  Class          
  A              A+ (sf)       
  B              BBB  (sf)      
  C              BB (sf)       
  D              B             

  Springleaf Funding Trust 2015-B
               Rating
  Class                      
  A              A+ (sf)       
  B              BBB (sf)      
  C              BB (sf)       
  D              B             

  Springleaf Funding Trust 2016-A
               Rating
  Class          
  A              A+ (sf)       
  B              BBB (sf)      
  C              BB (sf)       
  D              B             
  
  Springleaf Funding Trust 2017-A
               Rating
  Class                      
  A              AA (sf)       
  B              A (sf)        
  C              BBB (sf)      
  D              BB            


PATRONS' LEGACY 2003-IV: Moody's Cuts LILAC 03-A Debt Rating to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Series A Investor
Certificates (certificates) from Patrons' Legacy 2003-IV, a
securitization of a small pool of insurance policies (primarily
life insurance policies, single premium life annuities and
supplemental policies).

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Patrons' Legacy 2003-IV

LILAC 03-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2017
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's negative rating action is based on the latest annual
statements of account as of December 2017 for one of the underlying
life insurance policies which states that the Coverage Protection
Guarantee will expire in November 2018. Based on the structure of
the transaction this will likely result in interest shortfalls for
the certificates in order to keep the policy in force should
reserve accounts be depleted.

The Coverage Protection Guarantee feature, so long as it is in
effect, prevents the life policy from termination even if its Cash
Surrender Value is not sufficient to cover its monthly deductions.
In the event that the Coverage Protection Guarantee expires as
projected for the policy in question, premium payments would have
to increase in order to keep the life insurance policy in force.

Per the Trust Agreement, the payment of life insurance premiums has
a higher priority than interest payments to the certificates.
Additionally, the transaction has a Liquidity Reserve Account and
Additional Expense Reserve Account that can be used to pay for
shortfalls of certain items in the priority of payments, including
the life insurance premiums and interest payments to the
certificates. If the life insurance premium payments rise, both
reserve accounts will help the transaction continue to make timely
interest payments to the certificates. The rate and degree of
depletion of the reserve accounts would depend on the longevity of
the insured individual and the cost of insurance. If the reserve
accounts were to eventually be depleted, the annuity income to the
trust will not be sufficient to cover for both the increased life
insurance premiums and the interest payments and thereby result in
an interest shortfall on the certificates. Any shortfall amount
will be added to the certificate balance likely resulting in future
principal loss to certificate holders.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Monitoring Life Insurance ABS" published in January 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Change in mortality or lapse risk as well as change in the
insurance financial strength ratings of the life insurance, annuity
or supplemental policy providers.


RAIT TRUST 2015-FL5: DBRS Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B(high)
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings of five Floating Rate Notes issued
by RAIT 2015-FL5 Trust:

-- Class B to AA (high) (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C to A (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class F to B (high) (sf) from B (sf)

In addition, DBRS confirmed the rating of the following note:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)

Furthermore, DBRS changed the trend on Class D to Positive from
Stable. Trends on the remaining classes remain Stable. DBRS does
not rate the first loss piece or notional class, Class G and Class
X, respectively.

The rating upgrades and Positive trend change reflect the increased
credit support to the bonds as a result of successful loan
repayments and the improved performance outlook for a majority of
the remaining loans in the pool.

At issuance, the collateral consisted of 31 floating-rate loans
secured by 35 transitional commercial properties. As at the
November 2017 remittance, 19 loans remain in the pool, with an
aggregate outstanding principal balance of $207.4 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 40.3% since issuance because
of both scheduled and unscheduled loan repayment. One of the
remaining loans (11.4% of the current cut-off trust balance) was
structured with a future funding component to be used for property
renovations and future leasing costs to aid in properties'
stabilization; the servicer reports that the note has been fully
funded. In addition, most of the loans were structured with initial
reserves to be used toward similar business plans.

In comparison with DBRS's expectations at issuance, the majority of
properties are progressing with their respective business plans
with improved financial outlooks since issuance. Based on the
servicer's most recent annualized net operating income (NOI) figure
ended May 31, 2017, the 19 remaining loans displayed a
weighted-average (WA) improvement of 8.7% over the issuer's
in-place figure for those loans.

As at the November 2017 remittance, all loans in the pool are
current and there are no loans on the servicer's watchlist. The
pool is concentrated by both loan size and property type, as the
largest ten loans represent 72.2% of the current cut-off trust
balance, while six loans are secured by retail properties,
representing 36.8% of the current cut-off trust balance. Only one
loan, representing 2.8% of the current cut-off trust balance, is
secured by a property located in a tertiary market, as the rest of
the pool is secured by properties located in urban or suburban
markets. To date, properties secured by the three largest loans,
representing 34.8% of the current cut-off trust balance, have
experienced WA occupancy growth of 21.0% over in-place figures at
issuance and currently have a WA occupancy rate of 92.5%. The
second-largest loan, exhibiting the lowest occupancy of the three
at 87.9%, is highlighted below.

The Mountain Towers loan (Prospectus ID#5; 11.4% of the current
cut-off trust balance) is secured by a 209,817-square-foot (sf)
office property located in Glendale, Colorado. Originally
constructed in 1984, the 19-storey tower received approximately
$2.0 million in capital improvements between 2005 and issuance.
Loan proceeds of $23.6 million, along with $4.4 million of sponsor
equity, facilitated the borrower's acquisition of the property;
established a $2.6 million future funding component (held outside
of the trust) to be used for tenant improvements and leasing
commissions (TIs/LCs); funded a $1.4 million capital improvement
reserve; and covered closing costs.

According to the August 2017 management report, the planned $1.4
million in capital improvements are complete and, per the loan
agreement, the future funding note was force funded into the TI/LC
reserve on March 3, 2017. As at November 2017, all reserves have
been fully utilized.

At issuance, the collateral was 72.5% occupied with an average
rental rate of $21.41 per square foot (psf). The sponsor's business
plan included the renovation of common areas (with a focus on the
lobby and corridors) and the improvement of all vacant space to
marketable conditions. Thereafter, the sponsor's hope was to
stabilize the property at an occupancy rate of 95.0% by leasing to
future tenants with asking rental rates between $23.00 psf and
$25.00 psf. As at the August 2017 rent roll, the property had an
occupancy and average rental rate of 84.6% and $15.27 psf compared
with 80.9% and $21.34 psf in August 2016. However, at this point in
time, six tenants (16.7% of the net rentable area (NRA)) were
receiving rent-free periods. Factoring in the future rental rates
of these six tenants (approximately $24.00 psf), the subject would
have had an average rental rate of $22.80 psf.

The three largest tenants at the subject, representing 41.0% of the
NRA, include the Department of Veterans Affairs (Department of VA;
27.0% of the NRA, with various lease expirations); EDCare (9.0% of
the NRA, through December 2026); and Closetbox, Inc. (Closetbox;
5.0% of the NRA, through July 2019). According to the August 2017
management report, the Department of VA (currently occupying
approximately 58,000 sf) was in negotiations for 14,000 sf (6.6% of
the NRA) of its space and had vacated 12,600 sf (6.0% of the NRA)
of its space since issuance. Per the August 2017 rent roll, the
14,000 sf space that the Department of VA occupied was month to
month. The tenant's largest space represents 21.4% of the NRA and
extends through September 2024. The two largest tenants to sign
leases since issuance have been EDCare (8.8% of the NRA, through
December 2026) and Closetbox (5.5% of the NRA, through July 2019),
which took occupancy in December 2016 and August 2016; both
received initial rent-free periods. To date, the rent-free periods
for EDCare and Closetbox have burned off, and the tenants pay
in-place rental rates of $25.00 psf and $20.29 psf, respectively.
Closetbox's lease is structured with contractual rental-rate
increases. Per Costar, other comparable office properties in the
Glendale submarket reported average vacancy and gross rental rates
of 9.1% and $24.69 psf, respectively. Prior to YE2018, only four
tenants, representing 5.3% of the NRA, will have lease
expirations.

As at Q2 2017, the loan had an annualized NOI of $1,678,741
compared with the DBRS Stabilized NOI of $1,949,248. However, given
the recent leasing activity at the subject and limited near-term
rollover, DBRS anticipates the loan to stabilize in the near
future, which is on target with its 2.5-year goal. DBRS has
requested leasing updates and TI allowances for newly signed
tenants and will provide an update when more information has been
received.

The ratings assigned to Classes C and D materially deviate from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers
a material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The structural features (loan or transaction) and/or
provisions in other relevant methodologies outweigh the
quantitative output of the multi-borrower parameters. Specifically,
advancing is limited to Classes A and B of the transaction.


SACRAMENTO TOBACCO: S&P Hikes Ratings on Two 2007 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Sacramento County Tobacco Settlement Securitization's asset-backed
bonds series 2005 are backed by tobacco settlement revenues due to
the state of California, as part of a master settlement agreement
by the tobacco companies and the settling states. Tobacco
settlement bonds are supported only by the pledged payments from
the master settlement agreements and are not linked to the rating
on the municipal.

S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class 2005A-1 (2023
maturity) and 2005A-2 (2027 maturity) bonds from Sacramento County
Tobacco Settlement Securitization's series 2005.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the four
classes maturing between 2038 and 2045. The bonds were originally
issued in 2005."

The transaction consists of current interest turbo term bonds,
convertible turbo term bonds, and capital appreciation turbo term
bonds, maturing between 2023 and 2045. Capital appreciation bonds
generally capitalize interest until all senior notes have been paid
in full and therefore tend to have the most risk.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of the transaction's
performance under a series of stressed cash flow scenarios,
including:

-- A cigarette volume decline test that assesses if the
    transaction can withstand annual declines in cigarette
    shipments;

-- Payment disruptions by the largest participating
    manufacturers, by market share, at various points over the
    transaction's term to reflect a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing;
    and

-- A liquidity stress test to account for settlement amount
    disputes by participating manufacturers, as a result of
    changes to their market share, which continues to shift to
    nonparticipating manufacturers.

S&P said, "We raised our ratings on the two senior-most classes as
it can now make timely interest and principal payments at a higher
rating level in our stress scenarios. We affirmed our ratings on
the four other classes to reflect our view of each class'
likelihood of making timely interest and principal payments under
all three stress scenarios commensurate with the current ratings.

"Since our last rating actions in January 2015, the senior-most
turbo bonds, which mature in 2023, have paid down to approximately
57.8% of their original balance from 62.8%.

"Our analysis also reflects developments within the tobacco
industry. We view the U.S. tobacco industry as having a stable
rating outlook based on the high brand equity and pricing power of
the top three manufacturers' conventional cigarette brands. In our
view, this should help offset ongoing cigarette volume declines and
allow for sustained cash flows. However, changing regulations and
ongoing litigation risk are constraining factors the industry
faces."

RATINGS RAISED

Sacramento County Tobacco Settlement Securitization
Tobacco settlement revenues asset-backed bonds series 2005

                                         Rating
Class      CUSIP        Maturity    To          From
2005-A1    888794AS3    6/1/2023    BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)
2005-A2    888794AV6    6/1/2027    BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Sacramento County Tobacco Settlement Securitization
Tobacco settlement revenues asset-backed bonds series 2005

Class     CUSIP         Maturity    Rating
2005-A1   888794AT1     6/1/2038    B- (sf)
2005-A1   888794AU8     6/1/2045    B- (sf)
2005B     888794AW4     6/1/2045    CCC+ (sf)
2005C     888794AX2     6/1/2045    CCC (sf)


SAN DIEGO TOBACCO: S&P Affirms 5 Ratings on 2006 Bonds
------------------------------------------------------
San Diego County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.'s asset-backed
bonds series 2006 are backed by tobacco settlement revenues due to
California as part of a master settlement agreement between
participating tobacco companies and the settling states. Tobacco
settlement bonds are supported only by the pledged payments from
the master settlement agreements and are not linked to the rating
on the municipal.

S&P said, "We raised our rating on one senior-most tranche.  At the
same time, we affirmed our ratings on five outstanding tranches.
Our rating actions reflect the tranches' ability to pay timely
interest and principal under various stress scenarios.

S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on one tranche from San Diego
County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.'s $583.63 million tobacco
settlement asset-backed bonds series 2006 to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BBB
(sf)'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on five
outstanding tranches from the same series.  The six outstanding
classes of this series were originally issued and rated in 2006.

San Diego County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.'s series 2006
consists of current interest turbo term bonds and capital
appreciation turbo term bonds maturing between 2025 and 2046.
Capital appreciation bonds generally capitalize interest until all
senior notes have been paid in full, so they tend to have the most
risk.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of the transaction's
performance under a series of stressed cash flow scenarios,
including:

-- A cigarette volume decline test that assesses if the
    transaction can withstand annual declines in cigarette  
    shipments;

-- Payment disruptions by the largest of the participating
    manufacturers, by market share, at various points over the
    transaction's term to reflect a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing;
    and

-- A liquidity stress test to account for settlement amount
    disputes by participating manufacturers, as a result of
    changes to their market share, which continues to shift to
    nonparticipating manufacturers.

S&P said, "We raised our rating on the senior-most class as it can
now make timely interest and principal payments at a higher rating
level. We affirmed our ratings on the five other classes to reflect
our view of each class' likelihood of making timely interest and
principal payments under all three stress scenarios commensurate
with the current ratings.

"Since our last rating actions in January 2015, the senior-most
turbo bonds have paid down to approximately 31.7% of their original
balance from approximately 52%.

"Our analysis also reflects developments within the tobacco
industry. We view the U.S. tobacco industry as having a stable
rating outlook based on the high brand equity and pricing power of
the top three manufacturers' conventional cigarette brands. In our
view, this should help offset ongoing cigarette volume declines and
allow for sustained cash flows. However, changing regulations and
ongoing litigation risk are constraining factors the industry
faces.

RATING RAISED

San Diego County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.

$583.63 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2006

                                          Rating
Class    CUSIP        Maturity    To           From
2006A    888804AW1    6/1/2025    BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

San Diego County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.

$583.63 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2006

Class     CUSIP         Maturity     Rating
2006A     888804AX9     6/1/2037     BB+ (sf)
2006A     888804AY7     6/1/2046     B+ (sf)
2006B     888804AZ4     6/1/2046     CCC+ (sf)
2006C     888804BA8     6/1/2046     CCC (sf)
2006D     888804BB6     6/1/2046     CCC (sf)


SATURNS TRUST 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on $60.192MM Units to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on Structured Asset Trust
Unit Repackagings (SATURNS) Trust No. 2003-1's $60.192 million
units to 'CC' from 'CCC'.

S&P said, "Our rating on the units is dependent on our rating on
the underlying security, Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp.'s 7.00%
notes due June 1, 2032 ('CC').

"The action reflects the Jan. 17, 2018, lowering of our rating on
the underlying security to 'CCC-' from 'CCC' and further lowering
of the rating to 'CC' on Jan. 24, 2018.

"We may take subsequent rating actions on this transaction due to
changes in our rating assigned to the underlying security."


SAXON ASSET 2001-2: Moody's Lowers Cl. AF-6 Debt Rating to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class AF-6
issued by Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-2, backed by subprime
mortgage loans.

The complete rating action are as follow:

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-2

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade to Class AF-6 from Saxon Asset Securities
Trust 2001-2 is solely due to the outstanding interest shortfall
which is not expected to be reimbursed. The actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SBL COMMERCIAL 2016-KIND: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
in SBL Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-KIND, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-KIND:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the seven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-A were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 11, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 0.5% to $547.25
million from $550.00 million at securitization due to scheduled
amortization. The certificates are collateralized by a single loan
backed by a first lien commercial mortgage related to a portfolio
of 550 early childhood education centers operated by KinderCare, a
leading operator of for-profit early childhood education centers.

The loan collateral is comprised of the borrower's fee interest in
550 childcare centers located across 37 states. Three states make
up 30.3% of the portfolio's total square footage including Illinois
(60 properties; 12.7% of the allocated loan amount; 10.9% of total
square footage), California (49 properties; 12.7% of the allocated
loan amount; 10.1% of total square footage), and Texas (50
properties; 6.6% of the allocated loan amount; 9.3% of total square
footage). September 2017 trailing-twelve month portfolio occupancy
was 66.3%, compared to 67.8% for the same period in the prior year.
As of year-end 2016, the portfolio's weighted average enrollment
rate was 66.6%, compared to 64.6% at year-end 2015.

The original first mortgage loan amount represents $547.25 million
of non-recourse first mortgage financing to a single borrower that
owns interests in 550 early childhood education centers. The
mortgage loan was originated on November 13, 2015 and is secured by
first priority mortgages/deeds of trust on the fee simple interest
in the 550-property portfolio. The loan has a term of ten years and
calls for amortization equal to 0.25% annually during years 1-3;
0.50% annually during years 4-5; 1.0% annually during years 6-8 and
2.0% annually thereafter. Principal payments are based on the
initial Loan amount and are to be paid in quarterly installments
concurrently with interest payments. The Borrower may prepay the
loan, in whole or in part, at any time without penalty or premium.

All 550 properties are subject to a 15-year absolute triple net
Master Lease with a fixed base rent for the first five years and
rent bumps in the fifth and tenth lease years equal to the lesser
of (i) 10% of the prior year's rent and (ii) the All Urban
Consumers, All Items, Not Seasonally Adjusted CPI increase. The
Master Lease includes two, five-year extensions for all of the
sites with at least twelve months prior notice. The tenant is
permitted to (i) permanently discontinue operations in up to
fifteen properties, (ii) sublease up to forty properties and (iii)
temporarily discontinue operations in up to five sites for up to
180 days for purposes of remodeling or making alterations or
improvements to a site or 120 days for the purposes of correcting
or curing any health, safety or regulatory issues or violations at
such site. However, the sum of subleased and dark centers may not
exceed forty properties.

The first mortgage balance of $547.25 million represents a Moody's
LTV of 117.0%. Inclusive of the $90.0 million mezzanine loan held
outside of the trust, the Moody's LTV is 136.3%. Moody's first
mortgage stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.21X and
Moody's total stressed DSCR is 1.04X.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to B-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2018-3. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans, including
170 agency-eligible high balance mortgage loans. The assets of the
trust consist of 719 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage loans,
substantially all of which have an original term to maturity of 30
years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores, significant
equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves. CitiMortgage
Inc. will serve as the master servicer for this transaction. There
are two servicers in this pool: Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(97.58%), First Republic Bank (2.42%).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.30%
in a base scenario and reaches 3.85% at a stress level roughly
consistent with the Aaa(sf) ratings. Moody's loss estimates are
based on a loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral
pool using Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model.
Loan-level adjustments to the model included: adjustments to
borrower probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress includes adjustments related to origination
quality. The model combines loan-level characteristics with
economic drivers to determine the probability of default for each
loan, and hence for the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also
calculated on a loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then
adjusted for borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-3 transaction is a securitization of 719 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $ 479,814,196. There are 146 originators in this pool,
including loanDepot.com, LLC (16.85%). None of the originators
other than United Shore Financial Services, LLC contributed 10% or
more of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. The
loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed
credit underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood). Moody's consider Redwood, the mortgage loan
seller, as a stronger aggregator of prime jumbo loans compared to
its peers. As of December 2017 remittance report, there have been
no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's have
rated to date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
Moody's decreased Moody's base case and Aaa loss expectations for
loans acquired under Redwood's guidelines or with overlays by
Redwood.

16.85% of the mortgage loans were originated by loanDepot. Of these
loans, 52% were underwritten to GSE guidelines with Redwood
overlays. The remainder of the loans were underwritten to
loanDepot's prime jumbo underwriting guidelines. These loans
represent 8.06% by loan balance of the entire pool. Moody's
consider loanDepot's origination quality of residential prime jumbo
loans to be in line with its peers. as an originator of residential
prime jumbo loans. Moody's did not make an adjustment for loans
underwritten to loanDepot's prime jumbo guidelines.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have
strong credit profile demonstrated by strong credit scores, high
down payment percentages and significant liquid reserves. Similar
to SEMT transactions Moody's rated recently, SEMT 2018-3 has a
weighted average FICO at 771 and a percentage of loan purpose for
home purchase at 63.1%, better than SEMT transactions issued
earlier last year, where weighted average original FICOs were
slightly below 770 and purchase money percentages were ranging from
40% to 60%.

Servicing considerations

Moody's assess the overall servicing arrangement for this pool as
adequate. The master servicer is CitiMortgage Inc. and the loans
will be serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing and First
Republic Bank.

The loans acquired from loanDepot are serviced by Cenlar. These
loans will be transferred post-closing from Cenlar to Shellpoint.
Given that the loanDepot loans represent 16.85% of the pool,
Moody's took into consideration Redwood's process for transferring
this amount of loans post-closing. As the servicing administrator,
Redwood will oversee the transfer of the loans. In the past,
Redwood has managed system-to-system transfers between Cenlar and
Shellpoint with minimal servicing disruption. Redwood will closely
monitor any exceptions and address them in a timely manner before
the distribution date statement is made available to
certificateholders. Moody's have not made any adjustments for this
transfer due to the adequate oversight by Redwood.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
view the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered. As
such, Moody's incorporated some additional sensitivity runs in
Moody's cash flow analysis in which Moody's increase the losses due
to potential interest shortfalls during the loan's liquidation
period in order to reflect this feature and to assess the potential
impact to the bonds.

Moody's believe there is a low likelihood that the rated securities
of SEMT 2018-3 will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments owing to potential future lawsuits against
key deal parties. First, the loans are prime quality and were
originated under a regulatory environment that requires tighter
controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the subordinate
classes and provides a back-stop to the representations and
warranties of all the originators except for FRB, has a strong
alignment of interest with investors, and is incentivized to
actively manage the pool to optimize performance. Third, historical
performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has been very strong to
date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably well defined processes
in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing basis. In
this transaction, an independent breach reviewer must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when a loan becomes
120 days delinquent, which reduces the likelihood that parties will
be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.15% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 703 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 13 First Republic
loans 3 Prime Lending loans. For the 16 loans, Redwood Trust
elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a TPR
firm check for TRID compliance.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believe that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

There was one loan with a final event grade of "C" due to an issue
with compliance with the TRID rule. The condition cited by Clayton
included the minimum and/or maximum payment amounts were
inconsistent on the closing disclosure and either or both of the
"In 5 Years" total payment or total principal amounts were
under-disclosed. Moody's believe that such conditions are not
material and thus, Moody's did not make any adjustment for this
loan.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase Moody's Aaa loss.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Chicago (FHLB Chicago). The mortgage loans
purchased by Redwood from the FHLB Chicago were originated by
various participating financial institution originators. For these
mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago will provide the loan-level R&Ws that
are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2018-3 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US
RMBS.

Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-CH1: Moody's Cuts B-5 Certs Rating to (P)Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its provisional ratings on
Class B-4 and Class B-5 of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH1, due to a change
made to the structure of the transaction since Moody's assigned
provisional ratings to 31 classes of certificates on February 1,
2018.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH1

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to (P)Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2018
Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to (P)Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2018
Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

The ratings of the senior classes A-1 through A-24, and the
subordinate classes B-1A, B-1B, B-2A, B-2B, and B3 remain the same
as announced in the February 1, 2018 press release "Moody's assigns
provisional ratings to Prime RMBS issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust
2018-CH1".

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

The structure has changed since Moody's assigned provisional
ratings to 31 classes of certificates on February 1, 2018. The
credit enhancement for the subordinate classes has decreased,
leading to a downgrade of Class B-4 and Class B-5 certificates.

In addition, after issuing provisional ratings on certificates in
this transaction, Moody's received updated loan data showing that 4
loans were dropped from the pool, reducing the total number of
loans backing SEMT 2018-CH1 from 591 to 587. The loans were dropped
from the pool because such loans have been paid in full.

We note that changes in the collateral affected Moody's loss levels
primarily due to an increase in seasoning. The Aaa MILAN loss level
has decreased from 10.45% to 10.35%. The expected loss has remained
the same at 0.85%. The description of the collateral below is based
on the collateral information provided in the updated offering
document, which reflects the updated pool.

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.85%
in a base scenario and reaches 10.35% at a stress level roughly
consistent with Aaa(sf) ratings. The MILAN CE may be different from
the credit enhancement that is consistent with a Aaa(sf) rating for
a tranche, because the MILAN CE does not take into account the
structural features of the transaction. Moody's took this
difference into account in Moody's ratings of the senior classes.
Moody's loss estimates are based on a loan-by-loan assessment of
the securitized collateral pool using Moody's Individual Loan Level
Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level adjustments to the model
included: adjustments to borrower probability of default for higher
and lower borrower DTIs, borrowers with multiple mortgaged
properties, self-employed borrowers, origination channels and at a
pool level, for the default risk of HOA properties in super lien
states. The adjustment to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model
output also includes adjustments related to aggregator and
origination quality. The model combines loan-level characteristics
with economic drivers to determine the probability of default for
each loan, and hence for the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also
calculated on a loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then
adjusted for borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-CH1 transaction is a securitization of 587 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $441,340,702. There are more than 100 originators in
this pool, including Fairway (6.5%), the remaining contributed less
than 5% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. The
loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed
credit underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank.

SEMT 2018-CH1 includes loans acquired by Redwood under its Choice
program. Although from a FICO and LTV perspective, the borrowers in
SEMT 2018-CH1 are not the super prime borrowers included in
traditional SEMT transactions, these borrowers are prime borrowers
with a demonstrated ability to manage household finance. On
average, borrowers in this pool have made a 26.06% down payment on
a mortgage loan of $754,812. In addition, the majority of borrowers
have more than 24 months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to
pay the mortgage for two years should there be an interruption to
the borrower's cash flow. Moreover, the borrowers on average have a
monthly residual income of $16,763. The WA FICO is 742, which is
lower than traditional SEMT transactions, which has averaged 769 in
2017 SEMT transactions. The lower WA FICO for SEMT 2018-CH1 may
reflect recent mortgage lates (0x30x3, 1x30x12, 2x30x24) which are
allowed under the Choice program, but not under Redwood's
traditional product, Redwood Select (0x30x24). While the WA FICO
may be lower for this transaction, Moody's do not believe that the
limited mortgage lates demonstrates a history of financial
mismanagement.

We also note that SEMT 2018-CH1 is the third SEMT transaction to
include a significant number of non-QM loans (157) compared to
previous SEMT transactions, where the number of non-QM loans was
limited. Previously, 2017-CH2 and 2017-CH1 had the largest number
of non-QM loans at 112 out of 420 and 108 loans out of 409 loans
respectively.

Redwood's Choice program is in its early stages, having been
launched by Redwood in April 2016. In contrast to Redwood's
traditional program, Select, Redwood's Choice program allows for
higher LTVs, lower FICOs, non-occupant co-borrowers,
non-warrantable condos, limited loans with adverse credit events,
among other loan attributes. Under both Select and Choice, Redwood
also allows for loans with non-QM features, such as interest-only,
DTIs greater than 43%, asset depletion, among other loan
attributes.

However, Moody's note that Redwood historically has been on average
stronger than its peers as an aggregator of prime jumbo loans,
including a limited number of non-QM loans in previous SEMT
transactions. As of the December 2017 remittance report, there have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's have
rated to date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
While in traditional SEMT transactions, Moody's have factored this
qualitative strength into Moody's analysis, in SEMT 2018-CH1,
Moody's have a neutral assessment of the Choice Program until
Moody's are able to review a longer performance history of Choice
mortgage loans.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
view the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered. As
such, Moody's incorporated some additional sensitivity runs in
Moody's cash flow analysis in which Moody's increase the losses due
to potential interest shortfalls during the loan's liquidation
period in order to reflect this feature and to assess the potential
impact to the bonds.

We believe there is a low likelihood that the rated securities of
SEMT 2018-CH1 will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments owing to potential future lawsuits against
key deal parties. First, the loans are prime quality and were
originated under a regulatory environment that requires tighter
controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, Redwood (or a majority-owned affiliate of the
sponsor), who will retain credit risk in accordance with the U.S.
Risk Retention Rules and provides a back-stop to the
representations and warranties of all the originators except for
First Republic Bank, has a strong alignment of interest with
investors, and is incentivized to actively manage the pool to
optimize performance. Third, the transaction has reasonably well
defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on an
ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
must review loans for breaches of representations and warranties
when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which reduces the
likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.70% ($7,502,792) of the closing pool
balance, which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds
from eroding credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 581 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 10 First Republic
loans. For the 10 loans, Redwood Trust elected to conduct a limited
review, which did not include a TPR firm check for TRID
compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

For the full review loans, the TPR report identified four grade "C"
compliance-related conditions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule. The conditions cited by Clayton included
the minimum and/or maximum payment amounts were inconsistent on the
closing disclosure and either or both of the "In 5 Years" total
payment or total principal amounts were under-disclosed. Moody's
believe that such conditions are not material and thus, Moody's did
not make any adjustments for these loans

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some
of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from First
Republic Bank where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans originated by First
Republic Bank.

The property valuation review conducted by the TPR firm consisted
of (i) a review of all of the appraisals for full review loans,
checking for issues with the comparables selected in the appraisal
and (ii) a value supported analysis for all loans. After a review
of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's found the exceptions to be
minor in nature and did not pose a material increase in the risk of
loan loss.

We have received the results of the inspection report or appraisal
confirmation for all the mortgage loans secured by properties in
the areas affected by FEMA Disaster areas. The results indicate
that the properties did not receive any material damage. SEMT
2018-CH1 includes a representation that the pool does not include
properties with material damage that would adversely affect the
value of the mortgaged property.

The originators and Redwood have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


TRITON AVIATION: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to Dsf
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class A-1 notes from
Triton Aviation Finance to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'.

Triton Aviation Finance is an asset-backed securities transaction
backed by the lease revenue and sales proceeds from a portfolio of
commercial aircraft.

The rating action reflects that the notes were not paid in full on
or prior to the final payment date after the liquidation on Dec.
19, 2017. On the final payment date, the class A-1 notes remained
unpaid by $60.396 million.




UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C5,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C5,:

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. EC, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

The ratings on class EC was affirmed due to the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) of the exchangeable classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in all classes except the exchangeable
class, Cl. EC were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodology used in rating Cl. EC was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in
June 2015. The methodologies used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12th, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $1.38 billion
from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 57% of the pool. Eleven loans,
constituting 10% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. Two loans,
constituting 0.8% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Cherry Creek Place III
($6.2 million -- 0.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 107,364
square foot (SF) office building located in Aurora, Colorado. The
loan transferred to special servicing in December 2016 due to
imminent default. Two tenants have recently vacated the property,
including the largest tenant that did not renew upon lease
expiration in the Fall of 2016. As of January 2018, the property
was 45% leased by three tenants.

The other specially serviced loan is secured by a hotel property in
Decatur, Texas. Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.6 million loss
for both specially serviced loans (52 % expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and partial year 2017 operating results for 80% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 94%, compared to 92% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 7% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.05X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 2.02X and 1.13X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 39% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Santa Anita Mall Loan ($215 million -- 15.6% of
the pool), which is secured by 956,343 SF within a 1.47 million SF
super-regional mall located in Arcadia, California. The A-note
represents a pari-passu interest in a $285 million mortgage loan.
The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Macy's, and Nordstrom. All
three anchor units are owned by their respective tenants and are
not contributed as collateral for the loan. The mall was expanded
in 2009 to include the promenade portion of the center. The
property is adjacent to the Santa Anita Park, a thoroughbred
racetrack, which is a demand driver for the mall. The estimated
aggregate gross sales volume of the three anchor tenants was $166.5
million in 2017, compared to $153.4 million in 2012. As of
September 2017 the property was 98% leased, with inline occupancy
of 97%, compared to securitization occupancy levels of 97% for the
total property and 93% for inline space. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 84% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 81% and 1.13X at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Valencia Town Center Loan ($195
million -- 14.1% of the pool), which is secured by 646,121 SF
within a 1.1 million SF super-regional mall located in Valencia,
California. The mall is anchored by Macy's, JC Penney, and Sears.
All anchor units are owned by their respective tenants and are not
included as collateral for the loan. The mall was expanded in 2010,
adding roughly 180,000 SF of outdoor space at a cost of
approximately $131 million. As of September 2017, the property was
96% leased, compared to 95% as of September 2016 and 97% at
securitization. In January 2018, one of the mall's anchor tenants,
Sears, announced it will be closing their 122,325 SF store at this
location. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.09X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Starwood Office Portfolio Loan
($129.7 million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of six class A office buildings that total 1.29 million
SF located across four states including Florida, South Carolina,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. As of Septermber 2017, the
portfolio was 85% leased, compared to 90% as of September 2016, 97%
as of September 2014, and 99% at securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 106%
and 1.02X at the last review.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fourteen
classes of UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C6,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6.6% to $1.210
billion from $1.295 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 72 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 62% of the pool. One loan, constituting
10.4% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Six loans, constituting 4.3% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 73% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 92.1%, unchanged from Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 14.4% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.86X and 1.15X,
respectively, compared to 1.86X and 1.14X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 575 Broadway
Loan ($125.85 million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
170,000 square foot (SF) mixed use retail and office building
located in Manhattan's SoHo submarket. The property is encumbered
by a ground lease that is scheduled to expire in June 2060. As of
June 2017, the property was 100% leased, unchanged from year-end
2015 & 2016, and up from 93% at securitization. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.38X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 27.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Gateway Center Loan ($160 million -- 13.2%
of the pool), which is secured by three cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans secured by 355,000 SF within a 639,000 SF
class A anchored retail center in Brooklyn, New York. The property
was constructed in 2002 by The Related Companies. The properties
are shadow anchored by Target and Home Depot. Collateral tenants
include BJ's Wholesale Club (lease expiration: September 2027), Bed
Bath & Beyond (January 2023), and Babies R US (January 2023). As of
September 2017, the property was 100% leased, unchanged since
securitization. This ten-year loan is interest-only throughout the
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.78X,
respectively, unchanged from the last review.

The second largest loan is the Broward Mall Loan ($95 million --
7.9% of the pool), which is secured by 326,000 SF within a 1.042
million SF super-regional mall located in Plantation, Florida. The
mall is anchored by Sears, Macy's, JC Penney and Dillards, none of
which are part of the collateral. In late 2017, Seritage announced
plans to downsize the Sears space by half and invest $20 million to
redevelop the space with outdoor dining, shops and entertainment
space. As of June 2017, the property was 95% leased, up from 91% at
year-end 2016. This ten-year loan is interest-only throughout the
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 83% and 1.17X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the The Shoppes at River Crossing Loan
($77.4 million -- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by 528,000 SF
within a 728,000 SF lifestyle center located in Macon, Georgia.
Non-collateral anchors include Dillard's and Belk. Collateral
tenants include Dick's Sporting Goods, Barnes & Noble, Jo-Ann
Fabric and Crafts, and DSW Shoe Warehouse. As of year-end 2016, the
property was 97% leased, up from 94% the year prior. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.98X, respectively, unchanged from
the last review.


UBSCM 2018-NYCH: S&P Assigns Prelim. B(sf) Rating in Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to UBSCM
2018-NYCH Mortgage Trust's $300.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is CMBS securitization backed by one
three-year, floating-rate mortgage loan totaling $300.0 million
with two, one-year extension options. The mortgage loan is secured
by the fee interest in six limited-service and one extended-stay
hotel located in the Manhattan submarkets of Time Square, Midtown
South, and Downtown.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 12,
2018 Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  UBSCM 2018-NYCH Mortgage Trust
  Class       Rating(i)          Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)           76,111,000
  X-CP(ii)    BBB- (sf)         154,252,000(iii)
  X-NCP(ii)   BBB- (sf)         154,252,000(iii)
  B           AA- (sf)           28,669,000
  C           A- (sf)            21,311,000
  D           BBB- (sf)          28,161,000
  E           BB- (sf)           38,441,000
  F           B (sf)             31,183,000
  G           NR                 41,124,000
  H           NR                 19,975,000
  HRR         NR                 15,025,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii)Interest only.
(iii)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP and
X-NCP certificates will be equal to the aggregate certificate
balance of the class A, class B, class C, and class D certificates.

NR--Not rated.


VENTURE CLO XXII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
CLO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Venture
XXII CLO, Limited (the "Issuer"):

Moody's rating action is:

US$385,500,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$67,500,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$33,500,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class E-R Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

MJX Venture Management II LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on February 14, 2018
(the "Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on January 28, 2016 (the "Original Closing
Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional subordinated notes
to redeem in full all classes of existing secured notes. On the
Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one class of
subordinated notes that will remain outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional
subordinated notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features will occur in connection with the refinancing. These
include: extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the
stated maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral
quality tests; changes to the overcollateralization test levels;
and changes to comply with the Volcker Rule.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $597,945,305

Defaulted par: $4,109,391

Diversity Score: 80

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2910

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the rating(s) assigned to the Refinancing Notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (2910 to 3347)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (2910 to 3783)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -4

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: -1


VIRGINIA TOBACCO: S&P Affirms B- Ratings on Three 2007 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp.'s series 2007 is backed by
tobacco settlement revenues due to Virginia as part of a master
settlement agreement between participating tobacco companies and
the settling states. Tobacco settlement bonds are supported only by
the pledged payments from the master settlement agreements and are
not linked to the rating on the municipal.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on all five tranches from
Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp.'s series 2007. All outstanding
classes of this series were originally issued and rated in 2007 and
are backed by tobacco settlement revenues due to Virginia as part
of a master settlement agreement between participating
tobacco companies and the settling states.

The rated portion of Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp.'s series
2007 consists of two turbo term bonds, one convertible turbo term
bond, and two capital appreciation bonds maturing between 2046 and
2047. Capital appreciation bonds generally capitalize interest
until all senior notes have been paid in full and therefore tend to
have the most risk.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of the transaction's
performance under a series of stressed cash flow scenarios,
including:

-- A cigarette volume decline test that assesses if the
    transaction can withstand annual declines in cigarette
    shipments;

-- Payment disruptions by the largest of the participating
    manufacturers, by market share, at various points over the
    transaction's term to reflect a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing;
    and

-- A liquidity stress test to account for settlement amount
    disputes by participating manufacturers, as a result of
    changes to their market share, which continues to shift  to
    nonparticipating manufacturers.

S&P said, "We affirmed our ratings on all five classes to reflect
the likelihood that they will make timely interest and principal
payments under all three stress scenarios commensurate with the
current ratings.

"Our analysis also reflects developments within the tobacco
industry. We view the U.S. tobacco industry as having a stable
rating outlook based on the high brand equity and pricing power of
the top three manufacturers' conventional cigarette brands. In our
view, this should help offset ongoing cigarette volume declines and
allow for sustained cash flows. However, changing regulations and
ongoing litigation risk are constraining factors the industry
faces."

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp. (Series 2007)

Class     CUSIP       Maturity       Rating
2007A-1   88880NAT6   June 1, 2046   B- (sf)
2007B-1   88880NAU3   June 1, 2047   B- (sf)
2007B-2   88880NAV1   June 1, 2046   B- (sf)
2007C     88880NAW9   June 1, 2047   CCC+ (sf)
2007D     88880NAX7   June 1, 2047   CCC (sf)


VOYA CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Class D-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Voya CLO 2016-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued on Feb. 25,
2016, that is managed by Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC. S&P
said, "In addition, we assigned a rating to the new class X-R
notes, which were also issued on the refinancing date. We withdrew
our rating on the original class A-1 notes following payment in
full on the Feb. 8, 2018, refinancing date."

On the Feb. 8, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R note issuances
were used to redeem the original class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, B-1, B-2,
C, and D notes as outlined in the transaction document provisions.
Therefore, S&P withdrew its rating on the original class A-1 notes
in line with their full redemption, and it is assigning ratings to
the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Change the rated par amount and aggregate ramp-up par amount to
$384.10 million and $416.60 million, respectively, from $257.30
million and $415.00 million.

-- Extend the reinvestment period to Jan. 20, 2023, from July 20,
2020.

-- Extend the non-call period to Jan. 20, 2020, from Jan. 20,
2018.

-- Extend the weighted average life test to nine years from the
Feb. 8, 2018, refinancing date, from eight years calculated from
the original transaction's closing date, Feb. 25, 2016.

-- Extend the legal final maturity date on the rated and
subordinated notes to Jan. 20, 2031, from Jan. 20, 2027.

-- Issue class X-R floating-rate notes, which are paid down in
equal quarterly installments of $200,000 on the first eight payment
dates beginning with the July 2018 payment date.

-- Adopt the use of the non-model version of CDO Monitor for this
transaction. During the reinvestment period, the non-model version
of CDO Monitor may be used to indicate whether changes to the
collateral portfolio are generally consistent with the transaction
parameters S&P assumed when initially assigning ratings to the
notes.

-- Change the required minimum thresholds for the coverage tests.

-- Make the transaction U.S. risk retention compliant.

-- Incorporate the recovery rate methodology and updated industry
classifications outlined in our August 2016 CLO criteria update.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

  Replacement Notes
  Class               Amount     Interest                         

                     (mil. $)     rate (%)        
  X-R                   1.60     LIBOR + 0.60
  A-1-R               259.50     LIBOR + 1.07
  A-2-R                50.50     LIBOR + 1.30
  B-R                  31.60     LIBOR + 1.80
  C-R                  22.50     LIBOR + 2.65
  D-R                  18.40     LIBOR + 5.25
  Subordinated notes   37.50     N/A

  Original Notes
  Class                Amount     Interest                         

                    (mil. $)     rate (%)        
  A-1                  257.30     LIBOR + 1.50
  A-2A                  32.45     LIBOR + 2.20
  A-2B                  20.00     3.92
  B-1                    8.90     LIBOR + 2.95
  B-2                   20.00     5.05
  C                     22.65     LIBOR + 4.20
  D                     20.50     LIBOR + 6.55
  Subordinated notes    37.50     N/A

  N/A--Not applicable.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"The assigned ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Voya CLO 2016-1 Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating        Amount (mil $)
  X-R                       AAA (sf)               1.60    
  A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             259.50     
  A-2-R                     AA (sf)               50.50     
  B-R                       A (sf)                31.60     
  C-R                       BBB- (sf)             22.50     
  D-R                       BB- (sf)              18.40     
  Subordinated notes        NR                    37.50     

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  Voya CLO 2016-1 Ltd.
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A-1                  NR              AAA (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


WAMU MORTGAGE 2006-AR5: Moody's Assigns Ca Rating to DX-PPP Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of four
underlying components, and re-assigned the rating on one bond from
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series 2006-AR5
Trust. The action resolves the review of one interest-only (IO)
bond, Class DX-PPP Group 4 PO Component, that was among those
placed on review on August 15, 2017 in connection with a correction
of errors in Moody's earlier analysis, as well as 3 IO bonds,
Classes DX-PPP Group 1 Component, DX-PPP Group 2 PO Component and
DX-PPP Group 3 PO Component, that were among those placed on review
August 29, 2017 in connection with a reassessment of Moody's
internal linkage of these IO bonds to their reference bond(s) or
pool(s).

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-AR5 Trust

Cl. DX-PPP, Assigned Ca (sf)

Cl. DX-PPP Group 1 Component, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 29,
2017 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. DX-PPP Group 2 PO Component, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug
29, 2017 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. DX-PPP Group 3 PO Component, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug
29, 2017 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. DX-PPP Group 4 PO Component, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug
15, 2017 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on Classes DX-PPP, DX-PPP Group 1 Component,
DX-PPP Group 2 PO Component, DX-PPP Group 3 PO Component and DX-PPP
Group 4 PO Component are driven by the correction of an error. At
closing Moody's assigned ratings on the following certificates
issued by WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-AR5 Trust:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-AR5 Trust

Class 1A, Class 2A, Class 3A, Class 4A, Class 5A, Class 4A-1B,
Class. 5A-1B, Class CA-1B, Class DX-PPP, Class 5X-PPP, Class R,
Class L-B-1, Class L-B-2, Class L-B-3, Class L-B-4, Class L-B-5,
Class L-B-6, Class L-B-7, Class L-B-8, Class L-B-9, Class L-B-10,
Class L-B-11 and Class L-B-12.

Class DX-PPP is an IO PO bond which has four IO components and four
principal-only (PO) components. After the assignment of the initial
rating to the Class DX-PPP certificate, Moody's erroneously stopped
publishing the rating on this certificate and instead began
publishing ratings only on the underlying payment components that
generate the cashflow supporting Class DX-PPP.

Moody's has now corrected this error and has re-assigned a rating
to Class DX-PPP, the certificate originally rated by Moody's and
issued by WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-AR5 Trust. Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings on the
underlying payment components. The rating history of the underlying
payment components will remain on moodys.com. Hereafter, Moody's
will only publish the rating at the certificate level and will not
publish ratings for the related underlying payment components.

The action resolves the review of Class DX-PPP Group 4 PO Component
that was among those placed on review on August 15, 2017 in
connection with a correction of an input error in Moody's earlier
analysis, and of Classes DX-PPP Group 1 Component, DX-PPP Group 2
PO Component and DX-PPP Group 3 PO Component that were among those
placed on review August 29, 2017 in connection with a reassessment
of Moody's internal linkage of these IO bonds to their reference
bond(s) or pool(s).The factors that Moody's considers in rating an
IO bond depend on the type of referenced securities or assets to
which the IO bond is linked. For IO PO bonds, which have both IO
component and PO components, Moody's determines the rating using a
weighted average of the ratings of the two different types of
components.

In Moody's prior analysis, Moody's incorrectly treated the
underlying components of Class DX-PPP as four separate bonds.
Moody's has reassessed the linkage for the composite Class DX-PPP,
and determined that it is linked to the appropriate pools. The
rating action on Class DX-PPP reflects the updated bond
composition, correction to prior input errors, the linkage
reassessment, and updated performance of the underlying pools and
bonds.

The methodologies used in rating Class DX-PPP were "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


WELLS FARGO 2014-LC18: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class X-F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings of all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC18 issued by
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-LC18. All classes were
confirmed with Stable trends as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

The Class PEX certificates are exchangeable with the Class A-S,
Class B and Class C certificates (and vice versa).

Classes D, E, F, G, X-E, X-F and X-G have been privately placed
pursuant to Rule 144A.

This transaction closed in December 2014 with 99 loans secured by
117 commercial properties. As of the November 2017 remittance, all
99 loans remained in the pool, with a collateral reduction of 2.6%
since issuance as the result of scheduled amortization. At
issuance, 44 loans representing 57.0% of the transaction balance
had full or partial interest-only (IO) periods remaining. As of the
November 2017 remittance, 21 loans (35.1% of the pool) had
remaining IO periods, with 14 of those loans (14.3% of the pool)
structured with a full IO term. There have been no loans defeased
since issuance.

The transaction benefits from healthy overall net cash flow (NCF)
growth since issuance, with loans representing 94.7% of the pool
reporting year-end (YE) 2016 financials and a weighted-average (WA)
NCF growth of 13.7% over the DBRS NCF figures derived at issuance.
Cash flow growth has been even stronger for the largest 15 loans,
which, as of the most recent YE periods reported for each, showed a
WA NCF growth of 19.4% over the DBRS NCF figures. For the loans
reporting YE2016 financials, the WA debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 1.81 times (x), with the Top 15 loans (46.4% of the
pool) reporting a WA DSCR of 2.01x and a WA debt yield of 11.8%,
based on the most recent YE figures reported. Comparatively, the WA
DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS Debt Yield at issuance for the pool as a
whole were 1.68x and 9.8%, respectively.

As of the November 2017 remittance, there was one loan in special
servicing (Prospectus ID #40, Gardens on Whispering Pines),
representing 0.9% of the pool balance. There are also 11 loans
(8.9% of the pool) on the servicer's watchlist. The majority of the
watchlisted loans are being monitored for upcoming rollover or
property condition items, with the remainder showing cash flow
declines. DBRS applied a stressed scenario in the analysis where
merited for those loans showing increased risk since issuance.

The specially serviced loan is secured by a multifamily property in
the tertiary community of Albany, Georgia, and was previously on
the servicer's watchlist for a low DSCR of 1.02x at YE2016. The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2017 for imminent
default, which the special servicer reports is the result of a
dispute within the ownership structure. The special servicer is
negotiating with the sponsor on workout options, and as of the
November 2017 remittance, the loan was due for the July 2017
payment and all payments due thereafter. An updated appraisal has
not been finalized, but DBRS expects a value decline from the $13.5
million value determined at issuance and as such has applied a
stressed scenario in the analysis for this loan. For additional
information on this loan, please see the DBRS Loan Commentary on
the DBRS Viewpoint platform.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-E, X-F and X-G are IO certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche and may be
adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The ratings assigned to Classes B, C, E and PEX materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviations are warranted given the
sustainability of loan performance trends have not yet been
demonstrated.


WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS1: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-NXS1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations follow the overall stable
performance of the underlying loans. All loans are performing
in-line with Fitch's expectations. There have been no material
changes to the pool since issuance, therefore the original rating
analysis was considered in affirming the transaction. As of the
January 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 1.8% to $937.8 million from $955.2
million at issuance.

Watchlist Loans/Fitch Loans of Concern: There are five loans (7.8%)
on the servicer's watchlist, of which two (3.0%) are considered
Fitch Loans of Concern. The largest watchlist loan (4.1%) is
secured by a 278,455 square foot (sf) mixed use property in Coconut
Grove, FL. The servicer reports that the second largest tenant
(15.2% of the net rentable area) will be vacating in March 2018.
The borrower has been contacted for updates, and Fitch will
continue to monitor.

The second largest watchlist loan (2.1%) is secured by a 126,962
square foot (sf) office building located in Raleigh, NC and is
considered as a Fitch Loan of Concern. The property's sole tenant
is dark after being acquired by a Canadian pharmaceutical company
in April 2015. However, the tenant continues to pay rent under the
lease obligations and the loan has remained current.

The other three loans on the watchlist are due to occupancy
declines and minor deferred maintenance.

Single Tenant Properties: The pool consists of 47 (36.3%)
single-tenanted properties, including collateral for three of the
top 10 loans.

Above Average Collateral Quality: The pool's collateral exhibits
above average quality. At issuance, 13 properties (50.8%) received
property quality grades of 'B+' or better.

Interest Only Loans: Seven loans (25.1%) are full-term interest
only, and 24 loans (46.1%) are partial interest only.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $15.0 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $164.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $155 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $237 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $706.2 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $152.8 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.9 million* class X-E at' BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.7 million* class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.7 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.7 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Indicates notional amount and interest-only.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEX
certificates, and class PEX certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G, X-B or X-G certificates. The
ratings for class A-5FL and A-5FX were previously withdrawn.


ZAIS CLO 8: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to ZAIS CLO 8
Ltd.'s $414 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by primarily broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are
governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 13,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  ZAIS CLO 8 Ltd./ZAIS CLO 8 LLC

  Class                Rating             Amount
                                        (mil. $)
  A                    AAA (sf)           283.50
  B                    AA (sf)             58.50
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)              27.00
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)           27.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)            18.00
  Subordinated notes   NR                  46.50

  NR--Not rated.


[*] Fitch Cuts/Withdraws Rating on Distressed Bonds in 4 CMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on already distressed bonds
in four U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

Two bonds in two transactions have been downgraded to 'Dsf', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds were
previously rated 'Csf', which indicated that a default was
imminent.

One bond in one transaction has also been downgraded to 'Dsf', as
the bond has incurred a principal write-down. The rating on this
class has also been withdrawn as it is no longer considered by
Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage. The trust balances
have been reduced to zero or the classes have experienced
non-recoverable realized losses. The bond was previously rated
'Csf', which indicated that a default was imminent.

Fitch has affirmed seven classes in two transactions at 'Dsf' as a
result of previously incurred realized losses. The ratings on these
classes have also been withdrawn as they are no longer considered
by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage. The trust
balances have been reduced to zero or the classes have experienced
non-recoverable realized losses.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are limited to the bonds with a principal
write-down. Any remaining bonds in the transaction have not been
analysed as part of this review.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch would
further review the affected classes.

The affected deals are:

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4  
* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
* GE Commercial Mortgage Corp 2005-C3
* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C3

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2EjugPp


[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 7 Bond From 5 Option ARM RMBS Loans
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
interest-only (IO) bonds from five transactions, backed by Option
ARM RMBS loans, issued by Countrywide. All of the bonds in action
are IO PO bonds that have two components, an interest-only (IO)
component and a principal-only (PO) component.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-4

Cl. 1-X-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-16

Cl. X-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-27

Cl. 3-X-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 3-X-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 1-X-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-62

Cl. 1-X-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-81

Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
actions also reflect a change in the relative weight that Moody's
assigns to the IO and PO components of these IO PO bonds.

For IO PO bonds, which have both an IO component and a PO
component, Moody's determines the ratings using a weighted average
of the ratings of the two components. While historically Moody's
were using a more qualitative judgment in the analysis of these IO
PO bonds, Moody's have now assigned weights of 95% and 5% to the IO
and PO components respectively, because of the lower proportion of
the PO component in relation to the IO component. In addition, as
the PO components pay off or take losses, the ratings of the IO PO
bonds will eventually become equal to that of the IO component.

The balance of the PO components of Class X-1 from CWALT, Inc.
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-16 and Class 1-X-2
from CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-27
is zero. Therefore, the ratings of these 2 bonds reflect the
ratings of their IO components only.

The methodologies used in rating these 7 IO bonds were "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


[*] Moody's Lowers Ratings on 23 Bonds From 16 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 23
Interest-Only (IO) bonds from 16 US residential mortgage backed
securitization (RMBS) transactions, issued by multiple issuers
prior to 2009.

The rating actions reflect a correction of errors in Moody's prior
analysis of the affected bonds. These bonds have not paid interest
for an extended period of time due to weak performance that reduced
the interest distribution amount to zero.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-8

Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-2 Trust

Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-7

Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSAB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-1

Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-7

Cl. 8-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-9

Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Trust 2005-HYB9

Cl. 2-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-54CB

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-4

Cl. A-X2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-6

Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2006-AB1

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10XS

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R4

Cl. 1A-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-33H

Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2016
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-2

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-3

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The factors that Moody's considers in rating an IO bond depend on
the type of referenced securities or assets to which the IO bond is
linked. Generally, the ratings on IO bonds reflect the linkage and
performance of the respective transactions, including expected
losses on the collateral, and pay-downs or write-offs of the
related reference bonds. However, downgrade of the ratings of 23 IO
bonds to C(sf) reflects the nonpayment of interest for an extended
period, ranging between 19 months to 12 years. Prior rating actions
did not take the nonpayment of interest into consideration. The
action corrects the ratings to reflect the nonpayment of interest
for an extended period of time due to weak performance.

For these bonds, the coupon rate or the notional balance is subject
to a calculation that has reduced the required interest
distribution to zero. The reduction to zero is generally attributed
to weak performance and/or rate reduction on the collateral due to
underlying loan modifications. Because the coupon on these bonds is
subject to changes in interest rates and/or collateral composition,
there is a remote possibility that they may receive interest in the
future. The rating of C addresses the loss of interest attributable
to credit related reasons.

Principal Methodologies

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $110.3MM of RMBS Issued 2003 & 2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 28 bonds,
downgraded the ratings of three bonds, and confirmed the ratings of
12 bonds from 12 residential mortgage backed securitization (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2003 and 2006. The action includes the
resolution of the review of 14 interest-only (IO) bonds that were
among those placed on review on August 29, 2017 in connection with
a reassessment of Moody's internal linkage of certain IO bonds to
their reference bond(s) or pool(s).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The rating
upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the related
pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement available to the
bonds and/or the realignment based on the current pro rata payment
and loss allocation since credit supports have depleted. The rating
downgrades are due to the weaker performance of the underlying
collateral and/or the erosion of enhancement available to the
bonds.

The actions resolve the review of 14 IO bonds which were among
those placed on review for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages
captured in Moody's internal database, prompted by the
identification of errors in that database. The factors that Moody's
considers in rating an IO bond depend on the type of referenced
securities or assets to which the IO bond is linked. The ratings of
the IO bonds reflect the performance of the underlying collateral
and bonds.

Class A-X-2 from IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2 is an IO
PO, a bond with both an IO component and a principal-only (PO)
component, Moody's determines the ratings of IO PO bonds such as
this using a weighted average of the ratings of the two
components.

Moody's has reassessed the linkage for the 14 IO bonds previously
on review, and determined that all of these IO bonds were linked to
the appropriate bond(s) or pool(s).

Moody's is evaluating the remaining IO bonds on review and note
that, although a number of linkages may be corrected, this will not
necessarily lead to rating movements in all cases.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2FVCqxR


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $146.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003 & 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two bonds,
downgraded the ratings of 17 bonds, and confirmed the ratings of 12
bonds from 11 residential mortgage backed securitization (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2003 and 2008. The rating action
includes the resolution of the review of 14 interest-only (IO)
bonds that were among those placed on review on August 29, 2017 in
connection with a reassessment of Moody's internal linkage of
certain IO bonds to their reference bond(s) or pool(s).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The rating
upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the related
pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement available to the
bonds and/or the realignment based on the current pro rata payment
and loss allocation since credit supports have depleted. The rating
downgrades are due to the weaker performance of the underlying
collateral and/or the erosion of enhancement available to the
bonds.

The actions resolve the review of 14 IO bonds which were among
those placed on review for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages
captured in Moody's internal database, prompted by the
identification of errors in that database. The factors that Moody's
considers in rating an IO bond depend on the type of referenced
securities or assets to which the IO bond is linked. The ratings of
the IO bonds reflect the performance of underlying collateral and
bonds.

Moody's has reassessed the linkage for the 14 IO bonds previously
on review, and determined that all of these IO bonds were linked to
the appropriate pool(s). These 14 IO bonds reference a portion of
the aggregate collateral pool (a "sub-pool"), each of which
sub-pool amounts to 75% or more of the entire collateral pool. As a
result, Moody's have treated these IO bonds as linked to the entire
pool.

Moody's is evaluating the remaining IO bonds on review and note
that, although a number of linkages may be corrected, this will not
necessarily lead to rating movements in all cases.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2C6E0L5


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $624MM of Alt-A Loans Issued 2005-2006
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 34 tranches and
downgraded seven tranches from eight US residential mortgage backed
transactions (RMBS), backed by Alt-A loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American General Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-1

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. VIII-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-G Trust

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-10

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 4, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-11

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3A5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3A1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 3A2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-9

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates 2005-5

Cl. II-AN, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A1D1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A1D2, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on August 8, 2016)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. The
rating upgrades are primarily due to an improvement in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are
primarily due to deterioration in credit enhancement to the bonds
and reflect the expected losses on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. The
methodologies used in rating IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-AR1 CL. A-2X were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published
in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in published in June 2017.


Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 26 US RMBS IO Bonds From 24 Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 24
Interest-Only (IO) bonds, upgraded the rating of one IO bond and
downgraded the rating of one IO bond from 24 US residential
mortgage backed securitization (RMBS) transactions, issued by
multiple issuers prior to 2009. Of these, 2 bonds were among those
placed on review on August 15, 2017 in connection with a correction
of errors in Moody's earlier analysis, and 24 bonds were among
those placed on review on August 29, 2017 in connection with a
reassessment of Moody's internal linkage of these IO bonds to their
reference bond(s) or pool(s).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action resolves the review of 2 IO bonds which were among those
placed on review in connection with data input errors in prior
analyses and 24 IO bonds which were among those placed on review
for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages captured in Moody's
internal database, prompted by the identification of errors in that
database. The factors that Moody's considers in rating an IO bond
depend on the type of referenced securities or assets to which the
IO bond is linked.

For the 2 IO bonds that had data input errors in prior analysis,
the data inputs were corrected as part of the analysis for this
rating action.

Moody's has reassessed the linkage for all of the 26 IO bonds in
rating action, and determined that their prior linkages were
incorrect. The linkages of all 26 IO bonds have been updated.

Of the 26 IO bonds in action, 4 IO bonds reference multiple bonds
and 22 IO bonds reference a portion of the aggregate collateral
pool(s) (a "sub-pool"). For 21 of the 22 IO bonds referencing
sub-pools, the sub-pool amounts to 75% or more of the entire
collateral pool; as a result, Moody's has treated these IO bonds as
linked to the entire pool.

The remaining IO bond, Cl. AX from Structured Asset Securities Corp
Trust 2005-17, references two sub-pools. One sub-pool amounts to
75% or more of the entire collateral pool, while the other sub-pool
amounts to less than 75% of the entire collateral pool. The
realized losses to date (% of original balance) of the sub-pools
backing this IO bond are comparable to that of the entire
collateral pools. As a result, Moody's has also treated this IO
bond as linked to the entire collateral pool.

The rating actions on the 26 IO bonds reflect the linkage
reassessment, the corrections to the linkages, and updated
performance of the underlying collateral and bonds.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2srCR0X


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 36 US RMBS Bonds Issued Prior to 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 33
Interest-Only (IO) bonds, and downgraded the ratings of 3 IO bonds
from 25 US residential mortgage backed securitization (RMBS)
transactions, issued by multiple issuers prior to 2009. These 36 IO
bonds were among those placed on review on August 29, 2017 in
connection with a reassessment of Moody's internal linkage of these
IO bonds to their reference bond(s) or pool(s). 32 bonds in this
action are IO PO bonds, which have both an IO component and a
principal-only (PO) component.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action resolves the review of 36 IO bonds which were among
those placed on review for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages
captured in Moody's internal database, prompted by the
identification of errors in that database. The factors that Moody's
considers in rating an IO bond depend on the type of referenced
securities or assets to which the IO bond is linked. For IO PO
bonds, which have both an IO component and a PO component, Moody's
determines the ratings of IO PO bonds using a weighted average of
the ratings of the two components.

Moody's has reassessed the linkage for the 36 IO bonds being
confirmed or downgraded in rating action, and determined that 23 of
these IO bonds were linked to the appropriate bonds(s) or pool(s).
For the remaining 13 IO bonds, the linkage was incorrect and has
been updated. Nine of these 13 bonds are IO PO bonds, 5 of which
had a linkage correction applied only with respect to the PO
component, 3 of which had a linkage correction applied with respect
to only the referenced pool(s) or bond(s) and one which had a
linkage correction with respect to both. The rating actions reflect
the linkage reassessment, the corrections to the linkages of the 13
IO bonds, and updated performance of the underlying collateral and
bonds.

All of the IO bonds in action reference both certain senior bond(s)
and a portion of the aggregate collateral pool in the transaction.
The linkage to the pool is often determined as a calculation of the
overcollateralization available to the senior bond(s). For
simplification, Moody's treated such overcollateralization as a
subordinated tranche and have considered these 36 IO bonds as
linked to multiple bonds.

Moody's are evaluating the remaining IO bonds on review and note
that, although a number of linkages may be corrected, this will not
necessarily lead to rating movements in all cases.

Principal Methodologies

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2Eg0Npn


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 52 Bonds From 42 U.S. RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 47
Interest-Only (IO) bonds, upgraded the ratings of 2 IO bonds and
downgraded the ratings of 3 IO bonds from 42 US residential
mortgage backed securitization (RMBS) transactions, issued by
multiple issuers prior to 2009. Of these, 3 bonds were among those
placed on review on August 15, 2017 in connection with a correction
of errors in Moody's earlier analysis, and 49 bonds were among
those placed on review on August 29, 2017 in connection with a
reassessment of Moody's internal linkage of these IO bonds to their
reference bond(s) or pool(s). 6 bonds in this action are IO PO
bonds, which have both an IO component and a principal-only (PO)
component.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action resolves the review of 3 IO bonds which were among those
placed on review in connection with data input errors in prior
analyses and 49 IO bonds which were among those placed on review
for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages captured in Moody's
internal database, prompted by the identification of errors in that
database. The factors that Moody's considers in rating an IO bond
depend on the type of referenced securities or assets to which the
IO bond is linked. For IO PO bonds, which have both an IO component
and a PO component, Moody's determines the rating of IO PO bonds
using a weighted average of the ratings of the two components.

For the 3 IO bonds that had data input errors in prior analysis,
the data inputs were corrected as part of the analysis for this
rating action.

Moody's has reassessed the linkage for the 52 IO bonds in rating
action, and determined that 34 of these IO bonds were linked to the
appropriate bonds(s) or pool(s). For the remaining 18 IO bonds, the
linkage was incorrect and has been updated. Six of these 18 IO
bonds are IO PO bonds for which the linkage correction applied only
with respect to the PO component, where prior analysis incorrectly
omitted the PO component rating.

All 52 IO bonds in action reference a portion of the aggregate
collateral pool (a "sub-pool"). For 31 of the IO bonds, the
sub-pool amounts to 75% or more of the entire collateral pool; as a
result, Moody's have treated these IO bonds as linked to the entire
pool. For nine IO bonds, the sub-pool amounts to less than 75% of
the entire collateral pool. However, the realized loss to date (%
of original balance) of the sub-pool(s) backing these nine bonds
are comparable to the entire pool. As a result, Moody's have also
treated these nine IO bonds as linked to the entire pool.

For the remaining 12 IO bonds that reference a sub-pool, the
sub-pool amounts to less than 75% of the entire collateral pool and
has a different realized loss to date (% of original balance) than
that of the entire pool. As a result, Moody's used the realized
loss of the sub-pool in the analysis for rating actions.

The rating actions on the 52 IO bonds reflect the linkage
reassessment, the corrections to the linkages of 18 IO bonds, and
updated performance of the underlying collateral and bonds.

Moody's is evaluating the remaining IO bonds on review and note
that, although a number of linkages may be corrected, this will not
necessarily lead to rating movements in all cases.

Factors that can lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2EPJrAU


[*] S&P Completes Review on 100 Classes From 17 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 100 classes from 17 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2004 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime collateral. The review yielded 50 upgrades, three
downgrades, 46 affirmations, and one discontinuance.

Analytical Considerations

S&P said, "We incorporate various considerations into our decisions
to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

Collateral performance/delinquency trends;

Missed interest payments;

Priority of principal payments;

Erosion/increase in credit support;

Loan modifications; and

Available subordination and/or overcollateralization."

Rating Actions

Please see the ratings list for the rationales for classes with
rating transitions. The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's
opinion that S&P's projected credit support and collateral
performance on these classes has remained relatively consistent
with its prior projections.

A List of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                   http://bit.ly/2BvtsIM


[*] S&P Completes Review on 22 Classes From 6 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 1, 2018, completed its review of 22
classes from six U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2001 and 2007. All of these
transactions are backed by reperforming collateral. The review
yielded eight upgrades, 12
affirmations, and two discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P said, "We incorporate various considerations into our decisions
to raise or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative ratings
suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations are
based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
Historical missed interest payments;
Principal payment priority; and
Available subordination and/or overcollateralization."

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

S&P said, "We raised five ratings by four or more notches due to
increased credit support. This is attributed to sequential
principal payments because of failing cumulative loss triggers. As
a result, the upgrades on these classes reflect the classes'
ability to withstand a higher level of projected losses than
previously anticipated."


[*] S&P Discontinues 39 Classes From 12 CDO Deals on Note Paydowns
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on one class from one
cash flow (CF) collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and 38 classes from 11
CF collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

-- Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranche
paid down, other rated tranches
still outstanding.

-- Ares XXVI CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in December
2017.

-- Catamaran CLO 2013-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
December 2017.

-- Flatiron CLO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid
down.

-- Fortress Credit BSL II Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
November 2017.

-- Fortress Credit Opportunities III CLO L.P. (CF CLO): optional
redemption in November 2017.

-- JFIN CLO 2012 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down,
other rated tranches still outstanding.

-- JFIN REVOLVER CLO 2015 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

-- Kingsland V Ltd. (CF CLO): last remaining rated tranche paid
down.

-- Stoney Lane Funding I Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
January 2017.

-- Venture VIII CDO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down,
other rated tranches still outstanding.

-- Venture XVI CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in January
2017.

  RATINGS DISCONTINUED                                        
  Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  B                   NR                  B+ (sf)
   Ares XXVI CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
  C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
   Catamaran CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                             Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
  C                   NR                  A (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
  F                   NR                  B (sf)
   Flatiron CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  D                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

  Fortress Credit BSL II Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1F-R              NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  AA (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  A (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
   Fortress Credit Opportunities III CLO L.P.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-1T-R              NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2T-R              NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-1-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)
  B-2-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  A+ (sf)
  D-R                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
   JFIN CLO 2012 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-2a                NR                  AAA (sf)
   JFIN REVOLVER CLO 2015 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  B-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-F                 NR                  AAA (sf)
   Kingsland V Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  E                   NR                  B (sf)


  Stoney Lane Funding I Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  C                   NR                  A- (sf)
  D                   NR                  B+ (sf)
   Venture VIII CDO Ltd.
                             Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  C                   NR                  A- (sf)
  D                   NR                  B+ (sf)

  Venture VIII CDO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-2A                NR                  AAA (sf)

  Venture XVI CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Actions on 39 Classes From 13 US RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 39 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2000 and 2005. These transactions are backed by subprime
and prime collateral. The review yielded 19 upgrades, 16
affirmations, and four discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into our decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows. These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential
effects on certain classes. Some of these considerations include:

- Historical interest shortfalls;
- Priority of principal payments;
- Loan modifications; and
- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

Please see the ratings list for the rationales for classes with
rating transitions. The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion
that our projected credit support and collateral performance on
these classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-FRE1 received funds
related to a July 29, 2014, settlement regarding the alleged breach
of certain representations and warranties in the governing
agreements of 330 JPMorgan Chase & Co. legacy RMBS trusts. The
trustee applied the settlement funds as subsequent recoveries and
unscheduled principal payments, and these allocations satisfied the
amounts outstanding on two of the classes, the ratings of which S&P
is are now discontinuing. They also sufficiently increased the
credit support for two other classes to cover S&P's projected
losses for those classes at their new rating levels.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                         http://bit.ly/2EeUMwk


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 87 Classes From 17 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 87 classes from 17 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2001 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime or re-performing collateral. The review yielded 29
upgrades, 49 affirmations, two withdrawals, and seven
discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Loss severity trends;
-- Expected short duration;
-- Subsequent upgrade is unlikely under current criteria; Default
no longer virtually certain; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"We raised 12 ratings by four or more notches due to increased
credit support. This is attributed to sequential principal payments
because of either failing performance triggers or subordination
floors defined in the legal documents. As a result, the upgrades on
these classes reflect the classes' ability to withstand a higher
level of projected losses than previously anticipated.

"Further, we withdrew our ratings on classes A-II-A and A-II-B from
RASC Series 2003-KS4 Trust since Ambac Assurance Corporation is no
longer rated by S&P Global Ratings. As such, we no longer have
sufficient information about the insurers' creditworthiness to form
the basis of an insurer-dependent rating for the aforementioned
classes."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2o4J4KY


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

                   *** End of Transmission ***