/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/170423.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 23, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 112

                            Headlines

AIR CANADA 2015-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class C Certs
AMAC CDO I: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to CCCsf
AMMC CLO 16: Moody's Gives Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E-R Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 5: Moody's Raises Rating on Class F Notes to B2
ANTARES CLO 2017-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes

ARROWPOINT CLO 2014-3: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
BANK 2017-BNK4: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Certs
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-CRT2: Fitch Rates Class B-1 Notes 'BB+'
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR3: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. H Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR8: Moody's Hikes Class E Certs Rating to B1

BICENTENNIAL TRUST 2017-1: DBRS Gives (P)Bsf Rating to Cl. G Certs
BICENTENNIAL TRUST 2017-1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to Cl. G Debt
CAPITAL ONE 2002: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class 1D Debt
CARLYLE US 2017-1: Moody's Rates Class D Notes 'Ba3(sf)'
CATSKILL PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. D Notes

CERBERUS LOAN XVIII: Moody's Gives Ba1(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
CITIGROUP 2016-GC37: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
CITIGROUP 2016-P3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
CITIGROUP 2017-P7: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
COLD STORAGE 2017-ICE3: Moody Gives (P)Ba1 Rating to Cl. HRR Certs

COLD STORAGE 2017-ICE3: S&P Gives (P)BB+ Rating on Cl. HRR Certs
CONN'S RECEIVABLES 2017-A: Fitch Rates Class C Notes 'B-sf'
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Rates Cl. B-2 Debt Rating 'Bsf'
DRYDEN 47: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Class F Notes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2017-2: DBRS Gives (P)BBsf Rating to Cl. D Notes
GOLDEN STATE 2017 A-1: S&P Hikes $610MM Bonds Due 2033 to B+
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on A-J Debt
GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC32: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 2013-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Cl. B Certs

JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Fitch Hikes Class L Certs Rating to 'BBsf'
JP MORGAN 2004-C2: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class M Debt to 'CCCsf'
JP MORGAN 2007-C1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. A-M Debt to 'BB+'
JP MORGAN 2014-FL5: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certificates to 'BB-'
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2013-C12: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt

JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
JPMCC TRUST 2016-GG10: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on AM-B Debt
KKR FINANCIAL 2013-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. D-R Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Tranches to 'D'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to Ca

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B+
LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E-RR Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-MKB2: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. F Certs to BB+
MID-STATE CAPITAL 2005-1: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. B Notes to B2
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP21: Moody's Cuts Class E Debt Rating to B2

MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C5: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class H Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C10: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C22: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-2: S&P Gives Prelim. B Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt

NXT CAPITAL 2017-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
OCP CLO 2013-4: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
ONEMAIN DIRECT 2016-1: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba1
PALMER SQUARE 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
PREFERRED TERM XX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to Ba3(sf)

RAMP TRUST 2003-RS10: Moody's Hikes Class M-I-1 Debt Rating to B3sf
SACO I 2005-5: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. II-M-5 Notes to B1(sf)
SOUND POINT III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class F Notes to B1(sf)
TRAPEZA CDO XII: Moody's Hikes Class C-1 Notes Rating to Caa3(sf)
UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class G Notes

VENTURE LTD VIII: Moody' Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba3(sf)
VOYA CLO 2014-2: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class E-R Notes
VOYA CLO 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating on Cl. D Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. H Debt
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Moody's Hikes Class E Certs Rating to Ba1

WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B+
WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Notes
[*] Fitch Takes Actions on 419 Classes in 20 US RMBS Transactions
[*] Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 CRE CDOs
[*] Moody's Hikes $1.96BB of RFC Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007

[*] Moody's Hikes $150MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.1BB of RMBS Issued 2005-2006

                            *********

AIR CANADA 2015-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on the following aircraft
enhanced equipment trust certificates (EETCs):

Air Canada Pass Through Trust Series 2015-1
-- 2015-1 class A certificates due 2027 at 'A';
-- 2015-1 class B certificates due 2023 at 'BBB';
-- 2015-1 class C certificates due 2020 at 'BB'.

Air Canada Pass Through Trust 2013-1 Pass Through Trust
-- 2013-1 class A certificates due 2025 at 'A';
-- 2013-1 class B certificates due 2021 at 'BBB-';
-- 2013-1 class C certificates due 2018 at 'BB'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch's review of the EETC ratings follows the agency's upgrade of
Air Canada's long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from
'B+'. The affirmation of the senior tranches reflects Fitch's
top-down methodology, which relies primarily on collateral value
and where the credit quality of the airline is a secondary factor.


Subordinate tranche ratings are based on a bottoms-up approach,
with the ratings being notched up from the airline's IDR. Although
Air Canada was upgraded by one notch, the affirmation of the
subordinated tranche ratings is due to provisions in Fitch's EETC
criteria that provide for more limited ratings uplift once an
airline is upgraded into the 'BB' category. The criteria state that
Fitch may apply 0-3 notches of ratings uplift depending on Fitch
view of the affirmation factor for airlines rated in the 'B'
category and 0-2 notches for airlines in the 'BB' category.

Both the Air Canada 2013-1 and 2015-1 class A certificates remain
sufficiently overcollateralized to pass Fitch's 'A' level stress
tests when incorporating the latest available aircraft appraisal
data. This suggests that senior tranche debtholders would be
expected to achieve full principal recovery prior to the expiration
of the transaction's liquidity facility even in a harsh downturn
scenario.

There has been no change to Fitch's view of the strategic
importance of either of these pools of aircraft to Air Canada's
fleet and therefore no change to Fitch views that the subordinated
tranche ratings are supported by a high affirmation factor.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for both
transactions include:

-- Asset values in-line with those provided by Fitch's
    independent aircraft appraisers;

-- Asset value depreciation for collateral aircraft at roughly
    5%/year;

-- Asset value stresses in line with those detailed in Fitch's
    EETC criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A tranche ratings are primarily driven by the value of the
underlying collateral. The ratings for the 2013-1 class A
certificates could be considered for a negative action if market
values for the 777-300ER were to experience an unexpected and
severe decline. Similarly, the 2015-1 class A certificates could be
considered for a negative action if 787 values were to experience
an unexpected and severe decline. However, both transactions
feature significant amounts of downside cushion at their current
rating levels. The 2015-1 class A certificates could be considered
for an upgrade if 787 values continue to perform well and if Air
Canada's credit profile stays stable or continues to improve.

The B and C tranche ratings are linked to the underlying airline
IDR. Therefore if Air Canada's IDR were to be upgraded, the B and C
tranches could be upgraded in tandem. However, if Fitch were to
downgrade the IDR to 'B+' the subordinated tranches may not be
downgraded as Fitch EETC criteria provides for some additional
notching for airlines rated in the 'B' category.


AMAC CDO I: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to CCCsf
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one distressed class and affirmed one
distressed class of AMAC CDO Funding I (AMAC CDO).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The CDO is extremely concentrated with only two loans remaining; a
defaulted mezzanine position under which no recovery is expected
and an amortizing whole loan. The upgrade of class E reflects the
class' reduced likelihood of default due to the potential near-term
payoff of the underlying assets. While significant principal
recoveries on the performing loan are expected, the ratings remain
distressed due to the portfolio's concentration and concerns
regarding the loan's ability to pay off at its May 11, 2017
maturity date. Additionally class E, the senior class, requires
timely payment of interest, and should the Robert Plan loan
default, the payment of interest to that class could be disrupted,
causing the class to default.

Since the last rating action, the class A-2 through D-2 notes have
paid in full while class E has received $5.4 million in pay down
from the full payoff of 12 loans as well as scheduled amortization.
As of the March 2017 trustee report, the balance of class E is now
only $654,530. All swaps have been terminated. The CDO remains
under-collateralized by approximately $32.5 million; class F and
below have negative credit enhancement.

A deterministic analysis was performed due to the extreme pool
concentration; a 100% probability of default was assumed and a look
through analysis was performed on the remaining assets with respect
to principal coverage and interest coverage.

The sole performing asset (82.9% of the portfolio), is a whole loan
in the amount of $15.3 million secured by a 203,300 sf office
property located in Bethpage, NY. The loan was extended one year to
May 11, 2017 and the interest rate reduced to 4.5% from 5% in
exchange for the borrower paying down the loan by $3.6 million and
depositing $1 million to a leasing reserve to cover TI/LC costs
associated with a new lease it executed. One tenant (1.3%) is month
to month and all other leases expire between 2020 and 2022.
Occupancy increased to 83.5% as of year-end 2016 compared to 72.3%
the prior year. An expansion lease was recently signed by PSEG
increasing occupancy at the property to approximately 99%. Trailing
12 month ended Sept. 30, 2016 Debt Service Coverage Ratio increased
to 2.38x from 1.20x at YE 2015. Cash flow increased as two new
tenants began paying rent March 1, 2016 and rent from a large
tenant (11% of NRA) that took occupancy Sept. 1, 2016 was
annualized. Per REIS (4Q 2016) the East Nassau submarket vacancy
was 13.3% with asking rents of $27.92/psf. In-place rents at the
property were $26.47/ psf per the December 2016 rent roll.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs'. Cash flow modeling was not performed,
as it would not provide analytical value given that the remaining
assets were modeled at 100% default probability in all stresses.

AMAC CDO is managed by C-III Asset Management LLC. As of the March
2017 trustee report, the transaction was passing its principal and
interest coverage tests.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

There are two assets remaining. Class E is subject to a downgrade
should the performing loan default or should recoveries be lower
than expected. Classes F and below are significantly
under-collateralized and expected to ultimately default.

Fitch has upgraded the following rating:

-- $654,530 class E to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch has affirmed the following rating:

-- $24.3 million class F notes at 'Csf'; RE: 0%.

Classes A-2 through D-2 paid in full. Fitch does not rate the
preferred shares.


AMMC CLO 16: Moody's Gives Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by AMMC CLO 16,
Limited:

U.S.$6,000,000 Class X-R Amortizing Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class X-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$317,985,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$55,015,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$30,000,000 Class C-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

U.S.$30,000,000 Class D-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$27,000,000 Class E-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

American Money Management Corporation (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on April 17, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of certain
classes of notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously
issued on May 14, 2014 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer used the proceeds from the issuance of
the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes. The Issuer also issued one class of subordinated notes on
the Original Closing Date, which is not subject to this refinancing
and will remain outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period; and
changes to certain collateral quality tests.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $497,130,643

Diversity Score: 80

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2949

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2949 to 3391)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X-R Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2949 to 3834)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X-R Notes: 0

Class A-R Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -3

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: -1



ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 5: Moody's Raises Rating on Class F Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Anchorage
Capital CLO 5, Ltd.:

U.S.$305,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2026 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$57,500,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2026 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

U.S.$30,000,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2026 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A1 (sf)

Additionally, Moody's has taken rating actions on the following
outstanding notes issued by the Issuer on the original issuance
date (the "Original Closing Date"):

U.S.$35,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
previously on November 18, 2014 Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$30,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on November 18, 2014 Assigned Ba3 (sf)

U.S.$12,500,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Upgraded to B2 (sf);
previously on November 18, 2014 Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on April 17, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of certain
classes of notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously
issued on the Original Closing Date. On the Refinancing Date, the
Issuer used the proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes
to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

Moody's rating actions on the Class D Notes, Class E Notes, and
Class F Notes are primarily a result of the refinancing, which
increases excess spread available as credit enhancement to the
rated notes. Additionally, Moody's expects the Issuer to continue
to benefit from a portfolio weighted average recovery rate (WARR)
level that is higher than the covenanted test level.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratingss was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of each class of the Issuer's notes is subject to
uncertainty relating to certain factors and circumstances, and this
uncertainty could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of Moody's
ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the Manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by the Manager or other transaction parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: Investing in collateral of better credit
quality, or better than Moody's expected credit performance of the
assets collateralizing the transaction can lead to positive CLO
performance. Conversely, a negative shift in the credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: During the amortization period, the pace of
deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds is an important
source of uncertainty. Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate
owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the Manager, which could have a significant
impact on the ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO
notes, beginning with those notes having the highest payment
priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings can be sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen owing to any decision by the Manager to reinvest into new
issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can increase the default
risk horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
collateral.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions described below,
Moody's conducted additional sensitivity analyses, which were
considered in determining the ratings assigned to the rated notes.
In particular, in addition to the base case analysis, Moody's
conducted sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of
default probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results. Below is a summary of the impact of different
default probabilities, expressed in terms of WARF level, on the
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches difference
versus the base case model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Moody's Assumed WARF - 20% (2680)

Class A-R: 0

Class B-R: +1

Class C-R: +2

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Class F: +2

Moody's Assumed WARF + 20% (4020)

Class A-R: 0

Class B-R: -1

Class C-R: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Class F: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
recovery rate, and weighted average spread, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following
base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $498,474,896

Diversity Score: 57

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3350 (corresponding to a
weighted average default probability of 27.49%)

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.13% (before accounting for LIBOR
floors)

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.45%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.71

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


ANTARES CLO 2017-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Antares CLO
2017-1 Ltd./Antares CLO 2017-1 LLC's $1.611 billion middle-market
floating notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 17,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term loans
      that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The credit
      enhancement provided through the subordination of cash
      flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Antares CLO 2017-1 Ltd./Antares CLO 2017-1 LLC
Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)      1,035.00
B                     AA (sf)         207.00
C (deferrable)        A (sf)          131.40
D (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)       106.20
E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)        131.40
Subordinated notes    NR              206.88

NR--Not rated.


ARROWPOINT CLO 2014-3: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-R, C-R,
D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014
that is managed by Arrowpoint Asset Management LLC.  S&P withdrew
its ratings on the transaction's original class A, B, C, D, and E
notes following payment in full on the April 17, 2017, refinancing
date.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class F
notes, which was not part of the refinancing.

On the April 17, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A, B, C, D, and E notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew the ratings on the transaction's original notes in line
with their full redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the
transaction's replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available
is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the transaction remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd.
Replacement class    Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A-R                  AAA (sf)                 250.00
B-R                  AA (sf)                   48.00
C-R                  A (sf)                    32.40
D-R                  BBB (sf)                  22.00
E-R                  BB (sf)                   17.20

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd.
                        Rating
Original class      To          From
A                   NR          AAA (sf)
B                   NR          AA (sf)
C                   NR          A (sf)
D                   NR          BBB (sf)
E                   NR          BB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd.
Class                Rating
F                    B (sf)

OUTSTANDING CLASS

Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd.
Class                   Rating
Subordinated notes      NR

NR--Not rated.


BANK 2017-BNK4: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to BANK 2017-BNK4 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-BNK4:

-- $33,805,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $88,384,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $235,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $268,432,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,824,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67,045,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $670,445,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $155,639,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,100,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,494,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,270,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,550,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,775,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,270,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,550,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,775,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $43,100,400ab class X-G;
-- $43,100,400b class G;
-- $50,409,442.16bc RR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5% of the
pool balance (as of the closing date).

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 48 loans secured by 64
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,008,188,843 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Bank of America, National Association, Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, and Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 81.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage Higher than Recent Transactions: The transaction has
higher leverage than other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.14x for the trust is lower
than the YTD 2017 average of 1.25x and 2016 average of 1.21x.
Additionally, the pool's Fitch LTV of 110.1% for the trust is
higher than the YTD 2017 average of 104.0% and the 2016 average of
105.2%.

Pool Diversity: The pool shows diversity with respect to loan size
and property type. The top 10 loans represent 52.5% of the pool,
and the loan concentration index (LCI) is 385; both metrics are
below the respective 2016 averages of 54.8% and 422. Loans secured
by office and mixed-use properties that are predominately office
make up a combined 39.9%, followed by retail at 23.2%, hotel at
19.6% and industrial at 9.4%. Overall, there are 19 retail
properties, consisting of a mix of stand-alone, mixed-use,
unanchored and anchored shopping centers. None of the properties
were regional malls.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down by only 8.8%, which is below the 2016
average of 10.4%. Thirteen loans (48.7%) are full-term
interest-only and 13 loans (19.2%) are partial interest-only.
Fitch-rated transactions in 2016 had an average full-term,
interest-only percentage of 33.3% and a partial interest-only
percentage of 33.3%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2017-BNK4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-CRT2: Fitch Rates Class B-1 Notes 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IIIb
Trust 2017-CRT2 the following ratings:

-- $112,032,000 class M notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,185,000 class B-1 initial exchangeable notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $5,820,000 class B-2 initial exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $8,730,000 class B-3 initial exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $112,032,000 class M-X notional notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch will not rate the following classes:

-- $8,729,893 class B-4 initial exchangeable notes;
-- $33,464,893 class B subsequent exchangeable notes.

BOMFT 2017-CRT2 is collateralized by 16 underlying securities from
GSE Credit Risk Transfer (CRT) transactions. The underlying
securities include M2 classes from various Fannie Mae Connecticut
Avenue Securities (CAS) transactions and M3 classes from various
Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) transactions.

The underlying securities are general unsecured obligations of
Fannie Mae ('AAA'/Outlook Stable) and Freddie Mac ('AAA'/Outlook
Stable) and are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
a reference pool of certain residential mortgage loans held in
various Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac-guaranteed MBS. All of the
underlying securities were issued between 2014 and 2015, and 15 of
the underlying securities rely on a fixed tiered loss severity
schedule that is determined by the amount of cumulative credit
events in the reference pool when passing credit losses to
bondholders.

Fitch currently holds public ratings on nine of the 16 underlying
securities ranging from 'B+sf' to 'BBB+sf' and maintains ratings on
at least one class in eight of the 10 underlying transactions. For
the three unrated securities that are not in Fitch-rated
transactions, Fitch relies on publicly available information in its
credit analysis.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M notes, the 'BB+sf' rating on the B-1
notes, the 'BBsf' rating on the B-2 notes, and the 'BB-sf' rating
on the B-3 notes reflects credit enhancement (CE) sufficient to
protect against projected losses on the remaining underlying
reference pool balances of approximately 1.45%, 1.25%, 1.00% and
0.80%, respectively, when the projected reference pool losses are
weighted by the contributing balance of the underlying securities.
To help ensure rating stability on the new notes, the initial CE
provides protection one rating notch above Fitch's rating-stressed
projected losses. For example, the M notes ('BBB-sf') are initially
protected against Fitch's 'BBBsf' rating stress scenario and the
B-1 notes ('BB+sf') are initially protected against Fitch's
'BBB-sf' rating stress scenario.

The CE and projected recovery for the rated notes in this
transaction were assessed by comparing the CE and class size for
each underlying security to Fitch's loss projections for the
related reference mortgage pools. For example, a hypothetical
underlying security with CE of 2.00% and a class size of 1.00% is
assumed to recover 50% of its class principal balance in a rating
stress scenario with a 2.50% underlying reference pool loss. The
total estimated principal recovery amount available to pay the
rated notes is the aggregated projected recovery of each underlying
security, weighted by its contributing balance. Fitch believes this
is a conservative approach to estimating principal recovery for the
new rated classes, since it does not allow for any rating benefit
from the shorter remaining life of the M class. To the extent the
new rated classes pay off in full before Fitch's projected losses
on the underlying reference pools are fully realized, the classes
will be able to sustain more severe stress scenarios than their
initial rating reflects.

The structure allows excess interest collections to be used as
principal payments on the senior class. If the transaction is not
called at the Step Up Date, the interest rate on the class M-X will
fall to 0% and interest otherwise allocated to this class will be
used to pay down the class M. Additionally, interest from the
subordinate bonds will pay down the class M and this amount will
accrue to the subordinate bond balances. While this change is a
positive for the rated classes due to the potential build-up of
overcollateralization, Fitch did not provide additional credit for
this feature. The credit enhancement on each of the rated classes
is sufficient to protect against Fitch's expected loss without the
benefit from any excess spread.

Fitch's credit rating reflects the probability of ultimate recovery
of principal and the timely payment of bond interest up to the Net
WAC cap. Fitch's credit analysis of BOMFT 2017-CRT2 focused
primarily on principal recovery due to the transaction's definition
of the Net WAC cap. The Net WAC cap is defined as the interest
collected (not due) on the underlying securities, net of expenses
over the class principal balance of the P&I notes. In such a
structure, interest shortfalls that can affect credit ratings on
the new classes are generally not possible, since interest due is
effectively defined as interest available.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Performance to Date (Positive): All of the underlying reference
pools have performed well, incurring fewer than 5 bps of loss to
date. The performance has been driven by high credit quality and
strong home price appreciation. The remaining loans have benefitted
from an average of 20% home price appreciation since origination.

Fixed Tiered Loss Severity Transactions (Positive): 15 of the 16
underlying securities are from CRT transactions structured with a
fixed loss severity schedule that is based upon the percentage of
cumulative credit events. This structure limits potential losses to
bondholders. Further, as the transactions age with strong
performance, the potential for high loss severities becomes
increasingly less probable, even in high-stress rating scenarios.

Hard Maturity Date (Positive): All of the underlying transactions
are structured to a final legal maturity at which time the related
issuer will repay the outstanding balance of the transaction in
full. Fitch currently rates the issuers 'AAA' and therefore Fitch
considers the probability of repayment of any outstanding balances
at the maturity date to be a 'AAA' credit risk. The final maturity
date for each transaction is either 10 years or 12.5 years after
issuance depending on whether it is a fixed loss severity
transaction or an actual loss transaction. As the transactions
continue to season and approach the maturity date, the window in
which losses can be realized by the transaction decreases,
resulting in lower loss expectations on the remaining balances.
Fitch applies a reduction to its lifetime default expectations to
account for this, with the most seasoned transactions receiving the
largest benefit.

Sequential Payment Priority (Positive): Due to the sequential
payment priority among the non-senior classes in the underlying
transactions, the underlying securities have benefitted from an
increase in CE as a percentage of the underlying reference pool.  

Not Currently Receiving Principal (Negative): Only five of the
underlying securities are currently receiving principal. However,
Fitch estimates, on average, the underlying securities are likely
to begin receiving principal within two years.

Class Thickness (Negative): The classes of the underlying
securities make up a relatively small percentage of the underlying
reference pool balance, with an average size between 2% and 3%. The
small class sizes relative to the CRTs' capital structure may
increase the potential volatility of recoveries in the event of a
default. When considering the class thickness and recovery
volatility of the underlying securities, Fitch considered the size
of the class relative to the differences between projected
reference pool losses in increasingly stressful rating scenarios.
On average for the underlying securities, the difference between
the scenario that causes a dollar of principal writedown and a
scenario that results in a complete loss to the underlying security
is approximately two full rating categories. Measured a different
way in terms of national home price decline, Fitch estimates the
difference between the scenarios that cause a dollar of loss and a
complete loss on the underlying securities is, on average, a 10%
further national home price decline, which Fitch believes is a
meaningful difference in macroeconomic scenarios. Additionally,
unlike recent vintage private label U.S. RMBS where a relatively
small number of loans can make up 2%-3% of a mortgage pool, the
same percentage represents thousands of loans in CRT transactions,
helping to mitigate idiosyncratic risk.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into receivership if
it determines that the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE)
assets are less than its obligations for longer than 60 days
following the deadline of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA could
repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac if
it is determined that such action would promote an orderly
administration of the GSE's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S.
government will continue to support both Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, as reflected in its current rating of the GSE. However, if at
some point Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, the rating of the GSEs could be downgraded,
and ratings on the notes for the underlying securities - and
ultimately this transaction -- could be affected.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Although the transaction is not a Re-REMIC, since the underlying
securities are not REMIC classes, Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Surveillance
and Re-REMIC Criteria' was considered due to the similarities in
transaction structure with Re-REMICs.

Fitch made two variations to the criteria for this transaction. The
first variation applies to which bonds are eligible for ratings in
new issue Re-REMICs. While Fitch generally limits underlying bond
eligibility to senior bonds that are currently receiving principal
payments, Fitch believes there are sufficient mitigating factors to
provide ratings on these classes. Such factors include the
sequential pay structure and a hard maturity date (in 122 months on
average), which is expected to mitigate tail risk common in U.S.
RMBS. Additionally, performance to date on the reference pools has
been strong, with many rated classes indicating positive rating
pressure. Finally, the issuers of the underlying assets (Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac) hold unique leverage in the residential mortgage
market, which is expected to help mitigate loan quality weakness
and operational risk.

The second variation from the above referenced criteria is in
relation to the application of Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model
(PCM), typically used to rate multiple bond Structured Credit
transactions. The U.S. RMBS Re-REMIC criteria state that Fitch will
utilize a hybrid approach between Fitch's RMBS and Structured
Credit groups for transactions backed by more than five
non-distressed RMBS. While Fitch ensured the projected U.S. RMBS
default probability of the underlying securities was consistent, or
higher than under the PCM approach, Fitch relied on the GSE CRT
bond-level analysis (rather than the generic U.S. RMBS portfolio
probabilities used in the Structured Credit PCM model) to estimate
the recoveries of the underlying securities in the event of a
default. Fitch used the GSE CRT bond-specific recoveries, rather
than the generic U.S. RMBS portfolio assumptions from the PCM
Structured Credit approach, due to structural features that are
uncommon in U.S. RMBS mezzanine classes, such as sequential payment
priority and hard maturity dates.

The use of the bond-specific GSE CRT recoveries resulted in a
rating approximately 2-3 ticks higher than the rating implied with
the generic U.S. RMBS recoveries generated by the Structured Credit
PCM approach due to the distinctive structural features of the
underlying GSE CRT bonds relative to traditional US RMBS.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR3: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. H Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed seven classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-PWR3 (BSCMSI
2004-PWR3).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Credit Enhancement: The upgrade to class G reflects sufficient
credit enhancement and continued de-levering of the transaction
through amortization and paydown of maturing loans following the
resolution of two previously specially serviced assets, as well as
support from defeased collateral (8.4%).

Pool Concentration: The transaction is highly concentrated with
only seven loans remaining of the original 118. None of the loans
are delinquent or in special servicing. Fitch capped the ratings
for class G based on the transaction's concentrations.

Property Type Concentration: 80.6% of the remaining pool is secured
by retail properties. The largest loan (36.7%) has exposure to
Sears with a lease that expires in July 2017.
Maturity Concentration: $3.8 million (October 2017), $7.1 million
(2018), $1.8 million (2019) and $3.8 million (2023-2034).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlook on class G reflects the increasing credit
enhancement and expected continued pay down to the class following
the resolution of two previously specially serviced assets. The
rating on class G was capped at 'Asf' due to the pool's
concentrations, and further upgrades are unlikely. Downgrades would
be considered should loans transfer to special servicing or
expected losses increase.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following rating:

-- $4.5 million class G to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable
from Negative.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $11.7 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 90%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D, E and F have paid in full.
Class Q is not rated. Classes X-1 and X-2 were previously
withdrawn.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR8: Moody's Hikes Class E Certs Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR8, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-PWR8:

Cl. E, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of Class E was upgraded due to an increase in credit
support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has
paid down 66% since Moody's last review.

The rating of Class F was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected plus realized loss. Class F has
already experienced a 29% realized loss as a result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating of the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 17.1% of the
current balance, compared to 55.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.6% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 30% of the pool is in
special servicing. Moody's determines a probability of default for
each specially serviced loan that it expects will generate a loss
and estimates a loss given default based on a review of broker's
opinions of value (if available), other information from the
special servicer, available market data and Moody's internal data.
The loss given default for each loan also takes into consideration
repayment of servicer advances to date, estimated future advances
and closing costs. Translating the probability of default and loss
given default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies
the aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to the most junior
classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior classes.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 13, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $15.8 million
from $1.77 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 2.8%
of the remaining pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Two loans, constituting 18% of the remaining pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $89.6 million (for an
average loss severity of 42.7%). One loan, the Sunnyside Plaza
Shopping Center ($4.7 million -- 29.7% of the pool), is currently
in special servicing. The loan is secured by a 66,698 square foot
(SF) grocery-anchored retail property located in Winchester,
Virginia. The improvements were constructed in 1990 and renovated
with the addition of a second building in 2001-2002 (6,000 SF). The
loan was transferred to special servicing due to imminent default
in October 2012. The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
(VADEQ) has indicated that they would like additional sampling and
installation of a voluntary mitigation system in regards to an
environmental issue. The special servicer is completing
environmental investigations in conjunction with the in place
receiver. The special servicer has also been advised of a title
defect which must be corrected prior to finalizing the foreclosure.
Once the defect is corrected, the special servicer intends to
proceed with enforcement of remedies.

Moody's received full or partial year 2015 operating results for
100% of the pool and full or partial year 2016 operating results
for 53% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 55%
compared to 54% at last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.6% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.88X and 1.91X,
respectively, compared to 1.87X and 1.87X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 56% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Norwood Shopping Center Loan ($5.9 million --
37.8% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery-anchored retail
center in North Hills, California, a suburb situated approximately
24 miles northwest of the Los Angeles CBD. The property was 100%
leased as of December 2016, compared to 97% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 59% and 1.57X, respectively, compared to
60% and 1.54X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Stonebriar Village Loan ($1.9
million -- 12.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 100-unit
garden-style multifamily community located in Plainview, Texas. The
property was 89% leased as of June 2016, compared to 99% occupied
as of last review. The loan has a maturity date in April 2017 and
the borrower indicated they intend to pay off the loan.

The third largest loan is the Waterman Plaza Loan ($845,534 -- 5.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 7,800 SF retail strip center
that is shadow anchored by a Bel Air supermarket and is located in
Elk Grove, California, a suburb of Sacramento. The property was
100% leased as of September 2016, however, the loan has been placed
on the watchlist as a result of the largest tenant being on a
month-to-month lease. The loan has amortized over 48% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 44% and 2.18X,
respectively, compared to 39.7% and 2.42X at the last review.


BICENTENNIAL TRUST 2017-1: DBRS Gives (P)Bsf Rating to Cl. G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-1 to be issued by
Bicentennial Trust as follows:

-- AAA (sf) to the Class A Certificates
-- AA (sf) to the Class B Certificates
-- A (sf) to the Class C Certificates
-- BBB (sf) to the Class D Certificates
-- BBB (low) (sf) to the Class E Certificates
-- BB (sf) to the Class F Certificates
-- B (sf) to the Class G Certificates (collectively, the Rated
    Certificates)

The Class H Certificates and Class Z Certificates (collectively
with the Rated Certificates, the Certificates) are not rated by
DBRS.

The ratings are based on the following factors:

(1) The collateral is a diversified pool of $2.0 billion
first-lien, fixed-rate, conventional Canadian residential mortgages
with a maximum loan-to-value (LTV) of 80% originated by Bank of
Montreal (BMO). The weighted-average LTV was 66.5% as of the
cut-off date based on indexed property value.

(2) The experience of BMO in the residential mortgage market with

     strong performance history and servicing capability.

(3) Pass-through structure increases subordination over time.

(4) BMO provides lifetime representations and warranties.

DBRS uses the Canadian RMBS model to estimate default frequency,
loss severity and expected loss on a loan-level basis. The RMBS
model output does not include the risk of mortgage default at
maturity (i.e., balloon risk). Balloon risk is considered to be low
in this transaction due to strong asset quality, the financial
strength of the Seller, proven refinancing liquidity during the
financial crisis and if a performing mortgage is not renewed by the
Seller or any other lender prior to its maturity date, the
Administrator (including a Replacement Administrator) will extend
the maturity date up to five years (to no later than the Rated
Final Distribution Date) and maintain the same interest rate that
was in effect prior to extension in order to prevent the mortgage
from becoming delinquent or defaulted at maturity. To assess the
balloon risk, DBRS nevertheless considers the probability of no
lender liquidity at the end of the loan tenure and a hypothetic
percentage of loan defaults as a result of non-renewal. The balloon
risk is in addition to the credit risk estimated by the RMBS model.
When determining the loss severity of loans that default as a
result of non-renewal, since such borrowers have been current on
their mortgage payments and the timing of default is known, DBRS
considers scheduled mortgage payments and a certain level of house
price appreciation during the mortgage term.

With the RMBS model results and adjustment for balloon risk, DBRS
runs a proprietary cash flow model incorporating the transaction
structure and assumptions for timing of default, interest rates and
prepayments. The result was that the Rated Certificates with the
proposed structure could withstand each stress scenario with no
loss. The ability of the Issuer to repay interest and principal of
the Rated Certificates is consistent with the respective ratings.

The Seller and Administrator, BMO, is rated AA/R-1 (high) with
Negative trends by DBRS as of July 28, 2016, and is the
fourth-largest Schedule I bank in Canada as measured by assets with
approximately $692.4 billion assets as of January 31, 2017.


BICENTENNIAL TRUST 2017-1: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to Cl. G Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional credit ratings
to the following classes of certificates to be issued by
Bicentennial Trust:

Issuer: Bicentennial Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
2017-1

CAD1,862.531M Cl. A Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

CAD39.211M Cl. B Certificate, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

CAD19.605M Cl. C Certificate, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

CAD14.704M Cl. D Certificate, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

CAD6.862M Cl. E Certificate, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

CAD6.862M Cl. F Certificate, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

CAD5.882M Cl. G Certificate, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

This transaction represents the inaugural issuance by Bicentennial
Trust, which is sponsored by Bank of Montreal (BMO) (Aa3, negative;
a2, Aa2(cr); Prime-1). The certificates are supported by 6,364
prime quality, fixed rate mortgage loans originated by BMO, with a
total balance of CAD1,960,559,333 as of the February 28, 2017
cut-off date. All mortgage loans were extended to obligors located
in Canada and secured by Canadian residential properties.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the notes are based on an analysis of the
characteristics of the underlying portfolio, protection provided by
credit enhancement and the structural integrity of the
transaction.

In analyzing the portfolio, Moody's determined the MILAN Credit
Enhancement (CE) of 5% and the portfolio Expected Loss (EL) of
0.45%. The MILAN CE and portfolio EL are key input parameters for
Moody's cash flow model.

MILAN CE of 5%: This is consistent with the average MILAN CE
assumption for other Canadian RMBS and covered bond transactions
and follows Moody's assessment of the loan-by-loan information
taking into account the historical performance and the pool
composition including (i) the relatively low weighted average
current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 66.46% (ii) and weighted
average credit score of 741.

Portfolio expected loss of 0.45%: This is based on Moody's
assessment of the lifetime loss expectation for the pool taking
into account (i) the historical collateral performance of the loans
to date; as provided by the seller; (ii) the current macroeconomic
environment in Canada and (iii) benchmarking with similar RMBS
transactions.

Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement in this transaction is
primarily comprised of subordination provided by the junior
tranches. Under the sequential pay structure, all scheduled
principal payments and prepayments are used to pay down the
certificates in order of seniority.

Operational Risk Analysis: BMO's servicing is considered to be a
strength, given its credit rating of Aa2(cr)/P-1; a local,
branch-based focus on the account relationships that helps detect
borrower stress early; and a centralized and specialized loan
collection department responsible for delinquency management.
Moody's believe that BMO has adequate controls and procedures in
place to provide high quality servicing.

Balloon Risk Analysis: BMO (the seller) is required to offer to
renew or refinance all mortgage loans at their contractual
maturity, providing the borrower is not in default and satisfies
BMO's underwriting criteria at such time. Upon renewal or refinance
of a mortgage loan, BMO will repurchase that mortgage loan from the
trust for an amount equal to the full principal amount of the loan
plus accrued interest. If, prior to the end of the contractual term
of a performing mortgage loan, the related borrower has not
received an offer from BMO consistent with then prevailing posted
mortgage rates or entered into an agreement with another party to
renew, refinance, or repay the loan, then the servicer of the
portfolio will be required to extend all such loans at their
existing interest rate. Mortgage loans that are extended by the
servicer would continue to be held by the Custodian and collections
would continue to flow through to the certificate holders. The
combination of BMO's conditional obligation to offer to renew all
mortgage loans at the end of their contractual term, and the
requirement on the part of the servicer to extend any remaining
performing loans at the end of their contractual term, eliminates
the risk that a performing borrower may be pushed into default by a
demand for repayment at the end of the contractual term. This
effectively mitigates the balloon risk associated with the
Bicentennial mortgage pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

This methodology was calibrated based on settings specific for
Canada.

Deviations from Published Methodology

Rating committees, where appropriate, consider other factors that
Moody's deem relevant to Moody's analysis and adapt the methodology
accordingly. In determining the ratings on this transaction,
Moody's have deviated from Moody's published methodology in that
the MILAN model settings for Canada are primarily intended to be
used in evaluating mortgage pools that back covered bond or
asset-backed commercial paper programs because these types of
transactions adequately address the balloon risk that exists in
Canadian residential mortgages. In the case of the Bicentennial
Trust transaction, the balloon risk in the pool is structurally
mitigated through BMO's conditional obligation to renew and
repurchase loans at the end of their contractual term, and the
requirement of the servicer to extend all maturing, performing
loans that have not otherwise been renewed and repurchased by BMO,
or repaid by the borrower. Use of MILAN is therefore appropriate
for this transaction.

Please note that on March 21, 2017, Moody's released a Request for
Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance. Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment,
titled " Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing
Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close, due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions. For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater unemployment,
worsening household affordability and a weaker housing market could
result in downgrade of the rating. Deleveraging of the capital
structure or conversely a deterioration in the certificate's
available credit enhancement could result in an upgrade or a
downgrade of the rating, respectively.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal at par on or before the rated final legal
maturity date. Moody's ratings only address the credit risk
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's preliminary
credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the transaction and
associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour to assign
definitive ratings to the certificates. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating. Moody's will disseminate the
assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client Service
Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing basis.



CAPITAL ONE 2002: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class 1D Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Capital One Multi-asset
Execution Trust. The Rating Outlooks are Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on continued stable trust performance.
The current 12-month average gross yield is 22.12% as of the March
2017 reporting period, slightly lower than the 12-month average of
22.59% the previous year.

Monthly payment rate (MPR), a measure of how quickly consumers are
paying off their credit card debts, has improved over the past
year. Currently, the 12-month average is 29.59%, higher than the
12-month average of 28.54% the previous year.

Gross charge-offs have experienced a slight decline over the past
year. As of the March 2017 reporting period the 12-month average is
3.43%, compared to 3.67% as of the March 2016 reporting period.
Twelve-month averages for 60+ day delinquencies also declined to
1.40% from 1.48% over the same period.

Fitch runs cash flow breakeven analysis by applying stress
scenarios to three-, six-, and 12-month performance averages to
evaluate the breakeven loss multiples at different rating levels.
The performance variables that Fitch stresses are the gross yield,
MPR, gross charge-off, and purchase rates. Fitch's analysis
included a comparison of observed performance trends over the past
few months to Fitch's base case expectations for each outstanding
rating category. As part of its ongoing surveillance efforts, Fitch
will continue to monitor the performance of these trusts. For
further information, please review the U.S. Credit Card ABS
Issuance updates published on a monthly basis, available at
www.fitchratings.com.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Eligible Institution: Fitch looks to its own ratings in analyzing
counterparty risk and assessing counterparty's creditworthiness, as
per the Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds, dated March 20, 2017. The definition of eligible
institutions for this deal allows for the possibility of using a
depository institution not rated by Fitch, which does not meet the
Fitch counterparty criteria for a 'AAAsf' rated note. Since The
Bank of New York Mellon, as Indenture Trustee currently maintains a
'AA'/'F1+'/Stable Outlook rating, Fitch doesn't believe such a
variation currently has a measurable impact upon the ratings
assigned.

Commingling: Under the Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance
and Covered Bonds dated March 20, 2017, Fitch looks to its own
ratings in analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a
counterparty's creditworthiness. The Indenture, does not mention
Fitch by name in the required minimum ratings for the servicer to
be excluded from the two day remittance provision, which represents
a criteria variation. Since Capital One Bank is currently rated
'A-'/'F1', and the rating thresholds for commingling are in line
with Fitch's criteria, Fitch doesn't believe such variation has a
measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch models three different scenarios when evaluating the rating
sensitivity compared to expected performance for credit card
asset-backed securities transactions: 1) increased defaults; 2) a
reduction in purchase rate, and 3) a combination stress of higher
defaults and lower MPR.

Increasing defaults alone has the least impact on rating migration
even in the most severe scenario of a 75% increase in defaults. The
rating sensitivity to a reduction in purchase rate also does not
result in any rating migration in the most severe scenario of a
100% decrease in purchase rate. The harshest scenario assumes both
stresses to defaults and MPR to occur simultaneously. The ratings
would only be downgraded under the severe stress of a 75% increase
in defaults and 35% reduction in MPR. To date, the transactions
have exhibited strong performance with all performance metrics
within Fitch's initial expectations. For further discussion of
sensitivity analysis, please see the new issue report related to
one of the transactions listed below.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Capital One Multi-asset Execution Trust

--2007-5A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2007-7A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2014-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2014-4A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2014-5A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-2A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-4A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-5A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-6A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-7A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2015-8A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-2A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-4A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-5A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-6A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2016-7A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2017-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2017-2A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2017-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2004-3B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
--2005-3B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
--2009-C (B) at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
--2009-A (C) at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
--2002-1D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.



CARLYLE US 2017-1: Moody's Rates Class D Notes 'Ba3(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Carlyle US CLO 2017-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$302,225,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$87,775,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$67,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2(sf)

US$32,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$38,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Carlyle 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Carlyle CLO Management L.L.C. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's six year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 10.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes:-1

Class A-2 Notes:-2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


CATSKILL PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Catskill Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$612,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$47,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1b Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$80,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$77,500,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$57,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$45,000,00 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Catskill Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans (excluding any second lien loans), cash,
and eligible investments, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist
in the aggregate of second lien loans and unsecured loans. Moody's
expects the portfolio to be approximately 88% ramped as of the
closing date.

GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 5 year reinvestment
period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,000,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2796

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2796 to 3215)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: 0

Class A-1b Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2796 to 3635)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: -1

Class A-1b Notes: -3

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


CERBERUS LOAN XVIII: Moody's Gives Ba1(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Cerberus Loan Funding XVIII L.P.

Moody's rating action is:

US$306,450,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$45,600,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$59,550,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$33,900,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa2 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba1 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Cerberus XVIII is a managed cash flow SME CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by small and medium enterprise
senior secured corporate loans. At least 80% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien loans, cash and eligible investments, and up
to 20% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans. The
portfolio was approximately 90% ramped as of the closing date.

Cerberus Business Finance, LLC (the "Servicer") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's two year
reinvestment period.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 30

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3975

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 6.75%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 38.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

On the closing date, a small percentage of the portfolio consisted
of loans for which the Issuer has not yet obtained Moody's credit
estimates, but based on the information received Moody's expects
that Moody's will assign credit estimates to these loans when
sufficient information becomes available. In determining Moody's
base-case assumptions, Moody's assumed that such loans have rating
factors commensurate with credit estimates that are lower than the
average credit estimate of the loans in the closing portfolio. In
addition, Moody's ratings analysis included stress scenarios in
which Moody's assumed a rating factor commensurate with a Caa3
rating for certain concentrations of such loans.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3975 to 4571)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3975 to 5168)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1



CITIGROUP 2016-GC37: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust (CGCMT) 2016-GC37 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The annualized 2016 NOI for the pool is flat
compared to issuance underwriting and within Fitch's expectation
for pool's performance. There are no delinquent or specially
serviced loans and only one loan on the watchlist (0.9%). The loan
is loan the watchlist due to servicer questions on the provided
rent roll.

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 0.04% to $691.7 million from
$694.7 million at issuance. Per servicer reporting there is one
loan (1%) on the watchlist for discrepancies with a recently
submitted rent roll. There are no defeased loans.

High Pool Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 56.1% of
the pool by balance. This is in line with the YTD 2016 average of
56.2% and greater than the 2015 average of 49.3%.

Primary Market Exposure: Seven of the top 10 properties totalling
39.7% of the pool are located in the CBDs of primary markets,
including New York, Denver, Los Angeles and Austin.

Above-Average Hotel Exposure: There are six loans, representing
16.2% of the pool, that consist of hotel properties, plus a
mixed-use building with a hotel component that make up 5.7% of the
pool. This is higher than the YTD 2016 average of 14.9% and the
2015 average hotel concentration of 17%. Hotels have the highest
probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower CBMS model.

High Fitch Leverage: The pool has higher leverage statistics than
other recent Fitch-rated transactions. At issuance, the pool's
weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR of 1.04x is below both the YTD
2016 average of 1.14x and the 2015 average of 1.18x. The pool's WA
Fitch LTV of 115.3% is above both the YTD 2016 average of 108.7%
and the 2015 average of 109.3%.

Lack of Full-Year Information: As this is the transaction's first
review and less than 12 months since issuance, limited full year
financial information is available.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains stable. Due to the
recent issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset level event changes the portfolio-level
metrics. Future upgrades may be limited due to the transaction's
high concentration of hotel properties which exhibit increased
long-term performance volatility, but could occur with sustained
improved performance and additional paydown. Downgrades are
possible with significant performance declines.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $19 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $227.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $523.2a million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.9a million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39.9b million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.9b million class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $106.8b million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.0b million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.2c million class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.2ac million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.1c million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.8c million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes G and H.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
exchanged for the class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.
(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.


CITIGROUP 2016-P3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust CGCMT 2016-P3 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral. There have been no material changes to the
pool since issuance, and therefore the original rating analysis was
considered in affirming the transaction. As of the March 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 0.2% to $769.5 million from $771 million at issuance.

Stable Performance: The performance of the pool has been largely
stable since issuance with no loans delinquent or in special
servicing. At issuance, the pool was highly leveraged.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The twentieth largest loan (1.4%), 725 8th
Avenue, is on the master servicer's watchlist as a result of the
single tenant, Wahlburgers, never taking occupancy. The tenant
reportedly began paying rent in March 2016, but the space remains
under construction and the tenant has not taken physical occupancy.


New York City Concentration: Eight loans (38% of the pool) are
secured by properties located in the New York MSA, including six of
the top 10. Nyack College NYC, 600 Broadway, 79 Madison Avenue, 5
Penn Plaza, and 225 Liberty Street are located in Manhattan. One
Court Square is located in Long Island City, Queens.

Below-Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by
6.8% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, significantly
worse than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 11.7% and 10%,
respectively. Twelve loans (47.4%) are full-term, interest-only,
and 13 loans (37%) are partial interest-only. The remaining 12
loans (15.6%) are amortizing balloon loans with terms of five to 10
years.

High Pool concentration: The top 10 loans represent 61.4% of the
pool, which is greater than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 49.3%
and 56.2%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $12.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $98.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $221.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $580.2 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.4 million class X-B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $121.4 million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $38.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44.3 million class X-D* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Indicates notional amount and interest-only.

The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


CITIGROUP 2017-P7: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings and Outlooks to Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-P7, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2017-P7:

--$18,129,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$94,881,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$250,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$289,834,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$49,088,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$773,379,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$45,124,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$47,631,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$71,447,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$45,124,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$47,631,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$57,659,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$57,659,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$27,576,000ad class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$10,028,000ad class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$17,397,073ace class V-2A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$1,015,059ace class V-2B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$1,071,454ace class V-2C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$1,297,033ace class V-2D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$18,412,132ace class V-3AB 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$1,071,454ace class V-3C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$1,297,033ace class V-3D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

--$41,363,974ad class G;
--$22,556,995ace VRR Interest;
--$1,776,376ace class V-2E;
--$1,776,376ace class V-3E.

(a) Privately placed.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Part of a vertical credit risk retention interest that in the
aggregate has a principal balance representing approximately 2.2%
of the fair value of all classes of regular certificates issued by
the issuing entity as of the closing date.
(d) Part of a horizontal credit risk retention interest that in the
aggregate has a fair value as of the closing date representing
approximately 2.8825% of the fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.
(e) Exchangeable Certificates.

Since Fitch issued its expected ratings on March 23, 2017, the
V-2A, V-2B, V-2C, V-2D, V-2E, V-3AB, V-3C, V-3D, and V-3E classes
have been added to the transaction structure as exchangeable
certificates exchangeable for the VRR Interest. The classes above
represent the final ratings and transaction structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 46 loans secured by 58
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,025,317,969 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Citi Real
Estate Funding Inc., Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC, and Principal
Commercial Capital.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 84.5% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 88.8%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Above-Average Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are
slightly worse than those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.17x is
slightly worse than the YTD 2017 average of 1.25x and the 2016
average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of 106.8% is higher than
average when compared with the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 104%
and 105.2%, respectively. Excluding the credit opinion loan, the
pool has a Fitch DSCR of 1.16x and Fitch LTV of 108.2%.

High Office and Low Hotel Concentration: Loans secured by office
properties and mixed-use properties that are predominantly office
make up a combined 61.6% of the pool. The pool's office
concentration is well-above the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 43.1%
and 28.7%, respectively. Hotel properties comprise only 6.5% of the
pool which is below the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 12.2% and
16%, respectively. Loans secured by office properties have an
average probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.
Conversely, hotel properties have the highest probability of
default in Fitch's multiborrower model, all else equal.

Weak Amortization: Eighteen loans (48.2%) are full-term interest
only and 15 loans (36.2%) are partial interest only. Fitch-rated
transactions at 2017 YTD had an average full-term interest-only
percentage of 49.9% and a partial-interest-only percentage of
25.8%. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will
pay down by only 7.7%, which is above the 2017 YTD average of 7%
but significantly below the 2016 average of 10.4%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CGCMT 2017-P7 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


COLD STORAGE 2017-ICE3: Moody Gives (P)Ba1 Rating to Cl. HRR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by Cold
Storage Trust 2017-ICE3, Commercial Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2017-ICE3:

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. HRR, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to a portfolio of 54
temperature controlled properties. The single borrower underlying
the mortgage is comprised of 21 special-purpose bankruptcy-remote
entities, each of which is indirectly wholly owned and controlled
by Lineage Logistics Holdings, LLC.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of Moody's Single Borrower methodology. The rating
approach for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit
risk inherent in the underlying property with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely driven
by the LTV of the underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $1,295,000,000 represents a Moody's
LTV of 80.3%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 4.93X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.39X.

Loan collateral is comprised of the borrower's fee interest in 53
temperature-controlled properties and a leasehold interest in one
temperature-controlled property located within 17 states.
Construction dates range between 1950 and 2016 and reflect an
average age of 17.3 years.

Property subtypes based on Moody's classification include
Distribution/Port (28 properties; 62.9% of TTM NCF; 62.1% of total
square footage), Production Attached/Advantaged (10 properties;
21.8% of TTM NCF; 16.9% of total square footage) and public
warehouse (16 properties; 15.3% of TTM NCF; 21.0% of total square
footage). Most of the facilities are well-suited for their use,
exhibiting a weighted average clear height of 32.7 feet. For the
twelve months up to February 28, 2017 the portfolio's utilization
rate was 80.0%.

Moody's analysis for temperature controlled portfolios
predominantly focuses on five main factors. These include the
assessment of (1) a facility's proximity to a Global Gateway
Industrial Market, agricultural and/or food producers, (2) Building
Size, (3) Functionality of a facility, (4) Property Subtype which
is categorized into three distinct subgroups mainly Public
Warehouse, Production Attached/Advantaged, and Distribution/Port
Facilities and (5) Utilization and Contracts with food producers,
pharmaceutical companies, manufactures and farmers. With respect to
the portfolio collateral, Moody's assessment of the portfolio's
value centers was positive with respect to facility size,
functionality metrics, and location.

Revenues for the underlying 54 properties are effectively
cross-collateralized. Loans secured by multiple properties benefit
from lower cash flow volatility given that excess cash flow from
one property can be used to augment another's cash flow to meet
debt service requirements. The loan also benefit from the pooling
of equity from each underlying property.

There are 21 borrowers which are all special purpose entities that
are 100% directly or indirectly owned by the loan sponsor, who is
the non-recourse guarantor. The borrowers are all special-purpose
bankruptcy-remote entities each of which is required to appoint one
or more independent directors, managers or others similar persons.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which it uses for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type. These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5%, 14.2%,
or 22.5%, the model-indicated rating for the currently rated (P)
Aaa (sf) class would be (P) Aa1 (sf), (P) Aa3 (sf), or (P) A3 (sf),
and currently rated (P) Aa3 (sf) class would be (P) A2 (sf), (P)
Baa1 (sf), or (P) Ba1 (sf), respectively. Additionally, the model
indicated rating for the currently rated (P) A3 (sf) class would be
(P) Baa2 (sf), (P) Ba1 (sf), or (P) B1 (sf), and currently rated
(P) Baa3 (sf) class would be (P) Ba2 (sf), (P) B1 (sf), and (P)
Caa1 (sf), respectively, and currently rated (P) Ba1 (sf) class
would be (P) Ba3 (sf), (P) B2 (sf), (P) Caa2 (sf). Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's and (b) must be construed solely
as a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


COLD STORAGE 2017-ICE3: S&P Gives (P)BB+ Rating on Cl. HRR Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Cold Storage
Trust 2017-ICE3's $1.295 billion commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2017-ICE3.

The certificate issuance is commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $1.295 billion, with five one-year extension
options, secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 54
temperature-controlled warehouse properties, and a security
interest in the master lease and the rents due thereunder.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 18,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the guarantor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cold Storage Trust 2017-ICE3

Class       Rating(i)             Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)             765,102,000
B           AA- (sf)             180,024,000
C           A- (sf)              135,018,000
D           BBB- (sf)            150,106,000(ii)
HRR         BB+ (sf)              64,750,000(ii)

(i) The rating on each class of securities is preliminary and
subject to change at any time.  The issuer will issue the
certificates to qualified institutional buyers in line with Rule
144A of the Securities Act of 1933.  
(ii) The initial certificate balances of the class D and HRR
certificates are subject to change based on the final pricing of
all certificates and the final determination of the eligible
horizontal residual interest that will be held by a retaining
third-party purchaser in order for Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co. and
JPMorgan Chase Bank National Association, as retaining sponsors, to
satisfy their U.S. risk retention requirements with respect to this
securitization transaction.


CONN'S RECEIVABLES 2017-A: Fitch Rates Class C Notes 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to Conn's
Receivables Funding 2017-A, LLC (Conn's 2017-A), which consists of
notes backed by retail loans originated and serviced by Conn
Appliances, Inc. (Conn's):

-- $313,220,000 class A notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $106,270,000 class B notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,340,000 class C notes at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class R notes at 'NRsf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The 2017-A trust pool consists of 100%
fixed-rate consumer loans originated and serviced by Conn's
Appliances, Inc. The pool exhibits a weighted average FICO score of
606 and a weighted average borrower rate of 26.66%.

Fitch's base case default rate for the 2017-A pool is 24.25% and a
2.2x stress is applied at the 'BBBsf' level, reflecting the high
absolute value of the historical defaults, along with the
variability of default performance in recent years and the high
geographic concentration.

Rating Cap at 'BBBsf': Due to higher loan defaults in recent years,
management changes at Conn's, high concentration of receivables
from Texas, and Conn's credit risk profile, Fitch placed a rating
cap on this transaction at the 'BBBsf' category.

Dependence on Trust Triggers: The trust depends on the three trust
performance triggers in order to ensure the payments due on the
notes during times of degrading collateral performance. As a
result, the class A and B notes are most affected by the
front-loaded default curves, in which stressed defaults rise above
trigger levels before excess cash can be released. For the class C
notes, particularly in back-loaded default scenarios, excess cash
can be released before the triggers go into effect, which
constrains the ratings of the notes.

Credit Enhancement: The expected initial hard credit enhancement
(CE) for class A, B, and C is 45.5%, 26.5%, and 17.5%,
respectively. The trust must build to an overcollateralization
target of 35% before any excess cash can be released. This target
has been reduced to 35% from 40% in Conn's 2016-B, which is a
primary driver of the lower class C rating of 'B-sf'.

Servicing Capabilities: Conn Appliances, Inc. has a long track
record as an originator, underwriter, and servicer. The credit risk
profile of the entity is mitigated by the backup servicing provided
by Systems & Services Technologies, Inc. (SST), who has committed
to a servicing transition period of 30 days.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or charge-offs
on customer accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the investments. Decreased CE may make
certain ratings on the investments susceptible to potential
negative rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing a transaction's
initial base case write-off assumption by an additional 10%,
additional 25% and additional 50%, and examining the rating
implications. The increases of the base case write-offs are
intended to provide an indication of the rating sensitivity of the
notes to unexpected deterioration of a transaction's performance.

During the sensitivity analysis, Fitch examines the magnitude of
the multiplier compression by projecting the expected cash flows
and loss coverage levels over the life of investments under higher
than the initial base case charge-off assumptions. Fitch models
cash flows with the revised charge-off estimates while holding
constant all other modeling assumptions.

Under the 10% stress, the class A, B, and C notes would be
downgraded one notch. Under the 25% stress, the class A notes would
be downgraded below investment grade, the class B notes would be
downgraded one category to Bsf, and the class C notes would be
downgraded to speculative grade. Under the 50% stress, the class A
would be downgraded to 'BB-sf', while the class B and C notes would
be downgraded to speculative grade.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
and downgraded the ratings on three classes in Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C2:

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes (Classes A-M & A-MFL) were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on seven P&I classes (Classes A-J, B, C, D, G, H & J)
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss.

The ratings on two P&I classes (Classes E & F) were downgraded due
to realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class A-X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 30.7% of the
current balance, compared to 10.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 11.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 77% to $590 million
from $3.298 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 34 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 78% of the pool. Three loans, constituting
5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Eighteen loans, constituting 60% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $138 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%). Nine loans, constituting 25% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Metro Square 95 Office Park loan ($48 million -- 8.4% of the
pool), which is secured by a seven-building office campus located
in Jacksonville, Florida, just south of the Jacksonville CBD. The
property was 77% leased as of June 2015, compared to 90% as of
December 2014. Major tenants at the property include Wells Fargo,
Skate World, and Baptist Medical; Wells Fargo renewed their lease
in December 2015 through 2020. The loan transferred to special
servicing in September 2011 for imminent default after the borrower
submitted a financial hardship letter.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 300-318 East
Fordham Road - A Note loan($30 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which
is secured by a street level retail space in the Bronx, New York,
the third largest retail district in New York City. The loan was
previously modified in 2012, bifurcating the original loan balance
of $47 million into a $30 million A-Note and a $17.7 million
B-Note. The loan transferred back to special servicing for the
second time due to delinquency in April 2015. Ongoing litigation
between the borrower and lender has precluded the Special Servicer
from obtaining an updated appraisal for the property.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Conyers Commons
loan ($16..1 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
single story power center Conyers, Georgia, 25 miles east of
Atlanta. The property is 65% occupied as of February 2017. The
property is anchored by Ross Dress for Less and Kirkland's, and is
shadow anchored by a Target. The loan transferred to special
servicing for imminent default in August 2014 and became REO in
December 2014.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $98 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (70% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $54 million (a 100% expected loss based on a 100%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 77% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 108%, compared to 110% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 8.4% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.83X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 0.93X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

As of the March 17, 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $97 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

The top three conduit loans represent 41% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Two North LaSalle Loan ($127.4 million -- 22.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 26-story, 691,410 square foot
(SF) Class A office building in Chicago's downtown loop. The
structure was built in 1978 and renovated in 2001. The property was
71% leased as of December 2015, compared to 71% as of December
2014. The loan was returned to the Master Servicer as a performing
loan on March 3, 2017, following a modification. As part of the
modification, the borrower contributed $22 million of new equity,
$19 million into a TI/LC reserve and the remaining $3 million into
an interest reserve. Furthermore, the maturity date was extended by
three years, with two additional extension options, and the
interest rate was reduced.

The second largest loan is the Alliance Portfolio Loan A-Note
($62.7 million -- 11% of the pool), which was originally secured by
32 multifamily properties located in Texas, Florida, Tennessee,
Georgia and Arizona. The loan underwent a complex modification in
September 2012. The original $475.0 million loan was bifurcated
into a $423.0 million A-Note and $52.0 million B-Note. A $28.0
million C-Note was also created, which increased the collateral's
hard debt to $503.0 million. The C-Note was primarily composed of
capitalized accrued bankruptcy interest and a portion of the
difference between the contract interest rate and the reduced
modified interest rate. The borrower contributed approximately
$23.0 million of new equity to fund capital improvements,
replacement, leasing and other reserves as well as to pay special
servicing fees, modification fees and reimburse some bankruptcy
costs. The maturity date was extended to January 11, 2020. The
A-Note rate was reduced from 5.365% to 3.0% in the first year. The
rate gradually increases and reverts back to the 5.365% contract
rate in year six. As of December 2015, the weighted average
occupancy of the portfolio was 97%. Eleven properties have since
been released from the portfolio, contributing to the paydown of
the A-Note.

The third largest loan is the SouthPointe Pavilions Loan ($42
million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 199,692 SF
strip mall in Lincoln, Nebraska, roughly six miles south of the
downtown area. As of December 2016, the property was 96% occupied,
compared to 98% occupied as of December 2015. Major tenants at the
property include Scheels, Bed Bath & Beyond, and South Pointe
Cinema - Marcus Theaters. A multi-year, $103 million project is
underway to create a free-standing 220,000 SF Scheels store at the
property; the store will feature a Ferris wheel, aquarium, sports
simulators and an exhibit on US presidents. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to 103%
and 0.97X at the last review.



DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Rates Cl. B-2 Debt Rating 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Deephaven Residential
Mortgage Trust 2017-1's $219.817 million mortgage pass-through
notes.

The note issuance is residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate and
interest-only residential mortgage loans secured by single-family
residences, planned-unit developments, and condominiums to
nonconforming borrowers.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The pool's collateral composition;
   -- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
   -- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
   -- The transaction's representation and warranty framework; and
   -- The mortgage aggregator.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Class       Rating(i)           Amount
                               (mil. $)
A-1         AAA (sf)         141,090,000
A-2         AA (sf)           23,330,000
A-3         A (sf)            27,864,000
M-1         BBB (sf)          11,168,000
B-1         BB (sf)            9,730,000
B-2         B (sf)             6,635,000
B-3         NR                 1,326,489
XS          NR                  Notional(ii)
R           NR                      N/A

(i) The ratings address ultimate principal and interest payments,
but interest can be deferred on the classes.  
(ii) Notional amount equal to the aggregate stated principal
balance of the mortgage loans.
NR--Not rated.  
N/A--Not applicable.


DRYDEN 47: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Dryden 47 Senior Loan Fund.

Moody's rating action is:

US$434,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$51,100,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$43,400,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$32,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

US$10,500,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F
Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Dryden 47 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. While the Class A-1 Notes are outstanding,
at least 96% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans
and eligible investments, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist
of second lien loans and non-senior secured loans. The portfolio is
at least 80% ramped as of the closing date.

PGIM, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's 4.75 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $700,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2765

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2765 to 3180)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2765 to 3595)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2017-2: DBRS Gives (P)BBsf Rating to Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-2 (the
Issuer):

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The transaction
    benefits from credit enhancement in the form of
    overcollateralization, subordination, amounts held in the
    reserve fund and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are
    sufficient to support DBRS-projected expected cumulative net
    loss assumptions under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
    address the timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and
    principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- Exeter Finance Corp.'s (Exeter) capabilities with regard to
    originations, underwriting, servicing and ownership by the
    Blackstone Group L.P., Navigation Capital Partners, Inc. and
    Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Exeter and
    considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and
    servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts with an
    acceptable backup servicer.

-- Exeter's senior management team has considerable experience
    and a successful track record within the auto finance
    industry.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    Exeter's auto loan portfolio.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Exeter and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets, and the consistency with the DBRS methodology
    "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."


GOLDEN STATE 2017 A-1: S&P Hikes $610MM Bonds Due 2033 to B+
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Golden State Tobacco
Securitization Corp.'s $630.855 million tobacco settlement bonds
series 2017 A-1.  S&P also raised its ratings on three classes and
discontinued its ratings on two classes from the 2007A issuance. In
addition, S&P confirmed its ratings on four other 2007 classes.

The bond issuances are asset-backed securities transactions backed
by tobacco settlement revenues, resulting from master settlement
agreement payments, senior liquidity reserve accounts, and interest
income.

The assigned ratings reflect:

   -- The likelihood that timely interest and scheduled principal
      payments will be made at the bonds' maturities.

   -- The credit quality of the two largest participating tobacco
      manufacturers: Altria Group Inc. (A-/Stable/A-1), parent of
      Philip Morris USA Inc., and Reynolds American Inc.
      ('BBB/Stable'), parent of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (RJ
       Reynolds).  In October 2016, British American Tobacco PLC
      (BAT; 'A-') announced its intention to purchase the 57.8% of

      RJ Reynolds that it did not already own.  BAT has a limited
      presence in the U.S. (outside of its existing large share of

      RJ Reynolds); therefore, this purchase will not result in an

      increase in its U.S. market share.  Because of the merger
      proposal, S&P Global Ratings placed its corporate credit
      rating on BAT on CreditWatch with negative implications;
      however, even with a possible one-notch downgrade, it would
      remain investment-grade.

   -- The transaction's legal and payment structures.

   -- The senior liquidity reserve account of $253 million fully
      funded at closing and only available to senior bonds.  The
      account will comprise $126.5 million in cash and short-term
      eligible investments and $126.5 million in a bank deposit
      account backed by a letter of credit written by a financial
      institution rated 'AA+/Stable/A-1+'.

The upgrades reflect each bond's ability to withstand stresses at
higher rating categories.

S&P discontinued its ratings on two classes from series 2007A-1
because of repayment from proceeds of the 2017 A-1 issuance.

The upgrades and confirmations follow a full review of every bond
class issued by Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corp. as a
result of the series 2017 A-1 issuance.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corp (Series 2017 A-1)

Maturity           Rating      Amount ($)
2018               A (sf)      39,670,000
2019               A (sf)      41,420,000
2020               A (sf)      43,530,000
2021               BBB+ (sf)   45,745,000
2022               BBB+ (sf)   48,070,000
2023               BBB+ (sf)   50,515,000
2024               BBB+ (sf)   53,085,000
2025               BBB+ (sf)   55,790,000
2026               BBB+ (sf)   58,625,000
2027               BBB (sf)    61,610,000
2028               BBB (sf)    64,750,000
2029               BBB (sf)    68,045,000

RATINGS RAISED

Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corp.
                                Rating
Series       Maturity       To          From          Amount ($)
2007A-1      2017           A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     18,955,000
2007A-1      2033           B+ (sf)     B- (sf)      610,525,000
2007A-2      2037           B (sf)      B- (sf)      524,780,000

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corp.
                                Rating
Series      Maturity        To          From          Amount ($)
2007A-1     2017            NR          BBB+ (sf)      5,140,000
2007A-1     2027            NR          B (sf)       863,100,000

RATINGS CONFIRMED

Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corp.
Series      Maturity        Rating            Amount ($)
2007A-1      2047           B- (sf)        1,176,765,000
2007A-1     2047            B- (sf)          693,575,000
2007B      2047            CCC+ (sf)         271,957,000
2007C      2047            CCC (sf)           35,863,000

NR--Not rated.




GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on A-J Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp. (GCCFC) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-GG9.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the concentrated nature of the pool and
expected losses from the specially serviced assets. Fitch modeled
losses of 32.1% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 11.6%, including $543.6 million (8.3%
of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. As of the
March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 89.7% to $675.3 million from $6.58
billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan (0.1% of
the pool) is defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes C through S.

Concentrated Pool; Specially Serviced Assets: The pool is
concentrated with only 16 loans remaining, of which 15 (99.9%) are
in special servicing.

Anticipated Paydown: Although paydown is expected from the
refinance of two of the three largest specially serviced loans, it
is possible that losses from the remaining assets could impact
class A-J.

COPT Office Portfolio: The largest contributor to expected losses
is the specially-serviced COPT Office Portfolio (18.9% of the
pool). The asset is real estate owned (REO) and originally
consisted of nine office properties, totaling 618,541 square feet
(sf), located in Linthicum, MD, and five office properties,
totaling 400,441 sf, in Colorado Springs, CO. Six of the properties
have been sold and the remaining seven properties are REO. Current
occupancy for the remaining portfolio is 32.4% as of February 2017.
According to the special servicer, there are no immediate
disposition plans for the seven remaining properties after several
failed auction attempts.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further downgrades to the distressed classes A-J through D will
occur as losses are realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $479.1 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;
-- $32.9 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $98.6 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $41.1 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $23.6 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M and A-MFX
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class S
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on class A-MFL
and the interest-only class X certificates.



GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC32: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2015-GC32 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch has issued a focus report on this transaction. The report
provides a detailed and up-to-date perspective on key credit
characteristics of the GSMS 2015-GC32 transaction and
property-level performance of the related trust loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 1.5% to $988
million from $1 billion at issuance.

Stable Performance: Overall pool performance remains stable from
issuance. All loans are current and there have been no specially
serviced loans since issuance. Three loans (4.6% of the current
balance) are currently on the servicer's watchlist, but none are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern.

High Retail and Manufactured Housing Concentration: Loans backed by
retail properties represent 39.2% of the pool, including five
within the top 15. Two loans (9%) are secured by regional malls,
one of which has exposure to Macy's and JCPenney as non-collateral
tenants. The Sears (non-collateral) at Alderwood Mall closed in
March 2017. Mobile home properties represent 11% of the pool, which
is higher than the historical average for Fitch-rated transactions.


Transaction Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by
14.7% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is
higher than the averages for Fitch-rated 2014 and 2015 vintage
transactions. Seven loans (9.2%) are full-term interest-only loans.
Nineteen loans (41%) are partial interest-only; of these, three
(7.8%) have commenced amortization. The remaining 37 loans (49.8%)
are balloon loans.

Pari Passu Loans: Six loans constituting 27.9% of the pool are part
of a pari passu loan combination: Ascentia Communities Portfolio
(9.9% of the pool), Dallas Market Center (5.6%), Kaiser Center
(5.6%), US StorageMart Portfolio (2.5%), Selig Office Portfolio
(2.5%) and Alderwood Mall (2.4%). The US StorageMart Portfolio and
Alderwood Mall have subordinate debt not included in the trust.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades may
occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance, although they may be limited due to the high retail
concentration. Downgrades to the classes are possible should a
material asset-level or economic event adversely affect pool
performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the 63 mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on Fitch analysis.
A copy of the ABS Due Diligence Form-15E received by Fitch in
connection with this transaction may be obtained through the link
contained on the bottom of the related rating action commentary.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $39.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $180 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $331.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $85 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.2 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $173 million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.6 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $757.3 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60.2 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.4 million* class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B, and C certificates.

Class E and F are privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A. Fitch
does not rate classes G and H.


HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 2013-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Cl. B Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on the enhanced equipment
trust certificates (EETCs) issued by Hawaiian Airlines (HA) Pass
Through Trust Series 2013-1:

-- Class A certificates at 'A-';
-- Class B certificates at 'BB+'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Senior EETC tranche ratings are primarily based on a top-down
analysis of the level of overcollateralization featured in the
transaction. The ratings also incorporate the structural benefits
of section 1110 of the bankruptcy code, and the presence of an
18-month liquidity facility.

Fitch's stress case utilizes a top-down approach assuming a
rejection of the entire pool of aircraft in a severe global
aviation downturn. The stress scenario incorporates a full draw on
the liquidity facility, an assumed 5% repossession/remarketing
cost, and a 30% stress to the value of the aircraft collateral. The
30% value haircut corresponds to the low end of Fitch's 30%-40% 'A'
category stress level for Tier 2 aircraft.

The collateral pool in this transaction consists of six 2013 and
2014 vintage A330-200s. Fitch views the A330-200 as a high quality
Tier 2 aircraft.

Values for the A330 family continue to experience some softness
with the pending introduction of the A330 NEO and from the recent
introduction of the A350. The A330-200 also suffers from
competition with the 787, as the 787-8 and 787-9 bracket the
A330-200 in terms of seating capacity, while the 787 is a more
efficient aircraft.

Subordinated tranche ratings are adjusted from Hawaiian's IDR based
on three primary considerations: 1) affirmation factor, 2) presence
of a liquidity facility, and 3) recovery prospects. Fitch considers
the affirmation factor for this collateral pool to be moderate to
high resulting in a +2 notch adjustment (maximum is 3). The B
tranche also features an 18-month liquidity facility, providing a
further +1 notch adjustment. No adjustment has been made for
recovery, resulting in a rating of 'BB+'.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Key assumptions included in Fitch's rating case include current
base values for the collateral aircraft provided by independent
appraisers. Depreciation rates and value stresses incorporated into
Fitch's base and stress case scenario are in line with those used
for similar Tier 2 assets as described in Fitch's EETC criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A-tranche ratings are primarily driven by the underlying
collateral. The ratings could be considered for a negative action
if declines in base value for the A330-200 outpace Fitch's
expectations. A positive rating action is not expected at this
time.

The subordinate tranche ratings are directly linked to Hawaiian's
IDR. However, Fitch's EETC criteria prescribe some compression of
the notching allowed for the affirmation factor as the airline
moves up the rating scale. Therefore, if HA were upgraded to 'BB-',
the B-tranche may be affirmed at 'BB+'. If HA were to be
downgraded, the B-tranche would likely be downgraded
commensurately.


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Fitch Hikes Class L Certs Rating to 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed two classes of JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation (JPMC)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-CIBC5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and High Credit Enhancement: The pool has
exhibited stable performance since Fitch's last rating action. The
upgrades reflect the increasing credit enhancement relative to the
remaining pool balance as a result of amortization and loan
payoffs. All remaining assets are either defeased or fully
amortizing performing loans. There are no specially serviced or
servicer watchlist loans. The transaction has paid down
approximately $14.5 million since Fitch's last rating action.

Concentrated Pool: Only eight of the original 118 loans remain
compared to 11 at Fitch's last rating action. Due to the
concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity
analysis that grouped the remaining loans based on loan structure
features, collateral quality, and performance, then ranked them by
the perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes defeased
loans, fully amortizing loans, and a performing fully amortizing
loan with binary performance risk. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

Defeasance: Three loans (49.4%) have fully defeased. Class J is
fully covered by defeasance and interest shortfalls are unlikely.

Single Tenant Exposure: All five non-defeased loans (50.6% of the
pool) are secured by single tenant properties, four of which (9%)
are secured by stand-alone drug stores.

Fully Amortizing Loan with Binary Performance Risk: The Southern
Wine & Spirits Building loan (41.8%) is secured by a 384,763 square
foot industrial property located in Las Vegas and is 100% leased to
Southern Wine & Spirits of America, the largest wine and spirits
distributor in North America, with a lease expiring December 2021.
In January 2016, the company merged with Glazer's, changing the
name to Southern Glazer's Wine and Spirits. The loan matures in
November 2022 approximately 12 months after the tenant's lease
expiration. The servicer reported year-end 2016 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.49x, compared to 1.47x in 2015. Fitch's
analysis considered the expected continued amortization of the loan
through the tenant's lease expiration.

Maturity Schedule: The remaining loans have final maturity dates in
2019 (3.8%); 2020 (48.1%); and 2022 (48.1%). All remaining loans
are fully amortizing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks are Stable as further upgrades are unlikely due
to the pool's significant concentration and high single tenant
exposure. However, further upgrades to class K and L are possible
with continued stable pool performance and increased credit
enhancement due to additional paydown and/or defeasance. While
downgrades are not expected, they are possible should an
asset-level or economic event cause a decline in pool performance.

Fitch upgrades the following classes:
-- $9.3 million class J to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5 million class K to to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5 million class L to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:
-- $5.4 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 60%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and the interest-only X-2
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X-1 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2004-C2: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class M Debt to 'CCCsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes and affirmed five classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Credit Enhancement and Better than Expected Recoveries: The
upgrades reflect the increasing credit enhancement relative to the
remaining pool balance, as well as higher than expected recoveries
on two specially serviced loans. At Fitch's last review, there were
three loans in special servicing, two of which received a full
recovery totalling approximately $13.2 million.

Highly Concentrated Pool with Low Quality Loans: The pool consists
of 11 of the original 134 loans. The properties are generally lower
quality, with 59.8% of the pool's current balance secured by assets
in tertiary markets that exhibit substantial performance
volatility. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis that grouped the remaining loans
based on loan structural features, collateral quality and
performance, which ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment. This includes defeased loans, fully amortizing loans,
balloon loans, and Fitch Loans of Concern. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

Specially Serviced Loan: The pool contains one specially serviced
loan (4.5%). The pool consists of manufactured housing portfolio
which exhibits increased economic volatility and binary performance
risk.

Low Fitch Leverage: The pool's loans have an issuer DSCR and LTV
are 1.36x and 77.44%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks are Stable as further upgrades are unlikely
given the high concentration, lower collateral quality, and adverse
selection of the remaining pool. Further upgrades to classes K
through P are possible with significant paydown or defeasance.
Downgrades to the non-investment grades are possible if additional
loans transfer to special servicing and/or expected losses increase
significantly.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes:

-- $11.6 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.5 million class J to 'Asf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.2 million class K to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.6 million class L to 'Bsf' from 'CCsf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $3.9 million class M to 'CCCsf' from 'Csf'; RE 100% from 0%;

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $6.1 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.6 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 50% from 0%;
-- $2.6 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

Fitch does not rate classes P. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-1-A,
B, C, D, E, F, RP-1, RP-2, RP-3, RP-4, and the RP-5 certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR certificate.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificate.



JP MORGAN 2007-C1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. A-M Debt to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings on classes A-4 and A-M also reflect S&P's
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels,
S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and future
performance, and the lower trust balance.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the pool trust
balance was $721.2 million while the pool collateral balance was
$726.4 million, which is 61.7% of the pool balance at issuance.
The pool currently includes 40 loans and four real estate owned
assets, down from 60 loans at issuance.  Eight of these assets
($265.3 million, 36.5%) are with the special servicer, three loans
($21.0 million, 2.9%) are defeased, and 10 loans ($86.1 million,
11.9%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The master
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported financial
information for all of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which
53.9% was partial or year-end 2016 data, and the remainder was
year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.18x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 81.5% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.58% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the eight specially
serviced assets and three defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased
assets have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of
$510.4 million (70.3%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers,
S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV
of 1.15x and 82.5%, respectively, for six of the top 10 nondefeased
assets.  The remaining assets are specially serviced and discussed
below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $46.4 million in principal
losses, or 3.9% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 15.3% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
eight specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, eight assets
in the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Details of the three largest specially serviced assets, all of
which are top 10 nondefeased loans, are:

The Westin Portfolio loan ($109.1 million, 15.0%) is the
second-largest loan in the pool and has a total reported exposure
of $118.7 million.  In addition, a $107.8 million pari passu piece
is in JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2008-C2,
another CMBS transaction.  The whole loan is secured a 487-room,
full-service hotel in Tucson and a 412-room, full-service hotel in
Hilton Head, S.C.  The whole loan, which has a
foreclosure-in-process payment status, was transferred to the
special servicer on Oct. 16, 2008, due to imminent default.  It is
S&P's understanding that on Nov. 17, 2010, debtors commenced
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and the loan was modified based
on a bankruptcy court ruling.  The modification terms included
requiring the reorganized debtors to make 251 monthly principal
payments of $500,000 totaling $125.5 million, with a balloon
payment of $121.7 million on the whole loan due on March 1, 2033,
and accruing interest.  The reported DSC for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2016, was 1.77x.  S&P expects a significant loss upon
this loan's eventual resolution.

The Stamford Marriott loan ($61.3 million, 8.4%), the
fourth-largest nondefeased asset in the pool, has a total reported
exposure of $65.2 million.

The loan is secured by a 506-room full-service lodging property in
Stamford, Conn.  The loan, which has a foreclosure-in-process
payment status, was transferred to special servicing on Dec. 3,
2015, due to imminent default.  Per the servicer, there are ongoing
negotiations for a potential restructuring of the loan. The
reported DSC and occupancy for the nine months ended Sept. 30,
2016, were 1.12x and 62.0%, respectively.  An appraisal reduction
amount of $31.5 million is in effect against this loan.  S&P
expects a moderate loss upon its eventual resolution.

The Inland - Bradley Portfolio loan ($38.3 million, 5.3%), the
fifth-largest nondefeased asset is the pool, has a reported
$38.3 million total exposure.  The loan is secured by four flex or
warehouse/distribution industrial properties totaling 1.1 million
sq. ft. in Illinois, North Carolina, and Michigan.  The loan, which
has a current payment status, was transferred to special servicing
on Jan. 20, 2017, due to imminent default.  According to the
special servicer, the consolidated occupancy dropped from 100% to
approximately 62% after the tenant APL Logistics, which represented
approximately 38% of the net rentable area, vacated the Coloma,
Mich. property.  LNR stated that it is exploring various work-out
strategies with the borrower.  The reported DSC and occupancy for
the nine months ended Sept. 20, 2016, were 1.48x and 75.0%,
respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon this loan's eventual
resolution.

The five remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 4% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the eight specially
serviced assets, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of
50.4%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C1

                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To            From
A-4               46630DAD4              AAA (sf)      A (sf)
A-M               46630DAG7              BB+ (sf)      BB- (sf)


JP MORGAN 2014-FL5: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certificates to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-FL5, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions on the pooled principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily
using our criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
in which S&P re-evaluated the collateral securing the eight
remaining loans in the transaction, and reviewed the deal structure
and liquidity available to the trust.  In addition, S&P's analysis
also considered the potential payoff of the Embassy Suites Atlanta
and Overlook III loans by their April 2017 maturity per the most
recent watch list comments.

The lowered ratings on the pooled classes C and D reflect S&P's
expected available credit enhancement to the classes, which S&P
believes is less than its current estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the most recent rating levels, and S&P's view of
the collateral's current and future performance.

The lowered rating on the class RH raked certificates reflects
S&P's re-evaluation of the Roosevelt Hotel loan.  The $140.0
million loan is secured by 1,015-room full-service hotel in midtown
Manhattan.  The class derives 100% of its cash flows from the
subordinate nonpooled portion of the loan.  Details on the loan
are:

The lowered ratings on the class RVW1 and RVW2 raked certificates
reflect S&P's re-evaluation of the Riverwalk II loan.  The $26.0
million loan is secured by a 12-story, 258,995-sq.-ft. class A
office building in Buffalo Grove, Ill.  The classes derive 100% of
their cash flows from the subordinate nonpooled portions of the
loan.  Details on the loan are:

S&P lowered its rating on the class X-EXT interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, under
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance on
class X-EXT references classes A, B, C, and D.

The affirmations on the pooled classes A and B reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings and S&P's views regarding the
remaining loans' current and future performance.

The affirmed rating on the class DBM raked certificates reflects
S&P's analysis of the DoubleTree Bahia Mar loan.  The $85.0 million
loan, secured by the borrower's leasehold interest in a 296-room
full-service hotel and 245-slip marina in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., is
split into a $77.3 million senior pooled component and a $7.7
million subordinate nonpooled component that provided 100% of the
cash flow to class DBM.  S&P's analysis considered the reported
stable operating performance and using a 10.00% capitalization
rate, S&P derived an S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value (LTV) of
60.8% on the pool trust balance.

The affirmed ratings on the class BRS1 and BRS2 raked certificates
reflect S&P's analysis of the Bacara Resort & Spa loan.  The $140.0
million loan, secured by the borrower's fee interest in a 354-room
full-service luxury destination resort in Goleta, Calif., is split
into a $100.0 million senior A note and a $40.0 million subordinate
B note.  The A note is further divided into three components: a
$65.8 million senior pooled component and two subordinate nonpooled
components totaling $34.2 million, which provided 100% of the cash
flow to the two raked classes.  S&P's analysis considered the
reported stable operating performance and using an 8.75%
capitalization rate, S&P derived an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 58.2%
on the pool trust balance.

The affirmed rating on the class DFW raked certificates reflects
S&P's analysis of the Westin DFW loan.  The $86.0 million loan,
secured by the borrower's fee interest in a 506-room full-service
hotel in Irving, Texas, is split into a $57.5 million senior A note
and a $28.5 million subordinate B note.  The A note is further
divided into two components: a $44.3 million senior pooled
component and a $13.2 million subordinate nonpooled component,
which provided 100% of the cash flow to the raked class.  S&P's
analysis considered the reported stable operating performance and
using a 9.00% capitalization rate, S&P derived an S&P Global
Ratings LTV of 58.3% on the pool trust balance.

The affirmed ratings on the class ESA1 and ESA2 raked certificates
reflect S&P's analysis of the Embassy Suites Atlanta loan.  The
$49.0 million loan, secured by the borrower's fee interest in a
302-room full-service hotel in Atlanta, is split into a
$37.8 million senior pooled component and two subordinate nonpooled
components totaling $11.2 million, which provided 100% of the cash
flow to the raked classes.  S&P's analysis considered the reported
stable operating performance and using a 9.25% capitalization rate,
S&P derived an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 60.8% on the pool trust
balance.

The affirmed rating on the class OVL raked certificates reflect
S&P's analysis of the Overlook III loan.  The $37.0 million loan,
secured by the borrower's fee interest in a 22-story,
438,709-sq.-ft. class A office building in Atlanta, is split into a
$24.75 million senior A note and a $12.25 million subordinate B
note.  The A note is further divided into two components: a $23.5
million senior pooled component and a $1.25 million subordinate
nonpooled component, which provided 100% of the cash flow to the
raked class.  S&P's analysis considered the reported steady
operating performance and using a 7.50% capitalization rate, S&P
derived an S&P Global Ratings LTV of 66.4% on the pool trust
balance.

The analysis of large-loan transactions is predominantly a
recovery-based approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this
approach, our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the lodging and office properties that secure the eight mortgage
loans in the trust.  S&P's analysis also considered the volatile
lodging collateral performance since 88.6% of the remaining pooled
trust balance is secured by lodging properties, specifically the
recent decline in revenue per available room (RevPAR) and net cash
flow (NCF) for the hotel property securing the Roosevelt Hotel loan
(details below).

According to the March 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
trust consisted of eight floating-rate IO loans indexed to
one-month LIBOR with an aggregate pooled trust balance of $402.9
million and an aggregate trust balance of $503.3 million, down from
10 loans totaling $516.7 million and $671.3 million, respectively,
at issuance.  All of the remaining loans currently mature in 2017
and have two extension options remaining.  According to the
transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the special
servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well as costs and
expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections the special
servicer conducts.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for the year-to-date or trailing 12 months
ended Sept. 30, 2016, and years ended Dec. 31, 2016 (if available),
Dec. 31, 2015, and 2014, and where applicable, the most recent 2016
rent rolls and Smith Travel Research (STR) reports that the master
servicer provided to determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash
flow for the properties.

Details on the three loans with reported downward trending cash
flow and/or occupancy are:

The Roosevelt Hotel loan is the largest loan in the pooled trust.
The $140.0 million mortgage loan is split into a $110.7 million
senior pooled component that represents 27.5% of the pooled trust
balance and a $29.3 million nonpooled component that supports the
class RH raked certificates.  In addition, the borrower may obtain
mezzanine debt up to $20.0 million, provided certain terms and
conditions are satisfied.  The IO loan pays interest at LIBOR plus
a 2.013% spread and initially matured on May 9, 2016, with three
one-year extension options.  The loan currently matures in May 2017
and has two extension options remaining, with final maturity of May
9, 2019.  The loan is secured by a first mortgage encumbering a
1,015-room full-service hotel located at 45 East 45th Street in New
York City.  Built in 1924 and originally opened in 1926, the hotel
was named in honor of President Theodore Roosevelt and has operated
as an unflagged hotel since its opening.  S&P's analysis considered
the hotel's reported performance, particularly the reported RevPAR,
which has declined in the past few years and which the master
servicer stated is due primarily to excess supply in the New York
City hotel market and increased expenses driven by online hotel
booking.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo, N.A. (Wells Fargo),
reported a 0.31x DSC for the year-to-date ended Sept. 30, 2016.
S&P's expected case value, using an 8.75% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate, and considering land value and prime location,
yielded a 90.9% S&P Global Ratings LTV on the pool trust balance.

The Riverwalk II loan is the seventh-largest loan in the pooled
trust and is currently with the special servicer, Strategic Asset
Services LLC (Strategic).

The $26.0 million mortgage loan is split into a $22.5 million
senior pooled component that makes up 5.6% of the pooled trust
balance and two subordinate nonpooled components totaling $3.5
million that support the class RVW1 and RVW2 raked certificates. In
addition, the borrower's equity interest in the whole loan secures
$10.0 million in mezzanine debt.  The IO loan pays interest of
LIBOR plus a 2.050% spread and initially matured on May 9, 2016,
with three one-year extension options.  Wells Fargo stated that the
loan currently matures in May 2017 and has two extension options
remaining, with final maturity of May 9, 2019. The loan is secured
by a first mortgage encumbering a 12-story, 258,995-sq.-ft., class
A office building in Buffalo Grove, Ill., a suburb of Chicago.
S&P's analysis considered the Dec. 31, 2016, rent roll, according
to which the property was 87.7% leased compared to a reported 96.2%
as of Sept. 30, 2016.  The two largest tenants make up 84.3%. Wells
Fargo reported a 4.17x DSC for the trailing 12 months ended Sept.
30, 2016.  S&P's expected case value, using a 7.50% S&P Global
Ratings capitalization rate, yielded a 75.3% S&P Global Ratings LTV
on the pool trust balance.

The Crowne Plaza Chicago O'Hare Hotel loan is the smallest loan in
the pooled trust and has a $21.0 million trust (5.2% of the pooled
trust) and whole loan balance.  In addition, the borrower's equity
interest in the whole loan secures $14.0 million in mezzanine debt.
The IO loan pays interest at LIBOR plus a 2.667% spread and
initially matured on April 9, 2016, with three one-year extension
options.  The loan currently matures in April 2017 and has two
extension options remaining, with final maturity of April 9, 2019.
The loan is secured by a first mortgage encumbering a 14-story,
503-key full service hotel in Rosemont, Ill., a suburb of Chicago.
Our analysis considered the hotel's reported decline in performance
as of year-end 2015 compared to year-end 2014.

Wells Fargo reported a 6.39x DSC for the year-to-date Sept. 30,
2016.  S&P's expected case value, using a 9.25% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate, yielded a 67.2% S&P Global Ratings LTV on the
pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-FL5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-FL5

                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A                46642YAA0             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
X-EXT            46642YAE2             BB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
B                46642YAG7             AA- (sf)      AA- (sf)
C                46642YAJ1             BBB+ (sf)     A- (sf)
D                46642YAL6             BB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
RH               46642YAQ5             B- (sf)       BB- (sf)
DBM              46642YAW2             BB (sf)       BB (sf)
BRS1             46642YAY8             BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
BRS2             46642YBA9             B- (sf)       B- (sf)
DFW              46642YBC5             BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
ESA1             46642YBE1             BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
ESA2             46642YBG6             B+ (sf)       B+ (sf)
OVL              46642YBJ0             BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
RVW1             46642YBL5             BB- (sf)      BB (sf)
RVW2             46642YBN1             B (sf)        BB- (sf)


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2013-C12: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C12:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the eleven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.2% of the
current balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMBB 2013-C12.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 28, compared to 30 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $1.21 billion
from $1.34 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 47% of the pool. One loan, constituting 8%
of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit assessment.
Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by US government securities.

Four loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool which resulted in
a loss. Two cross-collateralized loans, constituting 3.7% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The specially serviced
loans make up the Colony Hills Portfolio Loans ($44.5 million --
3.7% of the pool) which are secured by three apartment properties
located in Mobile, Alabama. The loans were transferred to the
Special Servicer in September 2015, for non-monetary default due to
an unauthorized pledge of interest. As of March 2016, the three
properties were collectively 89% occupied.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 76% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 98%, compared to 96% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.70X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Americold Cold
Storage Portfolio Loan ($99.4 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which
represents a pari-passu portion of a $198.7 million mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by a portfolio of 15 cold storage facilities
located across nine U.S. states, with a total storage capacity of
3.6 million square feet (77 million cubic feet). The loan sponsor
is Americold Realty Trust, the largest US operator of cold storage
facilities. The loan benefits from amortization. The property is
also encumbered by $102 million of mezzanine debt. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa1 (sca.pd)
and 1.72X, respectively.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 21.3% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Legacy Place Loan ($123.2 million
-- 10.2% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$197.2 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 484,000
square foot lifestyle retail center in Dedham, Massachusetts, a
suburb of Boston. The property was developed in 2009 and consists
of six buildings and parking for approximately 2,800 vehicles. The
property was 97% leased as of December 2016, the same as at the
prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.86X at last review.

The second largest loan is the IDS Center Loan ($87.1 million --
7.2% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$176.7 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.4 million
square foot mixed use property in downtown Minneapolis, Minnesota.
The collateral consists of a 57-story skyscraper office tower, an
eight-story annex building, a 100,000 square foot retail center,
and an underground garage. Nearly 100% of the leases are set to
expire during the loan's ten-year term, however, the property
benefits from a diverse tenant base, with the largest tenant
occupying 9% of the net rentable area (NRA). The largest tenant, a
law firm, renewed their lease through May 2021. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 101% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 100%
and 1.00X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Southridge Mall Loan ($48.4 million
-- 4.0% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$121.1 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
550,000 square foot portion of a 1.1 million square foot regional
mall in Greendale, Wisconsin, a suburb of Milwaukee. The mall
underwent a $45 million renovation in 2012, during which a new
Macy's anchor opened on the site of a former Dillard's. Kohl's
(85,247 SF; 15% of NRA) recently announced that they will be moving
their store to a new retail development in late 2018. The property
faces additional competition as it is one of four regional or
super-regional malls in the Milwaukee MSA. In-line occupancy was
86% at year-end 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 127% and
0.81X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.91X at last review.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on twelve classes of
JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C14, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C14:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the eleven P&I Classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on IO Class X-A was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.0% of the
current balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMBB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2013-C14.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is . The pool
has a Herf of 20, compared to 21 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7.0% to $1.07
billion from $1.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 45 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 60.5% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 2.1% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Three loans, constituting 1.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization.
One loan, the Four Points Sheraton -- San Diego ($8.98 million --
0.8% of the pool), is in special servicing. The loan is secured by
a 225-room full service hotel built in 1987 and located in Kearny
Mesa, approximately 10 miles north of the San Diego CBD. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2016 due to imminent
default followed by a monetary default. The Borrower filed Chapter
11 bankruptcy in May 2016.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 73%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 90% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 21% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.61X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.84X and 1.24X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Meadows Mall Loan ($100 million -- 9.4% of
the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a $150 million
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a
945,000 square foot (SF) regional mall located five miles west of
the Strip in Las Vegas, Nevada. The mall is anchored by Dillard's,
JC Penney, Sears and Macy's. In-line tenant sales for tenants less
than 10,000 SF were approximately $379 per square foot (PSF) in
December 2016 compared to $383 PSF a year earlier in December 2015.
The total mall was 97.6% leased as of December 2016, slightly down
from 98.4% in December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97%
and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 97.7% and 1.05X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Spirit Portfolio Loan ($97.1 million
-- 9.1% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of 26
properties including retail, industrial, office, and mixed-use. The
collateral is located in 13 different states. The top five states
by allocated loan balance are Illinois (19%), New Hampshire (13%),
Texas (12%), North Carolina (11%), and Indiana (11%). Twenty-five
of the 26 properties are leased to single tenants. The portfolio
was fully leased as of June 2016, the same as at last review.
Several tenants have leases at more than one property: LA Fitness
leases two properties; CVS leases four properties; Walgreens leases
two properties; Ferguson Enterprises leases three properties; and
Tractor Supply leases two properties. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 81.5% and 1.29X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the 589 Fifth Avenue Loan ($87.5 million
-- 8.2% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$175 million mortgage loan. The collateral is a 17-story, 173,000
SF office and retail property located near the Diamond District in
New York City. The entire retail portion is leased to H&M through
July 2033. The office portion is mostly leased to jeweler tenants.
No office tenant accounts for more than 5% of the net rentable
area. The property was 100% leased as of June 2016, and the same as
at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99.8% and 0.88X,
respectively, the same as at last review.


JPMCC TRUST 2016-GG10: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on AM-B Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. confirmed the ratings for all classes of JPMCC Re-REMIC
Trust 2016-GG10 as follows:

-- Class AM-A at BBB (low) (sf) with Positive trend
-- Class AM-B at BB (low) (sf) with Stable trend

The ratings confirmations and assignment of the Positive trend to
Class AM-A reflect the improved credit characteristics of the
underlying CMBS bond as a result of scheduled loan amortization,
successful loan repayment, proceeds recovered from specially
serviced loans and stabilizing cash flows on performing loans. The
transaction is a resecuritization, collateralized by the beneficial
interests in a portion of the A-M bond from one underlying
transaction that was securitized in 2007. The JPMCC 2016-GG10
resecuritization consists of a senior/subordinate pass-through
sequential-pay structure.

The underlying CMBS transaction is GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2007-GG10, Class A-M. Although DBRS does not publicly rate
the underlying transaction, a detailed level of analysis was
performed by using the CREFC IRP files from the latest remittance
period. As of the March 2017 remittance, the underlying transaction
had a current balance of $2.8 billion with 66 loans remaining in
the pool, representing a collateral reduction of 62.7% since
issuance. There were 48 loans, representing 60.1% of the pool
balance, on the servicer's watchlist, most of which were being
monitored for upcoming maturity. Ten loans, representing 12.3% of
the pool balance, are in special servicing. All loans in the
transaction are scheduled to mature in the next 12 months, and as
of the most recent financial reporting available, the transaction
has a weighted-average debt yield of 7.1%, which indicates some
borrowers may have difficulty securing refinance capital at
maturity.

DBRS analyzed the underlying certificate based on the performance
of the underlying loans and the transaction structure. The
underlying transaction was analyzed independently by DBRS, focusing
on the largest assets, the specially serviced loans and the loans
on the servicer's watchlist. This was done in an effort to make
adjustments to the pivotal loans within the transaction that carry
a higher likelihood of default. To simulate realized losses
expected on delinquent loans, DBRS ran a liquidation scenario using
a haircut to the latest appraisal to account for additional
expenses and/or potential future value decline where merited. Hope
notes of previously modified loans were assumed at a full loss and
were modified as applicable. Any accrued interest was further
assumed as a loss and applied against the bond stack, reducing the
DBRS liquidated credit enhancement.

The resulting weighted-average credit enhancement requirements for
all the loans in the underlying pool at each respective rating
category were then compared with the actual credit enhancement
provided to the contributed certificate within the underlying CMBS
structure.

The ratings are dependent on the continued performance of the
underlying CMBS transaction and do not address the likelihood of
additional trust fund expenses.

The ratings assigned to Classes AM-A and AM-B materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the Large Pool Multi-borrower
Parameters. DBRS considers a methodology deviation when there is a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the Large Pool Multi-borrower
Parameters; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect uncertain
loan-level event risk associated with the significant upcoming loan
maturities.



KKR FINANCIAL 2013-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. D-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by KKR Financial
CLO 2013-1, Ltd.:

U.S.$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2029
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$325,000,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$48,750,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2029 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$27,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

U.S.$32,500,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$26,750,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2029 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on April 17, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously issued
on June 25, 2013 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the Refinancing
Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing
Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These changes include: extensions of the
reinvestment period, stated maturity and non-call period; changes
to certain collateral quality tests; changes to the
overcollateralization test levels; and changes to certain
concentration limitations.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3004

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3004 to 3455)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1-R Notes: -1

Class A-2-R Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -1

Class D-R Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3004 to 3905)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1-R Notes: -2

Class A-2-R Notes: -4

Class B-R Notes: -4

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Tranches to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on four classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on six other classes from the same
transaction.  In addition, S&P removed the ratings from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with negative implications on
July 27, 2016.

These rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its temporary interest shortfall methodology as
well as S&P's criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P downgraded its ratings on classes E, F, G, and H, which have
experienced two consecutive months of interest shortfalls.
Specifically, S&P lowered its rating on class E to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'BB (sf)' to reflect its expectation of accumulated interest
shortfalls that S&P believes will remain outstanding in the near
future, and S&P lowered its ratings on the other three certificates
to 'D (sf)' because it believes that these classes will experience
interest shortfalls for the foreseeable future and would experience
credit erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially
serviced loans.

S&P affirmed its ratings on classes A-4, X-CL, X-ST, and B to
reflect credit enhancement and liquidity support levels that S&P
believes to be commensurate with the outstanding ratings.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on classes C and D, which have experienced two
consecutive months of interest shortfalls, to reflect its
expectation of interest shortfall durations and ongoing liquidity
support levels that are commensurate with the outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates also considered the magnitude of loans currently with
the special servicer.

S&P also removed its ratings on the certificates from CreditWatch,
where it placed them with negative implications on July 27, 2016,
to reflect the certificates' potential to experience ongoing
interest shortfalls for periods longer than those commensurate with
their then-outstanding ratings.  S&P is resolving these CreditWatch
placements today following a review of the credit characteristics
of the remaining loans in the pool, S&P's assessment of expected
recoveries and losses, and liquidation timing based on information
received from the master servicer and special servicer.  To the
extent that actual recoveries, losses, and/or liquidation timing
differ from our current expectations, S&P may revisit its analysis
and adjust its ratings accordingly.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $196.5 million, which is 13.8% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes four loans (which treats
the Passaic Street Industrial Park A and B hope notes as a single
loan), down from 103 loans at issuance.  Two of these loans ($181.5
million, 92.4%) are with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC (CWCapital), and no loans were reported on the
master servicer's watchlist or as defeased.  The master servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported recent financial information for
25.9% of the loans in the pool.

Excluding the two specially serviced loans, S&P calculated a 1.53x
S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service coverage (DSC) and
45.6% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value ratio using
a 7.60% S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate for
the two performing loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $32.3 million in principal
losses, or 2.3% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 10.4% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
two specially serviced loans.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, two loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital.  Details of the
two specially serviced loans are:

The UBS Center - Stamford loan ($145.6 million, 74.1%) is the
largest remaining loan in the pool and has a total reported
exposure of $153.2 million.  The loan is secured by an office
property totaling 682,327 sq. ft. in Stamford, Conn.  The loan was
transferred to CWCapital on Jan. 27, 2016, because of imminent
nonmonetary default.  The loan, which has a nonperforming matured
balloon payment status, was scheduled to mature on Oct. 11, 2016.
The property securing the loan was primarily occupied by UBS, which
has vacated major portions of its space and made its last rental
payment in October.  The borrower has indicated that it has not
been able to find new tenants for the property.  S&P expects a
significant loss (over 60% of the current loan balance) upon the
loan's eventual resolution.

The Passaic Street Industrial Park A and B hope notes loan ($35.9
million, 18.3%), which is the second-largest loan in the pool, has
a $35.9 million total reported exposure and is secured by a
2,110,719-sq.-ft. industrial warehouse property in Wood Ridge, N.J.
The loan, which has a foreclosure in progress payment status, was
retransferred to the special servicer in March 2016, because the
borrower provided a capital event notice.  The loan was previously
transferred to the special servicer in March 2010 because of
monetary default and was modified in February 2012. These terms
included:

   -- The single note was bifurcated into a $21.7 million senior A

      note and a $16.1 million subordinate B hope note;

   -- The interest rate payable on the A note was reduced, and the

      interest owed on the B hope note was fully deferred; and

   -- The loan's maturity date was extended to Dec. 11, 2018.

As of year-end 2015, the reported DSC and occupancy were 2.01x and
94.4%, respectively.  S&P expects a moderate loss (between 26% and
59% of the current loan balance) upon the loan's eventual
resolution.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

                              Rating
Class          Identifier     To           From
A-4            52108HYK4      AA- (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B              52108HYL2      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C              52108HYM0      BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
D              52108HYN8      BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E              52108HYP3      CCC- (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
F              52108HYQ1      D (sf)       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
G              52108HYR9      D (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
H              52108HYT5      D (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
X-CL           52108HZP2      AA- (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
X-ST           52108HZT4      AA- (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Neg



LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on five classes and downgraded the ratings on
two classes in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C4 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 23% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on one P&I class was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on one class was downgraded to Ca (sf) due to the
uncertainty of future interest payments based on the fact that all
of its references classes have an interest rate equal to the
weighted average coupon of the pool.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 33% of the
current balance, compared to 19% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LBUBS 2006-C4.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 77% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 4% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced and troubled loans to the most junior
class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three, compared to a Herf of five at Moody's
last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $123 million
from $1.98 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 53%
of the pool. One loan, constituting 1% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Thirty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
or contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $115 million (for
an average loss severity of 52%). Six loans, constituting 77% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Canyon Park Technology Center Loan ($64.6
million -- 52.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 904,000 square
foot (SF) office park consisting of 14 buildings located in Orem,
Utah. The property was 83% leased as of January 2017, up from 81%
leased as of December 2015. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2016 due to maturity default.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by
industrial and retail properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$39 million loss for the specially serviced loans (41% expected
loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 4% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 74%, compared to 88% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.49X and 1.25X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 21% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Seven Corners Loan ($16.4
million -- 13.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 70,000 SF
unanchored retail center located in Falls Church, Virginia. The
property was 100% leased as of October 2016, the same as of
December 2015. The loan is due to mature in May 2020. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 76%
and 1.25X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arizona Self Storage Loan ($5.2
million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 55,000 SF
self-storage and RV parking facility on 7.2 acres located in
Goodyear, Arizona. The property was 91% leased as of March 2017, up
from 90% occupied as of March 2016. The loan was previously
modified in 2011, extending loan maturity by 1 year and decreasing
the interest rate. Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the Shiloh Village Apartments Loan ($4.9
million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 169-unit
multifamily property built in 1979 and located in Dallas, Texas.
The property was 98% leased as of Decembet 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 53% and 1.94X, respectively, compared to 51% and
2.02X at the last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2006-C4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

S&P's upgrades follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes B, C, D, E, and F to also reflect
its expectation of the available credit enhancement for these
classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels; S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of
the transaction's collateral; the trust balance's significant
reduction; as well as the classes' interest shortfall history.

Specifically, class F was previously lowered to 'D (sf)' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P expected to remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time.  S&P raised its rating
on this class from 'D (sf)' because the interest shortfalls have
been resolved in full since November 2013, and S&P do not believe,
at this time, a further default of this certificate class is
virtually certain.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes D, E, and F, our analysis also
considered the susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
six specially serviced assets ($94.9 million, 77.2%).

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $123.0 million, which is 6.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes nine loans and one real
estate owned asset, down from 145 loans at issuance. Six of these
assets are with the special servicer, one loan ($1.7 million, 1.4%)
is defeased, and one loan ($5.2 million, 4.2%) is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for 100.0% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, of which 8.3% was year-end 2016 data, and the
remainder was partial-year or year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.38x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 79.8% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.20% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the six specially serviced
assets and one defeased loan.

To date, the transaction has experienced $114.9 million in
principal losses on the pooled classes, or 5.8% of the original
pool trust balance.  S&P expects losses to reach approximately 6.7%
of the original pool trust balance in the near term, based on
losses incurred to date and additional losses S&P expects upon the
eventual resolution of the six specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, six assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC.  Details of the two largest specially serviced assets are:

   -- The Canyon Park Technology Center loan ($64.6 million,
      52.6%) has a $66.5 million total reported exposure and is
      the largest loan in the pool.  The loan, which has a
      nonperforming matured balloon payment status, is secured by
      a 904,336-sq.-ft. office property in Orem, Utah.  The loan,
      which matured on April 11, 2016, was transferred to the
      special servicer on April 22, 2016, due to maturity default.

      The special servicer stated that a forbearance is being
      discussed with the borrower, which would give the borrower
      time to lease up recently vacated space. Reported occupancy
      was 83.4% as of Jan. 31, 2017; however, S&P expects
      occupancy to decline if tenants with upcoming lease
      expiration vacate.  The most recent appraisal value is $81.0

      million as of April 28, 2016. We expect a minimal loss upon
      this loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The 2802 Bloomington Road loan ($8.9 million, 7.2%) has an
      $8.9 million total reported exposure and is the third-
      largest loan in the pool.  The loan, which has a
      foreclosure-in-process payment status, is secured by a
      170,000-sq.-ft. industrial property in Champaign, Ill.  The
      loan, which matured on March 11, 2016, was transferred to
      the special servicer on March 24, 2016, due to maturity
      default.  The loan is related to three other specially-
      serviced loans (aggregated $17.8 million, 14.5%) in the pool

      that have the same guarantor and are also secured by
      industrial properties in various U.S. states.  All four
      industrial properties are 100% occupied by an investment-
      grade tenant, Rockwell Automation, with leases through
      November 2020.  The special servicer stated that 2802
      Bloomington Road will be marketed for sale next month.  A
      $2.5 million appraisal reduction amount is in effect against

      this loan.  The most recent appraisal value is $7.2 million
      as of Feb. 23, 2017.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
      this loan's eventual resolution.

The four remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 6.2% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the six specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 18.2%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25% and a moderate loss is 26%-59%.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C4

                                        Rating
Class             Identifier            To           From
B                 52108RAH5             AA+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
C                 52108RAJ1             AA (sf)      B (sf)
D                 52108RAK8             BBB+ (sf)    B- (sf)
E                 52108RAL6             B+ (sf)      CCC (sf)
F                 52108RAM4             B- (sf)      D (sf)


LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E-RR Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-RR, B-RR,
C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement notes from Longfellow Place CLO
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2013 that is managed by NewStar Capital LLC.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the class A-R, B-R, C-R, D, and E notes following
payment in full on the April 18, 2017, refinancing date.  S&P also
assigned a rating to a new class X note that was created as part of
the refinancing.

On the April 18, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement note issuances
were used to redeem the class A-R, B-R, C-R, D, and E notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the refinanced notes in line with their
full redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement
notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via an amended indenture,
which, in addition to outlining the terms of the replacement notes,
will also:

   -- Extend reinvestment period end date by 4.25 years.
   -- Extend the stated maturity date by 5.25 years.
   -- Add a class X note to the capital structure.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Longfellow Place CLO Ltd.
                                         Amount
Replacement class         Rating        (mil $)
A-RR                      AAA (sf)       297.00
B-RR                      AA (sf)         87.70
C-RR                      A (sf)          28.80
D-RR                      BBB (sf)        26.20
E-RR                      BB (sf)         19.70
F-RR                      NR              15.50

                                         Amount
New class                 Rating        (mil $)
X                         AAA (sf)         2.00

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Longfellow Place CLO Ltd.
                           Rating

Class       To              From
A-R         NR              AAA (sf)
B-R         NR              AAA (sf)
C-R         NR              AA- (sf)
D           NR              BBB+ (sf)
E           NR              BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-MKB2: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. F Certs to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust's series 2005-MKB2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
lowered its rating on the interest-only (IO) class from the same
transaction.  S&P also discontinued its ratings on two other
classes following the full repayment of their outstanding principal
balances.

The upgrades on the principal- and interest-paying classes
predominantly follow the full defeasance of the remaining
first-mortgage loan in the pool using S&P's criteria for rating
transactions in which the collateral is fully defeased by U.S.
government securities, as well as S&P's criteria for rating
transactions that have incurred interest shortfalls.  As a result
of the liquidation of the specially serviced Simon – DeSoto
Square Mall loan in March 2017, the real estate collateral securing
the remaining loan, the AFR Citicorp Portfolio loan in the pool,
was fully defeased by a portfolio of U.S. government securities.
This is now the sole cash flow source available to service the
outstanding rated liabilities.

Based on "U.S. Government Support In Structured Finance And Public
Finance Ratings," published Dec. 7, 2014, S&P analyzed the exposure
as a form of full credit substitution, in which the ratings on the
bonds are now dependent on the creditworthiness of the U.S. S&P
Global Ratings' long-term sovereign credit rating on the U.S. is
'AA+', and the outlook is stable.

Specifically, class F was previously lowered to 'D (sf)' because of
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P expected to remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time.  S&P raised its rating
on class F to 'BB+ (sf)' because the interest shortfalls, which
were primarily because of a nonrecoverable determination on the
Millennium Centre Retail loan, have been resolved after the loan
was liquidated in October 2016.  Class F received full
reimbursements of all past interest shortfalls and timely interest
payment over the last six months.  As such, S&P do not believe
further default is virtually certain on this class and is raising
its rating to 'BB+ (sf)' in accordance "Structured Finance
Temporary Interest Shortfall Methodology," published Dec. 15,
2015.

S&P lowered its rating on the class XC IO certificates based on
S&P's criteria for ratings IO securities.

S&P discontinued our ratings on classes B and C following the full
repayment of the bonds' outstanding principal balance as noted in
the April 12, 2017, trustee remittance report.

RATINGS LIST

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-MKB2
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To            From
B                 59022HGB2              NR            AA- (sf)
C                 59022HGC0              NR            A (sf)
D                 59022HGD8              AA+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E                 59022HGE6              AA+ (sf)      B- (sf)
F                 59022HGQ9              BB+ (sf)      D (sf)
XC                59022HHA3              AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


MID-STATE CAPITAL 2005-1: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. B Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
in eight transactions issued between 1997 and 2006. The collateral
backing these transactions consists primarily of manufactured
housing units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1997-07

A-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

A-7, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

A-9, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

A-10, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-01

A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-02

A-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Issuer: Mid-State Capital Corp. 2005-1

Cl. B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Mid-State Capital Corporation 2004-1 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Mid-State Capital Corporation 2006-1 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: UCFC Funding Corporation 1998-1

A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: UCFC Funding Corporation 1998-2

A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2014 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP21: Moody's Cuts Class E Debt Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on one classes
and downgraded the ratings on nine classes in Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2006-TOP21 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eight P&I classes were downgraded due to interest
shortfalls and realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans that are higher than Moody's had
previously expected.

The ratings on one P&I class was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class X was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 36.3% of the
current balance, compared to 26.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of MSC 2006-TOP21.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 56% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 0.4% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to five at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 13 March, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $144.7
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 40.1% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 99% of the pool. One loan, constituting
9.7% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment.

Four loans, constituting 18.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $25.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%). Four loans, constituting 56% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the SBC -- Hoffman Estates Loan ($58.0 million -- 40.1% of the
pool), which is secured by a senior participation in a $113.7
million first mortgage loan secured by a 1.7 million SF corporate
office campus located in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, approximately
25 miles northwest of the Chicago CBD. SBC Communications, which
developed the property between 1988 and 1995 was acquired by AT&T,
which subsequently vacated the property at the end of their lease
in August 2016. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
June 2016 due to imminent default stemming from AT&T's intention to
vacate their space at the property. The property is now 100% vacant
with the exception of a 10,000 SF suite that AT&T has an easement
to occupy at no-cost in perpetuity. The property is composed of the
main building (1.3 million SF), Lakewood Building (300,000 SF), and
the Institute Building (50,000 SF), which houses the property's
conference facilities. Amenities at the property include a food
court with space for several vendors, a fitness center and spa, and
executive parking garage, and space for retail services.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 1757 Tapo Canyon
Road ($20.0 million -- 13.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
179,000 SF office property located in Simi Valley, California. The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in July 2015 due to
imminent default due to the previous tenant, Bank of America,
vacating their space at the property. The property is now 100%
vacant.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the 4510 E. Thousand
Oaks Building Loan ($1.4 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 10,000 SF office building located in Westlake Village,
California, approximately 40 miles northwest of the Los Angeles
CBD. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in March 2014
due to payment default.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by an office
property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $51.5 million loss for
specially serviced loans (64% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans, constituting 0.4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $0.1 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the 13 March, 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $1.1 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full and partial year 2015 operating results for
100% of the pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results
for 98% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased
loans).

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 45 East 89
Street Condop Loan ($14.0 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a residential co-op located at 89th Street and Madison
Avenue in Manhattan. Moody's structured credit assessment is aaa
(sca.pd), the same as at Moody's last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Anthem Health Loan ($24.7 million -- 17% of the
pool), which is secured by a 234,000 SF office building located in
Louisville, Kentucky and was built in 2005. The loan had an
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in August 2015. The property is
100% leased to Anthem Health through August 2020. Moody's
incorporated a Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant
exposure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 106% and 0.94X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Huntsman R&D Facility Loan ($19.6
million -- 13.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 176,000 SF R&D
facility located on a 17-acre campus approximately 35 miles north
of Houston, Texas. The property is 100% occupied by Huntsman
International LLC through August 2022. Moody's incorporated a
Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant exposure.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.57X, respectively,
compared to 63% and 1.63X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Amberwood Garden Apartments Loan
($1.9 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 72-unit
multifamily property located in Hayward, California approximately
15 miles south of the Oakland CBD. The loan is fully amortizing and
has paid down 40% since securitization. The property was 99%
occupied as of December 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 31%
and 2.92X, respectively, compared to 32% and 2.80X at the last
review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C5: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class H Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 14 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust (MSBAM) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2012-C5.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The pool has exhibited stable performance since
issuance. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 16.2% to $1.13
billion from $1.35 billion at issuance. All loans are current and
there are no specially serviced loans. Per servicer reporting, four
loans (7.4%) are fully defeased. Nine loans (14.7%) are on the
servicer watchlist, one of which (7.3% of the pool balance) has
been identified as a Fitch Loan of Concern.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The third largest loan in the pool, US Bank
Tower (7.3%), expects U.S. Bank (30.3% of NRA) to vacate 49,516 sf
of its leased space at the property over a 16-month period that
began in January 2017. The property was 82% occupied as of December
2016 and if U.S. Bank vacates the space as expected, occupancy
would decline to 72% without additional lease-up.

High Retail and Office Exposure: Approximately 38.4% of the pool by
balance, including seven of the top 15 loans (27.1%), consists of
retail properties. Approximately 28.9% of the pool by balance,
including two of the top three loans (22%), consists of office
properties. One property in the pool, Nightingale Retail Portfolio,
has exposure to the anchor retailer JC Penney.

Scheduled Amortization: The entire transaction has a scheduled
amortization of 15%, which is higher than other transactions of the
same vintage. The pool includes low percentages of both
interest-only (14.5%) and partial interest-only (30.3%) loans.

Long-Dated Maturities: Only four loans (9% of the current balance)
mature prior to 2021. The majority of pool matures in 2022 (90.2%
of the current balance).

Low Levered Pool: The top 15 loans in the pool have a weighted
average Fitch LTV of 78% and a net operating income (NOI) DSCR of
2.14x. At Fitch's last rating action, the top 15 loans had a
weighted average Fitch LTV of 78.5% and a weighted average NOI DSCR
of 2.11x.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through J remain Stable due to the
relatively stable performance of the pool and sufficient class
credit enhancement, which is expected to increase from continued
amortization. Fitch's analysis included a sensitivity test
reflecting a negative stress scenario on the Nightingale Retail
Portfolio loan due to JC Penney exposure and Kroger's rollover risk
with the upcoming lease expiration. Upgrades to the classes may
occur with improved pool performance and additional class paydown
or defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should an
asset-level or economic event cause a decline in pool performance.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $88.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $149.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $489.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.2 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116.7 million class PST at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.5 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.1 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.5 million class F at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.6 million class G at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.7 million class H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $846.2 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66 million* class X-B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class J and X-C certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C10: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 16 classes in
Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C10 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes is consistent with Moody's expectations.

The rating on the exchangeable class (Class PST) was affirmed
because the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the exchangable classes is consistent with
Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.7% of the
current balance, compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.9% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014. The methodology used in rating the exchangeable class, Cl.
PST was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities"
published in June 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C10.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6% to $1.39 billion
from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 72 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to just under 10% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 8.5% of
the pool, have investment-grade structured credit assessments. One
loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, has defeased and is
secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 81% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, compared to 104% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.80X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.67X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is Milford
Plaza Fee Loan ($110 million -- 8% of the pool), which represents a
pari passu interest in a $275 million first mortgage. The loan is
secured by the ground lease on the land beneath the Row NYC Hotel,
formerly the Milford Plaza Hotel -- a 28-story, 1,331 key
full-service hotel located in Midtown Manhattan. The triple net
(NNN) ground lease commenced in 2013, expires in 2112 and includes
annual CPI rent increases. The tenant has purchase options at the
end of years 10, 20 and 30. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are baa1 (sca.pd) and 0.66X, respectively.

The other loan with a structured credit assessment is the Hampshire
House Co-op Loan ($9 million -- less than 1% of the pool), which is
secured by a 196-unit residential cooperative building overlooking
the south end of Central Park in Manhattan. Building amenities
include a doorman, health club, spa, laundry, live-in super and a
parking garage. Property occupancy was 95% as of September 2015.
The loan is interest-only during the entire term and the loan
exposure is $45,918 per unit. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and greater than 4.00X,
respectively.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 24% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Westfield Citrus Park Loan ($137
million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.1 million SF regional mall located in northwest
Tampa, Florida. The mall anchors are Dillard's, Macy's, Sears and
J.C. Penney. The anchor space is not part of the loan collateral.
The mall was 97% leased as of year-end 2016, the same as at Moody's
prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 1.02X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 500 North Capitol Loan ($105 million
-- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 233,000 SF, Class A
office building located in downtown Washington, DC. As of June
2016, the property was 100% leased, compared to 93% as of December
2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.90X,
respectively, compared to 120% and 0.89X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Southdale Center Loan ($96.6 million
-- 6.9% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$150 million first mortgage. The loan is secured by a
super-regional mall located in Edina, Minnesota. The mall is
anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney, Herberger's, Marshall's and a
movie theater. Macy's and J.C. Penney are not a part of the
collateral. The total mall was 93% leased as of September 2016,
compared to 78% leased as of year-end 2014 and 84% reported at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 107% and 0.91X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2013-C11 (MSBAM 2013-C11).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the generally stable performance of
the pool. The Negative Outlooks on classes D through G reflect the
deterioration in performance and uncertainty surrounding the
workout of the third largest loan in the pool, Matrix Corporate
Center (10.3%).

Fitch modeled losses of 6.4% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 5.8%. The pool has one specially
serviced loan (10.3%) and one loan (2.9%) on the servicer watch
list. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 9% to $779 million from
$856.3 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(1.6% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class J.

Matrix Corporate Center: The Negative Outlooks for classes D
through E reflect the uncertainty surrounding the Matrix Corporate
Center loan, which has been in special servicing since February
2016. Fitch Ratings remains concerned over the ultimate resolution
and recoverability of the loan given the collateral's low occupancy
and soft submarket conditions.

Retail Concentration; Mall Exposure: Retail loans represent 34.9%
of the current pool. The majority of the retail exposure is from
three of the top five loans, which are secured by regional malls
located in Clearwater, FL (12.8%), Dublin, OH (12%) and Edina, MN
(6.8%). One loan is sponsored by Westfield Group (12.8%), and two
are sponsored by Simon Property Group, LP (18.8%). In addition, two
of these regional malls (24.8%) have exposure to Sears as a
non-collateral tenant, and all three have exposure to Macy's and
JCPenney as non-collateral tenants.

Hotel Concentration: Hotel properties represent 20.1% of the pool.
Four loans in the top 15, Marriott Chicago River North, the Beverly
Garland Hotel, the Wyndham - Virginia Beach and the Marriott
Jacksonville, are secured by hotel properties.

Amortization and No Interest-Only Loans: The pool is scheduled to
amortize 15.4% prior to maturity. There are no interest-only loans.
Eight loans (45% of the pool) are partial interest-only loans, and
29 loans (55% of the pool) are balloon loans. Approximately 87% of
the pool consists of 10-year loans, and 13% consists of five-year
loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes D through G remain Negative due to
the uncertainty surrounding the resolution of the Matrix Corporate
Center loan. A disposition of the asset for less than expected may
warrant downgrades; conversely, the Rating Outlook may be revised
to Stable if the asset is resolved with minimal losses or the
asset-level performance reverts to levels seen at issuance. Rating
Outlooks on A-1 through C remain Stable due to the relatively
stable performance of the pool. Downgrades are possible with a
significant performance decline. Upgrades to senior classes, while
not likely in the near term, are possible with increased credit
enhancement and overall improved pool performance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $117.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $206.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $522.1 million interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $49.2 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $144.5 million class PST at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $9.6 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $8.6 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $20.3 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class H, J, or X-B certificates. The class A-S, B, and C
certificates may be exchanged for class PST certificates, and the
class PST certificates may be exchanged for the class A-S, B, and C
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C22: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust (MSBAM) 2015-C22 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance: There have been no material changes to
the pool's overall performance since issuance. As of the March 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance was
reduced by 1.4% to $1.09 billion from $1.11 billion at issuance.
Five loans (3.7% of the current balance) are currently on the
servicer's watchlist primarily for deferred maintenance issues,
none of which are considered Fitch loans of concern. The only Fitch
LOC is the specially serviced loan.

Specially Serviced Loan: Pathmark-Linden is a 59,250-sf
single-tenant retail building built in 1994 and located in Linden,
NJ. The loan transferred to special servicing for payment default
in November 2015 and remains in foreclosure. Pathmark vacated the
property shortly after its parent company filed for bankruptcy in
July 2015, and the property has since been vacant.

Concentration in Primary Markets: Seven of the pool's top 10 loans
(38.6%) are secured by properties in primary MSAs. The pool's
largest market concentrations are New York-New Jersey (16.3%),
Chicago (12.7%), and Houston (6.4%).

High Hotel and Retail Exposure: Approximately 23% of the pool by
balance, including three of the top five loans (16.9%), consists of
hotel properties. Approximately 32.7% of the pool by balance,
including four of the top 12 loans (14.1%), consists of retail
properties. However, there is no exposure to anchor retailers JC
Penney, Sears, or Macy's.

Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 12.4% of the
initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is greater than the
2014 average of 12.0%. Six loans (27.4%) are full-term
interest-only, 30 loans (34.9%) are partial interest-only and one
loan (9.2%) has an anticipated repayment date. The remaining 41
loans (37.6%) are amortizing balloon loans with loan terms of five
to10 years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable due to stable
collateral performance overall. Fitch does not foresee positive or
negative ratings migration until a material economic or asset-level
event changes the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.
Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $39.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $250 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $318.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60.9** million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.7** million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.2** million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26.3 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.8 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175.8** million class PST at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $820* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.7* million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.
**Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PST
certificates, and class PST certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the classes G and H certificates.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-2: S&P Gives Prelim. B Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2's $657.154 million
residential mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by highly seasoned, prime and nonprime
first-lien fixed-rate residential mortgage loans secured primarily
by single-family residential properties, condominiums, planned-unit
developments, two- to four-family residential properties,
cooperatives, and manufactured homes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 17,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided, as well as the associated
      structural transaction mechanics;

   -- The pool's collateral composition, which consists of highly
      seasoned, prime and nonprime, fixed-rate mortgages;

   -- The representation and warranty framework; and

   -- The ability and willingness of key transaction parties to
      perform their contractual obligations and the likelihood
      that the parties could be replaced if needed.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-2

Class            Rating               Amount ($)
A-1              AAA (sf)            617,910,000
A-IO             AAA (sf)         617,910,000(i)
B-1              AA (sf)              11,973,000
B1-IO            AA (sf)           11,973,000(i)
B-2              A (sf)                9,977,000
B2-IO            A (sf)             9,977,000(i)
B-3              BBB (sf)              7,316,000
B-4              BB (sf)               5,987,000
B-5              B (sf)                3,991,000
B-6              NR                    7,981,130
FB               NR                    2,882,010
A                AAA (sf)            617,910,000
B                NR                   47,225,130
A-1A             AAA (sf)            617,910,000
A1-IOA           AAA (sf)         617,910,000(i)
A-1B             AAA (sf)            617,910,000
A1-IOB           AAA (sf)         617,910,000(i)
A-1C             AAA (sf)            617,910,000
A1-IOC           AAA (sf)         617,910,000(i)
A-2              AA (sf)             629,883,000
B-1A             AA (sf)              11,973,000
B1-IOA           AA (sf)           11,973,000(i)
B-1B             AA (sf)              11,973,000
B1-IOB           AA (sf)           11,973,000(i)
B-1C             AA (sf)              11,973,000
B1-IOC           AA (sf)           11,973,000(i)
B-2A             A (sf)                9,977,000
B2-IOA           A (sf)             9,977,000(i)
B-2B             A (sf)                9,977,000
B2-IOB           A (sf)             9,977,000(i)
B-2C             A (sf)                9,977,000
B2-IOC           A (sf)             9,977,000(i)
B-3A             BBB (sf)              7,316,000
B3-IOA           BBB (sf)           7,316,000(i)
B-3B             BBB (sf)              7,316,000
B3-IOB           BBB (sf)           7,316,000(i)
B-3C             BBB (sf)              7,316,000
B3-IOC           BBB (sf)           7,316,000(i)
B-4A             BB (sf)               5,987,000
B4-IOA           BB (sf)            5,987,000(i)
B-5A             B (sf)                3,991,000
B5-IOA           B (sf)             3,991,000(i)

(i)Notional amount. NR--Not rated.



NXT CAPITAL 2017-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to NXT Capital CLO 2017-1
LLC's $349.35 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by middle-market speculative-grade senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term loans
      that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The credit
      enhancement provided through the subordination of cash
      flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

NXT Capital CLO 2017-1 LLC

Class                               Rating        Amount
A                                   AAA (sf)      226.70
B                                   AA (sf)        39.70
C (deferrable)                      A (sf)         31.75
D (deferrable)                      BBB- (sf)      24.80
E (deferrable)                      BB (sf)        26.40
Subordinated notes                  NR             57.00

NR--Not rated.


OCP CLO 2013-4: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class X,
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from OCP CLO
2013-4 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2013 that is managed by Onex Credit Partners LLC.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 13,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 24, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.  Based on the provisions in the amended and restated
indenture:

   -- The replacement class A-2-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes are
      expected to be issued at a higher spread than the original
      notes.

   -- The replacement class A-1-R floating-rate notes are expected

      to be issued at a lower spread than the original notes and
      will replace the original class A-1A and A-1B floating- and
      fixed-rate notes.

   -- The replacement class B-R notes are expected to maintain the

      same spread as the original class B notes.

   -- Class X notes will be issued at closing.

   -- The transaction will be upsized by $100 million, and the
      stated maturity and reinvestment period will be extended by
      four years.  The non-call period will be two years from the
      refinancing closing date.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OCP CLO 2013-4 Ltd./OCP CLO 2013-4 Corp.
Replacement class         Rating              Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                         AAA (sf)               2.40
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             382.60
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               77.00
B-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                33.60
C-R (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)             34.80
D-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              23.80
E-R (deferrable)          B (sf)                16.50


ONEMAIN DIRECT 2016-1: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Services has upgraded the ratings of four
outstanding tranches issued from OneMain Direct Auto Receivables
Trust 2016-1 (ODART 2016-1). The securitization is sponsored and
serviced by Springleaf Finance Corporation (SFC), rated B3, a
wholly owned subsidiary of OneMain Holdings, Inc., rated B3.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: OneMain Direct Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Class D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of the buildup of credit enhancement
owing to structural features including a sequential pay bond
structure, a non-declining reserve account and
overcollateralization. The transaction has particularly benefited
from the sequential pay bond structure because the underlying pool
of SFC's direct auto loans prepay at a much higher rate than
typical auto loans. SFC frequently refinances existing direct auto
loans for qualified borrowers which results in a prepayment of the
loan out of the trust. As long as SFC continues its renewal
practice, the transaction will benefit from high prepayments and a
rapid buildup of credit enhancement.

The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectation for ODART 2016-1
was decreased to 5.50% from 7.00%, reflecting stronger than
expected performance of the underlying loans as well as high
prepayments. Moody's CNL expectations is based on the transaction
performance to date as well as loss performance of SFC's portfolio
of hard secured loans greater than $6,000 in balance since 2006.
SFC launched the direct auto loan product in May 2014, thus there
is limited performance data. While SFC has extensive performance
data on its "hard secured" consumer loan portfolio -- which also
includes borrowing backed by vehicles -- the average balance, term,
APR and vehicle age of loans in that portfolio are significantly
different than direct auto loans. Defaults and recovery rates will
be difficult to forecast accurately until more data is gathered.
Moody's expects the direct auto loan performance to be stronger
than the historical hard secured loan performance due to its
stronger borrower characteristics as well as it's historically
higher recovery rates.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the March 2017
distribution date) and credit assumptions for each affected
transaction. The credit assumptions include Moody's expected
lifetime CNL expectation (expressed as a percentage of the original
pool balance) and Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation
(expressed as a percentage of the current pool balance).
Performance metrics include the pool factor, which is the ratio of
the current collateral balance to the original collateral balance
at closing; total hard credit enhancement, which typically consists
of subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and
excess spread per annum.

Issuer: OneMain Direct Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 5.50%; prior expectation (July 2016)
-- 7.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 7.56%

Pool factor -- 64.93%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 40.34%, Class B 31.03%,
Class C 20.55%, Class D 9.54%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 11.6%

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
Methodology for "Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance". If the revised Methodology is implemented as
proposed, the Credit Rating on OneMain auto loan ABS is expected to
be neutral. Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "
Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing
Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. The US job market and the market for used vehicle are
primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the loans or refinancing
opportunities that result in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and the market for
used vehicle are primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for
worse performance than Moody's expected include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


PALMER SQUARE 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1A-R,
A-1B-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R floating-rate replacement
notes from Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2013 that is managed by
Palmer Square Capital Management LLC.

On the April 17, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class A-1A-R, A-1B-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement
note issuance were used to redeem the original class A-1a, A-1b,
A-2, B, C, D, and E notes as outlined in the transaction document
provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on the original
notes in line with their full redemption, and S&P is assigning
ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a supplemental indenture
and carry a lower cost of debt than the original notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
Replacement class          Rating         Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A-1A-R                     AAA (sf)      280.000
A-1B-R                     AAA (sf)       25.000
A-2-R                      AA (sf)        37.700
B-R                        A (sf)         31.000
C-R                        BBB (sf)       23.000
D-R                        BB (sf)        18.000
E-R                        B- (sf)         8.500
Junior mezzanine notes     NR              1.300
Subordinated notes         NR             43.986

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
                           Rating
Class                To              From
A-1a                 NR              AAA (sf)
A-1b                 NR              AAA (sf)
A-2                  NR              AA (sf)
B                    NR              A (sf)
C                    NR              BBB (sf)
D                    NR              BB (sf)
E                    NR              B (sf)

NR--Not rated.



PREFERRED TERM XX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to Ba3(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XX, Ltd.:

US$332,300,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $182,025,005.95), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on April 9, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

US$84,600,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $79,909,016.62), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on April 9, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

US$75,500,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes Due 2038
(current balance of $71,313,602.31), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
previously on April 9, 2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following note issued by
PreTSL Combination Trust I:

US$10,000,000 PreTSL Combination Certificates, Series P XX-2 Due
2038(current rated balance of $5,014,771.64), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 16, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

Preferred Term Securities XX, Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by a portfolio of bank,
insurance and REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS).

PreTSL Combination Certificates, Series P XX-2, a combination note
security, was issued in December 2005. It is composed of $5.0
million of Class A-1 notes, $4.1 million of income notes issued by
Preferred Term Securities XX, Ltd., a TruPS CDO, and $3.2 million
face of a treasury strip due March 15, 2031 issued by the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage corporation.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class B notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios and the resumption
of interest payments on previously deferring assets since November
2016.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 3.7% or $6.9
million, the Class A-2 notes have paid down by approximately 0.9%
or $0.7 million and the Class B notes have paid down by
approximately 0.9% or $0.6 million since November 2016, using
principal proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and
the diversion of excess interest proceeds. Based on Moody's
calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class
B notes have improved to 210.2%, 146.0% and 114.8%, respectively,
from November 2016 levels of 194.8%, 136.5% and 107.8%,
respectively. Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to three
deferring assets that meet certain criteria, totaling $11.5 million
in par. Additionally, one previously deferring bank totaling $6.0
million in par redeemed. The Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class B notes
will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest as
long as the Class B OC test (currently reported at 110.84% versus a
115.0% trigger by the trustee) continues to fail. In addition, the
Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from principal proceeds
due to redemption of the underlying assets.

The affirmation on the PreTSL Combination Certificates, Series P
XX-2, reflects the stable coverage from the underlying components
of the certificates. At issuance, the combination certificates were
comprised of $5.0 million of Class A-1 notes, $4.1 million of
income notes and $3.2 million face of a treasury strip. Currently,
the combination certificates' rated balance of $5.0 million is
backed by $2.7 million of Class A-1 notes, $4.1 million of income
notes, and $3.2 million of a treasury strip.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector and the US P&C insurance sector, and a negative outlook on
the US life insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 842)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class B: +3

Combination Certificates: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1774)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Combination Certificates: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $382.5, defaulted/deferring par of $69.0 million, a weighted
average default probability of 14.16% (implying a WARF of 1349),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks, insurance companies and REIT
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by
Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on
the latest FDIC financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its
Insurance team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying
insurance firms' annual statutory financial reports. For REIT TruPS
that do not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their
credit quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.


RAMP TRUST 2003-RS10: Moody's Hikes Class M-I-1 Debt Rating to B3sf
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
issued by RAMP Series 2003-RS10 Trust, backed by subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS10 Trust

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SACO I 2005-5: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. II-M-5 Notes to B1(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 16 tranches
from eight deals backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-C

B-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

B-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2004-A

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2011 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL1

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-5

Cl. II-M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-9

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-S4

Cl. M6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-S2

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are the result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily the result of an
increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SOUND POINT III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class F Notes to B1(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Sound Point CLO
III, Ltd.:

US$248,250,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2025 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$64,250,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2025
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C-1-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2025 (the "Class C-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$5,000,000 Class C-2-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2025 (the "Class C-2-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$28,250,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2025 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Additionally, Moody's has taken rating actions on the following
outstanding notes issued by the Issuer on the original issuance
date (the "Original Closing Date"):

Up to U.S. $50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
August 22, 2013 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class A Loans due 2025 (the "Class A Loans"),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 22, 2013 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$22,750,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
August 22, 2013 Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$10,750,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class F Notes"), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
August 22, 2013 Assigned B2 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Sound Point Capital Management LP (the "Manager") manages the CLO.
It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on April 17, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of certain
classes of notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously
issued on August 22, 2013, the Original Closing Date. On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer used the proceeds from the issuance of
the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes.

Moody's rating actions are primarily a result of the refinancing,
which increases excess spread available as credit enhancement to
the rated notes. Additionally, the rating actions reflect the
benefit of the short period of time remaining before the end of the
deal's reinvestment period in July 2017. In light of the
reinvestment restrictions during the amortization period, and
therefore the limited ability of the Issuer to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will maintain a positive buffer relative to certain
covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's expects the Issuer to
continue to benefit from higher weighted average recovery rate
(WARR) and lower weighted average rating factor (WARF) levels
compared to the covenanted test levels.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in rating the Issuer's notes was
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of each class of the Issuer's notes is subject to
uncertainty relating to certain factors and circumstances, and this
uncertainty could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of Moody's
ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the Manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by the Manager or other transaction parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: Investing in collateral of better credit
quality, or better than Moody's expected credit performance of the
assets collateralizing the transaction can lead to positive CLO
performance. Conversely, a negative shift in the credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: During the amortization period, the pace of
deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds is an important
source of uncertainty. Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate
owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the Manager, which could have a significant
impact on the ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO
notes, beginning with those notes having the highest payment
priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Weighted average life (WAL): The notes' ratings can be sensitive
to the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
could lengthen owing to any decision by the Manager to reinvest
into new issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can
increase the default risk horizon and assumed cumulative default
probability of CLO collateral.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

10) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The historical default rate of assets rated Caa3 with a negative
outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's
speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, is higher than the
average. Exposure to such assets subject the notes to additional
risks if these assets default.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions described below,
Moody's conducted additional sensitivity analyses, which were
considered in determining the ratings assigned to the rated notes.
In particular, in addition to the base case analysis, Moody's
conducted sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of
default probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results. Below is a summary of the impact of different
default probabilities, expressed in terms of WARF level, on the
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches difference
versus the base case model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Moody's Assumed WARF - 20% (2143)

Class A-1-R Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class A Loans: 0

Class B-R Notes: 0

Class C-1-R Notes: +1

Class C-2-R Notes: +1

Class D-R Notes: +3

Class E Notes: +1

Class F Notes: +1

Moody's Assumed WARF + 20% (3215)

Class A-1-R Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class A Loans: 0

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-1-R Notes: -3

Class C-2-R Notes: -3

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
recovery rate, and weighted average spread, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following
base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $476,916,197

Defaulted par: $5,910,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2679 (corresponding to a
weighted average default probability of 19.03%)

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10% (before accounting for LIBOR
floors)

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.07%

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


TRAPEZA CDO XII: Moody's Hikes Class C-1 Notes Rating to Caa3(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd.:

US$250,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2042 (current outstanding balance of $153,025,100),
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015 Upgraded to A3
(sf);

US$68,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2042, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 10,
2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

US$19,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2042, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

US$49,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2042, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 10,
2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf).

US$38,000,000 Class C-1 Fifth Priority Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2042 (current balance of $42,804,275, including
deferred interest balance), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
July 13, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

US$9,000,000 Class C-2 Fifth Priority Secured Deferrable
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2042 (current balance of $14,619,481,
including deferred interest balance), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
previously on July 13, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and insurance trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios, full repayment of the Class B
notes' deferred interest balance, and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since April 2016.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 4.8% or $7.7
million since April 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes have improved to 222.7% and
154.2%, respectively, from April 2016 levels of 215.2% and 151.2%,
respectively. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

In addition, the Class B OC ratio, currently reported at 119.73% by
the trustee, has been passing the trigger of 117% since July 2016.
Therefore excess interest was used to pay $2.1 million of the Class
B notes' deferred interest balance in July and October 2016. The
Class B notes' deferred interest balance has now been fully repaid
and the Class C-1 and C-2 notes are also receiving current interest
payments, although their deferred interest balance will remain
outstanding until the Class C OC test is cured.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 701 from 804 in
April 2016. In addition, one $5 million asset has redeemed at par
since then.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of prior errors. In
previous rating actions, a $50 million interest rate cap was
incorrectly modeled as an interest rate swap, resulting in an
overestimation of the amount payable to the hedge counterparty. In
addition, the management fee was understated in the analyses. The
errors have now been corrected, and actions reflect these changes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 448)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class A-3: +2

Class B: +2

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1067)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3: -1

Class B: -1

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par of $340.8 million,
defaulted par of $62.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 7.85% (implying a WARF of 701), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc™, an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of UBS-Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C2 (UBSBB 2012-C2) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the underlying
loans and increased credit enhancement to the classes. As of the
March 2017 distribution date, the transaction had paid down by
18.9% primarily due to the March 2017 payoff of the largest loan in
the pool (110 William Street; $135.8 million) as well as scheduled
amortization. There have been no realized losses to date.
Approximately 1.4% of the pool is currently defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently impacting the non-rated class H.

Retail Concentration: The pool has a significant concentration of
loans secured by retail properties at 52.4%. Five of the top 15
loans are secured by regional malls (33.4% of the pool). Fitch
performed an additional sensitivity analysis on the portfolio to
address concerns related to this concentration and the overall
weakness in the retail sector.

Scheduled Amortization: Approximately 87.5% of the pool is
currently amortizing. At issuance, the pool was expected to
amortize by the above average amount of 15%.

Limited Upcoming Maturities: There are limited scheduled maturities
prior to 2022. A total of three loans (4.6% of the pool) have
maturity dates in 2017 or 2019.

Specially Serviced Loan: Only one loan (1% of the pool) is
currently in special servicing. The loan, which is secured by an
office property located in Houston, TX, transferred to special
servicing on March 13, 2017 due to imminent maturity default. The
loan is scheduled to mature on May 6, 2017, and payoff at that time
is not expected. At issuance, the loan was secured by two
properties; however, one property was sold and released in February
2016 with a $14.9 million pay down. Per the servicer, the loan had
a year-end (YE) 2016 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.86x.
However, it should be noted that the debt service amount did not
change after the release of the other secured property. The
February 2017 rent roll reported an occupancy of 88.9%; however, it
is expected to decrease to 75% due to the downsizing of its largest
tenant. The property has a significant energy related tenancy.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for classes A-2 through G remain Stable due to the
pool's overall stable performance and increased credit enhancement.
There are minimal scheduled loan maturities prior to 2022. Upgrades
to the classes may occur with improved pool performance and
additional class pay down or defeasance; however, they may be
limited due to the high concentration of retail loans. Downgrades
to the classes are possible should an asset level or economic event
cause a decline in pool performance.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $25.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116.3 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $479.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $94.2 million class A-S-EC at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.8 million class B-EC at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.6 million class C-EC at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $203.7 class EC at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.3 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.8 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.3 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- *Class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable.

*Interest-Only class.

The class A-S-EC, class B-EC and class C-EC certificates may be
exchanged for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may
be exchanged for class A-S-EC, class B-EC and class C-EC
certificates. As of the June 2013 remittance, all of the class
A-S-EC, class B-EC and class C-EC certificates had been exchanged
for class EC certificates.

Class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the interest-only
class X-B or class H certificates.


VENTURE LTD VIII: Moody' Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba3(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Venture VIII CDO, Limited:

US$50,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf); previously on December 15, 2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on December 15, 2016 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf); previously on December 15, 2016 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$106,250,000 Class A-1A Senior Revolving Notes Due 2021 (current
balance of $36,918,389.46), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
December 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$4,500,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$429,075,000 Class A-2A Senior Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
$130,620,414.68), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 15,
2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$47,675,000 Class A-2B Senior Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
$18,699,047.18), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 15, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$46,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Venture VIII CDO, Limited, issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July
2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since December 2016. Since that
time, the Class A-1A notes have been paid down by approximately
27.7% or $14.2 million, the Class A-2A notes have been paid down by
approximately 31.8% or $61.0 million, and the Class A-3 notes have
been paid down by approximately 25.5% or $6.4 million. Based on the
trustee's March 2017 report, the OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class
C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at 146.91%, 124.97%,
113.92% and 106.93%, respectively, versus November 2016 levels of
136.65%, 120.24%, 111.54% and 105.88%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since December 2016. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 3345 compared to 3249 in
December 2016. Additionally, based on Moody's calculations, the
proportion of the assets with a Moody's default probability rating
of Caa1 or below, which include adjustments for ratings with a
negative outlook and ratings on review for downgrade, has increased
to 25.7% of the portfolio, compared to 23.6% in December 2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

8) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a small number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. Moody's normally updates such estimates
at least once annually, but if such updates do not occur, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

9) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $4.6 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2676)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4014)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $409.8 million, defaulted par of
$26.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 18.69%
(implying a WARF of 3345), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.86%, a diversity score of 71 and a weighted average
spread of 4.01% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


VOYA CLO 2014-2: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Voya CLO
2014-2, Ltd.:

US$2,500,000 Class X-R Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class X-R
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$331,000,000 Class A-1-R Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class A-2a-R Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-2a-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class A-2b-R Fixed Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-2b-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$27,600,000 Class B-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$33,600,000 Class C-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$23,000,000 Class D-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$9,500,000 Class E-R Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class E-R Notes"), Assigned B2 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans, eligible investments and second lien
loans.

Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on April 17, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of certain
classes of notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes") previously
issued on June 4, 2014 (the "Original Closing Date") along with
additional subordinated notes. On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer
used the proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to
redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes. The Issuer also
issued one class of subordinated notes on the Original Closing
Date, which is not subject to this refinancing and will remain
outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: reinstatement and extension of the
reinvestment period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call
period; and changes to certain collateral quality tests, issuance
of Class X-R Notes and additional subordinated notes.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $514,500,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2905

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2905 to 3341)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X-R Notes: 0

Class A-1-R Notes: 0

Class A-2a-R Notes: -2

Class A-2b-R Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -1

Class D-R Notes: 0

Class E-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2905 to 3777)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X-R Notes: 0

Class A-1-R Notes: -1

Class A-2a-R Notes: -3

Class A-2b-R Notes: -3

Class B-R Notes: -4

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes:-2


VOYA CLO 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating on Cl. D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Voya CLO 2017-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$3,100,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class X
Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$320,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Voya CLO 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of underlying assets that are
unsecured loans and second lien loans. The portfolio is
approximately 88% ramped as of the closing date.

Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. H Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the distressed ratings of seven classes
of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-C17.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only six
commercial assets remaining. The smallest loan is secured by
defeased collateral. The largest loan is secured by a distressed
mall and was previously in special servicing and modified into an A
and B note (combined representing 47% of the pool).

The pool is also concentrated by property type; five of the six
non-defeased assets (69.6% of the pool) are secured by retail
properties with occupancy concerns, including the previously
mentioned mall. The second largest loan is secured by a retail
property with a dark anchor space that is currently only 10%
physically occupied. Fitch's analysis included additional
sensitivity stresses to account for the concentrated nature of the
pool.

Interest Shortfalls: Class J has not received its full interest
payment since 2014 following the modification of the largest loan.
This loan is scheduled to mature in 2018; however, based on Fitch's
valuation of the asset, it is not likely to recover all deferred
interest.

The Westland Mall (47% of the current pool balance) is a 338,476
square foot regional mall located in Burlington, IA. The mall is
anchored by Younkers (19.7% of the net rentable area [NRA] through
January 2022) and Marshalls (7.3% of the NRA through October 2023).
There is also a movie theater occupying 8.5% of the NRA which acts
as a non-collateral anchor tenant. Two anchor spaces previously
occupied by JCPenney and McGregor's Furniture are vacant. According
to the most recent rent roll, the property is 43.7% occupied.

The Westland Mall loan was sent to the special servicer for
imminent default and was modified in March 2014. Terms of the
modification included an A/B note split, which resulted in a $10.5
million A-note with a reduced interest rate and conversion from
amortizing to IO payments and a $6.4 million interest-accruing hope
note. The loan's maturity date was extended to January 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Additional downgrades to the distressed ratings are possible if
expected losses increase. Although unlikely, upgrades are possible
in the event of improved loan level performance or better than
expected recoveries.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $17.7 million class H at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $6.8 million class J at 'CCsf', RE 95%;
-- $10.2 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $1.2 million class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-1A, A-PB, A-J, B, C, D, E, F and G
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P
certificate. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-P and X-C certificates.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Moody's Hikes Class E Certs Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on five classes in Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C25, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C25:

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 26% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on four P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with expected recovery of principal and interest
from specially and troubled loans as well as losses from previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 28.3% of the
current balance, compared to 42.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. IO was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of WBCMT 2006-C25.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 78.0% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior classes and the recovery
as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to five at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17,2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $149.5
million from $2.86 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 5% to 45% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 20% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $147 million (for an average loss
severity of 56%). Six loans, constituting 78% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Hercules Plaza Loan ($65.1 million -- 45% of the pool),
which is secured by a 518,000 square foot (SF) office property in
downtown Wilmington, Delaware. The loan transferred to special
servicing in July 2016 for imminent monetary default after a tenant
occupying 24% of Net Rentable Area (NRA) vacated at lease
expiration. The property cashflow is now insufficient to cover debt
service and operating expenses. As of the September 2016 rent roll,
the property was 54% leased, down from 73% at yearend 2015. The
servicer is moving forward with Receivership and foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Skagit Valley
Square Loan ($16.6 million -- 11.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 172,000 SF community shopping center located in Mt. Vernon,
Washington. The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2010
after occupancy fell to 67%. As of February 2017, the property was
95% leased. The asset is currently being marketed for sale with
anticipated disposition in May 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Summit Ridge
Business Park Loan ($15.2 million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is
secured by three flex/research & development office buildings
totaling approximately 134,000 SF in San Diego, California. Since
the servicer took title in 2011, occupancy has increased from a low
of 28% to 100% as of February 2017. The asset is currently being
marketed for sale with an anticipated disposition in May 2017.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $40.5 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (36% expected loss on
average).

As of the March 17, 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $14.8 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

The two conduit loans not in special servicing represent 22.0% of
the pool balance. The largest loan is the Shoppes at North Valley
Loan ($29.0 million -- 20.2% of the pool), which is secured by
226,000 SF of a larger 710,000 SF power center built in 2005 and
located in Saint Joseph, Missouri. The property is anchored by
Target, The Home Depot and Sam's Club, all non-collateral. As of
the September 2016 rent roll, the property is 98% leased to 26
tenants, up from 93% at yearend 2015. The loan is past the November
2015 Anticipated Repayment Date (ARD) and began hyperamortizing in
2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.91X,
respectively, compared to 105% and 0.89X at the last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B+
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating to 'B+ (sf)' from 'D (sf)' on
the class A-J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C30, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating action reflects its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The rating on class A-J was previously lowered to 'D (sf)' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P expected to remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time.  S&P raised its rating
on this class to 'B+ (sf)' because it do not expect a further
default on class A-J to be virtually certain since the class has
experienced timely interest payments over the past 15 months. While
available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive rating
movement, S&P's analysis also considered the susceptibility to
reduced liquidity support from the 39 specially serviced assets
($1.15 billion, 85.0%), as well as the largest performing loan in
the pool, the Bank One Center loan ($177.3 million,13.1%), which
was previously corrected.

The Bank One Center loan is secured by a 1.5 million-sq.-ft. office
property in Dallas.  The corrected mortgage loan was modified
effective May 31, 2013, which included bifurcating the trust
balance into a $143.5 million A note and a $33.8 million
subordinate B note, and extending the maturity date to Jan. 11,
2020.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2016 were
1.43x and 66.8%, respectively.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.40 billion, which is 17.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 30 loans and 14 real
estate owned assets (reflecting crossed-collateralized and
crossed-defaulted loans and A/B notes), down from 263 loans at
issuance.  There are no defeased loans, 39 assets ($1.15 billion,
85.0%) are with the special servicer, and five ($202.4 million,
15.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist (this reflects the
transfer of the McClamroch Hall loan, which ocurred after the
trustee remittance report date).  The master servicer, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., reported financial information for 74.5% of the loans in
the pool, of which 71.1% was partial or year-end 2016 data, and the
remainder was year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.24x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 118.0% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.07%.  S&P Global
Ratings weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 39 specially serviced
assets and the Bank One Center subordinate B hope note ($33.8
million, 2.5%).  The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding
pool trust balance of $882.4 million (65.2%) and nine of the 10
assets are specially serviced.

To date, the transaction has experienced $159.0 million in
principal losses, or 2.0% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 7.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the 39 specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, 39 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC.  Details of the four largest specially serviced assets, all of
which are top 10 loans, are:

The One Congress Street loan ($190.0 million, 14.0%) has a total
reported exposure of $192.0 million.  The loan is secured by a 1.2
million-sq.-ft. mixed-use (office/parking/retail) property in
Boston.  The loan was transferred to special servicer on Oct. 29,
2014, at the borrower's request in preparation for a large-scale
redevelopment.  CWCapital indicated that the loan was modified
before the loan maturity, which was extended to Aug. 11, 2017, and
it will remain with CWCapital for monitoring until payoff.  The
loan is current in payment status.  The reported DSC and occupancy
as of Sept. 30, 2016, were 1.05x and 6.8%, respectively.  S&P
expects a minimal loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Four Seasons Aviara Resort – Carlsbad, CA loan ($186.5
million, 13.8%) has a total reported exposure of $203.2 million.
The loan is secured by a 329-room resort lodging facility with spa
and golf course in Carlsbad, Calif.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on April 16, 2013, due to imminent monetary
default.  A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure has been filed.  This loan
has an appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $93.5 million and the
master servicer has deemed it nonrecoverable.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon its eventual resolution.

The PNC Corporate Center loan ($57.1 million, 4.2%) has a total
reported exposure of $57.5 million.  The loan is secured by a
581,430-sq.-ft. office property in Louisville, Ky.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on June 10, 2016, due to
imminent monetary default.  CWCapital indicated that the largest
tenant at the property, PNC Bank National Assn. (26.8% of the net
rentable area), did not renew their lease at the Feb. 28, 2017,
expiration date.  The reported DSC as of Sept. 30, 2016, was 1.10x.
S&P expects a moderate loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Sealy C Pool loan ($49.4 million, 3.7%) has a total reported
exposure of $53.7 million.  The loan is secured by 14
warehouse/office properties totaling 1.0 million sq. ft. in Texas
and Louisiana.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
July 19, 2012, due to imminent monetary default.  CWCapital
indicated that borrower has hired a marketing team to sell the
portfolio.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2016,
were 0.76x and 61.1%, respectively.  An ARA of $5.5 million is in
effect against this loan and S&P expects a minimal loss upon its
eventual resolution.

The 35 remaining assets with the special servicer have each
individual balances that represent less than 3.3% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 37 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 35.6%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C30
                                          Rating
Class              Identifier             To           From
A-J                92978QAJ6              B+ (sf)      D (sf)


WELLS FARGO 2013-LC12: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial pass-through certificates, 2013-LC12
(WFCM 2013-LC12).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relatively Stable Performance: The overall pool has exhibited
relatively stable performance since issuance. As of the April 2017
remittance reporting, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
paid down by 4% to $1.35 billion from $1.41 billion at issuance.
One loan (0.6% of current pool) has been defeased.

Specially Serviced Loan: The Crowne Plaza Madison loan (0.8% of
current pool), which is secured by a 226-key full service hotel
property located in Madison, WI, was recently transferred to
special servicing in March 2017 for imminent maturity default. The
loan, which is scheduled to mature in September 2017, reported a
net cash flow (NCF) DSCR of 1.27x for YE2016. The property suffers
from various major deferred maintenance issues, including a
non-functional boiler and chiller and rooms have been taken offline
for mechanical repairs. The borrower has indicated they would agree
to a deed in lieu of foreclosure, as immediate capital needs exceed
property-level cash flow, making it difficult to refinance the loan
prior to maturity.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Nine additional non-specially serviced
loans (24.1% of current pool) were designated as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs), including four top-15 loans (22.1%). Carolina
Place (6.6%) lost one of its initial non-collateral anchor tenants,
Macy's, which recently closed its store in March 2017. Fitch
continues to monitor the overall loan due to low and declining
collateral anchor tenant sales and any possible occupancy issues
that could arise from any co-tenancy clauses being triggered from
Macy's store closure. The Innsbrook Office Portfolio (6.5%)
experienced a significant decline in both occupancy and cash flow
since issuance. Recent new leasing has boosted occupancy, but cash
flow remains suppressed as many of these new tenants are still in
their free rent period. The Rimrock Mall (5.7%), which is located
within close proximity to the Bakken shale region and the Canadian
Oil Sands, reported lower sales and year-over-year declines in cash
flow since issuance. The One Eleven Magnolia loan (3.4%) reported a
lower DSCR; the property has above-market rental rates and
concentrated rollover over the next few years. The other
non-specially serviced FLOCs outside of the top 15 have low DSCR,
declining occupancy or upcoming lease rollover concerns.

Retail Concentration; Regional Mall Exposure: Loans secured by
retail properties represent 40.4% of the current pool, which
includes five of the top-15 loans (26.9%). Four of these top-15
loans (24.8%) are secured by regional malls located in Atlanta, GA
(6.6%), Pineville, NC (6.6%), Baltimore, MD (5.9%) and Billings, MT
(5.7%), three of which are sponsored by General Growth Partners
(19.1%) and one by Starwood Capital Group (5.7%). In addition,
three of these regional malls (19.1%) have exposure to Sears and
Macy's and three (18.2%) have exposure to JC Penney.

Loan Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 14.9% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity. Nine loans (14.6% of
current pool) are full-term interest-only loans. At issuance, 17
loans (48.4%) had a partial interest-only period; only three of the
original 17 loans (13%) remain in their interest-only period until
mid-2018.

Loan Maturities: Nearly 90% of the current pool has a scheduled
loan maturity or anticipated repayment date in 2023. The remainder
of the maturities includes 1.3% in 2017, 2.5% in 2018, 5.9% in 2021
and 0.5% in 2022.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for classes A-1 through D remain Stable due to the
relatively stable performance of the pool and expected continued
amortization. Rating Outlooks for classes E and F were revised to
Negative from Stable due to the high concentration of regional
malls in the pool, three of which have reported lower sales since
issuance, and due to the overall weakness in the retail sector.
Downgrades to these classes are possible should overall pool
performance decline significantly. Upgrades may also occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Rating Outlooks where indicated:

-- $75.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $103 million (#)(a) class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-3FX (a) at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $363.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $149.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116.3 million (b) class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class X-A (*) at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $88.1 million (b) class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56.4 million (b) class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $260.7 million (b) class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66.9 million (a) class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.2 million (a) class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $14.1 million (a) class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

Fitch does not rate class G or the interest-only class X-B.

(#) Floating rate.
(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be exchanged
for Class PEX certificates; and Class PEX certificates may be
exchanged for Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates.
(*) Notional amount and interest-only.


[*] Fitch Takes Actions on 419 Classes in 20 US RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 419 classes in 20
U.S. RMBS transactions. The transactions reviewed consisted of 20
seasoned performing loan (SPL) and re-performing loan transactions
(RPL), and one ReRemic U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions.

Rating Action Summary:
-- 387 classes affirmed;
-- 32 classes upgraded.

Additionally, 232 classes have a Positive Outlook and 187 classes
have a Stable Outlook. A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating
actions can be found at 'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a
title search for 'U.S. RMBS Rating Actions for Apr. 13, 2017', or
by using the link provided.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

          http://bit.ly/2po6ihZ

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Performance has generally been stronger than expected and expected
losses have improved since the prior reviews. The base-case
expected loss has gone down 1%, and the 'AAAsf' stress scenario
loss has gone down by over 2%, driven primarily by low delinquency,
home price appreciation and a recent criteria change that resulted
in a less punitive treatment for seasoned loans with less than full
documentation. The pools reviewed have an average deal age of 15
months and an average serious delinquency rate under 4%. Recent
constant prepayment rates (CPRs) are averaging approximately 9% and
pool factors average approximately 84%. The average credit
enhancement (CE) of investment-grade classes under review has
increased from 31% at issuance to 38%.

The rating analysis included three criteria variations that
constrained positive rating actions due to limited seasoning: The
first limited upgrades on deals with less than 18 months of
seasoning; the second limited upgrades on bonds that have been
upgraded within the last six months, and the third limited Positive
Outlooks on deals with less than 12 months of seasoning.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.



[*] Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 CRE CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four, upgraded nine and affirmed 138
classes from 18 commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations (CRE CDOs) with exposure to commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS). Fitch has also withdrawn the rating on one
remaining distressed class within one transaction, as it is no
longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's
coverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

This review was conducted under the framework described in Fitch's
criteria reports, 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. None of the
reviewed transactions have been analyzed within a cash flow model
framework due to the concentrated nature of these CDOs. The impact
of any structural features was also determined to be minimal in the
context of these outstanding CDO ratings or the hedge has expired.
A look-through analysis of the remaining underlying bonds was
performed to determine the collateral coverage of the remaining
liabilities.

For transactions where the percentage of collateral experiencing
full interest shortfalls significantly exceeds the credit
enhancement (CE) of the most senior class of notes, Fitch did not
perform a look-through analysis, since the probability of default
for these classes of notes can be evaluated without factoring in
potential further losses.

The upgrades to classes C-FL and C-FX in Anthracite CDO III
Ltd./Corp. and class B in G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC to 'AAAsf' are
attributed to deleveraging of the capital structure and upgrades to
the underlying collateral since the last rating action. The
transactions have received $13.6 million and $15.9 million,
respectively, of principal repayment since the last rating action.
These notes are reliant on 'AAAsf' collateral to perform.

The upgrade to class C in Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP to 'AAAsf' is
attributable to the high class CE and the small outstanding class
balance. The transaction has received $9.2 million of principal
repayment since the last rating action.

The upgrades to classes D-FL and D-FX in Anthracite CDO III
Ltd./Corp. to 'AAsf' are attributed to deleveraging of the capital
structure and upgrades to the underlying collateral. The notes are
reliant on 'AAsf' collateral to perform.

The upgrade to class B in Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd./Corp. to 'Asf'
is attributed to deleveraging of the capital structure and upgrades
to the underlying collateral. The transaction has received $20.8
million of principal repayment since the last rating action. The
note is reliant on 'Asf' collateral to perform.

The upgrade to class B in MSCI 2005-RR6 to 'BBB-sf' is attributed
to increased CE and deleveraging of the capital structure. The
transaction has received $28.6 million of principal repayment since
the last rating action. The note is reliant on 'BBB-sf' collateral
to perform.

The upgrade to class A-2 in ARCap 2004-RR3 to 'Bsf' is attributed
to deleveraging of the capital structure and upgrades to the
underlying collateral. The transaction has received $51.2 million
of principal repayment since the last rating action. The note is
reliant on 'Bsf' collateral to perform.

One class has been affirmed at 'CCCsf', indicating that default is
possible, due to reliance on distressed collateral rated 'CCCsf' to
perform.

One class has been downgraded to 'CCsf', indicating that default is
probable, due to reliance on distressed collateral to perform.

Fitch has affirmed 85 classes at 'Csf' and downgraded one class to
'Csf' due to undercollateralization, if these classes' CE levels
are below the percentage of collateral with a Fitch derived rating
of 'CCsf', and/or if the classes are experiencing full interest
shortfalls.

Fitch has affirmed 16 classes at 'Dsf' because they are
non-deferrable classes that have experienced interest payment
shortfalls. An additional two classes were downgraded to 'Dsf' and
36 classes were affirmed at 'Dsf' due to principal writedowns.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative migration and defaults beyond those projected could lead
to downgrades for eight transactions. Upgrades are possible with
continued deleveraging of the capital structure or with positive
migration of the underlying bond ratings. The remaining 10
transactions have limited sensitivity to further negative migration
given their highly distressed rating levels. However, there is
potential for classes to be downgraded to 'Dsf' if either they are
non-deferrable classes that experience any interest payment
shortfalls or are classes that experience principal writedowns.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

           http://bit.ly/2olBZ7G


[*] Moody's Hikes $1.96BB of RFC Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 83 tranches,
from 28 transactions issued by RFC.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-EFC1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-EFC2 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1S, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-NC1 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-NC3 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RS4 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ1 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ3 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ4 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ5 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS2 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS3 Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS6 Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-EMX1 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-EMX2 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-EMX3 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS1 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS2 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 31, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS4 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS5 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS6 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS7 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS8 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS1 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS4 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1S, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Hikes $150MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from three transactions issued by various issuers, and
backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-3

Cl. A-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 23,
2015 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 23,
2015 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-6 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 23,
2015 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 20,
2012 Confirmed at C (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-2

Cl. M4 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Peoples Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-4

Cl. 1A2 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A3 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2015
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2A1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4,
2013 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.1BB of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 65 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of two tranches from 21 transactions,
backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-F

Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-2

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. II-4A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-4A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-5

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. I-M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-7

Cl. I-1A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-1A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-1I, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2I, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-NA, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. NIO, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-2

Cl. 6-M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-3

Cl. 8-A-1-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-3-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 8-M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A6

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 27, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-2

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5AR

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: MortgageIT Trust 2005-5, Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series
2005-5

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 15, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 15, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR2

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust Series 2006-MTA1

Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates 2005-4

Cl. I-A1C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A1D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-APT, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

Cl. A-I-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-3

Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-PT, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-18

Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and / or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are due
to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and / or the
erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Chevy Chase Funding
LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-1 Cl. NIO was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment (RFC), in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its cross-sector rating methodology for
rating structured finance IO securities. Please refer to Moody's
RFC titled "Moody's Proposes Revised Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities " for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
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                            *********

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Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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