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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, January 7, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 6

                            Headlines

ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Certs to Ca(sf)
ARCAP 2005-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 6 Tranches
ATRIUM HOTEL 2017-ATRM: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F Certs
CWMBS INC 2004-4CB: Moody's Withdraws B1 Rating on Cl. 2-A-1 Certs
G-STAR 2003-3: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on Class A-3 Notes

GOLDENTREE LOAN XI: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F-R-2 Notes
JP MORGAN 2017-6: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating on Class B-5 Debt
KKR CLO 20: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
LONG POINT: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D-2 Notes
SLM STUDENT 2014-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to BB

[*] Moody's Hikes $189.4MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2003-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $$1.735BB of RMBS Issued 1997-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $533.2MM of Securities Issued 2003-2005
[*] S&P Hikes 8 Ratings on 4 Pass-Through Repackaged Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 182 Classes From 23 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Withdraws 115 Ratings From 20 U.S. RMBS Deals

                            *********

ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Certs to Ca(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust Collateralized
Debt Obligation Certificates, Series 2003-1:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

The Class E and F Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes".

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating on one class of notes due to: (i)
improvement in the intra-rating distribution; primarily within the
investment grade rated assets; and (ii) forward looking
expectations on the amortization profile of the remaining asset
pool. While the overall credit profile of the transaction has
decreased, as evidenced by WARF, the expected amortization profile
offsets this along with the improved intra-ratings distribution.
The affirmations are due to the key transaction metrics performing
within levels commensurate with existing ratings. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC)
transactions.

ARCap 2003-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool
balance) issued between 1999 and 2003. As of the November 30, 2017
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, is $285.3 million, compared to $414.4 million at
issuance with the paydown directed to the senior most outstanding
class of notes, as a result of full and partial amortization of the
underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
5535, compared to 4989 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (18.3% compared to 23.5% at last
review); A1-A3 (12.6% compared to 0.0% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(0.0% compared to 11.3% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (12.6% compared to
1.0% at last review; B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 14.7% at last review;
and Caa1-Ca/C (56.5%, compared to 49.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.9 years, as compared to 3.4 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying CMBS look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 7.3%, compared to 9.2% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool by +5% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to one notches upward (e.g.,
one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


ARCAP 2005-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 6 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritization Trust Collateralized
Debt Obligation:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

The Class A, B, C, D, E, F, and G Notes are referred to herein as
the "Rated Notes".

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. While
the credit quality of the current collateral pool has improved
since last review, as evidenced by WARF, the implied cumulative
implied losses to the collateral pool offset this improvement. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

ARCap 2005-1 is a static cash transaction, that is wholly backed by
a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100%
of the pool balance) issued between 2004 and 2005. As of the
November 30, 2017 report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $532.6 million,
compared to $568.3 million at issuance with the paydown directed to
the senior most outstanding class of notes, as a result of full and
partial amortization of the underlying collateral.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
5042, compared to 5786 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (12.3% compared to 4.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 2.8% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(4.3% compared to 3.9% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (14.2% compared to
9.0% at last review; B1-B3 (19.3% compared to 18.9% at last review;
and Caa1-Ca/C (49.4%, compared to 61.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.6 years, as compared to 3.3 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying CMBS look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 7.3%, compared to 15.3% at last review.
The reduced MAC is due to the improved credit distribution since
last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool by +5% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero notches (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


ATRIUM HOTEL 2017-ATRM: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Atrium Hotel Portfolio Trust
2017-ATRM, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-ATRM:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan secured by the
fee and leasehold interests in 29 limited- and full-service hotels
containing a total of 7,015 guestrooms located across 16 states.
The ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of Moody's Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology published in July 2017. The rating approach for
securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also consider
a range of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's
structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's LTV ratio.

The first mortgage balance of $600,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 103.1%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 3.20X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.19X. The financing
is subject to two mezzanine loans totaling $150,000,000. The
Moody's Total Debt LTV (inclusive of the mezzanine loans) is 128.8%
while the Moody's Total Debt Actual DSCR is 2.01X and Moody's Total
Debt Stressed DSCR is 0.95X.

The loan is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 29
limited- and full-service hotels totaling 7,015 guestrooms. The
properties are geographically diversified across sixteen states
with the largest state concentration represented by South Carolina
(3 properties; 14.0% of the ALA and 13.8% of the TTM NCF). No
single property represents more than 9.3% of the total ALA. The
loan's property-level Herfindal Index score is 22.9 based on the
allocated loan amount.

The portfolio operates under nine different flags across three
hotel franchises and includes a single, independently managed
property. Fifteen hotels representing 55.0% of the ALA operate
under the Hilton brand and are managed as a Hilton, Embassy Suites,
Hampton Inn, and Homewood Suites. Eight hotels representing 25.5%
of the ALA operate under the Marriott brand and are managed as a
Marriott, Sheraton, and Renaissance. Five hotels representing 17.8%
of the ALA operate under the IHG brand and are managed as a Holiday
Inn and Crowne Plaza. As of TTM September 30, 2017, the Portfolio
was 70.1% occupied and reported an average ADR and RevPAR of
$127.64 and $89.46.

Approximately 94.2% of the portfolio by ALA is comprised of
full-service hotels and 5.8% of the portfolio by ALA are comprised
of limited-service hotels. The Properties were constructed between
1979 and 2000 and have an average age of approximately 26 years,
with renovations taking place between 2005 and 2016 for 22 of the
29 Properties. From 2011 to YTD October 2017, the Borrower Sponsor
invested approximately $171.4 million ($24,431/key) of capital into
these properties. Additionally, $25.0 million of the loan proceeds
were reserved at closing to fund scheduled property improvements.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: portfolio diversity
as the properties are located across 16 states, strong brand
affiliation under the Hilton, Marriott and IHG hotel franchises,
strong sponsorship from Atrium Holding Company, capital investment
in the amount of $171.4 million since 2011, and cross
collateralization and cross defaulting which results in lower cash
flow volatility given pooling.

Notable credit challenges of the transaction include: subordinate
debt, limited recourse as the "bad-boy" guaranty is limited to 15%
of the total loan amount, the weighted average age of the
properties which is approximately 26 years, the increased
volatility of hotels versus other commercial real estate asset
classes, the lack of amortization and variable debt service
payments which increases term risk.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5.0%,
13.8%, and 21.9%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa (sf) classes would be Aa1 (sf), Aa3 (sf), and A1 (sf),
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather they
are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal
has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings
impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated
standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration
in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be
assigned in each case could vary from the information presented in
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


CWMBS INC 2004-4CB: Moody's Withdraws B1 Rating on Cl. 2-A-1 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of Class A
issued by Greenwich Capital Structured Products Trust 2005-1
(Greenwich 2005-1), Class A-IO, issued by Terwin Mortgage Trust
2006-12SL (Terwin 2006-12SL) and Class 2-A-1 issued by CWMBS, Inc.
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4CB (CWMBS
2004-4CB). Class A-IO and Class 2-A-1 are IO bonds that were among
those placed on watch on August 29, 2017 in connection with a
reassessment of the IO bond linkages captured in Moody's internal
database, prompted by the identification of errors in that
database.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-4CB

Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-12SL

Cl. A-IO, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 C (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Greenwich Capital Structured Products Trust 2005-1

Cl. A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Confirmed at B1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action resolves the review of two IO bonds which were among
those placed on watch for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages
captured in Moody's internal database. Following the linkage
reassessment, Moody's determined that Class A-IO from Terwin
2006-12SL has been linked to the appropriate reference bonds.
However, Class A-IO's rating is being withdrawn because Moody's no
longer maintains ratings on the two reference bonds that are linked
to Class A-IO. The ratings of the two reference bonds were
withdrawn in May 2014 due to the cancellation of the monoline
insurance policies that had guaranteed those bonds. Moody's
incorrectly maintained the rating on Class A-IO after the
withdrawal of the ratings on the IO's reference bonds.

After having reviewed the various linkages, Moody's has decided to
withdraw the rating of Class 2-A-1 from CWMBS 2004-4CB because it
believes it has insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to
support the maintenance of the rating. Class 2-A-1 is linked to a
portion of the collateral pool for which information is not clearly
reported in the data available for the transaction.

In connection with the withdrawal of the rating on Class 2-A-1,
Moody's has also withdrawn the rating of Class A issued by
Greenwich 2005-1. Greenwich 2005-1 is a re-securitization
transaction (Resec) backed by seven underlying securities, one of
which is Class 2-A-1 of CWMBS 2004-4CB; as noted above, Moody's has
decided to withdraw the rating on Class 2-A-1. Because the ratings
on Resec bonds generally link to the ratings on the underlying
securities and their performance, Moody's cannot maintain the
rating on Class A of the Greenwich 2005-1 Resec due to the
withdrawal of the rating of its underlying security, and has thus
withdrawn the rating.


G-STAR 2003-3: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on Class A-3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by G-Star 2003-3, Ltd.:

Cl. A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2038, Affirmed Caa1 (sf);
previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2038, Affirmed Ca (sf);
previously on Nov 23, 2016 Affirmed Ca (sf)

The Class A-2 and A-3 Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on two classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

G-Star 2003-3, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: i) asset backed securities, primarily in the form of
residential subprime securities (ABS) (90.3% of collateral pool
balance); ii) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (3.4%);
and iii) real estate investment trust bonds (REIT) (6.3%). As of
the December 15, 2017 note valuation report, the aggregate note
balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, has
decreased to $85.9 million from $426.0 at issuance, as a result of
pre-payments and regular amortization, recoveries from defaulted
collateral, and principal proceeds resulting from the failure of
certain par value and interest coverage tests.

The pool contains nine assets totaling $5.8 million (24.1% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's December 15, 2017 report. While there have been
limited implied losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
5752, compared to 5763 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: A1-A3 (7.2% compared to 0.1% at last
review); Baa1-Baa3 (3.1% compared to 11.3% at last review); Ba1-Ba3
(4.3% compared to 3.7% at last review); B1-B3 (17.8% compared to
15.7% at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (67.5% compared to 69.1% at
last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, as compared to 2.3 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying RMBS look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 5.9%, as compared to 4.4% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 20.9%, compared to 18.9% at securitization
at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other key parameters constant, reducing
the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral pool by -5% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero to one notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of
the collateral pool by +5% would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch upward
(e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


GOLDENTREE LOAN XI: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class F-R-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes including six classes of refinancing notes and the Class X
Notes (the "CLO Refinancing Notes") issued by GoldenTree Loan
Opportunities XI, Limited:

Moody's rating action is:

US$3,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$340,000,000 Class A-R-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-R-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class B-R-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B-R-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class C-R-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C-R-2 Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$36,500,000 Class D-R-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D-R-2 Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class E-R-2 Junior Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class E-R-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$7,500,000 Class F-R-2 Junior Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class F-R-2 Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

GoldenTree Loan Management, LP (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the CLO Refinancing Notes on December 29,
2017 (the "Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of
all classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on March 26, 2015 and November 22, 2016. On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the
CLO Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the CLO Refinancing Notes, a variety
of other changes to transaction features will occur in connection
with the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to collateral quality matrix and a variety of other changes
to transaction features.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $538,605,400

Defaulted par: $3,988,000

Diversity Score: 52

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3119

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.05 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the CLO Refinancing Notes is subject to
uncertainty. The performance of the CLO Refinancing Notes is
sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. The
Manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the CLO Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the CLO Refinancing Notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the CLO
Refinancing Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference
versus the current model output, whereby a negative difference
corresponds to higher expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3119 to 3587)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R-2 Notes: -1

Class B-R-2 Notes: -2

Class C-R-2 Notes: -2

Class D-R-2 Notes: -1

Class E-R-2 Notes: -1

Class F-R-2 Notes: -2

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3119 to 4055)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R-2 Notes: -1

Class B-R-2 Notes: -3

Class C-R-2 Notes: -4

Class D-R-2 Notes: -2

Class E-R-2 Notes: -1

Class F-R-2 Notes: -4


JP MORGAN 2017-6: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating on Class B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-6 (JPMMT 2017-6). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 1,443 30-year, fully-amortizing
fixed rate mortgage loans with a total balance of $883,819,918 as
of December 1, 2017 cut-off date. Similar to prior JPMMT
transactions, JPMMT 2017-6 includes conforming fixed-rate mortgage
loans originated by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. (Chase) and
LoanDepot, and underwritten to the government sponsored enterprises
(GSE) guidelines in addition to prime jumbo non-conforming
mortgages purchased by JPMMAC from various originators and
aggregators. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and LoanDepot, will be the
servicers on the conforming loans originated by JPMorgan Chase and
LoanDepot, respectively, while Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing,
LoanDepot, USAA, Guaranteed Rate, PHH Mortgage, First Republic
Bank, TIAA, FSB and Johnson Bank will be the servicers on the prime
jumbo loans. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will be the master servicer and
securities administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association will
be the trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a typical
shifting-interest structure that benefits from and a senior and
subordination floor.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-6

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.45%
in a base scenario and reaches 5.35% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using Moody's US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
assessments and the financial strength of Representation & Warranty
(R&W) providers.

Moody's bases provisional ratings on the certificates on the credit
quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the
transaction, Moody's assessments of the aggregators, originators
and servicers, the strength of the third party due diligence and
the representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2017-6 is a securitization of a pool of 1,443 30-year,
fully-amortizing mortgage loans with a total balance of
$883,819,918 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted average (WA)
remaining term to maturity of 357 months, and a WA seasoning of 3
months. The borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and
sizeable equity in their properties. The WA current FICO score is
771 and the WA original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is
71.8%. The characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to other JPMMT transactions backed by 30-year
mortgage loans that Moody's has rated.

In this transaction, 55.2% of the pool by loan balance was
underwritten by Chase and LoanDepot to Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's guidelines (conforming loans). Moreover, the conforming loans
in this transaction have a high average current loan balance at
$536,992. The higher conforming loan balance of loans in JPMMT
2017-6 is attributable to the greater amount of properties located
in high-cost areas, such as the metro areas of New York City, Los
Angeles and San Francisco. LoanDepot contributes approximately
12.5% of the mortgage loans in the pool. The remaining originators
each account for less than 10% of the principal balance of the
loans in the pool and provide R&W to the transaction.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Four third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, collateral, and regulatory reviews on
100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR results indicated compliance
with the originators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority
of loans, no material compliance issues, and no appraisal defects.
The loans that had exceptions to the originators' underwriting
guidelines had strong documented compensating factors such as low
DTIs, low LTVs, high reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment
histories. The TPR firms also identified minor compliance
exceptions for reasons such as inadequate RESPA disclosures (which
do not have assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) violations related to fees that were out of
variance but then cured and disclosed. Moody's did not make any
adjustments to Moody's expected or Aaa loss levels due to the TPR
results.

JPMMT 2017-6's R&W framework is in line with other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.
Moody's review of the R&W framework takes into account the
financial strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including
qualifiers and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association (rated Aa2), who is the R&W provider for
approximately 48.6% (by loan balance) of the loans, is the
strongest R&W provider. Moody's have made no adjustments on the
Chase loans in the pool, as well as loans originated by TIAA, FSB
and First Republic Bank. In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers
are unrated and/or financially weaker entities. Moreover, JPMMAC
will not backstop any R&W providers who may become financially
incapable of repurchasing mortgage loans. Moody's made an
adjustment for these loans in Moody's analysis to account for this
risk.

For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MAXEX platform, MAXEX under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MAXEX to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in the JPMMT
transactions. Five Oaks Acquisition Corp. backstops all validated
R&W violations through a combination of enforcement and insolvency
guarantees.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank National Association. The
custodian's functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
and JP Morgan Chase Bank. The paying agent and cash management
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than
the trustee. In addition, Wells Fargo, as Master Servicer, is
responsible for servicer oversight, and termination of servicers
and for the appointment of successor servicers. In addition, Wells
Fargo is committed to act as successor if no other successor
servicer can be found. Moody's assess Wells Fargo as an SQ1
(strong) master servicer of residential loans.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.75% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 6.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 0.55% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate writedown amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero I.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Other Considerations

Similar to recent JPMMT transactions, extraordinary trust expenses
in the JPMMT 2017-6 transaction are deducted from Net WAC as
opposed to available distribution amount. Moody's believe there is
a very low likelihood that the rated certificates in JPMMT 2017-6
will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against key
deal parties. First, all of the loans are prime quality Qualified
Mortgages originated under a regulatory environment that requires
tighter originations controls than pre-crisis, thus reducing the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well defined
processes in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing
basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
(Pentalpha Surveillance, LLC), named at closing must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when certain clearly
defined triggers have been breached which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Third, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a credit, compliance and valuation review
of 100% of the mortgage loans by independent third parties (AMC,
Inglet Blair, Opus and Clayton Services LLC). Finally, the
performance of past JPMMT transactions have been well within
expectation.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


KKR CLO 20: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by KKR CLO 20 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$384,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$69,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$34,200,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

KKR CLO 20 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 90% ramped as of
the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2863

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2863 to 3292)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2863 to 3722)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


LONG POINT: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Long Point Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$367,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$25,500,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-1b Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$54,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$43,750,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$11,500,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

US$11,500,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes and the
Class D-2 Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Long Point Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is at least 90% ramped as of the
closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: 0

Class A-1b Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: -1

Class A-1b Notes: -3

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1


SLM STUDENT 2014-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions:

-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmation of the class A-2 notes is reflective of cash flow
modelling results supporting implied ratings at the commensurate
rating level.

The downgrade is mainly driven by the extension of weighted average
remaining terms compared to last year. With 101.01% total parity,
the final payoff of the bonds will be closely tied with the last
paying loans of the trust. Extension of the terms further acerbate
the tail-end maturity risk, causing the class A-3 notes to miss
their legal final maturity date under Fitch's 'B' cases. This
technical default of class A notes would result in interest
payments being diverted away from class B, which would cause that
note to default as well. As the notes fail Fitch's 'Bsf' cash flow
scenarios marginally in maturity, meaning the model indicated that
notes are paid shortly after their maturity date without principal
or interest shortfall and they have a long time horizon to
maturity, Fitch leaves the notes at 'BBsf', as a slight change in
the future economic environment could result in full repayment of
bonds by maturity dates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
13.5% and a 40.5% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumes a sustainable constant default rate of 2.7%
and a sustainable constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) of 14% based on data provided by the issuer. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve in its credit stress cash
flow analysis. The claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.5% in the
base case and 3.0% in the 'AAA' case. The trailing twelve months
(TTM) levels of deferment, forbearance and income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) are 8.6%, 15.3% and 20.5%, which are used as
the starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria. The borrower benefit is
assumed to be 0.16%.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for this transaction
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for SAP and the securities. As of November 2017, 0.3%
of the trust student loans are indexed to 91-day T-Bill and 99.7%
to one-month LIBOR. All notes are indexed to one-month LIBOR. Fitch
applies its standard basis and interest rate stresses to this
transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and for the class A
notes, subordination. As of November 2017, senior and total
effective parity ratios (including reserve account) are 106.3%
(6.0% CE) and 101% (1% CE), respectively. Liquidity support is
provided by a reserve account sized at 0.25% of the outstanding
pool balance with a floor of $996,942. The transactions will
continue to release cash as long as the target OC amount of the
greater of 1% and outstanding adjusted pool balance and $1.25
million is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the
class A-3 notes do not pay off before their maturity date in the
'B' stress cases of Fitch's modelling scenarios. If the breach of
the class A-3 maturity date triggers an event of default, interest
payments will be diverted away from the class B notes, causing them
to fail the 'B' stress cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables. Additionally, the
results do not take into account any rating cap considerations.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Basis Spread increase 0.5%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf';
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.


[*] Moody's Hikes $189.4MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2003-2007
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 30 tranches
from 11 transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-C

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-D

Cl. A-PO, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-D

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series
2004-A

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-SC1

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 11, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-GH2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GH1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-SD1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The tranches
upgraded are primarily due to improved credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in Nov 2017 from 4.6% in Nov
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $$1.735BB of RMBS Issued 1997-2007
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 117 tranches,
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from 49 subprime RMBS
transactions issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CPT Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-EC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Series
2002-HE4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-8

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-1

Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2

Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-5

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2014
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2014
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2002-HE2 (wholesale;25% fixed/75% ARMs)

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-6

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-4

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-1

M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC8

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Developing on Dec 02, 2016)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Confirmed
at A3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-11

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R10

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Funding Corporation Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-OPT1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-3C1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3C2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3D, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Basic Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB5 Trust

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB7

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2002-HE2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2002-HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE4

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-4

Cl. IIM-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-3

Cl. IIM-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-5

Cl. IIA-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2014
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. IIM-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-4

B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2017 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf)

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-5

A-9, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

A-10, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2006-C

Cl. 1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2014 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-7

Cl. I-A-2b, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE8

Cl. II-1A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-1A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-2A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 4, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE3

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.The upgrades are
primarily driven by the total credit enhancement available to the
bonds relative to the expected losses on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in November 2017 from 4.6% in
November 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for 2017. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $533.2MM of Securities Issued 2003-2005
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 40 principal
and interest (P&I) tranches from 13 US residential mortgage backed
transactions (RMBS) backed by Alt-A and Option ARM mortgage loans,
issued by multiple issuers between 2003 and 2005. Moody's has also
confirmed the ratings of one Interest Only-Principal Only (IO PO)
bond and two Interest-Only (IO) bonds, and upgraded the rating of
one IO PO bond from four US RMBS transactions. The action resolves
the review of two IO bonds and two IO PO bonds which were among
those placed on review on 29 August 2017 in connection with a
reassessment of the IO bond linkages captured in Moody's internal
database, prompted by the identification of errors in that
database.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-12

Cl. 14-A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 14-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 15-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-X, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. I-A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A3B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2017 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF2

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8

Cl. 7-A-1-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-3-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-61

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HY1

Cl. 1-A1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A1B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-1

Cl. 3-A-X, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A8

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-3A3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-19XS

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR1

Cl. X-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2017 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. One of
the actions also reflects the correction of a prior error, while
others reflect a reassessment of the IO linkage and a change in the
relative weight that Moody's assigns to the IO and PO components of
the IO PO bonds, as discussed below.

The rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of credit
enhancement available to the bonds.The rating upgrade on Class
A-2B1 in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-A8 also
reflects a correction to Moody's cashflow modeling used to rate
this bond. In prior modeling, the cross collateralization payment
to Group 2 was incorrectly calculated to allocate insufficient
payments to Group 2 senior bonds. The error has been corrected, and
action on Class A-2B1 reflects the correct allocation of cross
collateralization payments.

The action resolves the review of two IO bonds, Class X-1 in
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR1 and Class
3-A-X in MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-1, which were
among those placed on review for a reassessment of the IO bond
linkages captured in Moody's internal database. The factors that
Moody's considers in rating an IO bond depend on the type of
referenced securities or assets to which the IO bond is linked.
Moody's have reassessed the linkage of these two IO bonds and
determined that they were linked to the appropriate reference
bonds. The confirmations of the ratings on these two IO bonds
reflect the linkage reassessment and updated performance of the
respective transactions, including expected losses on the
collateral, and pay-downs or write-offs of the related reference
bonds.

The action also resolves the review of two IO PO bonds, Class II-X
in CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-12 and Class X-2 in DSLA
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1, which were also among the bonds
placed on review for a reassessment of the IO bond linkages
captured in Moody's internal database. IO PO bonds have both an
interest-only component and a principal-only component. Moody's
determines the rating of IO PO bonds using a weighted average of
the ratings of the two components. While historically Moody's were
using a more qualitative judgment in the analysis of these IO PO
bonds, Moody's have now assigned weights of 95% and 5% to the IO
and PO components, respectively, because the credit risk of the
transaction is almost solely attributable to the performance of the
IO component. In addition, as the PO components pay off or take
losses, the ratings of the IO PO bonds will eventually become equal
to that of the IO components.

The PO components of the IO PO bonds in this rating action are
linked to the arrearage pool in each transaction; in addition to
receiving principal from the arrearage pools they are entitled to a
share from the senior distribution amount along with the other
senior certificates. The arrearage pool in these transactions
represents past-due payments on the loans at the time of
securitization. The ratings of the PO components take into account
the credit enhancement provided by subordination and payment
priority of the tranche relative to the subordinate tranches.
Moody's have reassessed the linkage of these two IO PO bonds and
determined that they were linked to the appropriate reference bonds
and pools. The ratings on the IO components reflect the linkage
reassessment and updated performance of the respective
transactions, including expected losses on the collateral, and
pay-downs or write-offs of the related reference bonds. The upgrade
to the rating of Class X-2 in DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1 is
driven by the improved expected loss of the linked pools.

We are evaluating the remaining IO bonds on review and note that,
although a number of linkages may be corrected, this will not
necessarily lead to rating movements in all cases.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. The
methodologies used in rating DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1 Cl.
X-2, CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-12 Cl. II-X, MASTR
Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-1 Cl. 3-A-X, and Structured
Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR1 Cl. X-1 were "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in November 2017 from 4.6% in
November 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact
the performance of these transactions. An IO bond may be upgraded
or downgraded, within the constraints and provisions of the IO
methodology, based on lower or higher realized and expected loss
due to an overall improvement or decline in the credit quality of
the reference bonds and/or pools.


[*] S&P Hikes 8 Ratings on 4 Pass-Through Repackaged Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on eight classes from four
pass-through repackaged transactions. The ratings on these
transactions are dependent on S&P's ratings on the related
underlying securities.

S&P said, "Also, we affirmed the 'BB' rating on PPLUS Trust Series
GSC-2's certificates. Our rating on the certificates is dependent
on the lower of our rating on the underlying security, Goldman
Sachs Capital I's $2.75 billion 6.345% capital securities ('BB'),
and our rating on the swap counterparty guarantor, Bank of America
Corp. ('A-').

"The rating actions reflect the Nov. 22, 2017, raising of our
rating on Bank of America Corp. to 'A-' from 'BBB+'.

"We may take subsequent rating actions on these transactions due to
changes in our ratings assigned to the underlying security or swap
counterparty guarantor."

RATINGS RAISED

Preferred Pass-Through Trust 2006-B US$192.5 mil floating rate
pass-through due 02/28/2027

Underlying security: Bank of America Corp.'s US$2.025 billion
floating-rate depositary shares floating-rate non-cumulative
preferred stock series E ('BBB-')

  Class                Rating
              To                     From
  A           BBB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
  B           BBB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)

Auction Rate Securities Trust 2007-1 US$75 mil auction rate and
leveraged trust certificates trust 2007-1 Underlying security: Bank
of America Corp.'s US$1.5 billion floating-rate series 5 ('BBB-')

  Class                Rating
              To                     From
  A           BBB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
  B           BBB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)

Auction Rate Securities Trust 2007-2 US$50 mil floating rate
pass-thru series 2007-2 due 08/21/2027 Underlying security: Bank of
America Corp.'s US$2.025 billion floating-rate depositary shares
floating-rate non-cumulative preferred stock series E ('BBB-')

  Class                Rating
              To                     From
  A           BBB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
  B           BBB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)

Fixed Income Pass-Through Trust 2006-C
US$140 mil money markets and leveraged certificates series 2006-C
Underlying security: Bank of America Corp.'s US$165 million
floating-rate (three-month LIBOR + 65 bps) notes due 12/01/2026
('BBB+')

  Class                 Rating
              To                     From
  A           BBB+ (sf)              BBB (sf)
  B           BBB+ (sf)              BBB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

PPLUS Trust Series GSC-2
US$35 mil PPLUS trust certificates series GSC-2
Underlying security: Goldman Sachs Capital I's US$2.75 billion
6.345% Capital Securities ('BB')
Swap Counterparty Guarantor: Bank of America Corp. ('A')

  Class            Rating
  Certificates     BB


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 182 Classes From 23 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 182 ratings from 23 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
prime jumbo collateral. The review yielded 28 upgrades, 15
downgrades, 130 affirmations, and nine discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2qfiT8G


[*] S&P Withdraws 115 Ratings From 20 U.S. RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 115 classes from 20 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2008. All of these transactions are backed by
prime jumbo and Alternative-A collateral. The review yielded 115
withdrawals.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2zXWoEy


                            *********

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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