TCR_Public/180211.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 11, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 41

                            Headlines

ALESCO PREFERRED X: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating From Ba1
APOLLO AVIATION 2014-1: Fitch Assigns BBsf Rating to Cl. C Debt
BBCMS TRUST 2018-RRI: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on F Certs
BENCHMARK 2018-B1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F-RR Certs
BENCHMARK 2018-B2: Fitch to Rate Class G-RR Certificates 'Bsf'

CANYON CAPITAL 2014-1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. E-R Notes
CD 2017-CD3: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certificates
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on X-B Certs
CIFC FUNDING 2018-I: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2015-A: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to B-4 Certs

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2018-RP1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'Bsf'
COMM 2016-DC2: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M Debt Rating to Ca
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: Fitch Lowers Class H Certs Rating to 'Csf'
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: S&P Affrims B+(sf) Rating on Class G Notes

CREDIT SUISSE 2008-C1: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 3 Tranches to 'Csf'
ELLINGTON CLO II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
EVERBANK MORTGAGE 2018-1: Moody's Rates Cl. B-4 Debt '(P)Ba2'
FANNIE MAE 2018-C01: Fitch to Rate 19 Note Classes 'Bsf'
FIRST FRANKLIN 2005-FFH2: Moody's Hikes Cl. M3 Debt Rating to B1

FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on E Notes
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to B-5 Debt
FREDDIE MAC 2017-HRP1: Fitch Corrects Dec. 13 Release
GALTON FUNDING 2018-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Cl. B5 Certs
GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Hikes Rating on Cl. J Certs to 'BBsf'

GLS AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class C Notes
HAMPTON ROADS 2007A: Fitch Affirms B+ Rating on Class III Bonds
JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 2 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC6: Fitch Hikes Cl. L Certs Rating to 'Bsf'
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC13: Fitch Hikes Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to Bsf

JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: DBRS Hikes Class C Debt Rating to BB(high)
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class E Certs
JP MORGAN 2018-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class B-5 Debt
JP MORGAN 2018-ASH8: S&P Assigns Prelim. B-(sf) Rating on F Certs
LOCKWOOD GROVE: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. E-RR Notes

MAGNETITE XVI: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
MARINER CLO 5: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
MIDOCEAN CREDIT I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-RR Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Moody's Lowers Cl. X-B Certs Rating to B2

MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS9: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Withdraws C(sf) Ratings on 6 Tranches
PINNACLE PARK: Moody's Lowers Class F Notes Rating to Caa1
ROCKWALL CDO II: Moody's Hikes Class B-1L Notes Rating to Ba1

SATURNS SEARS 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on $60.19MM Notes to C
SELKIRK 2013-1: DBRS Hikes Class E Debt Rating to BB(high)
SELKIRK 2013-2: DBRS Hikes Class G Notes Rating From BB(low)
SELKIRK 2014-3A: DBRS Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B(high)
SELKIRK 2014-3V: DBRS Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B(high)

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-CH1: Moody's Rates Class B-5 Certs '(P)Ba2'
TESLA AUTO 2018-A: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
THARALDSON HOTEL 2018-THPT: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on F Certs
TOWD POINT 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Class B2 Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL 2018-C8: Fitch to Rate Class F-RR Certs 'B-sf'

UNITED AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
VB-S1 ISSUER: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes 'BB-sf'
VENTURE XVI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E-RR Notes
VOYA CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C33: S&P Affirms CCC(sf) Rating on Cl. C Notes

WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on X-H Certs
WIRELESS CAPITAL 2013-2: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Ratings on 2 Tranches
WP GLIMCHER 2015-WPG: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Cl. SQ-3 Certs
[*] Moody's Hikes $110.3MM of Alt-A RMBS & Multi-Family Loans
[*] Moody's Hikes $537MM of RMBS Issued 2015-2016

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.54BB of RMBS Issued 2001-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $158.3MM of Alt-A & Option ARM Loans
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $207.4MM of RMBS Issued 2004 & 2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $3.1BB of GSE (CRT) RMBS Issued in 2006
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 110 Classes From 12 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 93 Classes From 17 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Withdraws Ratings on 26 Classes From Five U.S. RMBS Deals

                            *********

ALESCO PREFERRED X: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating From Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding X, Ltd.:

US$489,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due September 23, 2036 (current balance of
$243,267,828), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 28, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$119,500,000 Class A-2A Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due September 23, 2036, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
on March 28, 2016 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class A-2B Second Priority Senior Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due September 23, 2036, Upgraded to Aa3
(sf); previously on March 28, 2016 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$82,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes due September 23, 2036 (current balance of $81,138,347),
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on March 28, 2016 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding X, Ltd, issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2017.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 10.2% or $27.7
million since February 2017, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets. Based on Moody's calculations,
the OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2, and Class B notes have
improved to 251.2%, 163.9%, and 134.6%, respectively, from February
2017 levels of 235.5%, 159.4%, and 132.6%, respectively. Moody's
gave full par credit in its analysis to one deferring asset with $5
million in par that meets certain criteria. The Class A-1 notes
will continue to benefit from redemptions of any assets in the
collateral pool.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit estimates.
Because these are not public ratings, they are subject to
additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 619)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: +2

Class A-2B: +2

Class B: +4

Class C-1: +3

Class C-2: +3

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1675)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2A: -2

Class A-2B: -2

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then used
the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par and (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $611.1 million, defaulted par of $52.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 11.08% (implying a WARF of 1056),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc,
an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive
credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the
bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.
For insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies
on the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit
analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory
financial reports.


APOLLO AVIATION 2014-1: Fitch Assigns BBsf Rating to Cl. C Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to the 2018
refinancing asset-backed securities (ABS) issued by Apollo Aviation
Securitization Equity Trust 2014-1 (AASET 2014-1):

-- $375,000,000 class A loans 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68,000,000 class B loans 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,000,000 class C loans 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

AASET 2014-1 is a Delaware statutory trust established in 2014 to
initially purchase 40 commercial aircraft from SASOF II, a private
equity fund managed by Apollo Aviation Group (Apollo). The trust
will acquire beneficial interests in an additional five aircraft
and two engines from SASOF II as part of the refinancing. AASET
2014-1 now owns beneficial interests in 37 aircraft and two
engines, and their related leases. The 2018 refinancing will redeem
any outstanding notes from the trust, including the class E
certificates.

AASET 2014-1 is serviced by Apollo via its Irish servicing
subsidiary Apollo Aviation Management Limited (AAML).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

End-of-Life Asset Quality: The pool is largely comprised of
good-quality A320 and B737 family current generation aircraft
despite the high weighted average (WA) age of 17 years. However,
there is a significant concentration in less marketable A330s
widebody aircraft, which have been prone to higher declines in
market value in recent years. It is expected that 44% of the pool
will come off lease prior to 2020. However, many of these aircraft
are expected to be sold or parted out at lease-end due to their
age.

Weak Lessee Credits: There are 20 airline lessees in the pool with
a significant concentration of unrated or speculative grade airline
lessees, which is typical of aircraft ABS. Fitch assumed unrated
lessees would perform consistent with either a 'B' or 'CCC' Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to accurately reflect the default risk in the
pool. Lessee ratings were further stressed during future recessions
and when aircraft reach Tier 3 classification. Despite the weaker
credit profile of the pool, the largest lessee is American Airlines
rated 'BB-', a factor Fitch considered in its analysis.

Technological Risk: The A320 and B737 current generation aircraft
both face replacement programs with the recent introduction of the
A320neo and B737 MAX. The A330 also faces future replacement from
the A330neo. Other variants from new and existing OEMs will also
pressure the pool's values and lease rates. However, the large
operator bases, long lead time for replacement and current low fuel
price environment should all help to mitigate this risk.

Adequate Structural Protections: All classes of notes were able to
pay in full under stress scenarios commensurate with the assigned
ratings. The transaction contains structural features that are
expected to protect noteholders from deterioration in cash flow.
These include a DSCR rapid amortization trigger, partial cash
sweeps, and a requirement to use excess proceeds to amortize the
notes.

Strong Servicing Capability: The transaction will depend on
Apollo's ability to collect lease and maintenance payments,
remarket and repossess aircraft in an event of lessee default, and
procure maintenance to ensure stable performance. Fitch believes
Apollo is a capable servicer, evidenced by servicing of their
managed portfolio and sponsored ABS.

Commercial Aviation Cyclicality: The airline industry has
historically been subject to significant cyclicality stemming from
macroeconomic and geopolitical events. Downturns are typically
marked by reduced aircraft utilization rates, values and lease
rates as well as deteriorating credit quality amongst lessees.
Fitch's analysis assumes multiple periods of significant volatility
over the life of the transaction.

Fitch's modeling assumptions and stresses were derived and applied
consistent with criteria. Assumptions including those relating to
aircraft tiers, depreciation, recessionary value declines, and
lease rate factors are unchanged from the values stated in criteria
in Fitch's primary scenarios. Fitch utilized the low end of the
recessionary value decline stress ranges.

The lower of mean and median (LMM) maintenance-adjusted base values
(MABVs) were utilized for the values of aircraft in the pool. Fitch
also removed the highest outlier appraisal for widebody aircraft in
the pool due to the high level of deviation observed in appraisal
values. Aircraft useful life was assumed to be 20 years for Fitch's
primary rating scenario, but adjusted in certain cases according to
current remaining lease terms. Assumptions detailed below are also
for Fitch's primary scenario, and are based off Apollo's historical
fleet experience and data. The information was supplemented by
industry data in certain instances.

Fitch utilized a cumulative probability curve for remarketing
downtime, whereby Tier 1 aircraft were assumed be remarketed within
one month 45% and 55% of the time under an 'Asf' scenario in
recessionary and non-recessionary periods, respectively, both well
below Apollo's historical experience. These probabilities then
increase month-over-month until tapering off and reaching 100%
probability by month eight and seven, respectively. Probability
assumptions were stressed further by 5% across tiers, and increased
by 5% to assume a higher probability of shorter remarketing times
across lower rating category stresses.

Under 'Asf', 'BBBsf' and 'BBsf' scenarios, Fitch assumed four,
three and two months of repossession downtime during assumed
recessionary periods, and three, two and two months during
non-recessionary periods, respectively. Recessions were assumed to
last for four years with value declines occurring over the first
three years. The first recession was assumed to begin six months
after transaction close, while each subsequent recession was
assumed to begin five years after the end of the prior recession.

Narrowbody aircraft were assumed to experience remarketing and
repossession costs of $400,000 and $450,000, respectively, under
'Asf' scenarios. These cost assumptions were each decreased by
$50,000 when moving down to lower rating category stresses.
Widebody aircraft were assumed to experience $800,000 and $700,000
in remarketing and repossession costs, respectively, under the
'Asf' scenario. These cost assumptions were also decreased by
$50,000 when moving down to lower rating category stresses.

Fitch assumed new lease terms of 40 and 50 months in 'Asf'
scenarios for recessionary and non-recessionary periods,
respectively. These assumptions were increased by five months each
when moving down to lower rating category stresses. Fitch assumed a
lease extension probability of 50% for all scenarios. Fitch assumed
an extension term of 24 months for 'Asf' scenarios, which increases
by six months when moving down to lower rating category stresses.
These assumptions are well below Apollo's historical experience.

Fitch assumed the majority of aircraft by value were sold for 50%
of their future stressed market values for residual proceeds
assumptions. Fitch assumed 100% and 75%, respectively, for Tier 1
and 2 narrowbody aircraft sold within the first five years
following close due to high residual proceeds observed in both
Apollo and industry sales data. All assumed proceeds were based off
the aircraft market value in Fitch's modeling scenarios, which
considers standard depreciation and any recessionary value declines
to which aircraft are exposed.

Fitch assumed largely consistent assumptions for the two engines in
the pool with several unique exceptions described herein. Phase 1
engines were assumed to incur 0% depreciation while 2 and 3 engines
were assumed to incur 5% and 10%, respectively. Further to value
considerations, phase 1, 2 and 3 engines were assumed to incur 10%,
15% and 20% recessionary value declines, respectively, under the
'Asf' scenario. These value declines were stressed at reduced
levels for lower rating scenarios.

All future leases related to the engines were assumed to be
short-term leases with lease rate factors of 1.20% for phase 1 and
2 engines and 1.45% for phase 3, consistent with rates observed in
market data. These short-term leases were assumed to have terms of
four, five and six months, respectively, with an extension rate
probability of 30%. Remarketing and repossession costs for these
leases were assumed to start at $20,000 and $40,000, respectively,
decreasing by $5,000 when moving down to each lower rating category
scenario. These costs were assumed to be consistent across
recessionary and non-recessionary environments.

All other assumptions for the engines in the pool were consistent
with the assumptions outlined above for aircraft.

Maintenance assumptions and stresses were also applied consistent
with criteria and the assumptions detailed above. Fitch's primary
maintenance cash flows assume 50% of future lessees pay maintenance
reserves.

Fitch's ratings do not consider the application of step-up interest
to the notes following the anticipated repayment date which occurs
seven years following transaction close.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Due to the correlation between global economic conditions and the
airline industry, the ratings may be affected by global
macro-economic or geopolitical factors over the remaining term of
the transaction. Therefore, Fitch evaluated various sensitivity
scenarios which could affect future cash flows from the pool and
recommended ratings for the notes.

Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis assuming a 25% decrease to
Fitch's lease rate factor curve to observe the impact of depressed
lease rates on the pool. This scenario highlights the effect of
increased competition in the aircraft leasing market, particularly
for mid- to end-of-life aircraft over the past few years, and
stresses the pool to a higher degree by assuming lease rates below
observed market rates. The class A and B notes are likely to be
unaffected under this scenario, while the class C notes could be
subjected to a one category downgrade.

Fitch evaluated a scenario in which all unrated airlines are
assumed to carry a 'CCC' rating. This scenario mimics a prolonged
recessionary environment in which airlines are susceptible to an
increased likelihood of default. In turn, this would subject the
aircraft pool to more downtime and expenses, as repossession and
remarketing events would increase. The notes show little
sensitivity to increased defaults and associated expenses and
downtime under this scenario. All classes are still able to pass
scenarios commensurate with their assigned ratings. The notes are
somewhat insulated from this scenario, as well as the LRF stress
scenario, due to the relatively short expected remaining asset
life.

Fitch created a scenario in which the A330s in the pool encounter a
considerable amount of stress to their residual values. All the
A330s, which total 27.6% of the pool by LMM of MABVs, were assumed
to be Tier 3 aircraft to stress recessionary value declines.
Further, a lower credit of 25% was given to residual proceeds. The
A330s are only granted part-out value at the end of their useful
lives under this scenario. While the rating of the class A notes is
unlikely to be affected by such a scenario, the class B and C notes
could experience a downgrade of up to one and two categories,
respectively.


BBCMS TRUST 2018-RRI: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BBCMS Trust
2018-RRI's $400.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate, interest-only
commercial mortgage loan totaling $400.0 million with three,
one-year extension options, secured by cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted mortgages, and deeds of trust to secure debt on the
borrowers' fee and leasehold interests in 86 limited-service
hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 5,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  BBCMS Trust 2018-RRI
   Class     Rating             Amount
                               (mil. $)
  A         AAA (sf)        111,200,000
  X-CP      BBB- (sf)       110,600,000(i)
  X-NCP     BBB- (sf)       110,600,000(i)
  B         AA- (sf)         40,600,000
  C         A- (sf)          30,100,000
  D         BBB- (sf)        39,900,000
  E         BB- (sf)         62,600,000
  F         B- (sf)          55,500,000
  G         NR               39,900,000
  HRR       NR               20,200,000

(i)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP and
X-NCP certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the class
B, C, and D certificates.


BENCHMARK 2018-B1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F-RR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Benchmark 2018-B1 Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2018-B1.

-- $18,703,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $157,629,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,272,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,449,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $387,112,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $885,279,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97,114,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,853,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,075,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,853,000ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,520,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,334,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,520,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,334,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,074,000ac class F-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:
-- $40,816,346ac class G-RR;
-- $40,426,662ad class VRR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.
(d) Vertical credit risk retention interest.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Jan. 16, 2018, class
A-4 decreased in size from $175,000,000 to $135,000,000, and class
A-5 increased in size from $347,112,000 to $387,112,000. The
classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

Since Fitch's presale was published on Jan. 16, 2018, the issuer
provided Fitch with year-end 2017 financial performance figures for
the Radisson Blu Aqua. Net cash flow (NCF) at year-end 2017 was
$5.5 million, approximately $1.3 million below TTM August 2017
financials, which were previously the most recent information
available to Fitch. The short-term performance drop was primarily
attributed to new supply coming on-line, namely the opening of the
1,205 key Marriott Marquis in September 2017. Fitch reviewed the
updated information and determined that no changes were necessary
to its previously published NCF. Fitch's NCF analysis is meant to
reflect long-term estimations of property performance through a
complete economic cycle. Significant performance stresses were
built into Fitch's analysis, and year-end 2017 performance strongly
aligned with Fitch's NCF of $5.5 million.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 49 loans secured by 173
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,166,378,009 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by German American Capital Corporation, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, National Association, and Citi Real Estate Funding Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 74.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 89.9%, and asset summary reviews
of 100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage in Line with Recent Transactions: The pool's
leverage is in line with recent comparable Fitch-rated
multiborrower transactions. The Fitch DSCR is 1.28x, which is
slightly better than the 2017 average of 1.26x. Fitch LTV is
103.2%, slightly worse than the 2017 average of 101.6%. Excluding
credit opinion loans, the pool's normalized Fitch DSCR and LTV were
also close, at 1.26x and 107.6%, respectively, compared to the 2017
averages of 1.21x and 107.2%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing 9.2%
of the pool, have investment-grade credit opinions. The Woods (4.9%
of pool) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'Asf*' on a
standalone basis. Worldwide Plaza (4.3% of pool) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB+sf*' on a stand-alone
basis.

Weak Amortization: Seventeen loans (58.8% of pool) are full-term
interest-only and 18 loans (28.4% of pool) are partial
interest-only, compared to similar Fitch-rated transactions in
2017, which had an average full-term interest-only percentage of
46.1% and an average partial interest-only percentage of 28.7%. The
pool is scheduled to amortize by 5.9% of the initial pool balance
by maturity, which is lower than the 2017 and 2016 averages of 7.9%
and 10.4%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 13.8% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
Benchmark 2018-B1 certificates and found that the transaction
displays average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a
scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.
In a more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB+sf' could result.


BENCHMARK 2018-B2: Fitch to Rate Class G-RR Certificates 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Benchmark 2018-B2
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
Series 2018-B2.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $29,604,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $341,798,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $444,175,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54,333,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,220,681,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,281,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165,771,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,281,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,280,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,838,000ab class X-D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,838,000b class D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,746,000bc class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,837,000bc class F-RR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,838,000bc class G-RR 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

The following class is not expected to be rated:
-- $56,512,898bc class NR-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 5, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which hare 57 loans secured by 67
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,507,013,899 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by German American Capital Corporation, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, National Association, and Citi Real Estate Funding Inc.

Fitch received a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 79.5% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 86.7%, and asset summary reviews
of 86.7% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage Than Recent Transactions: The pool has average
leverage relative to other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.26x is in line with the year-to-date (YTD) 2017 average of
1.26x and greater than the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch
loan to value (LTV) of 99.2% is lower than the YTD 2017 average of
101.6% and is in line with the 2016 average of 105.2%. Excluding
the credit opinion loans, the Fitch DSCR is 1.24x and the Fitch LTV
is 106.6%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: There are 10 loans,
including the six-loan Beacon multifamily group with
investment-grade credit opinions totaling 18% of the pool. This is
above the 2017 average of 11.7% credit opinion loans in other
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The credit opinion loans
include Apple Campus 3 (BBB-*sf; 4.5% of the pool), The Woods
(Asf*; 3.8% of the pool), Worldwide Plaza (BBB+*sf; 3.3% of the
pool), Red Building (BBB-*sf; 2.7% of the pool) and six Beacon
multifamily loans with individual credit opinions ranging from
'BBB-sf*' to 'AAAsf*'. Net of these loans, the Fitch DSCR and LTV
are 1.24x and 106.6%, respectively for this transaction.

High-Quality Collateral: Fitch performed site inspections on 75.8%
of the pool. Of the inspected properties, 31.0% of them received a
property quality grade of 'A' or 'A-', and 37.4% of the sampled
properties received a property quality grade of 'B+'. Additionally,
no property in the pool received a property quality grade below
'B-'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 12.9% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period). The
following rating sensitivities describe how the ratings would react
to further NCF declines below Fitch's NCF. The implied rating
sensitivities are only indicative of some of the potential outcomes
and do not consider other risk factors to which the transaction is
exposed. Stressing additional risk factors may result in different
outcomes. Furthermore, the implied ratings, after the further NCF
stresses are applied, are more akin to what the ratings would be at
deal issuance had those further stressed NCFs been in place at that
time.


CANYON CAPITAL 2014-1: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
CLO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Canyon
Capital CLO 2014-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer"):

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$5,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$248,000,000 Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1A-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$16,000,000 Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-1B-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$44,000,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2031 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
(sf)

US$20,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2031 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Canyon Capital Advisors LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on January 30, 2018
(the "Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of the
Class A-1-R secured notes previously issued on January 30, 2017 and
the Class A-2, B, C, D, and E secured notes previously issued on
April 30, 2014 (the "Original Closing Date") (collectively, the
"Refinanced Notes"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used
proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in
full the Refinanced Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; changes to the
overcollateralization test levels; and changes to comply with the
Volcker Rule.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In particular,
Moody's took into account differences between the trustee's
reported diversity score, and Moody's own diversity score
calculations. For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following
base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $400,000,000

Defaulted par: $0

Diversity Score: 51

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2609

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2609 to 3000)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1A-R Notes: 0

Class A-1B-R Notes: -1

Class A-2-R Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -1

Class D-R Notes: 0

Class E-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2660 to 3392)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1A-R Notes: -1

Class A-1B-R Notes: -3

Class A-2-R Notes: -4

Class B-R Notes: -4

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: -1


CD 2017-CD3: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of CD 2017-CD3 Mortgage
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-CD3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The overall pool performance remains stable
from issuance. There are no delinquent or specially serviced loans.
As of the January 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
balance has been reduced by 0.33% to $1.32 billion from $1.33
billion at issuance. The largest loan in the pool is currently on
the servicer's watchlist.

Largest Loan: The largest loan, 229 West 43rd Street Retail Condo
(7.6% of current pool), is secured by a six-floor, 245,132-square
foot retail condominium located along West 43rd and 44th Streets in
the Times Square area of Manhattan.

As of the September 2017 rent roll, the property was fully leased
to eight tenants, including Bowlmor (31.6% of net rentable area
[NRA]; lease expiry in July 2034), National Geographic (24.1%;
October 2032), Gulliver's Gate (18.6%; January 2031) and Guitar
Center Stores (11.5%; January 2029); however, physical occupancy
was 88.7%. One restaurant tenant, Guy's American Bar & Kitchen
(6.4%), vacated on Dec. 31, 2017, ahead of its scheduled November
2032 lease expiration. The tenant's base rent is considered
below-market at $118.25 psf. Fitch requested an update from the
servicer on the tenant's lease status and intentions, but it was
not provided. Another restaurant tenant, OHM Group (The American
Market by Todd English; 4.9% of NRA), has not yet opened for
business. The tenant was originally expected to take occupancy in
late 2017. Fitch requested an update from the servicer on the
tenant's expected opening date, but it was not provided.

The loan reported a low net cash flow (NCF) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 0.86x for the first half of 2017. This is primarily
due to four tenants, which signed leases at the time of issuance,
including National Geographic, Gulliver's Gate, OHM (The American
Market by Todd English) and Los Tacos (0.7% of NRA), having free
rent periods. At issuance, the borrower deposited $11.1 million
into an upfront reserve for rent concessions for these tenants. For
the first half of 2017, rent concessions totaled $4.3 million,
which would bring DSCR up to 2.30x. In addition, the property
benefits from an Industrial Commercial Incentive Program (ICIP) tax
abatement. The tax exemption has entered its phase out period,
beginning the 2017/2018 tax year with burn-off by 20% per year
until 2021.

Higher Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR and loan-to-value
(LTV) for the trust are 1.14x and 108.4%, respectively, compared to
1.21x and 105.2%, respectively, for Fitch-rated transactions in
2016.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans
(10.2% of pool) have investment-grade credit opinions, which is
above the 2016 average of 8.4%. The third largest loan, 85 Tenth
Avenue (5.7%), has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf' on
a stand-alone basis. Hilton Hawaiian Village Waikiki Beach Resort
(4.5%) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf' on a
stand-alone basis.

Pool Concentrations: The top 10 loans comprise 52.6% of the pool.
Office properties comprise 53.9% of the pool. Geographic
concentrations include New York City (31.3% of pool) and California
(19.6%).

Below-Average Amortization: Sixteen loans (51.2% of pool) are
full-term interest-only and 16 loans (27.2%) are partial
interest-only, compared to 33.3% and 33.3%, respectively, for
Fitch-rated transactions in 2016. The pool is scheduled to amortize
by 6.9% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, well below
the respective 2016 average of 10.4%.

Additional Debt: Two loans (10.2% of pool) have secured subordinate
secured debt and four loans (19%) have mezzanine or preferred
equity financing. The transaction has a Fitch DSCR and LTV on the
total debt of 1.03x and 119.6%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall
stable collateral performance and no material changes since
issuance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration unless a material economic or asset level event changes
the underlying transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $24.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $589.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54.8 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $78.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76.5 million(a) class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.8 million(a)(d) class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable
-- $14.7 million class(a)(d) F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $985.5 million(b) class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61.9 million(b) class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76.5 million(a)(b) class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.0 million(e) class V-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $566,121(e) class V-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $581,020(e) class V-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $700,208(e) class V-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $60.2 million(a)(d) class G;
-- $25.1 million class(a)(c) VRR Interest;
-- $1.0 million class(e) V-E.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 1.9% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 3.1% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(e) Exchangeable certificates.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on X-B Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 12 classes in
CFCRE Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2011-C2, as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded to Aa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO classes Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were affirmed
based on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 5.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the
original pooled balance, the same as Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 51% to $380.7
million from $774.1 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 24% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 67% of
the pool. Five loans, constituting 10% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Nine loans, constituting 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are in special servicing as
of the January distribution date. The largest specially serviced
loan is the LAD SpringHill Suites Loan ($9.95 million -- 2.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a limited service four-story hotel
built in 2008 and located in Bossier City, Louisiana. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2015 for imminent
default and became real estate owned (REO) through a deed-in-lieu
in August 2015.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Crossroads Center
Loan ($7.9 million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
mixed-use office and retail property located in Roanoke, Virginia
near the Roanoke Airport. The loan transferred to special servicing
in December 2016 for maturity default. The loan is now REO.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $10.7 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (60% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2017 operating results for 89% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 84%, compared to 80% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 1.58X and 1.34X, at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 42% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall Loan ($90.2 million --
23.7% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$140.7 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
635,769 square foot (SF) portion within a 1.2 million SF regional
mall located in Grandville, Michigan. The property was built in
2000 and is anchored by Macy's, Younkers, Sears, Kohl's, JC Penney,
Dick's Sporting Goods and Celebration Cinemas. Only Dick's and
Celebration Cinemas are part of the collateral. JC Penney, Macy's,
Sears and Kohl's all have lease expirations in 2019. As of
September 2017, the anchor space was 100% leased, outparcel space
76% leased, and inline space 92% leased, compared to 100%, 87% and
92% leased respectively, at Moody's last review. The other loan
portion is held in COMM 2012-CCRE1 Mortgage Trust. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 66% and
1.43X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Solaris Loan ($40.4 million
-- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 70,023 SF retail
property located in Vail, Colorado. The property was built in 2010.
As of September 2017, the property was 97% leased compared to 100%
leased at Moody's last review. Approximately 11% of tenants roll in
2018 and more than 60% of the tenant leases extend beyond the loan
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 59% and 1.55X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the DC Mixed Use Portfolio A Loan ($29.7
million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by nine cross
collateralized and cross defaulted properties totaling 95,844 SF
located in Washington DC (eight properties) and northern Virginia
(one property). The nine properties contain a mix of retail, office
and mixed-use buildings which the Sponsor acquired between 1988 and
2008. Collectively, the properties are 96% occupied as of September
2017 compared to 94% at last review. This loan is on the watchlist
due to deferred maintenance at the 4445 Wisconsin Avenue NW
property. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.16X at last review.


CIFC FUNDING 2018-I: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by CIFC Funding 2018-I, Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "CIFC Funding 2018-I").

Moody's rating action is:

US$650,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$110,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

CIFC Funding 2018-I is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. Moody's expect the portfolio to be
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

CIFC CLO Management II LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,000,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2875

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2875 to 3306)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2875 to 3738)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2015-A: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to B-4 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to two
notes from two RMBS transactions issued by Citigroup Mortgage Loan
Trust in 2015. The certificates are backed by seasoned performing
and re-performing mortgage loans with a large percentage
(approximately 50% ) of the loans previously modified as of
transaction issuance. The collateral pools comprise of first lien,
fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgage loans with collateral
characteristics similar to that of Alt-A mortgages originated
before 2010.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2

Cl. B-4, Assigned B2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2015 Assigned NR
(sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A

Cl. B-4, Assigned B2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2015 Assigned NR
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

The rating actions are based on Moody's updated loss expectations
on the underlying pools and reflect the credit enhancement
available to the bonds. Moody's ratings also reflect the
representation and warranties (R&W) framework of the transactions,
which Moody's deem to be adequate. Representation provider for the
transactions is Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.

The pools have exhibited lower delinquencies and faster prepayment
rates than originally anticipated, resulting in an improvement to
Moody's future loss projections on the pools since deal issuance.
Moreover, cumulative losses realized on the pools to date have been
small. Further, credit enhancement for Citigroup Mortgage Loan
Trust 2015-A Class B-4 has increased to 10.4% from 6.75% at
issuance and for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2 Class B-4
has increased to 11.1% from 6.9% at issuance.

Moody's expected losses on a pool of re-performing mortgage loans
on Moody's estimates of 1) the default rate on the remaining
balance of the loans and 2) the principal recovery rate on the
defaulted balances. Moody's estimates of defaults are driven by
annual delinquency assumptions adjusted for roll-rates, prepayments
and default burnout factors. In estimating defaults on these pools,
Moody's used initial expected annual delinquency rates of 6% to 10%
and expected prepayment rates of 10% to 12% based on the collateral
characteristics and the observed performance of the individual
pools, and the observed performance of collateral similar to the
underlying loans.

The transactions have a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a subordination floor of 6.90% of the original collateral
balance for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2 and 6.75% of the
original collateral balance for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2015-A. Even though the senior bonds benefit from a cash flow
waterfall that allocates all prepayments to the senior bond for a
specified period of time, an increasing amount of prepayments will
be allocated to the subordinate bonds thereafter, if the loans'
performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests. However, the
subordination floors provide protection to the senior bonds in the
event of tail risk (risk of small number of loans defaulting when
fewer loans remain in pool).

The principal methodology used in rating Citigroup Mortgage Loan
Trust 2015-RP2, Cl. B-4 was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Securitisations Backed by Non- Performing and Re-Performing Loans"
published in August 2016. The principal methodology used in rating
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A, Cl. B-4 was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.



CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2018-RP1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2018-RP1 (CMLTI 2018-RP1):

-- $182,355,000 class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $182,355,000 class A-IO1 notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $182,355,000 class A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $30,195,000 class M-1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,614,000 class M-2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,393,000 class M-3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,210,000 class B-1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,177,000 class B-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

-- $274,874,086 class A-IO2 notional notes;
-- $9,029,000 class B-3 notes;
-- $9,029,000 class B-4 notes;
-- $9,029,014 class B-5 notes;
-- $274,874,086 class A-IO-S notional notes;
-- $296,031,014 class C notional notes;
-- $808,709 class SA notes;
-- $301,654 class PRA notes;
-- $10,139,377 class BC exchangeable notes;
-- Class R REMIC residual notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 958 loans totaling $296.0
million (comprising 954 seasoned performing and re-performing loans
[RPLs] and four newly originated loans), including $21.2 million in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, and excluding $0.3
million in non-interest bearing deferred principal reduction
amounts (PRA), as of the cutoff date. Distributions of principal
and interest (P&I) and loss allocations are based on a
sequential-pay, senior-subordinate structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A-1 notes reflects the 38.40%
subordination provided by the 10.20% class M-1, 5.95% class M-2,
5.20% class M-3, 4.80% class B-1, 3.10% class B-2, 3.05% class B-3,
3.05% class B-4, and 3.05% class B-5 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Fay Servicing,
LLC, rated 'RSS3+'), the representation (rep) and warranty
framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the sequential pay
structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Recent Delinquencies (Negative):
While almost all of the loans have been current on their mortgage
payments during the prior 12 months, only 36% have been clean for
more than 24 months. The majority (97%) of the loans have received
a modification due to performance issues, including 57% that were
completed as recent as 2015 and 2016. Although the borrowers tend
to be chronic late payers, the seasoning of roughly 11 years
indicates a willingness to make their payment.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch views the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement mechanisms
(RW&E) as consistent with a Tier I framework. Any loan that
incurred or incurs a realized loss or is 120 or more days
delinquent after cumulative realized losses plus the 120+
delinquency bucket exceeds 50% of the aggregate original credit
enhancement (CE) of the class B-3, B-4 and B-5 notes will be
reviewed for a breach. In addition, the controlling noteholder,
which cannot be the seller or an affiliate of the seller, has the
ability to cause a third-party review (TPR) on any loans that
liquidated with a realized loss. Fitch believes the performance
trigger for causing an automatic review is sufficient for
identifying breaches before significant deterioration in pool
performance occurs.

The transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws) from the sponsor, Citigroup Global Markets Realty
Corp. (CGMRC), which is a subsidiary of Citigroup, Inc. (rated
A/F1).

Due Diligence Findings (Negative): A TPR conducted on 100% of the
pool resulted in 10.3% (or 99 loans) graded 'C' or 'D'. For 39
loans, the due diligence results showed issues regarding high-cost
testing -- the loans were either missing the final HUD1, used
alternate documentation to test or had incomplete loan files --
and, therefore, a slight upward revision to the model output LS was
applied, as further described in the Third-Party Due Diligence
section. In addition, timelines were extended on 54 loans that were
missing final modification documents or where the modification
documents could not be confirmed (excluding two loans that were
already adjusted for HUD1 issues).

Recent Natural Disasters (Mixed): The servicer, Fay Servicing, LLC
(Fay), is conducting inspections on properties located in counties
designated as major disaster areas by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) as a result of the recent natural
disasters. In addition, CGMRC is reviewing servicing comments.

The sponsor, CGMRC, is obligated to repurchase loans that have
incurred property damage due to water, flood or hurricane that
materially and adversely affects the value of the property prior to
the transaction's closing. Fitch currently does not expect the
effect of the natural disasters to have rating implications due to
the repurchase obligation of the sponsor and due to the limited
exposure to affected areas relative to the CE of the rated bonds.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): Given that there is no
external P&I advancing mechanism, Fitch analyzed the collateral's
cash flows using its standard prepayment and default timing
assumptions to assess the cash flow stability of the high
investment grade-rated bonds. Fitch considered the borrower's pay
histories in comparison to its timing assumptions and found that
the subordination is expected to be sufficient to cover timely
payment of interest on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' notes. In addition,
principal otherwise distributable to the notes may be used to pay
monthly interest, which also helps provide stability in the cash
flows. However, the lower-rated bonds may experience long periods
of interest deferral and will generally not be repaid until the
note becomes the most senior outstanding.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances, which are made on
behalf of loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate,
reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are
less for this transaction than for those where the servicer is
obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow
priorities, together with increased subordination, provide for
timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated
classes.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest bearing principal
forebearance amounts totaling $21.2 million (7.1%) of the unpaid
principal balance are outstanding on 476 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV
despite the lower payment and amounts not owed during the term of
the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than if there
were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior
for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit
strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited relative
to those borrowers with more equity in the property. Additionally,
$0.3 million in non-interest bearing deferred PRA will be
securitized into a separate non-rated Class PRA.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Citigroup
Global Markets Realty Corp., will acquire and retain a 5% vertical
interest in each class of the securities to be issued.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in general accordance with its
criteria, as described in the report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
This incorporates a review of the originators' lending platforms,
as well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originators and arranger, which were found to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the notes.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria," and one criteria variation from "U.S. RMBS Rating
Criteria," which are described below.

The first variation (to "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and
Non-Performing Loan Rating Criteria") relates to increasing the
maximum PD credit that a loan can receive for having a clean pay
history. Fitch will typically apply the maximum clean current
credit for loans that have clean pay histories for at least 36
months and three-quarters of the maximum credit for loans that have
clean pay histories of 24 to 35 months. Based on a historical data
analysis of legacy RPL and RPL 2.0 performance to date, RPL
collateral has outperformed Fitch's initial expectations. In RPL
2.0, the cohort of clean current loans at deal closing are
performing substantially better than the weaker cohort of loans at
deal closing that had a delinquency in the previous 24 months. This
historical data supports increasing the maximum PD credit from 35%
to 50% for loans that are at least 36 months clean current, as well
as increasing the maximum PD credit from 26% to 36% for loans that
are 24 to 35 months clean current.

The second variation (to "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria") relates to
four loans (approximately 0.4% of the pool by UPB) in the pool that
are seasoned slightly less than Fitch's threshold for seasoned
loans, which is 24 months. On average, these loans are
approximately 14 months seasoned. The due diligence scope for these
loans was not consistent with Fitch's scope for newly originated
loans. Fitch is comfortable with the due diligence that was
completed on these loans, as it affects a small percentage of the
pool and the scope was consistent with Fitch's criteria for
seasoned and re-performing loans. In addition, Fitch received
updated values for these loans and conservative assumptions were
made on the collateral analysis regarding the loans' rep and
warranty framework.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.6% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


COMM 2016-DC2: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2016-DC2 Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Loan of Concern: The Columbus Park Crossing loan (5%) has
been designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern due to the announcement
that its largest anchor tenant, Sears, has closed. The collateral
property is a 638,028 sf regional mall located in Columbus, GA. The
largest tenants at the property include a now dark Sears, Carmike
Cinemas and Toys-R-Us. Sears, Carmike, and Toys-R-Us all are
subject to ground leases and own their improvements. Physical
occupancy declined to 77% upon Sears' departure, from 100% at
issuance, almost exclusively from Sears' departure.

Generally Stable Performance: Aside from the Columbus Park Crossing
loan, the performance of the pool has been largely stable since
issuance with no loans delinquent or in special servicing. As of
the January 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 1.1% to $797.1 million from $806.2
million at issuance. No loans are defeased.

Property Type Concentration: Retail represents the largest property
type concentration (31.2%), which is in line with the 2016 average
of 31.4% and higher than the 2015 average of 26.7%. Manufactured
housing communities represent 10% of the pool, significantly higher
than the 2016 and 2015 averages of 1.6% and 2.3%, respectively.

Above Average Amortization: Only four loans totalling 15.1% of
current pool balance are interest only, which is well below the
2016 and 2015 averages of 33.3% and 23.3%, respectively. Partial
interest-only loans represent 55.1% of the pool (23 loans), while
37 loans totalling 30% were amortizing balloon loans with terms of
five to 10 years. The pool is scheduled to amortize by 13% of the
initial pool balance prior to maturity, more than the respective
2016 and 2015 averages of 10.4% and 11.7%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A1 through E remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement, continued paydown, and generally
stable collateral performance. Fitch does not foresee positive or
negative ratings migration of these classes until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics. The Rating Outlook on class F has been
revised to Negative due to the potential downgrade concerns as a
result of the declining performance on the Columbus Park Crossing
loan. Anchor tenant Sears vacated in March 2017, and a replacement
tenant has not been found. Fitch's analysis included a stressed
scenario, which assumed a higher loss due to the vacant Sears. The
Negative Outlook reflects the property's location in a tertiary
market and the uncertainty with releasing the former Sears space.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $26.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $248.2 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $605.6 million* class X-A at'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.3 million* class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.2 million* class X-D 'BB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $42.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.1 million class E at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.1 million class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

*Indicates notional amount and interest-only. Fitch does not rate
the class G, H, X-E or X-F certificates. The rating for the X-B
certificates was previously withdrawn.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M Debt Rating to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on one class in Commercial Mortgage Acceptance
Corporation Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, 1998-C1
as follows:

Cl. M, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was upgraded due to higher recovery
than previously anticipated.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.2% of the
current pooled balance, the same as Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.2% of the original
pooled balance, the same as Moody's last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodology used in rating Cl. X
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 67% to $4.0 million
from $1.19 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 34.5% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to eight at Moody's last review.

Ten loans, constituting 84% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $14.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 30%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 79% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 45%, compared to 52% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.05X and 10.39X,
respectively, compared to 1.22X and 6.19at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 77% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Walgreens Loan ($1.4 million -- 34.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a 15,900 SF single-tenant retail property
located in Lakeland, Florida. The property is 100% leased to
Walgreens through October 2058. Due to single tenant exposure,
Moody's stressed the value of this property utilizing a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.88X,
respectively compared to 58% and 1.85X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreen's Drug Loan ($1.1 million
-- 27% of the pool), which is secured by a 13,900 SF single-tenant
retail property located in Arlington, Texas. The property is 100%
leased to Walgreens through September 2056. Due to single tenant
exposure, Moody's stressed the value of this property utilizing a
lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 53% and 2.04X,
respectively, the same as Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the United States Post Office Loan
($628,220 -- 15.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 10,567 SF
single-tenant retail property located in Middletown, Rhode Island.
The property is 100% leased to the US Postal Service through
December 2021. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 58%
since securitization. Due to single tenant exposure, Moody's
stressed the value of this property utilizing a lit/dark analysis.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.87X, respectively
compared to 57% and 2.08X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: Fitch Lowers Class H Certs Rating to 'Csf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded two and affirmed eight
classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
series 2005-C5 (CSFB 2005-C5), commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of class F reflects increased credit enhancement since
Fitch's last rating action from the liquidation and full recovery
of the real-estate owned Covington Plaza asset at better recoveries
than previously expected, which paid off class E. In addition, the
second largest loan in the pool has been defeased and class F is
now fully covered by defeased collateral. The downgrades of class G
and H reflect a greater certainty of loss on these classes due to
the continued underperformance of the largest loan, Gallery at
South Dekalb (46.7% of pool), which matures in July 2019.

Defeasance & Fully Amortizing Loans: Two loans (29.9% of pool) are
defeased and one additional loan (0.3%) is fully amortizing.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The Gallery at South Dekalb loan (46.7% of
pool) is secured by a 528,046 square foot (sf) portion of a 726,046
sf regional mall located in Decatur, GA, approximately seven miles
southeast of Atlanta. The mall is shadow-anchored by a Macy's
(198,000 sf), which is not part of the loan collateral. The largest
collateral tenants include Chapel Beauty (9% of collateral net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiry in December 2028) and Conway
(5.8%; April 2024). Collateral occupancy as of January 2018
declined to 61.5% from 70.7% in March 2017. The Satellite Cinemas
space (8.1% of collateral NRA) is dark after the tenant vacated
during 2017. The tenant opened for business in April 2016 and had
executed a 10-year lease through December 2026. As of the January
2018 rent roll, upcoming lease rollover consists of 4.4% of the
collateral NRA on month-to-month leases, 7.8% rolling in 2018 and
4.5% in 2019. Net operating income between 2015 and 2016 declined
20.3%. The loan had returned back to the master servicer in March
2016 after being modified in July 2015, whereby the maturity was
extended by four years to July 2019 and the loan was bifurcated
into a $29 million A-note and a $14.4 million B-note.

Pool Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only seven
of the original 282 loans remaining. One loan (7.5% of pool) is
secured by a co-op property located in the Riverdale, Bronx
neighborhood of New York City. The four other non-defeased loans
(62.6%) are secured by properties located in secondary and tertiary
markets.

Loan Maturity: The largest loan (46.7% of pool) matures in 2019 and
the remaining six loans (53.3%) mature in 2020.

As of the January 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.9% to $88.6 million from
$2.9 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through S.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class F reflects the class being fully
covered by defeased collateral. Classes G and H may be subject to
further downgrades should losses exceed expectations.

Fitch has upgraded the following class:
-- $21.3 million class F to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:
-- $36.3 million class G to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $21.8 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 70%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:
-- $9.3 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-J, B, C, D, E,
375-A, 375-B, and 375-C certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class A-X, A-SP and A-Y certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: S&P Affrims B+(sf) Rating on Class G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class F commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2005-C5, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P
affirmed its rating on class G from the same transaction.

S&P said, "For the upgrade and affirmation, our credit enhancement
expectation was in line with the raised and affirmed rating
levels.

"While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on class G, our analysis also considered the
susceptibility to reduce liquidity support from the two previously
corrected mortgage loans ($66.4 million, 75.9%). Specifically, we
viewed the corrected Gallery at South Dekalb loan ($40.9 million,
46.7%) to have refinancing risk due to reported declining occupancy
and cash flows at the underlying property."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 18, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $87.6 million (while the certificates balance was
$88.6 million), which is 3.0% of the pool balance at issuance. The
pool currently includes seven loans (reflecting the A and B notes
as one loan), down from 280 loans at issuance. Two loans ($26.1
million, 29.9% of the asset balance) are defeased and three ($44.0
million, 50.3%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.

Excluding the defeased loans and the subordinate B notes ($14.5
million, 16.6%), S&P calculated a 1.94x S&P Global Ratings weighted
average debt service coverage and 81.4% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value ratio using an 8.05% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate for the performing loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $146.6 million in
principal losses, or 5.1% of the original pool trust balance.

  RATINGS LIST

  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C5
                                         Rating      
  Class       Identifier             To              From      
  F           225470DP5              AA+ (sf)        A+ (sf)  
  G           225470BA0              B+ (sf)         B+ (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE 2008-C1: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 3 Tranches to 'Csf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes and downgraded five classes
of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust (CSMC) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2008-C1.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement; Adverse Selection: The affirmation of
class A-M is the result of high and increasing credit enhancement
due to amortization, loan payoffs, and dispositions since Fitch's
last rating action. In addition, the second largest loan in the
transaction, McHugh Marriott Hilton Portfolio, is expected to
payoff at the upcoming maturity in February 2018 due to the low
leverage. However, given the concentration and binary risk of the
top three loans in the pool, a Negative Outlook was assigned which
indicates that downgrades are possible if the McHugh Portfolio does
not payoff or if expected losses increase. The downgrades to the
distressed classes are the result of higher certainty of losses
given the transaction concentrations.

The pool is highly concentrated with only five loans remaining. Due
to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a
sensitivity analysis which grouped the remaining loans based on
loan performance, leverage and expected losses and ranked them by
their perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes fully
amortizing balloon loans and the specially serviced loans. The
ratings reflect this sensitivity analysis.

Concentration of Specially Serviced Loans: There are three
specially serviced loans representing 70.8% of the pool, including
two foreclosed loans (51.9%). The largest loan in the pool (50%),
Killeen Mall, is secured by roughly 385,000 sf of a 558,254-sf
regional mall located in Killeen, TX, home to Fort Hood, the
nation's largest armed forces training and development facility.
Anchors are Dillards (not part of collateral), JCPenney (not part
of collateral), Sears, and Burlington Coat Factory. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in June 2017 because the loan
was unable to payoff at maturity. The mall was 90.5% occupied and
the collateral portion was 83.5% occupied as of Sept 2017. Per
servicer reporting, NOI has been relatively stable ranging between
$6.11 million and $6.57 million from 2009-2016. As of YE2016, NOI
DSCR was 1.35x and has fluctuated very little since 2009.
Foreclosure is estimated for February 2018.

The third largest loan in the pool (19%), Southside Works, is
secured by 199,198-sf mixed-use property in Pittsburgh, PA. The
property consists of 144,241 sf of retail and 54,957 sf of office
space and was completed in 2005. It is the second phase of a
mixed-use lifestyle center. In addition to the subject collateral,
the Southside Works development includes approximately 360,000 sf
of retail and 220,000 sf of office space, as well as 84 loft
apartments. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
November 2017 due to the expectation that the loan would not payoff
at the January 2018 maturity. Occupancy declined to 83% at YE 2015
from 91% at YE 2014; however, it has rebounded up to 94% as of Nov.
2017. The retail portion occupancy is 96.1% and the office portion
is 89.6%. The most recent reported NOI DSCR was 1.39x at YTD
September 2017.

Paydown Since Issuance: As of the January 2017 distribution date,
the transaction has paid down 81.5% since issuance, to $164 million
from $887 million. The pool has paid down by $350.6 million since
the last rating action (68% of the outstanding balance at the last
rating action). Interest shortfalls total $8.7 million and extend
up to class E.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on the A-M class reflects the transaction's
concentration of specially serviced loans and the potential for
downgrades if McHugh Marriott Hilton Portfolio doesn't payoff at
maturity. Distressed classes are subject to downgrades as losses
are realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $57.7 million class A-J to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 40%;
-- $8.9 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.9 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $12.2 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $10 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $63.7 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $5.4 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-2FL, A-AB, A-3, A-1-A certificates have paid
in full. Fitch does not rate the class S certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class A-X
certificates.


ELLINGTON CLO II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Ellington CLO II, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$227,900,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$35,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$31,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Ellington CLO II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 82.5% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 17.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 85% ramped as
of the closing date.

Ellington CLO Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's three year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may not reinvest in
new assets and all principal proceeds, including sale proceeds,
will be used to amortize the notes in accordance with the priority
of payments.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000

Diversity Score: 30

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 4537

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 6.10%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 4537 to 5218)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 4537 to 5898)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


EVERBANK MORTGAGE 2018-1: Moody's Rates Cl. B-4 Debt '(P)Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 28
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
EverBank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-1 (EBMLT 2018-1). The ratings
range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Ba2 (sf).

EBMLT 2018-1 is the first transaction entirely backed by loans
originated by EverBank since 2013. In June 2017, EverBank was
acquired by Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America
(Aa1). TIAA, FSB is the successor to EverBank. EBMLT 2018-1
consists of prime jumbo pools underwritten to TIAA, FSB 's
underwriting standards. All of the mortgage loans in EBMLT 2018-1
are designated as qualified mortgage (QM) safe harbor loans. TIAA,
FSB will service the loans and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2) will be
the master servicer.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: EverBank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 3.80% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

EBMLT 2018-1 is a securitization of 551 primarily 30-year
fixed-rate prime residential mortgages (three loans are 25-year
fixed). Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction
have strong credit profile demonstrated by strong credit scores,
high percentage of equity and significant liquid reserves. The
credit quality of the transaction is in line with recent prime
jumbo transactions that Moody's have rated.

We decreased Moody's loss levels due to TIAA, FSB 's strength as an
originator of prime jumbo loans. Moody's believe that TIAA, FSB is
stronger than its peers due to its conservative underwriting
standards, solid performance history and strong quality control
policies and procedures.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have a
demonstrated ability to save and to manage credit. On average,
borrowers have 25.9% equity in the properties backing the mortgage
loans. In addition, approximately 67.0% of borrowers have more than
24 months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to pay the
mortgage for two years should there be an interruption to the
borrower's cash flow. Consistent with prudent credit management,
the borrowers have high FICO scores, with a weighted average score
of 776. In general, the borrowers have high income, significant
liquid assets and a stable employment history, all of which have
been verified as part of the underwriting process and reviewed by
the TPR firm.

The transaction includes mortgage loans backed by properties
located in areas designated by the Federal Emergency Management
Authority (FEMA) for federal assistance in the last 12 months. The
sponsor ordered inspections of mortgaged properties located in
counties where borrowers were eligible for individual assistance
from FEMA. No material damage was discovered. However, the sponsor
did not order inspections on properties located in areas designated
by FEMA as public assistance areas. Moody's note that mortgage
loans backed by properties located in areas affected by Hurricane
Harvey, Hurricane Irma and wildfires show zero delinquencies.
Moreover, the transaction includes an unqualified representation
that the pool does not include properties with material damage that
would adversely affect the value of the mortgaged property.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

One third-party due diligence firm verified the accuracy of the
loan level information that the sponsor gave us. This TPR firm
conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data accuracy and
compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage loans in the collateral
pool. The TPR results indicate that the majority of reviewed loans
were in compliance with originators' underwriting guidelines, no
material compliance or data issues, and no material appraisal
defects.

We consider the strength of the R&W framework in EBMLT 2018-1 to be
adequate. Moody's analysis of the R&W framework considers the R&Ws,
enforcement mechanisms and creditworthiness of the R&W provider.
The sponsor is TIAA, FSB whose parent, Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association of America, has an insurance financial strength
rating at Aa1 and a long-term issuer rating at Aa2. The sponsor has
provided unambiguous representations and warranties (R&Ws) with no
material knowledge qualifiers and not subject to a sunset. There is
a provision for binding arbitration in the event of a dispute
between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W breaches.

However, the R&W framework in EBMLT 2018-1 differs from other prime
jumbo transactions because breach review is not automatic. Once a
review trigger has been hit (e.g. 120-day delinquency), it is the
responsibility of the controlling holder, and subsequently the
senior holder group, to engage an independent reviewer and to bear
the costs of the review, even if a breach is discovered (unless the
R&W is an "intrinsic representation," then the sponsor will bear
the cost of review). If the controlling holder and the senior
holder group elect not to engage an independent reviewer to conduct
a breach review, the loan will not be reviewed, which may result in
systemic defects to go undetected. In Moody's analysis, Moody's
considered the incentives of the controlling holder and the senior
holder group, that a third-party due diligence firm has performed a
100% review of the mortgage loans as well as the early payment
default protection in this transaction.

Trustee/Custodian and Master Servicer/Securities Administrator

U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) (A1) will act as the
trustee for this transaction. In its capacity as custodian, U.S.
Bank will hold the collateral documents, which include, the
original note and mortgage and any intervening assignments of
mortgage.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) (Aa2) provides oversight of
the servicer. Moody's consider Wells Fargo as a strong master
servicer of residential loans. Wells Fargo's oversight encompasses
loan administration, default administration, compliance and cash
management. Wells Fargo will also act as securities administrator,
whose role includes paying the issued securities.

Other Considerations

Servicer optional purchase of delinquent loans: The servicer has
the option to purchase any mortgage loan which is 90 days or more
delinquent, which may result in the step-down test used in the
calculation of the senior prepayment percentage to be satisfied
when otherwise it would not have been. Moreover, because the
purchase may occur prior to the breach review trigger of 120 days
delinquency, the loan may not be reviewed for breaches of
representations and warranties and thus, systemic defects may go
undetected. In Moody's analysis, Moody's considered that the loans
will be purchased by the servicer at par, the servicer is limited
to purchasing loans up to 10% of the aggregate cut-off date balance
and that a third-party due diligence firm has performed a 100%
review of the mortgage loans. Moreover, the reporting for this
transaction will list the mortgage loans purchased by the
servicer.

Extraordinary expenses and risk of trustee holdback: Extraordinary
trust expenses in the EBMLT 2018-1 transaction are deducted from
Net WAC as opposed to available distribution amount. Moody's
believe there is a very low likelihood that the rated certificates
in EBMLT 2018-1 will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses
or indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against
key deal parties. First, the loans are prime quality, 100%
qualified mortgages and were originated under a regulatory
environment that requires tighter controls for originations than
pre-crisis, which reduces the likelihood that the loans have
defects that could form the basis of a lawsuit. Second, the
transaction has reasonably well defined processes in place to
identify loans with defects on an ongoing basis. In this
transaction, an independent breach reviewer, at the direction of
the controlling holder or senior holder group, must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when certain clearly
defined triggers have been breached which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Third, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a credit, compliance and valuation review
of all of the mortgage loans by an independent third party. 100% of
the loans were included in the due diligence review. Finally, the
performance of past EBMLT transactions have been well within
expectation.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction has a shifting interest structure that allows
subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under certain
defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure allows
subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks,
senior bonds are exposed to increased performance volatility, known
as tail risk. The transaction provides for a senior subordination
floor of 1.40% of the closing pool balance, which mitigates tail
risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement
over time. Additionally there is a subordination lock-out amount
which is 1.10% of the closing pool balance.

Transaction Structure

The transaction is structured as a one pool shifting interest
structure in which the senior bonds benefit from a senior floor and
a subordination floor. Funds collected, including principal, are
first used to make interest payments to the senior bonds. Next
principal payments are made to the senior bonds and then interest
and principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in
sequential order, subject to the subordinate class percentage of
the subordinate principal distribution amounts.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next realized losses
are allocated to the super senior bonds until their principal
balances are written off.

As in all transactions with shifting-interest structures, the
senior bonds benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all
prepayments to the senior bonds for a specified period of time, and
allocates increasing amounts of prepayments to the subordinate
bonds thereafter only if loan performance satisfies both
delinquency and loss tests.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published on February 2015.


FANNIE MAE 2018-C01: Fitch to Rate 19 Note Classes 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2018-C01:

-- $384,186,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $853,746,000 class 1M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1A-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1B-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1C-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $281,736,000 class 1E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $290,274,000 class 1E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1-X1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1-X2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1-X3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $563,472,000 class 1-X4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1-Y1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1-Y2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1-Y3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $572,010,000 class 1-Y4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $43,136,761,759 class 1A-H reference tranche;
-- $20,221,141 class 1M-1H reference tranche;
-- $14,829,237 class 1M-AH reference tranche;
-- $14,829,237 class 1M-BH reference tranche;
-- $15,278,062 class 1M-CH reference tranche;
-- $256,124,000 class 1B-1 notes;
-- $13,480,761 class 1B-1H reference tranche;
-- $224,670,634 class 1B-2H reference tranche.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
(AAA/Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
the mortgage loan reference pools of certain residential mortgage
loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 1M-1 notes reflects the 3.10% subordination provided
by the 0.66% class 1M-2A, the 0.66% class 1M-2B, the 0.68% class
1M-2C, the 0.60% class 1B-1 and its corresponding reference
tranche, as well as the 0.50% 1B-2H reference tranche.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2018-C01 (CAS 2018-C01) is
Fannie Mae's 24th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2018 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The CAS 2018-C01 transaction consists of 186,525 loans with
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 60% and less than or equal
to 80%.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
but are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors based on the payment priorities
set forth in the transaction documents.

Given the structure and counterparty dependence on Fannie Mae,
Fitch's ratings on the 1M-1 and 1M-2 notes will be based on the
lower of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and
credit enhancement (CE) available through subordination; or Fannie
Mae's Issuer Default Rating (IDR). The notes will be issued as
uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and carry a 12.5-year legal final
maturity. This will be an actual loss risk transfer transaction in
which losses borne by the noteholders will not be based on a fixed
loss severity (LS) schedule. The notes in this transaction will
experience losses realized at the time of liquidation or
modification that will include both lost principal and delinquent
or reduced interest.

Under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into
receivership if it determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less
than its obligations for more than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing, as well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae if it is
determined that the termination of such contract would promote an
orderly administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that
the U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in Fitch current rating of Fannie Mae. However, if at
some point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, Fannie Mae's ratings could be downgraded and
the 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, and 1M-2C notes' ratings affected.

The 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, 1M-2C and 1B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating-rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating-rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Fannie Mae
in second quarter 2017 (2Q17) and 3Q17. The reference pool will
consist of loans with LTV ratios greater than 60% and less than or
equal to 80%. Overall, the reference pool's collateral
characteristics are similar to recent CAS transactions and reflect
the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage originations.

Clean Pay History for Loans in Disaster Areas (Positive): Fannie
Mae will not be removing loans in counties designated as natural
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, any loans with a prior delinquency were removed from the
reference pool, as per the Eligibility Criteria. Therefore, all
loans in the reference pool in the disaster areas have had clean
pay histories since the natural disaster events occurred.

HomeReady Exposure (Negative): Approximately 1.6% of the reference
pool was originated under Fannie Mae's HomeReady program, which
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down-payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
HomeReady loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and
property value), which is reflected in increased CE.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or modification
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. Fitch accounted
for the 12.5-year hard maturity in its default analysis and applied
a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Limited Size and Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): Fitch
received third-party due diligence on a loan production basis, as
opposed to a transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that
regular, periodic third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan
production basis are sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality
control processes. Fitch views the results of the due diligence
review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence. See the
Third-Party Due Diligence section of this report for more details.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 1A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as the first loss 1B-2H reference
tranche, sized at 0.50%. Fannie Mae is also retaining a vertical
slice or interest of approximately 5% in each reference tranche
(1M-1H, 1M-AH, 1M-BH, 1M-CH and 1B-1H).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected sMVD. It indicates there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 36% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


FIRST FRANKLIN 2005-FFH2: Moody's Hikes Cl. M3 Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of six tranches
from three First Franklin subprime RMBS transactions.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF12

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH2

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-H1

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The upgrades
are primarily due to the total available credit enhancement to the
bonds.

The rating actions for Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan
Trust, Series 2007-H1 also reflect a correction to the cash-flow
model previously used by Moody's in rating this transaction. In
prior rating actions, the cash flow model did not allocate losses
appropriately between certificate group one and certificate group
two. Specifically, applied realized losses were allocated to
certain seniors based on under collateralization of their related
group rather than their group specific principal distribution
percentage as noted in the pooling and servicing agreement of the
transaction. This error has now been corrected, and rating actions
reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Flagship
Credit Auto Trust 2018-1's $200 million automobile
receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb, 7,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 47.5%, 40.0%, 30.9%, 24.3%,
and 20.7% credit support (including excess spread) for the class A,
B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
scenarios. These credit support levels provide coverage of
approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.40x S&P's
12.75%-13.25% expected cumulative net loss range for the class A,
B, C, D, and E notes, respectively. These break-even scenarios
cover total cumulative gross defaults (using a recovery assumption
of 40%) of approximately 79%, 67%, 52%, 41%, and 34%,
respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate to the assigned
ratings.

-- S&P said, "The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, our ratings on the class A and B
notes would not be lowered by more than one rating category from
our preliminary 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' ratings throughout the
transaction's life, and our ratings on the class C and D notes
would not be lowered more than two rating categories from our
preliminary 'A (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)' ratings. The rating on the
class E notes would remain within two rating categories of our
preliminary 'BB- (sf)' rating within the first year, but the class
would eventually default under the 'BBB' stress scenario after
receiving 42%-44% of its principal." The above rating movements are
within the one-category rating tolerance for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated
securities during the first year and three-category tolerance over
three years; a two-category rating tolerance for 'A', 'BBB', and
'BB' rated securities during the first year; and a three-category
tolerance for 'A' and 'BBB' rated securities over three years. The
'BB' rated securities are permitted to default under a 'BBB' stress
scenario.

-- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

-- The characteristics of the collateral pool being securitized.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-1

  Class       Rating      Type           Interest      Amount
                                         rate(i)     (mil. $)
  A           AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed         122.75
  B           AA (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed          22.50
  C           A (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed          24.56
  D           BBB (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed          18.42
  E           BB- (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed          11.77

(i) The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to B-5 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-1 (FSMT 2018-1). The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a single pool of fixed rate
non-agency jumbo mortgages (63.5% of the aggregate pool) and agency
eligible high balance conforming residential fixed rate mortgages
(36.5% of the aggregate pool), originated by Flagstar Bank, FSB,
with an aggregate stated principal balance of $487,656,132.

Flagstar Bank, FSB ("Flagstar") is the servicer of the pool, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Well Fargo") is the master servicer and
Wilmington Trust N.A. will serve as the trustee.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure similar to the Flagstar
Mortgage Trust 2017-2 transaction. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base servicing fee of $20.5
for all performing loans and increases according to certain
delinquent and incentive fee schedules. The Class B-6-C (NR) is
first in line to absorb any increase in servicing costs above the
base servicing costs. Moreover, the transaction does not have a
servicing fee cap.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary credit analysis

We calculated losses on the pool using Moody's US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
assessments, third-party review (TPR) scope and results, and the
financial strength of representation & warranty (R&W) provider.
Moody's expected loss for this pool in a base case scenario is
0.40% and reaches 5.90% at a stress level consistent with Moody's
Aaa (sf) scenario.

Collateral description

The FSMT 2018-1 transaction is a securitization of 754 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$487,656,132. This transaction has approximately five months
seasoned loans and strong borrower characteristics. The non-zero
weighted-average primary-borrower original FICO score is 766 and
the weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
is 67.4%. More than half of the borrowers have more than 24 months'
liquid reserves. There are however a relatively high percentage of
self-employed borrowers (31.5% by loan balance) in the aggregate
pool.

Flagstar Bank, FSB originated and will service the loans in the
transaction. Moody's consider Flagstar an adequate originator and
servicer of prime jumbo and conforming mortgages and Moody's loss
estimates did not include an adjustment for origination or
servicing arrangement quality.

Third-party review and representation & warranties

An independent TPR firm was engaged to conduct due diligence for
the credit, regulatory compliance, property valuation, and data
accuracy for a sample of 332 loans in this transaction. For the
remaining 427 loans, the TPR firm was only engaged to conduct a
regulatory compliance due diligence review (which did not include
compliance with ATR/QM rules). In addition, a collateral desktop
analysis (CDA) was performed by Clear Capital as a valuation check
for all of the loans in the pool.

The TPR results indicated adherence to the originators'
underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of loans. Two loans
were dropped from the securitization due to grade C/D findings
related to failed ATR/QM testing. The TPR firm did not identify any
loans with grade C or grade D compliance issues. One loan received
a grade C property valuation due to a failure to adequately inspect
the property following the recent wildfires. In addition, three of
the loans that were not reviewed by the TPR firm had CDAs that were
10% less than their appraisal values. Moody's viewed the 332 loan
sample size for the credit, property valuation and data integrity
reviews as adequate. However, Moody's applied a TPR adjustment in
Moody's analysis due to the grade C property valuation and to
account for the risk that there may be other loans with grade C or
grade D credit or property valuation issues in the non-sampled
portion of the pool. Also, the adjustment is partly due to the risk
that there may be loans with unidentified data integrity issues in
the non-sampled portion of the pool.

Flagstar Bank, FSB as the originator, makes the loan-level
representation and warranties (R&Ws) for the mortgage loans. The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed
the baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's have identified for
US RMBS. Further, R&W breaches are evaluated by an independent
third party using a set of objective criteria. The transaction
contains a "prescriptive" R&W framework in which the originator
makes comprehensive loan-level R&Ws and an independent reviewer
will perform detailed reviews to determine whether any R&Ws were
breached when (1) loans become 120 days delinquent (2) the servicer
stops advancing, (3) the loan is liquidated at a loss or (4) the
loan becomes between 30 days and 120 days delinquent and is
modified by the servicer. These reviews are prescriptive in that
the transaction documents set forth detailed tests for each R&W
that the independent reviewer will perform. Should the reviewer
observe evidence of a breach of R&W during the regular course of
performing a test(s), such evidence may be considered, provided the
sponsor has the right to refute the claim or provide supporting
documentation or evidence. Moody's did however make an adjustment
to Moody's loss levels to incorporate the weaker financial strength
of the R&W provider.

Servicing arrangement

We consider the overall servicing arrangement for this pool to be
adequate.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base fee of $20.5 for all
performing loans and increases according to certain delinquent and
incentive fee schedules. By establishing a base servicing fee for
performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans, the
fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The fee-for-service
compensation is reasonable and adequate for this transaction. It
also better aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance
and structure. The Class B-6-C (NR) is first in line to absorb any
increase in servicing costs above the base servicing costs.
Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted from the Class
B-6-C interest payment amount first and could result in interest
shortfall to the certificates depending on the magnitude of the
delinquency and incentive fees.

Trustee and master servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, N.A. The custodian
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells
Fargo, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight,
and termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. In addition, Wells Fargo is obligated to make servicing
advances if the servicer is unable to do so.

Tail risk & subordination floor

This deal has a shifting-interest structure, with a subordination
floor to protect against losses that occur late in the life of the
pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk). When the total
senior subordination is less than 1.1% of the original pool
balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any principal and all
principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In addition, if the
subordinate percentage drops below 6.0% of current pool balance,
the senior distribution amount will include all principal
collections and the subordinate principal distribution amount will
be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves benefit from a floor.
When the total current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus
the aggregate balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior
to it amount to less than 0.85% of the original pool balance, those
tranches do not receive principal distributions. Principal those
tranches would have received are directed to pay more senior
subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Based on an analysis of scenarios where the largest five to 10
loans in the pool default late in the life of the transaction,
Moody's viewed the 1.1% senior floor as slightly credit negative,
but not sufficiently so to merit an adjustment. Moody's viewed the
0.85% subordination floor as sufficiently credit negative to merit
an adjustment in Moody's rating analysis for the B-1, B-2 and B-3
tranches. As such, Moody's incorporated some additional sensitivity
runs in Moody's cashflow analysis in which Moody's increased the
losses to assess the potential impact to the bonds.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments
to the senior bond for a specified period of time, and increasing
amounts of prepayments to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but
only if loan performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

The senior support NAS certificates (Class A-14) will only receive
their pro-rata share of scheduled principal payments allocated to
the senior bonds for five years, whereas all prepayments allocated
to the senior bonds will be paid to the super senior certificates,
leading to a faster buildup of super senior credit enhancement.
After year five, the senior support NAS bond will receive an
increasing share of prepayments in accordance with the shifting
percentage schedule.

On or prior to the accretion termination date (the earlier of (1)
the distribution date on which Class A-10 has been reduced to zero
and (2) the distribution date where the aggregate balance of
subordinate certificates has been reduced to zero), the
accretion-directed certificate (Class A-10) will be entitled to
receive as monthly principal distribution the accrued interest that
would otherwise be distributable to the accrual certificate (Class
A-12).

All certificates (except Class B-6-C) in this transaction are
subject to a net WAC cap. Class B-6-C will accrue interest at the
net WAC minus the aggregate delinquent servicing and aggregate
incentive servicing fee. For any distribution date, the net WAC
will be the greater of (1) zero and (2) the weighted average net
mortgage rates minus the capped trust expense rate.

Realized losses are allocated reverse sequentially among the
subordinate and senior support certificates and on a pro-rata basis
among the super senior certificates.

Exposure to extraordinary expenses

Certain extraordinary trust expenses (such as fees paid to the
reviewer, servicing transfer costs) in the FSMT 2018-1 transaction
are deducted directly from the available distribution amount. The
remaining trust expenses (which have an annual cap of $300,000 per
year) are deducted from the net WAC. Moody's believe there is a
very low likelihood that the rated certificates in FSMT 2018-1 will
incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or indemnification
payments from potential future lawsuits against key deal parties.
First, the loans are prime quality, 100 percent qualified mortgages
and were originated under a regulatory environment that requires
tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces
the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the
basis of a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well
defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on an
ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
(Inglet Blair, LLC), named at closing must review loans for
breaches of representations and warranties when certain clear
defined triggers have been breached, which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a compliance review covering all of the
mortgage loans and the results of a credit and valuation review
covering a sample of the mortgage loans by an independent third
party (Clayton Services LLC).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


FREDDIE MAC 2017-HRP1: Fitch Corrects Dec. 13 Release
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a correction to the ratings release on
Freddie Mac's STACR 2017-HRP1 published on Dec. 13, 2017, which
includes variations from Fitch's criteria that were omitted from
the original release.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Freddie Mac's risk-transfer
transaction, Structured Agency Credit Risk Debt Notes Series
2017-HRP1 (STACR 2017-HRP1):

-- $40,000,000 class M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2AR exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2AS exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2AT exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook  
    Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2AU exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $10,000,000 class M-2AD notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2B notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2BR exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2BS exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2BT exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2BU exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $10,000,000 class M-2BD notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,000,000 class M-2BI notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class M-2R exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class M-2S exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class M-2T exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class M-2U exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $20,000,000 class M-2D exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $14,367,271,225 class A-H reference tranche;
-- $112,831,973 class M-1H reference tranche;
-- $119,247,960 class M-2AH reference tranche;
-- $119,247,959 class M-2BH reference tranche;
-- $75,000,000 class B-1 exchangeable notes;
-- $75,000,000 class B-1D notes;
-- $75,000,000 class B-1I notional notes;
-- $37,831,973 class B-1H reference tranche;
-- $25,000,000 class B-2D notes;
-- $87,831,973 class B-2H reference tranche.

The 'BBsf' rating for the M-2A (M-2A & M-2AD) notes reflects the
2.62% subordination provided by the 1.12% class M-2B (M-2B & M-2BD)
notes, the 0.75% class B-1D notes, the 0.75% class B-2D notes and
their corresponding reference tranches. The 'Bsf' rating for the
M-2B notes reflects the 1.50% subordination provided by the 0.75%
class B-1D notes, the 0.75% class B-2D notes and their
corresponding reference tranches. The notes are general unsecured
obligations of Freddie Mac (AAA/Stable) subject to the credit and
principal payment risk of a pool of certain residential mortgage
loans held in various Freddie Mac-guaranteed MBS.

This is the first transaction issued by Freddie Mac through its
STACR shelf backed by loans originated through Freddie Mac's Relief
Refinance Program (RRP).

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $15.04 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held guaranteed by Freddie Mac
where principal repayment of the notes is subject to the
performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans. As loans
liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding principal
balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual loan's loss
severity percentage related to those credit events, which includes
borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors. Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's expected rating on the M-2A and M-2B notes
will be based on the lower of: the quality of the mortgage loan
reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available through
subordination, and Freddie Mac's Issuer Default Rating. The M-2A,
M-2B, B-1D, B-1I and B-2D notes will be issued as LIBOR-based
floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate falls below
zero and becomes negative, the coupons of the interest-only
modifications and combinations (MAC) notes may be subject to a
downward adjustment, so that the aggregate interest payable within
the related MAC combination does not exceed the interest payable to
the notes for which such classes were exchanged. The notes will
carry a 25-year legal final maturity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Seasoned Performing Loans (Positive): The reference pool consists
of 82,552 fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans with terms of 241-360
months, totaling $15.04 billion, acquired by Freddie Mac between
April 1, 2009 and Dec. 31, 2011. The pool is seasoned over seven
years with a weighted average (WA), non-zero, updated credit score
of 741. Roughly 95% of the pool has been current for the prior 36
months with only 3.2% experiencing a delinquency from 7-24 months
prior, and 2.1% from over 24 months ago.

Positive Borrower Selection (Positive): The borrowers in the
reference pool have weathered a severe economic stress with minimal
delinquencies, showing a strong willingness and ability to pay.
Loans were originated under Freddie Mac's RRP (including the Home
Affordable Refinance Program [HARP], which is FHFA's name for
Freddie Mac's RRP for mortgages with a loan-to-value [LTV] greater
than 80%). Through the refinance programs, the borrowers have
continued to perform on their mortgages as rising home prices have
rebuilt equity in their homes. The current mark-to-market (MtM)
combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio has improved to 82% from 98% at
the time of the relief refinance loan.

Servicing Defect Removals (Positive): Similar to the STACR DNA and
HQA transactions, this transaction will include provisions where
the loan will be removed from the reference pool if the servicer
does not materially comply with Freddie Mac's servicer guide.
Relative to an unseasoned pool, Fitch places less emphasis on the
risk of manufacturing defects with this pool, and greater emphasis
on the servicer's ability to maintain its right to foreclose on the
property.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 14.4% of
the loans are covered either by borrower-paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI). Freddie Mac will guarantee the MI
coverage amount. While the Freddie Mac guarantee allows for credit
to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI
available due to the automatic termination provision as required by
the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance is first
scheduled to reach 78%. LPMI does not automatically terminate and
remains for the life of the loan.

Recent Natural Disaster Loans Excluded (Positive): Freddie Mac has
decided not to produce property values through its Home Value
Explorer (HVE) tool for properties located in FEMA major disaster
areas, with the exception of Orange County, CA, until more
information is obtained relating to the status of these properties
following the disasters. As a result, loans located in these
FEMA-designated disaster areas were not included in the reference
pool due to their not meeting the ELTV eligibility. Loans for
properties located in Orange County were included because Freddie
Mac requires borrowers in Orange County to have hazard insurance
that covers fire.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The M-2 classes benefit
from the sequential-pay structure and stable CE provided by the
more junior B-1D and B-2D classes, which are locked out from
receiving any principal until classes with a more senior payment
priority are paid in full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from solid alignment of
interests. Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the A-H and the M-1H reference tranche. Freddie Mac will
also retain a minimum of 5% of the M-2A, M-2B and B-1D tranches,
and a minimum of 50% of the B-2D tranche.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated five criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria," and one criteria variation from "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss
Model Criteria," which are described below.

The first variation to the "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and
Non-Performing Loan Criteria" is that a review of the loan-level
pay history provided by Freddie Mac was not conducted by a
third-party reviewer. Fitch considered this as a non-material
variation since Fitch view Freddie Mac's servicer oversight process
as robust with sufficient controls in place to assure the accuracy
of the pay histories provided.

An updated tax and title review was not conducted, resulting in the
second variation. Fitch views this variation as non-material since
the servicer provides a rep and warranty that the servicer will
maintain clear title to the loans, per Freddie Mac's servicing
guide. If the servicer is found to be in violation of the servicing
guidelines, it would be considered a servicing defect and the loans
would be removed from the pool.

The third criteria variation is due to the custodial exception
report not being provided. Per Freddie Mac's servicer guide, the
servicer must maintain the mortgage file and adhere to the Document
Custodian Procedures Handbook. If not, Freddie Mac can request the
loan be repurchased. As a result, Fitch views this variation as
non-material.

The fourth variation is treating each loan as its original pre-RRP
loan purpose instead of as a new refinance loan. While these loans
are technically new refinance loans, the loan is essentially a rate
and term modification. RRP was initiated to help performing
borrowers with mortgages greater than their property value take
advantage of the lower interest rate environment. Treating the pool
as 100% refinance loans would have resulted in higher loss levels
compared to treating the loans as 100% modified and using its
original loan purpose. This is counterintuitive given the clean
performance history and strong credit quality of these borrowers.
The application of this treatment had an impact of approximately
25bps benefit at the 'BBsf' level.

The last variation to the "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and
Non-Performing Loan Criteria" is the use of pre-RRP DTI instead of
assuming 45% for missing post-RRP DTI. As noted above, although
these loans are technically new refinance loans originated under
RRP, in substance, they are rate and term modifications. One of the
conditions for RRP is that the borrowers have to be refinanced into
a loan with better terms than their original mortgage. As such, pre
RRP DTIs were used instead of applying the default DTI of 45% for
missing post-RRP DTIs. Since the RPL criteria default DTI of 45%
for missing DTIs is higher than the average pre-RRP DTI of 39%,
applying criteria cannot be supported given the program's mandate.
This had an impact of roughly 30bps benefit at the 'BBsf' level.

The one criteria variation to "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria"
is the application of Freddie Mac's aggregator credit for
acquisitions in 2013 and thereafter. While the loans in the pool
were acquired by Freddie Mac between 2009 and 2011, Freddie Mac
incorporated additional QC sampling in 2011 for RRP loans. Based on
the QC scope in place for RRP loans between 2009 and 2011, only
three loans were noted to have compliance issues. Given the
additional risk controls Freddie Mac implemented for the RRP loans,
evidenced by the minimal QC findings and strong historical
performance, the acquisition process was treated in line with
post-2012 Freddie Mac acquisitions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected 17.1% at the 'BBsf' level, and 12.3% at the 'Bsf'
level. The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.


GALTON FUNDING 2018-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Cl. B5 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2018-1 (GFMT
2018-1):

-- $282,834,000 class A11 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $282,834,000 class AX11 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $282,834,000 class A12 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $282,834,000 class AX12 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $282,834,000 class A13 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $282,834,000 class AX13 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $253,521,000 class A21 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $253,521,000 class AX21 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $253,521,000 class A22 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $253,521,000 class AX22 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $253,521,000 class A23 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $253,521,000 class AX23 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,313,000 class A31 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $29,313,000 class AX31 notional certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $29,313,000 class A32 exchangeable certificates 'AA+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $29,313,000 class AX32 notional certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $29,313,000 class A33 certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,313,000 class AX33 notional certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $202,816,000 class A41 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $202,816,000 class AX41 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook

    Stable;
-- $202,816,000 class A42 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $202,816,000 class AX42 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook

    Stable;
-- $202,816,000 class A43 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $202,816,000 class AX43 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook

    Stable;
-- $50,705,000 class A51 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $50,705,000 class AX51 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,705,000 class A52 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $50,705,000 class AX52 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,705,000 class A53 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $50,705,000 class AX53 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,028,000 class A61 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $38,028,000 class AX61 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $38,028,000 class A62 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $38,028,000 class AX62 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $38,028,000 class A63 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,028,000 class AX63 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $12,677,000 class A71 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $12,677,000 class AX71 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $12,677,000 class A72 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $12,677,000 class AX72 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $12,677,000 class A73 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,677,000 class AX73 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $282,834,000 class AX notional exchangeable certificates
    'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,823,000 class B1 certificates 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,823,000 class BX1 notional certificates 'AA-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $7,130,000 class B2 certificates 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,130,000 class BX2 notional certificates 'A-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $7,288,000 class B3 certificates 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,288,000 class BX3 notional certificates 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $4,436,000 class B4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,535,000 class B5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch did not rate the following certificate:

-- $2,855,648 class B6 certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of 30-year
fixed-rate and adjustable-rate fully amortizing loans to borrowers
with strong credit profiles, relatively low leverage and large
liquid reserves. The loans are seasoned an average of eight
months.

The pool has a weighted average (WA) original FICO score of 754,
high average balance of $749,000 and a low sustainable
loan-to-value (sLTV) ratio of 69.7%. However, the pool also
contains a meaningful amount of investor properties (27%),
non-qualified mortgage (non-QM) or higher-priced qualified mortgage
(HPQM) loans (50%), interest-only (IO) loans (23%) and non-full
documentation loans (12%). Fitch's loss expectations reflect the
higher default risk associated with these attributes as well as
loss severity adjustments for potential ability-to-repay (ATR)
challenges.

Galton as Aggregator (Neutral): Galton Capital (Galton) is a
residential mortgage team within Mariner Investment Group, LLC
(MIG), an SEC registered investment adviser formed in 1992. Founded
in 2007, Galton's initial investments were focused in RMBS. Galton
began acquiring loans in 2015 and issued its first RMBS transaction
in 2017. Fitch conducted a full review of Galton's aggregation
processes and believes that Galton meets industry standards needed
to aggregate mortgages for RMBS. In addition to the satisfactory
operational assessment, a due diligence review was completed on
100% of the pool.

High California Concentration (Negative): Approximately 78% of the
pool is located in California, which is significantly higher than
recent Fitch-rated transactions. In addition, the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) concentration is high, as the top three MSAs
account for 56.5% of the pool. The largest MSA concentration is in
the Los Angeles MSA (27.1%) followed by the San Francisco MSA
(21.2%) and the San Diego MSA (8.2%). As a result, a geographic
concentration penalty of 1.13 was applied.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch
considers the transaction's representation, warranty and
enforcement (RW&E) mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier 3
quality. As a result of the Tier 3 RW&E framework and the unrated
counterparty supporting the repurchase obligations of the RW&E
providers, the pool received a PD penalty of 234 basis points at
the 'AAAsf' level (addressed in further detail in the presale
report).

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Mixed): A loan-level due
diligence review was conducted on 100% of the pool in accordance
with Fitch's criteria and focused on credit, compliance and
property valuation. 25% of the loans received an 'A' grade, and the
remainders were graded 'B' (70%) and 'C' (4%). A majority of the
loans that were graded 'B' and 'C' were related to TRID issues that
were corrected with subsequent or post-close documentation. 17
loans received an increase to loss severity (LS) expectations due
to TRID-related errors.

Servicing Advancing (Neutral): The servicing administrator (Galton
Mortgage Loan Seller LLC) is obligated to make advances of
delinquent principal and interest on mortgage loans for the first
120 days of delinquency (at which point they become stop-advance
mortgage loans) to the extent such advances are deemed recoverable,
and Mr. Cooper, formerly known as Nationstar Mortgage LLC, (as
master servicer) will make required advances not paid by the
servicing administrator. In the event that both the servicing
administrator and master servicer fail to make required advances,
the securities administrator, Citibank, N.A. (rated A+/F1) will be
required to advance.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the
pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor
of 2.50% of the original balance will be maintained for the
certificates. Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that
might allow principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders
earlier than the five-year lockout schedule.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the certificates.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$275,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full. Expenses associated with engaging and
compensating a breach reviewer will be subject to an annual cap of
$100,000, unless any expenses in excess of the $100,000 cap are
approved by 25% or more of the aggregate voting interests of the
certificates.

Recent Natural Disasters (Neutral): Approximately 71% of the loans
are located in areas that the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) has designated for federal assistance during the past 12
months, related to Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma and the
California Wildfires. For all loans in the pool located in such
areas, either (i) the loan was originated after the disaster date,
(ii) the borrower made at least three payments following the
disaster date, (iii) the borrower was contacted and confirmed that
there was no material property damage, or (iv) an inspection was
ordered and no material damage was visible.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 7.6%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.



GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Hikes Rating on Cl. J Certs to 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed three classes of GE
Commercial Mortgage Corporation (GECMC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-C2.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Credit Enhancement: The upgrade reflects the increased credit
enhancement from the liquidation and full recovery of a $21 million
real estate owned (REO) office asset which resulted in
significantly better recoveries than previously expected. In
addition, the remaining performing loan continues to perform. Class
J is reliant on proceeds through amortization of the performing
loan to pay in full.

Class J Capped: Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis which assumed stressed values on
the remaining performing loan and the REO asset. Based on this
analysis, the rating of class J is capped at 'BBsf' based on
Fitch's stressed value assumptions. The performing loan's credit
qualities are perceived to be consistent with a 'BBsf' rating given
the tertiary location and collateral quality.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only two of
the original 142 loans remaining. One loan (67.8% of the pool) is
in special servicing. The second loan (32.4%) is secured by a
retail property in a secondary market.

The specially serviced loan, Salisbury Barnes and Noble (67.8%) is
a 44,264 square foot neighborhood retail center in Salisbury, MD.
The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2015 for balloon
maturity default after the borrower was unable to refinance the
loan due to occupancy declines. The asset became REO in April 2016.
The property's occupancy has improved slightly from 71% in December
2015 to 79% as of December 2017. Per the most recent servicer
reporting, the property is not yet being marketed for sale.

The performing loan, Su Casa (32.4%), is secured by a 75,005 square
foot grocery anchored, neighborhood retail center in Phoenix, AZ.
The property is 100% occupied as of December 2017. The loan is
fully amortizing with a May 2025 maturity.

Disposition: Since Fitch's last rating action, the pool has
benefited from the disposition of the former largest loan in the
transaction, the Chatsworth Business Park, $21 million. The loan
was liquidated in June 2017 and did not incur any realized losses.

As of the January 2018 remittance report, the pool has been reduced
by 99.4% to $11.2 million from $1.8 billion at issuance. Fitch
modelled 3.06% in losses out of the original pool balance including
$53.1 million (2.85%) incurred. Cumulative interest shortfalls in
the amount of $3.2 million are currently affecting classes K
through M and classes P and Q.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class J reflects sufficient credit
enhancement to the classes relative to expected losses. Future
upgrades are not likely. Downgrades are possible if pool
performance deteriorates.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned a Rating Outlook to the following
class:

-- $1.3 million class J to 'BBsf' from 'Csf'; Outlook Stable
    assigned.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $9.3 million class K at 'Dsf'; revised RE to 60% from 0%;
-- $515,884 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-J, B, C, D, E, F, G and
H certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class N,
O, P and Q certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on
the interest-only class X-C and X-P certificates.


GLS AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to GLS Auto Receivables
Trust 2018-1's $266.45 million automobile receivables-backed notes
series 2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 42.1%, 33.8%, and 28.6% of
credit support (as of pricing) for the class A, B, and C notes,
respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including
excess spread). These credit support levels provide coverage of
approximately 1.90x, 1.50x, and 1.25x our 21.00%-22.00% expected
cumulative net loss for the class A, B, and C notes, respectively.

-- S&P said, "The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario (1.50x our expected loss level), all else being equal, our
rating on the class A notes will remain within one rating category
of the assigned 'A (sf)' rating, and our rating on the class B
notes will remain within two rating categories of the assigned 'BBB
(sf)' rating. The class C notes will remain within two rating
categories of the assigned 'BB (sf)' rating during the first year
but will eventually default under the 'BBB' stress scenario. These
rating movements are within the limits specified by our credit
stability criteria."

-- S&P's analysis of over four years of origination static pool
data and performance data on Global Lending Services' three Rule
144A securitizations.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction, including the representations in
the transaction documents that all contracts in the pool have made
a least one payment.

-- The notes' underlying credit enhancement in the form of
subordination, overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess
spread for the class A, B, and C notes.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made to the notes
under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which it
believes are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  GLS Auto Receivables Trust 2018-1  
  Class   Rating       Type            Interest     Amount
                                        rate(i)    (mil. $)
  A       A (sf)       Senior          Fixed        206.91
  B       BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed         34.98
  C       BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed         24.56


HAMPTON ROADS 2007A: Fitch Affirms B+ Rating on Class III Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following classes of Hampton Roads
PPV, LLC (VA) military housing taxable revenue bonds (Hampton Roads
Unaccompanied Project), 2007 series A:

-- Approximately $210 million class I bonds at 'A-';
-- Approximately $58 million class II bonds at 'BB';
-- Approximately $9 million class III bonds at 'B+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable on all bonds.

SECURITY

The bonds are special limited obligations of the issuer and are
primarily secured by a first lien on all receipts from the
operation of the unaccompanied housing project known as Hampton
Roads, located at Norfolk Naval Complex. The absence of a
cash-funded reserve fund limits protections afforded bondholders.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IMPROVED DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE: The affirmation of the ratings
reflect sufficient debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) in 2017 of
1.72x, 1.33x, and 1.27x for the class I, class II, and class III
bonds, respectively. The Stable Outlook reflects expectations of
maintained DSCRs moving forward as a result of managing elevated
operating expenses from maintenance and repairs and fluctuations in
operating revenues from future Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)
rates.

VOLATILE BAH RATES: Following two consecutive years of BAH
increases of at least 8%, BAH rates increased by approximately 3%
in 2018 for the project. Volatility in BAH rates remains an ongoing
credit concern and can be evidenced by its five-year BAH history: a
2.1% decrease (2017), 8.44% increase (2016), 8.91% increase (2015),
5.77% decrease (2014), and 5.25% increase (2013).

SOLID OCCUPANCY: Despite a large deployment in April 2016 which
temporarily lowered occupancy to between 85% in 2016 and 90% at the
start of 2017, the project maintained an average occupancy rate of
94.6% for 2017. Additionally, the project currently has a 95%
occupancy level.

HIGH TURNOVER LEVELS: The project continues to experience high
turnover levels as a result of deployments, which continues to put
negative pressure on project operations.

ABSENCE OF CASH RESERVE: The absence of a cash-funded debt service
reserve fund detracts from bondholder security for all classes of
bonds; however, the class III bonds are the most vulnerable.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

BAH CHANGES: Any future decreases or increases in BAH would put
negative or positive pressure on the ratings, respectively.


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2002-CIBC5, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-CIBC5 as follows:

Cl. J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class (Class J) was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes (Classes K and L) were upgraded
primarily due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from amortization. The pool has paid down by 20%
since Moody's last review.

The rating on one P&I class (Class M) was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X-1 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $20.9 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from 1.6% to
44.4% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 47.2% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one, the same as at Moody's last review.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $24 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 96% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 36%, compared to 42% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 29% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.99X and 2.93X,
respectively, compared to 1.01X and 2.48X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 50% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Southern Wine & Spirits Building Loan ($9.3
million -- 44.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 385,000 square
foot (SF) warehouse and office building in Las Vegas, Nevada. The
property is 100% leased to Southern Wine and Spirits, one of the
largest distributors of wine, spirits and non-alcoholic beverages
in the US, through December 2021 under a triple net lease. The loan
has amortized 60% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 38% and 2.66X, respectively, compared to 43% and 2.35X at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is known as the Eckerd-Staples Loan
($673,742 -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 12,700 SF
drug store located in Corpus Christi, Texas. The property is 100%
to CVS through June 2020. The loan has amortized 74% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 30% and 3.67X,
respectively compared to 42% and 2.64X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens - Alsip Loan ($402,795 --
1.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 14,725 SF drug store
located in Alsip, Illinois. The property is 100% to Walgreens
through April 2021. The loan has amortized 61% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 26% and 4X,
respectively compared to 32.3% and 3.18X at Moody's last review.


JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC6: Fitch Hikes Cl. L Certs Rating to 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed three classes of JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC6.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Defeasance: Loans representing 70.6% of the pool are fully defeased
and backed by 'AAA' rated collateral. The same defeased loans
represented only 42.1% of the pool at the time of the last rating
action; however, given increased concentration as a result of loan
payoffs, these loans now account for a higher percentage of the
outstanding pool balance.

Amortization and Maturity Outlook: The pool has experienced 97.5%
collateral reduction since issuance. Since the last rating action,
seven loans have repaid from the trust, including a large
underperforming matured-balloon loan. These payoffs contributed
$20.7 million in principal to pay the class F and G certificates in
full. The majority of the remaining debt is either fully amortizing
or backed by fully defeased collateral. Loans representing 5.5% of
the pool are scheduled to mature in 2018, 22.8% in 2020, 47.3% in
2022 and 24.4% in 2023.

Fitch Loan of Concern: There is only one non-defeased loan that is
not scheduled to fully amortize. This loan represents 22.8% of the
pool and is backed by a grocery-anchored retail center
approximately 25 miles north of the Dallas CBD. It was previously
in special servicing, but has been performing according to its
modification terms since returning to the master servicer in 2011.

Pool Concentration: There are only nine loans remaining as of the
January 2018 remittance. Fitch's review included a sensitivity
analysis to account for this concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook for classes J and K was revised to Stable from Positive
following their upgrade. These classes are fully covered by
defeased collateral and fully amortizing debt. The upgrade of class
L follows increased credit enhancement since the last rating action
and continued improved performance of the Fitch Loan of Concern.
Recovery of the class L principal is reliant on this loan, which is
the second largest loan in the pool and the only non-defeased loan
with a scheduled balloon balance. Future upgrades to class L are
largely tied to the ongoing performance and refinance of this
loan.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings and revised Outlook as
indicated:

-- $5.2 million class J to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook revised to

    Stable from Positive;
-- $7.8 million class K to 'AAAsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to

    Stable from Positive;
-- $5.2 million class L to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
    assigned.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $5.1 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.2 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC13: Fitch Hikes Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to Bsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades one class of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp. (JPMCC) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2005-CIBC13.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Credit Enhancement: The senior class benefits from
increasing credit enhancement (CE) due to additional paydown
resulting from the payoff at maturity of the former largest loan
since Fitch's last review, as well as the prepayment of one
additional loan prior to maturity, better than expected recoveries
on two disposed loans, and declining leverage on the remainder of
loans in the pool. As a result of the increased CE, losses are no
longer expected on class A-J.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only 17
loans remaining. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans
based on loan structural features, collateral quality and
performance which ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment. This includes defeased loans, fully amortizing loans,
balloon loans, and Fitch loans of concern. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

Since issuance, the transaction has paid down by 97.2%, to $76.8
million from $2.7 billion.

Defeasance: Two loans, Hilton Garden Inn - Ground Lease (4.6%) and
SuperFresh Superstore (1.7%) are fully defeased.

Specially Serviced Loans: Four loans (32.8%) in the pool, including
the largest loan in the transaction (15.2%), are currently in
special servicing and losses are expected. The largest loan, Bayou
Walk Village, was transferred to the special servicer in January
2014, for imminent default due to structural issues at the
property. The issue affects the inline tenants who make up
approximately 36% of the property. The borrower's engineering firm
concluded that the best course of action is to demolish the
impacted area, as remediation costs are greater than the cost to
demolish and rebuild. The loan is currently in monetary default. It
is secured by a 93,669sf retail property, located in Shreveport,
LA, with occupancy of 74% as of June 2017 and annualized NOI of
$878 thousand. Leases at the property include Jo-Ann's, with 25.1%
net rentable square feet (nrsf), expiring March 14, 2028, Barnes &
Noble (24.7%), expiring Feb. 28, 2018 and Old Navy (16.%), expiring
Aug. 31, 2024. Per the special servicer, discussions with the
borrower are ongoing. The lender's legal counsel was retained to
proceed with foreclosure and a receiver has been appointed to the
property.

Maturity Schedule: One loan (6.6%) matures in July 2019. Ten loans
(36.4%) mature in 2020. One loan (12.9%) matures in December 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class J reflects sufficient credit
enhancement to the class relative to expected losses. Future
upgrades are possible with timely loan dispositions and workout
resolutions. Downgrades are possible if pool performance
deteriorates and expected losses increase significantly.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned an Outlook to the following class:
-- $41.2 million class A-J to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
    assigned.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised REs:

-- $35.6 million class B at 'Dsf'; RE revised to 50% from 10%;
-- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-2FL, A-3A1, A-3A2, A-4, A-SB, A-2FX and
A-M certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class
NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: DBRS Hikes Class C Debt Rating to BB(high)
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the rating on the following class of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-LDP4
issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Series 2005-LDP4 (the Trust):

-- Class C to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the rating on the following class:

-- Class B at A (high) (sf)

DBRS assigned a Positive trend to both classes.

The rating upgrade and Positive trend assignments reflect the
increased credit support to the bonds as a result of loan
amortization, proceeds recovered from loan liquidations and
successful loan repayment. Since issuance, the pool has experienced
a collateral reduction of 97.5%, with 11 of the original 184 loans
outstanding as of the November 2017 remittance. Over the past year,
one loan prepaid from the Trust, representing a principal paydown
of $12.1 million. In total, 30 loans have been liquidated from the
Trust at a combined realized loss of $215.4 million since
issuance.

As of the November 2017 remittance, eight loans, representing 69.2%
of the current pool balance, are reporting YE2016 financials and
based on those figures, the weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio and WA debt yield were 1.60 times and 18.0%,
respectively. The largest loan, Prospectus ID#17 – 23 Main
Street, representing 35.7% of the current pool balance, is
scheduled to mature in 2018 and reported an exit debt yield of
14.8%. There are two loans in special servicing and two loans on
the servicer's watchlist, representing 30.3% and 8.2% of the
current pool balance, respectively. One loan, representing 0.5% of
the current pool balance, is fully defeased.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2006-LDP8, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-LDP8 as follows:

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I Class E was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.
The rating on the P&I Class F was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class X was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 71% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 25% at Moody's last review. The
base expected loss percentage figure is much higher than at last
review due to significant paydowns since the deal has paid down 69%
since Moody's last review. The based expected loss numeric figure
is actually lower than at last review. Moody's base expected loss
plus realized losses is now 6.6% of the original pooled balance,
compared to 6.7% at the last review. Moody's provides a current
list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Cl.
X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $48 million
from $3.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
45% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with investment-grade
structured credit assessments and no defeased loans.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to a Herf of two at last review.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $167 million (for an average loss
severity of 69%). Four loans, constituting 82% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Bonneville Square Loan ($21 million -- 45% of the pool),
which is secured by a five-story, 89,000 square foot (SF) Class B
office property located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The property
transferred to special servicing in November 2014 after the
borrower notified the servicer of imminent default. Foreclosure
occurred in March 2016 and the property became REO in April 2016.
The property was 68% occupied as of January 2018, up from 46%
occupied in October 2016.

The second loan in special servicing is the Shoppes on Dean Loan
($11 million -- 23% of the pool), which is secured by a 41,000 SF
retail property located in Englewood, New Jersey. The property is
anchored by a health club which occupies approximately 53% of the
property's net rentable area (NRA). The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2015 at the borrower's request due to inability
to cover debt service due to vacancy concerns. The property
occupancy was 63% in December 2017, essentially unchanged from the
prior year and compared to 100% in 2010 and 95% at securitization.

The third loan in special servicing is the Fiesta Crossing SC Loan
($4 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 65,000 SF
shopping center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The property was 31%
occupied as of December 2017, unchanged from the prior year, and
down from 90% as recently as 2014.

The remaining specially serviced loan is a 37,000 SF retail
property in Spring Hill, Florida. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$34 million loss for these specially serviced loans (86% expected
loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2017 operating results for 67% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced loans). Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 66%, compared to 85% at Moody's last review. Moody's
conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 13.9% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 1.70X,
respectively, compared to 1.26X and 1.38X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The three conduit loans represent 18% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Eastpoint Business Park Loan ($4.5 million --
9% of the pool), which is secured by a 45,000 SF foot suburban
office property located in Louisville, Kentucky. Not including
common areas and meeting spaces, the property was 78% occupied as
of September 2017, with the largest tenant occupying approximately
67% of the property's NRA and a lease expiration in June 2021, less
than three months prior to the scheduled loan maturity date in
September 2021. The loan benefits from amortization and has paid
down 10.7% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
84% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.17X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Round Rock Town Center Loan ($2.5
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 45,000 SF
neighborhood retail center in Round Rock, Texas, in the greater
Austin area. The property was 97% occupied as of December 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 47% and 2.31X, respectively,
compared to 48% and 2.25X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 30 East Hoffman Avenue Loan ($1.5
million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 22,000 SF
suburban office property in Lindenhurst, New York, on Long Island.
The property was 100% leased to Suffolk County under a lease set to
expire in July 2026. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 43% and
2.29X, respectively compared to 30% and 3.29X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2018-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class B-5 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-1 (JPMMT 2018-1). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 735 fully-amortizing fixed rate
mortgage loans with a total balance of $463,721,641 as of January
1, 2018 cut-off date. Similar to prior JPMMT transactions, JPMMT
2018-1 includes conforming fixed-rate mortgage loans originated by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association ("Chase") and
loanDepot.com, LLC("loanDepot"), and underwritten to the government
sponsored enterprises (GSE) guidelines in addition to prime jumbo
non-conforming mortgages purchased by JPMMAC from various
originators and aggregators.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. will be the servicer on the conforming
loans originated by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. loanDepot and
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will service conforming loans
originated by loanDepot. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, loanDepot,
USAA Federal Savings Bank, Guaranteed Rate, Inc., and PHH Mortgage
Corporation will be the servicers on the prime jumbo loans. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will be the master servicer and securities
administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association will be the
trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the representations and
warranties breach reviewer.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a typical shifting-interest structure that benefits from
and a senior and subordination floor.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.4%
in a base scenario and reaches 5.2% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using Moody's US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
assessments and the financial strength of Representation & Warranty
(R&W) providers.

Moody's base Moody's definitive ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, Moody's assessments of the aggregators,
originators and servicers, the strength of the third party due
diligence and the representations and warranties (R&W) framework of
the transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2018-1 is a securitization of a pool of 735 fully-amortizing
mortgage loans with a total balance of $463,721,641 as of the
cut-off date, with a weighted average (WA) original term to
maturity of 359.8 months, and a WA seasoning of 3.4 months. The
borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and sizeable
equity in their properties. The WA original FICO score is 772 and
the WA original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is 71.4%. The
characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are generally
comparable to other JPMMT transactions backed by 30-year mortgage
loans that Moody's have rated. Two GSE eligible loans (0.2% of the
pool) were recast due to curtailments.

There are 136 properties located in counties affected by wildfires
in southern California. Post-disaster inspections for these
properties have been ordered by the loan seller. Any loans that
come back with damages greater than $1,000 will be removed or
repurchased out of the pool. In addition, there is a property
damage test as part of the breach review process for a severely
delinquent loan or a delinquent modified loan which will provide a
further level protection against losses precipitated by damage from
the recent fires. Furthermore, 12.9% of the properties are located
in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and the wildfire in
northern California. Post-disaster inspections ordered by the loan
seller indicated that none of those properties were damaged or had
an estimated total cost to repair all damages under $1,000.

In this transaction, 41.9% of the pool by loan balance was
underwritten by Chase and loanDepot to Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's guidelines (conforming loans). Moreover, the conforming loans
in this transaction have a high average current loan balance at
$532,692. The higher conforming loan balance of loans in JPMMT
2018-1 is attributable to the greater amount of properties located
in high-cost areas, such as the metro areas of New York City, Los
Angeles and San Francisco. Chase (31.9%), Caliber Home Loans
(13.0%), United Shore Financial Services (12.8%) and loanDepot
(12.2%) contribute approximately 69.9% of the mortgage loans in the
pool. The remaining originators each account for less than 10% of
the principal balance of the loans in the pool and provide R&W to
the transaction.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Three third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, collateral, and regulatory reviews on
100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR results indicated compliance
with the originators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority
of loans, no material compliance issues, and no appraisal defects.
The loans that had exceptions to the originators' underwriting
guidelines had strong documented compensating factors such as low
DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment
histories. The TPR firms also identified minor compliance
exceptions for reasons such as inadequate RESPA disclosures (which
do not have assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) violations related to fees that were out of
variance but then cured and disclosed. Moody's did not make any
adjustments to Moody's expected or Aaa loss levels due to the TPR
results.

JPMMT 2018-1's R&W framework is in line with other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework takes into account the
financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including
qualifiers and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association (rated Aa2), who is the R&W provider for
approximately 31.9% (by loan balance) of the loans, is the
strongest R&W provider. Moody's have made no adjustments on the
Chase loans in the pool. In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers
are unrated and/or financially weaker entities. Moreover, JPMMAC
will not backstop any R&W providers who may become financially
incapable of repurchasing mortgage loans. Moody's made an
adjustment for these loans in Moody's analysis to account for this
risk.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank Trust National Association.
The custodian's functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as
Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight, and
termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. In addition, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 1.25% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 6.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 1.00% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate writedown amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero I.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Other Considerations

Similar to recent JPMMT transactions, extraordinary trust expenses
in the JPMMT 2018-1 transaction are deducted from Net WAC as
opposed to available distribution amount. Moody's believe there is
a very low likelihood that the rated certificates in JPMMT 2018-1
will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against key
deal parties. First, all of the loans are prime quality Qualified
Mortgages originated under a regulatory environment that requires
tighter originations controls than pre-crisis, thus reducing the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well defined
processes in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing
basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
(Pentalpha Surveillance, LLC), named at closing must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when certain clearly
defined triggers have been breached which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Third, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a credit, compliance and valuation review
of 100% of the mortgage loans by independent third parties.
Finally, the performance of past JPMMT transactions have been well
within expectation.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


JP MORGAN 2018-ASH8: S&P Assigns Prelim. B-(sf) Rating on F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-ASH8's
issuance is a CMBS transaction backed by one two-year,
floating-rate, interest-only commercial mortgage loan totaling
$395.0 million, with five one-year extension options, secured by
the fee simple and leasehold interests in eight full-service hotels
and by a first-lien mortgage encumbering all of the operating
lessees' rights in the properties.

S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-ASH8's $395.0
million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by one two-year, floating-rate, interest-only commercial
mortgage loan totaling $395.0 million, with five one-year extension
options, secured by the fee simple and leasehold interests in eight
full-service hotels and by a first-lien mortgage encumbering all of
the operating lessees' rights in the properties.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 7,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-ASH8


  Class       Rating(i)             Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)             111,600,000
  X-CP        BBB- (sf)            173,920,000(ii)
  X-EXT       BBB- (sf)            217,400,000(ii)
  B           AA- (sf)              37,400,000
  C           A- (sf)               30,300,000
  D           BBB- (sf)             38,100,000
  E           BB- (sf)              60,200,000
  F           B- (sf)               50,400,000
  G           NR                    47,000,000
  HRR         NR                    20,000,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP
certificates references the aggregate certificate balances of the
A-2 portion of class A, B-2 portion of class B, C-2 portion of
class C, and D-2 portion of class D. The notional amount of the
class X-EXT certificates references the aggregate certificate
balances of the class A, B, C, and D certificates.
NR-- Not rated.


LOCKWOOD GROVE: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. E-RR Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
CLO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Lockwood
Grove CLO, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is:

US$255,000,000 Class A-1-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (The "Class A-1-RR Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class A-X-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (The "Class A-X-RR Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class B-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (The "Class B-RR Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class C-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (The "Class C-RR Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$23,500,000 Class D-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (The "Class D-RR Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class E-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (The "Class E-RR Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Tall Tree Investment Management, LLC (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on February 6, 2018
(the "Second Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing
of all classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original
Notes") previously issued on October 25, 2016 (the "First
Refinancing Date"). On the Second Refinancing Date, the Issuer used
proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in
full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: 396,402,549

Defaulted par: $1,860,918

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3099

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.21 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3099 to 3564)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1-RR Notes: -1

Class A-X-RR Notes: 0

Class B-RR Notes: -2

Class C-RR Notes: -2

Class D-RR Notes: -1

Class E-RR Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3099 to 4029)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1-RR Notes: -1

Class A-X-RR Notes: 0

Class B-RR Notes: -3

Class C-RR Notes: -4

Class D-RR Notes: -2

Class E-RR Notes: -1


MAGNETITE XVI: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Magnetite
XVI, Limited:

Moody's rating action is:

US$335,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$11,579,000 Class C-1-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class C-1-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$18,171,000 Class C-2-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class C-2-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,250,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class E-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

BlackRock Financial Management, Inc., (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on February 2, 2018
(the "Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on December 18, 2015 (the "Original Closing
Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes, along with the proceeds from the
issuance of one other class of secured notes to redeem in full the
Refinanced Original Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer
also issued one class of subordinated notes that will remain
outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and the other
class of secured notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features will occur in connection with the refinancing. These
include: changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes
to the overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $499,000,000

Defaulted par: $0

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2852

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the rating(s) assigned to the Refinancing Notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2852 to 3280)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-1-R Notes: -2

Class C-2-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2852 to 3708)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-1-R Notes: -3

Class C-2-R Notes: -3

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2


MARINER CLO 5: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Mariner CLO
5 Ltd.'s $459.20 million floating rate notes.

The note issuance is CLO transaction backed primarily by broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are
governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 5,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Mariner CLO 5 Ltd./Mariner CLO 5 LLC

  Class               Rating        Balance (mil. $)
  A                   AAA (sf)           307.00
  B                   AA (sf)             58.70
  C                   A (sf)              43.50
  D                   BBB- (sf)           29.80
  E                   BB- (sf)            20.20
  Subordinated notes  NR                  51.65

  NR--Not rated.



MIDOCEAN CREDIT I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-RR Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-RR, A-2-RR, B-RR, C-RR, and D-RR replacement note from MidOcean
Credit CLO I, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO), originally
issued in 2013 and reset in 2016 that is managed by MidOcean Credit
Fund Management L.P.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Feb. 13, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the rating on the originally refinanced notes and assigning ratings
to the new replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't
occur, we may affirm the rating on the original notes and withdraw
our preliminary rating on the replacement note."

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

  Current date after proposed refinancing

  Class     Amount   Interest          BDR     SDR    Cushion
          (mil. $)   rate(%)           (%)     (%)        (%)
  A-1-RR    210.50   LIBOR + 0.82      69.29   59.81      9.48
  A-2-RR     39.00   LIBOR + 1.30      62.59   51.81     10.78
  B-RR       22.00   LIBOR + 1.80      54.17   45.58      8.58
  C-RR       13.50   LIBOR + 2.55      50.88   40.08     10.80
  D-RR       11.40   LIBOR + 5.15      45.52   33.42     12.10

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the rating
assigned to the note remains consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support it, and we will take further rating action as
we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  MidOcean Credit CLO I
  Replacement class          Rating       Amount
                                         (mil. $)
  A-1-RR                     AAA (sf)      210.50
  A-2-RR                     AA (sf)        39.00
  B-RR                       A (sf)         22.00
  C-RR                       BBB (sf)       13.50
  D-RR                       BB (sf)        11.40


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ8, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HQ8 as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 35.0% of the
current balance, compared to 55.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis also incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 58% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced that it expects
will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $42.7 million
from $2.73 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 5% to 48% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 36% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

The trust has realized an aggregate loss of $240.1 million (for an
average loss severity of 51%) from 57 liquidated loans. Three
loans, constituting 57% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Inland BISYS
Fund Loan ($20.5 million -- 48.0% of the pool), which is secured by
a 240,000 SF office property built in 1995 and located in Columbus,
Ohio. The loan was transferred to special servicing on October 10,
2017 for imminent default due to borrower's inability to continue
making the monthly payments as a result of Citi Fund Services'
lease expiring on 8/31/17 and vacating the premises (227,869 SF-
95% of NRA). The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured
by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $12.5
million loss for the specially serviced loans (51% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results and partial year
2017 operating results for 100% of the pool, excluding specially
serviced loans. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 120%
compared to 122% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 8% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Two remaining performing conduit loans represent 42.5% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Bel Air Town Center Loan ($15.4
million -- 36.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 90,000 SF
unanchored retail neighborhood center in Bel Air, Maryland. As of
the September 2017, the property was 72% leased compared to 70% at
Moody's last review. Top tenants at the property include Long &
Foster Real Estate and Chili's Grill with lease expirations in 2021
and 2020, respectively. The loan is on the servicer's watchlist due
to low occupancy and DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 131%
and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 134% and 0.83X at the last
review.

The second performing loan is the Advanced Circuits Loan ($2.7
million -- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 61,000 SF
industrial property located in Aurora, Colorado. The property is
100% occupied by a single tenant, Advanced Circuits Inc., the 3rd
largest printed circuit board manufacturer in the US, with a lease
expiration in November 2026. To account for the single tenant
exposure, Moody's incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 59% and 1.75X, respectively, compared to 57% and
1.80X at Moody's last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Moody's Lowers Cl. X-B Certs Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2011-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2011-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class X-A was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the IO Class X-B was downgraded due to a decline in
the credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 18, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38% to $759 million
from $1.21 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 43 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 65.6% of the pool. One loan, constituting
2% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Six loans, constituting 5% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

Four loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool. Two loans,
constituting 7% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Towne West Square Mall
loan ($46 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a
regional mall of approximately 944,000 SF located in Wichita,
Kansas. The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2017
due to imminent default. The mall is anchored by JC Penney,
Dillards and Dick's Sporting Goods, all of which are not part of
the collateral. As of September 2017, inline occupancy was 69%.
While the property has been cash flow positive in recent years,
actual in-place net cash flow at the property fell to a 1.03X DSCR
as of September 2017 reporting, compared to a 1.33X DSCR at
year-end 2016. The second specially serviced loan is secured by a
mixed use property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $31.5 million
loss for these specially serviced loans (60% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 99% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 83%, compared to 85% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 21.6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the FedEx
Distribution Center Loan ($15.2 million -- 2% of the pool), which
is secured by a 117,000 SF single tenant industrial property
located in East Elmhurst, New York. The property is leased to FedEx
Corporation on a triple net lease expiring in 2023, with rent bumps
every five years. The loan had an original term of ten years and is
amortizing on a 15-year schedule. The loan has an anticipated
repayment date (ARD) of December 2020 and a final maturity in
December 2022. Due to the single tenant nature of this building,
Moody's has incorporated a lit/dark analysis into this review to
account for lease rollover risk. Moody's current structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.55X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 42% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Deerbrook Mall Loan ($137.8 million --
18% of the pool), which is secured by a 554,500 SF portion of a 1.2
million SF regional mall located in Humble, Texas. The property is
anchored by Dillards, Macy's, Sears, JC Penney and AMC Theatres.
AMC Theatres is the only anchor space included in the loan
collateral. Inline occupancy was 97% as of September 2017. The loan
benefits from amortizion and is scheduled to mature in April 2021.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.21X, respectively,
compared 78% and 1.22X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Ingram Park Mall Loan
($130.5 million -- 17% of the pool), which is secured by a 375,000
SF portion of a 1.1 million SF regional mall located in San
Antonio, Texas. The property is anchored by Dillards, Macy's,
Sears, and JC Penney, all of which own their own improvements.
Inline occupancy was 89% as of September 2017 compared to 85% at
Moody's last review. The sponsor announced a planned $9 million
renovation which began during 2017. The loan is amortizing on a
30-year schedule and matures in June 2021. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 87% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 89% and 1.13X at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Three Riverway Office Loan
($47.8 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 20-story,
Class A office building totaling approximately 398,000 SF and
located in Houston, Texas. The Property is part of a five-building
office park situated in the northern portion of the Galleria/Uptown
Houston submarket. The property is located within a larger 27-acre
master planned development featuring office, retail, and apartment
properties, as well as a 378-room full service hotel. The
collateral property sustained damage as a result of flooding
related to Hurricane Harvey in late August 2017. The servicer
expects the impact from the flooding to be mitigated by insurance,
and the lender has begun to receive insurance proceeds for property
damage as well as for business interruption. The loan is amortizing
on a 30-year schedule and matures in May 2021. The Property was 76%
leased as of November 2017 compared to 77% at the prior review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.92X, respectively,
compared to 110% and 0.91X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seventeen
classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
Series 2013-C9:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on fourteen P&I Classes (A-2, A-AB, A-3, A-3FL, A-3FX,
A-4, A-S, B, C, D, E, F, G & H) because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on IO Classes X-A and X-B were affirmed based on the
credit performance of the referenced classes.

The transaction contains a exchangeable certificates. Classes A-S,
B and C may be exchanged for Class PST certificates. The PST
certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of interest and
principal distributable on the Classes A-S, B and C certificates
that are exchanged for such PST certificates. The rating on Class
PST was affirmed based on the credit performance of the referenced
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.0% of the
current balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses remain unchanged at 2.4%.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 . The
methodologies used in rating the Cl. PST were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015, "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 18, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18.3% to $1.04
billion from $1.28 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 59% of the pool. One loan, constituting
15.8% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment.

Nine loans, constituting 11.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. One loan, constituting
0.7% of the pool, is currently in special servicing.

The specially serviced loan is the Hilton Garden Inn Houston
Westbelt Loan ($7.5 million -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 120 key, limited service, Hilton Garden Inn located in
southwestern Houston, Texas. In 2016, room and food & beverage
revenue dropped by $850K which contributed to the decline in
property performance. The loan transferred to special servicing in
April 2017 due to imminent monetary default after the Borrower
failed to make February through May 2017 debt service payments. The
borrower has reinstated the loan payments but is delinquent in the
payment of the legal fees and costs incurred to date. The borrower
is also not cooperating with the master servicer in opening a cash
management account. The special servicer has engaged legal counsel,
a motion to appoint a receiver was filed and the franchise has been
notified.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 81.1% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 91.2% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 98.5%, compared
to 93.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 14.1% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.75%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.67X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.82X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Milford Plaza
Fee Loan ($165 million -- 15.8% of the pool), which represents a
pari passu interest in a $275 million first mortgage. The loan is
secured by the ground lease on the land beneath the Row NYC Hotel,
formerly the Milford Plaza Hotel -- a 28-story, 1,331 key
full-service hotel located in Midtown Manhattan. The triple net
(NNN) ground lease commenced in 2013, expires in 2112 and includes
annual CPI rent increases. The tenant has purchase options at the
end of years 10, 20 and 30. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are baa1 (sca.pd) and 0.66X, respectively,
compared to baa1 (sca.pd) and 0.66X at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 26.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Colonnade Office Loan ($155.4 million --
14.9% of the pool), which is secured by a three-building, Class A
office complex and attached parking structure located in Addison,
Texas. The buildings contain approximately 1.05 million square feet
(SF) and range from 12 to 16 stories tall. The property has
undergone approximately $7.5 million of capital improvements and
now has LEED Silver certification. It was 97% leased (to about 60
unique tenants) as of September 2017 compared to 95% in September
2016, 91% at yearend 2015 and 88% at securitization. The Loan was
interest only for the first 36 months of the term and began
amortizing in 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
1.08X, respectively, compared to 110.5% and 0.95X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Dartmouth Mall Loan ($61.1 million
-- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 531,000
SF component of a 671,000 SF regional mall in Dartmouth,
Massachusetts. The property is anchored by Macy's, Sears, J.C.
Penney and a 12-screen AMC theatre. The Macy's is not part of the
collateral and was not included on the list of closures announced.
In-line occupancy was 95% and total Property was 96% as of
September 2017 compared to 88% in-line and 95% total Property in
December 2016. Several tenants including Finish Line, Gap, Ruby
Tuesday, Hollister and Wet Seal vacated during 2016-2017. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 127.3% and 0.91X, respectively, compared
to 104.2% and 1.04X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Apthorp Retail Condominium Loan
($59.9 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 12,851
SF ground floor retail condominium unit within the Apthorp
condominium building located on Broadway between 79th and 80th
streets on the Upper West Side in New York City. The Building was
built between 1906-1908 and is on the National Register of Historic
Places. The Property was 100% leased as of September 2017. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 101.1% and 0.83X, respectively, compared
to 103% and 0.81X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS9: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust's MSCI 2016-UBS9 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Overall pool performance remains stable and
generally in line with expectations at issuance, with minimal
paydown or changes to credit enhancement. As of the January 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 1.3% to $658.0 million from $666.6 million at issuance.
There have been no specially serviced loans since issuance. While
six loans are on the servicer's watchlist, none have been
designated Fitch Loans of Concern. No loans are defeased.

Pool Concentrations: The top five, 10 and 15 loans comprise 42.3%,
69.1% and 82.7% of the pool respectively. The pool's largest
concentration by property type is office (33.1%), followed by
retail (25.1%). Two loans within the top 15 are secured by retail
outlet properties (8.9%). Loans secured by industrial properties
comprise 19.9% of the pool, which is greater than the 2015 average
of 4.2%.

Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 11.8% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is in line with
the 2015 average. Six loans (26.4%) are full-term interest only.
Ten loans (34.9%) are partial interest only, and the remaining 15
loans (38.7%) are amortizing balloon loans with terms of seven to
10 years.

Pari Passu Loans: Nine loans representing 54.3% of the pool,
including seven of the top 10 loans, are pari passu loans.

Premium Outlet Concentration: Two of the top 15 loans (8.9% of the
pool) are secured by premium outlets from related sponsors. The
Ellenton Premium Outlets loan (5.9% of the pool) is secured by a
476,481 SF outlet center located in Ellenton, FL, which is situated
between Bradenton/Sarasota to the south and Tampa/St. Petersburg to
the north. The servicer reported a YE 2016 NOI DSCR of 2.55x. As of
the September 2017 rent roll, the property was 94.4% leased, a
slight decline from the YE 2016 occupancy of 97.4%. The largest
tenants include VF Factory Outlet (4.9% of NRA), Saks Fifth Avenue
Off Fifth (4.2% of NRA) and the Nike Factory Store (3.2% of NRA).
There is approximately 20% roll in 2018. The Grove City Premium
Outlets loan (3.0% of the pool) is secured by a 531,200 SF outlet
center located in Grove City, PA, approximately 50 miles north of
Pittsburgh. The servicer reported a YE 2016 NOI DSCR of 2.87x. As
of the September 2017 rent roll, the property was 88.6% leased, a
slight decline from the YE 2016 occupancy of 92.6%. The largest
tenants include VF Factory Outlet (5.1% of NRA), Old Navy (3.8% of
NRA) and the Nike Factory Store (3.1% of NRA). There is
approximately 9% roll in 2018. Fitch requested recent tenant sales
information for both properties, but has not received any from the
servicer to date.

Fitch increased the cap rate applied to these loans from the
issuance levels due to the outlet centers' tertiary locations and
the lack of recent tenant sales information provided.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics. No loans are scheduled to mature until
2022 (8.5% of the pool).

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:
-- $21.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $192.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $458.1 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87.5 million class X-B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40.0 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30.0 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.2 million class X-D* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.0 million class X-E* at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.0 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.7 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G, H, X-FG or X-H certificates.


PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Withdraws C(sf) Ratings on 6 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings on the
following notes issued by issued by Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

Cl. E, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings because it believes it
has insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support the
maintenance of the ratings.

The collateral manager does not publish updated performance
information on assets in the asset pool which Moody's use to
evaluate components of expected loss.


PINNACLE PARK: Moody's Lowers Class F Notes Rating to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Pinnacle Park CLO, LTD.:

US$63,750,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on January 17, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the rating on the following notes:

US$5,938,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 24, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$307,500,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 17, 2017 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

US$28,125,000 Class C-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on January 17, 2017 Assigned A1
(sf)

US$31,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on April 24, 2014 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$29,375,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on April 24, 2014 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Pinnacle Park CLO, LTD., issued in April 2014, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
April 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade and affirmation actions reflect the benefit of the
limited period of time remaining before the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in April 2018, and the expectation that
deleveraging will commence shortly. On the other hand, the
downgrade action on the Class F notes reflects the specific risks
to the junior-most notes posed by par loss and credit deterioration
observed over the last year in the underlying CLO portfolio. Based
on Moody's calculation, the total collateral par balance (including
recoveries on current defaults) is $488.9 million, or $11.1 million
less than the $500 million initial par amount targeted during the
deal's ramp-up at initial closing. Furthermore, the
trustee-reported weighted average spread (WAS) has declined since
January 2016 and is currently reported at 3.41% (versus a covenant
level of 3.36%).

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2319)

Class A-R: 0

Class B-R: 0

Class C-R: +3

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Class F: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3479)

Class A-R: 0

Class B-R: -1

Class C-R: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Class F: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $485.0 million, defaulted par of $8.1
million, a weighted average default probability of 21.0% (implying
a WARF of 2899), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.2%, a diversity score of 68 and a weighted average spread of
3.40% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


ROCKWALL CDO II: Moody's Hikes Class B-1L Notes Rating to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Rockwall CDO II Ltd.:

US$48,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due 2024,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2017 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

US$36,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due 2024
(current outstanding balance of $28,510,000), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on January 25, 2017 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Combination Notes due 2024 (current rated balance of
$4,260,396), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on January 25, 2017
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$115,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due 2024
(current outstanding balance of $65,471,330), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on May 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$76,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due 2024,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2017 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Rockwall CDO II Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans with significant exposure to CLO tranches. As per Moody's
calculation, outstanding CLO tranches currently represent
approximately 14.8% of the portfolio. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in May 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since May 2017. The Class A-1LB
notes have been paid down by approximately 42.5% or $48.4 million
since then. Based on the trustee's Dec 2017 report, the OC ratios
for the Class A, Class B-1L and Class B-2L notes are reported at
144.10%, 125.25% and 114.97%, respectively, versus May 2017 levels
of c 134.99%, 120.54% and 112.93%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since May 2017. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) is currently 2972 compared to 2723 at that
time. Moody's also notes that the deal holds a material par amount
of thinly traded or untraded loans, whose lack of liquidity may
pose additional risks especially for the subordinated notes
relating to the issuer's ultimate ability to pursue a liquidation
of such assets, especially if the sales can be transacted only at
heavily discounted price levels.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal has exposure to
securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed through
credit estimates. Moody's normally updates such estimates at least
once annually, but if such updates do not occur, the transaction
could be negatively affected by any default probability adjustments
Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

7) Combination notes: The rating on the combination notes, which
combines cash flows from one or more of the CLO's debt tranches and
the equity tranche, is subject to a higher degree of volatility
than the other rated notes. Moody's models haircuts to the cash
flows from the equity tranche based on the target rating of the
combination notes. Actual equity distributions that differ
significantly from Moody's assumptions can lead to a faster (or
slower) speed of reduction in the combination notes' rated balance,
thereby resulting in better (or worse) ratings performance than
previously expected.

8) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $3.3 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

9) Exposure to CLO securities: The portfolio includes a material
concentration in CLO securities. Moody's views CLOs as highly
correlated, and the specific CLO securities that the issuer has
invested in have longer average lives and are of relatively better
average credit quality than the loans in the portfolio. Therefore,
as the deal further seasons and amortizes, the CLO securities,
currently representing 14.8% of the total collateral, may comprise
an even larger portion of the portfolio. Conversely, if a larger
portion of the CLO tranches are redeemed, the corporate loan
collateral that has a relatively worse average credit quality, may
comprise an even larger portion of the portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2378)

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +1

Class B-1L: +3

Class B-2L: +1

Combination Notes: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3566)

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Combination Notes: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $266.8 million, defaulted par of
$30.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 21.1%
(implying a WARF of 2972), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 44.2%, a diversity score of 21 and a weighted average
spread of 2.94% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 10.4% of the collateral pool.


SATURNS SEARS 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on $60.19MM Notes to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following certificates issued by SATURNS Sears Roebuck Acceptance
Corp. Debenture Backed Series 2003-1:

US$60,191,725 7.25% Callable Units due June 1, 2032 Notes (current
outstanding balance of $46,808,075), Downgraded to C; previously on
November 20, 2017 Downgraded to Ca

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the change in the rating of the
7.00% Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. debentures due June 1, 2032,
issued by Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. ("Underlying Securities"),
which was downgraded to C on January 26, 2018. The transaction is a
structured note whose rating is based on the rating of the
Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the transaction.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating will be sensitive to any change in the rating of the
7.00% Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. debentures due June 1, 2032,
issued by Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp.


SELKIRK 2013-1: DBRS Hikes Class E Debt Rating to BB(high)
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings on the following classes of
Asset-Back Notes (the Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2013-1 (the
Trust) as:

-- Class C to AA (sf) from A (high) (sf)
-- Class D to A (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class F to BB (low) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the ratings of the following classes:

-- Class A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment and the overall improved performance of the remaining
collateral in the pool since issuance. In the last 12 months there
has been a collateral reduction of 21.7% as a result of 11 loans
repaying from the Trust, contributing $200 million in principal
reduction to the senior bonds. At issuance, the collateral
consisted of 55 seasoned, fixed-rate loans secured by 67 commercial
and multifamily properties. As of the November 2017 remittance, 32
loans remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal
balance of $417.6 million.

The top 15 loans continue to exhibit stable performance with a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt
yield of 1.74 times (x) and 14.0%, respectively, based on the most
recent year-end reporting available for the individual loans. The
top 15 loans have experienced WA net cash flow (NCF) growth of
24.6% over the DBRS issuance figures. In addition, two loans in the
top 15 are maturing in the next 12 months, representing 9.6% of the
current pool balance. Based on YE2016 financials, these loans
reported a WA DSCR and WA exit debt yield of 2.0x and 18.0%,
respectively, metrics indicative of loans with a higher likelihood
of being able to refinance at maturity. As of the November 2017
remittance, there are no loans in special servicing and three loans
on the servicer's watchlist, representing 11.3% of the current pool
balance. Two of these loans are being monitored for performance
declines, with individual DSCRs ranging between 1.03x and 1.16x for
the YE2016 reporting period. The remaining loan has been flagged
for elevated vacancy as the largest tenant at the subject vacated
at lease expiration. DBRS accounted for the elevated vacancy in its
analysis for this loan, which is highlighted below.

The 830 Morris Turnpike loan (Prospectus ID#24, representing 3.2%
of the current pool balance) is secured by an 83,430 square foot
office property located in Milburn, New Jersey. The loan was added
to the watchlist as Santander Bank (Santander), which formerly
occupied 50.0% of the net rentable area (NRA) and vacated its space
upon lease expiration in October 2016. The tenant represented 64.6%
of the property's base rent. According to the servicer, the
trailing 12 months' DSCR fell below 1.20x as of January 2017,
following the tenant's departure from the subject, which qualified
as a trigger event under the Cash Collateral Agreement. As of
November 2017, the servicer noted that the borrower has remained in
compliance of the cash sweep and has been trapping $75,000 per
month into a Tenant Improvement Reserve since November 2014, for
the formerly occupied Santander space. According to the March 2017
rent roll, the property was 63.4% occupied, with the largest three
tenants cumulatively representing 34.5% of the NRA, on leases that
are scheduled to expire between March 2018 and February 2024. The
largest tenant, Stone Mountain Management Corp. (18.6% of the NRA),
has an upcoming lease expiration in March 2018 and DBRS has
requested a leasing update from the servicer, with a response
pending to date.

As at November 2017, CoStar was reporting an average vacancy rate
of 3.4% and an average asking rental rate of $38.25 per square foot
(psf) for comparable office properties within the Short
Mills/Milburn submarket, which is above the subject's current
average rental rate of $27 psf. Despite the elevated vacancy rate,
the loan benefits from experienced sponsorship and the property
remains in good overall condition, with no deferred maintenance
noted, according to the March 2017 site inspection. As of YE2016
reporting, the DSCR was reported at 1.26x, reflective of a 17.3%
growth in cash flows over the YE2015 DSCR of 1.07x. The loan was
analyzed with a stressed NCF figure to reflect the elevated vacancy
at the subject and the upcoming tenant rollover risk in March 2018.


SELKIRK 2013-2: DBRS Hikes Class G Notes Rating From BB(low)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of the following classes of
Asset-Backed Notes (the Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2013-2 as:

-- Class C to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class D to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class E to A (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to BBB (high) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the rating of the following classes as
follows:

-- Class A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class D and E, which
were assigned a Positive trend.

The rating upgrades and trend changes reflect the increased credit
support to the bonds as a result of scheduled loan amortization,
successful loan repayment and the overall improved performance of
the remaining collateral in the pool since issuance. Specifically,
there has been an 18.6% increase in collateral reduction over the
last 12 months, primarily a result of the repayment of five loans,
which cumulatively totaled $84.0 million at issuance.

At issuance, the collateral consisted of 40 seasoned, fixed-rate
loans secured by 57 commercial and multifamily properties. As of
the November 2017 remittance, 16 loans remain in the pool with an
aggregate outstanding principal balance of $115.2 million. The top
15 loans continue to exhibit stable performance with a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt
yield of 1.70 times (x) and 21.5%, respectively, based on the most
recent year-end reporting available for the individual loans. The
top 15 loans have experienced WA net cash flow growth of 24.8% over
the DBRS issuance figures. In addition, two loans are maturing in
the next 12 months, representing 8.9% of the current pool balance.
Based on YE2016 financials, these loans reported a WA DSCR and WA
exit debt yield of 1.97x and 21.2%, respectively, metrics
indicative of loans with a higher likelihood of being able to
refinance at maturity. As of the November 2017 remittance, there
are no loans in special servicing and no loans on the servicer's
watchlist; however, one loan in the top 15 is reporting a year-end
cash flow decline over the DBRS issuance figure, which is
highlighted below.

The Heights Office Building loan (Prospectus ID#20, representing
5.6% of the current pool balance) is secured by a 104,418 square
feet (sf) office property located in San Antonio, Texas. According
to the March 2017 rent roll, the property was 100% occupied, with
the largest three tenants representing 32.0% of the net rentable
area (NRA), on leases scheduled to expire between November 2019 and
August 2021. As of November 2017, CoStar was reporting vacancy
rates of 13.6% and average asking rental rates of $21.73 per square
foot (psf) for comparable office properties within the North
Central submarket, which is below the subject's average rental rate
of $29.09 psf. In addition, CoStar reported the property as 98.9%
leased as the subject's occupancy has remained historically above
97.0% since issuance, with minimal tenant rollover anticipated
through 2018. As of YE2016 reporting, the DSCR was reported at
1.73x, compared with the DBRS Term DSCR of 2.34x, reflective of a
19.4% decline in YE2016 cash flows over the DBRS issuance figure.
The decline is attributed to a 28.7% increase in total operating
expenses since issuance, mainly driven by increases in real estate
taxes and utilities expenses. Despite the cash flow decline, the
subject's performance remains stable and the loan benefits from an
experienced sponsor, with property quality remaining in overall
excellent condition, according to the May 2017 site inspection.

All ratings will be subject to ongoing surveillance, which could
result in ratings being upgraded, downgraded, placed under review,
confirmed or discontinued by DBRS.

The ratings assigned to Classes E, F, and G materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviations are warranted given
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


SELKIRK 2014-3A: DBRS Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B(high)
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of the following classes of
Asset-Backed Notes (the Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2014-3A as
listed below:

-- Class B to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)

-- Class C to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)

-- Class D to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

-- Class E to BB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

-- Class F to B (high) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the rating of the following class of the
Certificates:

-- Class A2 at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment and the overall improved performance of the remaining
collateral in the pool since issuance. In the last 12 months, there
was a collateral reduction of 5.0% as a result of eight loans
repaying from the Trust, contributing $38.0 million in principal
reduction to senior bonds. At issuance, the collateral consisted of
62 seasoned, fixed-rate loans secured by 65 commercial and
multifamily properties. As of the November 2017 remittance, 43
loans remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal
balance of $514.3 million.

The top 15 loans continue to exhibit stable performance with a
weighted-average (WA) debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt
yield of 1.87 times (x) and 16.1%, respectively, based on the
year-end (YE) 2016 financials. The top 15 loans experienced WA net
cash flow growth of 38.4% over the DBRS issuance figures. As of the
November 2017 remittance, there are no loans in special servicing
but one loan on the servicer's watchlist, representing 5.1% of the
current pool balance. The loan has been flagged for upcoming tenant
rollover risk as one of the largest tenants at the subject will be
vacating at lease expiration. DBRS accounted for the elevated
vacancy in its analysis for this loan, which is highlighted below.

The 750 East Pratt Street loan (Prospectus ID#4, representing 5.1%
of the current pool balance) is secured by a 336,462 square feet
(sf) office building located in Baltimore, Maryland. The loan was
added to the watchlist as Exelon Business Services (Exelon), which
occupies 45.4% net rentable area (NRA), provided notice to the
borrower that it will be vacating its space upon lease expiration
at YE2017. According to the March 2017 rent roll, the property was
100% occupied, as Exelon and Venable, LLP each occupy 45.4% of the
NRA; cumulatively, they represent 90.8% of the NRA. The Venable,

LLP tenant has a lease that is scheduled to expire in December
2022, approximately two years prior to loan maturity in October
2024.

According to the servicer, the borrower recently signed a lease
with Johns Hopkins University to assume approximately 59,000 sf of
the former Exelon space (17.5% of the NRA). Johns Hopkins
University will be paying a rental rate of $28 per square feet
(psf) for its space, which is below the rental rate that Exelon is
currently paying for its space at $34 psf. In addition, the
borrower also executed a ten-year lease with KPMG for approximately
21,400 sf (6% of the NRA), with a commencement date in May 2018 at
an undisclosed rental rate. According to the servicer, the
subject's occupancy rate will decline to 79% from 100% once both
tenants take occupancy following Exelon's departure from the
subject.

As of November 2017, CoStar reported an average vacancy rate of
8.8% and average asking rental rates of $24.30 psf for comparable
office properties within the Central Business District submarket,
which is below the subject's current average rental rate of $33.04
psf (which is skewed by the higher rate paid by Exelon). Despite
the elevated vacancy rate associated with the upcoming tenant
rollover, the subject's occupancy historically remained at or near
100% since issuance, and the loan is structured with cash
management in the event the DSCR declines below 1.20x. The property
remains in overall good condition with no deferred maintenance
noted, according to the March 2017 site inspection. As of YE2016
reporting, the DSCR was reported at 1.46x, remaining in line with
the YE2015 DSCR of 1.48x. The loan was analyzed with a stressed net
cash flow figure to reflect the upcoming tenant rollover risk.


SELKIRK 2014-3V: DBRS Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B(high)
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of the following classes of
Asset-Backed Notes (the Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2014-3V
as:

-- Class B to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E to BB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to B (high) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS also confirmed the rating of the following class:

-- Class A2 at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment and the overall improved performance of the remaining
collateral in the pool since issuance. In the last 12 months, there
was a collateral reduction of 5.0% as a result of eight loans
repaying from the Trust, contributing $38.0 million in principal
reduction to senior bonds. At issuance, the collateral consisted of
62 seasoned, fixed-rate loans secured by 65 commercial and
multifamily properties. As of the November 2017 remittance, 43
loans remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal
balance of $514.3 million.

The top 15 loans continue to exhibit stable performance with a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt
yield of 1.87 times (x) and 16.1%, respectively, based on year-end
(YE) 2016 financials. The top 15 loans experienced WA net cash flow
growth of 38.4% over the DBRS issuance figures. As of the November
2017 remittance, there are no loans in special servicing and one
loan on the servicer's watchlist, representing 5.1% of the current
pool balance. The loan has been flagged for upcoming tenant
rollover risk as one of the largest tenants at the subject will be
vacating at lease expiration. DBRS accounted for the elevated
vacancy in its analysis for this loan, which is highlighted below.

The 750 East Pratt Street loan (Prospectus ID#4, representing 5.1%
of the current pool balance) is secured by a 336,462 square feet
(sf) office building located in Baltimore, Maryland. The loan was
added to the watchlist as Exelon Business Services (Exelon),
occupying 45.4% net rentable area (NRA), provided notice to the
borrower that it will be vacating its space upon lease expiration
at YE2017. According to the March 2017 rent roll, the property was
100% occupied, as Exelon and Venable, LLP each occupy 45.4% of the
NRA, cumulatively representing 90.8% of the NRA. The Venable, LLP
tenant has a lease that is scheduled to expire in December 2022,
approximately two years prior to loan maturity in October 2024.

According to the servicer, the borrower recently signed a lease
with Johns Hopkins University to assume approximately 59,000 sf of
the former Exelon space (17.5% of the NRA). Johns Hopkins
University will be paying a rental rate of $28 per square foot
(psf) for its space, which is below the rental rate that Exelon is
currently paying for its space at $34 psf. In addition, the
borrower has also executed a ten-year lease with KPMG for
approximately 21,400 square feet (6% of the NRA), with a
commencement date in May 2018 at an undisclosed rental rate.
According to the servicer, the subject's occupancy rate will
decline to 79% from 100% once both tenants take occupancy following
Exelon's departure from the subject.

As of November 2017, CoStar was reporting an average vacancy rate
of 8.8% and average asking rental rates of $24.30 psf for
comparable office properties within the Central Business District
submarket, which is below the subject's current average rental rate
of $33.04 psf, which is skewed by the higher rate paid by Exelon.
Despite the elevated vacancy rate associated with the upcoming
tenant rollover, the subject's occupancy has historically remained
at or near 100% since issuance, and the loan is structured with
cash management in the event the DSCR declines below 1.20x. The
property remains in overall good condition, with no deferred
maintenance noted, according to the March 2017 site inspection. As
of YE2016 reporting, the DSCR was reported at 1.46x, remaining in
line with the YE2015 DSCR of 1.48x The loan was analyzed with a
stressed net cash flow figure to reflect the upcoming tenant
rollover risk.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-CH1: Moody's Rates Class B-5 Certs '(P)Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2018-CH1, except for the
interest-only classes. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans.

SEMT 2018-CH1 is the third securitization that includes loans
acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation ("Redwood"
or "Seller"), a subsidiary of Redwood Trust, Inc., under its
expanded credit prime loan program called "Redwood Choice".
Redwood's Choice program is a prime program with credit parameters
outside of Redwood's traditional prime jumbo program, "Redwood
Select." The Choice program expands the low end of Redwood's FICO
range to 661 from 700, while increasing the high end of eligible
loan-to-value ratios from 85% to 90%. The pool also includes loans
with non-QM characteristics (27.8%), such as debt-to-income ratios
up to 50.9%. Non-QM loans were acquired by Redwood under each of
the Select and Choice programs.

The assets of the trust consist of 591 fixed rate mortgage loans,
all of which are fully amortizing, except for two mortgage loans
that have an interest-only term. Substantially all of the mortgage
loans have an original term to maturity of 30 years. The loans were
sourced from multiple originators and acquired by Redwood. All of
the loans conform to the Seller's guidelines, except for loans
originated by First Republic Bank, which were originated to conform
to First Republic Bank's guidelines.

The transaction benefits from nearly 100% due diligence of data
integrity, credit, property valuation, and compliance conducted by
an independent third-party firm.

CitiMortgage, Inc. will act as the master servicer of the loans in
this transaction. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, First Republic
Bank and PHH Mortgage Corporation will be primary servicers on the
deal.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1(sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1(sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1(sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa3(sf)

Cl. B-1B, Assigned (P)Aa3(sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A1(sf)

Cl. B-2B, Assigned (P)A1(sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)A3(sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Baa2(sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)Ba2(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.85%
in a base scenario and reaches 10.45% at a stress level roughly
consistent with Aaa(sf) ratings. The MILAN CE may be different from
the credit enhancement that is consistent with a Aaa(sf) rating for
a tranche, because the MILAN CE does not take into account the
structural features of the transaction. Moody's took this
difference into account in Moody's ratings of the senior classes.
Moody's loss estimates are based on a loan-by-loan assessment of
the securitized collateral pool using Moody's Individual Loan Level
Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level adjustments to the model
included: adjustments to borrower probability of default for higher
and lower borrower DTIs, borrowers with multiple mortgaged
properties, self-employed borrowers, origination channels and at a
pool level, for the default risk of HOA properties in super lien
states. The adjustment to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model
output also includes adjustments related to aggregator and
originators assessments. The model combines loan-level
characteristics with economic drivers to determine the probability
of default for each loan, and hence for the portfolio as a whole.
Severity is also calculated on a loan-level basis. The pool loss
level is then adjusted for borrower, zip code, and MSA level
concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-CH1 transaction is a securitization of 591 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $444,288,998. There are more than 100 originators in
this pool, including Fairway (6.5%), the remaining contributed less
than 5% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. The
loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed
credit underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank.

SEMT 2018-CH1 includes loans acquired by Redwood under its Choice
program. Although from a FICO and LTV perspective, the borrowers in
SEMT 2018-CH1 are not the super prime borrowers included in
traditional SEMT transactions, these borrowers are prime borrowers
with a demonstrated ability to manage household finance. On
average, borrowers in this pool have made a 26.02% down payment on
a mortgage loan of $754,646. In addition, the majority of borrowers
have more than 24 months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to
pay the mortgage for two years should there be an interruption to
the borrower's cash flow. Moreover, the borrowers on average have a
monthly residual income of $16,723. The WA FICO is 742, which is
lower than traditional SEMT transactions, which has averaged 769 in
2017 SEMT transactions. The lower WA FICO for SEMT 2018-CH1 may
reflect recent mortgage lates (0x30x3, 1x30x12, 2x30x24) which are
allowed under the Choice program, but not under Redwood's
traditional product, Redwood Select (0x30x24). While the WA FICO
may be lower for this transaction, Moody's do not believe that the
limited mortgage lates demonstrates a history of financial
mismanagement.

Moody's also note that SEMT 2018-CH1 is the third SEMT transaction
to include a significant number of non-QM loans (157) compared to
previous SEMT transactions, where the number of non-QM loans was
limited. Previously, 2017-CH2 and 2017-CH1 had the largest number
of non-QM loans at 112 out of 420 and 108 loans out of 409 loans
respectively.

Redwood's Choice program is in its early stages, having been
launched by Redwood in April 2016. In contrast to Redwood's
traditional program, Select, Redwood's Choice program allows for
higher LTVs, lower FICOs, non-occupant co-borrowers,
non-warrantable condos, limited loans with adverse credit events,
among other loan attributes. Under both Select and Choice, Redwood
also allows for loans with non-QM features, such as interest-only,
DTIs greater than 43%, asset depletion, among other loan
attributes.

However, Moody's notes that Redwood historically has been on
average stronger than its peers as an aggregator of prime jumbo
loans, including a limited number of non-QM loans in previous SEMT
transactions. As of the December 2017 remittance report, there have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's has
rated to date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
While in traditional SEMT transactions, Moody's has factored this
qualitative strength into Moody's analysis, in SEMT 2018-CH1,
Moody's have a neutral assessment of the Choice Program until
Moody's are able to review a longer performance history of Choice
mortgage loans.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
view the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2018-CH1 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments owing to
potential future lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the
loans are prime quality and were originated under a regulatory
environment that requires tighter controls for originations than
pre-crisis, which reduces the likelihood that the loans have
defects that could form the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood (or
a majority-owned affiliate of the sponsor), who will retain credit
risk in accordance with the U.S. Risk Retention Rules and provides
a back-stop to the representations and warranties of all the
originators except for First Republic Bank, has a strong alignment
of interest with investors, and is incentivized to actively manage
the pool to optimize performance. Third, the transaction has
reasonably well defined processes in place to identify loans with
defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent
breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations
and warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which
reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.70% ($7,552,913) of the closing pool
balance, which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds
from eroding credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 581 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 10 First Republic
loans. For the 10 loans, Redwood Trust elected to conduct a limited
review, which did not include a TPR firm check for TRID
compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

For the full review loans, the TPR report identified four grade "C"
compliance-related conditions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule. The conditions cited by Clayton included
the minimum and/or maximum payment amounts were inconsistent on the
closing disclosure and either or both of the "In 5 Years" total
payment or total principal amounts were under-disclosed. Moody's
believe that such conditions are not material and thus, Moody's did
not make any adjustments for these loans

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some
of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from First
Republic Bank where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans originated by First
Republic Bank.

The property valuation review conducted by the TPR firm consisted
of (i) a review of all of the appraisals for full review loans,
checking for issues with the comparables selected in the appraisal
and (ii) a value supported analysis for all loans. After a review
of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's found the exceptions to be
minor in nature and did not pose a material increase in the risk of
loan loss.

Moody's have received the results of the inspection report or
appraisal confirmation for all the mortgage loans secured by
properties in the areas affected by FEMA Disaster areas. The
results indicate that the properties did not receive any material
damage. SEMT 2018-CH1 includes a representation that the pool does
not include properties with material damage that would adversely
affect the value of the mortgaged property.

The originators and Redwood have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies, available to all
registered users of Moody's website, www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


TESLA AUTO 2018-A: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Tesla Auto Lease Trust 2018-A (TALT 2018-A). This
is the first auto lease transaction for Tesla Finance LLC (TFL; not
rated). The notes are backed by a pool of closed-end retail
automobile leases originated by TFL, who is also the servicer and
administrator for this transaction.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Tesla Auto Lease Trust 2018-A

$422,610,000, 2.32%, Class A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

$40,140,000, 2.75%, Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
(sf)

$27,970,000, 2.97%, Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

$23,710,000, 3.30%, Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
(sf)

$31,620,000, 4.94%, Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of TFL as the servicer
and administrator.

Moody's expected median cumulative net credit loss expectation for
TALT 2018-A is 0.50% and the total Aaa loss on the collateral is
35.00% (including 4.00% credit loss and 31.00% residual value loss
at a Aaa stress). Moody's based its cumulative net credit loss
expectation and Aaa loss level of the collateral on an analysis of
the quality of the underlying collateral; the historical credit
loss and residual value performance of similar collateral,
including securitization performance and managed portfolio
performance; the ability of TFL and its sub-servicer
LeaseDimensions to perform the servicing functions; and current
expectations for the macroeconomic environment during the life of
the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, the Class B notes, the Class C
notes, the Class D notes, and the Class E notes benefit from
31.25%, 24.65%, 20.05%, 16.15%, and 10.95% of hard credit
enhancement, respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the notes
consists of a combination of overcollateralization, a non-declining
reserve account and subordination, except for the Class E notes
which do not benefit from subordination. The notes may also benefit
from excess spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the subordinate notes if levels of credit
enhancement are higher than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of portfolio losses. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the vehicles
securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses also
depend greatly on the US job market and the market for used
vehicles. Other reasons for better-than-expected performance
include changes to servicing practices that enhance collections or
refinancing opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit enhancement
are insufficient to protect investors against current expectations
of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the US
job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


THARALDSON HOTEL 2018-THPT: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Tharaldson Hotel
Portfolio Trust 2018-THPT's $960.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate, interest-only
commercial mortgage loan totaling $960.0 million, with three
one-year extension options, secured by the fee simple and leasehold
interests and the operating lessee's leasehold interests in 135
hotels: 88 limited-service, 41 extended-stay, and six full-service
hotel properties.

Since the preliminary ratings were issued, the interest rate on the
mezzanine loan was increased to 10.80% from 10.50%. S&P said, "This
decreases our debt service coverage (based on the mortgage and
mezzanine loan balances, the actual spreads plus a 1.57% LIBOR
rate, and our net cash flow) to 1.81x from 1.82x.  The ratings
reflect our view of the collateral's historical and projected
performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Tharaldson Hotel Portfolio Trust 2018-THPT

  Class             Rating          Amount ($)
  A                 AAA (sf)       261,060,000
  X-CP              BBB- (sf)      424,992,000(i)
  X-EXT             BBB- (sf)      531,240,000(i)
  B                 AA- (sf)        99,180,000
  C                 A- (sf)         73,720,000
  D                 BBB- (sf)       97,280,000
  E                 BB- (sf)       153,710,000
  F                 B- (sf)        135,850,000
  G                 NR              47,500,000
  H                 NR              43,700,000
  RR interest       NR              48,000,000

(i)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the A-2 portion of
class A, B-2 portion of class B, C-2 portion of class C, and D-2
portion of class D through April 2019, and 0% thereafter. The
notional amount of the class X-EXT certificates will be reduced by
the aggregate amount of principal distributions and realized losses
allocated to the A-1 portion of class A, B-1 portion of class B,
C-1 portion of class C, and D-1 portion of class D through April
2019 and after April 2019, the notional amount of the class X-EXT
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the class A, B, C,
and D certificates.
NR--Not rated.


TOWD POINT 2018-1: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Class B2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of notes issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2018-1.

The notes are backed by one pool of seasoned, performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans. The collateral pool is
comprised of 4,525 first and junior lien, balloon, adjustable,
fixed and step rate mortgage loans, and has a non-zero updated
weighted average FICO score of 657 and a weighted average current
LTV of 84.1% (for junior lien loans, LTV is calculated based on
junior lien balance over current valuation) as of December 31, 2017
(the "Statistical Calculation Date"). Approximately 81.9% of the
loans, as of the Statistical Calculation Date, in the collateral
pool have been previously modified. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. is the servicer for the loans in the pool. FirstKey Mortgage,
LLC will be the asset manager for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2018-1

Cl. A1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A3, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A4, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B1, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B2, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. M1, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected losses on TPMT 2018-1's collateral pool is 14.00%
in Moody's base case scenario. Moody's loss estimates take into
account the historical performance of the loans that have similar
collateral characteristics as the loans in the pool, and also
incorporate an expectation of a continued strong credit environment
for RMBS, supported by a current strong housing price environment.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitizations Backed by Re-Performing and Non-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.

Collateral Description

TPMT 2018-1's collateral pool is primarily comprised of seasoned,
performing and re-performing mortgage loans. Approximately 81.9% of
the loans (as of the Statistical Calculation Date) in the
collateral pool have been previously modified. The majority of the
loans underlying this transaction exhibit collateral
characteristics similar to that of seasoned Alt-A mortgages.

Moody's expected losses on the pool on Moody's estimates of 1) the
default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and 2) the
principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. The two factors
that most strongly influence a re-performing mortgage loan's
likelihood of re-default are the length of time that the loan has
performed since modification, and the amount of the reduction in
monthly mortgage payments as a result of modification. The longer a
borrower has been current on a re-performing loan, the less likely
they are to re-default. As of the Statistical Calculation Date,
approximately 46.3% of the borrowers of the loans in the collateral
pool have been current on their payments for the past 24 months.

Moody's estimated expected losses using two approaches -- (1)
pool-level approach, and (2) re-performing loan level analysis. In
the pool-level approach, Moody's estimated losses on the pool by
applying Moody's assumptions on expected future delinquencies,
default rates, loss severities and prepayments as observed on
similar seasoned collateral. Moody's projected future annual
delinquencies for eight years by applying an initial annual default
rate assumption adjusted for future years through delinquency
burnout factors. The delinquency burnout factors reflect Moody's
future expectations of the economy and the U.S. housing market.
Based on the loan characteristics of the pool and the demonstrated
pay histories, Moody's applied an initial expected annual
delinquency rate of 13.0% for the pool for year one. Moody's then
calculated future delinquencies using default burnout and voluntary
conditional prepayment rate (CPR) assumptions. Moody's aggregated
the delinquencies and converted them to losses by applying pool
specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity assumptions.
Moody's CPR and loss severity assumptions are based on actual
observed performance of seasoned loans and prior TPMT deals. In
applying Moody's loss severity assumptions, Moody's accounted for
the lack of principal and interest advancing in this transaction.

Moody's also conducted a loan level analysis on TPMT 2018-1's
collateral pool. Moody's applied loan-level baseline lifetime
propensity to default assumptions, and considered the historical
performance of seasoned loans with similar collateral
characteristics and payment histories. Moody's then adjusted this
base default propensity up for (1) adjustable-rate loans, (2) loans
that have the risk of coupon step-ups and (3) loans with high
updated loan to value ratios (LTVs). Moody's applied a higher
baseline lifetime default propensity for interest-only loans, using
the same adjustments. To calculate the pool loss, Moody's applied a
loan-level loss severity assumption based on the loans' updated
estimated LTVs. Moody's further adjusted the loss severity
assumption upwards for loans in states that give super-priority
status to homeowner association (HOA) liens, to account for
potential risk of HOA liens trumping a mortgage.

For loans with deferred balances, Moody's assumed that 100% of the
remaining PRA amount and approximately 31% of the non-PRA deferred
principal balance on modified loans would be forgiven and not
recovered. The deferred balance in this transaction is $36,850,551,
representing approximately 5.2% of the total unpaid principal
balance (as of the Statistical Calculation Date). Loans that have
HAMP remaining principal reduction amount (PRA) totaled $3,501,272,
representing approximately 9.5% of total deferred balance. In
addition, 464 loans, or 10.3% of the pool, had current valuation
derived from previous BPO values or original appraisals but
adjusted for any appreciation or depreciation from previous
valuation date to current date using a Home Data Index (HDI).
Moody's applied a haircut to the property value to loans using this
approach. The updated property values for all other loans in the
pool were obtained within 12 months of the statistical calculation
date, December 31, 2017. The final expected loss for the collateral
pool reflects the due diligence findings of four independent third
party review (TPR) firms as well as Moody's assessment of TPMT
2018-1's representations & warranties (R&Ws) framework.

Transaction Structure

TPMT 2018-1 has a sequential priority of payments structure, in
which a given class of notes can only receive principal payments
when all the classes of notes above it have been paid off.
Similarly, losses will be applied in the reverse order of priority.
The Class A1, A2, M1 and M2 notes carry a fixed-rate coupon subject
to the collateral adjusted net WAC and applicable available funds
cap. The Class A3 and A4 are variable rate notes where the coupon
is equal to the weighted average of the note rates of the related
exchange notes. The Class B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 are variable rate
notes where the coupon is equal to the lesser of adjusted net WAC
and applicable available funds cap. There are no performance
triggers in this transaction. Additionally, the servicer will not
advance any principal or interest on delinquent loans.

Moreover, the monthly excess cash flow in this transaction, after
payment of such expenses, if any, will be fully captured to pay the
principal balance of the bonds sequentially, allowing for a faster
paydown of the bonds.

Moody's coded TPMT 2018-1's cashflows using SFW®, a cashflow tool
developed by Moody's Analytics. To assess the final rating on the
notes, Moody's ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios
through SFW. The scenarios encompass six loss levels, four loss
timing curves, and four prepayment curves. The structure allows for
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal with
respect to the notes by the legal final maturity.

Third Party Review

Four independent third party review (TPR) firms -- JCIII &
Associates, Inc. (subsequently acquired by American Mortgage
Consultants), Clayton Services, LLC, AMC Diligence, LLC and Westcor
Land Title Insurance Company -- conducted due diligence for the
transaction. Due diligence was performed on 96.4% of the loans by
count in TPMT 2018-1's collateral pool for compliance, 96.4% for
data capture, 97.2% for pay string history, and 98.9% for title and
tax review. The TPR firms reviewed compliance, data integrity and
key documents to verify that loans were originated in accordance
with federal, state and local anti-predatory laws. The TPR firms
conducted audits of designated data fields to ensure the accuracy
of the collateral tape.

Based on Moody's analysis of the third-party review reports,
Moody's determined that a portion of the loans had legal or
compliance exceptions that could cause future losses to the trust.
Moody's incorporated an additional increase to Moody's expected
losses for these loans to account for this risk. FirstKey Mortgage,
LLC, retained Westcor to review the title and tax reports for the
loans in the pool, and will oversee Westcor and monitor the loan
sellers in the completion of the assignment of mortgage chains. In
addition, FirstKey expects a significant number of the assignment
and endorsement exceptions to be cleared within the first twelve
months following the closing date of the transaction.

Representations & Warranties

Our ratings reflect TPMT 2018-1's weak representations and
warranties (R&Ws) framework. The representation provider, FirstKey
Mortgage, LLC is unrated by Moody's. Moreover, FirstKey's
obligations will be in effect for only thirteen months (until the
payment date in March 2019). The R&Ws themselves are weak because
they contain many knowledge qualifiers and the regulatory
compliance R&W does not cover monetary damages that arise from TILA
violations whose right of rescission has expired. While the
transaction provides a Breach Reserve Account to cover for any
breaches of R&Ws, the size of the account is small relative to TPMT
2018-1's aggregate collateral pool ($707 million). An initial
deposit of $1,450,000 will be remitted to the Breach Reserve
Account on the closing date, with an initial Breach Reserve Account
target amount of $2,514,975.

Transaction Parties

The transaction benefits from a strong servicing arrangement.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. will service 100% of TPMT 2018-1's
collateral pool. Moody's assess SPS higher compared to its peers.
Furthermore, FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, the asset manager, will
oversee the servicer, which strengthens the overall servicing
framework in the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and U.S. Bank
National Association are the Custodians of the transaction. The
Delaware Trustee for TPMT 2018-1 is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. TPMT 2018-1's Indenture Trustee is U.S. Bank National
Association.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligors defaulting or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2018-C8: Fitch to Rate Class F-RR Certs 'B-sf'
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Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2018-C8 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2018-C8.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $23,231,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68,276,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,465,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $284,183,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $320,462,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $731,617,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $185,517,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,920,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54,871,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,726,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,949,000b class X-D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,949,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,310,000ac class D-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,903,000ac class E-RR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,371,000 ac class F-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:
-- $40,500,891ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 30, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 67 loans secured by 126
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,045,167,892 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by: UBS AG, Ladder Capital Finance LLC, Societe
Generale, Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P., Rialto
Mortgage Finance, LLC, CIBC Inc., and Barclays Bank PLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 63.3% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.4% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is higher than recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR is 1.17x, which is lower than
the 2017 average of 1.26x. The pool's Fitch LTV is 107.2%, which is
worse than the 2017 average of 101.6%. Excluding credit opinion
loans, the pool's normalized Fitch DSCR and LTV are similar at
1.17x and 107.8%, compared to the 2017 averages of 1.21x and
107.2%, respectively.

Diverse Pool: The pool is less concentrated than recent Fitch-rated
transactions. The top 10 loans make up 43.4% of the pool, less than
the 2017 average of 53.1%. The pool's average loan size of $15.6
million is lower than the average of $20 million for 2017. The
concentration results in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 276,
less than the 2017 average of 398.

Weak Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the
pool is scheduled to pay down by 6.5%, which is below the 2017 and
2016 averages of 7.9% and 10.4%, respectively. Thirty-one loans
representing 57.1% of the pool are full-term, interest-only loans,
which is greater than the 2017 and 2016 averages of 46.1% and
33.3%, respectively. Additionally, 17 loans representing 19.2% of
the pool are partial-term, interest-only loans.

Lower Hotel Exposure: Loans secured by hotel properties represent
only 7.9% of the pool by balance, which is lower than the 2017
average of 15.8% for Fitch-rated transactions. Hotels have the
highest probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model, all
else equal. Loans secured by office properties and mixed-use
properties that are predominantly office make up 28.7% of the pool.
Loans secured by retail properties and mixed-use properties that
are predominantly retail make up 26.1% of the pool. Office and
retail properties have an average probability of default in Fitch's
multiborrower model, all else equal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 16.6% below the most recent
year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period.
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the UBS
2018-C8 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


UNITED AUTO 2018-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
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S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to United Auto Credit
Securitization Trust 2018-1's $171.73 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 61.6%, 54.1%, 44.7%, 34.8%,
27.4%, and 24.9% (pre-haircut) credit support for the class A, B,
C, D, E, and F notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even
cash flow scenarios (including excess spread). These credit support
levels provide coverage of approximately 2.85x, 2.45x, 2.00x,
1.50x, 1.17x, and 1.10x S&P's expected net loss range of
20.50%-21.50% for the class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes,
respectively.

-- The likelihood of timely interest and principal payments by the
assumed legal final maturity dates under stressed cash flow
modeling scenarios that are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

-- S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, the ratings on the class A, B, and
C notes would not be lowered and the rating on the class D notes
would not decline by more than one rating category. Under this
scenario, the ratings on the class E and F notes would not decline
by more than two rating categories from our 'BB- (sf)' and 'B (sf)'
ratings, respectively, in the first year but would ultimately not
pay off in a 'BBB' stress scenario, as expected. These potential
rating movements are consistent with our credit stability criteria,
which outline the outer bound of credit deterioration as a
one-category downgrade within the first year for 'AAA' and 'AA'
rated securities and a two-category downgrade within the first year
for 'A' through 'B' rated securities under moderate stress
conditions."

-- Credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
securitized. It is approximately five months seasoned, with a
weighted average original term of approximately 44 months and an
average remaining term of about 39 months. As a result, S&P expects
that the pool will pay down more quickly than many other subprime
pools with longer weighted average original and remaining terms.

-- S&P's analysis of six years of static pool data following the
credit crisis and after United Auto Credit Corp. (UACC) centralized
its operations and shifted toward shorter loan terms. S&P also
reviewed the performance of UACC's three outstanding
securitizations, as well as its seven securitizations from 2004 to
2007.

-- UACC's 20-plus-year history of originating, underwriting, and
servicing subprime auto loans.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2018-1

  Class       Rating       Type            Interest       Amount
                                            rate         (mil. $)
  A           AAA (sf)     Senior          Fixed           78.84
  B           AA (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed           21.47
  C           A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed           21.47
  D           BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           24.74
  E           BB- (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           19.14
  F           B (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed            6.07


VB-S1 ISSUER: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes 'BB-sf'
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Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for VB-S1 Issuer, LLC's
Secured Tower Revenue Notes, Series 2018-1.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $185,000,000 series 2018-1, class C, 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,000,000 series 2018-1, class D, 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,000,000 series 2018-1, class F, 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:

-- $12,500,000a series 2018-1, class R.

(a) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 5.0% of
the 2018 certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 1, 2018.

The transaction is an issuance of notes backed by mortgages
representing approximately 88.1% of the annualized run rate net
cash flow (ARRNCF) and guaranteed by the direct parent of the
borrower. This guarantee is secured by a pledge and
first-priority-perfected security interest in 100% of the equity
interest of the issuer, direct subsidiaries of which own or lease
2,551 wireless communication sites, which includes 2,664 towers and
other structures. The new notes will be issued pursuant to a
supplement to the amended and restated indenture dated as of the
expected closing of the series 2018-1 transaction.

At closing, note proceeds will be used to fund upfront reserves,
refinance existing debt and for general corporate purposes.
The ratings reflect a structured finance analysis of the cash flows
from the ownership interest in cellular sites, not an assessment of
the corporate default risk of the ultimate parent, Vertical Bridge
(VB).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Trust Leverage: Fitch's NCF on the pool is $63.3 million, implying
a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.20x. The
debt multiple relative to Fitch's NCF is 8.99x, which equates to a
debt yield of 11.1%. Excluding the risk retention 2018-1 class R,
the offered notes have a Fitch DSCR, NCF Multiple and DY of 1.23x,
8.79 and 11.4%, respectively.

Technology Dependent Credit: Due to the specialized nature of the
collateral and potential for changes in technology to affect
long-term demand for tower space, similar to most wireless tower
transactions, the senior classes of this transaction do not achieve
ratings above 'Asf'. The securities have a rated final payment date
30 years after closing, and the long-term tenor of the securities
increases the risk that an alternative technology will be developed
that renders obsolete the current transmission of wireless signals
through cellular sites. Currently, wireless service providers (WSP)
depend on towers to transmit their signals and continue to invest
in this technology.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for the offered
certificates, and found a 10% decline in NCF would result in a
downgrade of the 2018-C certificates to 'BBB-sf', while a 15%
decline would result in a downgrade to below investment grade. The
Rating Sensitivity section in the presale report includes a
detailed explanation of additional stresses and sensitivities.


VENTURE XVI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E-RR Notes
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Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Venture XVI
CLO, Limited:

Moody's rating action is:

US$320,000,000 Class A-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2028 (the "Class A-RR Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$56,000,000 Class B-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2028 (the "Class B-RR Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class C-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2028 (the "Class C-RR Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2028 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class E-RR Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2028 (the "Class E-RR Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

MJX Venture Management II LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on January 31, 2018
(the "Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of existing secured notes previously issued on March 14,
2014 (the "Original Closing Date") and April 17, 2017 (the "2017
Refinancing Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used
proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, along with the
proceeds from the subordinated notes, to redeem in full all classes
of existing secured notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; changes to the
overcollateralization test levels; and changes to comply with the
Volcker Rule.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $488,997,336

Defaulted par: $14,330,020

Diversity Score: 90

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3194

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (3194 to 3673)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-RR Notes: 0

Class B-RR Notes: -1

Class C-RR Notes: -2

Class D-RR Notes: -1

Class E-RR Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (3194 to 4152)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-RR Notes: 0

Class B-RR Notes: -3

Class C-RR Notes: -4

Class D-RR Notes: -2

Class E-RR Notes: -1


VOYA CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Voya CLO
2016-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued on Feb. 25, 2016, that is managed by Voya Alternative Asset
Management LLC. In addition, S&P assigned preliminary ratings to
the new class X-R notes, which are also expected to be issued on
the refinancing date.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 6,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Feb. 8, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the rating on the currently rated class A-1 notes and assigning
ratings to the replacement notes. However, if the refinancing
doesn't occur, we may affirm the rating on the class A-1 notes and
withdraw our preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Change the rated par amount and aggregate ramp-up par amount to
$384.10 million and $416.60 million, respectively, from $257.30
million and $415.00 million.

-- Extend the reinvestment period to Jan. 20, 2023, from July 20,
2020.

-- Extend the non-call period to Jan. 20, 2020, from Jan. 20,
2018.

-- Extend the weighted average life test to nine years from the
Feb. 8, 2018, refinancing date, from eight years calculated from
the original transactions closing date, Feb. 25, 2016.

-- Extend the legal final maturity date on the rated and
subordinated notes to Jan. 20, 2031, from Jan. 20, 2027.

-- Issue class X-R floating-rate notes, which are expected to be
paid down in equal quarterly installments of $200,000 on the first
eight payment dates beginning with the July 2018 payment date.

-- Adopt the use of the non-model version of CDO Monitor for this
transaction. During the reinvestment period, the non-model version
of CDO Monitor may be used to indicate whether changes to the
collateral portfolio are generally consistent with the transaction
parameters S&P assumed when initially assigning ratings to the
notes.

-- Change the required minimum thresholds for the coverage tests.

-- Make the transaction U.S. risk retention compliant.

-- Incorporate the recovery rate methodology and updated industry
classifications outlined in S&P's August 2016 CLO criteria update.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

  Replacement Notes
  Class               Amount     Interest                         

                     (mil. $)    rate (%)        
  X-R                   1.60     LIBOR + 0.60
  A-1-R               259.50     LIBOR + 1.07
  A-2-R                50.50     LIBOR + 1.30
  B-R                  31.60     LIBOR + 1.80
  C-R                  22.50     LIBOR + 2.65
  D-R                  18.40     LIBOR + 5.25
  Subordinated notes   37.50     N/A

  Original Notes
  Class                Amount     Interest                         

                      (mil. $)     rate (%)        
  A-1                  257.30     LIBOR + 1.50
  A-2A                  32.45     LIBOR + 2.20
  A-2B                  20.00     3.92
  B-1                    8.90     LIBOR + 2.95
  B-2                   20.00     5.05
  C                     22.65     LIBOR + 4.20
  D                     20.50     LIBOR + 6.55
  Subordinated notes    37.50     N/A

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance (see table). In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Voya CLO 2016-1 Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X-R                       AAA (sf)               1.60
  A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             259.50
  A-2-R                     AA (sf)               50.50
  B-R                       A (sf)                31.60
  C-R                       BBB- (sf)             22.50  
  D-R                       BB- (sf)              18.40
  Subordinated notes        NR                    37.50


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C33: S&P Affirms CCC(sf) Rating on Cl. C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings today raised its rating on the class A-M
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C33, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

For the upgrade and affirmations, S&P's credit enhancement
expectation was in line with the raised or affirmed rating levels.

The upgrade on the class A-M certificates reflects the significant
reduction in trust balance as well as its status as the front bond
in the transaction, which benefits from amortization.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on class A-M, S&P's analysis also considered the
fact that all of the remaining assets in the transaction are either
specially serviced or previously corrected. Therefore, the ultimate
repayment of the principal balance on the class A-M certificates
requires the successful resolution of these assets.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 18, 2018, trustee remittance report, the
certificates balance was $704.7 million and the collateral pool
balance was $699.3 million, which is 19.6% of the pool balance at
issuance. The pool currently includes 11 loans (adjusted for A/B
notes as one loan) and three real estate owned (REO) assets, down
from 166 loans at issuance. Twelve of these assets ($413.8 million,
58.7%) are with the special servicer, and one ($129.2 million,
18.3%) is on the master servicer's watchlist.

The transaction only has two performing loans remaining. Both loans
are pari passu and are secured by 666 Fifth Avenue, a 1.45
million-sq.-ft. office property located in New York. S&P calculated
a 0.57x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service coverage
(DSC) and 134.1% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio using a 6.25% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate for these loans. The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the two subordinate B
notes ($27.0 million, 3.8%).

To date, the transaction has experienced $200.1 million in
principal losses, or 5.6% of the original pool certificates trust
balance. S&P expects losses to reach approximately 10.3% of the
original pool trust balance in the near term, based on losses
incurred to date and additional losses it expects upon the eventual
resolution of the 12 specially serviced assets and the two 666
Fifth Avenue B notes.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Jan. 18, 2018, trustee remittance report, 12 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, Torchlight Loan Services
LLC. Details of the two largest specially serviced assets are as
follows:

-- The Independence Mall loan ($200.0 million, 28.6%) is the
second-largest loan in the trust and
the largest loan with the special servicer with a total reported
exposure of $202.5 million. The loan is secured by retail property
totaling 398,009 sq. ft. located in Independence, Mo. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in May 2017 due to maturity
default. The loan matured in July 2017. The special servicer has
commenced advertising for a trustee sale, scheduled for Feb. 16,
2018. An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $80.6 million is in
effect against the loan. S&P expects a moderate loss upon the
loan's eventual resolution.

-- The Central/Eastern Industrial Pool loan ($82.3 million, 11.8%)
is the third-largest loan in the trust with a total reported
exposure of $102.8 million. The loan is secured by 13 industrial
properties totaling 2.1 million sq. ft. located in nine states. The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in July 2010 due to
imminent default. The special servicer is expected to exercise
foreclosure on the individual properties. An ARA of $21.1 million
is in effect against the loan. S&P expects a minimal loss upon the
loan's eventual resolution.

S&P said, "We also credit impaired the two subordinate 666 Fifth
Avenue B notes totaling $27.0 million. We expect both B notes will
incur significant losses."

The 10 remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that represent less than 4.3% of the total pool trust
balance. S&P estimated losses for the 12 specially serviced assets
and the two credit impaired loans, arriving at a weighted-average
loss severity of 39.0%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25% and a moderate loss is 26%-59%.

RATINGS LIST

  Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commecial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C33
                                              Rating
  Class         Identifier             To             From
  A-M           92978NAJ3              A+ (sf)        A- (sf)      
     
  A-J           92978NAK0              B+ (sf)        B+ (sf)      
    
  B             92978NAL8              B- (sf)        B- (sf)      
   
  C             92978NAM6              CCC (sf)       CCC (sf)


WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on X-H Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C37 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C37 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-EF at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-G at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-H at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The collateral consists of 63
fixed-rate loans secured by 141 properties, and as of the November
2017 remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 0.7% as a
result of scheduled loan amortization. Loans representing 92.6% and
22.9% of the pool balance reported Q2 2017 and Q3 2017 financials,
respectively, and these loans reported a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.89 times (x) and
10.4%, respectively, compared with the DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS Debt
Yield of 1.69x and 9.2%, respectively. As of the November 2017
remittance, thirteen of the largest loans in the pool reported
updated financials, with a WA Q2 2017 DSCR of 2.01x, which
represents a WA cash flow improvement of 14.8% over the DBRS NCF
figures derived at issuance. Six loans, representing 25.6% of the
pool, were structured with full-term interest-only (IO) payments.
An additional 18 loans, representing 30.3% of the pool, have
partial IO periods ranging from 18 months to 60 months. Nine of
these loans, representing 13.4% of the pool balance, will begin to
amortize by YE2017.

As of the November 2017 remittance, there are six loans,
representing 13.6% of the pool, being monitored on the servicer's
watchlist. Four of these loans, representing 7.3% of the pool
balance, are being monitored for non-performance-related issues
limited to relatively minor deferred maintenance. The largest loan
on the watchlist, Prospectus ID #5, Franklin Square III, is secured
by a retail property located in Gastonia, North Carolina, and is
being monitored for the loss of Gander Mountain, which represented
15.8% of the NRA.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Hilton Hawaiian Village loan
(Prospectus ID#1, 7.0% of the pool balance), Quantum Park loan
(Prospectus ID#2, 6.9% of the pool balance) and Potomac Mills loan
(Prospectus ID#4, 4.8% of the pool balance) investment grade. With
this review, DBRS confirms that the performance of these loans
remain consistent with investment-grade characteristics.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-EF, X-G and X-H are IO certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The ratings assigned to Classes B, C and H materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviations are warranted given the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.


WIRELESS CAPITAL 2013-2: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Wireless Capital
Partners, LLC secured wireless site contract revenue notes series
2013-1 and 2013-2:

-- $91.43 million class 2013-1A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31 million class 2013-1B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.32 million class 2013-2A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6 million class 2013-2B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The certificates represent beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 745 wireless sites securing one
fixed-rate loan. As of the January 2018 distribution date, the
aggregate principal balance of the notes has been reduced by 2.8%
to $145.75 from $150 million since issuance.

The transaction is structured with scheduled monthly principal
payments that will amortize down the principal balance 10% by the
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in year seven, reducing the
refinance risk. The scheduled monthly principal payments are paid
sequentially beginning in the third year from closing until the
note's ARD.

The ownership interest in the wireless sites consists of lease
purchase sites, easements and fee interests in land, rooftops or
other structures on which site space is allocated for placement of
tower and wireless communication equipment. Unlike typical cell
tower securitizations in which the towers serve as collateral, the
collateral for this securitization generally consists of lease
purchase sites, easements and the revenue stream from the payments
the owner of the tower and/or tenants of the site pay to MelTel II
Issuer LLC, formerly known as WCP Issuer LLC.

MelTel II Issuer LLC, an affiliate of Melody Wireless
Infrastructure, acquired Wireless Capital Holdings, LLC, the
ultimate parent of WCP Guarantor LLC, now known as MelTel II
Guarantor LLC, in January 2015. The manager was replaced by an
affiliate of the new issuer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Cash Flow: As of January 2018, Fitch stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.52x, which compares with 1.51x at last
review and 1.23x at issuance. The debt multiple relative to Fitch's
net cash flow (NCF) was 7.20x, which equates to a debt yield of
13.9%.

Technology-Dependent Credit/Rating Cap: The ratings have been
capped at 'Asf' and upgrades are unlikely due to the specialized
nature of the collateral and the potential for changes in
technology to affect long-term demand for wireless tower space. The
notes have a rated final payment date in 2043, and the long-term
tenor of the notes increases the risk that an alternative
technology rendering obsolete the current transmission of wireless
signals through cellular sites will be developed. Currently,
wireless service providers (WSP) depend on towers to transmit their
signals and continue to invest in this technology.

Leases to Strong Tower Tenants: Cash flow is derived from 947
separate leases across 745 towers in markets throughout the United
States. Investment-grade tenants account for approximately 60.6% of
run-rate revenue. Telephony towers account for 96.9% of run-rate
revenue. Leases to AT&T and Verizon represent approximately 45.2%
of the revenue.

Additional Notes: The borrower has the ability to issue additional
notes in the future that will rank senior to, pari passu with, or
subordinate to the rated notes. These may be issued without the
benefit of additional collateral, provided the post-issuance DSCR
is not less than 2.00x. The possibility of upgrades may be limited
due to this provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on all classes are expected to remain Stable.
Downgrades are unlikely due to continued cash flow growth from
annual rent escalations and automatic renewal clauses resulting in
higher DSCR since issuance. The ratings have been capped at 'A' and
upgrades are unlikely due to the specialized nature of the
collateral and the potential for changes in technology to affect
long-term demand for wireless tower space.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction, and also serves
as the backup advancing agent. Fitch downgraded Deutsche Bank's
Issuer Default Rating to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A-'/'F1' on Sept. 28,
2017. Fitch relies on the master servicer, Midland Loan Services
(parent PNC Bank, National Association, A+/F1/Stable), which is
currently the primary advancing agent, as a direct counterparty.
Fitch provided ratings confirmation on Jan. 24, 2018.


WP GLIMCHER 2015-WPG: S&P Affirms B-(sf) Rating on Cl. SQ-3 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on four pooled classes and
five non-pooled classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from WP Glimcher Mall Trust 2015-WPG, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

For the affirmations, S&P's credit enhancement expectation was in
line with the affirmed rating levels.

The affirmations on the class PR-1 and PR-2 raked certificates
reflect our analysis of the Pearlridge Center loan. The $105.0
million trust loan is secured by a 903,692-sq.-ft. mall in Aiea,
Hawaii. The class PR raked certificates derive 100% of their cash
flows from the subordinate non-pooled component totaling $46.0
million of the loan. S&P's property analysis concluded stable
operating performance and, using a 6.75% capitalization rate, it
derived an S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 78.6%
on the trust balance.

The affirmations on the class SQ-1, SQ-2, and SQ-3 raked
certificates reflect our analysis of the Scottsdale Quarter loan.
The $95.0 million trust loan is secured by a 541,971-sq.-ft.
mixed-use retail and office property in Scottsdale, Ariz. The class
SQ raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from the
subordinate non-pooled component totaling $57.0 million of the
loan. S&P's property analysis concluded stable operating
performance and, using a 7.11% capitalization rate, it derived an
S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio of 94.4% on the trust balance.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than that
of the lowest-rated reference class. Class X's notional balance
references classes A, B, and C.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by two
10-year fixed-rate IO loans secured by the two properties mentioned
above. Details on the two loans are below.

The Pearlridge Center loan has a whole loan aggregate principal
balance of $225.0 million. This is evidenced by four senior notes,
A-1-S, A-2-S, A-1-C, and A-2-C. The A-1-C and A-2-C loans of $120.0
million are not part of the trust. In addition to the four senior
notes, there are four junior notes, B-1-S, B-2-S, C-1-S, and C-2-S,
which are all part of the trust. S&P said, "Our property-level
analysis included a re-evaluation of the retail property that
secures the mortgage loan in the trust and considered the
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the
past four years (2013 through 2016) and partial year 2017. We then
derived our sustainable in-place net cash flow (NCF), which we
divided by a 6.75% S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate to
determine our expected-case value." This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings LTV of 78.6% on the trust balance."

The master servicer, Key Bank N.A., reported a debt service
coverage (DSC) of 3.04x on the trust balance for year-end 2016, and
occupancy was 94.2% according to the June 30, 2017, rent roll.
Based on the June 2017 rent roll, the five largest tenants are
Macy's, Bed Bath & Beyond, Pearlridge Mall Theaters, Long Drug
Store, and Pali Momi Medical Center. There is some tenant rollover
risk in the near-term, with 17.23% of the leases set to expire in
2018 and 13.24% of the leases set to expire in 2019.

The Scottsdale Quarter loan has a whole loan aggregate principal
balance of $165.0 million. This is evidenced by four senior notes,
A-1-S, A-2-S, A-1-C, and A-2-C. The A-1-C and A-2-C loans of $70.0
million are not part of the trust. In addition to the four senior
notes, there are four junior notes, B-1-S, B-2-S, C-1-S, and C-2-S,
which are all part of the trust. S&P said, "Our property-level
analysis included a re-evaluation of the mixed-use retail and
office property that secures the mortgage loan in the trust and
considered the servicer-reported NOI and occupancy for the past
four years (2013 through 2016) and partial year 2017. We then
derived our sustainable in-place NCF, which we divided by a 7.11%
S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate to determine our
expected-case value." This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings
LTV of 94.4% on the trust balance.

Key Bank N.A. reported a DSC of 2.60x on the trust balance for
year-end 2016, and occupancy was 94.9% according to the June 30,
2017, rent roll. Based on the June 2017 rent roll, the five largest
tenants are Starwood Hotels & Resorts, IPIC Theaters, H&M,
Restoration Hardware, and Maracay Homes. There is minimal tenant
rollover risk in the near-term, with 6.74% of the leases set to
expire in 2018 and 6.64% of the leases set to expire in 2019.

According to the Jan. 8, 2018, trustee remittance report, the
aggregate trust balance was $200.0 million and pays an annual fixed
interest rate of 3.53% and matures on June 1, 2025. To date, the
trust has not incurred any principal losses.

RATINGS LIST

  WP Glimcher Mall Trust 2015-WPG
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2015-WPG
                                       Rating
  Class        Identifier       To                   From
  A            92939VAA2        AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
  X            92939VAC8        A- (sf)              A- (sf)  
  B            92939VAE4        AA- (sf)             AA- (sf)
  C            92939VAG9        A- (sf)              A- (sf)  
  PR-1         92939VAL8        BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
  PR-2         92939VAN4        BB (sf)              BB (sf)  
  SQ-1         92939VAQ7        BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
  SQ-2         92939VAS3        BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)
  SQ-3         92939VAU8        B- (sf)              B- (sf)  


[*] Moody's Hikes $110.3MM of Alt-A RMBS & Multi-Family Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of eight tranches
from two transactions, backed by Alt-A and Multi-Family mortgage
loans, issued by Impac.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-8

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-AM, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2005
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2005 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2005
Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. 2-B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-1

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2013
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the stable or improved
credit enhancement available to the bonds and the improved
collateral performance of the related underlying pools. The actions
reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools, Moody's
updated loss expectations on the pools and an update in the
approach used in analyzing the transaction structures.

In Moody's prior analysis for the securitizations, Moody's used a
static approach for the Group 2 pools that are backed by
multi-family loans. The static approach compared the total credit
enhancement for a bond, including excess spread, subordination,
overcollateralization, and other external support, if any, to
Moody's expected losses on the mortgage pool(s) supporting that
bond. Moody's approach has now been updated to include a cash flow
analysis of the Group 2 pools, wherein Moody's run several
different loss levels, loss timing, and prepayment scenarios using
Moody's scripted cash flow waterfalls to estimate the losses to the
different bonds under these scenarios and the ratings on the
bonds.

The rating upgrades on Classes 1-A and 1-AM from Impac CMB Trust
Series 2005-8 also reflect a correction to the cash flow model used
in rating this transaction. In prior rating actions, excess cash
flow was mistakenly not used to reimburse realized losses on the
tranches. This error has now been corrected, and action reflects
the correct application of excess cashflow to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in January 2018 from 4.8% in
January 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $537MM of RMBS Issued 2015-2016
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 41 tranches
from four RMBS re-performing loan transactions issued by Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust and Towd Point Mortgage Trust in 2015 and 2016.
The transactions are backed by modified and un-modified seasoned
re-performing loans.

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AC, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-PS1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2-IO, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrades are driven by the stronger performance of the
underlying loans in the pools relative to initial expectations and
an increase in the credit enhancement available to the rated bonds
due to high prepayments. The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools which incorporate Moody's assessment of
the representations and warranties frameworks of the transactions,
the due diligence findings of the third party review at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's servicers. Fay
Servicing, LLC is the primary servicer of the collateral for
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A, Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2015-PS1 and Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2, and Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc is the primary servicer for the majority
of the collateral for Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4.

The loans underlying the pools have fewer delinquencies and have
prepaid at faster rates than originally anticipated, resulting in
an improvement in Moody's loss projections. Serious delinquencies
(loans that are 60 or more days delinquent) as a percentage of
current pool balances, as of December 2017, were 6.7% for Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A, 1.7% for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2015-PS1, 4.26% for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2 and 3.6%
for Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4. Cumulative losses realized on
the pools till date have been small and, in Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2016-4, are largely driven by modification losses recognized
on forborne amounts.

Moody's base Moody's expected losses on a pool of re-performing
mortgage loans on Moody's estimates of 1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and 2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances. The two factors that most strongly
influence a re-performing mortgage loan's likelihood of re-default
are the length of time that the loan has performed since
modification, and the amount of the reduction in monthly mortgage
payments as a result of modification. The longer a borrower has
been current on a re-performing loan, the less likely they are to
re-default. Moody's used expected annual delinquency rates between
3% and 11% and expected prepayment rates between 8% and 12% to
estimate future losses on the collateral based on the collateral
characteristics of the loans, observed performance of the loans in
the pools and observed performance of loans similar to the loans in
the pools.

The rating upgrades also reflect the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds driven by strong prepayments on the
underlying collateral and the transaction waterfalls. Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A, 2015-PS1 and 2015-RP2 incorporate a
shifting interest waterfall with subordination floors to protect
the bonds against tail risk. Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4,
incorporates a sequential pay structure with available excess
spread that is used to cover for losses and pay down the bonds.

The upgrades of the exchangeable and interest-only certificates
reflect the upgraded ratings of their related bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non- Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-A Cl. A-1-IO, Cl. A-2-IO,
Cl. A-3-IO, and Cl. A-4-IO, Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-PS1
Cl. A-1-IO and Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-RP2, Cl. A-1-IO,
and Cl. A-2-IO were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non- Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.54BB of RMBS Issued 2001-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 66 tranches,
and downgraded the rating of one tranche, from 25 subprime RMBS
transactions issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-RM1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-5

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W11

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ABS Trust Certificates, Series 2001-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB7

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB8

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-RES1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-A

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-4

AF-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF14

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2015 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF9

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH3

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH5

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-WMC2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-NC1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC6

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. A2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The downgrade is due to the total losses
expected on the bond. The actions reflect the recent performance of
the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $158.3MM of Alt-A & Option ARM Loans
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of four tranches and
downgraded five tranches from five US residential mortgage backed
transactions (RMBS), backed by Alt-A and Option ARM loans, issued
by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007--5 Trust

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-3

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4

Cl. 2A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR3

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2018
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. The
rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of credit
enhancement available to the bonds and pay down of senior bonds.

The rating downgrades are primarily due to deterioration in credit
enhancement to the bonds. The downgrades on Cl. M-4, M-5 and M-6 in
Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-1 are due to outstanding interest
shortfalls on the bonds that are unexpected to be reimbursed due to
the weak interest recoupment mechanism in the transaction.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $207.4MM of RMBS Issued 2004 & 2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 28 tranches
from 10 transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-C

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CF1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD3

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC 2006-SP2 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2004-SP3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP1 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP4 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-SP3 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The rating
upgrades are primarily due to an increase of credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in December 2017 from 4.7% in
December 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $3.1BB of GSE (CRT) RMBS Issued in 2006
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 33 tranches
from four Agency Risk Transfer transactions issued in 2016. These
four transactions are actual-loss credit risk transfer (CRT)
transactions issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in 2016.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C01

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2I, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2I, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C02

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2I, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C04

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2I, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: STACR 2016-HQA2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3AF, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3AI, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds and a reduction in the expected losses on
the underlying pools owing to strong collateral performance. The
outstanding rated bonds in these transactions have continued to
benefit both from a steady increase in the credit enhancement as a
result of sequential principal distributions among the subordinate
bonds and higher than expected voluntary prepayment rates since
issuance.

The risk transfer transactions provide credit protection against
the performance of a "reference pool" of mortgages guaranteed by
Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. The notes are direct, unsecured
obligations of Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae and are not guaranteed by
nor are they obligations of the United States Government. Unlike a
typical RMBS transaction, note holders are not entitled to receive
any cash from the mortgage loans in the reference pools. Instead,
the timing and amount of principal and interest that Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae is obligated to pay on the Notes is linked to the
performance of the mortgage loans in the reference pool. Principal
payments to the notes relate only to actual principal received from
the reference pool with pro-rata payments between senior and
subordinate bonds, provided some performance triggers are met, and
sequential among subordinate bonds.

The bonds have benefited from sustained prepayment rates and
continued increases in credit enhancement. The December 2017
remittance data shows a three month average conditional prepayment
rate (CPR) of 15.2% for CAS 2016-C01, 12.8% for CAS 2016-C02, 14.0%
for CAS 2016-C04 and 13.6% for STACR 2016-HQA2. Although
delinquencies underlying the pools have recently risen due to
impact of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the percentage of loans that
are 60-plus days delinquent is low, at about 20 bps to 40 bps of
the original balance as December 2017. Additionally, there are no
net losses for CAS 2016-C01, CAS 2016-C02 and CAS 2016-C04. The net
losses are approximately 0.0019% of the original pool balance for
STACR 2016-HQA2 as of the December 2017 remittance report.

Our updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third party review received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicers.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015. The
methodologies used in rating Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series
2016-C01/Cl. 1M-2I and Cl. 2M-2I;Connecticut Avenue Securities,
Series 2016-C02/Cl. 1M-2I;Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series
2016-C04/Cl. 1M-2I; and STACR 2016-HQA2/Cl. M-2I and Cl. M-3AI were
"Moody's Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February
2015, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 110 Classes From 12 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 110 classes from 12 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1994 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed by
prime collateral. The review yielded 57 upgrades, one downgrade, 51
affirmations, and one discontinuance.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A vast majority of the classes whose ratings were raised by three
or more notches have the benefit of increased credit support. These
classes have benefitted from the failure of performance triggers
and/or reduced subordinate class principal distribution amounts,
which has built credit support for these classes as a percent of
their respective deal balance. Ultimately, S&P believes these
classes have credit support that is sufficient to withstand
projected losses at higher rating levels.

On July 29, 2014, a settlement was reached in the litigation
regarding the alleged breach of certain representations and
warranties in the governing agreements of 330 JPMorgan Chase & Co.
legacy residential mortgage-backed securities trusts, including
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-A1. On Jan. 25, 2018, it received
approximately $4.69 million in settlement funds. These funds were
allocated to pay principal on senior classes and to reimburse prior
write-downs on class B-1, increasing its balance and ultimately
increasing credit support for the senior classes. As a result, S&P
raised the ratings on a majority of the senior classes as it
believes the additional credit support is sufficient to withstand
losses at higher rating levels.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2BIgM21


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 93 Classes From 17 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 93 classes from 17 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), including one
credit-linked note transaction and two resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transactions, issued between
2003 and 2009. All of these transactions are backed by prime jumbo,
Alternative-A, and subprime mortgage collateral. The review yielded
21 upgrades, three downgrades, 61 affirmations, and four
discontinuances. S&P also placed four ratings on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Underlying collateral performance;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Tail risk;
-- Expected short duration; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"We placed our ratings on four classes from Nomura Asset Acceptance
Corp. Alternative Loan Trust Series 2003-A3 on CreditWatch with
negative implications. The CreditWatch negative placements reflect
our review of interest shortfalls on the affected classes as
reported by the trustee. After verifying the outstanding interest
shortfalls as well as the application of reimbursement based on the
deal documents, we will take rating actions as we consider
appropriate according to our criteria."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2EqZtDo


[*] S&P Withdraws Ratings on 26 Classes From Five U.S. RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 26 classes from five
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 1997 and 2004. All of these transactions are backed
by prime jumbo, subprime, and Alternative-A collateral. The review
yielded 26 withdrawals.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

           http://bit.ly/2E5zGxh


                            *********

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