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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 21, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 140

                            Headlines

245 PARK 2017-245P: Fitch to Rate Class HHR Certificates 'BBsf'
ACAS CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 17 Note Classes
ANTHRACITE LTD 2005-HY2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Tranches
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-5: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class F Certs
BLUEMOUNTAIN FUJI I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Debt

BRENTWOOD CLO: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to Ba3(sf)
CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
CD 2017-CD4: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Certs
CITIGROUP 2006-C4: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Certs
CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Fitch Affirms CCCsf Rating on Cl. A-JFX Certs

CLNS TRUST 2017-IKPR: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Debt
COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class J Certs
DT AUTO OWNER 2017-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
FANNIE MAE CAS 2015: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to Class 2M-2 Notes
GOLDMAN SACHS 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS6: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-sf'
GUGGENHEIM PDFNI 2: Fitch Rates $8MM Class D Notes 'B'
HIGHLAND PARK I: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 4 Tranches
INGRESS CBO I: Moody's Withdraws C(sf) Rating on Class C Notes

JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC14: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Certs to BB
JP MORGAN 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class C Debt
JP MORGAN 2017-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C6: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Tranches to D

LEAF RECEIVABLES 2017-1: Moody's Rates Class E-2 Notes '(P)Ba3'
LONG POINT III: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on $300MM Class A Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating on Class F Certs
NEUBERGER BERMAN 24: Moody's Gives Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes

OAKTREE CLO 2014-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class DR Notes
PACIFIC BAY: Fitch Withdraws 'Dsf' Preference Shares Rating
PALMER SQUARE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES : Moody's Hikes Cl. N Debt Rating to B1
RFSC TRUST 2001-RM2: Moody's Cuts Class M-I-1 Debt Rating to B2

SOLOSO CDO 2007-1: Moody's Ups Rating on Class A-2L Notes to Caa1
THAYER PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D Notes
TIAA SEASONED 2007-C4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to D
TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ba2
TROPIC CDO IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class A-3L Notes From Ba1

TROPIC CDO V: Moody's Ups Rating on Class A-2L Notes to Caa1(sf)
VANGUARD NATURAL: Posts $8.908 Million Net Loss for Q1 2017
VIBRANT CLO VI: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C20: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B2
WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. F Notes

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Debt
WOODMONT TRUST 2017-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
ZIGGURAT CLO: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. F-R Sec. Notes
[*] Moody's Hikes $108MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $128.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006

[*] S&P Completes Review on 23 Classes From 13 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Puts 117 Ratings From 7 Deals on CreditWatch Negative

                            *********

245 PARK 2017-245P: Fitch to Rate Class HHR Certificates 'BBsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on 245 Park Avenue Trust
2017-245P Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $260,000,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $260,000,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,000,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,000,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,000,000 class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,000,000b class HHR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5.0% of the fair market value of the non-residual classes in the
aggregate (as of the closing date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 11, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial interests in the mortgage
loan securing the fee interest in a 1,723,093 square foot (sf),
44-story office tower located at 245 Park Avenue 46th and 47th
streets in New York, NY. Proceeds of the loan were used to acquire
the property and pay closing costs. The certificates will follow a
sequential-pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Office Collateral in a Prime Manhattan Location: The
245 Park Avenue property is a 44-story Class A office building
located on an entire block bound by Park Avenue, Lexington Avenue
and 47th and 48th streets in the Grand Central office submarket of
Midtown Manhattan. Fitch assigned a property quality grade of
'A-'.

Historical Occupancy and High-Quality Tenancy: The property was
91.2% occupied as of Feb. 28, 2017 and has recorded average
occupancy of 95.1% since 2007. The property serves as a
headquarters for Societe Generale, Major League Baseball, Angelo
Gordon, and RaboBank. Tenants with investment-grade credit ratings
account for 65.1% of the properties base rental revenue.
Acquisition by Institutional Sponsorship: The loan is funding the
acquisition of the subject property for $2.21 billion by HNA Group
(HNA). HNA, based in China, is a global Fortune 500 company with
interests across a diverse array of sectors.

Rollover Risk and Departure of Major League Baseball (MLB): MLB is
the second largest tenant at the property, occupying 12.6% of net
rentable area (NRA). MLB expires in October 2022 but has announced
their intention to relocate in 2019. In total, 29.3% of NRA expires
in 2022 with an additional 21.8% of NRA expiring in 2026, one year
prior to loan maturity.

Fitch Leverage: The $500.0 million mortgage loan has a Fitch debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) of 1.08x and
81.1%, respectively and debt of $696 psf based on the current NRA.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch performed a break-even analysis to determine the amount of
value deterioration the pool could withstand prior to $1 of loss on
the total debt and 'AAAsf' rated class. The break-even value
declines were performed using both the appraisal values at issuance
and the Fitch-stressed value.

Based on the as-is appraisal value of $2.21 billion, break-even
values represent declines of 45.7% and 66.5% for the total debt and
'AAAsf' class, respectively.

Similarly, Fitch estimated total debt and 'AAAsf' break-even value
declines using the Fitch-adjusted property value of $1.5 billion,
which is a function of the Fitch net cash flow (NCF) and a stressed
capitalization rate, in relation to the appropriate class balances.
The break-even value declines relative to the total debt and
'AAAsf' balances are 18.9% and 50.0%, respectively, which
correspond to equivalent declines to Fitch NCF, as the Fitch
capitalization rate is held constant.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A and
found that a 10% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 31% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade.


ACAS CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 17 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd. is a static cash transaction solely backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(100.0% of the pool balance). As of the March 31, 2017 trustee
report, the collateral par amount is $25.1 million, representing a
$1.1 billion decrease since securitization primarily due to
realized losses to the collateral pool. The Moody's rated notes are
currently severely under-collateralized as evidenced by a ratio of
2.5/100 for assets/notes, including defaulted and deferred
interests to all the rated notes.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collaterals it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10000, the
same as that at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collaterals and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collaterals follow: Ca/C and 100.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 0.5 years, compared to 1.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral and look-through CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, the same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
However, in light of the performance indicators noted above,
Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced are
sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ANTHRACITE LTD 2005-HY2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. Commercial
Mortgage-Related Securities, Series 2005-HY2:

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
While the credit quality of the asset pool has improved since last
review, as evidenced by WARF, it did not result in the upgrade of
any Moody's rated notes. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Anthracite 2005-HY2 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance). As of the April 26, 2017 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $358.0 million from $478.1 million at
issuance, with principal pay-down directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes. The pay-down was the result of a
combination of regular amortization and resolution or sales of
defaulted collateral. Currently, the transaction has implied
under-collateralization of $336.5 million, compared to $325.7
million at last review, primarily due to implied losses on the
collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7748,
compared to 8080 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collaterals and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collaterals follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 22.5% compared to 19.2% at
last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 77.5% compared to 80.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.1 years, compared to 1.2 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral and look-through CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Holding all other key parameters static, Increasing the recovery
rate of 100% of the collateral pool by +10.0% would result in an
average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero notches
upward (e.g., one notch upward implies a ratings movement of Baa3
to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-5: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the ratings on
three classes in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5:

Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class D was upgraded primarily due to an increase in
credit support since Moody's last review, resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The pool has paid down 10% since Moody's
last review.

The ratings on Classes E and F were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The rating of Class J was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The ratings on Classes G and H were downgraded due to higher
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class XC) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 34.8% of the
current balance, compared to 8.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of BACM 2005-5.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 8% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 68% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $113.4
million from $1.96 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six remaining mortgage loans. One loan,
constituting 0.4% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $70.3 million (for an
average loss severity of 21%). One loan, the Orchard Plaza loan
($9.0 million -- 7.9% of the pool), is currently in special
servicing. The loan is secured by a 186,000 SF anchored retail
center located Byron Center, Michigan, approximately 15 miles south
of Grand Rapids. The loan was transferred to the special servicer
in September 2015 due to maturity default after the Borrower's
inability to pay off the loan by its original maturity date. The
special servicer completed a deed-in-lieu in October 2016. The
property's largest anchors Family Faire and Kmart vacated in 2011
and 2016, respectively. Although Kmart has closed this location,
they continue to meet their obligations under their lease, which
expires in October 2019. The property was 69% leased as of February
2017, however, excluding the dark Kmart space, the property was
less than 10% occupied.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two loans,
constituting 68% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss
of $39 million from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

The top three performing loans represent 88.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Fireman's Fund Loan ($70.0 million -- 61.8%
of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a $133.5
million first-mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
three-building, 710,000 SF, Class A, corporate office campus
located in Novato, California. The property is 100% leased to
Fireman's Fund through November 2018. Fireman's Fund had previously
announced that it will be vacating the property after moving much
of their operations to Petaluma, California. The loan had an
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in October 2015 and the loan has
entered its hyper-amortization period. The loan has amortized
approximately 30% since securitization. The tenant's lease
obligations continue through November 2018, however, due to future
occupancy concerns Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the AmeriCredit Operations Center Loan
($23.4 million -- 20.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 246,000
SF Class A office building located in Arlington, Texas. The
property is 100% leased to GE Financial through August 2022.
Moody's analysis incorporated a Lit/Dark approach to account for
the single-tenant exposure. The loan has a maturity date in
September 2017 and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.28X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the SunTrust Tower Loan ($7.1 million --
6.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 94,000 SF, nine-story,
Class B, office building located in the central business district
(CBD) of Pensacola, Florida. The loan was previously transferred to
the special servicer in July 2015 due to imminent maturity default
after SunTrust (43% of the net rentable area) indicating they
planned to vacate the property at their lease expiration in March
2016. After SunTrust vacated the property, the loan was
subsequently modified and returned to the master servicer in
October 2016 with an extended maturity date through August 2019.
The property was 59% occupied as of December 2016. The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy and Moody's
has identified this as a troubled loan.


BLUEMOUNTAIN FUJI I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BlueMountain
Fuji U.S. CLO I Ltd./BlueMountain Fuji U.S. CLO I LLC's $435
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 12,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain Fuji U.S. CLO I Ltd./BlueMountain Fuji U.S. CLO I LLC


Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)               310.00
A-2                     NR                      25.00
B                       AA (sf)                 39.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                  36.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                27.00
E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)                23.00
Subordinate notes       NR                      47.30

NR--Not rated.


BRENTWOOD CLO: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to Ba3(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Brentwood CLO, Ltd.:

US$68,600,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on May 7, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

In addition, Moody's also downgraded the rating on the following
notes:

US$21,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of
$15,985,977.79), Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Finally, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$51,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of $21,597,229.29),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 7, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$23,800,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously
on May 7, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating action and affirmations are primarily a result
of deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February
2017. The Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes have been paid down in
full, by $43.3 million, and the Class A-2 notes have been paid down
by approximately 58.1% or $29.9 million since that time. Based on
Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B and
Class C notes are currently 666.65%, 159.62% and 126.30%,
respectively, versus February 2017 levels of 244.12%, 141.65% and
123.64%, respectively.

The rating downgrade on the Class D Notes is primarily a result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio and a decline
in the the OC ratio for the Class D notes since February 2017.
Based on Moody's calculation, the portfolio's weighted average
rating factor (WARF) is currently 3815 compared to 3156 in February
2017, the exposure to collateral securities rated (or assumed by
Moody's to be rated) Caa1 or lower is currently 31.9% compared to
22.7% in February 2017 and the OC ratio for the Class D notes is
currently 110.77% versus February 2017 level of 113.36%.
Additionally, Moody's notes the transaction contains some thinly
traded or untraded loans, whose lack of liquidity may pose
additional risks relating to the issuer's ultimate ability or
inclination to pursue a liquidation of such assets, especially if
the sales can be transacted only at heavily discounted price
levels.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements extending
maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable exposure to
long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. Moody's normally updates such estimates
at least once annually, but if such updates do not occur, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3052)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4578)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $137.0 million, defaulted par of
$31.1 million, a weighted average default probability of 24.35%
(implying a WARF of 3815), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 46.60%, a diversity score of 16 and a weighted average
spread of 3.21% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months or assets that do not have ratings, which represent
approximately 14.0% of the collateral pool.


CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Cantor Commercial Real
Estate Mortgage Trust (CFCRE) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-C4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations are based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral. There have been no
material changes to the pool since issuance, and therefore the
original rating analysis was considered in affirming the
transaction.

As of the April 12, 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
balance has been reduced by 0.7% to $834 million, from $840 million
at issuance. All loans are current and there have been no specially
serviced loans. One loan (0.3%) is on the servicer's watchlist due
to deferred maintenances issues, which is not expected to impact
property operations.

Pool Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 11.6% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is better than
the 2016 average of 10.4% for fixed-rate transactions and slightly
worse than the 2015 average of 11.7%. Nine loans (30.2% of the
pool) are full-term interest-only, and 12 loans (28.7%) are partial
interest-only. Fitch-rated transactions in 2016 have an average
full-term interest-only percentage of 33.3% and a partial
interest-only percentage of 33.0%.

Less Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
compose 47.9% of the pool by balance. Compared to other Fitch-rated
U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this transaction is
lower than the full-year 2016 and 2015 average concentrations of
54.8% and 49.3%, respectively.

High Fitch Leverage: The pool has higher leverage statistics than
other 2016/2015 Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.
The pool's Fitch DSCR at issuance of 1.12x is below the full year
2016 average of 1.21x and 2015 average of 1.18x. The pool's Fitch
LTV at issuance of 109.3% is above the 2016 average of 105.2% and
in line with the 2015 average of 109.3%.

Property Quality: Of the properties inspected by Fitch, 56.4%
received property quality
grades of 'B+' or better, including four of the top 10 loans (Hyatt
Regency St. Louis at The Arch, 215 West 34th Street & 218 West 35th
Street, Renaissance Cincinnati and Madbury
Commons).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $27,174,360 class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,787,000 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,464,000 class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $230,220,000 class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,651,548 class A-HR at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $591,642,360(b) class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,651,548(b) class X-HR at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,799,000(b) class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62,997,000 class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,799,000 class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,799,000 class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,999,000(a)(b) class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,450,000(a)(b) class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,148,000(a) class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,999,000(a) class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,450,000a class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or class X-G certificates. Fitch
had previously withdrawn the ratings on the interest-only classes
X-C and X-D.


CD 2017-CD4: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to CD 2017-CD4 Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-CD4:

-- $28,964,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,250,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,102,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $192,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $234,483,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $669,372,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,573,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,355,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,564,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,919,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,910,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,386,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,554,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,910,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,386,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,554,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Since Fitch issued its expected ratings on April 24, 2017, the V-A,
V-BC, V-D, and V-E classes have been introduced to the transaction
structure as exchangeable certificates.

-- $11,437,995ce class V-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,297,277,000ce class V-BC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $767,406ce class V-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The classes above represent the final ratings and transaction
structure.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $35,286,789a class G;
-- $35,286,789ab class X-G;
-- $1,114,572ce class V-E;
-- $45,022,523de VRR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A, Regulation D or
Regulation S.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Exchangeable classes that are a component of VRR Interest and
represent approximately 1.6% of the total transaction size in
aggregate.
(d) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing
approximately 5.0% of the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(e) Non-offered certificates that will be retained by certain
retaining parties specified in the deal documents.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 47 loans secured by 53
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$900,450,312 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by German American Capital Corporation, Citi Real Estate
Funding Inc., and Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 79.5% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage Lower than Recent Averages: The pool has lower
leverage than recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value
(LTV) for the trust are 1.22x and 102.4%, respectively, compared
with the year-to-date (YTD) 2017 average DSCR of 1.22x and LTV of
104.7% and the 2016 average DSCR of 1.21x and LTV of 105.2%.

Limited Amortization: Ten loans representing 28.4% of the pool are
full-term interest-only and 18 loans representing 44.5% of the pool
are partial interest-only. The pool is scheduled to amortize by
9.9% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity.

Single-Tenant Concentration: Four loans among the largest 20 are
single-tenant properties (14.1% of the pool). Moffett Place Google
(8.3%), Malibu Vista (2.0%), Alvogen Pharma US (1.9%) and SG360
(1.8%) are single-tenant properties. Fitch conducted a dark-value
analysis to test the probability for recovery in the event that the
tenant in each case vacated the entire property during the loan
term. Fitch made certain assumptions for occupancy, downtime
between leases, carrying costs and re-tenanting costs and compared
the resulting dark values to the outstanding loan balance. Fitch
was comfortable the dark value covers the implied high
investment-grade proceeds for the single-tenant properties
sampled.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15% below the
most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties for
which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CD
2017-CD4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.



CITIGROUP 2006-C4: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust (CGCMT) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2006-C4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the pool
since last rating action. As of the April 2017 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 94.8% to
$116 million from $2.26 billion at issuance.

Highly Concentrated Pool: Only 15 of the original 170 assets remain
in the pool. The largest five assets account for 65.3% of the
pool.

High Percentage of Specially Serviced Assets: Seven loans totaling
64.3% of the pool are in special servicing. This includes several
retail and office properties that have high or full vacancy.

Tertiary Market Mall Exposure: The largest loan in the pool (25.8%)
is the DuBois Mall, which is in special servicing due to its
inability to secure takeout financing at maturity. The loan was
unable to be refinanced as the property reflects a lower value than
the debt it secures. The largest two tenants at the property are
JCPenney and Sears, which have both been closing stores.
Additionally, the borrower is comprised of a 35-member
Tenant-In-Common structure, which will likely complicate workout
negotiations. Foreclosure is a likely resolution strategy.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlook for class B remains Stable due to generally stable
performance of the pool since last rating action. While unlikely,
upgrades are possible given further payoff, defeasance, or lower
than anticipated losses on the specially serviced loans. Downgrades
are possible in the event of further asset level deterioration,
particularly related to the DuBois Mall loan.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns or revises REs as
indicated:

-- $31.1 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 30%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $30.1 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.5 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $22.6 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.7 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-1A, A-M and A-SB have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate class P. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Fitch Affirms CCCsf Rating on Cl. A-JFX Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three distressed classes and affirmed
the remaining classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-C6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Upcoming Maturities: Ninety non-defeased, non-specially serviced
loans, representing 60.8% of the current pool balance, are
scheduled to mature in the next four months. The weighted-average
debt-service-coverage-ratio (DSCR) of these loans is 1.23x and the
weighted-average debt yield is 8.8%. Based on the average credit
metrics, Fitch expects some loans will default at maturity and
transfer to special servicing.

Lack of REO Resolutions: At the last rating action, there were 27
real-estate-owned (REO) assets (of 34 total in special servicing at
that time). Since then, 13 loans have been disposed via
liquidation; however, 14 new loans have transferred to special
servicing and three assets are newly REO, bringing the total REO
count to 21. The average aging for REO assets is 37 months.

Defeasance: There are now 18 fully defeased loans (6.7% of the
pool), up from 15 at the last rating action.

Realized Losses: The pool has already realized $233 million in
trust loss to date, completely eroding the balance of Fitch-rated
classes K through Q and diminishing the original balance of class J
65.3%. Based on the volume of assets currently in special
servicing, Fitch expects there could be significant additional
losses to the remaining bonds in the future.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4, A-4FL and A-1A remain Stable based
on sufficient credit enhancement and defeasance collateral, as well
as the expectation that these classes will receive a significant
amount of principal in the coming months as loans mature. The
Rating Outlook on classes A-M and A-MFX remains Negative,
indicating the uncertainty surrounding the wave of maturities
scheduled to occur in the next four months. If a significant enough
number of loans do not payoff at maturity and transfer to special
servicing, it is possible that these classes could be downgraded
based on increased loss projections. If the large wave of upcoming
maturities result in no defaults, these classes could potentially
be upgraded, but Fitch views this as unlikely. Downgrades to the
distressed classes are expected as they experience realized
losses.

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

-- $23.8 million class B to 'Csf'; RE 0% from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $71.3 million class C to 'Csf'; RE 0% from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $35.7 million class D to 'Csf'; RE 0% from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has also affirmed the following ratings:

-- $573.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72.9 million class A-FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $162.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $425.6 million class A-M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $50 million class A-MFX at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $248.3 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $150 million class A-JFX at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $29.7 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $35.7 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $47.6 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $53.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $22.7 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class S certificate. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3,
A-3B and A-SB are paid in full. The rating on classes X, A-MFL and
A-JFL were previously withdrawn.


CLNS TRUST 2017-IKPR: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CLNS Trust
2017-IKPR's $754 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $754.0 million, with three one-year
extension options, secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 36
extended-stay, nine limited-service, and two full-service hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 16,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CLNS Trust 2017-IKPR

Class        Rating(i)            Amount ($)
A            AAA (sf)            239,210,000
X-CP         BBB- (sf)       326,230,000(ii)
X-EXT        BBB- (sf)       469,490,000(ii)
B            AA- (sf)             84,455,000
C            A- (sf)              62,795,000
D            BBB- (sf)            83,030,000
E            BB- (sf)            130,815,000
F            B- (sf)             115,995,000
RR           NR                   37,700,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii)Notional balance.  The class X-CP certificates' notional amount
will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal distributions
and realized losses allocated to the A-2 portion of the class A
certificates, as well as the B, C, and D certificates.  The class
X-EXT certificates' notional amount will be reduced by the
aggregate amount of principal distributions and realized losses
allocated to the class A, B, C, and D certificates.


COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class J Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of COBALT CMBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust's (COBALT) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect the relatively
stable loss expectations since Fitch's last review. Fitch modeled
losses of 11.6% of the original pool balance, including 4.3% of
losses incurred to date. This is relatively flat from the previous
rating action in December 2016, when loss expectations of the
original pool balance were 11.5%.

Principal Paydown: Since Fitch's last rating action, the pool has
experienced 69% in paydown. Credit enhancement (CE) has increased
significantly as a result.

Pool Concentration and Adverse Selection: The pool is highly
concentrated with only 24 out of the original 152 loans remaining.
Twenty-two loans (95%) have been identified as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOC), including 17 loans (68%) currently in special
servicing. Of the delinquent loans, five assets (16.1%) are real
estate owned (REO) and six loans (27%) are currently in the
foreclosure process. Risks surrounding the performing FLOCs include
modified loans including "Hope" note modifications, fluctuating
property performance, low debt service coverage ratios, and
secondary market locations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-MFX and A-M have been revised to
Stable from Negative due to the significant increase in the class
credit enhancement as a result of principal repayment to the senior
bonds since Fitch's prior rating action. The Outlook on classes
A-JFX and A-JFL remain Stable due to relatively high CE; however,
further upgrades are not recommended at this time given the
remaining pool concentration and adverse selection concerns.
Downgrades could occur on these classes if losses on the specially
serviced loans/assets exceed Fitch's expectations, if pool
performance deteriorates, or if additional loans default at
maturity. Distressed classes (those rated below 'Bsf') may be
subject to further rating actions as losses are realized.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $8.7 million class A-MFX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $784,874 class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $102.6 million class A-JFX at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-JFL at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.2 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 10%;
-- $27.2 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.
-- $21.2 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.1 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $18.1 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.2 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $19 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-AB, A-3 and A1A certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class S certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


DT AUTO OWNER 2017-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to DT Auto Owner Trust
2017-2's $442.41 million asset-backed notes series 2017-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 67.0%, 61.4%, 52.5%,
      43.6%, and 37.7% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit
      support levels provide approximately 2.20x, 2.00x, 1.65x,
      1.35x, and 1.20x coverage of S&P's expected net loss range
      of 29.50%-30.50% for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.  Credit enhancement also covers cumulative
      gross losses of approximately 95.7%, 87.7%, 75.0%, 62.3%,
      and 53.8%, respectively, assuming a 30% recovery rate.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments by the legal
      final maturity dates made under stressed cash flow modeling
      scenarios that S&P deems appropriate for the assigned
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      not likely be lowered while outstanding, and the class D
      notes would likely remain within one category of S&P's
      'BBB (sf)' rating, all else being equal.  The rating on the
      class E notes would remain within two rating categories of
      S&P's 'BB (sf)' rating during the first year, though class E

      would ultimately default in the moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario with approximately 67% principal repayment.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized, including a high percentage (over 85%) of
      obligors with higher payment frequencies (more than once a
      month), which S&P expects will result in a somewhat faster
      paydown on the pool.

   -- The transaction's sequential-pay structure, which builds
      credit enhancement (on a percentage-of-receivables basis) as

      the pool amortizes.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

DT Auto Owner Trust 2017-2
Class       Rating          Type            Interest       Amount
                                            rate (%)     (mil. $)
A           AAA (sf)        Senior              1.72       193.00
B           AA (sf)         Subordinate         2.44        57.51
C           A (sf)          Subordinate         3.03        69.50
D           BBB (sf)        Subordinate         3.89        67.09
E           BB (sf)         Subordinate         6.03        55.31


FANNIE MAE CAS 2015: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to Class 2M-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
six previously unrated notes from three Fannie Mae Connecticut
Avenue Securities (CAS) transactions issued in 2015:

-- Series 2015-C02 class 1M-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-C02 class 2M-2 notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-C03 class 1M-2 notes 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-C03 class 2M-2 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-C04 class 1M-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-C04 class 2M-2 notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch had previously only rated the M-1 classes, which are senior
to the M-2 classes, in the three transactions. All of the M-1
classes have seen positive rating pressure, reflecting strong
performance to date.

In August 2016, Fitch assigned ratings to eight previously unrated
M-2 classes in transactions issued prior to CAS 2015-C02. The six
classes assigned ratings were the final remaining unrated M-2
classes in CAS transactions. Subsequent to the CAS 2015-C04
transaction, the M-2 classes were assigned ratings at issuance.

Fitch's reference mortgage pool loss assumptions for Fannie Mae CAS
transactions were recently published as part of a periodic review
of all Fitch rated GSE Credit Risk Transfer transactions. The
report detailing Fitch's loss expectations can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'GSE CRT
Loss Projections' or by clicking the link below. The published
report reflects loss expectations as of the December 2016
remittance period and may have minor differences from the April
2017 remittance period expected losses used in this rating
analysis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong performance to date (Positive): All of the reference
mortgage pools have performed well since issuance. Serious
delinquency remains low and none of the transactions have incurred
more than 5 bps of loss to date.

Build-up of Credit Enhancement (Positive): Since issuance, the M-2
classes have had a steady increase in their credit enhancement
percentage as the reference pool has paid down with minimal loan
losses.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Based on
its review of Fannie Mae's acquisition platform, Fitch believes
that Fannie Mae has a well-established and disciplined
credit-granting process in place and views its lender approval and
oversight processes for minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring
sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan quality control
(QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a tight control
environment as is most evidenced by the very few findings noted by
the third-party due diligence results. Tight controls reduce
operational risk and improve overall loan quality. The lower risk
was accounted for by Fitch by applying a lower default estimate for
the reference pool of 5%.

Legal Maturity Credit (Positive): The new ratings are assigned to
transactions with a legal final maturity of 10 years for series
2015-C02 and 2015-C03, and 12.5 years for series 2015-C04. The hard
maturity limits the timeframe in which losses can be realized. As
the transactions season, and as the legal maturity nears, Fitch
adjusts its loss expectations to account for the reduced loss
exposure window.

Home Price Appreciation (Positive): Property values in the
reference pools have benefitted from home price appreciation since
issuance. Since origination, the reference pools have experienced
an average gain in property values of nearly 17%.

Counterparty Dependence on Fannie Mae (Neutral): The notes are
general unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae and are subject to the
performance of the reference pool. Fannie Mae will be responsible
for making monthly payments of interest and principal to investors
based on the payment priorities of the transaction. Due to the
counterparty dependence, Fitch's rating is based on the lower of:
1) the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement available through subordination, and 2) Fannie Mae's
Issuer Default Rating (IDR). Fannie Mae's IDR is currently
'AAA'/Stable Outlook, reflecting a direct link to the U.S.
sovereign rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Third party due diligence was reviewed as part of Fitch's rating of
the M-1 classes at deal issuance. The due diligence focused on
credit and compliance reviews, desktop valuation reviews and data
integrity. Fitch received certifications indicating that the
loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with Fitch's
published standards. The certifications also stated that the
company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.
No additional due diligence was considered in rating of the M-2
classes.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Goldman Sachs
Commercial Mortgage Capital, L.P. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2010-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the generally stable performance of
the underlying collateral pool since issuance. There are no
delinquent or specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled losses of
4.8% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 3.1%. The pool has experienced no realized losses to
date.

Fitch has designated one loan (4.9%) as a Fitch Loan of Concern.
The Payless & Brown Industrial Portfolio is composed of two
single-tenant industrial properties totaling 1,153,374 square feet.
The Brown Shoe distribution facility is located in Lebec, CA,
(approximately 40 miles south of Bakersfield) and the Payless
distribution center is located in Brookville, OH (roughly 22 miles
west of Dayton). Payless ShoeSource, with 4,400 stores in more than
30 countries, filed for Chapter 11 protection in April 2017 and
plans to immediately close 400 underperforming stores in the U.S.
and Puerto Rico.

As of the April 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 35.5% to $565.1 million from
$876.5 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(8.7% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class G.

Stable Performance: All loans in the pool continue to exhibit
property-level performance in line with issuance expectations.

Concentrated Pool: The transaction is concentrated with only 27
loans remaining, all of which mature in the fourth quarter of 2020.
The largest 10 loans account for 69% of the pool, and the largest
15 account for 85%.

Single Tenant Exposure: Ten loans totaling 42.5% of the pool are
secured by single-tenant properties. Of this concentration, five
loans are secured by multiple properties, including Cole Portfolios
I and II, Louisiana Walgreens Portfolio, and ARC Credit Portfolios
I and II, each among the largest 15 loans in the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 though F remain Stable as the
majority of the pool has maintained performance consistent with
issuance. Further upgrades are possible with continued paydown.
Downgrades are considered unlikely, but are possible should there
be any significant performance declines.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $35.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $376.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $411.7 million interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $26.3 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29.6 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates or the interest-only
X-B certificates.


GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three and
affirmed the ratings of five classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2010-C1:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades of the three principal and interest (P&I) classes are
due to an increase in credit support resulting from amortization.
The affirmations of four P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable
ranges. The affirmation of interest-only (IO) Class X is consistent
with the weighted average rating factor or WARF of its referenced
classes. Moody's does not rate Class G.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Class X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II Commercial Mortgages Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2010-C1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity,
other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2017 Payment Date, the transaction's
certificate balance has decreased 24% to $599 million from $788
million at securitization due to the payoff of four loans and
scheduled amortization. The certificates are collateralized by 19
fixed-rate mortgage loans, including three loans that have defeased
representing 17% of the trust balance. The defeased loans are The
Mall at Partridge Creek, Oliveira Plaza and Canyon Point Market
Place. The trust has not experienced losses or interest shortfalls
since securitization.

The largest loan in the pool is collateralized by 660 Madison
Avenue Retail ($86 million -- 14% of the pool balance), a 264,498
square foot retail property 100% leased to Barney's NY. The
property is located on Madison Avenue between East 60th Street and
East 61st Street in the Plaza District submarket of New York City.
The property serves as Barney's flagship store. Barney's lease
expires in January 2019. The loan maturity date is July 6, 2020.
Moody's current loan to value (LTV) ratio is 58%. Moody's current
structured credit assessment for this loan is aa3 (sca.pd).

The Burnsville Center loan ($71 million -- 12% of the pool
balance), the second largest non-defeased loan, is secured by the
523,692 square foot portion of a 1.1 million square foot regional
mall located in Burnsville, Minnesota. Although the mall is not the
dominant mall with the market, the property is the only regional
mall within the market south of the Minnesota River. The
improvements for the anchor stores, Macy's, Sears and JC Penney,
are not part of the loan collateral. Additional anchor stores are
Dick's Sporting Goods and Gormans. The Burnsville Center was 89%
leased and the Burnsville Center -- Mervyn's was 90% leased, as of
November 2016. Moody's current LTV is 63%. Moody's structured
credit assessment for this loan is a2 (sca.pd).

The Cole Portfolio loan ($62 million -- 10% of the pool balance),
the third largest non-defeased loan, is secured by 20 retail
properties and one office property containing a total of 530,826
square feet located throughout 14 states. The largest property,
Sunset Valley Homestead, is a 138,757 square foot multi-tenanted
office building located in Sunset Valley, Texas. The property was
99% leased, as of September 2016. The remaining collateral consists
of 19 single tenant retail properties, and one single tenant office
property occupied by Cargill. Walgreen Co. (Baa2 senior unsecured,
ratings under review for possible downgrade) is the largest single
tenant exposure accounting for 41% of the total leasable area of
the single-tenanted properties. Other single-tenant retail property
tenants include Kohl's, CVS, Advance Auto and Tractor Supply. The
single-tenant properties were all 100% leased, as of September
2016. Moody's LTV is 63%. Moody's current structured credit
assessment for this loan is a1 (sca.pd).


GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS6: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2017-GS6 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates and
expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $15,431,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $250,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $359,651,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,390,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $738,619,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87,653,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,147,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,579,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,074,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,748,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,748,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,530,000bd class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,518,000bd class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following are not expected to be rated:

-- $33,893,308bd class G.
-- $24,170,112c VRR Interest.

a) Notional amount and interest only.
b) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
c) Vertical credit risk retention interest.
d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 12, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 33 loans secured by 73
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$959,131,421 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company and Goldman Sachs Bank
USA.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 77.7% of the properties
by balance, asset summary reviews on 100% of the pool, and cash
flow analysis of 91.2% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch leverage is better than
average when compared with other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. Specifically, the pool's Fitch DSCR of
1.32x is stronger than the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 1.22x and
1.21x, respectively. Similarly, the Fitch LTV for the pool of 98.8%
is better than the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 104.5% and 105.2%,
respectively.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The pool is more concentrated than other
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. Specifically, the
pool has 33 loans as compared with the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages
of 48 and 50 loans, respectively. Moreover, the largest 10 loans
comprise 66.3% of the pool, which is worse than the YTD 2017 and
2016 averages of 53.5% and 54.8%, for other Fitch-rated
multiborrower deals. This results in a loan concentration index
(LCI) score of 535, which is higher than the YTD 2017 and 2016
averages of 395 and 422. The largest loan in the pool is 1999
Avenue of the Stars at 9.96% of the pool.

Low Amortization: Thirteen loans comprising 53.8% of the pool are
full interest-only, which is poorer than the YTD 2017 and 2016
averages of 45.9% and 33.3%, respectively, for other Fitch-rated
multiborrower deals. Additionally, 12 loans representing 28.8% of
the pool are partial interest-only. Overall, the pool is scheduled
to pay down by 5.32%, which is worse than the YTD 2017 and 2016
averages of 8.1% and 10.4%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: One loan, 1999 Avenue of the
Stars (9.96% of the pool), received an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf' on a stand-alone basis. The pool's credit
opinion loan concentration of 9.96% is greater than the 2017 YTD
and the 2016 averages of 5.90% and 8.36%, respectively. Net of the
credit opinion loan, Fitch's DSCR and LTV are 1.31x and 102.4%,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 14.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the GSMS
2017-GS6 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis, and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


GUGGENHEIM PDFNI 2: Fitch Rates $8MM Class D Notes 'B'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to the notes
issued on the Fourth Funding Date by Guggenheim Private Debt Fund
Note Issuer 2.0, LLC (Guggenheim PDFNI 2):

-- $60,000,000 class A, series A-4, 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $25,000,000 class B, series B-4, 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7,500,000 class C, series C-4, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $8,000,000 class D, series D-4, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms all other outstanding notes.

Fitch does not rate the leverage tranche, class E notes, and
limited liability company membership interests.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch assigned ratings to the notes issued on the fourth funding
date, occurring on May 11, 2017. Pursuant to the fourth funding
date, the issuer has drawn an aggregate of $140 million from the
commitments plus $110 million from the leverage tranche (not rated
by Fitch). Of this $250 million, $39.5 million was issued in the
form of first-loss class E notes and LLC membership interests,
neither of which are rated by Fitch.

The first three funding dates occurred on April 12, 2016, July 8,
2016, and Aug. 30, 2016, achieving a total capitalization of $1
billion through the third funding date. This amount consisted of
$512 million of rated notes, $248 million of unrated first-loss
class E notes and LLC interests, and $240 million from the leverage
tranche. All notes from each series are cross-collateralized by the
entire collateral portfolio, which, after the fourth funding, is
expected to consist of approximately $166 million of broadly
syndicated loans, approximately $1.05 billion of private-debt
investments (PDIs) and approximately $76.8 million in cash.

Guggenheim PDFNI 2.0 is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that invests in a portfolio composed of a combination
of broadly syndicated loans and middle-market PDIs. The manager,
Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC (GPIM) may raise up
to $2 billion of commitments from investors to fund the
transaction. Investors earn class-specific commitment fees on the
undrawn portions of their commitments. The commitments are expected
to be fully drawn through a maximum of seven separate funding dates
during the investment period. At each funding date, notes and the
leverage tranche will be issued in proportions that may decrease
the level of credit enhancement (CE) available for each class. The
total capital structure resulting from the fourth funding date
reflects a capital structure proportional to the one originally
anticipated for the sixth funding date from the closing documents.
The expected CE levels and capital structures at close for each
funding date are further described in Fitch's report 'Guggenheim
Private Debt Fund Note Issuer 2.0, LLC' dated Sept. 25, 2015.

Fitch expects to assess the creditworthiness of the notes at each
funding date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Enhancement: (CE) for each class of rated notes, in addition
to excess spread, is sufficient to protect against portfolio
default and recovery rate projections in each class's respective
rating stress scenario. The degree of CE available to each class of
rated notes exceeds the average CE levels typically seen on
like-rated tranches of recent CLO issuances backed by middle-market
loans.

'B-' Asset Quality: The average credit quality of the indicative
portfolio is 'B-'. Fitch's analysis centered on a Fitch-stressed
portfolio with a weighted average rating of 46.4 ('B-/CCC+').
Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote a highly
speculative credit quality while issuers in the 'CCC' rating
category denote substantial credit risk. When analyzing the Fitch
stressed portfolio for the fourth funding date, class A, B, C and D
notes were projected to withstand default rates of up to 79.5%,
70.7%, 65.4% and 62.3%, respectively, at their current rating
stresses.

Moderate Recovery Expectations: In determining the rating of the
notes, Fitch created a stressed portfolio and assumed recovery
prospects consistent with a Fitch Recovery Rating (RR) of 'RR3' in
line with the collateral quality test limit for asset recoveries.
However, Fitch observed that the indicative portfolio had a lower
weighted average recovery rate assumption than the covenanted 'RR3'
level, and therefore, applied additional recovery haircuts to bring
them closer to the observed levels in the indicative portfolio.

FITCH ANALYSIS

Analysis was conducted on a Fitch-stressed portfolio which was
created by Fitch and designed to address the impact of the most
prominent risk-presenting concentration allowances and targeted
test levels to ensure that the transaction's expected performance
is in line with the ratings assigned. The Fitch-stressed portfolio
and notable portfolio concentration limitations are described in
the press release 'Fitch Rates Guggenheim Private Debt Fund Note
Issuer 2.0, LLC' dated April 12, 2016.

The Fitch-stressed portfolio assumed a $1.25 billion portfolio with
the following assumptions:

-- Total of 39 obligors, with maximum concentrations for the nine

    largest obligors;
-- Maximum weighted average life of 7.5 years;
-- 90% floating rate assets earning a weighted average spread
    (WAS) of 6.25% (per WAS covenant);
-- 10% fixed rate assets earning a weighted average coupon (WAC)
    of 8.00% (per WAC covenant);
-- 10% of the assets paying interest semi-annually;
-- 15% deferrable items.

For those concentration limitations and test levels that were out
of compliance in the indicative portfolio, additional stresses were
applied to the Fitch-stressed portfolio to reflect the
non-compliant concentrations and test levels:

-- Maximum concentrations for the five largest industries: Fitch
had classified 22% of the loan assets as computer and electronics
in the indicative portfolio. This exceeds the maximum 20%
limitation for the top industry, per the transaction documents. To
address this excess exposure, the industry concentration for
computer and electronics in the Fitch-stressed portfolio was
increased to 22%.The remaining top four industries were increased
to 20%, 15%, 15%, and 15%, respectively. The sixth industry was
sized at 13%.

-- Maximum 'CCC' obligations: Approximately 29.5% of the indicative
loan portfolio was considered 'CCC' or below, largely due to 21.6%
being unrated. This exceeded the maximum 20% limitation, and as a
result, Fitch assumed a 30% 'CCC' concentration.

-- 'RR3' recoveries (with RR multiplier): The Fitch-stressed
portfolio initially assumed 100% of the assets were assigned a
Fitch RR of 'RR3'. However, the indicative portfolio had a lower
weighted average recovery assumption than was covenanted, and
therefore, Fitch applied a recovery multiplier of 92% to bring the
Fitch-stressed portfolio recoveries closer to the recoveries
reflected in the indicative portfolio. This reduced the base case
recovery assumption of the Fitch-stressed portfolio to 50.7%
(versus a base case recovery assumption of 50.8% in the indicative
portfolio).

Cash flow modelling results show that all notes passed their
respective PCM hurdle rates in all nine stress scenarios when
analyzing the indicative portfolio, with minimum cushions of 10% or
more. The class C and D notes also passed their hurdle rates in all
nine stress scenarios with a minimum cushion of 1.4% and 7.3%,
respectively, when analyzing the Fitch-stressed portfolio. The
class A notes passed the 'A-sf' PCM hurdle rate in seven of the
nine stress scenarios with two marginal failures of 0.5%. The class
B notes passed the 'BBB-sf' PCM hurdle rate in five of the nine
stress scenarios with two failures of 2.30%, one failure of 2.0%
and one marginal failure of 0.70%.

Given the failures of the class A and B notes, Fitch tested the
performance of the notes at the rating level one notch below the
'A-sf' and 'BBB-sf' rating hurdles, respectively. The class A notes
passed the 'BBB+sf' PCM hurdle rate in all nine stress scenarios
with a minimum cushion of 8.6%, and the class B notes passed the
'BB+sf' PCM hurdle rate in all nine scenarios with a minimum
cushion of 8.70%.

Fitch was comfortable assigning the respective 'A-sf', 'BBB-sf',
'BBsf' and 'Bsf' ratings to class A, B, C and D notes, because the
agency believes the notes can sustain a robust level of defaults
combined with low recoveries, in addition to the strong performance
of the notes in the sensitivity scenarios and the degree of
cushions when analyzing the indicative portfolio. The Stable
Outlook on the notes reflects the expectation that the notes have a
sufficient level of credit protection to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the fourth funding date structure's sensitivity to
the potential variability of key model assumptions including
decreases in recovery rates and increases in default rates or
correlation. Fitch also analyzed the impact of a failure to fund
commitments beyond the fourth funding date.

Fitch expects each class of notes to remain within one rating
category of their original ratings even under the most extreme
sensitivity scenarios. Some notes were able to withstand rating
stresses within two rating categories in certain scenarios. Results
under these sensitivity scenarios ranged between 'A+sf' and 'BB+sf'
for the class A notes; 'BBB-sf' and 'B+sf' for the class B; 'BB+sf'
and 'CCCsf' for the class C; and 'BB+sf' and 'CCCsf' for the class
D.

The results of the sensitivity analysis also contributed to Fitch's
assignment of Stable Outlooks for each class of notes.

VARIATIONS FROM CRITERIA

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its CLO rating
criteria, as described in its September 2016 report, 'Global Rating
Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs', with the following
variations.

Fitch assumed 15% of the portfolio was able to defer interest
payments in its cash flow model analysis, in line with the
permissible exposure to deferrable items under the concentration
limitations. According to the indenture, if these items have been
deferring for over a year they will not be given par credit for
certain tests. Fitch assumed these assets deferred their interest
payments for one year to account for the period in which such asset
would be deferring yet still be given par credit. This is a more
conservative assumption and has a minor impact versus the standard
application of criteria, which does not indicate a specific stress
for deferrable assets.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under Related Research below.
The appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to those
Fitch considers typical for the asset class as detailed in the
Special Report titled 'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement
Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions,' dated May
31, 2016.

Details of the transaction's performance are available to
subscribers on Fitch's web site at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

Fitch has also affirmed the following notes:

-- $149,000,000 class A notes, series A-1, 'A-sf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $76,000,000 class A notes, series A-2, 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $65,000,000 Class A notes, series A-3, 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $50,000,000 class B notes, series B-1, 'BBB-sf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $25,000,000 class B notes, series B-2, 'BBB-sf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $25,000,000 Class B notes, series B-3, 'BBB-sf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $45,000,000 class C notes, series C-1, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $21,000,000 class C notes, series C-2, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $16,500,000 class C notes, series C-3, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $21,000,000 class D notes, series D-1, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $10,125,000 class D notes, series D-2, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $8,375,000 class D notes, series D-3, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.


HIGHLAND PARK I: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 4 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Highland Park CDO I:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on six classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The credit quality of the asset pool has deteriorated, as evidenced
by WARF and WARR, however future expected asset performance and
amortization since last review have resulted in the affirmation.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

Highland Park CDO I is a static cash CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of: i) CMBS securities (30.4% of the collateral pool
balance); ii) CRE CDOs (27.8%); iii) whole loans (34.2%); and iv)
b-notes (7.6%). As of the May 18, 2016 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares is $202.6 million compared to $600.0 million at issuance,
with the paydown directed to the senior most outstanding notes.
Please note, the collateral balances reported herein exclude
equities held in the form of common stock.

The pool contains eleven assets totaling $62.4 million (63.6% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as impaired interest
securities as of the trustee's March 31, 2017 report. Four of these
assets (41.0% of the impaired balance) are CRE CDO, four assets are
CMBS (35.7%), two assets are commercial real estate b-notes
collateralized by land (11.2%), and one asset is a commercial real
estate b-note collateralized by land (12.2%). While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate to high losses to occur on the
impaired interest securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. Moody's modeled a WARF of 7393, compared to 6560 at last
review. The current ratings on the Moody's-rated collateral and the
assessments of the non-Moody's rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and
16.7% compared to 0.0% at last review, Baa1-Baa3 and 0.6% compared
to 0.0% at last review, Ba1-Ba3 and 0.0% compared to 11.3% at last
review, B1-B3 and 11.1% compared to 26.5% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C
and 71.1% compared to 62.3% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.8 years, as compared to 1.9 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying collateral loan exposures.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 15.5%, compared to 19.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, same as last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Changes to any one or more of the key parameters could have rating
implications for some of the rated notes, although a change in one
key parameter assumption could be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameter assumptions. The rated notes are
particularly sensitive to changes in the ratings recovery rates of
the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other
parameters constant, reducing the recovery rate of 100% of the
collateral by -10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero notches downward (e.g., one
notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing
the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral by +10% would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to
one notch upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


INGRESS CBO I: Moody's Withdraws C(sf) Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the rating on the following
SF CDO notes issued Ingress CBO I, Ltd.:

  US$21,250,000 Class C Third Priority Fixed Rate Notes Due
  2040 ($26,129,851 outstanding balance including cumulative
  deferred interest), Withdrawn (sf); previously on March 10,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC14: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class A-J
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating action on the class A-J certificates follows its
analysis of the transaction, primarily using its criteria for
rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review
of the credit characteristics and performance of the remaining
assets in the pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for class A-J will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current rating. The
affirmation also reflects S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

According to the April 12, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $49,290 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $25,816;

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $11,579; and

   -- Liquidation fee totaling $10,000.

The current interest shortfalls affected class B.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 12, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $90.8 million, which is 3.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes nine loans and two real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 200 loans at issuance.  Five
of these assets ($62.4 million, 68.7%) are with the special
servicer, and two ($11.1 million, 12.3%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC, reported financial information for 50.0% of the loans
in the pool, of which 88.7% was partial- or year-end 2016 data, and
the remainder was partial-year 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.14x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 101.5% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 8.15% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude three of the five
specially serviced assets.

To date, the transaction has experienced $313.7 million in
principal losses, or 11.4% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 11.8% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
three of the five specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the April 12, 2017, trustee remittance report, five assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details of the two largest specially serviced assets
are:

   -- The Canyon Portal 2 ($21.8 million, 24.0%) has $21.8 million

      in reported total exposure.  The collateral property is
      located in Sedona, Arizona, and consists of 26,199 sq. ft.
      of retail and 21,312 sq. ft. of lodging.  The loan was
      transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 25, 2015, as the

      borrower filed for bankruptcy protection and consequently
      defaulted at maturity on Jan. 1, 2016.  The loan was
      previously specially serviced for payment default.  C-III
      stated that the loan has been modified, and the maturity
      date has been extended to Nov. 13, 2018, with one one-year
      extension option subject to meeting certain conditions.  The

      reported DSC and occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2015, were 1.18x
      and 96.7%, respectively.

   -- The Green Bay Plaza REO asset ($16.5 million, 18.2%) has
      $20.8 million reported total exposure.  The asset is a
      234,801-sq.-ft retail property in Green Bay, Wis.  The loan
      was transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 21, 2014,
      due to imminent monetary default in anticipation of a
      decrease in cash flow associated with the loss of two major
      tenants.  The property became REO on Sept. 15, 2014.
      According to the special servicer, the property will be
      placed on the market for sale by second-quarter 2017.  A
      $3.9 million appraisal reduction amount is in effect against

      the loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss (26% to 59%) upon
      this loan's eventual resolution.

The three remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 13.1% of the total
pool trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for three of the five
specially serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss
severity of 40.8%.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Certs to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP8, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its rating on one other class from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes B, C, and D to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  In
addition, the upgrades reflect S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral, including
the five specially serviced assets ($137.1 million, 88.3%), based
on information received from the master and special servicers, and
the significant reduction in the trust balance.

S&P also affirmed its rating on class E to reflect its expectation
that the available credit enhancement for this class will be within
its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement for the current
rating as well as S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movements on classes B, C, and D, S&P's analysis
also considered the certificates' susceptibility to reduced
liquidity support from the specially serviced assets.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $155.3 million, which is 5.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes eight loans and one real
estate-owned (REO) asset, down from 150 loans at issuance.  Five of
these assets are with the special servicer.  The master servicers,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and Midland Loan Services, reported year-end
2015 or 2016 financial information for all of the remaining assets
in the pool.

Excluding the five specially serviced assets, S&P calculated a
1.36x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt service coverage
(DSC) and 66.7% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value
ratio using a 7.77% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average
capitalization rate for the three performing loans.  To date, the
transaction has experienced $167.5 million in principal losses, or
5.5% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects losses to
reach approximately 6.5% of the original pool trust balance in the
near term, based on losses incurred to date and additional losses
S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the five specially
serviced assets.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance reports, five assets
in the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management
LLC (C-III).  Details of the three largest specially serviced
assets are:

   -- The CNL/Welsh Portfolio loan ($97.1 million, 62.5%) is the
      largest loan in the pool and has $97.2 million in reported
      total exposure.  It is currently secured by nine industrial
      and three office properties totaling 2.4 million sq. ft.
      across the U.S.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on July 11, 2016, due to maturity default.  The
      loan matured on July 7, 2016.  The special servicer
      indicated that the borrower is working on selling the
      remaining portfolio of 12 properties.  The reported DSC and
      occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 1.47x and 95.7%,
      respectively.  A $24.5 million appraisal reduction amount
      (ARA) is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a minimal

      loss, if any, upon its eventual resolution.

   -- The Bonneville Square REO asset ($21.7 million, 14.0%) is
      the second-largest asset in the transaction and has $25.6
      million in reported total exposure.  The asset is an 89,143-
      sq.-ft. office property in Las Vegas, Nev.  The loan was
      transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 26, 2014, due to

      imminent default, and the property became REO on April 4,
      2016.  The reported DSC as of year-end 2015 was 0.09x, and
      reported occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2015 was 57.5%.  A
      $12.3 million ARA is in effect against the asset, and S&P
      expects a significant loss upon its eventual resolution.

   -- The Shoppes on Dean loan ($11.1 million, 7.2%) is the third-
      largest asset in the pool and has $12.5 million in reported
      total exposure.  It is secured by a 40,666-sq.-ft. retail
      property in Englewood, N.J.  The loan was transferred to the

      special servicer on April 3, 2015, because the borrower
      stated that it could no longer fund property debt service
      due to significant vacancy.  As of year-end 2015, the
      reported DSC and occupancy were 0.14x and 64.1%,
      respectively.  A $6.2 million ARA is in effect against this
      loan, and S&P expects a moderate loss upon its eventual
      resolution.

The two remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 3.0% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the five specially
serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of
23.5%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-LDP8
                                        Rating
Class             Identifier            To             From
B                 46629MAN5             A+ (sf)        BB- (sf)
C                 46629MAP0             BBB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
D                 46629MAQ8             BB (sf)        B (sf)
E                 46629MAT2             B- (sf)        B- (sf)


JP MORGAN 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2010-C1, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Confirmed at
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of four P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on Class E was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class E has
already experienced a 45% loss as a result of a principal reduction
on the Gateway Salt Lake loan.

The rating on Class D was downgraded due higher anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO classes X-A and X-B were affirmed due to the
credit performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF) of
their reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.6% of the
current balance, compared to 15.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was" Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMCC 2010-C1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of seven, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 71% to $205.7
million from $716.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by ten remaining mortgage loans. Two loans,
constituting 31.4% of the pool, have investment-grade structured
credit assessments.

One loan, constituting 25.8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, constituting 5.7% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Aquia Office
Building loan ($11.8 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 98,000 SF office building located in Stafford, Virginia,
approximately 40 miles southwest of Washington, DC. The loan was
initially transferred to the special servicer in March 2015 when
the borrower indicated it would be unable to pay-off the loan at
maturity, after the largest tenant exercised a lease termination
option. The loan returned to the master servicer in late 2015 after
a maturity date extension, but subsequently transferred back to the
special servicer in June 2016 due to maturity default. The loan is
now real estate owned (REO) and the property was 72% occupied as of
March 2016.

Moody's received full year 2015 and full or partial year 2016
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 53%, compared to 57% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
14% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.84X and 2.01X,
respectively, compared to 1.98X and 1.88X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Cole
Portfolio Loan ($40.7 million -- 19.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of 14 retail and two industrial
single-tenant properties located across 10 states: Alabama (2),
California (1), Illinois (2), Indiana (1), Nebraska (1), North
Carolina (1), Ohio (2), South Carolina (1), Texas (4), and
Wisconsin (1). The tenants include, FedEx, LA Fitness, Academy
Sports, Walgreens, Tractor Supply and Advance Auto. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and
1.64X, respectively, compared to a3 (sca.pd) and 1.62X at the last
review.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Berry Plastics Portfolio Loan ($24.0 million -- 11.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of three industrial properties
totaling 1.4 million SF located across three states; Indiana,
Kansas, and Maryland. The portfolio is 100% leased through March
2032 to Berry Plastics. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and 2.20X, respectively, compared to
aa2 (sca.pd) and 2.13X at the last review.

The top three performing loans represent 46.1% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Gateway Salt Lake Loan ($53.0 million --
25.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 624,000 SF open-air
lifestyle center located in Salt Lake City, Utah. The property is
part of a larger 35-acre mixed-use development centered around a
former rail depot. The property has lost several major tenants
since securitization, including Dicks Sporting Goods (91,000 SF,
14.6% of NRA) which vacated at its lease expiration in January
2017. Property performance began to deteriorate after the
construction of a competitive property, City Creek Center was
completed in 2012. Occupancy at the property has declined from 96%
at securitization to 48% as of April 2017. The loan was modified in
2016, ultimately resulting in an maturity date extension through
2021, an interest rate reduction, and a principal reduction to
$53.0 million. The modification resulted in a $41.3 million
principal loss to the trust. In 2016, the loan was assumed by a new
borrower, which is in the process of repositioning the property.
The loan remains on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR
and low occupancy and Moody's has identified this as a troubled
loan.

The second largest loan is the Ramco Retail Portfolio Loan ($27.1
million -- 13.2% of the pool), which is secured by two anchored
retail centers. The first property is West Oaks II a 379,711 SF
retail center located in Novi, Michigan and the second property is
Spring Meadows, a 211,817 SF retail center located in Holland,
Ohio. The portfolio was 94% leased as of December 2016. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.82X, respectively, compared to 58%
and 1.78X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Fairway Plaza Loan ($14.6 million --
7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 169,000 SF anchored retail
center located in Pasadena, Texas, approximately 15 miles southeast
of the Houston CBD. Major tenants that are part of the collateral
include PetSmart, the Nike Store, Michael's, Old Navy, and Dress
Barn. The property was 100% occupied as of December 2016. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.81X, respectively, compared to
57% and 1.78X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2017-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 27
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-2 (JPMMT 2017-2). The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf)-(P)Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are supported by 1,519 primarily 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$ 1,019,973,689 as of the May 1, 2017 Cut-off date. Like JPMMT
2017-1, JPMMT 2017-2 includes conforming fixed-rate mortgage loans
originated by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. (Chase) and underwritten
to the government sponsored enterprises (GSE) guidelines in
addition to prime jumbo non-conforming mortgages purchased by
JPMMAC from various originators and aggregators, including loans
acquired either directly or indirectly from TH TRS Corp. (Two
Harbors). These loans were acquired by JPMMAC either directly from
Two Harbors or indirectly through MAXEX, LLC, which operates a
mortgage loan exchange for the purchase and sale of mortgage loans.
Chase will be the servicer on the conforming loans, while
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Everbank and PHH Mortgage
Corporation will be the servicers on the prime jumbo loans. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will be the master servicer and securities
administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association will be the
trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the representations and
warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of principal and interest
and loss allocations are based on a typical shifting-interest 'I'
structure that benefits from a subordination floor.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2017-2

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-8, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool average
0.40% in a base scenario and reaches 4.90% at a stress level
consistent with the Aaa ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using Moody's US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the Cut-off Date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
Association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
assessments, the financial strength of Representation & Warranty
(R&W) providers, and extraordinary expenses.

Moody's bases its provisional ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, Moody's assessments of the aggregators,
originators and servicers, the strength of the third party due
diligence and the representations and warranties (R&W) framework of
the transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2017-2 is a securitization of a pool of 1,519 primarily
30-year, fully-amortizing mortgage loans with a total balance of $
1,019,973,689 as of the cutoff date, with a weighted average (WA)
remaining term to maturity of 354 months, and a WA seasoning of six
months. The borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and
sizeable equity in their properties. The WA current FICO score is
773 and the WA original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is
69.9%. The characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to other JPMMT transactions backed by 30-year
fixed mortgage loans that Moody's has recently rated.

In this transaction, 15.2% of the pool by loan balance was
underwritten by Chase to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's guidelines
(conforming loans). Moreover, the conforming loans in this
transaction have a high average current loan balance at $ 498,036.
The higher conforming loan balance of loans in JPMMT 2017-2 is
attributable to the greater amount of properties located in
high-cost areas, such as the metro areas of New York City and San
Francisco.

Approximately 11.8% (by loan balance) of the pool consists of loans
acquired by JPMMAC either directly or indirectly from TH TRS Corp.
(Two Harbors). These loans were acquired by JPMMAC either directly
from TH TRS Corp. (7.1% by loan balance) or indirectly through
MAXEX, LLC, (MAXEX) (4.7% by loan balance), a financial services
technology company which operates a mortgage loan exchange for the
purchase and sale of mortgage loans called LNEX. MAXEX acts as a
central clearinghouse and single counterparty to exchange
participants. As an independent market utility, MAXEX can provide
consistency through standardized guidelines and procedures
including a pre-settlement independent loan audit on all loans.
Moreover, all Two Harbors loans were reviewed by an independent
third-party due diligence firm, who checked the loans for adherence
to Two Harbors guidelines, regulatory compliance and valuation.

Among the originators contributing more than 10% to the pool, Chase
represents 15.2% of the outstanding principal balance of mortgage
loans, Everbank represents 15.8% of the outstanding principal
balance of the mortgage loans, and United Shore Financial Services,
LLC represents 19.5% of the outstanding principal balance of the
mortgage loans. The remaining originators each account for less
than 10% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool.

Third-party Review

Three independent third party review (TPR) firms - Opus Capital
Markets Consultants LLC (Opus), AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC) and
Clayton Services LLC (Clayton) - reviewed 100% of the loans in this
transaction for credit, regulatory compliance, property valuation,
and data accuracy. The due diligence results confirm compliance
with the originators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority
of loans, no material compliance issues, and no material valuation
issues. The loans that had exceptions to the originators'
underwriting guidelines had significant compensating factors that
were documented.

Representations & Warranties (R&W) Framework

The sellers have provided clear R&Ws, including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is a provision for binding arbitration in the
event of a dispute between the trust and the R&W provider
concerning R&W breaches. Further, R&W breaches are evaluated by an
independent third party using a set of objective criteria. JPMMT
2017-2 introduces a new breach review trigger: Loans are reviewed
if the loan becomes between 30 days and 120 days delinquent and is
modified by the servicer. The R&W providers vary in financial
strength. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. (rated Aa2), who is the R&W
provider for approximately 15.2% (by loan balance) of the loans, is
the strongest R&W provider. For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the
MAXEX platform, Central Clearing and Settlement LLC, (CCS) MAXEX's
subsidiary and seller under the Assignment, Assumption and
Recognition agreement (AAR), will make the R&Ws. The loans where
CCS is the R&W provider represent 6.92% by loan balance of the
pool. Under the AAR, JPMMAC will assign to the trust a backstop
made by Five Oaks Acquisition Corp. (Five Oaks) where Five Oaks
backstops CCS in the event that CCS is insolvent.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.50% of the
original pool balance ($5,099,868), the subordinate bonds do not
receive any principal and all principal is then paid to the senior
bonds. In addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 6.00%
of current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will
include all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 0.70% of the
original pool balance ($7,140,689), those tranches do not receive
principal distributions. Principal those tranches would have
received are directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds
pro-rata.

Net WAC

The net WAC definition is the greater of (1) (a) the weighted
average of the net mortgage rates of the mortgage loans in that
group as of the first day of the related due period, weighted on
the basis of their stated principal balances, minus (b) the
reviewer annual fee rate for such distribution date and (2) zero.
The certificates that are at risk are the lockout classes,
especially Class B-6, which has the longest weighted average life.

Extraordinary Trust Expenses

Extraordinary expenses, which include expenses to be reimbursed to
the trustee, securities administrator and to the reviewer, as well
as expenses related to enforcement for breach of R&Ws and others,
will be taken out of the available distribution amount, which
decreases funds available for payment of the certificates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS," published on February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X-1, Cl. A-X-2,
Cl. A-X-3, Cl. A-X-4, Cl. A-X-5, Cl. A-X-6, Cl. A-X-7, and Cl.
A-X-8 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C6: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Tranches to D
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on four classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C6, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust, as well as
using S&P's temporary interest shortfall methodology to address the
current and expected interest shortfalls affecting the trust.

The downgrade on class A-J reflects credit support erosion that S&P
anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of four ($218.8
million, 65.0%) of the five ($289.6 million, 86.0%) specially
serviced assets (discussed below), as well as susceptibility to
liquidity interruption due to ongoing interest shortfalls.  In
addition, S& downgraded classes B, C, and D to 'D (sf)' to reflect
its expectation that the classes' accumulated interest shortfalls
will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future. Classes B and C
have experienced accumulated interest shortfalls for seven
consecutive months and class D for eight consecutive months.  As of
the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, net monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $704,682 and primarily reflect the:

   -- Net appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER)
      amount of $598,417;

   -- Nonrecoverable interest of $246,951;

    -- Deferred interest on the modified loan of $53,543; and

   -- Net special servicing fees of $51,109.

The above net interest shortfalls were offset by interest recovery
of $245,339.  The current interest shortfalls affected classes
subordinate to, and including, class B.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $336.6 million, which is 11.0% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes five loans and two real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 168 loans at issuance.  Five
of these assets are with the special servicer, no loans are
defeased and one loan ($45.9 million, 13.6%) is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for 85.9% of the loans in the pool,
of which 83.7% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was
year-end 2016 data.

S&P calculated a 1.00x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 95.8% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.87% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude four of the five specially
serviced assets.

To date, the transaction has experienced $220.3 million in
principal losses, or 7.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 12.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
four of the five specially serviced assets.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, five assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details of the three largest specially serviced assets
are:

   -- The Westfield Chesterfield loan ($140.0 million, 41.6%) is
      the largest loan in the pool and has a total reported
      exposure of $144.8 million.  The loan is secured by a
      641,800-sq.-ft. retail property in Chesterfield, Mo.  The
      loan was transferred to the special servicer on March 16,
      2016, due to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on

      Sept. 11, 2016.  Based on recent special servicer comments,
      a receiver has been appointed and foreclosure proceedings
      are likely to be completed soon.  The reported DSC and
      occupancy as of year-end 2015, were 1.24x and 93.0%,
      respectively.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $117.6

      million is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a
      significant loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The Greenbrier Mall loan ($70.8 million, 21.0%) is the
      second-largest loan in the pool and has a total reported
      exposure of $70.8 million.  The loan is secured by an
      895,655-sq.-ft. retail property in Chesapeake, Va.  The loan

      was transferred to special servicing on May 23, 2016, due to

      imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on Aug. 1,
      2016.  The special servicer stated that it approved and
      completed a loan modification on Dec. 20, 2016.  The
      modification terms included extending the maturity date to
      Dec. 1, 2019, and a modified interest rate.  The loan is
      currently being monitored by the special servicer and is
      anticipated to be returned to the master servicer soon.  The

      reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 1.32x
      and 96.7%, respectively.

   -- The Willowwood I & II REO asset ($46.4 million, 13.8%) is
      the third-largest asset in the pool and has a total reported

      exposure of $46.5 million.  The asset is a 244,871-sq.-ft.
      office in Fairfax, Va.  The loan was transferred to the
      special servicer on March 26, 2015, due to the sponsor's
      request for relief due to deteriorating cashflow at the
      property.  The property became REO on May 2, 2016.  Recent
      performance information wasn't available.  An ARA of
      $27.1 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P expects
      a moderate loss upon this asset's eventual resolution.

The two remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 10.0% of the total
pool trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for four of the five
specially serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss
severity of 70.3%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C6
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To             From
A-J              50179MAH4             CCC- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
B                50179MAJ0             D (sf)         BB+ (sf)
C                50179MAK7             D (sf)         BB- (sf)
D                50179MAL5             D (sf)         B+ (sf)


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2017-1: Moody's Rates Class E-2 Notes '(P)Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 12, LLC Series
2017-1 (LEAF 2017-1), sponsored by LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc.
(LEAF; unrated). The transaction is a securitization of equipment
loans and leases, whose collateral is mainly represented by office
and other small-ticket equipment.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 12 LLC, Series 2017-1

$91,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$82,000,000 Class A-3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$24,234,000 Class A-4 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$14,427,000 Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$14,071,000 Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

$9,797,000 Class D Notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

$13,893,000 Class E-1 Notes, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$11,578,000 Class E-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying equipment
contracts, the strong and steady historical performance of similar
contracts originated by LEAF Capital Funding, LLC; the
transaction's sequential pay structure; the experience and
expertise of LEAF, as the transaction servicer; and the back-up
servicing arrangement with U.S. Bank National Association
(long-term deposits Aa1/ long-term CR assessment Aa2(cr),
short-term deposit P-1, BCA aa3).

Moody's cumulative net loss expectation for the LEAF 2017-1
transaction is 3.0%, and the Aaa level is 23.0%. Moody's cumulative
net loss expectation is based on its analysis of the credit quality
of the underlying collateral, the historical performance of LEAF's
prior securitizations and managed portfolio, the ability of LEAF to
perform the servicing functions, and its current expectations for
future economic conditions. There is initially 21.15% hard credit
enhancement behind the Class A notes consisting of
overcollateralization that will build over time, a non-declining
reserve account and subordination.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
"Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance".
If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit
Ratings on LEAF 2017-1 are not expected to be affected. Please
refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes
Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance," for further details regarding the implications
of the proposed Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings."

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if levels of credit protection are
greater than necessary to protect investors against its current
expectations of portfolio loss. Losses could be lower than Moody's
original expectations as a result of lower frequency of default by
the underlying obligors or slower depreciation of the value of the
equipment that secure the obligors' promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and the
performance of various sectors where the lessees operate.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit protection
are insufficient to protect investors against its current
expectations of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's
original expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor
defaults or a deterioration in the value of the equipment that
secure the obligors' promise of payment. Transaction performance
also depends greatly on the US macro economy and the performance of
various sectors where the lessees operate.


LONG POINT III: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on $300MM Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the 'BB-sf' rating on the following Principal
At-Risk Variable Rate Notes issued by Long Point Re III Limited, a
Cayman Islands exempted company licensed as a Class C insurer:

-- $300,000,000 class A notes; scheduled maturity May 23, 2018.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

This affirmation is based on Fitch's annual surveillance review of
the notes that includes a scheduled evaluation of the natural
catastrophe risk, counterparty exposure, collateral assets and
structural performance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Series 2015-1 notes provide three years of indemnity, per
occurrence coverage to various insurance subsidiaries or affiliates
of the Travelers Companies, Inc. (Travelers) (IDR 'A+'; Stable
Outlook) for Tropical Cyclone, Earthquake, Severe Thunderstorms and
Winter Storm events. The Covered Area is restricted to the
northeast U.S. that includes Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia and
Vermont.

On May 2, 2017, AIR Worldwide (AIR), acting as the Reset Agent,
completed the Reset Report that indicated an attachment probability
as 1.016% for the upcoming Risk Period starting May 16, 2017 and
ending May 15, 2018. This corresponds to an implied rating of 'BB-'
per the calibration table listed in Fitch's 'Insurance-Linked
Securities Methodology'. This is a decrease from the prior
attachment probability of 1.278%. The updated attachment
probability includes updated property exposures provided by
Travelers within the Subject Business in the Covered Area that have
been run through an escrowed AIR model.

The Updated Trigger Amount and Exhaustion Amount were increased to
$2.346 billion and $2.846 billion, respectively from the previous
levels of $1.968 billion and $2.468 billion. The Insurance
Percentage remains unchanged at 60%.

Per a specified formula in the Series Supplement, the Updated Risk
Interest Spread was reset at 3.50%, which is the Minimum Risk
Interest Spread and a decrease from the previous period's 3.748%.
This reflects the Updated Modeled Expected Loss of 0.906% which is
a 20 bp reduction from the Initial Modeled Expected Loss.

The collateral asset meets Fitch's criteria requirement for
'AAA'-rated U.S. money market funds. Fitch believes the notes and
indirect counterparties are performing as required. There have been
no reported early redemption notices or events of default and all
agents remain in place.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This rating is sensitive to the occurrence of a qualifying natural
catastrophe event(s), the counterparty rating of the Travelers and
the rating or performance on the assets held in the collateral
account. Currently, the risk assessment of the catastrophe events
is the driving force of the note rating.

If a qualifying covered event occurs that results in a loss of
principal, Fitch will downgrade the note to reflect an effective
default and issue a Recovery Rating.

The catastrophe risk element is highly model-driven and actual
losses may differ from the results of the simulation analysis. The
escrow model may not reflect future methodology enhancements by AIR
which may have an adverse or beneficial effect on the implied
rating of the notes were such future methodology considered.

To a lesser extent, the notes may be downgraded if the credit
ratings of the Travelers or the reinsurance trust account assets
were significantly downgraded to a level commensurate to the
implied rating of the natural catastrophe risk.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
Series 2017-C33 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $28,500,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,200,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,500,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,500,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $130,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $156,052,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $479,752,000 b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125,079,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,256,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,551,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,272,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,554,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,554,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,564,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,854,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:
-- $26,557,919a class G 'NR';
-- $17,213,062.56a VRR Interest 'NR'.

a - Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b - Notional amount and interest only.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Above-Average Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at
maturity, the pool will pay down by 11.4%, which is above the 2016
average of 10.4% and the YTD 2017 average of 7.8%. Six loans
(26.6%) are full-term interest-only and 18 loans (45.4%) are
partial interest-only. Fitch-rated transactions in 2016 had an
average full-term, interest-only percentage of 33.3% and a partial
interest-only percentage of 33.3%. Fitch-rated transactions in 2017
had an average full-term, interest-only percentage of 45.9% and a
partial interest-only percentage of 29.2%.

Pool Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 56.7% of the
pool, which is more concentrated than the 2016 average of 54.8% and
the YTD 2017 average of 53.2% for fixed-rate transactions. The pool
exhibits above-average pool concentration, with a loan
concentration index (LCI) of 415, which is above the YTD 2017
average of 393. For this transaction, a scenario analysis in which
the largest 10 loans were defaulted with losses calculated based on
a 64.7% value decline, increased Fitch's modeled credit enhancement
by approximately 1.50% at 'AAAsf'.

Average Fitch Leverage: The pool has leverage in line with other
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of
1.23x is slightly better than the 2016 average of 1.21x and the YTD
2017 average of 1.22x. The pool's Fitch LTV of 102.5% is better
than the 2016 average of 105.2% and the YTD 2017 average of
104.7%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 14.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSBAM
2017-C33 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


NEUBERGER BERMAN 24: Moody's Gives Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 24, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$318,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$47,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$34,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$29,750,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$22,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Neuberger Berman CLO 24 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 100%
ramped as of the closing date.

Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2709

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.3%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2709 to 3115)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2709 to 3522)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Northwoods Capital XV, Limited.

Moody's rating action is:

US$285,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$19,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$7,500,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$24,750,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the Class D Notes, and the
Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Northwoods Capital XV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, and up to 7.5% of the
portfolio may consist of collateral obligations that are not senior
secured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
60% ramped as of the closing date.

Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C-1 Notes: -4

Class C-2 Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


OAKTREE CLO 2014-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class DR Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1R, A-2R,
BR, CR, and DR replacement notes from Oaktree CLO 2014-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014 that
is managed by Oaktree Capital Management L.P.  S&P also assigned a
rating to the new class X notes that were created as part of the
refinancing.  S&P withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1,
A-2A, A-2B, B, C, and D notes following payment in full on the May
15, 2017, refinancing date.

On the May 15, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1R, A-2R, BR, CR, and DR replacement note issuances were used to
redeem the class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, B, C, and D notes as outlined in
the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its
ratings on the refinanced notes in line with their full redemption,
and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via an amended indenture,
which, in addition to outlining the terms of the replacement notes,
will also:

   -- Extend the reinvestment period end date by 3.25 years.
   -- Extend the stated maturity date by 4.25 years.
   -- Add class X notes to the capital structure.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Oaktree CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
Replacement/new class     Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1R                      AAA (sf)             271.30
A-2R                      AA (sf)               58.75
BR                        A (sf)                26.40
CR                        BBB (sf)              23.10
DR                        BB (sf)               17.45
X                         AAA (sf)               3.00

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Oaktree CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
                  Rating

Class       To              From
A-1         NR              AAA (sf)
A-2A        NR              AA (sf)
A-2B        NR              AA (sf)
B           NR              A (sf)
C           NR              BBB (sf)
D           NR              BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PACIFIC BAY: Fitch Withdraws 'Dsf' Preference Shares Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Preference Shares issued by
Pacific Bay CDO, Ltd./Inc. and simultaneously withdrawn the
rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pacific Bay entered an Event of Default on Dec. 10, 2008 due to the
failure of the class A/B Overcollateralization Ratio to be equal to
or greater than 100%. On May 1, 2009 a majority of the controlling
class voted to accelerate the transaction and directed the Trustee
to declare the principal of the notes to be immediately due and
payable. The public sale of the collateral was conducted from March
7, 2017 to March 8, 2017. Total principal proceeds of $76.7 million
were distributed to the noteholders on May 4, 2017 which was
sufficient to repay the class A-2, B and C notes in full. The
Preference Shares did not receive any liquidation proceeds.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivities are not applicable as the rating is being
withdrawn.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was reviewed in relation to this
rating action.

Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn the following rating:

-- $17,000,000 Preference Shares to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'.

Class A-2, B and C notes have been marked 'PIFsf'.


PALMER SQUARE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Palmer Square CLO 2013-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2013 that is managed by Palmer Square Capital Management LLC.  S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D
notes following payment in full on the May 15, 2017, refinancing
date.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the original
class E notes, which were not part of this refinancing.

On the May 15, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and S&P assigned ratings to the replacement notes.  The
replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture, which
included no other substantial changes to the transaction.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             212.80
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               59.70
B-R                       A (sf)                19.75
C-R                       BBB (sf)              16.20
D-R                       BB (sf)               13.65

RATING AFFIRMED
Palmer Square CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Original class            Rating
E                         B (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN
Palmer Square CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Original class            To         From
A-1                       NR         AAA (sf)
A-2                       NR         AA (sf)
B                         NR         A (sf)
C                         NR         BBB (sf)
D                         NR         BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES : Moody's Hikes Cl. N Debt Rating to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Prudential Securities
Secured Financing Corporation 1999-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2:

Cl. N, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. A-EC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-EC2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as a significant increase
in defeasance, to 48% of the current pool balance from 37% at the
last review. The deal has paid down 11% since Moody's last review.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, compared to 0.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-EC and Cl. A-EC2
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Prudential Securities Secured
Financing Corporation 1999-C2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to a Herf of six at Moody's last
review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $13.7 million
from $869 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
28% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 48% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 7% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in or
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $17 million (for an
average loss severity of 15%).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 65%, compared to 50% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 19% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.13X and 2.47X,
respectively, compared to 1.71X and 3.77X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 38% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Office Depot Tallahassee Loan ($2.2 million --
16.2% of the pool), which is secured by a free standing Office
Depot in Tallahassee, Florida. The lease was recently extended
through June 2025. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.25X,
respectively.

The second largest loan is the Office Depot Ormond Beach Loan ($1.9
million -- 13.7% of the pool), which is secured by a free standing
Office Depot in Ormond Beach, Florida. The lease was recently
extended through June 2025. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85%
and 1.27X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens Drug Store Loan ($1.2
million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a free standing
Walgreens located 20 miles west of the Detroit CBD. The loan passed
its ARD in 2009 and has continued to amortize since then. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 48% and 2.45X, respectively.


RFSC TRUST 2001-RM2: Moody's Cuts Class M-I-1 Debt Rating to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of CL.M-I-1
and CL. M-I-2 from RFSC Series 2001-RM2 Trust.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RFSC Series 2001-RM2 Trust

Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 17, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 17, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades are primarily due to the decrease of credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The actions also reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SOLOSO CDO 2007-1: Moody's Ups Rating on Class A-2L Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Soloso CDO 2007-1 Ltd.:

US$263,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due October 2037
(current balance of $178,265,955), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
on March 20, 2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

US$83,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due October 2037,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 20, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

US$68,000,000 Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October
2037, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Soloso CDO 2007-1 Ltd., issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1LA notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios, and full repayment of the Class
A-2L deferred interest balance.

The Class A-1LA notes have paid down by approximately 1.6% or $3.3
million since June 2016 using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Additionally, the Class A-2L notes' deferred
interest balance of $4.0 million has been fully repaid since July
2016. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class
A-1LA, Class A-1LB and Class A-2L notes have improved to 192.7%,
131.5% and 104.3%, respectively, from June 2016 levels of 185.8%,
128.7% and 101.6%, respectively. Moody's gave full par credit in
its analysis to one deferring asset that meet certain criteria,
with $4.0 million in par. In addition, since June 2016, two
previously deferring banks with a total par of $9.0 million have
resumed making interest payments on their TruPS.

The Class A-1LA notes will continue to benefit from the diversion
of excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool. Additionally, the notes are expected
to benefit from credit enhancement available in the form of excess
spread, because an out-of-the-money interest rate swap, with a
total notional of $75.0 million, is scheduled to mature in July
2017. The Class A-2L notes will continue to receive current
interest as long as the Class A-1 OC is satisfied (reported at
134.07% versus a trigger of 131.02%).

The rating actions on the Class A-1LB and Class A-2L notes also
take into consideration the Event of Default (EoD) that occurred in
October 2010 and the associated likelihood of acceleration and
liquidation in the future. The transaction declared an EoD
according to Section 5.1(a)(iii)(A) of the indenture because of
missed interest payments on the Class A-1 notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 486)

Class A-1LA: +1

Class A-1LB: +2

Class A-2L: +2

Class A-3L: 0

Class A-3F: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1122)

Class A-1LA: -1

Class A-1LB: -1

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: 0

Class A-3F: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $343.5 million, defaulted and deferring par of $111.8 million, a
weighted average default probability of 6.77% (implying a WARF of
745), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.


THAYER PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Thayer Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$302,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$64,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$39,500,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$28,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Thayer Park CLO, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2881

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2881 to 3313)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2881 to 3745)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


TIAA SEASONED 2007-C4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on two classes and affirmed
its ratings on six classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from TIAA Seasoned Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C4,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrade on class F reflects the class' susceptibility to
reduced liquidity support due to ongoing interest shortfalls from
the specially serviced crossed loan ($80.7 million, 40.6%), as well
as credit support erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon its
eventual resolution.  In addition, S&P lowered its rating on class
G to 'D (sf)' because it expects the accumulated interest
shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  The
class had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for three
consecutive months.

According to the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $378,901 and resulted
primarily from interest not advanced due to a nonrecoverable
determination totaling $363,442, and special servicing fees
totaling $16,803.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class G.

The affirmations on classes A-J, B, C, D, and E reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings as well as S&P's views regarding
the collateral's current and future performance. S&P's analysis
also considered the reduced liquidity support on these classes due
to the recent nonrecoverability determination on the specially
serviced loan (reflected starting in the February 2017 trustee
remittance report), and S&P will continue to monitor its
liquidation strategy and timing.  If the liquidity support on these
classes declines further, S&P will evaluate the effect, if any, on
the rated bonds and may adjust our ratings accordingly.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $198.5 million, which is 9.5% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 13 loans (reflecting
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans), down from 139
loans at issuance.  The Algonquin Commons Portfolio Roll-Up loan is
with the special servicer, the Gunn Collection Retail Center loan
($2.0 million, 1.0%) is on the master servicer's watchlist, and no
loans are defeased.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for 89.3% of the loans in the pool,
of which 74.2% was year-end 2016 data and the remainder was
year-end 2015 data.

Excluding the specially serviced loan, we calculated a 1.33x S&P
Global Ratings weighted average debt service coverage (DSC) and
65.1% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value ratio using
a 7.17% S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate for
the remaining loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $25.3 million in principal
losses, or 1.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 3.6% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the specially serviced loan's
eventual resolution.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the April 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the largest
loan in the pool, the Algonquin Commons Portfolio Roll-Up loan, was
with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III). The
loan consists of two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans
(the Algonquin Commons Phase I and II loans) and has a total
reported exposure of $116.9 million.  The loan is secured by two
retail properties totaling 564,790 sq. ft. in Algonquin, Ill.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on June 20, 2012, due
to imminent monetary default. C-III indicated that foreclosure was
filed and the noteholder has filed suit against the borrower and
guarantor for failure to turn over cash flow for a specified period
of time and against the guarantor under the payment guarantee.  The
reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2016 were 0.54x and
82.4%, respectively, for Phase I and 0.78x and 96.1%, respectively,
for Phase II.  The loan was deemed nonrecoverable and S&P expects a
significant loss (60% or greater) upon its eventual resolution.

RATINGS LIST

TIAA Seasoned Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C4
                                   Rating
Class             Identifier       To                  From
A-J               87246AAE8        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
B                 87246AAF5        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
C                 87246AAG3        AA+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
D                 87246AAH1        AA (sf)             AA (sf)
E                 87246AAJ7        AA- (sf)            AA- (sf)
F                 87246AAK4        BB+ (sf)            A (sf)
X                 87246AAL2        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
G                 87246AAM0        D (sf)              BBB- (sf)


TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd.:

US$194,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $101,084,318.50), Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015 Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 26,
2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$32,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2035, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$50,500,000 Class B-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2035 (current balance of $49,915,170.48), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on May 26, 2015 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed Rate Notes
Due 2035 (current balance of $22,239,432.39), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on May 26, 2015 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios (OC), the resumption of interest
payments of previously deferring assets, and an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since May 2016.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 3.2% or $3.3
million since May 2016, mainly using diversion of excess interest
proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the
Class A-1, Class A-2, Class A-3, and Class B-2 notes have improved
to 261.04%, 207.63%, 165.87%, and 114.11%, respectively, from May
2016 levels of 252.72%, 202.33%, 162.47%, and 112.49%,
respectively. Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to one
deferring asset that meets certain criteria, totaling $4.5 million
in par. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 1006 from 1179 in
May 2016. Since that time, three previously deferring banks with a
total par of $11.5 million have resumed making interest payments on
their TruPS.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector and the US P&C insurance sector, and a negative outlook on
the US life insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 633)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1449)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3: -2

Class B-1: -2

Class B-2: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then used
the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $263.9 million, defaulted/deferring par of $15.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 10.77% (implying a WARF of
1006), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
10.00%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data. For
insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on
the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial
reports.


TROPIC CDO IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class A-3L Notes From Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Tropic CDO IV Ltd.:

US$160,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035
(current balance of $49,685,237), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
on July 17, 2015 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

US$40,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 17, 2015 Upgraded to A2
(sf);

US$37,500,000 Class A-3L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due April
2035, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 17, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf);

US$26,000,000 Class A-4L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035
(current balance including interest shortfall of $29,307,748),
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 28, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf);

US$35,000,000 Class A-4 Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035
(current balance including interest shortfall of $40,050,649),
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 28, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf);

Tropic CDO IV Ltd., issued in November 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1L notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios (OC) and the resumption of interest
payments of previously deferring assets since July 2016.

The Class A-1L notes have been paid down by approximately 31% or
$24.8 million since July 2016 using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Since July 2016, three previously deferring
banks with a total par of $30.0 million have resumed making
interest payments on their TruPS and two assets with a total par of
$20.0 million have redeemed at par. Based on Moody's calculations,
the OC ratios for the Class A-1L, Class A-2L, Class A-3L and Class
A-4 notes have improved to 366.3%, 202.9%, 143.1% and 92.6%
respectively, compared to July 2016 levels of 270.1%, 176.4%,
132.9% and 91.3%, respectively. The Class A-1L notes will continue
to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the use of
proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 505)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: +1

Class A-3L: +2

Class A-4L: +2

Class A-4: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1274)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: -1

Class A-3L: -2

Class A-4L: -1

Class A-4: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par of $182.0 million,
defaulted and deferring par of $55.0 million, a weighted average
default probability of 8.61% (implying a WARF of 799), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc, an econometric model
developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's
evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the
pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.


TROPIC CDO V: Moody's Ups Rating on Class A-2L Notes to Caa1(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Tropic CDO V Ltd.:

US $220,000,000 Class A-1L1 Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036
(current balance of $144,675,465), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
on December 21, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$220,000,000 Class A-1L2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036
(current balance of $158,370,835), Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously
on December 21, 2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

US$94,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on December 21, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

US$51,000,000 Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July
2036 (current balance of $55,384,073, including deferred interest),
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2014 Upgraded to Ca
(sf)

Tropic CDO V Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio of bank, insurance,
and REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1L1 and Class A-1L2 notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios (OC).

The Class A-1L1 and Class A-1L2 notes have been paid down by
approximately $5.3 million (3.5%) and $4.3 million (2.6%),
respectively, since May 2016, mainly using diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1L2, Class A-1LB, and Class A-2L notes have improved to
155.9%, 119.0%, and 104.0%, respectively, from May 2016 levels of
148.4%, 116.0%, and 103.0%, respectively. The Class A-1L1 and Class
A-1L2 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of a prior error. In
previous rating actions, the administrative expenses were not
modeled correctly, resulting in an underestimation of the fees
payable on top of the waterfall. The correction of this error had a
negative impact on the ratings for this transaction, and today's
upgrades are partially tempered by such correction.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 620)

Class A-1L1: +1

Class A-1L2: +1

Class A-1LB: +3

Class A-2L: +3

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1408)

Class A-1L1: -2

Class A-1L2: -2

Class A-1LB: -1

Class A-2L: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $472.5 million, defaulted/deferring par of $180.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 10.92% (implying a WARF of
920), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks, insurance companies and REIT
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc™, an econometric model developed by Moody's
Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the
credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on the
latest FDIC financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have
public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance
team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance
firms' annual statutory financial reports. For REIT TruPS that do
not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit
quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.


VANGUARD NATURAL: Posts $8.908 Million Net Loss for Q1 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------
Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC, reported a net loss of $8,908,000
for the three months ended March 31, 2017, lower compared to a net
loss of $145,260,000 for the same period in 2016.

Vanguard said total revenues were $118,763,000 for the first
quarter, compared to $113,199,000 for the same period a year ago.

At March 31, 2017, the Company had total assets of $1,297,274,000
against total liabilities of $2,202,595,000 and total members'
deficit of $905,321,000.

As of April 30, 2017, approximately 940 claims totaling $19.5
billion have been filed with the Bankruptcy Court against the
Debtors by approximately 750 claimants.  The Company expects
additional claims to be filed prior to the bar dates. In addition,
creditors who have already filed claims may amend or modify their
claims in ways the Company cannot reasonably predict. The amounts
of these additional claims and/or amendments or modifications to
claims already filed may be material.

The Company anticipates the claims filed against the Debtors in the
Chapter 11 proceedings will be numerous.  The Company expects the
process of resolving claims filed against the Debtors to be complex
and lengthy.  The Company plans to investigate and evaluate all
filed claims in connection with our plan of reorganization. As part
of the process, the Company said it will work to resolve
differences in amounts scheduled by the Debtors and the amounts
claimed by creditors, including through the filing of objections
with the Bankruptcy Court where necessary.

A copy of the Company's Form 10-Q Report is available at
https://goo.gl/QcZb4U

              About Vanguard Natural Resources

Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC -- http://www.vnrllc.com/-- is  
a publicly traded limited liability company focused on the
acquisition, production and development of oil and natural gas
properties.  Vanguard's assets consist primarily of producing and
non-producing oil and natural gas reserves located in the Green
River Basin in Wyoming, the Permian Basin in West Texas and New
Mexico, the Gulf Coast Basin in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and
Alabama, the Anadarko Basin in Oklahoma and North Texas, the
Piceance Basin in Colorado, the Big Horn Basin in Wyoming and
Montana, the Arkoma Basin in Arkansas and Oklahoma, the Williston
Basin in North Dakota and Montana, the Wind River Basin in
Wyoming, and the Powder River Basin in Wyoming.

The Debtors listed total assets of $1.54 billion and total debts
of $2.3 billion as of Feb. 1, 2017.

Paul Hastings LLP is serving as legal counsel and Evercore
Partners is acting as financial advisor to Vanguard.  Opportune
LLP is the Company's restructuring advisor.  Prime Clerk LLC is
serving as claims and noticing agent.

Judy R. Robbins, the U.S. Trustee for Region 7, on Feb. 14, 2017,
appointed three creditors to serve on the official committee of
unsecured creditors appointed in the Debtor's case.  The Committee
hired Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP as counsel and FTI
Consulting, Inc., as financial advisor.

The Company on March 16, 2017, filed a motion with the Bankruptcy
Court disclosing a Stipulation and Agreed Order entered into on
March 15, 2017, by and between the Debtors and certain unaffiliated
holders of its Preferred Units and common units pursuant to which
the Debtors and the Ad Hoc Equity Committee agreed, among other
things, that professionals for the Ad Hoc Equity Committee would be
funded by the Debtors' estates for services performed within a
defined scope and subject to agreed caps on fees and expenses as
described in the Stipulation and Agreed Order.  

Counsel to the Ad Hoc Equity Committee are Sharon M. Beausoleil,
Esq., Alexander Chae, Esq., and Holland N. O'Neil, Esq., at Gardere
Wynne Sewell LLP.

Attorneys for Citibank, N.A, as administrative agent under the
Third Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, dated as of September
30, 2011, are Chris Lopez, Esq., Stephen Karotkin, Esq., and
Joseph H. Smolinsky, Esq., at Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP.


VIBRANT CLO VI: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Vibrant CLO VI, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$57,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Vibrant VI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

Vibrant Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager"), an affiliate of DFG
Investment Advisers, Inc., will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's 4.25 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.25 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C20: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2005-C20, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C20:

Cl. F, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Downgraded to
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 12% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 17.4% of the
current balance, compared to 17.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-C was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2005-C20.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 95% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $63.0 million
from $3.66 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 95% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 4% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in or contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $171
million (for an average loss severity of 74%). One loan,
constituting 94.8% of the pool, is currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loan is the NGP Rubicon GSA Pool Loan ($59.7
million -- 94.8% of the pool), which represents a 50% participation
interest in a mortgage loan secured by a portfolio consisting seven
properties located in various US states. The portfolio was
originally secured by 14 properties with US government leases. The
portfolio most recently transferred to special servicing on April
23, 2015 for imminent monetary default. The portfolio is cash
managed. Moody's anticipates a modest loss for the specially
serviced loan.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

The sole non-defeased performing loan is the Village Shops Loan
($436,151 -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a retail strip
center constructed in 1985 and located in Salem, Massachusetts.
This is a fully amortizing loan and has paid down 71% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 21% and 5.34X,
respectively, compared to 26% and 4.31X at the last review.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C34 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates issued by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 68 loans secured by 92
commercial properties. The loans were contributed to the trust by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC, Rialto
Mortgage Finance, LLC, Silverpeak Real Estate Finance LLC, and
Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations are based on the overall
stable performance of the underlying collateral pool. There have
been no material changes to the pool since issuance, and therefore
the original rating analysis was considered in affirming the
transaction. As of the April 2017 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate balance has been reduced by 0.56% to $698.8 million, from
$702.8 million at issuance. There are no specially serviced loans.
Five loans (5.4%) are on the servicer's watchlist, including one
loan listed as 30 days delinquent (0.7% of the pool) as of April
2017.

High Retail Concentration: Thirty-one of the 68 loans in the
transaction are completely or partially secured by retail
properties. Retail properties represent approximately 38.1% of the
pool by balance, including seven loans in the top 15. One of the
two properties backing the second-largest loan, Congressional North
Shopping Center & 121 Congressional Lane, had a hhgregg store
recently close. There are no other property type accounts for more
than 16% of the pool by balance.

Additional Subordinate Financing: Three loans (20.5% of the pool)
have additional subordinate debt in place, including the two
largest loans, Regent Medical Office (10% of the pool) and
Congressional North Shopping Center & 121 Congressional Lane
(8.4%).

Pool Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 12.3% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity. Two loans (8.9%) are
full-term interest-only, 32 loans (52.4%) are partial
interest-only, and 10 loans (7.5%) have amortization schedules of
25 years or less.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $29.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- *$115 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- *$25 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- *$0 million class A-3FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $172.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.2 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.9 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* The aggregate initial balance of class A-3, A-3FL and A-3FX
certificates will be $140 million. Holders of the class A-3FL
certificates may exchange all or a portion of their certificates
for a like principal amount of class A-3FX certificates having the
same pass-through rate as the class A-3FX regular interest.

Fitch does not rate classes G and H and the interest-only classes
X-FG and X-H.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C5:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current balance, compared to 1.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of WFRBS 2011-C5.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18% to $898 million
from $1.09 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 65% of the pool. Eight loans, constituting
6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Eleven loans, constituting 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss and there
are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 1.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.4 million (a 17% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 82% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 83%, compared to 81% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.56X and 1.30X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 39% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Domain Loan ($190.9 million -- 21% of the
pool), which is secured by an 879,000 square foot (SF) retail
component of a 1.2 million square foot (SF) lifestyle center
located in Austin, Texas. The property was developed by Simon
Property Group, the loan sponsor, in two phases between 2007 and
2010. The total cost was approximately $388 million ($441 per SF)
and constitutes 50% of the Domain condominium, which also includes
828 residential units that are not part of the collateral. The
property is anchored by Neiman Marcus, Macy's (non-collateral),
Dillard's (non-collateral), Dicks Sporting Goods and an 8-screen
movie theatre. As of December 2016, the property was 91% leased,
compared to 96% leased at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 64% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to 65% and 1.37X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Puck Building Loan ($84.2 million --
9% of the pool), which is secured by seven floors of a 239,000 SF
mixed-use building located in the SoHo office submarket of
Manhattan, New York. The building is on the National Register for
Historic Places and has been designated as a Landmark. The property
contains 207,000 SF of net rentable area (NRA) comprised of 161,000
SF of office, 45,000 SF of retail and additional storage space. As
of December 2016, the property was 100% leased, the same as at
Moody's last review. Recreational Equipment Inc. (REI) has its
flagship New York City store at this location. Major office tenants
include NYU, Oscar Insurance and Dolce Vita. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to 108%
and 0.88X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Arbor Walk and Palms Crossing Loan
($75 million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by two anchored
retail centers totaling 793,000 SF. Simon Property Group is the
loan sponsor. Arbor Walk was built in 2006, contains 465,000 SF of
retail space and is located in Austin, Texas (eight miles north of
the Austin CBD). Arbor Walk is anchored by Home Depot, Marshalls
and Jo-Ann Fabrics. Palm Crossings was built in 2007, contains
328,000 SF of retail space and is located in McAllen, Texas. Palm
Crossing is anchored by Hobby Lobby, Beall's and Babies R Us. As of
December 2016, Arbor Walk and Palm Crossings were 99% and 85%
leased, respectively. The occupancy at Palm Crossing decreased
after Sports Authority closed its location in 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 78% and
1.29X at the last review.


WOODMONT TRUST 2017-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Woodmont
2017-2 Trust's $1.05 billion floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 11,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term loans
      that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The credit
      enhancement provided through the subordination of cash
      flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Woodmont 2017-2 Trust
Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)        672.00
B                     AA (sf)         130.20
C (deferrable)        A (sf)           93.00
D (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)        77.10
E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)         77.70
Certificates          NR              156.80

NR--Not rated.


ZIGGURAT CLO: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. F-R Sec. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Ziggurat CLO
Ltd.:

US$3,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$320,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$18,400,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$31,600,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-2-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$37,500,000 Class D-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class E-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class F-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class F-R Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC (the "Manager")
manages the CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflects the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Press Release

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 10, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on December 2, 2014 (the "Original Closing
Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced
Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $495,916,045

Defaulted Par: $4,832,472

Diversity Score: 52

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3281

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.09%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.91%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3281 to 3773)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-1-R Notes: -2

Class B-2-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: -1

Class F-R Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3281 to 4265)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-1-R Notes: -3

Class B-2-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -3

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: -1

Class F-R Notes: -4


[*] Moody's Hikes $108MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 15 tranches,
from 6 transactions issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS6 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-7, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS5 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2001-KS3 Trust

A-II, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS11 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS8 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $128.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
and downgraded the ratings of eight tranches from four
transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-3

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5

Cl. 1-A-1A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2003-3

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2016
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR6
Trust

Cl. 2-A-1B2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1B3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5 are
based on both performance of the bonds and the correction of an
error in the cash-flow model used by Moody's in rating this
transaction. In prior rating actions, the cash-flow waterfalls of
interest distribution were modeled incorrectly. This error has now
been corrected, and rating actions on the bonds reflect the
appropriate allocation of interest distribution, as well as the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on those pools.

The rating actions on the remaining bonds are a result of the
recent performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectation on the pools. The rating upgrades are a
result of the improving performance of the related pools and / or
an increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds. The
rating downgrades are due to the weaker performance of the
underlying collateral and / or the erosion of enhancement available
to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 23 Classes From 13 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 23 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2006.  The review yielded 10 upgrades, one
downgrade, and 12 affirmations.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

All of the raised ratings were raised three or more notches.  The
upgrades reflect an increase in credit support for each class since
the last review and are sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses
for these rating levels.

The following table shows the credit support change for each class
since the last review.

CREDIT SUPPORT INCREASES

                       Date of          Credit support (%)
Transaction    Class   last review      Current             Prior

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFA
               M3-A    Nov. 24, 2015    51.82               39.04
               M3-F    Nov. 24, 2015    51.82               39.04

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFB
               M-4     Nov. 24, 2015    73.33               64.53
               M-4     Nov. 24, 2015    60.66               47.99

GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE5
               I-A-1   Nov. 24, 2015    35.41               25.58
               II-A-2  Nov. 24, 2015    35.41               25.58

Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2004-6
               M-2     March 31, 2015   31.17               27.10

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-SL1
               A       Nov. 24, 2015    99.82               61.15
Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-S5

               M1      Nov. 24, 2015    49.38               40.25

Terwin Mortgage Trust 2005-11
               1-M-1a  May 9, 2016      54.75               39.42

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its rating on class II-A-2 from Terwin Mortgage Trust
2005-11 to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because of the implied
writedown of $386,664.  The downgrade reflects S&P's view that this
class is virtually certain to default.

                             AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover our projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Increased delinquencies;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
      and/or
   -- A high proportion of balloon loans in the pool that are
      approaching their maturity date.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2q7qFQf


[*] S&P Puts 117 Ratings From 7 Deals on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on each class from Erie
Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp., Nassau County Tobacco
Settlement Corp., New York Counties Tobacco Trust I,II, III, IV,
and VI, Rockland Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp., Suffolk
Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp., TSASC Inc. (2017), and
Westchester Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp. (2016) on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  All of these transactions
are asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions backed by tobacco
settlement revenues resulting from master settlement agreement
payments.

The CreditWatch negative placements reflect the lower-than-expected
settlement payments as a result of a higher tribal NPM credit,
which is based on the 2015 Native American cigarette sales volume
determined by the independent investigator, Nardello and Co.

Background of New York State NPM adjustments

In October 2015, New York State negotiated its own agreement to
address the master settlement agreement (MSA) NPM adjustments.  The
two remaining original participating manufacturers (OPMs) and a
majority of the subsequent participating manufacturers (SPMs),
executed the New York NPM Settlement, in which more than $690
million was released to New York State from the MSA disputed
payment account.  This agreement also stipulated that New York will
no longer be subject to the NPM adjustments, except in rare
circumstances.   The settlement resolved the NPM adjustment
disputes relating to calendar years 2004 through 2014.  Most of the
settlement payments have occurred for these years, except for an
annual $90 million OPM credit plus a proportionate SPM credit and
prime interest rate, which will be applied to the payments made in
2018 and 2019.

For 2015 and later, the New York NPM Settlement established two PM
credits against future payments to the state.  The first is the
Non-Compliant SET-Paid NPM Sales Credit tax, which is applied if
there is greater noncompliance with the NPM escrow deposit
requirement. As reported by the New York Attorney General's office,
the rate of noncompliance has been within the safe harbor created
under the settlement and they expect to continue to be protected
under the safe harbor.  The payment made in April 2017 does not
include an adjustment for this credit.  The second is the Tribal
NPM Packs credit described below.

Tribal NPM Packs credit

As a result of the New York NPM Settlement, the tobacco companies
are entitled to a tribal credit towards their payments to New York
State.

The Tribal NPM Packs credit is based on the number of NPM cigarette
packs (including NPM packs manufactured on reservations) that are
sold to non-Native American state consumers on or from Native
American reservations in the state, and on which state cigarette
excise tax is not paid.  Because these sales are not reported to
the state, a third-party investigator provides an estimate every
two years.  In January 2017, Nardello and Co. was appointed as the
independent investigator called for by the New York State
settlement agreement.  They were to determine the number of tribal
cigarette packs that were sold to New York State consumers for
which New York State did not collect excise tax in 2015.  The
number of packs determined in 2015 is used to calculate the April
2017 and 2018 Tribal NPM Packs credit.

S&P's rating analysis in 2017 considered a 54 million tribal pack
estimation provided by IHS Global Inc.  IHS Global Inc.'s estimate
took into account an approximation of the cigarette demand in New
York, the population's proximity to a reservation's retail outlet,
and the general tribal cigarette demand.  These results were
compared with "empty pack" studies, as well as the increase in
various state excise taxes, to estimate intrastate smuggling
brought on by the huge disparities in state excise taxes.  Based on
IHS Global Inc.'s estimation, S&P assessed a reasonable base-case
expectation of the tribal pack adjustment for 2015, and then
stressed that expectation by a multiple for each rating category.
For example, the 'BBB' assumption was 87 million packs and the 'A'
assumption was 97 million packs.

In April 2017, Nardello and Co. determined a 2015 volume of 175
million untaxed Native American cigarette packs in comparison to
our initial assumption of 97 million packs under a 'A' scenario
based on IHS Global Inc.'s estimation.  This resulted in a
difference in the 2017 payment to New York State of over $60
million.  S&P expects a similar difference in the 2018 payment year
as the 175 million packs is applied for two years.  As Nardello and
Co. is appointed under the New York State settlement agreement, its
tribal pack determination is binding and cannot be contested.  The
tenor of the independent investigator is four years and it cannot
be removed for dissatisfaction with the outcome.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch negative placements following the
completion of a comprehensive review of each transaction.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Erie Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp. (Series 2005 A&E)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
2005-A    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)
2005-A    BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)
2005-A    BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)
2005-E    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)

Nassau County Tobacco Settlement Corp. (Series 2006)
                    Rating
Class     To                   From
2006 A-1  BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)
2006 A-2  B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
2006 A-3  B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
2006 A-3  B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)


New York Counties Tobacco Trust I (Series 2000)
                    Rating
Class     To                   From
2019      A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
2035      A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
2042      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

New York Counties Tobacco Trust II (Series 2001)  
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
2035      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
2043      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)

New York Counties Tobacco Trust III (Series 2003)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
2043      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)

New York Counties Tobacco Trust IV (Series 2005 A and B)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
2005A     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
2005A     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
2005A     BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)
2005A     B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)
2005A     B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)
2005B     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
2010A     B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

New York Counties Tobacco Trust VI (Series VI)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A-1       A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A-1       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A-1       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A-1       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A-1       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A-1       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A-2A      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A-2B      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
C         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
C         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)

Rockland Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp. (Series 2001)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
2025      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2035      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
2043      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf

Suffolk Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp. (Series 2012)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
2017      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2018      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2019      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2020      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2021      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2022      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2023      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2024      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2025      A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
2026      A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
2032      A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
2037      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)

TSASC Inc. (2017 A and B)
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
A         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
B         BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)
A         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
B         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
A         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
B         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
B         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
A         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
B         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)

Westchester Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp. (Series 2016 A, B,
and C)
                    Rating
Class     To                   From
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
B         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
C         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
C         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
C         BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
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