TCR_Public/170716.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 16, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 196

                            Headlines

1776 CLO I: Moody's Hike Class E Secured Notes Rating to B1(sf)
ADAMS MILL: Moody's Affirms Ba3(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
ALM VI: S&P Sets Prelim. BB Rating on Class D-RR Replacement Notes
ANGEL OAK 2017-2: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
ARES XLIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Class E Notes

BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Moody's  Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B3
BANK 2017-BNK6: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'B-sf'
BANK 2017-BNK6: S&P Gives Prelim. B+ Rating on 2 Tranches
BXP TRUST 2017-GM: Moody's Assigns Ba2(sf) Rating to Class E Certs
CASTLELAKE AIRCRAFT 2017-1: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on Class C Loans

CFIP CLO 2014-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on Class ER Notes
CGMS COMMERCIAL 2017-MDDR: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on E-FX Certs
CVP CLO 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating to $335.75 Cl. E Notes
EDUCATIONAL LOAN 2006-1: Fitch Withdraws CCC Rating on B-1 Notes
FIRST INVESTORS 2017-2: S&P Assigns (P)BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes

GOLUB CAPITAL 35: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
JAMESTOWN CLO X: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 3 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class H Debt
KKR CLO 18: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes

MARINER CLO 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on IO Certs
MIDOCEAN CREDIT VII: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
REALT 2017-1: Fitch Withdraws 'Bsf' Rating on Class G Certificates
RITE AID 1999-1: Moody's Puts B2 Debt Rating Under Review

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-5: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to B-4 Certs
US CAPITAL II: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to B1
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C12: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Class O Notes
WEST TOWN 2017-KNOX: S&P Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class E Certs
[*] Moody's Hikes $18.6MM of 2nd Lien RMBS Issued 2003-2007

[*] Moody's Hikes $354MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 1998-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $228.9MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $39.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2007
[*] S&P Completes Review on 62 Classes From Nine US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Rating on 46 Classes From 16 CDO Transactions

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 123 Classes From 18 RMBS Deals

                            *********

1776 CLO I: Moody's Hike Class E Secured Notes Rating to B1(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by 1776 CLO I, Ltd.:

US$35,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 30, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

US$16,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2020, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 30, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

US$27,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2020 (current outstanding balance $5,380,581.52),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 30, 2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

1776 CLO I, Ltd., issued in April 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since March 2017. The Class B
notes have been fully paid down by $30.1 million, and the Class C
notes have paid down 80.1% or $21.6 million since that time. Based
on the trustee's June 2017 report, the OC ratios for the Class C,
Class D and Class E notes are reported at 1188.32%, 156.40% and
111.43%, respectively, versus March 2017 levels of 202.36%, 124.82%
and 105.95%, respectively.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Moody's notes that the transaction
has become increasingly exposed to a smaller number of obligors,
with the top four obligor exposures comprising over 50% of the
collateral portfolio.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially if they jump to default. Because of the deal's
low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented
its typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
default distribution using its CDOROMTM software or individual
scenario analysis.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF (Portfolio Rating Quality Notched Up by One
Rating Notch (1823))

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF (Portfolio Rating Quality Notched Down by One
Rating Notch (3026))

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations." In addition,
because of the collateral pool's low diversity, Moody's used
CDOROM™ to simulate a default distribution that it then used as
an input in the cash flow model.

Moody's also supplemented its modeling with individual scenario
analyses to assess the ratings impact of jump-to-default by large
obligors.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $62.9 million, defaulted par of $3.96
million, a weighted average default probability of 10.86% (implying
a WARF of 2358), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
45.29%, a diversity score of 8 and a weighted average spread of
2.82% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.


ADAMS MILL: Moody's Affirms Ba3(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Adams Mill CLO Ltd.:

US$11,750,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2026, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on August 12, 2014
Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$30,375,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Due 2026, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on August 12, 2014
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$2,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2026, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on August 12, 2014 Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$22,750,000 Class E-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Due 2026, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on August 12, 2014 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class E-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2026, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on August 12, 2014 Assigned Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on the Class F notes reflects the credit
deterioration in the underlying CLO portfolio and increased
expected losses on the notes. Based on the trustee's June 2017
report, the transaction had a portfolio weighted average rating
factor (WARF) of 3019, which was failing the covenant of 2751.
Based on Moody's calculations, assets that have a CFR of Caa1 or
lower (after applicable adjustments for negative outlook or review
for downgrade) represent approximately 14.9% of the performing
portfolio. Furthermore, as a result of defaults and trading losses,
the reinvestment overcollateralization test has deteriorated to
104.34% based on the June 2017 trustee report, from 106.63% on the
deal's effective date in October 2014.

The weighted average spread (WAS) of the portfolio has also
declined, to 3.5% in June 2017 from 4.0% in August 2016, reducing
excess spread available to support the Class F notes in case of a
coverage test failure. Notwithstanding the declining portfolio WAS,
Moody's analysis considered the expected refinancing of the Class
A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1 and C-2 notes on July 17, 2017, which will
increase excess spread available as credit enhancement to the rated
notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the rating:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2463)

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Class E-1: +2

Class E-2: +2

Class F: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3695)

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Class E-1: 0

Class E-2: 0

Class F: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $522 million, defaulted par of $8.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 24.50% (implying
a WARF of 3079), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.55%, a diversity score of 74 and a weighted average spread of
3.5% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


ALM VI: S&P Sets Prelim. BB Rating on Class D-RR Replacement Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-RR, A-2-RR, B-1-RR, B-2-RR, C-RR, and D-RR replacement notes
from ALM VI Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation originally
issued in June 2012 that is managed by Apollo Credit Management
LLC. The second replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture and will carry a lower spread over LIBOR
than the originally refinanced  notes, which were first refinanced
in June 2015. The class E-R notes are not part of this
refinancing.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 10,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 17, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the second replacement notes are expected to redeem the
notes from the first refinancing. At that time, S&P said, "we
anticipate withdrawing the ratings on those notes and assigning
ratings to the new notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't
occur, we may affirm the ratings on the originally refinanced notes
and withdraw our preliminary ratings.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance. In line with our criteria,
our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the
expected timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon
default, under various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.
In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's ability to
pay timely interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the
rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM VI Ltd.

Replacement class         Rating      Amount
                                     (mil. $)
A-1-RR                    AAA (sf)    321.50
A-2-RR                    AA (sf)      51.50
B-1-RR                    A (sf)       29.50
B-2-RR                    A (sf)       15.00
C-RR                      BBB (sf)     23.00
D-RR                      BB (sf)      20.00


ANGEL OAK 2017-2: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class B-2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage Trust
I LLC 2017-2's $203.609 million mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and
adjustable-rate, and interest-only residential mortgage loans
secured by single-family residences, planned-unit developments,
two- to four-family residences, townhomes, and condominiums to
nonconforming borrowers.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework; and
-- The mortgage originator concentration.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Angel Oak Mortgage Trust 2017-2

  Class       Rating(i)             Amount
  A-1         AAA (sf)         131,004,000
  A-2         AA (sf)           15,678,000
  A-3         A (sf)            22,729,000
  M-1         BBB (sf)          15,783,000
  B-1         BB (sf)           10,523,000
  B-2         B (sf)             7,892,000
  B-3         NR                 6,839,065
  XS          NR              Notional(ii)
  R           NR                       N/A


ARES XLIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Ares XLIV CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$567,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$92,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$95,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class A-3 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class A-3 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class
E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Ares XLIV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments purchased with
principal proceeds, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
non-senior secured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 70%-80% ramped as of the closing date.

Ares CLO Management II LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,000,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2875

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2875 to 3306)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class A-3 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2875 to 3738)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class A-3 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Moody's  Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes
and affirmed the ratings on five classes in Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3:

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I Classes (Classes A-J, B, C & D) were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 79%
since last review and 89% since securitization

The ratings on the remaining five P&I Classes were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 21.9% of the
current balance, compared to 9.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 84.7% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 14.5% of the pool . In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to the most junior
classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 89% to $401.5
million from $3.52 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 23 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 29% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 87% of
the pool. There are only two performing loans, representing 0.8% of
the pool, that are not on the master servicer's wathclist nor in
special servicing.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

Six loans, constituting 14.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $182 million (for an average loss
severity of 27%). Fifteen loans, constituting 85% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the HPI -- GSA Portfolio Loan ($114.6 million -- 28.6% of the
pool), which is secured by portfolio of 9 office properties,
totaling 812,000 SF located across eight states (Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and
Texas). One building was condemned and proceeds from the insurance
settlement was used to pay down a portion of the loan. Seven of the
remaining properties are leased to single tenants and all nine
remaining properties are leased to GSA tenants. This loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2017 for maturity default
and the special servicer indicated that they Borrower is working to
payoff the subject loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the JQH Hotel
Portfolio Loan ($100 million -- 24.9% of the pool), which
represents a pari passu portion of a $150 million mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by three full service hotels and two limited
service hotels located in Missouri (3 properties), Texas (1
property), and Tennessee (1 property). The properties were built
between 2000 and 2005. This loan transferred to special servicing
in July 2016 due to the Borrower filing Bankruptcy. The special
servicer indicated that the Borrower engaged a third party to
market and sell the remaining hotels.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $79 million loss for
the specially serviced loans. Moody's has also assumed a high
default probability for five poorly performing loans, constituting
14.5% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss of $8.7
million (a 15% expected loss based on a 50% probability default)
from these troubled loans.

The top three non-specially serviced loans represent 13% of the
pool balance. The largest non-specially serviced loan is the Yuba
City Marketplace Loan ($27 million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 142,800 SF retail property located in Yuba City, CA
approximately 40 north of Sacramento. As of March 2017, the
property was 86% leased to national tenants such as Marshalls, Bed
Bath & Beyond and Michaels. The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist and Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The second loan is the One Main Plaza Loan ($19.9 million -- 4.9%
of the pool), which is secured by an 81,800 SF office property in
Wailuku, HI. As of March 2017, the property was 82% leased to over
40 tenants. This loan has passed its scheduled maturity date June
2017 and is on the master servicer's watchlist. Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan.

The third loan is the Bellerive Plaza Loan ($6.1 million -- 1.5% of
the pool), which is secured by a 75,000 SF retailed property
anchored by Kroger and located in Nicholasville, KY (approximately
7 miles southwest of Lexington). As of March 2017, the property was
78% leased. The loan has passed its scheduled maturity in June 2017
and is on the master servicer's watchlist. Moody's has identified
this as a troubled loan.


BANK 2017-BNK6: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the BANK 2017-BNK6
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK6.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $31,100,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,600,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,900,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,200,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $225,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $239,812,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $620,612,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $172,885,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97,525,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41,005,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,355,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,464,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,948,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,866,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,464,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,948,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,866,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

-- $28,814,330ab class X-G;
-- $28,814,330b class G;
-- $46,662,596.37bc RR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of July 10, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 72 loans secured by 189
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$933,251,927 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; Bank of
America, National Association; Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital
Holdings LLC; and National Cooperative Bank, N.A.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 74.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 82.5%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage Than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is lower than recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The Fitch DSCR and LTV for the pool are 1.61x and
93.2%, respectively, significantly better than the YTD 2017
averages of 1.23x and 102.7%. Excluding investment-grade credit
opinion and multifamily cooperative loans, the pool has a Fitch
DSCR and LTV of 1.28x and 105.4%, respectively, better than the YTD
2017 normalized averages of 1.19x and 106.7%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing 16%
of the pool, have investment-grade credit opinions. General Motors
Building (9.6% of the pool) and Del Amo Fashion Center (6.4% of the
pool) have investment-grade credit opinions of 'AAAsf*' and
'BBBsf*, respectively, on a stand-alone basis. Combined, the two
loans have a weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.50x and
58.5%, respectively.

Pool Diversity by Loan Size: The transaction exhibits low pool
concentration, with a loan concentration index (LCI) of 362,
compared to the YTD average of 403. The top 10 loans account for
50.7% of the pool, below the YTD 2017 average of 53.7%, and the
pool's average loan size is $13 million, compared to the YTD 2017
average of $20.6 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2017-BNK6 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


BANK 2017-BNK6: S&P Gives Prelim. B+ Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BANK
2017-BNK6's $933.3 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 72 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $933.3 million ($793.5 million of
offered certificates), secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in 189 properties across 33 states.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 10,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the underlying
collateral's economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the
collateral pool's relative diversity, and our overall qualitative
assessment of the transaction.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  BANK 2017-BNK6

  Class                Rating(i)         Amount ($)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)          31,100,000
  A-2                  AAA (sf)          26,600,000
  A-SB                 AAA (sf)          39,900,000
  A-3                  AAA (sf)          58,200,000
  A-4                  AAA (sf)         225,000,000
  A-5                  AAA (sf)         239,812,000
  X-A                  AAA (sf)         620,612,000(ii)
  X-B                  A (sf)           172,885,000(ii)
  A-S                  AAA (sf)          97,525,000
  B                    AA (sf)           41,005,000
  C                    A (sf)            34,355,000
  X-D(iii)             BBB-(sf)          35,464,000(ii)
  X-E(iii)             BB- (sf)          19,948,000(ii)
  X-F(iii)             B+ (sf)            8,866,000(ii)
  X-G(iii)             NR                28,814,330(ii)
  D(iii)               BBB- (sf)         35,464,000
  E(iii)               BB- (sf)          19,948,000
  F(iii)               B+ (sf)            8,866,000
  G(iii)               NR                28,814,330
  RR interest(iii)     NR                46,662,596

(i)The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii)Notional balance.
(iii)Non-offered certificates.
NR--Not rated.


BXP TRUST 2017-GM: Moody's Assigns Ba2(sf) Rating to Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CMBS securities, issued by BXP Trust 2017-GM, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-GM:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* Reflects interest-only class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a beneficial ownership in a
portion of an interest-only, 10-year, fixed-rate, first-lien whole
loan with an outstanding Cut-off Date principal balance of
$2,300,000,000 (the "Whole Loan"). The Whole Loan will be secured
by the Borrower's fee simple interest in the General Motors
Building, a 1,989,983 square foot, Class A, office property located
at 767 Fifth Avenue in New York City.

More specifically, the trust assets primarily consist of twelve
promissory notes, including eight senior promissory notes (the
"Senior Trust Notes") and four junior promissory notes (the "Junior
Notes", and together with the Senior Trust Notes, the "Mortgage
Loan"), which combined, have an aggregate principal balance of
$1,555,000,000 as of the Cut-off Date. The aggregate Senior Trust
Notes and the aggregate Junior Notes have principal balances of
$725,000,000 and $830,000,000, respectively. The Mortgage Loan is
part of a split loan structure comprised of (i) the Mortgage Loan
and (ii) the "Companion Loans" (not assets of the trust fund)
including 21 promissory notes with an aggregate initial principal
balance of $745,000,000 that are pari passu in right of payment
with each other and with the Senior Trust Notes and senior in right
of payment with the Junior Notes. The Mortgage Loan and the
Companion Loans are primarily secured by a first priority mortgage
on the Property.

The Borrower, 767 Fifth Partners LLC, is a Delaware limited
liability company that is indirectly owned (in part) and controlled
by affiliates of Boston Properties Limited Partnership. The
Borrower is a single purpose entity whose primary business is the
performance of the obligations under the Loan Documents and the
ownership and/or operation of the Property. Boston Properties
Limited Partnership acts as the Loan Sponsor.

Developed in 1968, the Property is a 50-story high-rise office
building that occupies the entire city block bound by 58th Street,
59th Street, Madison Avenue and Fifth Avenue on the southeast
corner of Central Park. The Property features 188,000 SF of retail
space on the first two stories and the below-grade concourse.

As of June 1, 2017, the Property was 95.0% occupied and features a
diverse tenant roster, including the global headquarters for Weil,
Gotshal & Manges (24.6% of NRA), Aramis/Estee Lauder's headquarter
(15.1% of NRA), a flagship retail location for Under Armour (2.5%
of NRA), BAMCO (5.3% of NRA) and Apple's flagship retail store
(5.3% of NRA), among others.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both Moody's Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS methodology and Moody's IO Rating methodology. The
rating approach for securities backed by a single loan compares the
credit risk inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit
protection offered by the structure. The structure's credit
enhancement is quantified by the maximum deterioration in property
value that the securities are able to withstand under various
stress scenarios without causing an increase in the expected loss
for various rating levels. In assigning single borrower ratings,
Moody's also considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The Whole Loan first mortgage balance of $2,300,000,000 represents
a Moody's LTV of 91.4%. The Moody's Whole Loan First Mortgage
Actual DSCR is 2.35X and Moody's Whole Loan First Mortgage Stressed
DSCR is 0.87X.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The Property's
property quality grade is 0, reflecting the superior quality of
this trophy asset.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: trophy asset, asset
quality, high investor liquidity, property location, transport
access, recent tenant renewals and an experienced and committed
Sponsor.

Notable credit challenges of the transaction include: lack of
diversity for this single asset transaction, the lack of loan
amortization, tenant rollover risk, and the pipeline of New York
City Class A new office supply under construction.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5%, 15.7%,
and 25.2%, the model-indicated rating for i) the currently rated
Aaa (sf) classes would be Aa1 (sf), A2 (sf), and Baa1 (sf),
respectively, ii) the currently rated Aa3 (sf) classes would be A3
(sf), Baa2 (sf), and Ba2 (sf), respectively, iii) the currently
rated A3 (sf) classes would be Baa2 (sf), Ba2 (sf), and B1 (sf),
respectively, iv) the currently rated Baa3 (sf) classes would be
Ba1 (sf), B1 (sf), and B3 (sf), respectively, and v) the currently
rated Ba2 (sf) classes would be Ba3 (sf), B3 (sf), and Caa2 (sf),
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather they
are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal
has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings
impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated
standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration
in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be
assigned in each case could vary from the information presented in
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in overall performance
and Property income, increased expected losses from a specially
serviced and troubled loan or interest shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


CASTLELAKE AIRCRAFT 2017-1: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on Class C Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Castlelake
Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1's $785.5 million fixed-rate class
A, B, and C loans.

The issuance is backed by the aircraft-owning entity issuers'
series A, B, and C loans, which are in turn backed by
aircraft-related leases and shares or beneficial interests in
entities that directly and indirectly receive aircraft portfolio
lease and residual cash flows, among others.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 6,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The likelihood of timely interest on the class A loans
(excluding the step-up amount) on each payment date, the timely
interest on the class B loans (excluding the step-up amount) when
they are the senior-most loans outstanding on each payment date,
and the ultimate interest and principal payment on the class A, B,
and C loans on the legal final maturity at the respective rating
stresses.

-- The 74.13% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (based on the lower of the
mean and median [LMM] of the half-life base values and the
half-life current market values) on the class A loans, the 84.96%
LTV ratio on the class B loans, and the 94.52% LTV ratio on the
class C loans.

-- The initial asset portfolio, which comprises 39 narrow-body
passenger planes (30 A320 family, four B737-700, and five
B737-800), and four A330-300 wide-body passenger planes. The 43
assets have a weighted average age of approximately 13 years and
remaining average lease term of approximately 4.3 years. None of
the assets are currently out of production.

-- The age of the initial assets in the portfolio, which are in
mid-life, with a 13-year weighted average age (by value).
Currently, all 43 assets are on lease, with a 4.3-year weighted
average remaining maturity.

-- That some of the lessees are in emerging markets where the
commercial aviation market is growing.

-- The class A and B loans' 12-year amortization profile. The
class C loans follow a seven-year amortization profile.

-- That during the sixth and seventh year of the transaction, if
no rapid amortization event has occurred and is continuing, the
transaction will pay 50% of the available collections first to the
class A loans and second to the class B loans. Starting in the
eighth year after the initial closing date, the transaction will
pay 100% of the available collections first to the class A loans
and second to the class B loans. From the fourth to the seventh
year of the transaction, 30% of the available collections will be
paid to the class C loans. Starting in year eight the transaction
will pay 100% of the available collections to the class C loans.

-- That if a rapid amortization event (the debt service coverage
ratio or utilization
triggers have been breached or eight years after the initial
closing date) has occurred and is continuing, the transaction will
pay the class A loans' outstanding principal balance. A similar
arrangement applies to the class B loans after the class A loans
are paid.

-- That a portion of the end-of-lease payments will be paid to the
class A, B, and C loans according to a percentage based on  the
LTV.

-- A liquidity facility that equals nine months of interest on the
class A and B loans.

-- Morten Beyer & Agnew's (MBA's) provision of a maintenance
analysis at closing. After closing, Castlelake will perform the
maintenance analysis, which will be confirmed for reasonableness
and achievability in an opinion letter from MBA. Maintenance
reserve accounts are required to keep a balance to meet the higher
of $1 million in the aggregate and the sum of forward-looking
maintenance expenses (up to 12 months). The excess maintenance over
the required maintenance amount will be transferred to the payment
waterfall.

-- The senior indemnification (capped at $10 million), which is
modeled to occur in the first 12 months.

-- The junior indemnification (uncapped), which is subordinated to
the rated classes' principal payment.

-- Castlelake, which is a private investment firm focusing on
distressed assets and the servicer for this transaction.
Castlelake's in-house aircraft assets and aviation finance team is
experienced in managing mid-life and older aircraft assets.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1

  Class         Rating          Interest           Amount
                                rate (%)         (mil. $)
  A loans(i)    A (sf)              3.97           616.00
  B loans(i)    BBB (sf)            5.93            90.00
  C loans       BB (sf)             6.90            79.50

(i) A portion of the class A and B loans are delayed-draw notes.
S&P's analysis assumes the entire balance of each loan ($616
million class A loans and $90 million class B loans) will be funded
at close.


CFIP CLO 2014-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on Class ER Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, And E-R replacement notes from CFIP CLO 2014-1
Ltd./CFIP CLO 2014-1 LLC, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2014 that is managed by Chicago Fundamental
Investment Partners LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a
proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 10,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 13, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, S&P said, "we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also make the following changes:

-- The replacement class D-R and E-R notes are expected to be
    issued at a higher spread than the original notes.

-- The replacement class A-R, B-R, and C-R notes are expected to
    be issued at a higher spread than the original notes.

-- The stated maturity will be extended 4.25 years, the
    reinvestment period will be extended by 3.25 years, and the
    non-call period will be extended by two years.

-- The overcollateralization ratio thresholds, minimum weighted
    average spread covenant, and minimum weighted average recovery

    rate covenant are being amended.  

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  CFIP CLO 2014-1 Ltd./CFIP CLO 2014-1 LLC
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-R                       AAA (sf)            293.000
  B-R                       AA (sf)              60.000
  C-R (deferrable)          A (sf)               37.000
  D-R (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)            25.000
  E-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)             18.600
  Income notes              NR                   54.787

  NR--Not rated.


CGMS COMMERCIAL 2017-MDDR: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on E-FX Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CGMS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-MDDR's $$207.8 million pool A
fixed-rate certificates, $261.0 million pool B floating-rate
certificates, and $202.5 million pool C floating-rate
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a portfolio of predominantly grocery-anchored
retail properties.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 6,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect our view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loans' terms, and
the transaction's structure.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  CGMS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-MDDR

  Class       Rating(i)              Amount ($)
  Pool A fixed-rate certificates
  A-FX         AAA (sf)             104,860,000
  X-FX         AA- (sf)             143,618,000(ii)
  B-FX         AA- (sf)              38,758,000
  C-FX         A- (sf)               19,585,000
  D-FX         BBB- (sf)             24,023,000
  E-FX         BB (sf)               20,567,000
  Class VRR    NR                    10,937,000

  Pool B floating-rate certificates
  A-FL-PB      AAA (sf)             150,533,000
  X-FL-PB-CP   BBB- (sf)             91,260,000(ii)
  X-FL-PB-NCP  BBB- (sf)            91,260,000(ii)
  B-FL-PB      AA- (sf)              34,942,000
  C-FL-PB      A- (sf)               25,292,000
  D-FL-PB      BBB- (sf)             31,026,000
  E-FL-PB      BB (sf)               19,229,000
  Class VRR    NR                    13,738,000

  Pool C floating-rate certificates
  A-FL-PC      AAA (sf)             108,618,000
  X-FL-PC-CP   BBB- (sf)             65,761,000(ii)
  X-FL-PC-NCP  BBB- (sf)             65,761,000(ii)
  B-FL-PC      AA- (sf)              25,146,000
  C-FL-PC      A- (sf)               18,240,000
  D-FL-PC      BBB- (sf)             22,375,000
  E-FL-PC      BB- (sf)              28,132,500
  Class VRR    NR                    10,658,500

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers
in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii)Notional balance.
NR--Not rated.


CVP CLO 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating to $335.75 Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CVP CLO
2017-1 Ltd./CVP CLO 2017-1 LLC's $335.75 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 11,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of   

    broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans

    that are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
    cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
    the performance of the rated notes through collateral
    selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CVP CLO 2017-1 Ltd./CVP CLO 2017-1 LLC  

Class                     Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A                         AAA (sf)              222.50
B                         AA (sf)                58.25
C (deferrable)            A (sf)                 18.50
D (deferrable)            BBB (sf)               18.00
E (deferrable)            BB- (sf)               18.50
Subordinate notes         NR                     36.25

NR--Not rated.


EDUCATIONAL LOAN 2006-1: Fitch Withdraws CCC Rating on B-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the following Educational Loan Company
Trust I (ELC Trust I)'s Series 2006-1 notes ratings:

-- Series 2006-1 class A-1 notes 'Asf', Rating Watch Negative;
-- Series 2006-1 class A-2 notes 'Asf', Rating Watch Negative;
-- Series 2006-1 class A-3 notes 'Asf', Rating Watch Negative;
-- Series 2006-1 class B-1 notes 'CCCsf', Rating Watch Negative,
    RE 60%.

The trust collateral comprises Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties provided by eligible
guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department of
Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued interest.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch is withdrawing the ratings due to a lack of information.

As announced in its Jan. 30, 2017 rating action, Fitch allowed a
reasonable period for receipt of requested information, but still
has not received data regarding ELC Trust I's total pool, including
periodic new defaults and IBR usage covering the past 12 months.
The lack of information is inconsistent with Fitch's rating
criteria, resulting in the withdrawal.


FIRST INVESTORS 2017-2: S&P Assigns (P)BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to First
Investors Auto Owner Trust 2017-2's $226.43 million asset-backed
notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 6,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 38.1%, 33.4%, 26.1%, 20.3%,
    and 15.8% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E   
    notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
    (including excess spread). These credit support levels provide

    approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.40x coverage  

    of S&P's 10.25%-10.75% expected cumulative net loss (CNL)  
    range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively (see

    the Cash Flow Modeling Assumptions And Results section).

-- The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed

    cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate for the   
    preliminary ratings.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
    scenario, all else being equal, the ratings on the class A, B,

    and C notes would not drop by more than one rating category,
    and the rating on the class D notes would not drop by more
    than two rating categories within the first year. These
    potential rating movements are consistent with our rating
    stability criteria (see "Methodology: Credit Stability
    Criteria," published May 3, 2010).

-- The collateral characteristics of the pool being securitized
    with direct loans accounting for approximately 23% of the cut-
    off pool. These loans historically have lower losses than the
    indirect-originated loans.

-- Prefunding will be used in this transaction in the amount of
    $25.0 million, approximately 11% of the pool. The subsequent
    receivables, which amount to approximately 17%-23% of the
    company's 2016 quarterly origination volume, are expected to
    be transferred into the trust within three months from the
    closing date.

-- First Investors Financial Services Inc.'s (First Investors')
    28-year history of originating and underwriting auto loans,  
    and 17-year history of self-servicing auto loans, as well as
    its track record of securitizing auto loans since 2000.

-- First Investors' 13 years of origination static pool data,
    segmented by direct and indirect loans. Wells Fargo Bank
    N.A.'s experience as the committed back-up servicer.

-- The transaction's sequential payment structure, which builds
    credit enhancement based on a percentage of receivables as the

    pool amortizes.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  First Investors Auto Owner Trust 2017-2  

  Class   Rating     Type           Interest           Amount
                                    rate(i)       (mil. $)(i)
  A-1    AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed              130.00
  A-2    AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed               33.44
  B      AA (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed               14.10
  C      A (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed               20.40
  D      BBB (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed               16.50
  E      BB- (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed               11.99

(i)The actual coupons of the tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


GOLUB CAPITAL 35: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Golub Capital Partners CLO 35(B), Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$318,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$52,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$31,875,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$26,875,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Golub 35(B) is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and senior
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 60% ramped as of
the closing date.

GC Advisors LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2825

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2825 to 3249)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2825 to 3673)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


JAMESTOWN CLO X: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by Jamestown CLO X Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$4,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$384,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$72,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$13,370,000 Class B-1A Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class B-1A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$16,630,000 Class B-1B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class B-1B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$42,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$24,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

US$9,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B-1A Notes, the Class B-1B Notes, the Class C Notes, the
Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Jamestown CLO X is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing
date.

Investcorp Credit Management US LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2860

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2860 to 3289)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B-1A Notes: -2

Class B-1B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2860 to 3718)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B-1A Notes: -4

Class B-1B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -2


JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 3 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
in JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series
2008-C2:

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-4, A-4FL and A-1A were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-M and A-J were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class X was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.2% of the
current balance, compared to 12.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 22.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 22.4% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION:

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 12% to $613 million
from $1.166 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 55 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 55% of the pool. One loan, constituting
less than 1% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Eleven loans, constituting 22% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

Fourteen loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $191 million (for an average loss
severity of 80%). Three loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Westin Portfolio Loan ($107 million -- 18% of the pool),
which is secured by a pari-passu interest in two Westin hotels
(487-room hotel in La Paloma - Tuscon, Arizona; 412-room hotel in
Hilton Head, South Carolina). The loan transferred to special
servicing in October 2008 due to imminent default and the borrower
filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in November 2010. In May 2012, a
bankruptcy court in Arizona modified the loan to include a term
extension and the requirement of the Borrower to make $500,000 of
monthly principal-only payments for 21 years (split pro rata
between the two pari-passu notes). Various fees, interest, and
other expenses were capitalized into the loan balance as a part of
the loan modification. The special servicer has appealed the
modification and Ninth Circuit issued a favorable ruling for the
lender. The special servicer continues to monitor the loan and is
evaluating how this ruling will ultimately impact the overall
bankruptcy plan. The borrower continues to make its principal-only
monthly payments on the whole loan as required by the
modification.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by retail
properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $40.1 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (35% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 12% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $24 million (a 34% expected loss based on a
61% probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the June 12, 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $68.6 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 83% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 91% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, compared to 94% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 22% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.22X and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.20X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Lofts at New
Roc Loan ($4.3 million -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
98-unit residential cooperative located in New Rochelle, New York.
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa
(sca.pd) and 3.05X.

The top three performing loans represent 17% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Station Casinos Headquarters Loan ($40
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 139,000 SF
office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The building is fully
leased to Station Casinos under a 20-year lease through October
2027 and serves as its corporate headquarters. Upon emerging from
bankruptcy in August 2010, the lease was renegotiated at a
significant reduction in base rent. Due to the single tenant
nature, Moody's analysis includes a "lit/dark" analysis. Moody's
has identified this loan as a troubled loan due to the significant
decline in rental revenue from the renegotiated lease.

The second largest loan is the Hilton Garden Inn Philadelphia
Center City Loan ($35 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 279-key, full service hotel in the Central Business
District of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As of March 2017, ADR,
Occupancy and RevPAR were $175, 83% and $145, respectively,
compared to $165, 82% and $135 for the same period in 2016. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and 1.00X, respectively, compared to
109% and 1.09X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Two Democracy Plaza Loan ($31 million
-- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a ten-story office
building located in Bethesda, Maryland, just northwest of
Washington D.C. As of March 2017, the property was 92% leased. 84%
of the Net Rentable Area is occupied by a single tenant. Due to the
single tenant nature, Moody's analysis includes a "lit/dark"
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 64% and 1.57X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class H Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 12 classes in
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C6:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 16, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $860 million
from $1.13 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 37 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 60% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, compared to a Herf of 20 at Moody's last
review.

Eight loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in or
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $2.9 million (for an
average loss severity of 41%).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 95% of the
pool and partial year 2017 operating results for 81% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 90%, compared to 89% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 20% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.66X and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 1.69X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 35% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 200 Public Square Loan ($120.8 million -- 14.1%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.27 million square foot (SF),
Class A office tower in downtown Cleveland, Ohio. The property is
situated on Public Square and is the third-tallest building in
Cleveland. The property, which was built in 1985 includes an
eight-story atrium, conference facilities, a fitness center,
retail, and dining options. As of the March 2017 rent roll, the
property was 73% leased, compared to 78% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to
99% and 1.01X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arbor Place Mall Loan ($112.5
million -- 13.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 546,000 SF
component of a 1.16 million SF super-regional mall located in
Douglasville, Georgia. The property, which was built in 1999, is
anchored by Dillard's, Belk, Macy's, J.C. Penney, and Sears. All
anchors except for J.C. Penney are owned by the tenant and are not
part of the collateral. As of the March 2017 rent roll, the
property was 99% leased, the same as at the last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.92X, respectively, compared to
102% and 1.01X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Northwoods Mall Loan ($67.2 million
-- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 404,000 SF component of
a 792,000 SF regional mall located in North Charleston, South
Carolina. The property was built in 1972 and renovated by the
sponsor in 2004. The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Sears,
Dillard's, and Belk. All anchors except for J.C. Penney are owned
by the tenant and are not part of the collateral. As of the March
2017 rent roll, the property was 98% leased, the same as at the
last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 85% and 1.24X at the last review.


KKR CLO 18: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by KKR CLO 18 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$3,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$448,00,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$84,000 000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$42,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

KKR 18 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager"), will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $700,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2900 to 3335)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2900 to 3770)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


MARINER CLO 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Mariner CLO
2016-3 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in August 2016 that is managed by Mariner Investment Group
LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 11,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the July 24, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which will outline the terms of the replacement notes.

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

-- There will be a revised capital structure. The non-call period,
the reinvestment period, and the stated maturity will be extended
to July 2019, July 2021, and July 2029, respectively.

-- The weighted average life test has also been extended.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Mariner CLO 2016-3 Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-R                       AAA (sf)        315.00
  B-R                       AA (sf)          63.00
  C-R (deferrable)          A (sf)           37.00
  D-R (deferrable)          BBB (sf)         25.00
  E-R (deferrable)          BB (sf)          20.00
  Subordinated notes        NR               43.40

  NR--Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on IO Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes in Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc.,1998-C1-CTL , Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1998-C1-CTL:

Cl. A-PO, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on P&I Classes A-PO, B, and C were affirmed due to the
sufficiency of the credit support level and the transaction's key
metric, the weighted average rating factor (WARF), being within an
acceptable range.

The ratings on P&I Classes D and E were upgraded because of
increased credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The pool has paid down 14% since the last review.

The rating on the IO class, Class IO, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on December 15, 2016.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a lower
loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The prinipal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease
Financings" published in October 2016.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. IO was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 80% to $126.8
million from $630 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19.2% of the pool. Sixty-two of the loans are CTL loans
secured by properties leased to eight corporate credits. Seventeen
loans, representing 31.5% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Four loans, constituting 2.9% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans currently in special servicing. Twenty-one loans
have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $35.7 million.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($37.7
million -- 29.8% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: B3/Caa1 --
on review direction uncertain), Georgia Power Company ($24.3
million -- 19.2% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: A3 --
Negative outlook), and Kroger Co. (The) ($11.6 million -- 9.1% of
the pool; senior unsecured rating: Baa1 -- stable outlook). The
bottom-dollar WARF for this pool is 1956 compared to 1974 at the
last review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.


MIDOCEAN CREDIT VII: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by MidOcean Credit CLO VII.

Moody's rating action is:

US$378,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$51,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class B
Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$34,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$28,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes, and the Class
F Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

MidOcean Credit CLO VII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and senior unsecured loans. The portfolio is
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

MidOcean Credit Fund Management LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 58

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2929

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Spread (WAC): 5.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the impact of an
increase in default probability (expressed in terms of WARF level)
on the Rated Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch
difference versus the current model output, whereby a negative
difference corresponds to higher expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2929 to 3368)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2929 to 3808)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2


REALT 2017-1: Fitch Withdraws 'Bsf' Rating on Class G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the following expected ratings and
Rating Outlooks from the following classes of Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust (REAL-T) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2017-1:

-- $106,457,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $203,819,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,094,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,692,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,792,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,047,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,597,000 class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,047,000 class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

All currencies are in Canadian dollars (CAD).

The following classes were not expected to be rated by Fitch:

-- $359,740,410a class X;
-- $7,195,410 class H.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings have been withdrawn as they are no longer expected to
convert to final ratings in the near term. Fitch has also withdrawn
the presale report for the transaction dated June 14, 2017. Fitch
may assign the transaction expected ratings again in the future,
following an updated analysis of the portfolio and the proposed
structure.


RITE AID 1999-1: Moody's Puts B2 Debt Rating Under Review
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service revised the review on the rating of Rite
Aid Pass-Through Trust, Series 1999-1 to direction uncertain:

Cl. A-2, B2 Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain; previously on
Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded to B2 and Remained On Review for Possible
Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's revised the review of the rating of Rite Aid, Series 1999-1
to direction uncertain due to Rite Aid Corporation senior unsecured
rating B3/Caa1 being under review direction uncertain.

On June 29, 2017, Moody's revised the review of Rite Aid
Corporation to direction uncertain from on review for upgrade
following the announcement from the company that it had mutually
agreed with Walgreens Boots Alliance to terminate the previous
agreement under which Walgreens was to acquire all outstanding
shares of Rite Aid. The company has entered into a new agreement
with Walgreens to sell 2,186 Rite Aid stores and related assets
$5.175 billion. Rite Aid will also receive $325 million termination
fees. The transaction is subject to FTC approval.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a lower
loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease Financings"
published in October 2016.

No model was used in this review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of June 1, 2017, the transaction balance has decreased by 49% to
$85.5 million from $167.6 million at securitization. Originally
there were two classes, Cl A-1 and Cl A-2. The Cl A-1 paid off in
full on July 2, 2016. The outstanding Cl A-2 balance is amortizing
and will have a balloon payment approximately of $54 million, or
$64 per square foot (PSF) that is protected by residual insurance.

This credit-tenant lease (CTL) transaction is supported by a
mortgage on a portfolio of 53 drug stores with a total of 841,411
square feet located in 14 states and the District of Columbia. Each
property is subject to a fully bondable, triple net lease
guaranteed by Rite Aid Corporation.

Residual insurance covers 51 of the 53 properties and is provided
by Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Moody's insurance financial
strength rating of A1) of The Hartford Financial Services Group,
Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured debt rating of Baa2; stable
outlook). The two properties not covered by the residual insurance
secure loans will fully amortize by lease expiration.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-5: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to B-4 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-5. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans. The assets
of the trust consist of 643 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans, substantially all of which have an original term to maturity
of 30 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-5

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.30%
in a base scenario and reaches 3.75% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-5 transaction is a securitization of 643 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $485,245,437. Redwood Residential Acquisition Corp.
(Redwood) purchased the loans from 108 originators. The largest
originator by principal balance is First Republic Bank (19.56%).
The remaining originators are less than 10% each. In addition,
Redwood acquired approximately 3.56% of the mortgage loans by
stated principal balance from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago
(FHLB Chicago), which were originated by various participating
financial institution originators. The loan-level third party due
diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting, property
value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has agreed to
backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of all
originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood, which Moody's believes to
be an aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages that is
stronger than its peers. As of the June 2017 remittance report,
there have been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that
closed in 2010 and later, and delinquencies to date have also been
very low.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 552 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 91 First Republic
loans. For the remaining four loans, Redwood Trust elected to
conduct a limited review, which did not include a TPR firm check
for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some
of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from the same
originator where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's found the
exceptions to be minor in nature and did not pose a material
increase in the risk of loan loss. Moody's note that there are four
escrow holdback loans where the initial escrow holdback amount is
greater than 10%. In the event the escrow funds greater than 10%
have not been disbursed within six months of the Closing Date, the
Seller shall repurchase the affected Escrow Holdback Mortgage Loan,
on or before the date that is six months after the Closing Date at
the applicable Repurchase Price. Given that the small number of
such loans and that the seller has the obligation to repurchase,
Moody's did not make an adjustment for these loans.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-IO1, Cl. A-IO2,
Cl. A-IO3, Cl. A-IO4, Cl. A-IO5, Cl. A-IO6, Cl. A-IO7, Cl. A-IO8,
Cl. A-IO9, Cl. A-IO10, Cl. A-IO11, Cl. A-IO12, Cl. A-IO13, Cl.
A-IO14, Cl. A-IO15, Cl. A-IO16, Cl. A-IO17, Cl. A-IO18, Cl. A-IO19,
Cl. A-IO20, Cl. A-IO21, Cl. A-IO22, Cl. A-IO23, Cl. A-IO24, Cl.
A-IO25, was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.


US CAPITAL II: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to B1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by US Capital Funding II Ltd.:

US$33,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2034,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on October 21, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

US$70,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinate Notes Due
2034, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on October 21, 2016 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed/Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
Notes Due 2034, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on October 21, 2016
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$171,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2034
(current outstanding balance of $21,732,336.94), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on October 21, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US Capital Funding II Ltd., issued in June 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2016.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 35.3% or $11.9
million since October 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1, A-2, and B-2 notes have improved to 800.6% and
315.0%, and 105.3%, respectively, from October 2016 levels of
549.3%, 275.0%, and 104.2%, respectively. The rated notes will
continue to benefit from excess interest diversion, because of a
structural feature that requires interest diversion up to the
Optimal Principal Distribution Amount (OPDA), which is the
difference between all cumulative collateral decrease amounts and
all cumulative principal payments to the rated notes. The OPDA
amount was approximately $10.6 million in June 2017, based on
Moody's calculations.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

5) The deal has a $15 million pay-fixed receive-floating interest
rate swap that is currently out of the money and a $6 million
fixed-rate asset. If the fixed-rate asset prepays or defaults,
payments to hedge counterparties could consume a large portion or
all of the interest proceeds, leaving the Class B-1 and B-2 notes
with poor interest coverage. Payment timing mismatches between
assets and liabilities can lead to additional concerns.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 407)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1003)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B-1: -1

Class B-2: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par of $174.0 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $21.0 million, a weighted average
default probability of 6.64% (implying a WARF of 632), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate publicly. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed
by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation
of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies
on the latest FDIC financial data.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C12: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Class O Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust's series 2004-C12, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction. S&P also affirmed its ratings on two
other classes from the same transaction.

S&P said, "Our rating actions follow our analysis of the
transaction, primarily using our criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans in the pool,
the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

"We raised our ratings on six classes to reflect our expectation of
the available credit enhancement for these classes, which we
believe is greater than our most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.

"The affirmations reflect our expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within our estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings.

"While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on the six upgraded classes and positive rating
movement on the two affirmed classes, our analysis also considered
the trust's exposure to two previously modified loans, Eastdale
Mall ($24.9 million, 52.6%) and Callabridge Commons ($2.8 million,
5.9%), that were recently returned to the master servicer, as well
as the fact that all of the no n defeased loans are secured by
retail collateral."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the June 16, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $47.3 million, which is 4.4% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 12 loans. Three loans
($6.0 million, 12.8%) are defeased, and four loans ($29.9 million,
63.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist. The master servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial information for all of
the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 12.6% was partial-year
2017 data, 85.5% was year-end 2016 data, and the remainder was
partial-year 2015 data.

S&P said, "We calculated a 1.30x S&P Global Ratings weighted
average debt service coverage (DSC) and 63.1% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.97% S&P Global
Ratings weighted average capitalization rate."

The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate calculations exclude the
defeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $13.9 million in principal
losses, or 1.3% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-C12

                                     Rating                        
        
  Class          Identifier         To                 From        
     
  G              929766SM6          AA (sf)            BBB (sf)    
     
  H              929766SN4          A (sf)             BB+ (sf)    
     
  J              929766SP9          BBB (sf)           BB (sf)     
     
  K              929766SQ7          BBB- (sf)          BB- (sf)    
     
  L              929766SR5          BB+ (sf)           B+ (sf)     
     
  M              929766SS3          BB- (sf)           B (sf)      
     
  N              929766ST1          B- (sf)            B- (sf)     
     
  O              929766SU8          CCC+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)


WEST TOWN 2017-KNOX: S&P Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to West Town
Mall Trust 2017-KNOX's $150.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2017-KNOX.

The issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by a $150.0 million portion of a $210.0 million commercial
mortgage loan encumbering the borrower's fee-simple and leasehold
interest in West Town Mall, an approximately 1.34 million-sq.-ft.
(772,503 sq. ft. serve as the collateral) super-regional mall in
Knoxville, Tenn.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 11,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  West Town Mall Trust 2017-KNOX  

  Class          Rating                 Amount ($)
  A              AAA (sf)               60,705,000
  X(i)           AA- (sf)               86,165,000(i)
  B              AA- (sf)               25,460,000
  C              A- (sf)                19,095,000
  D              BBB- (sf)              23,465,000
  E              BB (sf)                13,775,000
  RR(ii)         BB (sf)                 7,500,000

(i)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X
certificates will be equal to the balance of the class A and B
certificates.
(ii)The initial certificate balance of the class RR certificates is
subject to change based on the final pricing of all certificates
and the final determination of the eligible vertical residual
interest that is expected to be held by JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.,
to satisfy its U.S. risk retention requirements with respect to
this securitization transaction.


[*] Moody's Hikes $18.6MM of 2nd Lien RMBS Issued 2003-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
from five transactions backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-J

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, 2007-G

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFB

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2003-6

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The tranches
upgraded are primarily due to the build-up in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in June 2017 from 4.9% in June
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $354MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 1998-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 17 tranches,
from 8 transactions issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W10

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CIT Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. AV, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-7

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2b, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2e, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2f, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-1

Cl. BV-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-3

X-IO, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-3C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-3D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1

Cl. A-6F, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Developing on Dec 02, 2016)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The upgrades on Ellington Loan Acquisition
Trust 2007-2 Cl. A-1, Cl. A-2b, Cl. A-2c, Cl. A-2d, Cl. A-2e, and
Cl. A-2f also reflect the reimbursement of past interest
shortfalls. Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-3 Class X-IO is an
Interest Only (IO) tranche that references multiple mortgage pools.
The upgrade is primarily due to the recent performance of the
underlying pools. The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Saxon Asset Securities
Trust 2001-3 Cl. X-IO was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.3% in May 2017 from 4.7% in May
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $228.9MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2007
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 24 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of one tranche from six transactions,
backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-13

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR4

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-OH2

Cl. A-1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-1-B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-8, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-15, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-P, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-P, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6AR

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012 Confirmed
at C (sf)

Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and / or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are due
to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and / or the
erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. Please see the
Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4 Cl. 3-A-X was Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities published in June 2017.
Please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a
copy of this methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in June 2017 from 4.9% in June
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $39.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches and downgraded the rating of one tranche from six
transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2

Cl. III-A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-SD1

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. II-M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD1

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2004-SD2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-SEA1

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The tranches
upgraded are primarily due to total credit enhancement available to
the bonds. The upgrade on Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities
Trust 2003-SD2 also reflects the lower projected losses on the
related underlying pool. The downgrade on Class A of Bear Stearns
Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD1 is primarily due to the
decrease in credit enhancement available to the bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in June 2017 from 4.9% in June
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 62 Classes From Nine US RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 62 classes from nine
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 2004 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed
by mixed collateral. The review yielded seven upgrades, 20
downgrades, 32 affirmations, and three withdrawals.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

            http://bit.ly/2ur5rPs


[*] S&P Discontinues Rating on 46 Classes From 16 CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 40 classes from 10
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions,
five classes from five CF collateral debt obligations (CDO) backed
by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and one class from
one CF CDO Other.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

- ARES XXV CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in May 2017.

- BlueMountain CLO III Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid  

   down, other rated tranche still outstanding.

- Bridgeport CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down,

   other rated tranches still outstanding.

- Canaras Summit CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
   down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

- Cent CLO 23 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in June 2017.

- CLO Repackaging 2014-3 Ltd. (CF CDO Other): rated tranche paid  

   down.

- Doral CLO III Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down,
   other rated tranches still outstanding.

- Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
   June 2017.

- G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranche paid
   down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

- JMP Credit Advisors CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption  
   in June 2017.

- LCM XV L.P. (CF CLO): optional redemption in May 2017.

- Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most
   tranche paid down, other rated tranche still outstanding.

- Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most
   tranche paid down.

- Newcastle CDO V Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranche paid

   down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

- N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranche
   paid down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

- OCP CLO 2013-3 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in June 2017.

  ARES XXV CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  AA (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  A (sf)
  D-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)
  E-R                 NR                  BB (sf)

  BlueMountain CLO III Ltd.
                             Rating
  Class               To                  From
  B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
  D                   NR                  A+ (sf)

  Bridgeport CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

  Canaras Summit CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

  Cent CLO 23 Ltd.
                             Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2a                NR                  AA (sf)
  A-2b                NR                  AA (sf)
  B                   NR                  A (sf)
  C                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  D                   NR                  BB (sf)
  E                   NR                  B (sf)

  CLO Repackaging 2014-3 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

  Doral CLO III Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

  Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-2R                NR                  AAA (sf)
  B-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  C-R                 NR                  AA (sf)
  D-R                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)

  G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  B                   NR                  BBB- (sf)

  JMP Credit Advisors CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
  C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
  E                   NR                  BB (sf)
  F                   NR                  B (sf)

  LCM XV L.P.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
  B                   NR                  AA (sf)
  C                   NR                  A (sf)
  D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
  E-1                 NR                  BB- (sf)
  E-2                 NR                  BB- (sf)

  Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  Q                   NR                  CC (sf)

  Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  B                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

  Newcastle CDO V Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  II-FL Def           NR                  CCC- (sf)

  N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  C                   NR                  B- (sf)

  OCP CLO 2013-3 Ltd.
                              Rating
  Class               To                  From
  A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
  A-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
  B                   NR                  A+ (sf)
  C                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
  D                   NR                  BB (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 123 Classes From 18 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 123 ratings from 18 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
Alternative-A, negative amortizing, home equity line of credit,
prime jumbo, small balance commercial, and subprime collateral. The
review yielded 20 upgrades, 25 downgrades, 77 affirmations, and one
withdrawal.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Expected duration of the bond;
-- Change in the constant prepayment rate;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Interest-only criteria;
-- Principal-only (PO) criteria;
-- Loan modification criteria; and
-- Erosion or increases in credit support.

DOWNGRADES

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on four classes from Alternative
Loan Trust 2003-J3 due to increased delinquencies, erosion of
credit support, and application of our PO criteria (see
"Methodology For Surveilling U.S. RMBS Principal-Only Strip
Securities For Pre-2009 Originations," published Oct. 11, 2016).

"We lowered our ratings on classes 1-A-2 and 1-A-3 from Alternative
Loan Trust 2003-J3 because of an increase in projected losses due
to an increase in delinquencies for the related pool. The
downgrades reflect our belief that our projected credit support for
these classes will be insufficient to cover our projected losses
for this transaction at a higher rating. Total delinquencies for
the pool's group one increased to 19.47% at May 2017 from 10.52% at
December 2016.

"We lowered our rating on class 2-A-1 from Alternative Loan Trust
2003-J3 because of eroded credit support as principal payments were
made to more subordinate classes and the class' inability to
withstand projected losses at the prior rating level.

"Accordingly, we lowered our rating on class PO (a PO class) from
the same transaction based on the application of our PO criteria."

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

     http://bit.ly/2uRelU6


                            *********

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for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
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