TCR_Public/170326.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 26, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 84

                            Headlines

ALESCO PREFERRED XVII: Moody's Hikes Cl. C-2 Notes Rating to Caa1
ANGEL OAK 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes B(sf) Ratings on Class B-2 Certs
ANGEL OAK 2017-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class B-2 Debt
ANTHRACITE CDO III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to B1(sf)
ARCAP 2005-1: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class A Notes

BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2014-ICTS: S&P Hikes Cl. D Debt Rating to BB+
BARCLAYS BANK 2017-1: Fitch Corrects February 27 Release
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL1: Fitch to Rate Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL2: Fitch to Rate Class B5 Notes Bsf
BBCMS TRUST 2015-SLP: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. E Debt

BHMS 2014-ATLS: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
BUSINESS LOAN 2001-2: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class M Notes
CAN CAPITAL 2014-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'CCC'
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating to Cl. D-2-R Debt
CBA COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class A Debt Rating to Caa1

CBA COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. X-1 Debt
CHICAGO SKYSCRAPER 2017-SKY: S&P Gives (P)B+ Rating to Cl. F Certs
CITI HELD 2016-PM1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class C Debt
CITIGROUP 2015-GC29: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Certificates

CONN RECEIVABLES 2016-A: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. C Debt
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C02: Fitch to Rate 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C5: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 2 Tranches
CREST LTD 2003-2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Tranches
CSFB MORTGAGE 2003-C3: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. K Debt

CSMC TRUST 2015-TOWN: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Debt
CSMC TRUST 2017-HD: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
CT CDO IV: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on Class C Notes
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1998-CG1: Fitch Hikes Cl. B-7 Debt Rating From BB
FREDDIE MAC 2017-SC01: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating to Cl. M-2 Debt

GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Rating on Cl. B5 Debt
GE BUSINESS 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. D Debt
GOLD KEY 2014-A: S&P Puts BB Rating on CreditWatch Negative
GREEN TREE 1993-04: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B-2 Debt to C(sf)
GRIPPEN PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes

GS MORTGAGE 2014-GSFL: S&P Lowers Cl. X-EXT Certs Rating to B
GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F Certs
HELLER FINANCIAL 2000-PH1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. H Debt
ICE 1: Moody's Affirms Caa2(sf) Rating on Class D Sec. Term Notes

JMP CREDIT III: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E-R Sec. Notes
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Moody's Lowers Class B Debt Rating to B3
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP11: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. A-M Debt
JP MORGAN 2013-LC11: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes

JP MORGAN 2014-PHH: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. E Certificates
JPMDB TRUST 2017-C5: Fitch to Rate Class G-RR Notes 'Bsf'
KATONAH 2007-I: Moody's Hikes Class B-2L Notes Rating From Ba1
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: S&P Raises Rating on A-J Certs to BB-
LEGACY BENEFITS 2004-1: Moody's Puts B1 Rating Under Review

MASTR ADJUSTABLE 2005-5: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-X Debt Rating to Caa3
MCF CLO V: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
MILL CITY 2017-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Ratings to Class B2 Debt
MLFA 2007-CANADA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. F Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: S&P Cuts Rating on 6 Tranches to D

MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Cl. C Debt
MOTEL 6 2015-MTL6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certificates
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2017-1: S&P Gives BB- Rating on Cl. E-N Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XII: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. E-2-R Notes

NXT CAPITAL 2017-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 30: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba1
OMI TRUST 2002-C: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to Ba1
PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirm C Rating on 6 Tranches

PPM GRAYHAWK: Moody's Hikes Class D Debt Rating From Ba1(sf)
PREFERRED TERM XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Tranches to Ba2
RESOURCE CAPITAL 2014-CRE2: Moody's Hikes Cl. C Debt Rating to Ba3
SACO I 2005-GP1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class A-1 Debt to Ba2
SHELLPOINT CO-ORIGINATOR: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt '(P)Ba2'

SLM PRIVATE 2003-A: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Debt to B1
SLM STUDENT 2008-4: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
SLM STUDENT 2008-5: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
SLM STUDENT 2008-6: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B Debt to 'Bsf'
SLM STUDENT 2013-4: Fitch Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches From Bsf

SYMPHONY CLO XV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Debt to Ba2
THL CREDIT 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
TOWD POINT 2015-1: DBRS Assigns BB(low) Ratings on 6 Tranches
TRAPEZA CDO XI: Moody's Hikes Class B Secured Notes Rating to B2
TRUPS FINANCIALS 2017-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 Rating to Cl. B Debt

VOYA CLO 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
WELLFLEET CLO 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2004-DD: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. II-A-8 Debt to B1
WELLS FARGO 2015-C27: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Debt

WELLS FARGO 2017-RB1: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'B-sf'
WELLS FARGO 2017-RC1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Ratings on 2 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2017-RC1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. E Notes
WHITEHORSE IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes from Ba1

WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL 2005-1: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to BB+
[*] Moody's Hikes $154.3MM Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2004-2006
[*] Moody's Hikes $23.4MM Scratch&Dent RMBS Issued 2003-2006
[*] Moody's Hikes $344MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2006-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $397MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004

[*] Moody's Hikes $41.2MM of SAIL Subprime RMBS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $50.9MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $875.8MM of Housing-Backed Securities
[*] S&P Completes Review on 78 Classes From 10 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 84 Classes From 12 RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Completes Review on 95 Classes From 12 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 43 Tranches From 11 CDO Deals
[*] S&P Takes Actions on 25 Classes From Nine RMBS Issued 2003-2010
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 25 Tranches From 2 RMBS Deals

                            *********

ALESCO PREFERRED XVII: Moody's Hikes Cl. C-2 Notes Rating to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by ALESCO Preferred Funding XVII, Ltd.:

US$236,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2038 (current balance of $178,343,209 ), Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2038, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 27,
2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2038, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 27,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$42,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2038 (current balance, including
interest shortfall, of $42,352,842), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
previously on June 27 2013, Affirmed C (sf)

US$500,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2038 (current balance, including
interest shortfall, of $510,140), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
on June 27 2013, Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios, the resumption of interest
payments on previously deferring assets and partial repayment of
the Class C notes' deferred interest balance since March 2016.

The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 3% or $5.5
million since March 2016 using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets. The Class C notes' deferred
interest balance has also been paid down by $5.2 million using
excess interest since then. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC
ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class B and Class C notes have
improved to 159.9%, 146.8%, 119.7% and 101.4%, respectively, from
March 2016 levels of 155.7%, 143.2%, 117.3% and 98.4%,
respectively. Once the Class C notes' deferred interest balance is
reduced to zero, the Class A-1 notes will benefit from the
diversion of excess interest as long as the Class C OC test
(currently reported at 102.14% versus a 110.16% trigger by the
trustee) continues to fail.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 399)

Class A-1:+1

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +3

Class C-1: +3

Class C-2: +3

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 924)

Class A-1:-1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -1

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge™ cash
flow model. CDOROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a
signed free license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $285.2 million, defaulted and deferring par of 30.0 million, a
weighted average default probability of 7.57% (implying a WARF of
626), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.


ANGEL OAK 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes B(sf) Ratings on Class B-2 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. on March 10, 2017, finalized its provisional ratings on
the Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2017-1 issued by Angel Oak
Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-1 (AOMT 2017-1 or the Trust):

-- $78.1 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-2 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class A-3 at A (low) (sf)
-- $9.4 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-1 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 46.65% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (low) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (low)
(sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 33.50%, 19.85%, 13.45%, 8.35% and
4.55% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, non-prime, primarily first-lien residential
mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 529 loans with a total
principal balance of $146,469,496 as of the Cut-Off Date (February
1, 2017).

Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (AOMS), Angel Oak Home Loans LLC
(AOHL) and Angel Oak Prime Bridge LLC are the originators for
70.9%, 26.9% and 2.2% of the portfolio, respectively. The mortgages
were originated under the following six programs:

(1) Portfolio Select (74.2%) – Made to borrowers with near-prime
credit scores who are unable to obtain financing through
conventional or governmental channels because (a) they fail to
satisfy credit requirements; (b) they are self-employed and need an
alternate income calculation using 24 months of bank statements to
qualify; (c) they may have a credit score that is lower than that
required by government-sponsored entity underwriting guidelines; or
(d) they may have been subject to a bankruptcy or foreclosure 24 or
more months prior to origination.

(2) Non-Prime General (6.4%) – Made to borrowers who have not
sustained a housing event in the past 24 months, but whose credit
reports show multiple 30+ and/or 60+ day delinquencies on any
reported debt in the past 12 months.

(3) Non-Prime Recent Housing (6.5%) – Made to borrowers who have
completed or have had their properties subject to a short sale,
deed-in-lieu, notice of default or foreclosure. Borrowers who have
filed for bankruptcy 12 or more months prior to origination or have
experienced severe delinquencies may also be considered for this
program.

(4) Non-Prime Foreign National (6.3%) – Made to investment
property borrowers who are citizens of foreign countries that do
not reside or work in the United States. Borrowers may use
alternative income and credit documentation. Income is typically
documented by the employer or accountant and credit is verified by
letters from overseas credit holders.

(5) Non-Prime Investment Property (0.7%) – Made to real estate
investors who may have financed up to five mortgaged properties
with the originators (or 20 mortgaged properties overall).

(6) Investor Cash Flow (5.9%) – Made to real estate investors who
are experienced in purchasing, renting and managing investment
properties with an established five-year credit history and at
least 24 months of clean housing payment history, but who are
unable to obtain financing through conventional or governmental
channels because (a) they fail to satisfy the requirements of such
programs or (b) may be over the maximum number of properties
allowed. Loans originated under the Investor Cash Flow program are
considered business-purpose and are not covered by the
ability-to-repay (ATR) rules or TRID (TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure) rule.

Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. (SPS) is the servicer for the
loans. Angel Oak Home Loans LLC will act as Servicing Administrator
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will act as the Master
Servicer. U.S. Bank National Association will serve as Trustee and
Custodian.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ATR rules, they were made to
borrowers who generally do not qualify for agency, government or
private label non-agency prime jumbo products for various reasons
described above. In accordance with the CFPB Qualified Mortgage
(QM) rules, none of the loans are designated as QM Safe Harbor,
5.0% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and 79.1% as non-QM.
Approximately 16.0% of the loans are for investment properties and
thus not subject to the QM rules.

The servicing administrator or servicer will generally fund
advances of delinquent principal and interest on any mortgage until
such loan becomes 180 days delinquent and they are obligated to
make advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums and
reasonable costs incurred in the course of servicing and disposing
of properties.

On or after the distribution date in March 2019, the Depositor has
the option to purchase all of the outstanding certificates at a
price equal to the outstanding class balance plus accrued and
unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full. Further, excess spread can be used to cover realized losses
first before being allocated to unpaid cap carryover amounts up to
the Class M-1 Certificates.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:
(1) Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-prime
mortgages, underwriting standards have improved significantly from
the pre-crisis era. All of the mortgage loans were underwritten in
accordance with the eight underwriting factors of the ATR rules,
although they may not necessarily comply with Appendix Q of
Regulation Z.

(2) Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:
-- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have robust
    loan attributes as reflected in combined loan-to-value (LTV)
    ratios, borrower household income and liquid reserves,
    including the loans in the Non-Prime programs that have weaker

    borrower credit.
-- LTVs gradually reduce as the programs move down the credit
    spectrum, suggesting the consideration of compensating factors

    for riskier pools.
-- The pool comprises 15.3% fixed-rate mortgages, which have the
    lowest default risk because of the stability of monthly
    payments. The pool comprises 84.7% hybrid adjustable-rate
    mortgages (ARMs) with an initial fixed period of five to ten
    years, allowing borrowers sufficient time to credit cure
    before rates reset. None of the loans are riskier hybrid ARMs
    with shorter teaser periods (two to three years).

(3) Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party
due diligence firm conducted property valuation and credit reviews
on 100% of the loans in the pool. For 94.2% of the loans (i.e., the
entire pool excluding the 77 Investor Cash Flow loans), a
third-party due diligence firm performed a regulatory compliance
review. Data integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

(4) Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Angel Oak
began originating non-agency loans in the fourth quarter of 2013.
Of the approximately 1,644 mortgages originated as of November
2016, 12 were ever 30 days delinquent, one loan has been 60 days
delinquent, four loans 90 days delinquent and six loans 120+ days
delinquent. In addition, voluntary prepayment rates have been
relatively high in previous Angel Oak securitizations, as these
borrowers tend to credit cure and refinance into lower-cost
mortgages.

(5) Strong Servicer: SPS, a strong residential mortgage servicer
and a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse, services the pool.
In this transaction, AOHL, as the servicing administrator, or SPS,
as the servicer, is responsible for funding advances to the extent
required. In addition, the transaction employs Wells Fargo as the
Master Servicer, rated AA (high) by DBRS. If the servicing
administrator or the servicer fails in its obligation to make
advances, Wells Fargo will be obligated to fund such servicing
advances.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:
(1) Geographic Concentration: Compared with other recent
securitizations, the AOMT 2017-1 pool has a high concentration of
loans located in Florida (37.3% of the pool). Mitigating factors
include the following:
-- Although the pool is concentrated in Florida, the loans are
    well dispersed among the metropolitan statistical areas
    (MSAs). The largest Florida MSA, Fort-Lauderdale-Pompano
    Beach-Deerfield, represents only 7.2% of the entire
    transaction. DBRS does not believe the AOMT 2017-1 pool is  
    particularly sensitive to any deterioration in economic
    conditions or the occurrence of a natural disaster in any
    specific region.
-- DBRS’s RMBS Insight model generates an elevated asset
    correlation, as determined by the loan size and geographic
    concentration, for this portfolio compared with pools with
    similar collateral, resulting in higher expected losses across

    all rating categories.

(2) Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:
Although slightly stronger than other comparable non-QM
transactions rated by DBRS, the R&W framework for AOMT 2017-1 is
weaker compared with post-crisis prime jumbo securitization
frameworks. Instead of an automatic review when a loan becomes
seriously delinquent, this transaction employs a mandatory review
upon less immediate triggers. In addition, the R&W provider,
guarantor or backstop provider are either unrated or have limited
performance history in non-QM securitizations and may potentially
experience financial stress that could result in the inability to
fulfill repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following mitigating
factors:
-- Satisfactory third-party due diligence was conducted on 100%
    of the loans included in the pool with respect to credit,
    property valuation and data integrity. A regulatory compliance

    review was performed on all but 77 Investor Cash Flow loans. A

    comprehensive due diligence review mitigates the risk of
    future R&W violations.
-- An independent third-party R&W reviewer, Clayton Services LLC,

    is named in the transaction to review loans for alleged
    breaches of representations and warranties.
-- DBRS conducted an on-site originator review of AOHL and AOMS
    and deems the mortgage companies to be operationally sound.
-- The sponsor, an affiliate of Angel Oak, will retain an
    eligible vertical interest in the securities, as well as a
    horizontal residual interest in the Class XS certificates,
    which collectively represent at least 5% of the fair value of
    all the certificates, aligning sponsor and investor interest
    in the capital structure.
-- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator scores

    downward to account for the potential inability to fulfill
    repurchase obligations, the lack of performance history as
    well as the weaker R&W framework. A lower originator score
    results in increased default and loss assumptions and provides

    additional cushions for the rated securities.

(3) Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans: As
compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this portfolio
contains mortgages originated to borrowers with weaker credits or
who have prior derogatory credit events, as well as QM-rebuttable
presumption or non-QM loans. In addition, certain loans were
underwritten to 24-month bank statements for income (21.8%) or as
business purpose loans (5.9%). DBRS notes the following mitigating
factors:
-- All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
    factors as required by the ATR rules.
-- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the
    pre-crisis era.
-- Bank statement as income and business purpose loans are
    treated as less-than-full documentation in the RMBS Insight
    model, which increases expected losses on those loans.
-- The RMBS Insight model incorporates loss severity penalties
    for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans, as explained
    further in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the
    report.
-- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the
    Non-Prime General and Non-Prime Recent Housing Event programs,

    borrower credit events had generally happened, on average, 46
    months and 23 months, respectively, prior to origination. In
    its analysis, DBRS applies additional penalties for borrowers
    with recent credit events within the past two years.

(4) Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest: The
servicing administrator or servicer will advance scheduled
principal and interest on delinquent mortgages until such loans
become 180 days delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss
severities to the transaction because advanced principal and
interest will not have to be reimbursed from the trust upon the
liquidation of the mortgages, but will increase the possibility of
periodic interest shortfalls to the Certificateholders. Mitigating
factors include that principal proceeds can be used to pay interest
shortfalls to the Certificates as the outstanding senior
Certificates are paid in full, as well as the fact that
subordination levels are greater than expected losses, which may
provide for payment of interest to the Certificates. DBRS ran cash
flow scenarios that incorporated principal and interest advancing
up to 180 days for delinquent loans; the cash flow scenarios are
discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow Analysis section of the
report.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (low) (sf) address the timely
payment of interest and full payment of principal (excluding
interest-only classes) by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB
(low) (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and
full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates.


ANGEL OAK 2017-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class B-2 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I,
LLC 2017-1 (AOMT 2017-1):

-- $78,141,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,261,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,993,000 class A-3 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,374,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,470,000 class B-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,566,000 class B-2 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:

-- $6,664,496 class B-3 certificates.

This is the fourth Fitch-rated RMBS transaction issued post-crisis
that consists primarily of newly originated, non-prime mortgage
loans. Fitch is taking a cautious approach towards this developing
sector as many of the entrants have limited operating histories and
performance track records. As a result, some transactions are
currently unable to achieve 'AAAsf' ratings from Fitch. This is
most applicable to aggregators with less than three years
experience acquiring loans from originators that Fitch is not
familiar with.

The 'AAAsf' for AOMT 2017-1 reflects the satisfactory operational
review conducted by Fitch of the originators, 100% loan-level due
diligence review with no material findings, a Tier 2 representation
and warranty framework, and the transaction's structure.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is collateralized with 79% non-qualified (Non-QM)
mortgages as defined by the Ability-to-Repay rule (ATR) while 5% is
designated as higher-priced QMs (HPQMs) and the remainder comprises
business purpose loans not subject to ATR.

The certificates are supported by a pool of 529 mortgage loans with
a weighted average original credit score of 698 and a weighted
average original combined loan to value ratio (CLTV) of 76.9%.
Roughly 29% consists of borrowers with prior credit events, 6% are
foreign nationals and 4% are second lien loans. In addition,
approximately 22% comprise loans to self-employed borrowers
underwritten to a 24-month bank statement program. 100% loan level
due diligence was performed to confirm adherence to guidelines and
controls and the transaction also benefits from an alignment of
interest as Angel Oak Real Estate Investment Trust I (Angel Oak
REIT I) or a majority owned affiliate, will be retaining a vertical
and horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not less than
5% of the aggregate fair market value of all the certificates in
the transaction.

The loan-level reps for this transaction are substantially
consistent with Fitch criteria; however, the framework lacks a
delinquency trigger for an automatic review and includes a testing
construct for identifying breaches that, in Fitch's view, limit the
breach reviewers ability to identify or respond to issues not fully
anticipated at closing. Fitch added credit enhancement at each
rating category (222 basis points at the 'AAAsf' rating category)
to mitigate the limitations of the framework and the
non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the providers. .

Initial credit enhancement for the class A-1 certificates of 46.65%
is substantially above Fitch's 'AAAsf' rating stress loss of
35.75%. The additional initial credit enhancement is primarily
driven by the pro rata principal distribution between the A-1, A-2
and A-3 certificates, which will result in a significant reduction
of the class A-1 subordination over time through principal payments
to the A-2 and A-3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Nonprime Credit Quality (Concern): The pool has a weighted average
(WA) original credit score of 698 and WA original combined
loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 76.9%. Roughly 29% consists of
borrowers with prior credit events, 6% are foreign nationals and 4%
are second lien loans. Twenty two loans experienced a delinquency
since origination, 17 of which were due to servicer transfer
issues. Approximately 22% was made to self-employed borrowers
underwritten to a 24-month bank statement program. An additional
13% allow for 30-day seasoning of assets to close compared to 60
days for full programs. Fitch applied default penalties to account
for these attributes and loss severity was adjusted to reflect the
increased risk of ATR challenges and loans with TILA RESPA
Integrated Disclosure (TRID) exceptions.

Satisfactory Originator Review and Track Record (Positive): Fitch
conducted an operational review of AOMS and AOHL and assessed them
as Average based on the companies' seasoned management team and
extensive nonprime mortgage experience, a comprehensive sourcing
strategy and sound underwriting and risk management practices. AOHL
(retail platform) commenced agency loan originations in 2011 and
ramped up its nonprime business in 2012. Correspondent and broker
originations are conducted by AOMS, which began operations in
2014.

Solid Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party loan-level due
diligence was performed on 100% of the pool, the results of which
generally reflect sound underwriting and operational controls. Of
the 452 loans subject to consumer compliance testing (443 of which
were subject to TRID), 60 were assigned 'C' grades due to material
noncompliance with TRID, with the majority of findings concentrated
in the fourth- and first-quarters of 2015 and 2016, respectively,
around the time TRID was implemented.

High Investor Property Concentration (Concern): Approximately 16%
of the pool comprises investment properties, 6% of which were
originated through the originators' investor cash flow program that
targets real estate investors qualified on a cash flow ratio basis.
While the borrower's credit score and LTV are used in the
underwriting of the cash flow loans, the ratio of mortgage
principal, interest, taxes, insurance and homeowner association
dues as a percentage of market rent, which averages 74.9%,
determines the cash flow ratio. In its analysis, Fitch assumed a
55% debt-to-income ratio (DTI) for these loans. The remaining
investor properties were underwritten to borrower DTIs.

Bank Statement Loans Included (Concern): Approximately 22% of the
pool (67 loans) was made to self-employed borrowers underwritten to
a 24-month bank statement program for verifying income in
accordance with either AOHL or AOMS' guidelines, which is not
consistent with Appendix Q standards and Fitch's view of a full
documentation program. While employment is fully verified and
assets partially confirmed, the limited income verification
resulted in application of a probability of default (PD) penalty of
approximately 1.5 times (x) for the bank statement loans at the
'AAAsf' rating category. Additionally, Fitch's assumed probability
of ATR claims was doubled, which increased the loss severity (LS).


Southeast Geographic Concentration (Concern): Over one-half of the
pool is located in the southeastern United States in areas prone to
hurricane risk. Approximately 18% is located in the Miami
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), with concentrations on the
Georgia and North Carolina coasts. To account for loan and
geographic risk, Fitch increased the pool's loss expectations at
every rating category (roughly 80 basis points [bps] in the 'AAAsf'
scenario).

R&W Framework (Mixed): As sponsor, the REIT, Angel Oak Real Estate
Investment Trust I, (Angel Oak REIT I) will be providing loan-level
representations (reps) and warranties (R&W) to the trust. If the
REIT is no longer an ongoing business concern, it will assign to
the trust its rights under the mortgage loan purchase agreements
with the originators, which include repurchase remedies for rep and
warranty breaches. While the loan-level reps for this transaction
are substantially consistent with a Tier I framework, the lack of
the delinquency trigger for an automatic review and the nature of
the prescriptive breach tests limit the breach reviewers ability to
identify or respond to issues not fully anticipated at closing.
Fitch added credit enhancement at each rating category (222 bps at
the 'AAAsf' rating category) to mitigate the limitations of the
framework and the non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the
providers.

Alignment of Interests (Positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors. Angel Oak
REIT I as sponsor and securitizer, or an affiliate will retain a
vertical and horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not
less than 5% of the aggregate fair market value of all certificates
in the transaction. As part of its focus on investing in
residential mortgage credit, as of the closing date, Angel Oak REIT
I and Angel Oak Strategic Mortgage Income Master Fund, Ltd, as
co-sponsor, will retain the class B-2, B-3 and XS certificates.
Lastly, the reps and warranties are provided by Angel Oak REIT I,
or the originators in the event the REIT ceases operations, which
aligns their interests with those of investors to maintain high
quality origination standards and sound performance.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until all
three classes have been reduced to zero. To the extent that either
the cumulative loss trigger event or the delinquency trigger event
occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds until they are
reduced to zero.

Performance Triggers (Mixed): Delinquency and loan loss triggers
convert principal distribution to a straight sequential payment
priority in the event of poor asset performance. Under Fitch's
front- and back-loaded default cash flow timing scenarios, the
transaction reverts to a straight sequential pay relatively
quickly, benefiting the senior classes. Additional scenarios were
analyzed to stress the sensitivity of the delinquency trigger,
which resulted in roughly 400-bp and 300-bp-increase to the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' credit enhancement levels, respectively, compared to
levels using Fitch's standard default timing scenarios.

Servicing and Master Servicer (Positive): Select Portfolio
Servicing (SPS), rated 'RPS1-'/Outlook Stable by Fitch, will be the
primary servicer. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), rated
'RMS1'/Outlook Negative, will act as master servicer. Advances
required but not paid by SPS will be paid by Wells Fargo. Fitch
does not rate any primary servicer higher than SPS and does not
rate any master servicer higher than Wells Fargo.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated four criteria variations from the
'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria' which are described below. A
variation was made to Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria'
in regards to treatment of loans with prior credit events.
Historical data suggests that borrowers with similar credit scores
as those in the pool are nearly 20% more likely to default on a
future mortgage, as compared to all outstanding borrowers, if they
had a prior mortgage related credit event. This adjustment was
applied to the roughly 29% of the pool that had a prior mortgage
related credit event, resulting in approximately a 6% increase to
the pool's probability of default at each rating category.

Due to the structural features of the transaction, Fitch analyzed
the collateral with a customized version of one of its loss models.
Fitch's Alt-A Loan Loss Model was altered to include two additional
inputs; operational quality and liquid reserves. These variables
were not common in legacy Alt-A loans and were excluded in the
derivation of Fitch's Alt-A model. Given the improvement in today's
underwriting over legacy standards, these aspects were taken into
consideration and a net credit was applied to the pool.

A third variation was made as an outside of the model adjustment to
account for the higher than average property values of the mortgage
loans and its impact on the probability of default. Fitch's
analysis showed that loans associated with property values
significantly below the median exhibited higher default rates
relative to those at or above the median value and larger
properties are generally associated with higher income borrowers
who may be less sensitive to income shocks than lower income
borrowers. Less desirable, low-value properties may also increase
the default risk if the borrower has more difficulty selling the
home. The average property value for this pool was over $400k and
there is a large distribution of loans with very high property
values relative to those in the Alt-A model's data set. Because
this variable is not considered in the Alt-A model, PDs are higher
for these loans than what the data suggests.

Fitch views the loans with a 30 day seasoning requirement for
assets to close as having less than full documentation for
verification of assets (VOA) as Fitch views 60 day seasoning for
the assets as consistent with a full documentation VOA program.
However, the customized Alt-A model only has two treatments for
documentation, full or non-full. The non-full documentation
treatment for partially verified assets is too punitive since both
income and employment are fully verified and generally consistent
with the ATR Appendix Q documentation. Fitch analyzed those loans
(except for the foreign nationals, which requires 60 days) as a
less than full VOA documentation category using its prime model to
derive the PD penalty for these loans.

The aggregate impact of these adjustments resulted in losses
approximately two notches lower than unadjusted legacy Alt-A model
output.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 5.7%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


ANTHRACITE CDO III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to B1(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Anthracite CDO III Collateralized Debt
Obligations:

Cl. D-FL, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating on two classes of notes due to
positive credit migration within the underlying collateral pool as
evidenced by the weighted average rating factor (WARF); combined
with greater than expected paydown from the underlying collateral.
This was more than offsetting to the number of defaulted assets,
currently at 55.8% as of the prior trustee date. Moody's has
affirmed the ratings on four classes of notes because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO &
Re-REMIC) transactions.

Anthracite CDO III, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of i) commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) (75.2%
of the collateral pool balance), and ii) one credit tenant lease
asset (CTL) (24.8%). As of the February 21, 2017 trustee report,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, was $194.1 million, compared to $435.3 million as at
issuance. The paydowns are a result of a combination of regular
amortization and prepayments.

The pool contains 10 assets totaling $26.1 million (55.8% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's February 21, 2017 report. Ten of these assets
(100% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the WARF, the weighted
average life (WAL), the weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's typically models these as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3006,
compared to 3222 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is: Aaa-Aa3 and 69.5% compared to 61.8% at last review,
A1-A3 and 0.0% compared to 5.6% at last review, B1-B3 and 0.7%
compared to 0.6% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 29.8% compared to
31.9% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.1 years, compared to 3.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 19.9%, compared to 15.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 6.2%, compared to 1.8% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying collateral and assessments.
Holding all other parameters constant, increasing the recovery rate
of 100% of the collateral pool by +10% would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero notches upward
(e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).
Reducing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by -10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero to one notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ARCAP 2005-1: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class A
notes from ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritization Trust, a U.S. commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.

The rating action follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 31, 2017, trustee report.

Though the interest coverage test and the par value ratio test
(both measured at the class G level) continue to fail, the class A
notes are current in their interest and are being paid down.  Since
S&P's previous review in March 2014, the class A notes have been
paid down by $5.96 million, and the current outstanding balance of
the notes is about 68%.

However, the underlying portfolio has incurred losses since S&P's
previous rating actions.  Though the class A notes fail S&P's top
obligor test at the 'CCC' category, S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)'
rating on the class A notes based on the quality of the assets
backing the notes, its overcollateralization level, and S&P's
expectation that the paydowns will continue as the notes are the
senior most in the transaction.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 8, 2014, criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations to assess the credit quality of
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria provide
specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not rated
by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2014-ICTS: S&P Hikes Cl. D Debt Rating to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on five classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from BAMLL Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-ICTS, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificate classes follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and current and future performance of the 607-room
Intercontinental New York Times Square hotel in midtown Manhattan,
which secures the $188.0 million floating-rate interest-only (IO)
mortgage loan that serves as collateral for the stand-alone
transaction.  As part of S&P's analysis, S&P also reviewed the
transaction's structure and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades on classes B, C, D, and E reflect S&P's expected
available credit enhancement for the affected tranches, which S&P
believes is less than its current estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the most recent rating levels.

The affirmation on class A reflects S&P's view of the current and
expected performance of the lodging collateral, the transaction's
structure, and liquidity support.

S&P lowered its rating on the class X-EXT IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest rated
reference class.  The notional balance on class X-EXT references
classes A, B, C, and D.

The analysis of stand-alone (single borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the volatile
collateral performance, specifically the declines in revenue per
available room (RevPAR), other departmental revenue, and net cash
flow (NCF); reported RevPAR, other departmental revenue, and NCF
were $291.36, $983,000, and $12.0 million, respectively, for the
trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2016, down from reported
$315.21, $2.2 million, and $21.6 million, respectively, in 2014.
S&P also considered the increase in operating expenses; reported
real estate taxes were up to $7.4 million for the trailing 12
months ended September 2016 from $6.5 million in 2014, and reported
general and administrative expenses were up to
$8.0 million from $6.6 million in 2014.  S&P derived its
sustainable in-place NCF, which it divided by an 8.50%
capitalization rate, to determine S&P's expected-case value.  This
yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio and debt
service coverage (DSC) of 88.5% and 1.65x (using LIBOR cap and
weighted average spread), respectively, on the trust balance.

According to the Feb. 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $188.0 million,
pays an annual floating interest rate of LIBOR plus a weighted
average spread of 2.17%, and matures in June 2017, with three
one-year extension options remaining.  In addition, there is $177.0
million of additional debt in the form of preferred equity.
According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the
special servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well as costs
and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections conducted by
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical net operating income for the trailing 12 months ended
Sept. 30, 2016, and years ended Dec. 31, 2015 and 2014, and S&P
used the Sept. 30, 2016, Smith Travel Reports provided by the
master servicer to determine our opinion of a sustainable cash flow
for the lodging property.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., reported a DSC on the trust balance and occupancy of 2.47x
and 92.7%, respectively, for the trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30,
2016.

RATINGS LIST

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-ICTS
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-ICTS

                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To             From
A                05525LAA6             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
X-EXT            05525LAE8             BB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
B                05525LAG3             A+ (sf)        AA- (sf)
C                05525LAJ7             BBB+ (sf)      A- (sf)
D                05525LAL2             BB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
E                05525LAN8             B+ (sf)        BB- (sf)


BARCLAYS BANK 2017-1: Fitch Corrects February 27 Release
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction of a release published Feb. 27,
2017 on Barclays Bank Commercial Mortgage Securities LLC Trust
2017-C1. It includes Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating Loan Servicers,'
which was omitted from the original release.

The revised press release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Barclays Bank Commercial Mortgage Securities LLC Trust
2017-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2017-C1:

-- $22,421,053 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66,989,474 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $152,631,581class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $319,560,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,421,053 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $599,023,161b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $110,176,843b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66,320,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,856,843 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,509,474 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82,366,320ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,393,690ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,556,843ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,856,846a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,393,690a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,556,843a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $8,557,895ab class X-G;
-- $25,672,986ab class X-H;
-- $8,557,895a class G;
-- $25,672,986a class H;
-- $42,787,408ac RR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5% of the
pool balance (as of the closing date).

Since Fitch issued its expected ratings on Feb. 9, 2017, the
following changes have occurred: the class A-3 balance increased
from $105,263,158 to $152,631,581 and the class A-4 balance
decreased from $366,928,423 to $319,560,000. Additionally, the
class X-B notional balance is now equal to the aggregate balance of
the class A-S and class B certificates. As such, Fitch's final
rating for the class X-B has been changed from 'A-sf' to 'AA-sf'.
The class X-D notional balance is now equal to the aggregate
balance of the class C and class D certificates. As such, the class
X- D notional balance increased from $43,856,843 to $82,366,320.
The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 58 loans secured by 75
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$855,747,738 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Bank PLC, UBS AG, and Rialto Mortgage
Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 76.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 81.6%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage Higher than 2016 Average: The pool has higher
leverage than other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.17x is worse
than the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch loan to value
(LTV) of 106.0% is slightly worse than the 2016 average of 105.2%.

Below-Average Amortization: Thirteen loans representing 47.3% of
the pool are full-term interest- only and 18 loans representing
22.6% of the pool are partial interest-only. Fitch-rated
transactions in 2016 had an average full-term interest-only
percentage of 33.3% and a partial interest-only percentage of
33.3%. The pool is scheduled to amortize by 7.4% of the initial
pool balance prior to maturity, below the average of 10.4% for
other Fitch-rated transactions.

Pool Diversity: The pool shows diversity with respect to loan size
and property type. The top 10 loans represent 49.9% of the pool,
and the loan concentration index (LCI) is 342; both metrics are
below the respective 2016 averages of 54.8% and 422.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
BBCMS 2017-C1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Ernst &
Young LLP. The due diligence focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis, and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis
or conclusions.






BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL1: Fitch to Rate Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa
Trust 2017-SPL1 (BOMFT 2017-SPL1):

-- $222,332,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $222,332,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,332,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $27,661,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,661,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $27,661,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $12,699,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,699,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,312,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,312,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $23,312,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $17,049,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,049,000 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $17,049,000 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $13,918,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $30,966,529.97 class B6 notes;
-- $30,966,529.97 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 5,733 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans of which 92.6% are daily simple-interest
mortgage loans totaling $347.94 million, which excludes $11.7
million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of
the cut-off date. Distributions of principal and interest and loss
allocations are based on a sequential pay, senior subordinate
structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 36.10% subordination provided by the 7.95% class B1, 3.65%
class B2, 6.70% class B3, 4.90% class B4, 4.00% class B5, and 8.90%
class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview
Loan Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 10 years with roughly 95.4% of the pool paying on
time for the past 24 months and 91.6% current for the past three
years. In addition, 39.5% of the pool has been modified due to
performance issues, while the remaining loans were either not
modified (28.6%) or had their interest rates reduced due to an
interest rate reduction rider incorporated at origination (31.9%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$106,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than that
implied by Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were
applied to loans with property values below $100,000, which ranged
from 49%-100%, and increased Fitch 'AAAsf' loss expectation by
roughly 240bps.

Daily Simple-Interest Loans (Concern): Approximately 93% of the
pool consists of daily simple-interest loans that accrue interest
on a daily basis from the date of the borrower's last payment.
While the monthly payment is fixed, if a borrower pays earlier than
the due date, less of the payment is applied to interest and more
is applied to principal. If the borrower pays late, more of the
payment is applied to interest and less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds. Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date. In
addition, close to 55% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk. Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial). Given that approximately
94% of the loans were originated and serviced by a single
originator prior to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that the roughly
20% compliance, data integrity and pay history sample is sufficient
to capture the potential risk of incomplete files that could
accompany portfolios traded in the secondary market. A full
custodial file review was conducted on 100% of the pool, and tax
and title search was conducted on over 99% of the pool. In
addition, BAM, with the guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
(BLS; as servicer and rated 'RSS2+'), reconstructed the past three
years of pay histories for 100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps from the interest remittance amount will be used
to pay down principal as well as any excess interest allocation
from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation. The
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions, as
well as the application of excess interest to the notes, is highly
supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in the
absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral and will generally not be repaid
until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Per Fitch's criteria, it may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVa, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued. In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
January 2024. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches of R&Ws.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated six criteria variations from "U.S.
RMBS Master Rating Criteria" and "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria."

The first variation is the less than 100% TPR due diligence review
for regulatory compliance, data integrity and pay history. Tax and
title review was conducted on over 99% of the pool, and a custodial
file review was conducted on 100% of the pool. The remaining tax
and title review will be performed post close. The less than 100%
TPR review is consistent with Fitch's criteria for seasoned
performing pools. However, because Fitch's criteria states it views
pools as seasoned performing if they consist of loans that were
never modified, a criteria variation was made. Without this
variation, the pool would have had to have 100% compliance, data
integrity and pay history TPR review to achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.

Fitch is comfortable with the reduced due diligence sample because
roughly 94% of the loans were originated by a single lender and the
sample provided is sufficient to provide a reliable indication of
the operational quality of the lender. The second variation is that
19.8% of the pool, below Fitch's criteria of 20%, was reviewed for
compliance, data integrity and pay history. Fitch believes the
slight variation from criteria is immaterial as only nine more
loans would be needed to meet the 20% threshold. In addition, as
noted above, approximately 94% of the loans were originated by a
single lender.

The third variation is that 36.9% of the tax, title and lien review
was conducted over 6 months prior to securitization. Of the 5,714
loans that were reviewed prior to closing, 5,691 were reviewed
within 12 months. Twenty-two were conducted between 12-16 months
ago. Fitch considered the robust servicing and ongoing monitoring
from Bayview Loan Servicing, which is a high-touch servicing
platform that specializes in seasoned loans. Given the strength of
the servicer, Fitch considered the impact of slightly seasoned tax,
title and lien reviews to be nonmaterial.

The fourth variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM). Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an AVM
product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors. Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but, rather, an
indexation product. Clear Capital is a reputable third-party vendor
that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set that goes down to the neighborhood level
and incorporates REO sales. Fitch believes the HDI product to be an
adequate alternative to an AVM. The HDI product was only used for
loans that were clean current for the prior 24 months and had an
LTV less than 60% based on the more conservative of the HDI value
and Fitch's indexed value. The impact of using this product is
neutral, as the HDI product is a sufficient alternative to an AVM
product and was only used on loans with an LTV of less than 60%.

The fifth variation is non-application of a default penalty to
income documentation for loans with less than full income
documentation that are over five years seasoned with no missed
payment in the prior three years. Fitch conducted analysis
comparing the performance of full documentation loans to non-full
documentation loans at origination. The analysis showed that after
five years of seasoning, the performance was the same. The impact
on the loss expectations from application of this variation
resulted in lower loss expectations of roughly 2 to 4 points,
depending on the rating category.

Lastly, an updated broker price opinion (BPO) will not be provided
on 1.3% of the pool. Due to the rural location of the property,
updated BPOs will not be received in time for the transaction. As
such, a 24% haircut was applied to the original appraisal with no
indexation applied, increasing the loss expectations by
approximately 10bps, depending on rating category. These properties
are located in rural areas and have an average original property
value of $62,000. Given the unknown condition of the property and
the rural location, there is a higher probability of decline in
value. The 24% haircut used is based on the median value of
available BPOs with a negative variance to the original appraisal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 36.3% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), Westcor Land Title Insurance
Company (Westcor), Linear Title & Closing Ltd. (Linear), Lincoln
Abstract & Settlement Services, LLC (Lincoln), DRI Title and Escrow
(DRI) and Digital Risk, LLC (Digital Risk). The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on: regulatory compliance
review, 24-month-pay history review, data integrity review, and BPO
reconciliation on the loans. A servicing comment review was not
performed as all loans have been current in the past 12 months. In
addition, Westcor, Linear, Lincoln, and DRI were retained to
perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a review to
confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant local
jurisdiction and the related assignment chains.

A sample due diligence review for regulatory compliance and data
integrity was conducted on 19.9% and pay histories was conducted on
approximately 22% of the pool (by loan count), while a custodial
file review was conducted on 100% of the pool. A tax review was
performed on 99.5% of the pool. The tax review on the remaining
loans will be conducted post close. Digital Risk, LLC conducted a
BPO reconciliation on approximately 20% of the BPOs obtained. The
title review was completed on almost 100% of the pool and the
remaining loans will be checked post deal closing to confirm clear
title for the remaining 0.2% of the pool. Any title issues will be
cleared within 90 days of closing, otherwise the loan will be
repurchased. There were minimal findings by the TPRs.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and based on the
findings made minor adjustments to its analysis.

Fitch made an adjustment on 69 loans that were subject to federal,
state, and/or local predatory testing. These loans contained
material violations including an inability to test for high cost
violations or confirm compliance, which could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability. These loans were marked as
"indeterminate". Typically, the HUD issues are related to missing
the Final HUD, illegible HUDs, incomplete HUDs due to missing pages
or only having estimated HUDs where the final HUD1 was not used to
test for high-cost loans. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a
100% LS for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's "do
not purchase" list of high-cost or "high-risk'" Fourteen loans were
affected by this approach.

For the remaining 55 loans subject to high-cost testing, the
properties are not located in the states that fall under Freddie
Mac's do not purchase list, and, therefore, the likelihood of all
loans being high cost is lower. However, Fitch assumes the trust
could potentially incur additional legal expenses. Fitch increased
its LS expectations by 5% for these loans to account for the risk.

There were 813 loans (21 loans which had Indeterminate HUD1
Adjustment applied) missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL2: Fitch to Rate Class B5 Notes Bsf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb
Trust 2017-SPL2 (BOMFT 2017-SPL2):

-- $123,136,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $123,136,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $123,136,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,061,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,061,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,061,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $4,168,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,168,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,587,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,587,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $14,587,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,903,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,903,000 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,903,000 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $7,389,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $16,197,433 class B6 notes;
-- $16,197,433 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 3,342 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans of which 91.4% are daily simple interest
mortgage loans totaling $189.44 million, which excludes $5.7
million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of
the cutoff date. Distributions of principal and interest and loss
allocations are based on a sequential pay, senior subordinate
structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 35.00% subordination provided by the 7.95% class B1, 2.20%
class B2, 7.70% class B3, 4.70% class B4, 3.90% class B5, and 8.55%
class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 10 years with roughly 96.4% of the pool paying on
time for the past 24 months and 92.4% current for the past three
years. In addition, 36.1% of the pool has been modified due to
performance issues, while the remaining loans were either not
modified (29.6%) or had their interest rates reduced due to an
interest rate reduction rider incorporated at origination (34.3%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$99,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than that
implied by Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were
applied to loans with property values below $99,000, which ranged
from 49%-100%, and increased Fitch 'AAAsf' loss expectation by
roughly 250 basis points (bps).

Daily Simple Interest Loans (Concern): Approximately 91% of the
pool consists of daily simple interest loans that accrue interest
on a daily basis from the date of the borrower's last payment.
While the monthly payment is fixed, if a borrower pays earlier than
the due date, less of the payment is applied to interest and more
is applied to principal. If the borrower pays late, more of the
payment is applied to interest and less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds. Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date. In
addition, close to 46% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk. Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial). Given that roughly 95% of
the loans were originated and serviced by a single originator prior
to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that the approximately 20%
compliance, data integrity and pay history sample is sufficient to
capture the potential risk of incomplete files that could accompany
portfolios traded in the secondary market. A full custodial file
review was conducted on 100% of the pool, and tax and title search
was conducted on over 99% of the pool. In addition, BAM, with the
guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (BLS; as servicer and rated
'RSS2+'), reconstructed the past three years of pay histories for
100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps from the interest remittance amount will be used
to pay down principal as well as any excess interest allocation
from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation. The
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions, as
well as the application of excess interest to the notes, is highly
supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in the
absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower-rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral, and will generally not be repaid
until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Per Fitch's criteria, it may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued. In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
July 2021. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches of R&Ws.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated five criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Master Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,' which are described below.

The first variation is the less than 100% TPR due diligence review
for regulatory compliance, data integrity and pay history. Tax and
title review was conducted on over 99% of the pool, and a custodial
file review was conducted on 100% of the pool. The remaining tax
and title review will be performed post close. The less than 100%
TPR review is consistent with Fitch's criteria for seasoned
performing pools. However, because Fitch's criteria state it views
pools as seasoned performing if they consist of loans that were
never modified, a criteria variation was made. Without this
variation, the pool would have had a 100% compliance, data
integrity and pay history TPR review to achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.

Fitch is comfortable with the reduced due diligence sample because
roughly 95% of the loans were originated by a single lender and the
sample provided is sufficient to provide a reliable indication of
the operational quality of the lender.

The second variation is that 34.2% of the tax, title and lien
review was conducted over six months prior to securitization. Of
the 3,511 loans that were reviewed prior to closing, seven were
reviewed within 12 months. The remaining 3,504 were conducted
between 12-16 months ago. Fitch considered the robust servicing and
ongoing monitoring from Bayview Loan Servicing, which is a
high-touch servicing platform that specializes in seasoned loans.
Given the strength of the servicer, Fitch considered the impact of
slightly seasoned tax, title and lien reviews to be nonmaterial.

The third variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM). Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an AVM
product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors. Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but, rather, an
indexation product. Clear Capital is a reputable third-party vendor
that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set that goes down to the neighborhood level
and incorporates real estate owned (REO) sales. Fitch believes the
HDI product to be an adequate alternative to an AVM. The HDI
product was only used for loans that were clean current for the
prior 24 months and had a loan to value (LTV)


BBCMS TRUST 2015-SLP: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of BBCMS Trust 2015-SLP
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2015-SLP
(BBCMS 2015-SLP).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the continued overall stable performance
of the pool. Credit enhancement has improved slightly due to the
release of nine assets ($17.5 million by allocated balances) at a
premium of 105%. The servicer provided trailing 12 months (TTM)
September 2016 financials and STR reports for the portfolio. Per
STR reporting, the portfolio weighted average TTM September 2016
revenue per available room (RevPAR) was $79.86, which is a 1.7%
decline over the prior year's performance. Average RevPAR
penetration for the period remained above average at 121.8%.

Granular and Diverse Portfolio: The portfolio now consists of 126
properties located in 21 states with 15 different flags. No single
asset accounts for more than 2.3% of the pool (by allocated loan
balance). Flags include Fairfield Inn & Suites, Residence Inn,
Springhill Suites, Courtyard, Hampton Inn, Staybridge Suites,
Homewood Suites, Comfort Suites, and Townplace Suites.

Market Position and Asset Quality: The portfolio is considered to
have above-average performance within the respective markets with a
TTM September 2016 weighted average RevPAR penetration level of
approximately 121.8%. The properties are somewhat older with
average age of approximately 20 years. Significant renovations or
PIPs have occurred in the past seven years, including approximately
$28 million reportedly spent in 2016.

Exposure to Energy Markets: The portfolio includes 20.1% exposure
to certain energy industry dependent sub-markets in Texas,
Colorado, and Oklahoma. Fitch applied an additional credit loss in
its analysis due to the portfolio's exposure to potential
performance volatility within these markets.

North Dakota Exposure: Approximately 6.5% of the pool (seven
hotels) consists of hotels located in the state of North Dakota.
None are within the Bakken Shale Formation. Three hotels (3%) are
located in the state capitol, Bismarck, while three (3%) are
located in Fargo and one is in Grand Forks (0.5%). Fargo and Grand
Forks are nearer to the Minnesota border and not reliant on the oil
industry. Bismarck is the state capital and a 1.5 to 2 hour drive
from the Bakken region.

Additional Debt: The total debt package includes mezzanine
financing in the current amount of $70 million, which is not
included in the trust. In addition, the borrower may obtain future
mezzanine debt up to $72.5 million, subject to certain performance
thresholds.

Experienced Sponsorship and Property Management: The sponsor is an
affiliate of Starwood Capital Group (Starwood). Starwood is a
global private investment firm with a core focus on real estate.
Starwood created Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. in 1995
and has since continued to acquire and operate hotels throughout
the world.

Capped Recourse Carveouts: The recourse carveout guarantors are TMI
Hospitality, Inc. and SOF X U.S. Holdings, L.P. (with regard to the
bankruptcy carveouts and capital work guaranty). The carveouts
related to a bankruptcy event are subject to a cap on liability
equal to 15% of the mortgage loan balance. TMI Hospitality is
required to maintain a minimum aggregate net worth of $400 million
exclusive of the properties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable. Due to
volatility in the overall hotel market, Fitch has capped RevPAR at
2014 levels in its analysis. Fitch is unlikely to upgrade classes C
through E unless there is significant sustained improvement in
overall portfolio performance. However, upgrades to those classes
could occur should there be a notable increase in property
releases. All classes could be subject to downgrade should
performance decline.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms the following ratings:

-- $179.5 million class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.1 million class C at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76.3 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.


BHMS 2014-ATLS: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on six classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from BHMS 2014-ATLS
Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The affirmations follow Forecast analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating global CMBS transactions.
Forecast analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
and the current and future performance of the first-lien mortgage
on the borrowers' fee interest in the Atlantis resort and casino
securing the loan in the trust, the transaction's structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations also reflect Forecast expectation that the
available credit enhancement for these classes will be, more or
less, within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings and Forecast views regarding the
collateral's current and future performance.

The analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, Forecast property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the Atlantis resort and casino in
Paradise Island, Bahamas, which includes: four hotel towers
totaling 2,917 keys, a 60,000-sq.-ft. casino, meeting and
convention center space totaling 458,000 sq. ft., restaurant, food
and beverage, and retail space, marine and water attraction
facilities, marina facilities, a water plant, a supplemental water
desalinization plant site, and a parking garage, warehouse, laundry
facilities, roadways, and other support facilities, all of which
secure the loan in the trust.  Because the property is in the
Bahamas, it is potentially subject to sovereign risk, which
includes risks related to repatriation, expropriation, and currency
inconvertibility.  This risk has been somewhat mitigated by both
the large proportion of revenues that are originated and collected
from the property in U.S. dollars and the availability of servicer
advancing through temporary cash shortfalls.  The borrowers also
obtained $800.0 million of political risk insurance to cover these
risks for the loan's term.

Forecast analysis considered the volatile collateral performance,
specifically the recent declines in reported revenue per available
room (RevPAR), casino revenue, and net cash flow (NCF) for the
collateral property as of the trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30,
2016, from year-end 2015.  S&P derived its sustainable in-place
NCF, which S&P divided by a 10.39% weighted average capitalization
rate, to determine S&P's expected-case value.  This yielded a S&P
Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 87.3% and 2.30x based on the fixed- and floating-rate (spread
and LIBOR cap), respectively, on the trust balance.

Additionally, S&P considered that properties located in the Bahamas
are subject to a 10% transfer tax.  However, the Bahamas Investment
Authority has exempted the mortgage and mezzanine loans from any
transfer tax that would be due upon a foreclosure or
deed/assignment in lieu of foreclosure.  In S&P's analysis, it
accounted for the $18 million actual transfer tax the sponsor paid
upon acquiring the property in 2012 by adjusting the loan's capital
structure.

According to the March 7, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
trust consisted of a componentized fixed- and floating-rate
interest-only mortgage loan with a $1.0 billion trust balance.  The
fixed-rate component totaled $650.0 million, pays a 4.6980% fixed
interest rate, and matures on July 1, 2021.  The floating-rate
component totaled $350.0 million, pays a floating interest rate
equal to LIBOR plus a 2.63% spread, and matures on July 1, 2017,
with four 12-month extension options.  In addition, the borrowers'
equity interests in the whole loan secure mezzanine loans totaling
$700.0 million.  According to the transaction documents, the
borrowers are responsible for the special servicing, work-out, and
liquidation fees, as well as costs and expenses incurred from the
special servicer's appraisals and inspections.  To date, the trust
has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NCF for the year-to-date ended Sept. 30, 2016, and years
ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, and 2013 as provided by the master
servicer to determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash flow for
the collateral property. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., reported a DSC and occupancy of 3.63x and 68.6%,
respectively, on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31,
2016.

RATINGS LIST

BHMS 2014-ATLS
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating        Rating
Class             Identifier             To            From
D-FX              05544BAL1              BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
E-FX              05544BAN7              BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
F-FX              05544BAQ0              B- (sf)       B- (sf)
D-FL              05544BBC0              BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
E-FL              05544BBE6              BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
F-FL              05544BBG1              B- (sf)       B- (sf)


BUSINESS LOAN 2001-2: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class M Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms Business Loan Express SBA loan-backed
adjustable-rate notes, series 2001-2 (2001-2) and series 2002-1
(2002-1):

Business Loan Express SBA Loan-Backed Adjustable-Rate Notes, series
2001-2
-- Class A at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
-- Class M at 'Csf', RE 100%.

Business Loan Express SBA Loan-Backed Adjustable-Rate Notes, series
2002-1
-- Class A at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

BLX 2001-2's affirmation reflects the recent stable performance of
the transaction as credit enhancement (CE) has built for class A
and M notes. However, the transaction remains under-collateralized
and late-stage delinquencies remain elevated. For these reasons,
default is considered a real possibility. Class A and M notes are
expected to have a 100% recovery of current note balance.

BLX 2002-1's affirmation for class A and M at 'BBBsf' and 'BBsf'
respectively, reflects the increased CE available as the reserve
balance has increased since last review. Fitch maintains the Stable
Outlook as the CE is expected to provide sufficient protection from
losses and future obligor concentrations.

METHODOLOGY

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', dated June 2016, including asset quality, CE,
financial structure, legal structure, and originator and servicer
quality.

Fitch's analysis focused on concentration risks within the pool, by
evaluating the impact of the default of the largest performing
obligors. The obligor concentration analysis is consistent with
Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating U.S. Equipment Lease and Loan ABS',
dated December 2016. The analysis compares expected loss coverage
relative to the default of a certain number of the largest
obligors. The required net obligor coverage varies by rating
category. The required number of obligors covered ranges from 20 at
'AAA' to five at 'B'. Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations
based on collateral type and historical recovery performance to the
largest performing obligors commensurate with the individual rating
category. The expected loss assumption was then compared to the
modeled loss coverage available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently delinquent loans. Fitch
also applied the 'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in
Global Structured Finance Transactions' dated June 2016 in
determining the ratings.

Additionally, Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, in particular, focusing on delinquent and
defaulted loans within the pool. All loans over 60 days delinquent
were deemed defaulted loans. The defaulted loans were applied loss
and recovery expectations based on collateral type and historical
recovery performance to establish an expected net loss assumption
for the transaction. Fitch stressed the cashflow generated by the
underlying assets by applying its expected net loss assumption.
Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to evaluate break-even
cash flow runs to determine the level of expected cumulative losses
the structure can withstand at a given rating level. The loss
multiplier scale utilized is consistent with that of other
commercial ABS transactions.

While the obligor concentration approach was the primary driver,
its results were compared to the stresses loss approach and
qualitative factors such the results of these approaches compared
to prior reviews, recent performance, and available CE. The rating
actions taken were ultimately the result of a combination of these
factors. Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions
and may take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected losses and impact available loss coverage and obligor
coverage. Lower loss coverage could impact ratings and rating
outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.
Should performance materially deteriorate, the decline in loss
coverage could negatively impact current ratings.


CAN CAPITAL 2014-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class A and B notes
from CAN Capital Funding LLC's series 2014-1 to 'BBB (sf)' and 'CCC
(sf)' from 'A (sf)' and 'BBB- (sf)', respectively, and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

CAN Capital 2014-1 is an asset-backed securitization (ABS)
transaction backed by a pool of loans and merchant cash advances
(MCAs) made to U.S. small businesses to fund their working capital
needs.  S&P placed the ratings on the notes on CreditWatch with
negative implications on Dec. 2, 2016, following an amortization
event triggered by the overcollateralization falling below its
required level.  The transaction was initially established with a
30-month revolving period, with principal amortization scheduled to
begin on May 15, 2017.  However, certain assets were misclassified
as eligible by the servicer when they were actually delinquent
under the terms of the transaction documents resulting in
$9,049,431 of nonperforming loans for the securitization when the
issue was corrected.  This amount comprised merchants who at some
point had not remitted payments between 32 and 47 consecutive days
but had been approved for a grace period.  Because of how grace
days had been implemented in the servicer's information systems,
these assets were not properly classified as nonperforming.  Once
these assets were removed from the performing asset balance, the
performing asset balance fell below its target balance, triggering
a rapid amortization event.  The use of grace day extensions
increased starting in the fourth quarter of 2015. The originator no
longer offers grace day extensions.

The downgrade on the class A notes reflects S&P's view that the
reduced credit enhancement is no longer sufficient to cover the
losses commensurate with the previous rating level.  The downgrade
on the class B notes reflects S&P's view that the reduced credit
enhancement is no longer sufficient to cover projected losses as a
combined result of the declining collateral performance and the
increase in nonperforming loans following the servicer's correction
of the asset misclassification.

According to the February 2017 servicer report, the outstanding
class A note balance is $69.873, million, and the eligible
performing asset balance is $89.201 million.  The transaction
distributes principal payments on a sequential basis.  The class A
notes are supported by the class B subordination of $20 million and
the reserve account balance of $1 million.  There is no
overcollateralization as the eligible asset balance is less than
the sum of the class A and B note balance.  While the transaction
was revolving, new performing assets could have been added to keep
the excess spread at a stable level.  Now that the deal is in rapid
amortization, the excess spread has decreased materially due to the
decline in performing assets.  The one-month excess spread as of
the February 2017 performance report is 4.18% compared with 26.32%
as of Dec. 2, 2016, when S&P placed its ratings on CreditWatch
negative.

"We ran the current pool through our Small Business Portfolio
Evaluator model.  The model uses Monte Carlo simulations to
determine a specific default distribution for small-business loan
pools.  As the collateral differs from small-business loans due to
the loans' short tenor and the MCAs, we applied a conversion factor
to convert the cumulative gross default levels generated by the
Small Business Portfolio Evaluator into net loss levels.  We then
compared the net loss levels with the credit enhancement available
to the notes.  Given the rapid decline in excess spread, we
anticipate minimal excess spread going forward and did not give
credit to excess spread as a credit enhancement.  The projected net
loss level for the class A notes at the 'A' stress level is 23.82%,
while the hard credit enhancement available to the class A note is
23.54%, leading to the downgrades," S&P said.

As of the February 2017 servicer report, the outstanding class B
note balance is $20 million.  The class B notes are supported by
the reserve account balance of $1 million and the one-month excess
spread of 4.18%.  The projected net loss level for the class B
notes is 14.0% at the 'BBB-' level and 7.3% at the 'CCC' level. The
hard credit enhancement available to the class B notes is 1.12%.
Similarly to how S&P treats the excess spread for the class A
notes, it do not give credit to excess spread as a credit
enhancement going forward for the class B notes because of the
rapid decline in excess spread.  Although the 1.12% credit
enhancement available to the class B notes is lower than the 7.3%
that S&P would need for a 'CCC (sf)' rating, it lowered its rating
to 'CCC (sf)' because the class B notes are paying timely interest
and principal.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

CAN Capital Funding LLC
Series 2014-1
                        Rating         Rating
Class                   To             From
A                       BBB (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Neg
B                       CCC (sf)       BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating to Cl. D-2-R Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2014-3, Ltd.:

US$359,400,000 Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$90,000,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned A1 (sf)

US$34,000,000 Class C-1-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class C-1-R Notes"), Assigned Baa1 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class C-2-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class C-2-R Notes"), Assigned Baa1 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class D-2-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class D-2-R Notes"), Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Class A-1A-R Notes, the Class A-2-R Notes,
the Class B-R Notes, the Class C-1-R Notes, the Class C-2-R Notes,
and the Class D-2-R Notes (the "Rated Notes") address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflects the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Class A-1A-R Notes, the Class A-2-R
Notes, the Class B-R Notes, the Class C-1-R Notes, the Class C-2-R
Notes, and the Class D-2-R Notes in connection with a refinancing
of the Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes,
the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, and the Class D-2 Notes
due 2026, originally issued on August 21, 2014 (the "Original
Closing Date"). The Issuer used the proceeds from the issuance of
Class A-1A-R Notes, the Class A-2-R Notes, the Class B-R Notes, the
Class C-1-R Notes, the Class C-2-R Notes, and the Class D-2-R Notes
to redeem in full the Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, and the
Class D-2 Notes that were refinanced.

In July 2016, the Issuer issued the Class A-1B-R Notes in
connection with the refinancing of the Class A-1B Notes. The Issuer
used the proceeds from the issuance of the Class A-1B-R Notes to
redeem in full the Class A-1B Notes. The Class A-1B-R Notes is not
subject to this refinancing.

On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one class of
subordinated notes, which, along with the two other classes of
notes not subject to this refinancing, will remain outstanding.

Carlyle CLO 2014-3 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The underlying portfolio is 100% ramped as of the
refinancing closing date.

Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C. (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the transaction's
remaining reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period, which
ends in July 2018, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations,
subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $797,146,604

Defaulted par: $6,140,161

Diversity Score: 77

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3000

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.74%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.74%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.60 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3000 to 3450)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A-R Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-1-R Notes: -1

Class C-2-R Notes: -1

Class D-2-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3000 to 3900)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A-R Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-1-R Notes: -2

Class C-2-R Notes: -2

Class D-2-R Notes: -1


CBA COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class A Debt Rating to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on one class in CBA Commercial Assets, Small
Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2006-1:

Cl. A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class, Class A, was upgraded due to loan
paydowns and amortization. The balance of Class A has been reduced
by 27.5% since Moody's prior review.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 25.4% of the
current balance, compared to 28.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 18.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 19.4% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CBAC 2006-1.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 23.5% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 9.1% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 35, compared to 43 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 27, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90.3% to $16.2
million from $166.8 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 53 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 42.8% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 8.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventy-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $26.5 million. Fourteen loans,
constituting 23.5% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.0 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (80.3% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans, constituting 9.1% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $0.6 million (a 40% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 91.9%, compared to 93.3% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.02%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.20X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 1.29X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. X-1 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-1:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected plus realized loss. Class A has already
experienced a 14% realized loss from previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 33.9% of the
current balance, compared to 35.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 34.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 35.1% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CBAC 2007-1.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 38% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 8% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 33, compared to 40 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 27, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 79% to $26.2 million
from $127.6 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 65 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 41% of the pool.

Five loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $34.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 76%). Twenty-three loans, constituting 38% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$7.4 million loss for specially serviced loans (75% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss $0.8 million (a 38% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.



CHICAGO SKYSCRAPER 2017-SKY: S&P Gives (P)B+ Rating to Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Chicago
Skyscraper Trust 2017-SKY's $1.02 billion commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2017-SKY.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $1.02 billion trust mortgage loan, secured
by a first lien on the borrower's fee interest in Willis Tower, a
class A, 110-story office building with a total of about 3.8
million sq. ft., located in Chicago, within the West Loop
submarket.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 14,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Chicago Skyscraper Trust 2017-SKY

Class       Rating         Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf      506,628,000
X-CP        BBB- (sf)    807,227,000(i)
X-NCP       BBB- (sf)    807,227,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)     112,584,000
C           A- (sf)       84,438,000
D           BBB- (sf)    103,577,000
E           BB- (sf)     140,730,000
F           B+ (sf)       20,731,000(ii)
HRR         B (sf)        51,312,000(ii)

(i)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
X-NCP certificates will be equal to the aggregate certificate
balance of the class A, class B, class C, and class D certificates.
(ii)The initial certificate balance of each of the class F and
class HRR certificates is subject to change based on final pricing
of all certificates and the final determination of the eligible
horizontal residual interest that will be retained by a third-party
purchaser in order for Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co., as retaining
sponsor, to satisfy its U.S. risk retention requirements.  OCM
Credit Portfolio L.P. is expected to be the initial controlling
class representative and the retaining third-party purchaser of the
class HRR certificates.


CITI HELD 2016-PM1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Citi Held
for Asset Issuance 2016-PM1 (CHAI 2016-PM1), which is backed by
marketplace loans originated via the Prosper platform:

-- Class A upgraded to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The rating actions above reflect the growth to date in hard credit
enhancement (CE) available to the notes, despite weaker than
expected trust performance. Fitch revised its lifetime gross
default expectation for the initial pool from 11% at deal closing
to 14.9%. Given the CNL trigger structure, the class C notes
demonstrate exposure to further deterioration, and in particular
back-loaded losses.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The 2016-PM1 trust pool consists of 100%
unsecured fixed rate consumer fully amortizing loans that are
either 36- or 60-month loan terms originated and serviced on
Prosper's marketplace online lending platform. Fitch's gross
default assumption for life of the collateral is 14.9%, which
translates to 16.5% of the current pool given delinquencies and the
chargeoff lag. Fitch assumes a base case recovery rate of 7.5%. At
the 'Asf' level, a default multiple of 2.8x and a recovery haircut
of 30% are applied.

CE and Liquidity Support: Hard CE for class A, B, and C is 52.7%,
39.4%, and 17.3%, respectively. Liquidity support is provided by a
non-declining reserve account, which is currently 0.84% of the pool
balance. While subordination available to the class A and B notes
will grow as the transaction pays down, overcollateralization (OC)
is at its target release level of 16.5%, and will not grow until it
hits its floor of 2% of the initial balance ($6.29 million). In
addition, a growing proportion of the OC consists of delinquent
assets. As a result, the class C notes are particularly exposed to
defaults occurring later in the transaction life, which is
currently the key constraint to their ratings.

Untested Performance Through a Full Economic Cycle: Loans
originated and serviced via online platforms such as Prosper's do
not yet have performance history through a recessionary
environment. Further, given that the underlying consumer loans are
unsecured and primarily intended for debt consolidation, Fitch
would expect borrowers to treat paying down these loans with lower
priority than other borrowings such as an auto loan or mortgage. As
such, the pool could experience especially elevated default
frequency in an economic downturn. Fitch placed a rating cap on
this transaction of 'Asf' category.

Servicing Capabilities: Prosper will service all of the loans in
the 2016-PM1 trust, and Citibank, N.A. will act as the backup
servicer. Fitch considers the servicing operations of Prosper of
consumer loans to be acceptable and Citibank, as a backup servicer,
to be effective.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or charge-offs
on borrower accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the notes. Decreased CE may make
certain ratings on the notes susceptible to potential negative
rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.


Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing a transaction's
initial base case charge-off assumption by an additional 10% and
additional 25%, and examining the rating implications. The
increases of the base case charge-offs are intended to provide an
indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration of a transaction's performance.

During the sensitivity analysis, Fitch examines the magnitude of
the multiplier compression by projecting the expected cash flows
and loss coverage levels over the life of investments under higher
than the initial base case charge-off assumptions. Fitch models
cash flows with the revised charge-off estimates while holding
constant all other modelling assumptions.

Under the 10% stress, the notes would likely retain their current
ratings. Under the 25% stress, the class A and B notes would likely
be downgraded one notch, while the class C notes will fall into
distressed categories.

Given the short remaining life of the assets, Fitch modelled timing
curves different from those described in the Global Consumer ABS
Criteria. The front, even, and back curves, which are in three
month intervals for the 36 month loans and six month intervals for
the 60 month loans, were 40%/30%/20%/10%, 20%/20%/20%/15%/15%/10%,
and 15%/15%/20%/15%/20%/15%, respectively.



CITIGROUP 2015-GC29: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2015-GC29 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect overall stable performance of the pool
since issuance. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.6% to $1.112
billion from $1.119 billion at issuance.

Stable Performance: The pool has exhibited stable performance since
issuance and pool performance is in line with Fitch's
expectations.

Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans account for 57.5% of the
pool by balance. At issuance the top 10 loans represented a larger
share than those typical of its vintage. Many of the largest loans
have high leverage; however, four of the largest 10 loans (29.2% of
the pool) are secured by properties located in New York City.

Limited Hotel Exposure: Only 6.0% of the pool by balance consists
of hotel properties, which is below the year to date 2015 average
of 17.8% and the 2014 average of 14.2% noted at issuance; hotels
have the highest probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower
CMBS model.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by only
8.4% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is less
than similar transactions of its vintage. Five loans (38.9%) are
full-term interest-only and 45 loans (44.0%) are partial
interest-only. At issuance Fitch-rated transactions in year to date
2015 and 2014 had average full-term interest-only percentages of
26.9% and 20.1%, respectively, and partial interest-only
percentages of 42.6% and 42.8%, respectively.

Pari Passu Loans: Six loans comprising 27.5% of the pool are part
of a pari passu loan combination: Selig Office Portfolio (11.2% of
the pool), 3 Columbus Circle (9.0% of the pool), 170 Broadway (4.5%
of the pool), Crowne Plaza Bloomington (1.2% of the pool), Eastmont
Town Center (1.1% of the pool) and Commerce Pointe I & II (0.4% of
the pool). The Selig Office Portfolio, 170 Broadway and Crowne
Plaza Bloomington loan combinations are serviced under the pooling
and servicing agreement for this transaction. The controlling notes
for the 3 Columbus Circle, Eastmont Town Center and Commerce Pointe
I & II loan combinations are held outside the trust.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Due to the recent
issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset level event changes the transaction's
portfolio-level metrics. Additional information on rating
sensitivity is available in the Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust
2015-GC29 (March 26, 2015) presale report, available at
www.fitchratings.com.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $22,437,521 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $146,427,000 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220,000,000 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $334,415,000 class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,822,000 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $838,892,000* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72,704,000* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,926,000(a) class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72,704,000(a) class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $180,362,000(a) class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,732,000(a) class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,713,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,713,000* class X-D at 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,769,000 class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,185,000 class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.
(a) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
exchanged for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates
may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C
certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G and H certificates.


COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes of
COMM 2007-FL14 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-FL14:

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-3-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-5-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of seven P&I classes, Classes D through K, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) are within acceptable ranges.

The affirmations of interest-only (IO) Classes X-3SG and X-5SG were
affirmed based on the credit performance of their referenced loan,
the New Jersey Office Portfolio loan. The affirmation of IO Class
X-2 is due to the weighted average rating factor or WARF of its
referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-2, Cl. X-3-SG,
and Cl. X-5-SG was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of COMM 2007-FL14.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity,
other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2017 Payment Date, the transaction's
certificate balance has declined by 98% to $48.7 million from $2.5
billion at securitization due to the payoff of 11 loans and the
partial pay down of the one remaining loan, the New Jersey Office
Portfolio loan. The New Jersey Office Portfolio loan was
transferred to special servicing in January 2011 and became REO
April 2012.

The New Jersey Office Portfolio loan is secured by three office
buildings and one industrial building leased as an exhibition
center totaling a combined 945,310 square feet. Two additional
office buildings originally in the portfolio were sold in 2014 and
2015 and released from the loan collateral. The most recent sale of
700 Atrium Drive closed August 2016 yielding net sale proceeds of
$6.0 million which were applied to the outstanding principal
balance. The properties are located in Franklin Township, New
Jersey. As of the December 2016 rent rolls, the portfolio was 61%
leased compared to 51% leased at last review and 48% at
securitization. The loan is REO via a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure
that closed in April 2012. The whole loan in the amount of $67.9
million includes subordinate mortgage debt held outside the trust
in the amount of $19.1 million. The properties are challenged by
high market vacancy.


CONN RECEIVABLES 2016-A: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. C Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Conn's
Receivables Funding 2016-A, LLC (Conn's 2016-A), which is backed by
consumer loans originated by Conn Appliances, Inc.:

-- Class A affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The upgrade of the class B note to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf' is due to
the credit enhancement (CE) that has built since closing. CE for
the class A, B, and C notes will continue to grow until the target
total overcollateralization (OC) level of 46% is reached. Total OC
is 32.76% as of the February 2017 payment period.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The 2016-A trust pool consists of 100%
fixed-rate consumer loans originated and serviced by Conn's
Appliances, Inc. The pool exhibits a weighted average FICO score of
606 and a weighted average borrower rate of 21.47%. The base case
default rate for the 2016-A initial pool remains unchanged at
23.3%, which equates to a default rate as a percent of the
remaining pool of 27.4%. Fitch applied a 2.2x stress at the 'BBBsf'
level, reflecting the high absolute value of the historical
defaults, along with the variability of default performance in
recent years and the high geographic concentration. The recovery
rate on defaulted loans for each note is assumed to be 3%. Fitch
utilized a default definition of four months in modelling to
account for currently delinquent assets.

Dependence on Trust Triggers: The trust, and in particular the
class C notes, depends on the two trust triggers - the Cumulative
Net Loss Trigger and Annualized Net Loss Trigger - in order to
ensure the payments due on the notes during times of degrading
collateral performance. In stressed scenarios, especially with back
loaded defaults, excess spread can be released from the trust
before the triggers are activated, which currently constraints the
class C note ratings.

Rating Cap at 'BBBsf': Due to higher loan defaults in recent years,
management changes at Conn's, and the credit risk profile of
Conn's, Fitch retains a rating cap on this transaction at the
'BBBsf' category.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a non-declining
reserve account, which was fully funded at closing at 1.50% of the
initial pool balance ($10,575,832), which is currently sufficient
to cover approximately four months of bond interest and fees.

Servicing Capabilities: Conn Appliances, Inc. demonstrates adequate
abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer with several
decades of experience. The credit risk profile of the entity is
mitigated by the backup servicing provided by Systems & Services
Technologies, Inc. (SST), which is also experienced in servicing
similar loan products.

Criteria Variation
Eligible Investments: Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for
Structured Finance and Covered Bonds', Fitch looks to its own
ratings in analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a
counterparty's creditworthiness. The definition of permitted
investments for this deal allows for the possibility of using
investments not rated by Fitch, which represents a criteria
variation. Since the only available funds to invest in are those
held in the Collection Account and Reserve Account, the funds can
only be invested for a short duration given the payment frequency
of the notes, and the funds are currently invested in a highly rate
money market fund focused on government securities, Fitch does not
believe such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings
assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or charge-offs
on borrower accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the notes. Decreased CE may make
certain ratings on the notes susceptible to potential negative
rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.


Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing a transaction's
initial base case charge-off assumption by an additional 10%, 25%,
and 50%, and examining the rating implications. The increases of
the base case charge-offs are intended to provide an indication of
the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration of
a transaction's performance.

During the sensitivity analysis, Fitch examines the magnitude of
the multiplier compression by projecting the expected cash flows
and loss coverage levels over the life of investments under higher
than the initial base case charge-off assumptions. Fitch models
cash flows with the revised charge-off estimates while holding
constant all other modelling assumptions.

Under the 10% stress, the class A notes would likely retain their
current ratings, and the class B and C notes would be downgraded
one notch each to 'BBB-sf' and 'B-sf', respectively.

Under the 25% stress, the class A would likely retain its current
rating, the class B would likely be downgraded two notches to
'BB+sf', and the class C notes would likely fall one notch to
'B-sf'.

Under the 50% stress, the class A would likely be downgraded one
notch to 'BBB-sf', the class B would likely be downgraded three
notches to 'BBsf', and the class C notes would likely fall into the
distressed category.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C02: Fitch to Rate 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2017-C02:

-- $379,890,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2M-2A notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $759,779,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y1 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y2 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y3 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y4 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $38,388,926,390 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $19,994,649 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $12,997,022 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $13,996,255 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $12,997,023 class 2M-CH reference tranche;
-- $189,945,000 class 2B-1 notes;
-- $9,997,325 class 2B-1H reference tranche;
-- $199,942,325 class 2B-2H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 3.00%
subordination provided by the 0.65% class 1M-2A, the 0.70% class
1M-2B, the 0.65% class 1M-2C, the 0.50% class 1B-1 and their
corresponding reference tranches as well as the 0.50% 1B-2H
reference tranche. The notes are general senior unsecured
obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject to
the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed
MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will consist of mortgage loans with
loan to values (LTVs) greater than 80.01% and less than or equal to
97.00%.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2017-C02 (CAS 2017-C02) is
Fannie Mae's 17th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $39.9 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Due to the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the 2M-1,
2M-2A, 2M-2B and 2M-2C notes will be based on the lower of: the
quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement
(CE) available through subordination and on Fannie Mae's Issuer
Default Rating.

The 2M-1, 2M-2A 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from May 2016 through September 2016. In this
transaction, Fannie Mae has only included one group of loans with
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) from 80.01% to 97.00%. Overall, the
reference pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent
CAS transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

ADDITIONAL RATING DRIVERS

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's tenth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in the pool are covered either by
borrower-paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI).
Fannie Mae will be guaranteeing the mortgage insurance (MI)
coverage amount, which will typically be the MI coverage percentage
multiplied by the sum of the unpaid principal balance as of the
date of the default, up to 36 months of delinquent interest, taxes
and maintenance expenses. While the Fannie Mae guarantee allows for
credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of
BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision as
required by the Homeowners Protection Act when the loan balance is
first scheduled to reach 78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C
and 2B-1 notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. As a
result, any collateral losses on the reference pool that occur
beyond year 12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the
transaction. Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year window in its
default analysis and applied a reduction to its lifetime default
expectations.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
seventh transaction in which Fitch received third-party due
diligence on a loan production basis as opposed to a
transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that production-based
diligence is sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality control
(QC) processes. The sample selection was limited to 6,961 loans
that were previously reviewed as part of Fannie Mae's post-purchase
QC review and met the reference pool's eligibility criteria. Of
those loans, 1,998 were selected for a full review (credit,
property valuation and compliance) by third-party due diligence
providers. Of the 1,998 loans, 416 were part of this transaction's
reference pool. Fitch views the results of the due diligence review
as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an above-average
aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to Fitch's loss
expectations based on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The 2M-1 class strongly
benefits from the sequential pay structure and stable CE provided
by the more junior 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 classes which are
locked out from receiving any principal until classes with a more
senior payment priority are paid in full. However, available CE for
the junior classes as a percentage of the outstanding reference
pool increases in tandem with the paydown of the 2M-1 class. Given
the size of the 2M-1 class relative to the combined total of all
the junior classes, together with the sequential pay structure, the
class 2M-1 will de-lever and CE as a percentage will build faster
than in a pro rata payment structure.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 2A-H senior reference tranches, which has an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as 100%of the first loss 2B-2H
reference tranche, sized at 50 bps. Fannie Mae is also retaining an
approximately 5% vertical slice/interest in the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B,
2M-2C and 2B-1 tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae, and this is reflected in Fannie
Mae's current rating. However, if, at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the ratings of
Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B and 2M-2C
notes' ratings affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 'BBB' sMVD of 23.3% and 'BB' sMVD of 18.5%. It indicates
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. and American Mortgage Consultants (AMC). The due diligence
focused on credit and compliance reviews, desktop valuation reviews
and data integrity. Adfitech and AMC examined selected loan files
with respect to the presence or absence of relevant documents.
Fitch received certifications indicating that the loan-level due
diligence was conducted in accordance with Fitch's published
standards. The certifications also stated that the company
performed its work in accordance with the independence standards,
per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence analysts
performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum years of
experience. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and
the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.

The offering documents for CAS 2017-C02 do not disclose any
representations, warranties, or enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that
are available to investors and which relate to the underlying asset
pools. Please see Fitch's Special Report for further information
regarding Fitch's approach to the disclosure of a transaction's
RW&Es as required under SEC Rule 17g-7.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C5: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-4 and A-1A
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C5, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A-M and A-1-AM certificates from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings to 'AAA (sf)' on classes A-4 and A-1A to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral, the
reduction in trust balance, and the increase in collateral
defeasance.

The affirmations on classes A-M and A-1-AM reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings, as well as S&P's views regarding
the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.11 billion, which is 40.7% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 103 loans (reflecting
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans) and six real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 187 loans at issuance.  Twelve
of these assets ($112.3 million, 10.2%) are with the special
servicer, 12 loans ($219.7 million, 19.9%) are defeased, and 37
loans ($398.7 million, 36.2%) are on the master servicers' combined
watchlist.  The master servicers, KeyBank Real Estate Capital and
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported financial information
for 97.0% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 55.5% was
partial- or year-end 2016 data, and the remainder was year-end 2015
data.

S&P calculated a 1.17x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 93.2% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.89% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude 13 specially serviced
assets, including one that was transferred to special servicing
subsequent to the February 2017 trustee remittance report ($116.8
million, 10.6%) and 16 defeased loans, including one that the
master servicer informed S&P defeased after the February 2017
trustee remittance report ($244.8 million, 22.2%).  The top 10
nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance
of $422.4 million (38.3%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV ratio
of 1.06x and 105.6%, respectively, for nine of the top 10
nondefeased loans.  The remaining loan is specially serviced and
discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $354.5 million in
principal losses, or 13.0% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 15.1% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the 13 specially serviced assets.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, 12 assets
($112.3 million, 10.2%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital.  The master servicer indicated that
one additional loan ($4.5 million, 0.4%) was transferred to special
servicing because it has a reported 60-plus-days delinquent payment
status.  Details of the two largest specially serviced assets, one
of which is a top 10 nondefeased loan, are:

The Palmer-Rochester Portfolio 1st loan ($49.1 million, 4.5%) is
the third-largest nondefeased loan in the trust and the largest
loan with the special servicer, with a total reported exposure of
$52.7 million.  The loan is secured by a mix of five multifamily,
mixed-use, and industrial properties totaling 441,026 sq. ft.
located in Rochester, N.Y.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Dec. 31, 2008, because of imminent payment default.

The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 0.11x and
82.8%, respectively.  According to the special servicer, the loan
has been embroiled in extensive litigation since 2010.  The special
servicer stated that it is attempting to obtain final judgment in
order to pursue foreclosure.  The loan has been deemed
nonrecoverable by the master servicer.  S&P expects a significant
loss (60% or greater) upon the loan's eventual resolution.

The Kukui Mall REO asset ($12.6 million, 1.1%) is the
second-largest asset with the special servicer with a total
reported exposure of $16.2 million.  The asset is a retail property
totaling 40,974 sq. ft. located in Kihei, Hawaii.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in October 2012 because of
imminent default, and the property became REO on Oct. 24, 2013. The
reported occupancy as of Dec. 31 2016, was 29.7%, and the reported
cash flow was not sufficient to coverage debt service.  An
appraisal reduction amount of $5.5 million is in effect against the
asset.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the asset's eventual
resolution.

The 11 remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 1.0% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 13 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 48.9%.

RATINGS LIST

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2007-C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C5
                                    Rating
Class             Identifier        To                  From
A-4               22546BAF7         AAA (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
A-1-A             22546BAG5         AAA (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
A-M               22546BAH3         B- (sf)             B- (sf)
A-1-AM            22546BBV1         B- (sf)             B- (sf)


CREST LTD 2003-2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Crest 2003-2, Ltd.:

Cl. D-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-REMIC).

Crest 2003-2, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(78.1% of the collateral pool balance); ii) CRE CDOs (6.3%); and
iii) credit tenant leases (CTL) (15.6%). As of the December 23,
2016 note valuation report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $82.9 million, compared
to $325.0 million at issuance.

The pool contains seven assets totaling $15.2 million (45.5% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's February 28, 2017 report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate-to-high losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3187,
compared to 3459 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (35.0%, compared to 23.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (16.0%, compared to 9.0% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(0.0%, compared to 6.5% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (12.7%, compared
to 15.4% at last review); B1-B3 (9.8%, compared to 17.6% at last
review); Caa1-Ca/C (26.%, compared to 28.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 3.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 11.6%, compared to 9.6% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 3.5%, compared to 4.7% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other parameters constant, reducing the
recovery rates of the collateral pool by -10.0% would result in an
average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero notches
downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3
to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of the collateral pool by
+10.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on the
rated notes of zero to one notch upward (e.g., one notch up implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2003-C3: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. K Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
in CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mtge Pass-Through
Ctfs. 2003-C3:

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of two P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected losses plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class A-X was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class A-Y was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor of WARF) of the
referenced loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 22.8% of the
current balance, compared to 24.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.4% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X and Cl. A-Y
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CSFB 2003-C3.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 63% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior class and the recovery
as a pay down of principal to the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of five, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 17 February, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98.7% to $22.7
million from $1.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 26.5% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 5.1% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 0.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $51.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 62.1%). Three loans, constituting 63.2% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Honeywell International Building Loan ($6.0 million --
26.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 163,000 SF office park
located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, approximately 75 miles south
of Denver. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
February 2013 due to maturity default. Honeywell exercised a
three-year extension in 2013 but did not renew their lease when it
expired in November 2016. The property is now 100% vacant.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Buffalo Square
Shopping Center Loan ($4.3 million -- 18.8% of the pool), which is
secured by 177,000 SF retail center located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The collateral is subject to a sandwich ground lease and this
sandwich ground lease is subject to a master ground lease of the
entire retail center. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer in July 2014 due to the borrower changing the property
manager without noteholder consent. The property was 95% occupied
as of November 2016.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the The Crossroads
Loan ($4.1 million -- 17.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
Class B office building located in Elmsford, New York, near White
Plains. The loan was first transferred to the special servicer in
December 2012 due to maturity default. The loan was extended
through January 2015 but returned to the special servicer due to
maturity default. The property was reported to be in fair condition
and was 57% occupied as of the November 2016 rent roll.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.2 million loss for specially
serviced loans (62.3% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full and partial year 2015 operating results for
100% of the pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results
for 99% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased
loans).

The top three performing loans represent 31.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Polar Plastics Loan ($4.4 million -- 19.3%
of the pool), which is secured by a 385,000 SF manufacturing
facility located in Mooresville, North Carolina approximately 30
miles north of Charlotte. The property is 100% leased to Pactiv
Corporation through March 2023. Moody's value incorporated a
Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant risk. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and 2.94X, respectively, compared to
37% and 2.88X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the ParkRidge at McPherson Loan ($1.6
million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 72 unit
multifamily property located in McPherson, Kansas, approximately 60
miles north of Wichita. The property was 96% occupied as of June
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.43X,
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.39X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the The Veranda at Twin Creek Apartments
Loan ($1.2 million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by an 88
unit multifamily property located in Killeen, Texas, approximately
50 miles north of Austin. The property was 99% occupied as of
September 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 40% and 2.43X,
respectively, compared to 41% and 2.38X at the last review.


CSMC TRUST 2015-TOWN: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of CSMC Trust, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2015-TOWN (CSMC
2015-TOWN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the continued overall stable performance
of the portfolio since issuance.

The portfolio has demonstrated an upward trend in servicer-reported
net cash flow, with trailing 12 month (TTM) September 2016 net cash
flow improving 6.7% from TTM September 2015 and 11.3% since
issuance. As of TTM September 2016, the servicer-reported portfolio
occupancy was 85.1%, compared to 87.4% for the TTM September 2015
period and 86.8% at issuance as of year-end (YE) 2014. Based upon
the servicer-provided December 2016 STR reports for each of the
underlying properties in the portfolio, the weighted-average weekly
revenue per available room (RevPAR), based upon allocated loan
balance, remained flat at $226 over the prior year and up from $203
at issuance as of YE 2014.

The transaction represents the beneficial interest in a trust that
holds a two-year, floating-rate, interest-only $380 million
mortgage loan, which had an initial loan maturity of March 6, 2017,
with three, one-year extension options. The servicer indicated the
borrower requested to exercise the first of its extension options
through March 2018. Fitch is awaiting confirmation that this
extension has been finalized.

Granular and Diverse Portfolio: The portfolio comprises 85 economy
extended-stay hotels (10,764 keys) branded as InTown Suites,
located across 18 states with concentrations in Texas (32.8% of the
allocated loan balance), Florida (11.7%), Tennessee (9.5%) and
Virginia (5%). The top three cities in Texas as a percentage of the
total pool balance are Houston (9.7%), San Antonio (6.2%) and
Arlington (4.1%). No single asset accounts for more than 2% of the
outstanding loan balance.

Exposure to Energy Markets: The portfolio comprises 28 properties
(33.8%) located in energy-dependent states, including Texas (32.8%)
and Oklahoma (1%). As of the most recent YE 2016 STR reports for
these properties, the weighted average weekly RevPAR declined 3.3%
between 2015 and 2016 with a weighted average RevPAR penetration
for these properties of 91.5%. Fitch is concerned about the impact
that recent oil price volatility may have on the overall economic
performance in these markets and stressed revenues due to the
portfolio's exposure to potential performance volatility.

Experienced Sponsorship and Management: An affiliate of Starwood
Capital Group acquired the InTown Suites chain in June 2013.
Starwood is a global private investment firm that has $52 billion
in assets under management.

Capped Recourse Carveouts: The recourse carveout guarantors are
InTown Hospitality Corp. and SOF IX U.S. Holdings, L.P. (with
regard to the bankruptcy carveouts). The carveouts related to a
bankruptcy event are subject to a cap on liability equal to 20% of
the loan amount. InTown Hospitality Corp. is required to maintain a
minimum aggregate net worth of $100 million exclusive of the
properties.

Additional Debt: At issuance, the total debt package included $120
million of mezzanine financing outside of the trust. Per the
servicer, the mezzanine debt paid off at maturity on March 6,
2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable. Due to
volatility in the overall hotel market, Fitch has capped RevPAR at
2014 levels in its analysis. Fitch is unlikely to upgrade classes B
through F unless there is significant sustained improvement in
overall portfolio performance. All classes could be subject to
downgrade should performance deteriorate significantly.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $138.5 million class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $9 million TF class certificates.


CSMC TRUST 2017-HD: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CSMC Trust
2017-HD's $218.6 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2017-HD.

The issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by one three-year, floating-rate commercial mortgage loan
totaling $218.6 million, with a one-year extension option, secured
by a cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted first-priority lien
mortgage on the borrowers' fee simple and leasehold interests, as
applicable, in the 878-room Hudson and the 194-room Delano hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 14,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CSMC Trust 2017-HD  

Class           Rating(i)           Amount ($)
A               AAA (sf)            69,900,000
X-CP            AAA (sf)        69,900,000(ii)
X-EXT           AAA (sf)        69,900,000(ii)
B               AA- (sf)            26,300,000
C               A- (sf)             19,600,000
D               BBB- (sf)           25,900,000
E               BB- (sf)            40,800,000
F               B (sf)              24,600,000
HRR             B- (sf)             11,500,000

(i)The rating on each class of securities is preliminary and
subject to change at any time.  The issuer will issue the
certificates to qualified institutional buyers in line with Rule
144A of the Securities Act of 1933.  
(ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the class
A certificates.



CT CDO IV: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CC (sf)' rating on the class C
notes from CT CDO IV Ltd., a U.S. commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.

The rating action follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 15, 2017, trustee report.

The transaction has eight assets remaining in the portfolio, and
the class C notes continue to defer their interest.  S&P affirmed
its 'CC (sf)' rating based on the quality of the assets backing it
and also on the class' failure of the top obligor test at the 'CCC
(sf)' rating.  

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations to assess the credit quality of
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria provide
specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not rated
by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the rating
assigned to the notes remains consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and will take rating actions
as S&P deems necessary.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1998-CG1: Fitch Hikes Cl. B-7 Debt Rating From BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed one class of DLJ
Commercial Mortgage Corp. (DLJ) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 1998-CG1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and High Credit Enhancement: The upgrade is the
result of stable performance and increased credit enhancement
through amortization and defeasance since Fitch's last rating
action. There continues to be no specially serviced loans. The
transaction has paid down approximately $10 million since Fitch's
last rating action.

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the transaction has paid
down 98% since issuance, to $28.6 million from $1.6 billion.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting the non-rated class C.

Defeasance: In total, four loans (61.2%) have defeased, including
one additional loan since Fitch's last rating action (2.4%). The
largest loan in the transaction is defeased 39.5% and matures in
2023.

Concentrated Pool: Only 11 of the original 303 loans remain. Due to
the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch's analysis included a
sensitivity test which grouped the loans by structural features and
current performance. The transaction's ratings are based on the
remaining loans' perceived likelihood of repayment, which
considered whether the loans are defeased, fully amortizing,
balloon loans, as well as current performance and whether loans are
considered Fitch loans of concern.

Maturity Schedule: The remaining loans have final maturity dates in
2018 (16.3%); 2022 (8.5%); 2023 (56.6%); and 2028 (3.7%). Seven
loans are fully amortizing (78%), two loans have anticipated
repayment dates (10.9%) and two are balloon loans (10.7%).

Largest Loans: The largest non-defeased loan is being monitored due
to upcoming rollover. The loan (10.8%) is collateralized by a
107,094 square foot (sf) retail property in Dallas, TX. The
property's largest two tenants, Tom Thumb (26% net rentable area
[NRA]) and CVS (14% NRA) expire in October 2017 and November 2017,
respectively. No information is known on whether the tenants plan
to renew. Although the loan is considered a Fitch loan of concern,
the loan is low levered with a debt per square foot (psf) of $29
and is fully amortizing. The loan matures in 2023.

The second largest non-defeased loan (10%) is collateralized by a
180,719 sf industrial property in Timonium, MD. The loan is also
being monitored by Fitch due to a decline in occupancy. As of
September 2016, occupancy declined to 84% from 99% at year-end (YE)
2015 due to one larger tenant formerly occupying 12% of the NRA
vacating at their lease expiration in 2016. The September 2016 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) declined to 1.30x from 1.47x at YE
2015. The loan is low levered with a debt psf of $16, is fully
amortizing and matures in 2022.

The third largest non-defeased loan (6.5%) is collateralized by a
122,204 sf retail property located in Little Rock, AR. Occupancy
was 70% as of September 2016 and 73% at YE 2015 compared to 85% in
2014. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to the low
occupancy and upcoming lease rollover; however, the DSCR continues
to be strong with a reported 1.83x as of September 2016. The
property's largest tenant with 31.2% of the NRA expires in June
2017. Another tenant's (9.3% of NRA) lease expired in September
2016 with no update provided by the borrower. However, based on the
tenant's website, they remain at the property. The loan is low
levered with a debt psf of $16, has an ARD in June 2018 and final
maturity in 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The two remaining rated classes have Stable Outlooks as no rating
changes are expected due to the concentrated nature of the pool.
The rating of class B-7 is capped at 'Asf' due to the pool's
significant concentration and lower collateral quality. However,
further upgrades to class B-7 are possible with continued stable
pool performance and increased credit enhancement due to additional
paydown and/or defeasance. While downgrades are not expected, they
are possible with significant performance decline.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

-- $15.6 million class B-7 to 'Asf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following class:

-- $5.3 million class B-6 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, and
B-5 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class C
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class S certificates.


FREDDIE MAC 2017-SC01: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating to Cl. M-2 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to two
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2017-SC01 (FWLS
2017-SC01). The ratings range from Baa1 (sf) to Ba3 (sf). The
certificates are backed by two pools of fixed-rate super conforming
prime residential mortgage loans. The collateral pools consist of
loans acquired by Freddie Mac from four sellers (Caliber Home Loans
(65.9%), Wells Fargo (19.1%), Quicken Loans (10.0%), and Fremont
Bank (4.9%)), pursuant to the terms of the Freddie Mac
Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide. Freddie Mac will serve in a
number of capacities with respect to the Trust. Freddie Mac will be
the Guarantor of the Senior Certificates, Seller, Master Servicer,
Master Document Custodian and Trustee.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2017-SC01

Cl. M-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss on pool 1 average 0.45% in a base-case
scenario and reach 6.00% at a stress level consistent with Aaa
rating on the senior classes. Moody's expected losses on pool 2
average 0.90% in a base-case scenario and reach 10.80% at a stress
level consistent with Aaa rating on the senior classes. Moodys
arrived at these expected losses using Moodys MILAN model. Moodys
Aaa stress loss for pool 1 is consistent with prime jumbo
transactions Moodys has recently rated. The lower FICO scores and
slightly higher CLTV on pool 2 contributed to the higher loss
expectations on the pool. In Moodys analysis, Moodys considered the
observed loss severity trends on Freddie Mac loans. Moodys did not
make any adjustments related to servicers and originators'
assessments. However, Moodys decreased Moodys base case and Aaa
loss expectation by 5% due to the strong representation and
warranties provider (Freddie Mac).

Collateral Description

The FWLS 2017-SC01 transaction is backed by a total of 1,227
fixed-rate super conforming prime residential mortgage loans with a
balance of $639,914,335. Pool 1 is backed by 656 loans with a
balance of $341,119,843 and pool 2 is backed by 571 loans with a
balance of $298,794,492. The collateral pools consist of loans
acquired by Freddie Mac from multiple sellers pursuant to the terms
of the Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide. The
weighted average CLTV is 74.9% for the aggregate pool, and 72.3%
and 77.9% for pool 1 and pool 2 loans respectively. The weighted
average FICO for the aggregate pool is 750, and 760 and 738 for
pool 1 and pool 2 loans respectively.

Third-Party Review(TPR)

Clayton conducted a review of credit, property valuations,
regulatory compliance (regulatory compliance was conducted only for
loans in the sample which were in states with assignee liability
laws and or regulations) and data accuracy checks for 314 mortgage
loans (from an initial pool of 1,254 loans). Moodys reviewed the
TPR reports and there were no exceptions for credit, property
valuations, and regulatory compliance. The data accuracy exceptions
were minor and did not pose a material risk.

Representations & Warranties (R&Ws)

Freddie Mac will make certain representations and warranties with
respect to the mortgage loans and will be the only party from which
the trust may seek repurchase of a mortgage loan as a result of any
material breach that provides for repurchase as a remedy. Freddie
Mac's Aaa senior ratings are underpinned by strong government
support. Moodys believes that the US Government will stand behind
obligations of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, meet the baseline set
of credit-neutral R&Ws Moodys has identified for US RMBS.

Structural considerations

The securitization has a two-pool 'Y' structure that distributes
principal on a pro rata basis between the senior and subordinate
classes subject to performance triggers, and sequentially amongst
the subordinate certificates. The transaction has two distinct
features: recoupment of unpaid interest on stop advance loans and
shifting certain principal payments, subject to limits, to cover
interest shortfalls to the rated subordinate bonds due to interest
rate modifications and extra-ordinary expenses.

In this transaction, Freddie Mac will stop advancing principal and
interest on any real-estate owned (REO) property or loans that are
180 days or more delinquent. This will decrease the amount of
interest remitted to the trust and could result in interest
shortfalls to the bonds. However, interest accrued but not paid on
the stop advance loans will be recovered from the liquidation
proceeds (for liquidated loans), borrower payments, modification or
repurchases and added to the interest remittance amount. This will
result in subsequent recoveries of any interest shortfalls on
subordinates bonds in the order of their payment priority.

Also, in this transaction, the certificates are exposed to interest
shortfalls due to interest rate modifications and extra-ordinary
expenses. If the interest accrued on the Class B certificate is
insufficient to absorb the reduction in interest amount caused by
modification and extra-ordinary expenses, and to the extent that
the Class B certificate is outstanding, the transaction allows for
certain principal payments (up to subordinate percentage of
scheduled principal) to be re-directed to cover interest shortfall
to the rated bonds, with a corresponding write-down of Class B
principal balance. As a result, before Classes M-1 or M-2 suffer
any unrecoverable interest shortfall, the Class B certificate
balance has to be reduced to zero. The Class B certificate
represents 1% of the collateral.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Downgrade

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Upgrade

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Rating on Cl. B5 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-1 (the
Certificates) issued by Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1 (GFMT
2017-1 or the Trust):

-- $220.2 million Class A11 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class AX11 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class A12 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class AX12 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class A13 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class AX13 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class A21 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class AX21 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class A22 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class AX22 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class A23 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class AX23 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A31 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class AX31 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A32 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class AX32 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A33 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class AX33 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class A41 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class AX41 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class A42 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class AX42 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class A43 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class AX43 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A51 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class AX51 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A52 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class AX52 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A53 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class AX53 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class X3 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class X4 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class X5 at AAA (sf)
-- $8.5 million Class B1 at AA (sf)
-- $8.5 million Class BX1 at AA (sf)
-- $10.8 million Class B2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $10.8 million Class BX2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class B3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class BX3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $2.5 million Class B4 at BB (sf)
-- $3.3 million Class B5 at B (sf)

Classes AX11, AX12, AX13, AX21, AX22, AX23, AX31, AX32, AX33, AX41,
AX42, AX43, AX51, AX52, AX53, X3, X4, X5, BX1, BX2 and BX3 are
interest-only (IO) certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A11, AX11, A12, AX12, A13, AX13, A21, AX21, A22, AX22, A23,
AX23, A31, AX32, A33, A41, AX42, A43, A51, AX52, A53 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 13.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf)
ratings reflect 10.15%, 5.90%, 3.50%, 2.50% and 1.20% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of mostly
expanded prime qualified mortgage (QM) and non-QM first-lien
residential mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 363 loans
with a total principal balance of $254,554,479 as of the Cut-Off
Date (February 1, 2017).

The mortgage loans were originally acquired by GMRF Mortgage
Acquisition Company LLC (the Sponsor) directly from either
originators or a third-party aggregator. The Sponsor is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Galton Mortgage Recovery Master Fund III, L.P.

The majority of the loans in this securitization (92.3%) are Credit
Grade A+ (Galton Program) borrowers with unblemished credit that
may not meet prime jumbo or agency/government guidelines. While
certain attributes are comparable with post-crisis prime
transactions, the loans in the GFMT 2017-1 portfolio may have IO
features, higher debt-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios, lower credit scores and barbelled distribution of certain
characteristics as compared with recent prime securitizations.
However, the overall credit profile of the Galton pool is much
stronger than those of other non-QM programs rated by DBRS.

The originators for the mortgage pool are Priority Financial
Network (17.6%); Parkside Lending, LLC (16.2%); RPM Mortgage, Inc.
(15.3%); Oaktree Funding Corp. (14.9%); PHH Mortgage Corp. (5.6%);
and various other originators, each comprising less than 5.0% of
the mortgage loans. The loans will be serviced by New Penn
Financial, LLC doing business as (dba) Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing. Galton Mortgage Loan Seller LLC (GMLS) will act as the
Servicing Administrator.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA (high) with a
Negative trend by DBRS) will act as the Master Servicer, Securities
Administrator and Custodian. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB,
dba Christiana Trust, will serve as Trustee.

In accordance with the CFPB QM rules, 22.3% of the loans are
designated as QM Safe Harbor, 9.1% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and
35.1% as non-QM. Approximately 33.6% of the loans are not subject
to the QM rules.

The Servicing Administrator will generally fund advances of
delinquent principal and interest (P&I) on any mortgage until such
loan becomes 120 days delinquent and is obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes, insurance premiums and reasonable costs
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that has been modified to allow available funds to
pay interest to the Class B1 and BX1 Certificates before paying
principal to the Senior Certificates.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths, including the
following:

(1) Satisfactory Underwriting Standards: Underwriting standards
have improved significantly from the pre-crisis era. The majority
of loans in this transaction (78.5%) were underwritten to a full
documentation standard with respect to verification of income
(generally through two years of W-2 forms or personal tax
statements), employment and assets. Some self-employed borrowers in
this pool were underwritten for income verification using 24 months
of bank statements (22.6% of the pool) and 12 months of bank
statements (24.1% of the pool). These borrowers have also provided
evidence of self-employment in the same business for the past two
years with a business narrative, as needed. For loans that were
underwritten to a less-than-full documentation standard, borrowers
were required to have stronger credit profiles or more equity in
their properties compared with a full-documentation loan.
Nonetheless, DBRS penalized such less-than-full documentation loans
by assigning lower documentation grades, which resulted in higher
expected losses for such loans.

(2) Robust Pool Composition: The loans in the pool, for the most
part, have relatively low LTV and DTI ratios and are made to
borrowers with robust FICO scores, incomes and reserves. The pool
is composed of loans with a weighted-average (WA) FICO score (based
on the lower of primary borrower and co-borrower's refreshed FICO
scores) of 744 and WA original combined LTV (CLTV) of 67.6%. The
borrowers have a WA DTI of 31.9% with WA reserves of approximately
$563,010 and WA annual income (primary borrower) of approximately
$444,318. Additionally, 93.4% of the pool consists of fixed-rate
loans, with only 6.1% having IO features. Although, when compared
with prime jumbo transactions, certain loan attributes, such as LTV
ratios and FICO scores, have a more barbelled distribution, the
Galton guidelines have compensating factors, such as capping the
DTI ratio or requiring additional reserves for the riskier loans.

(3) Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party
due diligence firm conducted property valuation, credit and
compliance reviews on 100.0% of the loans in the pool. Data
integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

(4) Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Galton
established the conduit and commenced activity in September 2014.
The first loan was acquired by the conduit in January 2015. Of
approximately 575 first-lien mortgages that were aggregated as of
December 2016, only four loans were ever 30-days delinquent
(excluding any servicing transfer issues) and these loans
self-cured shortly after.

(5) 100% Current Loans: All loans are current as of the Cut-Off
Date. Additionally, no loan in the securitization has had prior
delinquencies since origination.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

(1) Geographic Concentration: This transaction has a high
concentration of loans in California, which represents 76.5% of the
loans in the transaction. Performance of loans that are highly
concentrated in a particular region may be more sensitive to any
deterioration in economic conditions or the occurrence of a natural
disaster in that region. Some mitigating factors include the
following:

(a) DBRS's RMBS Insight model generates an elevated asset
correlation, as determined by loan size and geographic
concentration, for this portfolio compared with pools with similar
collateral, resulting in higher expected losses across rating
categories.
(b) There is metropolitan statistical area (MSA) diversity in the
pool for the loans from California.
(c) Nonetheless, DBRS believes that the elevated concentration of
Los Angeles loans demands additional penalties and credit
protection. DBRS applied the following stresses in its RMBS Insight
model, which increases the expected losses for the loans located in
the Los Angeles area:
(i) Increased the market value decline assumption for all
properties in the Los Angeles area by an additional 50% at each
rating category.
(ii) Increased the unemployment rate stress for borrowers in the
Los Angeles area.

(2) QM Rebuttable Presumption, Non-QM and Investor Loans: This
portfolio contains QM Rebuttable Presumption or non-QM loans, as
well as a significant concentration of investor loans. Some
mitigating factors include the following:

(a) All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
factors as required by the ATR rules. The loans were also
underwritten to comply with the standards set forth in Appendix Q.

(b) Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the
pre-crisis era.
(c) The DBRS RMBS Insight model incorporates loss severity
penalties for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans, as
explained further in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the
report for this transaction.
(d) Investor loans represent higher default risk (1.2 times (x) to
1.8x penalty) relative to owner-occupied loans holding other
attributes constant. In addition, investor loans in this pool have
a better credit profile than the overall pool, with a WA FICO of
758, WA original CLTV of 56.0%, WA DTI of 31.1% and substantial
liquid reserves at approximately $403,222. Finally, the Galton
guidelines have certain LTV caps and FICO floors for investor
properties.

(3) Representations and Warranties Framework: This transaction
employs a standard that includes materiality factors. Some of the
originators in the transaction may have limited history in
securitizations and/or may potentially experience financial stress
that could result in their inability to fulfill repurchase
obligations as a result of breaches of representations and
warranties. This transaction provides the following mitigating
factors:

(a) Third-party due diligence was conducted on 100% of the pool
with satisfactory results, which mitigates the risk of future
representations and warranties violations.
(b) The mortgage loans benefit from representations and warranties
backstopped by GMLS in the event of an originator's bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding and if the originator fails to cure,
repurchase or substitute loans for such a breach.
(c) The performance of the aggregated collateral, although limited
in history, has been satisfactory to-date.
(d) Automatic reviews on certain representations are triggered on
any loan that becomes 120-days delinquent or any loan that has
incurred a cumulative loss.
(e) The reviewer is required to review any triggered loans for
breaches of representations and warranties in accordance with
predetermined procedures and processes.
(f) Certain disputes are ultimately subject to the determination
made in a related arbitration proceeding.
(g) Notwithstanding the above, DBRS reduced the originator scores,
which resulted in higher expected losses.

(4) Advances of Delinquent P&I: The Servicing Administrator will
advance scheduled P&I on delinquent mortgages until such loans
become 120-days delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss
severities to the transaction because advanced P&I will not have to
be reimbursed from the Trust upon the liquidation of the mortgages,
but will increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls
to the Certificateholders. Mitigating factors include available
funds are used to pay interest to the Senior Certificates and Class
B1 and Class B1X Certificates before paying principal to the Senior
Certificates and subordination levels are greater than expected
losses, which may provide for payment of interest to the
Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that incorporated P&I
advancing up to 120 days for delinquent loans; the cash flow
scenarios are discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow Analysis
section of the report for this transaction.

(5) Servicing Administrator's Financial Capability: In this
transaction, the Servicing Administrator is responsible for funding
advances to the extent required. The Servicing Administrator is an
unrated entity and may face financial difficulties in fulfilling
its servicing advance obligation in the future. Consequently, the
transaction employs Wells Fargo as the Master Servicer. If the
Servicing Administrator fails in its obligation to make advances,
Wells Fargo will be obligated to fund such servicing advances.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (low) (sf), BBB (low)
(sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates.


GE BUSINESS 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. D Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four GE Business Loan Trusts:

Series 2005-1
-- Class A-3 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class D 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.

Series 2005-2
-- Class A 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B 'BBBsf''; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C 'BBsf''; Outlook Negative;
-- Class D 'Bsf''; Outlook Negative.

Series 2006-1
-- Class A 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class D 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Series 2006-2
-- Class A 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class D 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of notes in 2005-2, 2006-1 and 2006-2 reflect the
stable performance across the transactions and improved credit
enhancement (CE) levels. While obligor concentrations remain a
concern within these transactions, the concentrations haven't
shifted materially since last review and remain consistent with
those expected for their respective ratings.

The affirmation of outstanding notes for 2005-1 reflects recent
defaults over the past 18 months, which have substantially reduced
the spread account exposing the notes to the current delinquencies.
Available CE will likely not be able to support the loss coverage
and obligor coverage levels. While recoveries on these loans and
previously defaulted loans would provide some additional support,
the timing and size of these recoveries is uncertain. Class D
recovery estimate is 100%.

The Negative Outlooks reflect Fitch's concern with growing obligor
concentrations as the transactions continue to amortize. As the
number of obligors decline, the risk exposure increases for a
single obligor default within the pools further limiting the
outstanding credit support's ability to sustain the default of a
large obligor. Given current amortization and current
concentrations, Fitch believes the trusts to have increasing risk
exposure to additional obligor defaults. As such, Fitch will
continue to diligently monitor these transactions and may take
additional rating action.

METHODOLOGY

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's "Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria", issued June 2016, including asset quality, CE,
financial structure, legal structure, and originator and servicer
quality.

Fitch's analysis focused on concentration risks within the pool, by
evaluating the impact of the default of the largest performing
obligors. The obligor concentration analysis is consistent with
Fitch's "Criteria for Rating U.S. Equipment Lease and Loan ABS",
dated Dec 2016. The analysis compares expected loss coverage
relative to the default of a certain number of the largest
obligors. The required net obligor coverage varies by rating
category. The required number of obligors covered ranges from 20 at
'AAA' to five at 'B'. Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations
based on collateral type and historical recovery performance to the
largest performing obligors commensurate with the individual rating
category. The expected loss assumption was then compared to the
modeled loss coverage available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently delinquent loans. Fitch
also applied the "Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in
Global Structured Finance Transactions" dated June 2016 in
determining the ratings.

Additionally, Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, in particular, focusing on delinquent and
defaulted loans within the pool. All loans over 60 days delinquent
were deemed defaulted loans. The defaulted loans were applied loss
and recovery expectations based on collateral type and historical
recovery performance to establish an expected net loss assumption
for the transaction. Fitch stressed the cashflow generated by the
underlying assets by applying its expected net loss assumption.
Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to evaluate break-even
cash flow runs to determine the level of expected cumulative losses
the structure can withstand at a given rating level. The loss
multiplier scale utilized is consistent with that of other
commercial ABS transactions.

While the obligor concentration approach was the primary driver,
its results were compared to the stresses loss approach and
qualitative factors such the results of these approaches compared
to prior reviews, recent performance, and available CE. The rating
actions taken were ultimately the result of a combination of these
factors. Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions
and may take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and CE measures.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected losses and impact available loss coverage and obligor
coverage. Lower loss coverage could impact ratings and Rating
Outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.
Should performance materially deteriorate, the decline in loss
coverage could negatively impact current ratings.


GOLD KEY 2014-A: S&P Puts BB Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on each class from Gold Key
Resorts 2014-A LLC, Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2013-2, Diamond
Resorts Owner Trust 2014-1, Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2015-1, and
Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2015-2 on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  All of these transactions are asset-backed
securities (ABS) transactions backed by vacation ownership interval
(timeshare) loans.

The CreditWatch negative placements reflect higher-than-expected
delinquencies and gross defaults for each of these timeshare loan
portfolios.

As a percentage of total outstanding loans in Diamond Resorts
International Inc.'s portfolio, which includes the above Diamond
Resorts Owner Trust transactions, the 61-180 day delinquent loans
comprised 3.07% in December 2012, 3.25% in December 2013, 3.04% in
December 2014 and 4.14% in December 2015.  By December 2016, the
61-180 day collection of loans comprised 6.08% of the total
portfolio and by January 2017, it continued to rise to 6.57%. While
this data does not include the Gold Key Resorts loans, S&P has
observed similar increases in that portfolio as well.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch negative placements following the
completion of a comprehensive review of each transaction.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Gold Key Resorts 2014-A LLC
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B         BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)
C         BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)

Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2013-2
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A         AA (sf)/Watch Neg     AA (sf)
B         A+ (sf)/Watch Neg     A+ (sf)

Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2014-1
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A         A+ (sf)/Watch Neg     A+ (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)

Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2015-1
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg    AA- (sf)
B         A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)

Diamond Resorts Owner Trust 2015-2
                    Rating
Class     To                    From
A         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg    AA- (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)


GREEN TREE 1993-04: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B-2 Debt to C(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches and upgraded the ratings of three tranches in six
transactions issued between 1993 and 1998. The collateral backing
these transactions consists primarily of manufactured housing
units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1993-04

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1994-01

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-10

B-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1996-02

M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1996-07

M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-07

A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement. Green Tree Financial
Corporation MH 1996-02 M-1 tranche downgrade is due to the
depletion of credit enhancement available to the bond. Green Tree
Financial Corporation MH 1993-04 and 1994-01 B-2 tranches are not
expected to receive their full principal payments primarily due to
the outstanding interest shortfalls, prompting their downgrades.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



GRIPPEN PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Grippen Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$384,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$26,400,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Grippen Park CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of collateral obligations that are
not senior secured loans, cash or eligible investments. The
portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


GS MORTGAGE 2014-GSFL: S&P Lowers Cl. X-EXT Certs Rating to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-GSFL, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its
ratings on three other classes and affirmed its ratings on two
other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
in which S&P re-evaluated the collateral securing the four loans in
the transaction, and reviewed the deal structure and liquidity
available to the trust.

The upgrades on classes B and C reflect S&P's expectation of the
credit enhancement available to the classes, which it believes is
greater than its estimates of credit enhancement necessary at the
most recent rating levels, S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the remaining loans, and the reduced trust
balance.

The downgrades on classes E and F reflect S&P's expected available
credit enhancement available to the classes, which it believes is
less than its current estimate of necessary credit enhancement for
the most recent rating levels, and S&P's view of the collateral's
current and future performance.

The affirmations on classes A and D reflect S&P's expectation that
the available credit enhancement for these classes will be within
its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current ratings, and S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the remaining loans.

S&P lowered its rating on the class X-EXT interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, under
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance on
class X-EXT references classes A, B, C, D, E, and F.

The analysis of large-loan transactions is predominantly a
recovery-based approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this
approach, S&P's property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the lodging, retail, and industrial properties that secure the four
mortgage loans in the trust.  S&P's analysis also considered the
volatile lodging collateral performance, specifically the recent
declines in revenue per available room (RevPAR) and net cash flow
(NCF) for the hotel property securing the Yotel loan as of the
trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2016, from year-end 2015.

According to the Feb. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
trust consisted of four floating-rate IO loans with a $360.8
million aggregate trust balance, down from eight loans totaling
$542.8 million at issuance.  According to the transaction
documents, the borrowers will pay the special servicing, work-out,
and liquidation fees, as well as costs and expenses incurred from
appraisals and inspections the special servicer conducts.  To date,
the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of property's historical
NCF for the year-to-date or trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30,
2016, and years ended Dec. 31, 2015, and 2014 and, where
applicable, the most recent 2016 rent rolls and Smith Travel
Research reports that the master servicer provided to determine our
opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the properties.

The JW Marriott Chicago Hotel loan is the largest loan in the pool
with a $131.8 million (36.5%) trust and whole-loan balance.  The
borrower's equity interest in the whole loan also secures $133.2
million of mezzanine debt.  The loan is IO, accrues interest at a
rate of one-month LIBOR plus 2.739% per year, and had an initial
maturity of July 9, 2016, with three one-year extension options
with a final maturity of July 9, 2019.  The master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), indicated that the
borrower has exercised one of its extension options and the loan
currently matures in July 2017.  The loan is secured by a
first-mortgage lien on a 610-key, luxury full-service hotel in the
Central Loop submarket of Chicago's central business district and
consists of the first 12 floors of a 22-story building formerly
known as the City National Bank and Trust Co. Building. The
property was developed and completed between 2008 and 2010.  In
addition, it is S&P's understanding from the master servicer that
as of late 2016, there was outstanding litigation surrounding the
loans' sponsors associated with the hotel.  S&P's analysis
considered the stable reported net operating income (NOI).

Berkadia reported a 4.50x debt service coverage (DSC) for the
trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2016.  S&P's expected-case
value, using a 9.00% S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate,
yielded an 82.9% S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.

The Rite Aid Portfolio loan is the second-largest loan in the pool
with a $99.4 million (27.5%) trust balance.  The loan is IO, pays
floating-rate interest of one-month LIBOR plus a 3.56% spread, and
matures on April 13, 2017, with two one-year extension options. The
loan has a final maturity of April 13, 2019.  The loan is secured
by 44 individual single-tenant Rite Aid Corp. (Rite Aid; 'B/Watch
Pos') stores that are cross-collateralized in 14 states. S&P's
analysis considered the stable reported NOI as well as the recent
merger announcement of Rite Aid Corp. and Walgreen Co.
(BBB/Negative/A-2) and the possibility of divesting up to 1,200
Rite Aid stores.  Berkadia reported a 2.95x DSC for the
year-to-date Sept. 30, 2016.  S&P's expected-case value, using an
8.08% S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate,
yielded an 81.7% S&P Global Ratings LTV ratio.

The Yotel loan is the third-largest loan in the pool with a $94.0
million (26.1%) trust balance.  In addition, the borrower's equity
interest in the whole loan secures $145.5 million in mezzanine
debt.  In addition, there is $5.0 million of additional debt in the
form of preferred equity.  The loan is IO, pays floating-rate
interest of LIBOR plus a 2.561% spread, and initially matured on
Aug. 9, 2015.  The loan has three one-year extension options, and
Berkadia stated that the loan currently matures in August 2017 and
has one extension option remaining, with a final maturity of
Aug. 9, 2018.  The loan is secured by a first mortgage encumbering
a 718-room limited-service hotel located near Times Square and the
Jacob Javits Convention Center in New York City.  The property was
constructed in 2011 and is part of a 60-story mixed-use
development.  The hotel's reported performance has declined as of
the trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2016, from the year ended
2015 due to decreases in reported average daily rate caused
primarily by market competition and fluctuations.  Berkadia
reported a 4.41x DSC for the trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30,
2016.  S&P's expected-case value, using a 9.25% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate, yielded an 88.6% S&P Global Ratings LTV
ratio.

The Premier Chicago Industrial Portfolio loan, the smallest-loan in
the trust, has a $35.6 million (9.9%) trust balance.  In addition,
the borrower's equity interest in the whole loan secures $3.5
million in mezzanine debt.  The loan is IO, pays floating-rate
interest of one-month LIBOR plus a 2.831% spread, and had an
initial maturity of Feb. 9, 2017, with two one-year extension
options.  Berkadia confirmed that the loan currently matures on
Feb. 9, 2018, with a final maturity of Feb. 9, 2019.  The loan is
secured by a first mortgage encumbering seven industrial and
warehouse facilities totaling 1.15 million sq. ft. in Cook County,
Ill.  S&P's analysis considered the stable reported NOI.  Berkadia
reported a 3.39x DSC for the year-to-date Sept. 30, 2016.  S&P's
expected-case value, using a 7.55% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average capitalization rate, yielded an 82.5% S&P Global Ratings
LTV ratio.

RATINGS LIST

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-GSFL
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-GSFL
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A                36253TAA2             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
X-EXT            36253TBK9             B (sf)        BB- (sf)
B                36253TAG9             AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)
C                36253TAK0             A (sf)        A- (sf)
D                36253TAN4             BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
E                36253TAR5             BB- (sf)      BB (sf)
F                36253TBM5             B (sf)        BB- (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of five classes
in GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2016-ICE2, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-ICE2:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five principal and interest (P&I) classes were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) are within acceptable ranges.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance was $970 million, unchanged from at
securitization. The transaction is secured by a floating rate,
interest-only mortgage loan collateralized by a portfolio of 43
cold-storage facilities located across 14 US states (WA, CA, TX,
GA, IL, NE, PA, NC, AL, KS, KY, OH, VA, and CO). Construction dates
range between 1950 and 2014 and reflect an average age of 17.5
years. The loan sponsor is Lineage Logistics, a leading
temperature-controlled storage, logistics, and warehousing
company.

The 43 properties comprising the loan collateral are 100% leased
through a master lease agreement to the operating company Lineage
Logistics, LLC, an affiliate of the loan sponsor. The master lease
commenced in February 2016 with a base rent of $102.5 million per
annum, subject to annual increases equal to the greater of 2% or
CPI, not to exceed 3.5%. The largest subtenant is Walmart, which
contributes approximately 9% of the portfolio revenue. The second
largest tenant, Lamb Weston, contributes approximately 7% of
portfolio revenue. Post securitization, Lamb Weston was spun off
from former parent company ConAgra Foods, which carried a Moody's
investment grade rating at securitization. Following the spinoff,
Moody's, in October 2016, assigned a new, below investment-grade
rating (Moody's Senior Unsecured Rating Ba3, Stable Outlook) to the
spinoff, Lamb Weston Holdings, Inc., which reduced the share of
credit subtenants at the portfolio. Moody's has accounted for this
reduced share of credit subtenants in Moody's analysis.

Moody's stabilized NCF is $112 million, the same as at
securitization. Moody's trust LTV ratio is 89%, and Moody's
stressed DSCR for the trust is at 1.25X. The trust has not
experienced any losses or interest shortfalls since securitization.


GS MORTGAGE 2017-GS5: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-GS5 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $13,770,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,316,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $248,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $381,598,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,604,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $803,366,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72,329,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,078,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72,329,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,914,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,914,000 class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,497,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,497,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,957,000bd class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,333,000bd class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following are not expected to be rated:

-- $34,873,240bd class G;
-- $28,672,425ac VRR.

a) Notional amount and interest only.
b) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
c) The VRR is not a class of certificates, but represents the
vertically-retained interest in the issuing entity (representing
2.7% of the pool balance as of the closing date).
d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 6.5% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
March 20, 2017.

Since issuing its presale report, one interest-only class, X-C has
been added to the capital structure. This does not affect Fitch's
ratings on the other classes.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 32 loans secured by 72
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,061,941,665 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company and Goldman Sachs
Commercial Real Estate, LP.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 85.5% of the properties
by balance, asset summary reviews on 100% of the pool, and cash
flow analysis of 93.6% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Better Than Average Leverage: The Fitch leverage for this
transaction is better than that of other recent Fitch-rated
transactions. Excluding credit opinion loans, the conduit-only
Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.26x and the
conduit-only Fitch loan to value (LTV) is 103.7%. Both metrics
compare favorably to the year-to-date (YTD) 2017 and 2016 average
DSCRs of 1.15x and 1.16x, respectively, as well as the YTD 2017 and
2016 average LTV ratios of 110.4% and 109.9%. The fusion pool has a
Fitch DSCR of 1.28x and a Fitch LTV of 98.3%.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three
loans representing 14.3% of the pool have investment-grade credit
opinions. The proportion of investment-grade credit opinion loans
in this securitization exceeds the 2016 average concentration of
8.4%. The largest loan, 350 Park Avenue (9.42%), has a stand-alone
credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*'. The 14th largest loan, AMA Plaza
(2.83%), has a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBBsf*'. The 18th
largest loan, 225 Bush Street (2.07%), has a stand-alone credit
opinion of 'BBB+sf*'.

Very Low Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down just 4.4%, the lowest to date of any
Fitch-rated CMBS transaction. This is below the YTD 2017 average of
6.9% and the 2016 average of 10.4%. Fifteen full-term interest-only
loans compose 63.7% of the pool, and 12 loans representing 21.8% of
the pool are partial interest only.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans in the pool make up
64.2% of the pool. This is above both the YTD 2017 average of 50.7%
and the 2016 average of 54.8%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the GSMS
2017-GS5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AA-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result.


HELLER FINANCIAL 2000-PH1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. H Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
Heller Financial Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp. 2000 PH-1:

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class H was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected plus realized loss. Class H has already
experienced a 69% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced class.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.1%
of the original pooled balance, essentially unchanged from last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of HFCMC 2000-PH1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, and remains unchanged since Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.9% to $1.02
million from $956.9 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from 20% to
53% of the pool. One loan, constituting 26.2% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated with a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $68.2 million (for an
average loss severity of 48%).

The two remaining non-defeased loans represent 73.8% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Walgreens-Vegas Loan ($544,086 -- 53% of
the pool), which is secured by a 14,000 SF single tenant retail
building located in Las Vegas, Nevada. Walgreens lease expiration
is in 2048; however, the tenant has termination options every five
years starting in 2018. The loan has amortized over 85% since
securitization and matures in August 2018. Due to the single tenant
exposure, Moody's value incorporated a lit / dark analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 13% and >4.00X, respectively, compared
to 20% and >4.00X at the last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the
agency applied to the loan balance.

The second largest loan is the Tiny Tim Plaza Loan ($208,746 -- 20%
of the pool), which is secured by a 17,000 SF retail center located
in Santa Ana, California. The property is primarily occupied by
local tenants. The loan has amortized over 67% and matures in
December 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 18% and >4.00X,
respectively, compared to 21% and >4.00X at the last review.



ICE 1: Moody's Affirms Caa2(sf) Rating on Class D Sec. Term Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd.:

US$95,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Secured Term Notes Due
August 15, 2022 (current outstanding balance of $38,939,820),
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 8, 2016 Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

US$51,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Subordinate Secured Term
Notes Due August 15, 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June
8, 2016 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Secured Term Notes
Due August 15, 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 8,
2016 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following note:

US$40,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Junior Subordinate Secured Term
Notes Due August 15, 2022 (current outstanding balance of
$34,291,813), Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on June 8, 2016
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds, senior secured loans and non-senior secured loans,
with significant exposure to emerging market corporate and
sovereign issuers. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
August 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of credit quality
improvement in the portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios due to deleveraging of $111.5
million since June 2016. Based on the trustee's February 2017
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 3090
compared to 4017 in June 2016. The OC ratios for the notes have
also increased. The Class A-2 notes have been paid in full, and the
Class A-3 notes and the Class D notes have been paid down by
approximately 59.0% or $56.1 million and 4.48% or $1.6 million,
respectively, since then. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are
452.64%, 195.97%, 137.77% and 108.64%, respectively, versus June
2016 levels of 192.77%, 143.58%, 120.64% and 104.82%,
respectively.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of the proceeds used to
pay down notes has been from asset sales and prepayments on the
underlying collateral pool, including assets with ratings Caa3 or
lower. Asset sales coupled with prepayments, have significantly
reduced exposure in the portfolio to the oil and gas sector,
particularly in countries with low speculative grade foreign
currency ceilings, such as Venezuela.

In addition, the deal continues to have a large, out-of-the-money
interest rate swap, which matures in August 2017. The notional of
this swap, however, decreased substantially in February 2017 and
will decrease further in August 2017. On the latest payment date,
the reduction in swap notional required less excess interest.
Therefore, excess interest was available to deleverage the Class D
notes following a D OC test failure.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the bond and
loan markets and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could
have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have
a positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Country risk: The portfolio includes exposure to a large number
of countries with foreign currency ceilings below Aa3, including
significant exposure to Venezuela, Argentina, Russia, Azerbaijan
and Ukraine. Country risk arises from (a) political, financial and
economic factors either inside or outside the country, and (b) the
transfer of and conversion into foreign currency. Countries in the
same region could also be highly correlated because of mutual
dependence on external capital flows, on commodity price, or on
political regimes that could have spillover effects into
neighboring countries.

6) Recovery of defaulted assets: The portfolio includes a large
number of defaulted and Ca-rated assets, totaling $116.6 million,
or approximately 46% of total par and principal proceeds.
Fluctuations in the market value of defaulted assets reported by
the trustee and those that Moody's assumes as having defaulted
could result in volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the
timing of recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or
sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
higher than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

7) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors Moody's rates Caa1 or lower, especially if they jump to
default.

8) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
that is currently out of the money. If fixed-rate assets prepay or
default, the mismatch between the swap notional and the amount of
fixed assets would be more substantial. In such cases, payments to
hedge counterparties could consume a large portion or all of the
interest proceeds, leaving the transaction, even with respect to
the senior notes, with poor interest coverage. Payment timing
mismatches between assets and liabilities can lead to additional
concerns. If the deal does not receive sufficient principal
proceeds on the payment date to supplement the interest proceeds
shortfall, an interest payment default is much more likely to
occur. Similarly, using principal proceeds to pay interest could
lead to the risk of payment default on the principal of the notes.

9) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. Moody's normally updates such estimates
at least once annually, but if such updates do not occur, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

10) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $25.4 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3238)

Class A-3: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4856)

Class A-3: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations." In addition,
because of the collateral pool's low diversity and exposure to
countries with low foreign currency ceilings, Moody's used
CDOROM™ to simulate a loss distribution that it then used as an
input in the cash flow model, as described in Appendix III of
"Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
Obligations." Moody's also supplemented its modeling with
individual scenario analyses to assess the ratings impact of
jump-to-default by large obligors.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $161.7 million, defaulted par of
$91.2 million, a weighted average default probability of 17.47%
(implying a WARF of 4047), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 34.83%, a diversity score of 8, a weighted average
coupon of 9.2% and a weighted average spread of 4.4%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 8.8% of the collateral pool.


JMP CREDIT III: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E-R Sec. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by JMP Credit Advisors CLO III Ltd.

US$228,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$41,700,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A1 (sf)

US$21,600,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,300,000 Class E-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-R Notes, the Class B-R Notes, the Class C-R Notes, the
Class D-R Notes and the Class E-R Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Rated Notes in connection with the
refinancing of five classes of secured notes (together, the
"Refinanced Notes"), previously issued on September 30, 2014 (the
"Original Closing Date"). The Issuer used the proceeds from the
issuance of the Rated Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Notes
pursuant to this refinancing. On the Original Closing Date, in
addition to the Refinanced Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes, which are not subject to this refinancing and
will remain outstanding.

JMP CLO III is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and senior unsecured
loans. The underlying portfolio is 100% ramped as of the closing
date of the refinancing.

JMP Credit Advisors LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It directs
the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's reinvestment
period. After the reinvestment period, which ends in October 2018,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets and credit improved
assets, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par, the
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Total portfolio par and principal proceeds balance: $358,864,323

Defaulted par: $2,953,447

Diversity Score: 78

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2872

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.98%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2872 to 3303)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: 0

Class C-R Notes: -1

Class D-R Notes: 0

Class E-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2872 to 3734)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-R Notes: 0

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: -1


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Moody's Lowers Class B Debt Rating to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC12:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class A-J was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the P&I class D was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the P&I classes B and C were downgraded due to
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans that were higher than Moody's had previously
expected.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42.1% of the
current balance, compared to 27.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 10.3% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-CIBC12.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 5 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 13th, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $123 million
from $2.17 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 30% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Forty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $183 million (for an average loss
severity of 37%). Two loans, constituting 55% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Fort Steuben Mall Loan ($36.2 million -- 29.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a Class B regional mall in Steubenville, Ohio.
The mall was originally anchored by Sears, JC Penney, Walmart,
Dick's Sporting Goods, and Macy's, and is the only regional mall
within a 30 miles radius. The loan transferred to special servicing
in January 2016 when the borrower stated it will no longer will
fund shortfalls to cover debt service. Subsequent to the closure of
the anchor tenant Sears in June 2016, another anchor tenant,
Macy's, announced in January 2017 that the store at the mall will
be closed in the early spring of 2017. The mall was 76% leased as
of December 31th, 2016 (including Macy's occupancy). Foreclosure
occurred in February 2017. The special servicer is awaiting court
confirmation. Once the asset becomes real estate owned (REO), a
hold/sell recommendation will be completed in order to determine
timing and strategy of eventual REO sale. Moody's anticipates a
significant loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the South Brunswick
Square Loan ($31.7 million -- 25.9% of the pool), a 260,980 square
foot (SF) retail center located on Route 1 in South Brunswick /
Monmouth Junction, New Jersey. Approximately 142,000 SF of the
property is secured as collateral. The anchors at the property are
Home Depot (not part of collateral) and Bob's Furniture. The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2014 due to imminent
default. The former grocery anchor tenant, Stop & Shop, vacated at
its lease expiration in July 2014. The special servicer indicated
they are working to complete foreclosure of the collateral. All
property cash flow is currently directed to a lender-controlled
lockbox. The property was 75% leased as of December 2016,
essentially the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $50.7 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (75 % expected loss on average).

As of the March 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $12.4 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing
fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement
reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 80% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 84% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.37X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Discovery Channel Building Loan ($25.5 million
-- 20.8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 149,000 SF office
property located in downtown Silver Spring, Maryland. The property
is 100% leased to Discovery Communications, a mass media company,
through March 2025. The loan matures in July 2020. Moody's value
incorporates a dark/lit analysis to recognize the single-tenant
exposure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 1.11X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Lewisville Town Center Loan ($5.0
million -- 4.1% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 47,000 SF
retail property located in Lewistown a suburb of Dallas-Fort Worth,
Texas. The property is located in a major retail corridor. The
largest tenants include a JP Morgan Bank Branch, Korner Café and
Italian Vila. As of September 2016, the property was 97% leased.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.41X, respectively,
compared to 65% and 1.43X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Fairway Park Manor Loan ($4.7 million
-- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 100-unit apartment
complex located 3 miles south of Reno Downtown. As of September
2016, the occupancy was 96%, compared to 95% as of December 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 135% and 0.72X, respectively,
compared to 137% and 0.71X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2005-LDP4:

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of one P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class X-1 was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 26.0% of the
current balance, compared to 21.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMCC 2005-LDP4.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of six, compared to seven at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 15 February, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96.6% to $90.7
million from $2.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 30.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 98.0% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 14.0% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $224.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 55.5%). Two loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the North Tenaya Loan ($15.3 million -- 16.9% of the pool),
which is secured by an office building located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The property was transferred to the special servicer in
August 2015 due to monetary default. The property was 48% occupied
as of the January 2017 rent roll.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Inverness
Regional Shopping Center Loan ($8.1 million -- 9.0% of the pool),
which is secured by a 204,000 SF regional shopping center located
in Inverness, Florida. At securitization, the property was anchored
by a Publix, K-Mart, and Beall's Outlet. The property was 34%
occupied as of the December 2016 rent roll.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $18.3 million loss for specially
serviced loans (78.3% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 13.5% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $5.0 million (a 41.0% expected loss based on a
59.6% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 89%, compared to 76% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 24.1% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.24X and 1.57X,
respectively, compared to 1.46X and 1.66X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 50.0% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 23 Main Street Loan ($27.7 million -- 30.6%
of the pool), which is secured by a 350,000 SF single-tenant office
building located in Holmdel, New Jersey and serves as the corporate
headquarters for Vonage. The property had previously been
transferred to the special servicer due to uncertainty surrounding
the renewal of the Vonage lease. Vonage elected to extend their
lease through October 2023 and the loan was returned to the master
servicer in May 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and
1.00X, respectively, compared to 89% and 1.27X at the last review.
Moody's value incorporates a Lit/Dark analysis to account for the
single-tenant exposure.

The second largest loan is the Silver Hills Apartments Loan ($9.7
million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 273 unit
multifamily property located in Orlando, Florida approximately
eight miles northwest of the Orlando CBD. The property was 99%
occupied as of the December 2016 rent roll. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to 76% and
1.19X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Owens Corning Loan ($7.9 million --
8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 421,000 SF warehouse
facility located in Chester, North Carolina, approximately 45 miles
southwest of Charlotte and 60 miles north of Columbia, South
Carolina. The property is 100% leased to Boral Stone Products, a
subsidiary of Owens Corning. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 43% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 60% and 1.72X, respectively, compared to 51% and 2.02X at the
last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP11: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. A-M Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on five classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-LDP11:

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 31% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed because the class
does not, nor is expected to, receive monthly interest payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 18.5% of the
current balance, compared to 13.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 17.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23, compared to a Herf of 35 at Moody's last
review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 61% to $2.09 billion
from $5.41 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 136 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 50% of
the pool. Thirteen loans, constituting 5% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Seventy-three loans, constituting 46% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $559 million (for an
average loss severity of 46%). Ten loans, constituting 20% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is GSA Portfolio -- A Note Loan ($225.7 million --
10.8% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of nine
cross-collateralized properties located in five states (Colorado,
New York, West Virginia, Kansas and Pennsylvania). The loan has
transferred in and out of special servicing since 2012. The loan
most recently transferred back to the Special Servicer in February
2016 due to leasing concerns. The portfolio was 95% leased as of
September 2016. The loan's maturity date was extended to May 2017
as part of a loan modification which closed in the first quarter of
2014. The modification split the principal balance into an A Note
and a $34 million B Note. There is also mezzanine debt associated
with the property.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the JQH Hotel
Portfolio Loan ($50.0 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which
represents a $50 million portion of a $150 million senior mortgage.
The loan is secured by a portfolio of three full service hotels and
two limited service hotels across three states -- Missouri, Texas
and Tennessee. The loan transferred to special servicing in July
2016 due to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing. The other pari passu
portion is held in BACM 2007-3.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $170.7 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (40% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 23 poorly
performing loans, constituting 20% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $130.7 million (a 31% expected loss based on a
60% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 94% of the
pool and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 92% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 113%, compared to 112% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.28X and 0.91X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 0.92X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Maple Drive Portfolio Loan ($220.0 million --
10.6% of the pool), which is secured by three office properties in
Beverly Hills, California. The properties were 68% leased as of
September 2016, compared to 97% leased as of September 2015. The
largest tenant, New Corp., formerly occupied the entirety of
property 407 North Maple Drive and vacated in 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 142% and 0.67X, respectively, compared to 134%
and 0.71X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Save Mart Portfolio Loan ($153.0
million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of 31
single tenant grocery stores with a total of 1,611,853 square feet
(SF), spread across several locations in Northern California. As of
September 2016, the portfolio was 100% leased, the same as at
September 2015. The loan is currently on the watchlist due to low
DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 105% and 0.93X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Franklin Mills -- A Note Loan ($112.9
million -- 5.4% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion
of a $188.2 million A note senior mortgage. The loan is secured by
a super-regional mall located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As of
September 2016, the total property was 91% leased. This loan was
modified in 2012 with an A/B note split, and the B note totals
$90.0 million. This loan is pari passu with GSMS 2007-GG10. Moody's
A Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.94X, respectively,
compared to 113% and 0.91X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2013-LC11: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2013-LC11 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.5% of the
current balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.7% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating IO securities called "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities,"
dated October 20, 2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as
proposed, the changes could affect the ratings of JPMCC 2013-LC11.


DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 22 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $1.2 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 51 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9.9% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 60% of the pool.

Five loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool and there are no
loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 79% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 100.2%, compared to 98.2% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16.6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.63X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.70X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Grand Prairie Premium Outlets Loan ($118
million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 417,000 SF
outlet center located in Grand Prairie, Texas, 20 miles south of
Dallas. The property opened in August 2012 and was 96% leased as of
September 2016. The property is sponsored by Simon Property Group.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.06X, respectively,
compared to 90% and 1.05X at last review.

The second largest loan is the World Trade Center I & II Loan ($113
million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by two adjacent
28-story and 29-story Class A office buildings totaling 770,000 SF
and located in the CBD of Denver, Colorado. The property is also
encumbered with $17.6 million of additional mezzanine financing
held outside of the trust. The property was 75% leased as of
September 2016 compared to 81% in December 2015 and 91% at
securitization. Moody's value incorporates the increased vacancy at
the property and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.94X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Pecanland Mall Loan ($87 million --
7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 433,200 SF component of a
965,238 SF super-regional mall in Monroe, Louisiana. Five tenants
anchor the subject including Dillard's (165,930 SF), J.C. Penney
(138,426 SF), Sears (122,032 SF), Belk (105,650 SF) and Burlington
Coat Factory (63,436 SF). However, the land and improvements
occupied by Dillard's, J.C. Penney, Belk and Sears are not
contributed as collateral for the loan. J.C. Penney recently
announced that they will be closing their store at this location.
As of September 2016, the property was 98% leased. Moody's analysis
incorporates the potential volatility concerns of B-Malls in
tertiary locations. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and
0.95X, respectively, compared to 105% and 0.98X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2014-PHH: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. E Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-PHH, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the 1,642-guestroom Palmer House
Hilton hotel located in downtown Chicago, Ill., which secures the
$260.0 million floating-rate interest-only (IO) loan that serves as
collateral for the stand-alone transaction.  S&P also considered
the deal structure and liquidity available to the trust.  The
affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-EXT IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than the lowest-rated reference
class.  The notional amount of the class X-EXT certificate
references the aggregate certificate balance of the class A, B, and
C certificates.

The analysis of stand-alone (single borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P based its analysis partly on a
review of the servicer-reported financial performance to determine
its opinion of a sustainable in-place net cash flow (NCF) for the
lodging property.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
financial performance for the years ended 2012 through 2015, as
well as the trailing 12 months ended September 2016 historical net
operating income (NOI) as provided by the master servicer.
Historical performance remained stable in 2012 and 2013, and has
improved in 2014 and 2015.  In addition, S&P reviewed the Smith
Travel Report and inspection report provided by the master servicer
to determine our opinion of a sustainable NCF for the lodging
property.  The property benefits from Chicago's class L property
tax abatement, which applies to landmarked properties and is
intended to encourage and subsidize their restoration and
preservation.  The abatement began in 2009; it is scheduled to
gradually reduce beginning in 2019 and will decrease to zero in
2021.  As part of S&P's analysis, it accounted for this benefit by
assuming an unabated tax expense in deriving S&P's cash flows and
adding the abatement's discounted net present value to our value.

Palmer House Hilton is a 1,642-key full-service hotel in downtown
Chicago, built in 1871.  Renovations included $131.0 million
($79,927 per guestroom) in capital improvements between 2006 and
2009, as well as guestroom renovations between 2013 and 2016.  The
master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported a combined
debt service coverage (DSC) of 2.01x on the trust and mezzanine
balance and occupancy of 80.2% for the trailing 12 months period
ended Sept. 30, 2016.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a 9.00%
capitalization rate, yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings'
loan-to-value ratio of 80.1%.  Using S&P's sustainable in-place
NCF, it calculated a DSC of 2.75x (based on the maximum LIBOR cap
plus spread) on the trust balance.

As of the Feb. 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the IO loan had
a trust and whole-loan balance of $260.0 million and pays an annual
floating interest rate of LIBOR plus 2.1889%.  The loan had an
initial two-year term with three one-year extension options. The
borrower has exercised one of its three extension options, and the
loan is currently scheduled to mature on Aug. 9, 2017.  The
borrower's equity interest also secures $160.0 million of mezzanine
financing.

According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the
special servicing fees, work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs
and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections conducted by
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-PHH
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)
C         A- (sf)
D         BBB- (sf)
E         BB (sf)
F         B+ (sf)
X-EXT     A- (sf)


JPMDB TRUST 2017-C5: Fitch to Rate Class G-RR Notes 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on JPMDB Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-C5 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $32,683,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,129,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,341,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $457,116,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,148,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $824,327,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89,998,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93,910,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,347,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,651,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,478,000a class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,999,000ac class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,869,000ac class F-RR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,434,000ac class G-RR 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:
-- $44,347,191ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 35 loans secured by 50
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,043,452,191 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association and
German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 81.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 91.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are slightly
better than those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.21x is
slightly more favorable than the YTD 2017 average of 1.17x and in
line with the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of 102.5%
is better than average when compared with the YTD 2017 and 2016
averages of 106.1% and 105.2%, respectively. Excluding credit
opinion loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR of 1.17x and Fitch LTV of
109.7%.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three
loans representing 16.2% of the pool have investment-grade credit
opinions, which exceed the YTD 2017 and 2016 average concentrations
of 5.8% and 8.4%, respectively. All three credit opinion loans in
the pool: 350 Park Avenue (6.4% of the pool), Hilton Hawaiian
Village (6.0%) and Moffett Gateway (3.8%), have investment-grade
credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. The three
loans have a weighted average Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.44x and
65.5%, respectively.

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The largest 10 loans account for
53.7% of the pool, which is above the YTD 2017 average of 50.4% and
slightly below the 2016 average of 54.8%. The pool's average loan
size of $29.8 million is considerably greater than the YTD 2017 and
2016 averages of $18.6 million and $18.7 million, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
JPMDB 2017-C5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


KATONAH 2007-I: Moody's Hikes Class B-2L Notes Rating From Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Katonah 2007-I CLO Ltd.:

US$18,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on August 2, 2016 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

US$11,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Upgraded to
A2 (sf); previously on August 2, 2016 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$10,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Upgraded
Baa3 (sf); previously on August 2, 2016 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$227,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022 (current
outstanding balance of $89,375,253.14), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 2, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on August 2, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Katonah 2007-I CLO Ltd., issued in January 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2016. The Class
A-1L notes have been paid down by approximately 38.8% or $56.7
million since that time. Based on the trustee's February 2017
report, the OC ratios for the Senior Class A, Class A-3L, Class
B-1L, and Class B-2L notes are reported at 157.83%, 136.53%,
126.13% and 115.69% respectively, versus August 2016 levels of
138.93%, 125.77%, 118.89%, and 112.99% respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since August 2016. Based on the trustee's February 2017 report, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2741 compared to
2452 in August 2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively. In particular, Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis given that the post-reinvestment period reinvesting
criteria has loose restrictions on the weighted average life of the
portfolio.

7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $2.2 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2383)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +1

Class B-1L: +3

Class B-2L: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3575)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $181.7 million, defaulted par of $1.2
million, a weighted average default probability of 17.69% (implying
a WARF of 2979), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.84%, a diversity score of 36 and a weighted average spread of
3.28% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A proportion of the collateral pool includes debt obligations whose
credit quality Moody's assesses through credit estimates. Moody's
analysis reflects adjustments with respect to the default
probabilities associated with credit estimates. Specifically,
Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with credit
estimates that have not been updated within the last 15 months,
which represent approximately 1.9% of the collateral pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: S&P Raises Rating on A-J Certs to BB-
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2007-C6, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-MFL, A-J, and B
to reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral, the reduced
trust balance, and the increased in collateral defeasance.

The affirmations reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within S&P's estimate
of the necessary credit enhancement required for the current
ratings.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.39 billion, which is 53.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 86 loans and three real
estate-owned (REO) assets (representing crossed loans and the
subordinate B hope note), down from 140 loans at issuance.  Twelve
of these assets (representing crossed loans; $385.5 million, 27.7%)
are with the special servicer, 14 ($246.1 million, 17.7%) are
defeased, and 24 ($342.6 million, 24.7%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for 95.0% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, of which 32.5% was partial-year or year-end 2016, and
the remainder was year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.08x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 101.5% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.28% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 12 specially serviced
assets, 14 defeased loans, and a subordinate B hope note ($10.1
million, 0.7%). The top 10 nondefeased assets have an aggregate
outstanding pool trust balance of $727.4 million (52.3%).  Using
adjusted servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global
Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 0.99x and 110.0%,
respectively, for seven of the top 10 nondefeased assets.  The
remaining assets are specially serviced and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $159.2 million in
principal losses, or 5.3% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 9.8% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the 12 specially serviced assets (representing crossed loans).

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb .17, 2017, trustee remittance reports, 12 assets
(representing crossed loans) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC.  Details of the three largest specially
serviced assets, all of which are part of the top 10 nondefeased
assets, are:

The PECO Portfolio REO asset ($281.8 million, 20.3%) has a $283.5
million total reported exposure and is the largest asset in the
pool.  The asset originally consisted of 39 cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted loans secured by 39 retail properties totaling
4,250,370 sq. ft. across 13 states.  The loans were transferred to
the special servicer on Aug. 2, 2012, because of imminent payment
default and became REO between June 2014 and March 2015.  The
special servicer stated that eight of the 39 properties have been
sold and released to date, while the rest are in the evaluation and
leasing program.  It is S&P's understanding that the proceeds from
the eight properties sold to date have been used to repay prior
advances, deferred interest, and principal repayments.  A $127.4
million appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against this
asset.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this asset's eventual
resolution.

The Lakeland Town Center loan ($25.1 million, 1.8%) has a $25.4
million total reported exposure and is the second-largest asset
with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by an anchored
retail center totaling 304,375 sq. ft., in Lakeland, Fla.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 12, 2016, for
imminent default.  The special servicer stated that negotiations
with the borrower are ongoing, while the loan is being dual-tracked
for foreclosure until a resolution is achieved.  No ARA is
currently in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss
upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Dolce Norwalk loan ($22.7 million, 1.6%) has a $25.6 million
total reported exposure and is the third-largest asset with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by a full-service hotel
totaling 120 rooms in Norwalk, Conn.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on Oct. 9, 2015, because the borrowers
requested a maturity extension and changes to the existing cash
management waterfall.  The loan had matured in April 2016.  The
special servicer stated that discussions regarding potential
restructuring options with the borrower are ongoing, while the loan
is being dual-tracked for foreclosure. A $5.7 million ARA is in
effect against the loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
loan's eventual resolution.

The remaining assets with the special servicer have each individual
balances that represent less than 0.9% of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 12 specially serviced assets
(representing crossed loans), arriving at a weighted average loss
severity of 34.4%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
moderate loss is 26%-59%.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C6
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To            From
A-4               52109PAE5              AAA (sf)      AA (sf)
A-1A              52109PAF2              AAA (sf)      AA (sf)
A-M               52109PAG0              AA (sf)       BB (sf)
A-J               52109PAH8              BB- (sf)      B- (sf)
B                 52109PAJ4              B (sf)        B- (sf)
C                 52109PAK1              B- (sf)       B- (sf)
D                 52109PAL9              CCC (sf)      CCC (sf)
A-MFL             52109PAU9              AA (sf)       BB (sf)


LEGACY BENEFITS 2004-1: Moody's Puts B1 Rating Under Review
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Class A notes and placed
on review for possible downgrade for both the Class A notes and the
Class B notes that were issued by Legacy Benefits Life Insurance
Settlements 2004-1 LLC. The underlying collateral consists of a
pool of universal life insurance policies and annuity contracts
purchased on the lives of the insured individuals. Amounts received
under the fixed payment annuity contracts are designated to cover
the future premium payments on the corresponding insurance
policies, as well as the interest and principal on the notes.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Legacy Benefits Life Insurance Settlements 2004-1 LLC
                                                                  

  Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
  Possible Downgrade; previously on May 24, 2016 Downgraded to
  Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. B, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
  previously on May 24, 2016 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The cost of insurance has been rising with the aging of the
insured. Consequently, the cash flow from the annuities is being
diverted more and more to the payment of the premiums in order to
keep the life insurance policies active while the portion left for
the notes' interest payments and the Interest Reserve Account is
steadily decreasing.

The rating actions are prompted by an Event of Default on interest
payments for the Class B notes and the likelihood of a future
shortfall on Class A interest if current trends continue. On the
February Payment Date, the funds available in the Collection
Account and Interest Reserve Account were insufficient to pay the
total amount of interest due on the Class B notes and thus incurred
a shortfall of $39,644.72.

According to deal documents related to the Event of Default, the
transaction may be accelerated and the trustee can declare the
principal and all accrued interest on the notes to be immediately
due and payable, unless directed otherwise by the noteholders.
Final actions on both the Class A notes and the Class B notes
currently being placed under review will be resolved when Moody's
receives more clarity on the decision.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

The regular interest as well as the shortfall amount on the Class B
notes may be paid back in the next payment date due to expected
sizeable annuity payments. However, the shortfall scenario will
likely to recur for the Class B notes in the future if the cash
flow does not improve over time.

The Class A notes are currently paying interest as scheduled, it
may run into an interest shortfall situation in less than six
months if future collection amounts and payments for the next
several months are same as prior year periods where incoming
payments have solely come from annuity payments.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Monitoring Life Insurance ABS" published in January
2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Change in mortality or lapse risk as well as change in the
insurance financial strength ratings of the life insurance
companies and annuity providers.


MASTR ADJUSTABLE 2005-5: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-X Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
issued by MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-5, as a result
of the upgrades on the underlying pledged security tranches.

The transaction is a resecuritization of classes of certificates
from Green Tree manufactured housing securitizations.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-5

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade of Class A-1 is due to improved performance of
the underlying assets and subsequent rating upgrades on the
underlying tranches. Class A-X is an Interest Only tranche whose
notional balance is equal to the sum of the principal balances of
the Class A Notes and its rating upgrade is prompted by the rating
upgrade of Class A-1.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers on the underlying transactions or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


MCF CLO V: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to MCF CLO V LLC's $262.25
million floating-notes.  The note issuance is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction backed by middle market
speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      middle market speculative-grade senior secured term loans
      that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The credit
      enhancement provided through the subordination of cash
      flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

MCF CLO V LLC

Class                    Rating          Amount
                                       (mil. $)
A                        AAA (sf)        173.50
B                        AA (sf)          25.00
C                        A (sf)           23.50
D                        BBB- (sf)        18.00
E                        BB- (sf)         22.25
Subordinate notes        NR              40.595

NR--Not rated.


MILL CITY 2017-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Ratings to Class B2 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-1 (the Notes) issued by Mill City Mortgage
Loan Trust 2017-1 (the Trust) as follows:

-- $241.7 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.2 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $24.1 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $23.7 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 38.85% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 30.70%,
24.60%, 18.60%, 14.00% and 9.95% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of primarily
first-lien, seasoned, performing and re-performing residential
mortgages and home equity lines of credit mortgage loans (HELOCs).
The Notes are backed by 1,660 loans with a total principal balance
of approximately $395,316,146 as of the Cut-Off Date (February 28,
2017).

The loans are approximately 110 months seasoned and all are current
as of the Cut-Off Date, including 28 bankruptcy-performing loans.
Approximately 43.3% and 58.9% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for the past 36 months and 24
months, respectively, under the Mortgage Banker Associations
method.

The portfolio contains 58.9% modified loans. Within the pool, 507
loans have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates to
5.6% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 89.1% of the
modified loans. In accordance with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 5.9% of the loans
are designated as QM Safe Harbor, less than 0.1% as QM Rebuttable
Presumption and 0.1% as non-QM. Approximately 94.0% of the loans
are not subject to the QM rules.

Approximately 16.5% of the pool are HELOCs, of which 97.8% are
first liens and 2.2% are second liens. These loans have a fixed
credit limit for a 120-month draw period and then amortize for the
remaining 240 months subject to a decreasing credit limit. HELOC
borrowers may make draws on the mortgage up to the credit limit
until maturity, which will increase the current principal balance
of such loans. In addition, HELOC borrowers may also experience
payment shocks when the amortization period begins. As of the
Closing Date, Mill City Depositor, LLC (the Depositor) will fund a
HELOC Draw Reserve Account to purchase future draws from the
related servicer. For a detailed analysis of the HELOCs included in
the pool, refer to the HELOC section in Key Probability of Default
Drivers of the report.

Through a series of transactions, Mill City Holdings, LLC (Mill
City) will acquire the mortgage loans on the Closing Date. Prior to
the Closing Date, the loans were held in one or more trusts that
acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and 2016. Such trusts are
entities of which the Representation Provider or an affiliate
thereof holds an indirect interest. Upon acquiring the loans, Mill
City, through a wholly owned subsidiary (the Depositor), will
contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, Mill City will
acquire and retain a 5% eligible vertical interest in each class of
securities to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to
satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. These loans were originated and previously serviced by
various entities through purchases in the secondary market. As of
the Cut-Off Date, the loans are serviced by Resurgent doing
business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (68.9%) and Fay
Servicing, LLC (31.1%).

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M2 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strength in that the underlying
assets have generally performed well through the crisis.
Additionally, a satisfactory third-party due diligence review was
performed on the portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance,
payment history, data capture as well as title and lien review.
Updated broker price opinions or exterior appraisals were provided
for 100.0% of the pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed
on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
provider (CVI CVF II Lux Master S.à.r.l.), certain knowledge
qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS
criteria for seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1)
significant loan seasoning and relative clean performance history
in recent years, (2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including a
delinquency review trigger and a breach reserve account.

The DBRS ratings of AAA(sf) and AA(sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.




MLFA 2007-CANADA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes in Merrill Lynch Financial
Assets Inc. (MLFA) Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-Canada 22 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of Classes C and D were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from paydowns and loan
amortization. The deal has paid down 58% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class XC, was affirmed because of the
credit performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF) of
its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.3% of the
current balance, compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of MLFA 2007-Canada 22.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of seven, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 13, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 79% to $92.5 million
from $434.4 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 56% of the pool. Seven loans, constituting
42% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Twelve loans, constituting 58% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.2 million (for a loss severity of
43.5%).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 9.5% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $1.8 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2015 operating results for
83% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 85% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14.2% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.27X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 32.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Station Park London Loan ($13.5 million --
14.6% of the pool), which is secured by four office buildings and a
retail property located in the CBD of London, Ontario and are part
of a mixed-use development. The property was 73% occupied as of the
January 2017 rent roll. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and
0.86X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.84X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Yorkgate Mall Loan ($10.0 million --
10.9% of the pool), which represents a pari passu portion of a
$20.1 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 217,000 SF
enclosed shopping mall located in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. The
property is grocery anchored and was built in 1990. The property's
largest tenant, Designer Depot, went bankrupt in 2016, but the
space has been partially re-leased to Planet Fitness. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.33X, respectively, compared to 72%
and 1.32X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Hotel Gouverneur Pooled Pari Passu
Interest Loan ($6.4 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which represents
a pari passu portion of a $18.4 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 352 key hotel located in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The
most-recent financial information from December 2015 lists the
property as having had an occupancy rate of 71%. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.47X, respectively, compared to 96% and
1.30X at the last review.



MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: S&P Cuts Rating on 6 Tranches to D
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2007-HQ11, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class A-J certificates from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction's structure, the liquidity available to the
trust, and its criteria to assess interest shortfalls on the
affected tranches.

The downgrades on classes B, C, D, E, F, and G to 'D (sf)' reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls that we expect to remain
outstanding in the near term as well as credit support erosion that
we anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of the 14
specially serviced assets (including one loan on the master
servicer's watchlist that was transferred to special servicing
subsequent to the February 2017 remittance report, $282.9 million,
88.4%).  Classes B, C, D, and E have accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for six consecutive months, while classes F
and G have been outstanding for eight consecutive months.

According to the Feb. 14, 2017, trustee remittance (revised on Feb.
21, 2017), the current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $886,548
and resulted primarily from:

   -- Nonrecoverable interest amounts totaling $703,888;

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $103,707; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $59,643.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class B.

The affirmation on class A-J reflects S&P's expectation that the
available credit enhancement for this class will be within S&P's
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating and S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest positive rating
movement on class A-J, S&P's analysis also considered the
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the 14 specially
serviced assets.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 14, 2017, trustee remittance report (revised on Feb.
21, 2017), the collateral pool balance was $320.0 million, which is
13.2% of the pool balance at issuance.  The pool currently includes
18 loans (reflecting the A/B note as one) and two real estate-owned
assets, down from 171 loans at issuance.

Thirteen of these assets ($278.5 million, 87.0%) were with the
special servicer, no loans were defeased, and seven loans
(reflecting the A/B note as one, $41.5 million, 13.0%) were on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported year-end 2015, partial-year 2016,
or year-end 2016 financial information for 43.6% of the loans in
the pool.

S&P calculated a 1.12x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and an 89.9% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.73% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the specially serviced
assets, two watchlist loans ($15.9 million, 5.0%), which the master
servicer indicated had paid off subsequent to the February 2017
remittance report, and one subordinate B hope note ($1.0 million,
0.3%).

To date, the transaction has experienced $97.4 million in principal
losses, or 4.0% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 10.6% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
14 specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the February 2017 trustee remittance report, 13 assets in the
pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  In addition, the master servicer informed S&P that the
Country Brook Village loan ($4.4 million, 1.4%) was transferred to
the special servicer subsequent to the February 2017 trustee
remittance report because of environmental issues that are being
addressed at the property.  Details of the two largest specially
serviced assets, both of which are top 10 assets, are:

The Galleria at Pittsburgh Mills loan ($133.0 million, 41.6%) is
the largest asset in the pool and has a total reported exposure of
$133.6 million.  The loan is secured by 887,007 sq. ft. of retail
space in a 1,065,666-sq.-ft. regional mall in Tarentum, Pa.  The
loan was previously modified in 2011 but was transferred back to
the special servicer on Feb. 13, 2015, as a result of the sponsor's
request for an additional modification.  C-III is evaluating its
options after securing the property at a foreclosure sale in
January 2017.  No updated financial data was available for this
property.  This loan has been deemed non recoverable by the master
servicer, and S&P expects a significant loss upon its eventual
resolution.

The 950 L'Enfant Plaza loan ($90.0 million, 28.1%) has a total
reported exposure of $90.9 million.  The loan is secured by a
272,006-sq.-ft. office building in Washington, D.C.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on March 24, 2016, because of
imminent default.  The borrower failed to pay the maturity balance
due on Dec. 8, 2016. C-III indicated that negotiations with the
borrower are ongoing.  The reported DSC and occupancy for the three
months ended March 31, 2016, were 1.08x and 87.9%, respectively.
S&P expects a minimal loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The 12 remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent 6.1% or less of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 14 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 56.2%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ11
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To           From
A-J               61751NAH5              B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
B                 61751NAJ1              D (sf)       B (sf)
C                 61751NAK8              D (sf)       B (sf)
D                 61751NAL6              D (sf)       B- (sf)
E                 61751NAM4              D (sf)       B- (sf)
F                 61751NAN2              D (sf)       B- (sf)
G                 61751NAQ5              D (sf)       CCC (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Cl. C Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP25 (the Certificates)
issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Series 2007-TOP25 as
follows:

-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B at B (sf)
-- Class C at CCC (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Class C, which has a
rating that does not carry a trend.

The rating confirmations reflect the current overall performance of
the transaction. As of the February 2017 remittance, the trust has
a current balance of $134.9 million with 14 of the original 204
loans remaining in the pool. To date, there has been collateral
reduction of 91.3% since issuance. Since the transaction was placed
Under Review with Developing Implications in December 2016, 17
loans have successfully repaid. The six loans that failed to repay
at their respective loan maturities are now in special servicing.
The remaining eight loans mature in 2021 and 2026 and are reporting
a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.08
times and a WA debt yield of 16.4%, based on the most recently
reported financials. Given the paydown, the pool is concentrated by
loan size, with the three largest loans representing 73.8% of the
total pool balance. Additionally, there is also significant
property type concentration, with ten loans representing 87.0% of
the pool secured by retail assets.

As of the February 2017 remittance report, there are six loans,
representing 75.3% of the pool balance, in special servicing for
maturity default, with initial respective loan maturity dates
occurring between September 2016 and January 2017, including the
largest loan in the pool (Prospectus ID#3, Shoppes at Park Place;
52.6% of the pool balance). Given the recent transfer dates,
workout strategies are still being determined, and updated
appraisals have been ordered but not yet finalized; at this time,
DBRS anticipates that the cumulative losses that will be realized
at the loans’ resolutions will be contained to the unrated Class
D bond. Additionally, there are two loans representing 5.9% of the
pool balance on the servicer’s watchlist for credit-related
concerns.

The rating assigned to Class B materially deviates from the lower
rating implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
uncertain loan-level event risk associated with the resolution of
the loans in special servicing.


MOTEL 6 2015-MTL6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 11 rated classes of the Motel 6
Trust 2015-MTL6 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Performance As Expected: The affirmations and Stable Outlooks
reflect the stable-to-improving performance of the portfolio since
issuance. The net cash flow (NCF) increased based on the conclusion
of the capital improvement phase and institution of a rebranding
strategy. The Fitch adjusted NCF has increased 11% since issuance.
Additionally, the brand's cashflow on actual basis has increased
substantially as Blackstone continued to increase the operating
income through franchise segment.

The total mortgage loan is secured by a first priority, mortgage
loan consisting of a $90 million portion that enabled the sponsor
to voluntary prepay through December 2016 and a $1.71 billion, five
year fixed interest-only component. Additionally, the portfolio was
encumbered with an additional $200 million in mezzanine financing.
The borrower did not fully prepay the $90 million portion.

Property Releases: 26 properties were released at a 10% premium
which resulted in a 1% paydown to trust, and the paydown of
approximately $20 million to class A-1. As of the March 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate certificate balance was
$1.78 billion compared with $1.8 billion at issuance.

Single-Borrower Hotel Concentration: The transaction is primarily
secured by 481 of the original 507 owned economy hotels under the
Motel 6 and Studio 6 brands. Hotel performance is considered to be
more volatile due to their operating nature.

Geographic Diversity: The portfolio exhibits strong geographic
diversity across 47 states and one Canadian province. The largest
state exposure is California, with 138 hotels representing 27.2% by
number of properties.

Experienced Ownership and Management: Blackstone, and its various
real estate funds, is one of the largest hotel owners across a
broad spectrum of hotel categories and brands. Current and past
lodging investments include Hilton Hotels Corp., La Quinta, LXR
Hospitality and Extended Stay America. Fitch considers Blackstone's
operational expertise as a strength of this transaction.

Texas Concentration: Fitch is concerned about the impact that
recent pricing volatility may have on the overall economic
performance in markets with a high exposure to the oil and gas
industry. Sixty-four properties, approximately 13% of the portfolio
by property count, are located in Texas (11.7% by allocated loan
amount). Fitch applied an additional credit loss due to the
portfolio's exposure to potential performance volatility within
this region.

Ground Lease Structure: 57 properties, 8.8% of the allocated loan
amount, are leasehold interests. Many of the ground leases do not
contain finance ability and protective measures typically found in
ground leases, along with four ground leases maturing in the near
term. Cash flow pledges have been provided by 14 ground leases that
do not permit assignment of the ground lease to the borrower and/or
a leasehold mortgage without the consent of the ground lessor.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch used conservative cash flow assumptions on the portfolio to
ensure that revenues and incomes are sustainable over the long
term. Fitch applied an additional credit loss to cash flows from
properties located in Texas due to the potential performance
volatility within this region. The Rating Outlook for all classes
remains Stable. Upgrades may be limited due to the volatility of
hotel performance over the long term, but may occur with sustained
improved performance and additional paydown. Downgrades are
possible with significant performance decline.

Fitch affirms the following ratings:

-- $69.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60 million class A-2A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $436.8 million class A-2A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69.7 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.710 billion class X-CP at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.710 billion class X-NCP at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $310.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $140.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $212 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $350 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-1 (the Notes) issued by New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-1 (the Trust):

-- $635.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B1-IO at AA (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $15.9 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $14.8 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

In addition, DBRS has assigned new ratings to the following Notes
issued by the Trust:

-- $635.2 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A-1B at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A-1C at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A1-IOA at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A1-IOB at AAA (sf)
-- $635.2 million Class A1-IOC at AAA (sf)
-- $661.4 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B-1B at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B-1C at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)
-- $26.1 million Class B1-IOC at AA (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B-2B at A (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B-2C at A (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B2-IOA at A (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B2-IOB at A (sf)
-- $23.1 million Class B2-IOC at A (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)
-- $18.9 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)
-- $15.9 million Class B-4A at BB (sf)
-- $15.9 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)
-- $14.8 million Class B-5A at B (sf)
-- $14.8 million Class B5-IOA at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, B1-IO, B1-IOA, B1-IOB,
B1-IOC, B2-IO, B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B3-IOC,
B4-IOA and B5-IOA are interest-only notes. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, A-2, A, B-1A,
B-1B, B-1C, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B1-IOC, B-2A, B-2B, B-2C, B2-IOA,
B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B-3A, B-3B, B-3C, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B3-IOC, B-4A,
B4-IOA, B-5A and B5-IOA are exchangeable notes. These classes can
be exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable notes as
specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 16.05% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 12.60%,
9.55%, 7.05%, 4.95% and 3.00% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other class in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 6,544 loans with a total principal balance of
$756,694,458 as of the Cut-Off Date (February 1, 2017).

The loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted-average age of
161 months. As of the Cut-Off Date, 94.0% of the pool is current,
5.0% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association
(MBA) delinquency method and 1.0% is in bankruptcy (all bankruptcy
loans are performing or 30 days delinquent). Approximately 76.5%
and 83.8% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days
delinquent for the past 24 months and 12 months, respectively,
under the MBA delinquency method. Modified loans constitute 25.1%
of the portfolio. The modifications happened more than two years
ago for 71.1% of the modified loans. Because of the seasoning of
the collateral, none of the loans are subject to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage
rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC (NRZ), will acquire the loans on or
prior to the Closing Date in connection with the termination of
various securitization trusts that had acquired the mortgage loans
from various underlying sellers. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2017-1 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute loans to the
Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp., through a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5.0% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than the residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 61.1% of the pool is serviced by Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC and 38.9% by Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar).
Nationstar will also act as the Master Servicer and the Special
Servicer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates and satisfactory deal performance.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.


Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance and title/lien but was limited with
respect to payment history, data integrity and servicing comments.
Updated Home Data Index and/or broker price opinions were provided
for the pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed on the
majority of updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2017-1: S&P Gives BB- Rating on Cl. E-N Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-T-N, A-R-N,
B-N, C-N, D-N, and E-N replacement notes from NewStar Commercial
Loan Funding 2017-1 LLC (formerly known as NewStar Commercial Loan
Funding 2013-1 LLC), a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2013 that is managed by NewStar Financial Inc.
S&P withdrew its ratings on the original class A-T, A-R, B, C, D,
E, F, and G notes following payment in full on the March 20, 2017,
refinancing date.

On the March 20, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class A-T-N, A-R-N, B-N, C-N, D-N, and E-N replacement note
issuances were used to redeem the original class A-T, A-R, B, C, D,
E, F, and G notes as outlined in the transaction document
provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on the original
notes in line with their full redemption and S&P is assigning
ratings to the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2017-1 LLC
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-T-N                AAA (sf)      207.00
A-R-N                AAA (sf)       25.00
B-N                  AA (sf)        40.00
C-N                  A (sf)         32.00
D-N                  BBB- (sf)      24.00
E-N                  BB- (sf)       20.00
Subordinated notes   NR             49.25

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2017-1 LLC  
                              
Original class            Rating     
                     To           From
A-T                  NR           AAA (sf)
A-R                  NR           AAA (sf)
B                    NR           AA (sf)
C                    NR           A (sf)
D                    NR           BBB (sf)
E                    NR           BBB- (sf)
F                    NR           BB (sf)
G                    NR           B (sf)

NR--Not rated.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XII: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. E-2-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-R, C-R,
D-R, and E-2-R replacement notes from Northwoods Capital XII Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014
that is managed by Angelo, Gordon & Co. L.P.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original class A, B, C, D, and E-2 notes following
payment in full on the March 15, 2017, refinancing date.

On the March 15, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-2-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A, B, C, D, and E-2 notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and S&P assigned ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which included no other substantial changes to the
transaction.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Northwoods Capital XII Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating        Amount (mil $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)              376.20
B-R                       AA (sf)                69.60
C-R                       A (sf)                 52.20
D-R                       BBB (sf)               30.00
E-2-R                     BB (sf)                13.80

RATING AFFIRMED

Northwoods Capital XII Ltd.
Class                     Rating
E-1                       BB (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Northwoods Capital XII Ltd.
                             Rating
Original class            To        From
A                         NR        AAA (sf)
B                         NR        AA (sf)
C                         NR        A (sf)
D                         NR        BBB (sf)
E-2                       NR        BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.



NXT CAPITAL 2017-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to NXT Capital
CLO 2017-1 LLC's $349.350 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by middle-market speculative-grade senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 20,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term loans
      that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The credit
      enhancement provided through the subordination of cash
      flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

NXT Capital CLO 2017-1 LLC

Class                               Rating        Amount
A                                   AAA (sf)      226.70
B                                   AA (sf)        39.70
C (deferrable)                      A (sf)         31.75
D (deferrable)                      BBB- (sf)      24.80
E (deferrable)                      BB (sf)        26.40
Subordinated notes (deferrable)     NR             57.00

NR--Not rated.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 30: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners 30, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$390,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$34,200,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,800,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Octagon 30 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured
loans and first-lien last-out loans. The portfolio is at least 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2793

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2793 to 3212)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2793 to 3631)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners XI, Ltd.:

US$19,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on November 16, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on November 16, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$22,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
(current outstanding balance of $17,425,108.30), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 16, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$31,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on November 16, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners XI, Ltd., issued in July 26, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans, with material exposures to bonds
and CLO securities. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
August 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since November 2016. The Class
A-1A and Class A-1B notes have been fully paid down, by $65.9
million, and the Class A-2 notes have been paid by approximately
20.8% or $4.6 million since then. Based on Moody's calculations,
the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes
are currently 549.96%, 197.90%, 142.13% and 114.87% respectively,
versus November 2016 levels of 189.01%, 139.75%, 120.50% and
107.98%, respectively.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2113)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3169)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $95.3 million, defaulted par of $2.7
million, a weighted average default probability of 12.81% (implying
a WARF of 2641), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
42.85%, a diversity score of 27 and a weighted average spread of
3.53% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


OMI TRUST 2002-C: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
issued from five transactions. The collateral backing these
transactions consists primarily of manufactured housing units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 1998-A

M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to B2
(sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1998-C

A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

A-1 ARM, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1998-D

A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

A-1 ARM, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-C

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact
the performance of these transactions.


PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirm C Rating on 6 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on six classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a currently static cash transaction;
the reinvestment period ended in June 2013. The transaction is
currently backed solely by one defaulted mezzanine interest (100.0%
of the current pool balance). As of the February 27, 2017 trustee
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has decreased to $354.5 million from $1.0 billion
at issuance with the pay-down currently directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes. The pay down is due to regular
amortization, recoveries on defaulted assets, interest proceeds
paid as principal as a result of failing certain par value
triggers.

On the April 25, 2016 payment date, an event of default occurred on
the transaction as a result of a default in the payment of interest
to the senior most outstanding class of notes.

Moody's does expect significant losses to occur on the defaulted
asset once realized and has accounted for this in its analysis. The
asset is currently not paying ongoing interest payments in the
trust.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000, the
same as that at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-C (100.0%, the same as that at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 0.5 years, the same as that at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's did not model a MAC in its analysis as there is only one
asset in the pool. The performance of the asset is directly linked
to the performance of the notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.



PPM GRAYHAWK: Moody's Hikes Class D Debt Rating From Ba1(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by PPM Grayhawk CLO, Ltd.:

US$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$14,450,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $10,388,091.26), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
previously on Nov 17, 2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$64,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding
balance of $346,328.75), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17,
2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding
balance of $1,352,846.68), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17,
2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

U.S. $16,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on Nov 17, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

PPM Grayhawk CLO, Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April
2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since November 2016. The Class
A-1 and Class A-2b notes have been paid down by approximately 95%
or $32.1 million since that time. Based on the trustee's February
2017 report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and
Class D notes are reported at 405.76%, 180.90%, 133.74% and
112.06%, respectively, versus November 2016 levels of 213.24%,
147.93%, 123.80% and 110.44%, respectively.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. However, actual
long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (1964)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2946)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $71.7 million, defaulted par of
$384,366, a weighted average default probability of 12.2% (implying
a WARF of 2455), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
52.1%, a diversity score of 21 and a weighted average spread of
2.89% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.



PREFERRED TERM XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Tranches to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XIV, Ltd:

US$117,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due June 24,
2034, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

US$10,800,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
June 24, 2034, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

US$13,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes Due
June 24, 2034, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$257,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due June 24,
2034 (current balance of $130,153,623), Affirmed Aa1 (sf);
previously on October 6, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$62,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due June 24,
2034, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XIV, Ltd. issued in June 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios, and the resumption of interest
payments of previously deferring assets since March 2016.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 15.5% or $24
million since March 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemptions, sales and distributions of the underlying assets and
the diversion of excess interest proceeds. Based on Moody's
calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class
B notes have improved to 284.2%, 192.5% and 111.1%, respectively,
from March 2016 levels of 228.2%, 163.6% and 99.6%, respectively.
Two previously deferring assets with a total par of $26.75 million
have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. In
additional, Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to four
deferring assets that meet certain criteria, totaling $15 million
in par.

Based on the trustee's June 2016 report, the Class B notes' OC
ratio has improved to 104.2%, above the trigger of 103%, and
therefore excess interest was used to pay $0.9 million of the Class
C notes' deferred interest balance in June 2016. After the Class C
notes' deferred interest balance was reduced to zero, 60% of the
excess interest was diverted to pay down the notes in sequential
order, while the remaining amounts were paid to the income notes.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since March 2016. According to Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) deteriorated to 866 from 589 in March
2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 552)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: +3

Class B-2: +3

Class B-3: +3

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1415)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B-1: -2

Class B-2: -2

Class B-3: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDOROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a
signed free license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $370 million, defaulted/deferring par of $37 million, a weighted
average default probability of 9.16% (implying a WARF of 866), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.


RESOURCE CAPITAL 2014-CRE2: Moody's Hikes Cl. C Debt Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Resource Capital Corp. 2014-CRE2, Ltd.:

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of two classes of notes because of
greater than expected amortization resulting from prepayment on
high credit risk collateral, while the credit quality of the
collateral pool has been improving as evidenced by the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) and the weighted average recovery rate
(WARR). Moody's has also affirmed the rating of one class because
key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Resource Capital Corp. 2014-CRE2, Ltd. is a static cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of whole loans and pari-passu participations
collateralized by property types; primarily: i) multifamily (41.7%
of the collateral pool balance; ii) retail (23.0%); iii) office
(16.5%); iv) hospitality (10.6%); and v) mixed-use (8.2%). As of
February 17, 2017 payment date, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $218.5
million, from $353.9 million at issuance, as a result of pay-downs
from prepayments of the underlying collateral. The transaction,
while currently static, it has a mechanism that provides for a
pari-passu acquisition of funded companion loan positions of
existing assets arising from future funding. However. this
companion note acquisition period ended in July 2016.

No assets are listed as defaulted as of February 17, 2017 payment
date.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: WARF, the weighted average
life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's
typically models these as actual parameters for static deals and as
covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3926,
compared to 4094 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is: B1-B3 and 66.0% compared to 51.2% at last review,
Caa1-Ca/C and 34.0% compared to 48.8% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 3.3 years at last
review The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral loan exposures.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 55.5%, compared to 54.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 48.9%, compared to 40.4% at last review.
The increase in MAC is due to a decrease in the number of
collateral obligors since last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other key parameters static, reducing the
recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by -10.0% would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to
eleven notches downward (e.g. one notch down implies a rating
movement from Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of
the collateral pool by +10.0% would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of zero notch upward (e.g., one
notch upward implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SACO I 2005-GP1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class A-1 Debt to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of Class A-1 and
Class A-2 from SACO I Trust 2005-GP1, a transaction backed by
second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-GP1

Cl. A-1, Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul
31, 2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp. (Affirmed at A3,
Outlook Stable on August 8, 2016)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are the result of an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds, coupled with lowered loss
expectations on the pool. The actions also reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pool and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



SHELLPOINT CO-ORIGINATOR: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Debt '(P)Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 53
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2017-1 (SCOT 2017-1). The ratings
range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Ba2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by one pool of prime quality, 30 year
and 15 year fixed and adjustable rate, first-lien mortgage loans
originated by various originators. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing is
the primary servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the master servicer
and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, d/b/a Christiana Trust is
the trustee.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2017-1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.45%
in a base scenario and reaches 5.70% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SCOT 2017-1 transaction is a securitization of 392 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$280,375,649. The loans in this transaction have strong borrower
characteristics with a weighted average original FICO score of 768
and a weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
of 68.1%. In addition, 28.8% of the borrowers are self-employed and
refinance loans comprise 54.1% of the aggregate pool. The pool has
a high geographic concentration with 44.0% of the aggregate pool
located in California and 12.4% located in the Los Angeles-Long
Beach-Anaheim MSA.

Out of the total 392 loans in this transaction, 6 loans (1.29% of
stated principal balance) were originated or acquired by New Penn
Financial, LLC ("New Penn"). The remaining 386 loans (98.71% of
stated principal balance) were aggregated by Bank of America
National Association (BANA) through its jumbo whole loan purchase
program. There are 15 originators in the transaction. The largest
originators in the pool with more than 5% by balance are QUICKEN
LOANS INC. (31.2%), Stonegate Mortgage Corporation (15.0%), Guild
Mortgage Company (10.5%), JMAC Lending Inc., (10.31%), Caliber
Homes Inc., (5.86%), and PrimeLending (5.78%).

Moody's reviewed the underwriting guidelines of BANA's jumbo whole
loan purchase program. All the loans aggregated by BANA were
underwritten to BANA's guidelines except for Quicken and Caliber.
In addition, Moody's also reviewed the prime jumbo underwriting
guidelines of Quicken. However, given that Moody's has limited
performance information on the majority of the originators, Moody's
increased Moody's base case and Aaa loss expectations for the loans
aggregated by BANA with the exception of PrimeLending and Caliber
Home Loans Inc. both of which Moody's has assessed as stronger than
their peers. Moody's also assessed New Penn Financial LLC as an
above average originator of prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.

All of the mortgage loans in SCOT 2017-1 will be serviced by
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (SMS). Moody's assessment of SMS as
an above average primary servicer of residential mortgage loans
reflects Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing's above average collection
abilities, average loss mitigation results, above average
foreclosure and REO timeline management, above average loan
administration and below average servicing stability. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. will serve as the master servicer.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Three third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data integrity and
regulatory reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR results
indicate that the majority of reviewed loans were in compliance
with originators' underwriting guidelines, no material compliance
or data issues, and no appraisal defects.

New Penn and each originator of a loan acquired by Bank of America
and New Penn will provide comprehensive loan level R&W for their
respective loans. For Bank of America aggregated loans, the bank
will assign each originator's R&W to New Penn, who will assign to
the depositor, which will assign to the trust. To mitigate the
potential concerns regarding Bank of America originators' ability
to meet their respective R&W obligations, New Penn will backstop
the R&Ws for all originators' loans acquired by the bank as well as
originators' loans acquired by New Penn. New Penn's obligation to
backstop third party R&Ws will terminate 5 years after the closing
date. While Moody's acknowledge New Penn's relatively weak
financial strength, the collateral pool benefits from the diversity
of the originators that sourced the loans. In addition, Shellpoint
Partners LLC will act as guarantor for New Penn in the event that
New Penn has insufficient funds to fulfill its repurchase
obligation. Moody's note that Shellpoint Partners' financial
strength is also weak.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB,
d/b/a Christiana Trust. The custodian and securities administrator
functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In addition,
Wells Fargo is the master servicer and is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. As master servicer, Wells Fargo is also
committed to act as successor if no other successor servicer can be
found. Moody's assess Wells Fargo as a strong master servicer of
residential loans.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction has a shifting interest structure that allows
subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under certain
defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure allows
subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks,
senior bonds are exposed to increased performance volatility, known
as tail risk. The transaction provides for a senior subordination
floor of 1.90% of the cut-off pool balance, which mitigates tail
risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement
over time. Additionally there is a subordination lock-out amount
which is 1.30% of the cut-off pool balance.

Transaction Structure

The transaction is structured as a one pool shifting interest
structure in which the senior bonds benefit from a senior floor and
a subordination floor. Funds collected, including principal, are
first used to make interest payments to the senior bonds. Next
principal payments are made to the senior bonds and then interest
and principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in
sequential order, subject to the subordinate class percentage of
the subordinate principal distribution amounts.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next realized losses
are allocated to the super senior bonds until their principal
balances are written off.

As in all transactions with shifting-interest structures, the
senior bonds benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all
prepayments to the senior bonds for a specified period of time, and
allocates increasing amounts of prepayments to the subordinate
bonds thereafter only if loan performance satisfies both
delinquency and loss tests

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS," published on February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-IO1, Cl. A-IO2,
Cl. A-IO3, Cl. A-IO4, Cl. A-IO5, Cl. A-IO6, Cl. A-IO7, Cl. A-IO8,
Cl. A-IO9, Cl. A-IO10, Cl. A-IO11, Cl. A-IO12, Cl. A-IO13, Cl.
A-IO14, Cl. A-IO15, Cl. A-IO16, Cl. A-IO17, Cl. A-IO18, Cl. A-IO19,
Cl. A-IO20, Cl. A-IO21, Cl. A-IO22, Cl. A-IO23, Cl. A-IO24, Cl.
A-IO25, was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.


SLM PRIVATE 2003-A: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Debt to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded 19 classes and downgraded two
classes from nine private student loan securitizations sponsored,
administered and serviced by Navient Solutions, Inc. The
securitizations are backed by private (i.e. not
government-guaranteed) student loans.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2002-A

Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Confirmed
at Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-A

Class B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-B

Class B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-A

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-B

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-A

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-B

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-C

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2016 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Issuer: SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2007-A

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. C-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The primary rationale for the upgrades is the improved performance
of the underlying collateral pools with the ratios of total assets
to total liabilities (total parity levels) increasing for most of
the transactions over the 12-month period ending in December 2016.
In addition, the top-pay senior classes are benefiting from rapid
deleveraging.

The downgrades are a result of the continuous deterioration in the
total parity levels. The 2003-A, and 2003-B transactions suffer
from high funding costs, because they are partially funded with
auction rate securities. The high funding cost of auction-rate
securities that are currently in the failed auction mode erode
excess spread and expose the subordinated classes of notes in these
transactions to a significant default risk.

Moody's expected lifetime defaults as a percentage of original pool
balance are approximately 14.0%, 16.5%, 18.5%, 26.0%, 23.0%,
24.25%, 26.75%, 29.5% and 29.5% for the 2002-A, 2003-A, 2003-B,
2005-A, 2005-B, 2006-A, 2006-B, 2006-C and 2007-A trusts,
respectively.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities"
published in January 2010.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the ratings up are a decrease in
defaults rates, higher recoveries on defaulted loans and/or lower
net losses on the underlying assets than Moody's expects.

Down

Among the factors that could drive the ratings down are an increase
in defaults rates, lower recoveries on defaulted loans and/or
higher net losses on the underlying assets than Moody's expects.


SLM STUDENT 2008-4: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2008-4:

-- Class A-4 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed
    from Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AA+sf'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The class A-4 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
off the notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. Fitch's current U.S. sovereign rating is 'AAA'
with a Stable Outlook.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
13.5% and a 40.5% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 13.5% implies a
constant default rate of 3.9% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.49 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% for the base case and 3% for the 'AAA' case.

The trailing 12 month average of deferment, forbearance,
income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) and constant
prepayment rate (voluntary and involuntary) are 9.8%, 16.6%, 16.2%
and 13.7% respectively, which are used as the starting point in
cash flow modeling. Subsequent declines or increases are modeled as
per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.07% based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread, overcollateralization and, for the class A notes,
subordination provided by the class B notes. As of December 2016,
total and senior parity ratios (excluding the reserve account, as
pool factor is below 40%) are 102.55% and 114.68%, respectively.
Cash is being released from the trust given it has reached is
release level of 102.55%.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve
account equal to the greater of 0.25% of the pool balance and
$999,985, currently sized at the floor.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions, Inc. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP student loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS
Eligible Investments: Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for
Structured Finance and Covered Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch
looks to its own ratings in analyzing counterparty risk and
assessing a counterparty's creditworthiness. The definition of
permitted investments for this deal allows for the possibility of
using investments not rated by Fitch, which represents a criteria
variation. Since the available funds can only be invested for a
short duration given the payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does
not believe such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings
assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by U.S. Department of Education. Sovereign risks are not
addressed in Fitch's sensitivity analysis.


Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.



SLM STUDENT 2008-5: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2008-5:

-- Class A-4 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed
    from Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The class A-4 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
off the notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. Fitch's current U.S. sovereign rating is 'AAA'
with a Stable Outlook.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
14% and a 42% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress scenario.
The base case default assumption of 14% implies a constant default
rate of 4.0% (assuming a weighted average life of 3.44 years)
consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average constant
default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch applies the
standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is assumed to
be 0.50% for the base case and 3.0% for the 'AAAsf' case.

The trailing 12month average of deferment, forbearance,
income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) and constant
prepayment rate (voluntary and involuntary) are 10.2%, 16.3%, 16.9%
and 13.3%, respectively, which are used as the starting point in
cash flow modeling. Subsequent declines or increases are modeled as
per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.05% based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread, overcollateralization and, for the class A notes,
subordination provided by the class B notes. As of December 2016,
total and senior parity ratios (excluding the reserve account, as
pool factor is below 40%) are 103.79% and 113.32%, respectively.
Cash is being released from the trust given it has reached its
release level of 103.79%.

Liquidity Support: : Liquidity support is provided by a reserve
account equal to the greater of 0.25% of the pool balance and
$4,124,895, currently sized at the floor.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions, Inc. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP student loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS
Eligible Investments: Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for
Structured Finance and Covered Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch
looks to its own ratings in analyzing counterparty risk and
assessing a counterparty's creditworthiness. The definition of
permitted investments for this deal allows for the possibility of
using investments not rated by Fitch, which represents a criteria
variation. Since the available funds can only be invested for a
short duration given the payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does
not believe such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings
assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by the U.S. Department of Education. Sovereign risks are
not addressed in Fitch's sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'Bsf'; class B 'Bsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.



SLM STUDENT 2008-6: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B Debt to 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2008-6 (SLM 2008-6):

-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; removed from Rating Watch
    Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class A-4 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'Asf'; removed from Rating
    Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The class A-4 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
off the notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
14.75% and a 44.25% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 14.75% implies a
constant default rate of 4.3% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.4 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 10.2%, 16.0%, 17.4% and 12.9%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.04%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization, excess spread and, for the class A notes,
subordination. As of January 2017 distribution date, total and
senior effective parity ratios (which includes the reserve account)
are, respectively, 101.29% (1.27% CE) and 110.76% (9.71% CE).
Liquidity support is provided by a reserve account sized at the
greater of 0.25% of the pool balance, and $2,000,000, currently
equal to $2,000,000. The transaction will continue to release cash
as long as the target parity ratio of 101.01% (excluding the
reserve, as pool factor is below 40%) is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model indicates
that the class A-4 notes do not pay off before their maturity date
in all of Fitch's modelling scenarios, including the base cases. If
the breach of the class A maturity date triggers an event of
default, interest payments will be diverted away from the class B
notes, causing them to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Since the only
available funds to invest are those held in the Collection Account,
and the funds can only be invested for a short duration given the
payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.


SLM STUDENT 2013-4: Fitch Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches From Bsf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the ratings on the following classes of
SLM Student Loan Trust 2013-4 (SLM 2013-4):

-- Class A to 'AAAsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

On March 13, 2017, the legal final maturity date of the SLM 2013-4
class A and B notes were extended to June 2043 and December 2070
respectively. This effectively mitigates the maturity risk in
Fitch's cash flow modelling, resulting in the upgrade. Because the
class A notes no longer experiences technical defaults in
modelling, which would have otherwise diverted interest away from
the subordinate notes, the class B notes now pass BBB maturity cash
flow stresses. Excluding the $150,000 per annum contingent
Indenture Trustee fee in the cash flow modelling, the class B notes
would be eligible for an upgrade to 'AA'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
10.25% and a 30.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 10.25% implies a
constant default rate of 3.0% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.4 years) consistent with the trailing-12- month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, Income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 9.5%, 15.4%, 17.7% and 13.8%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.11%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization, excess spread and, for the class A notes,
subordination. As of January 2017 distribution date, total and
senior effective parity ratios (which includes the reserve account)
are, respectively, 101.01% (1.00% CE) and 105.86% (5.54% CE).
Liquidity support is provided by a reserve account sized at the
greater of 0.25% of the pool balance, and $748,897, currently equal
to $1,132,673.78. The trust will continue to release cash as long
as the target overcollateralization amount of the greater of 1.00%
of adjusted pool balance or $1,000,000 is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's Student Loan ABS (SLABS) cash flow model
indicates that the notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal
final maturity dates under the commensurate rating scenario.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Since the only
available funds to invest are those held in the Collection Account,
and the funds can only be invested for a short duration given the
payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBsf'

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.


SYMPHONY CLO XV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Debt to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
note issued by Symphony CLO XV, Ltd.:

Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on November 17, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following note:

Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on November 17, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Symphony CLO XV, Ltd., issued in November 2014, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
October 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of the recent
refinancing of the Class A, Class B-1, Class B-2, Class C and Class
D notes on March 13, 2017, which increases excess spread available
as credit enhancement to the rated notes. In addition, Moody's
expects that the deal will benefit from a higher weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) level compared to its covenant level.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $12.8 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2371)

Class E: +2

Class F: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3557)

Class E: -1

Class F: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $597.6 million, defaulted par of $5.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 24.86% (implying
a WARF of 2964), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.00%, a diversity score of 62 and a weighted average spread of
3.67% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


THL CREDIT 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by THL Credit Wind River 2017-1 CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$390,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

THL 2017-1 CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing date.

THL Credit Advisors LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2870

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.1 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2870 to 3301)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2870 to 3731)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


TOWD POINT 2015-1: DBRS Assigns BB(low) Ratings on 6 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned the following ratings to the Asset Backed
Notes, Series 2015-1 (the Notes) issued by Towd Point Mortgage
Trust 2015-1 (the Trust):

-- $133.3 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $34.6 million Class A2 at AAA (sf)
-- $23.2 million Class A3 at AA (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class A4 at A (sf)
-- $23.0 million Class A5 at BBB (sf)
-- $21.8 million Class A6 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $133.3 million Class AES at AAA (sf)
-- $133.3 million Class AESX at AAA (sf)
-- $167.9 million Class AE at AAA (sf)
-- $167.9 million Class AEX at AAA (sf)
-- $167.9 million Class AE1 at AAA (sf)
-- $191.1 million Class AE2 at AA (sf)
-- $57.8 million Class AE3 at AA (sf)
-- $216.4 million Class AE4 at A (sf)
-- $83.1 million Class AE5 at A (sf)
-- $48.5 million Class AE6 at A (sf)
-- $239.4 million Class AE7 at BBB (sf)
-- $106.1 million Class AE8 at BBB (sf)
-- $71.4 million Class AE9 at BBB (sf)
-- $48.3 million Class AE10 at BBB (sf)
-- $127.8 million Class AE11 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $93.2 million Class AE12 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $70.0 million Class AE13 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $44.7 million Class AE14 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $261.1 million Class A at BB (low) (sf)

Class AESX and Class AEX are interest-only notes. The class
balances represent notional amounts.

Classes AES, AESX, AE, AEX, AE1, AE2, AE3, AE4, AE5, AE6, AE7, AE8,
AE9, AE10, AE11, AE12, AE13, AE14 and Class A are exchangeable
notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of exchange
notes as specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 47.39% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (low) (sf) ratings reflect 40.14%,
32.20%, 25.01% and 18.19% of credit enhancement, respectively.
Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a previously issued securitization closed in
January 2015, consisting of a portfolio of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgages.

Certain entities affiliated with Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
acquired the loans, which were originated and previously serviced
by various entities through purchases in the secondary market. The
loans are serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

There is no advancing of delinquent principal or interest on any
mortgages by the servicer; however, the servicer is obligated to
make advances in respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs
and expenses incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of
properties.

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, as the Asset Manager, has the option to
sell certain non-performing loans or real-estate owned (REO)
properties to unaffiliated third parties. The asset sale price has
to equal a minimum reserve amount to maximize liquidation proceeds
of such loans or properties. The minimum reserve amount equals the
product of 63.7% and the then-current principal amount of the
mortgage loans or REO properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class A3 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
well-performing underlying assets, a strong servicer and Asset
Manager oversight. Additionally, a satisfactory third-party due
diligence review was performed on the portfolio with respect to
regulatory compliance, payment history and data capture as well as
title and tax review. Servicing comments were also reviewed for
majority of the loans. Updated broker price opinions or exterior
appraisals were provided for 100% of the pool.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider, certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer
mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for
seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan
seasoning and relative clean performance history in recent years,
(2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a strong
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including
delinquency review trigger and breach reserve accounts.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings address the timely payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Notes.


TRAPEZA CDO XI: Moody's Hikes Class B Secured Notes Rating to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd.:

US$281,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2041 (current balance of $136,054,893), Upgraded to
A1 (sf); previously on February 8, 2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

US$53,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2041, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on February 8,
2016 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2041, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on February 8,
2016 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2041 (current balance including deferred interest of
$26,657,764), Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2015
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd, issued on November 8, 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank,
insurance, REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS) and corporate
securities.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios (OC), the improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since March 2016 and the
correction of prior errors.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 14% or $22.2
million since March 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class A-3 and Class B notes have improved
to 202.5%, 145.7%; 131.8% and 116.9%, respectively, from March 2016
levels of 183.3%, 137.3%, 125.4% and 112.5%, respectively. The
Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 2077 from 2247 in
March 2016. The total par amount that Moody's treated as having
defaulted declined to $63.0 million from $100.4 million in March
2016. Additionally, three assets with a total par of $14.5 million
have redeemed at par since March 2016.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of two prior errors.
In previous rating actions, the amortization profile of REIT assets
was not modeled correctly, resulting in an early amortization of
the REIT assets and thus an underestimation of interest proceeds
available to the notes. In addition, the recovery rate upon default
on a corporate asset was not modeled correctly, resulting in an
underestimation of weighted average recovery rate upon default of
the portfolio. These errors have been corrected, and today's
actions reflect the correct modeling of the amortization profile of
the REIT assets and recovery rate upon default of the corporate
asset.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1276)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class A-3: +3

Class B: +3

Class C: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 2478)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par of $275.5 million,
defaulted par of $63.0 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24.78% (implying a WARF of 2077), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 10.54%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks, insurance companies and REIT
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by
Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on
the latest FDIC financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its
Insurance team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying
insurance firms' annual statutory financial reports. For REIT TruPS
that do not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their
credit quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.


TRUPS FINANCIALS 2017-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 Rating to Cl. B Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to three
classes of notes to be issued by TruPS Financials Note
Securitization 2017-1 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$212,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2039 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed-Floating Rate Notes
due 2039 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2039 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes and the Class B Notes are
referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

TFINS 2017-1 is a static cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO). The issued notes will be collateralized primarily by a
portfolio of (1) trust preferred securities ("TruPS"), senior notes
and subordinated debt issued by US community banks and their
holding companies and (2) TruPS and surplus notes issued by
insurance companies and their holding companies. Moody's expects
the portfolio to be 100% ramped as of the closing date.

EJF CDO Manager LLC (the "Manager"), an affiliate of EJF Capital
LLC, will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the
assets on behalf of the Issuer. The Manager will direct the
disposition of any defaulted securities or credit risk securities.
The transaction prohibits any asset purchases or substitutions at
any time.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
preferred shares.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority. The transaction also includes an
interest diversion feature whereby 40% of the interest at a junior
step in the priority of interest payments is used to pay principal
on the Class A Notes during the first eight years of the
transaction and 55% of the interest is used thereafter for the same
purpose until the Class A Notes' principal has been paid in full.

The portfolio of this CDO consists of (1) TruPS, senior notes and
subordinated debt issued by 49 US community banks and (2) TruPS and
surplus notes issued by 11 insurance companies, the majority of
which Moody's does not rate publicly. Moody's assesses the default
probability of bank obligors that do not have public ratings
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™, an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics. Moody's evaluation of the
credit risk of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q3-2016
financial data. Moody's assesses the default probability of
insurance company obligors that do not have public ratings through
credit assessments provided by its insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance companies' annual
statutory financial reports. Moody's assumes a fixed recovery rate
of 10% for both the bank and insurance obligations.

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes also took into account the
concentrated nature of the portfolio. There are 11 issuers that
each make up between 2.8% and 3.0% of the portfolio par. Moody's
ran a stress scenario in which Moody's assumed a two-notch
downgrade for up to 30% of the portfolio par. This stress scenario
was an important factor in the assigned ratings.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $360,203,000

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 759

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.09%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.13%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 10.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 16.0 years.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors were part of the rating committee
consideration. Moody's considers the structural protections in the
transaction, the risk of an event of default, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transaction, influenced the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: The transaction's performance could
be negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in
the general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector and the US P&C insurance sector, and a negative outlook on
the US life insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds due to
redemptions will occur and at what pace. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations could have an impact on
the notes' ratings.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The portfolio consists
primarily of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
assessments. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's obtained a loss distribution for this CDO's portfolio by
simulating defaults using Moody's CDOROM(TM), which used Moody's
assumptions for asset correlations and fixed recoveries in a Monte
Carlo simulation framework. Moody's then used the resulting loss
distribution, together with structural features of the CDO, as an
input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash flow model. Moody's CDOROM(TM) is
available on www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions --
Analytical Models, upon receipt of a signed free license
agreement.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of different default
probabilities on the Rated Notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the base
case modeling results, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
rating estimates (WARF of 562)

Class A-1 Notes: +1

Class A-2 Notes: +1

Class B Notes: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade rating estimates (WARF of 1065)

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2


VOYA CLO 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Voya CLO 2017-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$3,100,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class X
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$320,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class
A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Voya CLO 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of underlying assets that are
unsecured loans and second lien loans. Moodys expects the portfolio
to be approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


WELLFLEET CLO 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Wellfleet CLO 2017-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$258,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$47,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Wellfleet CLO 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans (assuming eligible principal
investments are senior secured loans), and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior unsecured loans
and first-lien last out loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Wellfleet Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets and credit improved assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


WELLS FARGO 2004-DD: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. II-A-8 Debt to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches from one transaction, backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans,
issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-DD Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-DD Trust

Cl. II-A-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The
ratings upgraded are due to the improving performance of the
related pool and an increase in credit enhancement available to the
bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C27: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C27 (the
Certificates) issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2015-C27:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-G at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class PEX certificates are exchangeable for the
Classes A-S, B and C certificates (and vice versa).

These rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction. At issuance, the pool consisted of 95 loans secured by
124 commercial and multifamily properties. The pool has since
experienced a collateral reduction of 1.1% as a result of scheduled
amortization, with all of the original 95 loans outstanding.
Approximately 91.1% of the pool reported YE2015 financials, which
reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.71 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 10.0%. Comparatively, the
DBRS issuance WA DSCR and WA debt yield figures for the pool were
1.51x and 8.7%, respectively.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there were seven loans,
representing 8.9% of the pool balance, on the servicer's watchlist
and one loan, representing 0.3% of the pool balance, in special
servicing. The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, WP Carey
Self Storage Portfolio VI (Prospectus ID#2, 4.6% of the pool), was
placed on the watchlist following a fire that occurred at one of
the nine self-storage properties which serve as collateral for the
loan. Insurance proceeds have been received and construction was
anticipated to be completed by January 2017. The other six loans on
the watchlist are being monitored for various issues ranging from
cash flow declines, deferred maintenance and tenant rollover, with
a WA YE2015 DSCR of 1.38x.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted and specially serviced loan, as
well as for the largest 15 loans in the pool, in the DBRS CMBS
IReports platform.  

The ratings assigned to Classes E and F materially deviate from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers
a material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C33 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations follow the overall stable performance of the
underlying loans. There have been no material changes to the pool
since issuance, therefore the original rating analysis was
considered in affirming the transaction. As of the February 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 0.6% to $708 million from $712 million at issuance.
There are three loans (6.8% of the pool) on the servicer's
watchlist.

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 14 loans (5.4% of the pool)
secured by multifamily coops; 12 are in the New York City metro
area, one is in Washington, D.C. and one is in Atlanta, GA. At
issuance, the weighted average Fitch debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) of the co-op collateral in this
transaction as rentals were 6.74x and 26.1%, respectively.

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest concentration by
property type is office (32.5% of the pool), which is greater than
the 2015 average of 23.5%. The pool also has an above average
concentration of self-storage properties that compose 14% of the
pool, higher than the 2015 average of 4%. Loans secured by hotel
properties make up only 12.9% of the pool, which is below the 2015
average of 17%. Office properties have an average likelihood of
default in Fitch's multiborrower model, and self-storage properties
have a below-average likelihood of default, while hotels properties
demonstrate more volatility and have higher default probabilities.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: At issuance Fitch had
assigned an investment grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf' for the
third largest loan in the pool, 225 Liberty Street (5.7%), on a
standalone basis. The loan is currently on the servicer's watchlist
due to reporting low DSCR, but the servicer OSAR reporting did not
take into account rent reserve disbursements which was anticipated
and established at closing for tenants in free rent period through
December 2017. Including rent reserve disbursements, the second
quarter 2016 DSCR would increase to 2.0x, compared to 0.98x as
reported in the OSAR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $26.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $191 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.4 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $547.8* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.3* million class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.6* million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.9* million class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.1* million class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.9 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.1 class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or class X-G certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2017-RB1: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates,
Series 2017-RB1.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $10,516,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,868,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,556,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $203,194,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,840,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,855,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $423,974,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $107,508,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,397,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,256,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,798,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,798,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,385,000ac class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,192,500ac class E-1 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,192,500ac class E-2 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,814,000ac class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,199,000ac class EF 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

-- $3,407,000ac class F-1;
-- $3,407,000ac class F-2;
-- $5,299,000ac class G;
-- $2,649,500ac class G-1;
-- $2,649,500ac class G-2;
-- $26,498,000ac class EFG;
-- $15,899,900ac class H;
-- $7,949,950ac class H-1;
-- $7,949,950ac class H-2;
-- $31,877,784ad RR interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Exchangeable certificates
(d) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing at least
5% of the pool balance (as of the closing date).

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 37 loans secured by 72
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$637,555,685 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Bank PLC, Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, UBS AG and Societe Generale.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 68.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 91.3%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Fitch Leverage: The pool has leverage statistics in line
with recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool's
Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is lower than the YTD 2017 average of 1.24x but
similar to the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of 105%
is in line with both the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 105.4% and
105.2%, respectively.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans compose 57% of the pool,
which is above the respective 2016 and YTD 2017 averages of 54.8%
and 50.5%. The pool's loan concentration index (LCI) is 453, which
is above the 2017 YTD average of 350. For this transaction, the
losses estimated by Fitch's deterministic test at 'AAAsf' exceeded
its base model loss estimate.

Due to the high property quality (65.1% of the top 10 loans
received a property quality grade of 'B+' or higher) and strong
locations (67.3% of the top 10 loans are located in primary
markets), Fitch's concluded loss estimate at 'AAAsf' is 100 basis
points lower than indicated by its deterministic test.

Weak Amortization: 13 loans (52.3%) are full-term interest only and
12 loans (33.1%) are partial interest only. Fitch-rated
transactions at 2017 YTD had an average full-term interest-only
percentage of 46.4% and a partial- interest- only percentage of
26.8%. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will
pay down by only 6.2%, which is below the 2017 YTD average of 7.7%
and significantly below the 2016 average of 10.4%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.7% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the WFCM
2017-RB1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


WELLS FARGO 2017-RC1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-RC1 (the Certificates), issued by Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-RC1.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, D, X-E, E, F and X-F have been privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F balances are notional. DBRS
ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood
of receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.
DBRS considers the IO certificates' positions within the
transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
ratings.

On January 17, 2017, DBRS released a Request for Comment on its
proposed methodology "Rating North American CMBS Interest-Only
Certificates." If this methodology is adopted without changes, DBRS
indicates that potential rating actions could be either downgrades
or confirmations to IO certificates.

Following the initial announcement of the transaction, the Holiday
Inn Beaumont dropped from the pool, reducing the total loan count
to 77 loans from 78 loans. The loan for Holiday Inn Beaumont
previously represented 1.6% of the total transaction balance and
was secured by the fee interest of a 253-key hotel in Beaumont,
Texas.

The collateral consists of 60 fixed-rate loans secured by 77
commercial and multifamily properties, comprising a total
transaction balance of $624,913,732. The transaction has a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the ratings, reflecting the long-term
probability of loan default within the term and its liquidity at
maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, five loans, representing 8.5% of the total pool, had a
DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x),
a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 21 loans, representing 44.5%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x.

Term default risk is low as indicated by the relatively strong
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term DSCR of 1.76x. In addition, 30
loans, representing 55.2% of the pool, have a WA DBRS Term DSCR in
excess of 1.50x. Fifteen loans, representing 7.9% of the pool, are
secured by cooperative properties and are very low-leverage, with
minimal term and refinance default risk Even when excluding the 15
loans secured by cooperative properties contributed by National
Cooperative Bank, N.A. (NCB), the deal exhibits a favorable WA DBRS
Term DSCR of 1.60x. The DBRS Refi DSCR, excluding the 15 NCB loans,
is 1.06x, indicating a higher refinance risk on an overall pool
level. Five loans, representing 14.9% of the pool, have DBRS Refi
DSCRs below 0.90x, including three of the top ten loans and seven
of the top 15 loans. Eleven loans, representing 33.7% of the pool,
including six of the top 15 loans, are structured with IO payments
for the full term. An additional 18 loans, representing 37.4% of
the pool, have partial IO periods, ranging from ten months to 60
months. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by using the amortizing
debt service obligation and the DBRS Refi DSCR is calculated
considering the balloon balance and lack of amortization when
determining refinance risk. DBRS determines the POD based on the
lower of Term or Refi DSCR, so loans that lack amortization will be
treated more punitively.

The pool is concentrated based on loan size, with a concentration
profile equivalent to that of a pool of 22 equal-sized loans. The
largest five and ten loans total 32.8% and 51.6% of the pool,
respectively. Three loans, comprising 19.6% of the transaction
balance, are secured by properties that are either fully or
primarily leased to a single tenant. Loans secured by properties
occupied by single tenants have been found to suffer from higher
loss severities in the event of default. As such, DBRS applied a
higher POD and cash flow volatility to single-tenant properties
with a compared with multi-tenant properties.

The DBRS sample included 28 of the 60 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 33 of the 77 properties in the
portfolio (69.1% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
average sample NCF adjustment for the pool was -8.4% and ranged
from -24.9% to 0.0%. The average DBRS sampled NCF haircut is in
line with recent transactions by DBRS where the average DBRS
sampled haircut has averaged -8.5%.

The ratings assigned to Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F
differ from the higher rating implied by the Large Pool
Multi-borrower Parameters. DBRS considers this difference to be a
material deviation from the methodology and, in this case, the
ratings reflect the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to
occur post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance that could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


WELLS FARGO 2017-RC1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-RC1's $624.9 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2017-RC1.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 60 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $624.9 million ($517.2 million of
offered certificates), secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in 77 properties across 21 states.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the underlying collateral's
economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's
relative diversity, and S&P's overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.

After the preliminary ratings were released, one loan, Holiday Inn
Beaumont, which had a balance of $10.0 million (1.58% of pooled
trust balance), was removed from the transaction.  S&P Global
Ratings re-evaluated the transaction following the removal of this
loan and determined that its ratings on the certificates did not
change from the preliminary ratings for any of the certificates.
However, the removal of this loan has affected the pool composition
and there were some minor, largely de minimis, changes that have
occurred.  Without the Holiday Inn Beaumont loan, the effective
loan count in the transaction decreased to 27.3 from 28.0, which
reflects a lower diversity in the transaction.  The S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value also decreased to 83.0%
from 83.1%.  The S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt service
coverage increased to 2.01x from 2.00x.  Additionally, following
the removal of the Holiday Inn Beaumont loan, the percentage of
loans secured by assets located in tertiary markets dropped to
16.8% from 18.1%, and the percentage of hospitality properties
decreased to 13.8% from 15.1%.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-RC1

Class              Rating(i)        Amount ($)
A-1                AAA (sf)         19,435,000
A-2                AAA (sf)         73,836,000
A-3                AAA (sf)        100,000,000
A-4                AAA (sf)        195,938,000
A-SB               AAA (sf)         26,358,000
A-S                AAA (sf)         46,009,000
X-A                AAA (sf)        415,567,000(ii)
X-B                A (sf)          101,666,000(ii)
B                  AA (sf)          28,942,000
C                  A (sf)           26,715,000
X-D(iii)           BBB- (sf)        30,425,000(ii)
X-E(iii)           BB- (sf)         23,005,000(ii)
X-F(iii)           B+ (sf)           8,163,000(ii)
X-G(iii)           NR               14,842,045(ii)
D(iii)             BBB- (sf)        30,425,000
E(iii)             BB- (sf)         23,005,000
F(iii)             B+ (sf)           8,163,000
G(iii)             NR               14,842,045
RR Interest(iii)   NR               31,245,687

(i)The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii)Notional balance.
(iii)Non-offered certificates. NR--Not rated.

CHANGES FROM PRELIMINARY RATINGS

                              WFCM 2017-RC1   WFCM 2017-RC1
                                (Final)        (Prelim)
Number of Loans                      60         61
Average Loan Size               $10,415,229   $10,408,422
S&P Global Ratings NCF Haircut    -8.7%         -8.8%
S&P Global Ratings Trust LTV       83.0%        83.1%
S&P Global Ratings Trust DSC       2.01         2.00
Effective Loan Count               27.3         28.0
Beginning Pool Balance        $624,913,732      $634,913,732
Ending Pool Balance           $565,757,963      $574,017,393
% Paydown                         -9.5%         -9.6%
Wt. Avg. Appraisal LTV            58.2%         58.2%
Wt. Avg. Issuer DSC               2.19          2.18
Wt. Avg. S&P Global Ratings Value Variance   -29.5%   -29.7%
Wt. Avg. S&P Global Ratings Cap Rate    7.99%    8.01%
Wt. Avg. S&P Global Ratings LTV    76.4%         76.4%
Wt. Avg. Mortgage Rate             4.99%         4.99%
Wt. Avg. Amortizing Loan Constant    5.97%       5.98%


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Westlake Automobile
Receivables Trust 2017-1's $700.00 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2017-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 47.93%, 41.19%, 31.49%,
      24.48%, and 21.61% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These provide
      approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x,
      respectively, of S&P's 13.00%-13.50% expected cumulative net

      loss range.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      principal payments under stress cash flow modeling scenarios

      appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes would not be lowered from the assigned ratings
      for the life of the deal; S&P's rating on the class C notes
      would remain within one rating category of the assigned
      rating; S&P's rating on the class D notes would remain
      within two rating categories of the assigned rating for the
      life of the deal; and S&P's rating on the class E notes
      would remain within two rating categories of the assigned
      rating over one year, but would ultimately default at month
      60, which is within the bounds of S&P's credit stability
      criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime automobile loans.

   -- The originator/servicer's long history in the
      subprime/specialty auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of approximately 10 years (2006-2016) of
      static pool data on the company's lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-1
Class    Rating      Type           Interest            Amount
                                    rate(i)           (mil. $)
A-1      A-1+ (sf)   Senior         Fixed               194.80
A-2      AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed               246.96
B        AA (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed                67.35
C        A (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed                89.86
D        BBB (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed                69.25
E        BB (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed                31.78

(i)The Westlake 2017-1 transaction was upsized after S&P Global
Ratings published its presale report on March 6, 2017.


WHITEHORSE IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes from Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by WhiteHorse IV Ltd.:

US$16,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 18, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf); previously on June 18, 2015 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$28,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $13,766,382.18), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on June 18, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 18, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

WhiteHorse IV Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since June 2016. The Class A-1
notes have been paid down completely, by $85.2 million, and the
Class A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 51% or $14.2
million since that time. Based on the trustee's February 2017
report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
notes are reported at 667.76%, 237.13%, 166.33% and 130.82%,
respectively, versus June 2016 levels of 170.57%, 139.71%, 124.81%
and 113.77%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since June 2016. Based on Moody's calculations, the portfolio's
weighted average rating factor (WARF) worsened to 3918 from 3206 in
June 2016, and its exposure to assets with a corporate family
rating of Caa1 and below also increased to 35.0% from 19.5% over
the same period.

The portfolio also includes a number of investments in securities
that mature after the notes do. Based on the Moody's calculations,
securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 22% of the portfolio. These investments could expose
the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes
mature.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light of the
deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its
sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis,
Moody's ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $3.1 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3134)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: :0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4702)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $91.1 million, defaulted par of $5.4
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.3% (implying
a WARF of 3918), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.48%, a diversity score of 23 and a weighted average spread of
4.58% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL 2005-1: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-1, A-R, and B
floating-rate notes from Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1
Ltd., a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE
CDO) transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the remaining six classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 15, 2017, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect increased credit support following the
transaction's collective paydowns of $210.06 million to the class
A-1 and A-R notes since S&P's September 2014 rating actions.  As a
result, their current balances are about 5% of their respective
original balances.

All coverage tests are passing and all tranches are current in
their interest.

Though defaults have decreased to $27.26 million from $29.21
million during S&P's last review, as a percentage of the portfolio,
they have increased to 16.63% from the 7.74% in S&P's last review
due to the decrease in the portfolio's size.  With less than 10
performing obligors currently in the portfolio, the transaction's
obligor concentration risk has increased.

The application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's criteria, constrains the ratings on
the class A-1, A-R, and B notes.

Although S&P's model-implied rating for class C is a notch higher
than the current rating, its rating action on this class reflects
its analysis of the transaction's liability structure and the
credit quality of the assets backing the notes.

Though the class D, E, F, G, and H notes failed S&P's largest
obligor default test at the 'CCC' category, its affirmations of the
'CCC- (sf)' ratings on these classes reflect the stable performance
of the underlying assets, the lack of any interest deferral on any
of their notes, and their respective overcollateralization levels.


S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.

                      Rating
Class          To                From
A-1            BB+ (sf)          B- (sf)
A-R            BB+ (sf)          B- (sf)
B              CCC+ (sf)         CCC (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Class        Rating
C            CCC- (sf)
D            CCC- (sf)
E            CCC- (sf)
F            CCC- (sf)
G            CCC- (sf)
H            CCC- (sf)


[*] Moody's Hikes $154.3MM Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2004-2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
issued from six transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-D

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2008 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-B

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-RP1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-RP2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CS Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-CF2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2016 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of increasing credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $23.4MM Scratch&Dent RMBS Issued 2003-2006
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
issued from five transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-RP1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse Mortgage Capital Trust 2006-CF1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Quest Trust 2005-X1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of increasing credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $344MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2006-2007
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 tranches
issued from five transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-SP1 Trust

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-SP4 Trust

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-SP1 Trust

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4,
2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-SP2 Trust

Cl. A-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6,
2015 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 6,
2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-SP3 Trust

Cl. A-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5,
2016 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions also reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The upgrades on RAAC Series 2007-SP2
Trust and 2007-SP3 Trust reflect the lower projected losses on the
related underlying pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $397MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 45 tranches,
from 13 transactions issued by RFC.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS11 Trust

A-I-6A Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 12,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

A-I-6B Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 12,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 12,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

A-I-7 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 12,
2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

M-II-2 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS4 Trust

Cl. A-II-B Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-II-A Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS6 Trust

Cl. A-II-A Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-II-B Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS7 Trust

M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17,
2012 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

M-II-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 17,
2012 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS8 Trust

A-I-6A Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30,
2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

A-I-6B Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30,
2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30,
2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

A-I-8 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30,
2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

M-I-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30,
2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30,
2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

M-II-2 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

M-II-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30,
2011 Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS9 Trust

Cl. A-I-6A Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 16,
2015 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6B Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 16,
2015 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-I-7 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 16,
2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar
30, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ5 Trust

A-7 Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2012
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

A-6-A Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

A-6-B Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS11 Trust

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS9 Trust

Cl. M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS4 Trust

Cl. A-I-5 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 25,
2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25,
2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS10 Trust

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26,
2016 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26,
2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26,
2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30,
2011 Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-5 Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 25,
2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 30,
2015 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 26,
2016 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 26,
2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS8 Trust

Cl. A-I-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Hikes $41.2MM of SAIL Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 10, 2017, upgraded the ratings
of four tranches from two transactions backed by Subprime RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC9

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-10

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2012 Confirmed
at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A7, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2012 Confirmed
at Aa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

The rating action on Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust
2003-BC9 Class M-2 also reflects a correction to the cash-flow
model previously used by Moody's in rating the transaction. In
prior rating actions, the cash flow model did not properly allocate
excess spread to reimburse projected tranche losses. This error has
now been corrected, and today's rating action reflects this
change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $50.9MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2004
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 14 tranches
from six transactions issued by various issuers, and backed by
subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-HS1

Cl. A-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4,
2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4,
2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 4,
2016 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC2

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-5

Cl. BV Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-6 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-7 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2016 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-WMC2

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 9,
2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 24,
2015 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2014
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 9,
2014 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-WMC3

Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 7,
2014 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 1,
2015 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $875.8MM of Housing-Backed Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of 16 tranches in 12 transactions issued
between 1995 and 2002. The collateral backing these transactions
consists primarily of manufactured housing units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Access Financial MH Contract Trust 1995-1

B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Access Financial MH Contract Trust 1996-1

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2005 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp 1999-B

A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp 2000-A

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp 2001-A

Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitizations Corp. Series 2000-1

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitizations Corp. Series 2000-2

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitizations Corp. Series 2000-4

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitizations Corp. Series 2002-1

Class M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Financial Capital Securitization LLC, Series
1997-I

Class M, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac MH Contract 1998-1

A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

A-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

A-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement available to the bonds. The
tranches downgraded are due to the depletion of available credit
enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact
the performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 78 Classes From 10 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 78 classes from 10 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2005.  The review yielded 17 upgrades, seven
downgrades, 47 affirmations, and seven withdrawals.

The transactions in this review are backed by subprime and
Alternative-A collateral.

The rating actions on the interest-only (IO) classes reflect the
application of S&P's IO criteria, which provide that S&P will
maintain the current rating on an IO class until all of the classes
that the IO security references are either lowered to below 'AA-
(sf)' or have been retired--at which time S&P will withdraw these
IO ratings.  The ratings on each of these classes have been
affected by recent rating actions on the reference classes upon
which their notional balances are based. Specifically, S&P will
maintain active surveillance of these IO classes using the
methodology applied before the release of S&P's criteria.

                                ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
   -- Principal-only (PO) criteria; and/or
   -- IO criteria.

The upgrades include three ratings that were raised three or more
notches because of increased credit support and the classes'
ability to withstand a higher level of projected losses than
previously anticipated.

S&P raised its rating on class C-B-1 from Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2003-AR18 to 'A+ (sf)' from
'BBB+ (sf)' because credit support increased to 18.28% in February
2017 from 12.09% in November 2014.  S&P raised its rating on class
A-7 from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-FR1 to
'AA+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' because credit support increased to
40.24% in February 2017 from 32.52% in December 2014.  And S&P
raised its rating on class AF-4 from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities
Inc. Series 2005-R9 to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' because credit
support increased to 91.32% in February 2017 from 75.06% in October
2015.

S&P raised its rating on class A-2 from Residential Asset
Securitization Trust 2003-A9's series 2003-I to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC
(sf)' because S&P believes this class is no longer vulnerable to
default.  Accordingly, S&P upgraded class PO, a principal-only
class, from the same transaction to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' based
on the application of S&P's PO criteria.

                            DOWNGRADES

Of the seven downgrades, S&P lowered its ratings on two classes to
speculative-grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or
higher).  Another three of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining two downgraded classes
already had speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that its projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Erosion of credit support; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications and imputed promises.

The downgrades include five ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  Of these, one was due to eroded credit support and the
classes' inability to withstand projected losses at the prior
rating levels, one reflects the increase in our projected losses
due to increased delinquencies, and three were due to loan
modification and imputed promises.

S&P lowered its rating on class M-1 from Bear Stearns Asset Backed
Securities I Trust 2004-HE7 to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' because of
eroded credit support as principal payments were made to
more-subordinate classes.  Credit support decreased to 35.28% in
February 2017 from 40.91% in June 2016.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes AF-5 from Centex Home Equity
Loan Trust 2003-A to 'A- (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' and on class AF-6
from the same transaction to 'A+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' to reflect
the increase in S&P's projected losses and its belief that the
projected credit support for these classes will be insufficient to
cover the projected losses S&P applied at the previous rating
levels.  The increase in S&P's projected losses is because of
higher reported delinquencies during the most recent performance
periods compared with those reported during the previous review
dates.  Total delinquencies increased to 20.62% at February 2017
from 16.27% at June 2016, and severe delinquencies increased to
16.50% at February 2017 from 13.73% at June 2016.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

S&P lowered its ratings on class AF-5 from Argent Securities Inc.'
series 2004-W5 to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'AAA (sf)', on class AF-5 from
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2003-10 to 'BBB+ (sf)'
from 'AA+ (sf)', on class A-6 from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities
Inc. Series 2004-FR1 to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)', and on class
AF-5 from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.  Series 2005-R9 to 'D
(sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'.  These downgrades reflect the application of
S&P's imputed promises criteria, which resulted in a maximum
potential rating (MPR) lower than the previous ratings on these
classes.

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications, S&P imputes an amount of interest owed to that class
of securities by applying "Methodology For Incorporating Loan
Modifications And Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings,"
published April 17, 2015, and "Principles For Rating Debt Issues
Based On Imputed Promises," published Dec. 19, 2014. Based on S&P's
criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a particular class,
the resulting rating may be lower than if it had solely considered
that class' paid interest based on the applicable WAC.

                             AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more-senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                            WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on classes II-A-1, II-A-2, III-M-1, C-B-1,
C-B-2, and C-B-3 from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s series 2003-AR9 and on class IV-M-2 from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.' series 2003-AR18
because the related pools have a small number of loans remaining.
Once a pool has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there
is a high degree of credit instability that is incompatible with
any rating level.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                        http://bit.ly/2mSFa6G


[*] S&P Completes Review on 84 Classes From 12 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 84 classes from 12 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2006.  The review yielded 13 upgrades (one of
which is an error correction), 16 downgrades, and 55 affirmations.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate subprime mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

For insured obligations where S&P maintains a rating on the bond
insurer that is lower than what it would rate the class without
bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P relies
solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.  In some
instances S&P's rating on a class will be capped at a maximum
potential rating (MPR) pursuant to S&P's loan modification
criteria.  Of the classes reviewed, the following are insured by an
insurance provider that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10's class AF-5B
      ('A+ (sf)'), insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('CCC');
   -- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-A's class
      A-4w ('AA (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal
      Corp. ('AA'); and
   -- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-A's class
      A-5w ('CCC (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal
      Corp. ('AA').

Four of the reviewed classes were insured by a rated insurance
provider when the classes were originated, but S&P Global Ratings
has since withdrawn its rating on those insurance providers.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                           CORRECTIONS

S&P corrected its rating on class MF-3 from CWABS Asset-Backed
Certificates Trust 2005-1 by raising it to 'CCC (sf)' from
'D (sf)'.  S&P lowered its rating on this class to 'D (sf)' on Oct.
30, 2015, pursuant to S&P's interest shortfall criteria,
"Structured Finance Temporary Interest Shortfall Methodology,"
published Dec. 15, 2015, based on the trustee's reports of interest
shortfalls.  The trustee has since confirmed to S&P that it
incorrectly reported interest shortfalls on this class and,
accordingly, S&P raised its rating on the class to 'CCC (sf)' to
reflect its view of the credit risk associated with this class.

                             UPGRADES

S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      or
   -- Error correction.

The upgrades include two ratings, classes A-4 and A-6 from Citicorp
Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-1, which were raised three
or more notches.  S&P raised its ratings on these two classes due
to an increase in credit support and the classes' ability to
withstand a higher level of projected losses than previously
anticipated.  Credit support for class A-4 increased to 39.1% in
January 2017 from 33.45% in October 2015. Credit support for class
A-6 increased to 39.1% in January 2017 from 33.45% in October
2015.

S&P raised four ratings to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because it
believes these classes are no longer virtually certain to default,
primarily owing to the improved performance of the collateral
backing this transaction.  However, the 'CCC (sf)' ratings indicate
that S&P believes that its projected credit support will remain
insufficient to cover its projected losses for these classes and
that the classes are still vulnerable to defaulting.

                            DOWNGRADES

Of the 16 downgrades, S&P lowered its ratings on eight classes to
speculative grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade
('BBB-' or higher), five of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, and three classes remained at a
speculative-grade level.  The downgrades include 11 ratings that
were lowered three or more notches.  The downgrades reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support for the affected classes
will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades are due to one or
more of these:

   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications; or
   -- Increased delinquencies.

Specifically, S&P lowered its ratings on 15 classes from 11
transactions pursuant to its loan modification criteria.  When a
class of securities supported by a particular collateral pool is
paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and the
interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications, S&P imputes an amount of interest owed to that class
of securities according to its loan modification criteria, and
"Principles For Rating Debt Issues Based On Imputed Promises,"
published Dec. 19, 2014.  Pursuant to S&P's loan modification
criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a particular class,
the resulting rating may be lower than if S&P had solely considered
that class' paid interest based on the applicable WAC. For these 15
classes, the application of our loan modification criteria to each
class resulted in an MPR that was lower than S&P's previous rating
for these classes.

In addition, S&P's downgrade on class A-II from New Century Home
Equity Loan Trust's series 2003-5 reflects the increase in its
projected losses on this class and S&P's belief that the projected
credit support for this class will be insufficient to cover the
projected losses S&P applied at the previous rating level.  The
projected losses for this class are due to higher reported
delinquencies: total delinquencies for this class increased to
56.06% in January 2017 from 51% in January 2016.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to S&P's
loss assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's
cash flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect its view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                        http://bit.ly/2n7IY6e


[*] S&P Completes Review on 95 Classes From 12 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 95 classes from 12 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2008.  The review yielded 24 upgrades, 10
downgrades, 56 affirmations, and five discontinuances.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- Decreased observed delinquencies.

The 24 upgrades include 22 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  Of these, one was due to the underlying collateral's
improved performance during the most recent performance periods
compared to previous review dates, and 21 were due to an increase
in credit support and the classes' ability to withstand a higher
level of projected losses than previously anticipated.

The upgrade on class 3-A from HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5
reflects a decrease in S&P's projected losses and its belief that
its projected credit support for this class will be sufficient to
cover its revised projected loss at this rating level.  S&P has
decreased its projected losses because there have been fewer
reported delinquencies during the most recent performance period
compared to those reported at the previous review date.  Severe
delinquencies for the group supporting the subject class decreased
to 3.93% as of December 2016 compared to 9.86% in June 2014, the
date of the prior review.

The upgrades on classes 1-A and 2-A-6 from HarborView Mortgage Loan
Trust 2004-5, classes 1-A-1, 2-A-1, 3-A-1, 3-A-2, 4-A-1, 5-A-1, and
5-A-2 from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14, classes 1-A-3, 1-A-4,
1-A-6, 2-A-1, 3-A-1, 3-A-2, 3-A-5, and 4-A-1 from Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, and classes 1-A-2, 2-A-2, 2-A-3, 3-A-3,
3-A-4, and 5-A-1 from JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, reflect an
increase in credit support and the classes' ability to withstand a
higher level of projected losses than previously anticipated.

Credit support for class 1-A from HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust
2004-5 increased to 42.40% in December 2016 from 31.48% at the
prior review in June 2014.  Credit support for class 2-A-6 from the
same transaction increased to 17.97% in December 2016 from 13.46%
at the prior review.

Credit support for classes 3-A-1, 3-A-2, 4-A-1, 5-A-1, and 5-A-2
from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14 increased to 12.98% in
December 2016 from 9.05% at the prior review in June 2014.  Classes
1-A-1 and 2-A-1 from the same transaction saw their credit support
percentages increase to 38.43% in December 2016 from 30.29% at the
prior review.

Credit support for classes 1-A-4, 2-A-1, 3-A-1, 3-A-2, 3-A-5, and
4-A-1 from Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1 increased to
12.35% in January 2017 from 9.32% at the prior review in June 2014.
Classes 1-A-3 and 1-A-6 from the same transaction saw their credit
support percentages increase to 16.86% in January 2017 from 14.76%
at the prior review.

Credit support for classes 1-A-2, 2-A-3, 3-A-4, and 5-A-1 from
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5 increased to 12.06% in January 2017
from 9.06% at the prior review in June 2014.  Credit support for
class 2-A-2 from the same transaction increased to 15.47% in
January 2017 from 12.45% at the prior review.  Additionally, credit
support for class 3-A-3 from the same transaction increased to
17.51% in January 2017 from 14.89% at the prior review.

                             DOWNGRADES

Of the 10 downgrades, six remained at an investment-grade level
('BBB-' or higher), while the remaining four downgraded classes
already had speculative-grade ratings ('BB+' or lower).  The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover its
projected losses for the related transactions at a higher rating.
The downgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends, specifically an
      increase in observed delinquencies;
   -- Erosion of credit support; and/or
   --  Declining constant prepayment rates (CPRs).

The downgrades include four ratings that were lowered three
notches.  All four were due to the increase in S&P's projected
losses due to increased delinquencies.

The downgrades on classes 1-A-1, 1-A-2, 1-A-3, 2-A, and 4-A from
Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-24A and class B1 from GSR
Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-9 reflect the increase in S&P's projected
losses and our belief that the projected credit support for the
affected classes will be insufficient to cover the projected losses
S&P applied at the previous rating levels.  The increase in S&P's
projected losses is due to higher reported delinquencies during the
most recent performance periods when compared to those reported at
the previous review dates.  For classes 1-A-1, 1-A-2, 1-A-3, 2-A,
and 4-A from Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-24A, total
severe delinquencies increased to 8.48% as of January 2017 from
7.48% in August 2015.  For class B1 from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust
2003-9, total severe delinquencies increased to 5.26% as of January
2017 from 4.75% in November 2014.

The downgrades on class A-5 from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2003-AR1 Trust and class 1-B-1 from GSR
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14 reflect an observed decrease in credit
enhancement available to the classes.  Both of these classes have
experienced the paydown and/or writedown of junior supporting
classes, therefore, eroding credit support.  While the credit
support percentage for class A-5 from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2003-AR1 Trust has remained stable, the actual
hard dollar credit support amount has decreased to $2.52 million in
January 2017 from $2.8 million in January 2016.  Credit support for
class 1B1 from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14 decreased to 8.37%
in January 2016 from 10.14% at the prior review in June 2014.  This
erosion of credit support exposes the downgraded classes to a
greater risk of potential back-ended losses.

The downgrades on classes 1-A-1 and 1-A-6 from GSR Mortgage Loan
Trust 2005-2F reflect a decrease in the CPR observed for the
underlying pool to 7.45% in January 2017 from 15.94% in November
2014.  The lower CPR rate has limited principal payments to these
more senior classes, extending their lives and making them more
susceptible to back-end losses.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', and 'CC'
Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's
view that these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting, and the
'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its rating on class 4-A-1 from JPMorgan Mortgage
Trust 2005-A5 because this class was paid in full during the
February 2017 remittance period.

S&P discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on classes with zero balances
or classes that have experienced write-downs exceeding 10% of the
bonds' initial balances.  These classes have been written down as a
result of realized losses that remain outstanding.  S&P
discontinued these ratings according to its surveillance and
withdrawal policy, because S&P views a subsequent upgrade to a
rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely under the relevant
criteria.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9% in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6% for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6% in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate remained at 4.9% for 2016 and will
      inch up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5% in 2016
      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                      http://bit.ly/2nMfadr


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 43 Tranches From 11 CDO Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 42 classes from 10
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions
and one class from one CF collateral debt obligations (CDO) backed
by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Atlas Senior Loan Fund Ltd. (CF CDO): optional redemption on

      February 2017.

   -- Carlyle McLaren CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid

      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Cedar Funding II CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): class A-X notes(i) paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- CIFC Funding 2012-I Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption on
      March 2017.

   -- Dryden XXII Senior Loan Fund (CF CLO): optional redemption
      on January 2017.

   -- Flagship CLO VI (CF CLO): optional redemption on March 2017.

   -- Goldentree Loan Opportunities IV Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption on February 2017.

   -- LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 PLC (CF CLO): optional
      redemption on January 2017.

   -- Muir Woods CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption on March
      2017.

   -- Octagon Investment Partners XI Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most
      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most
      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

(i)An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Atlas Senior Loan Fund Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L-R              NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2L-R              NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-3L-R              NR                  A+ (sf)
B-1L-R              NR                  BBB (sf)
B-2L                NR                  BB- (sf)
B-3L                NR                  B (sf)

Carlyle McLaren CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1LV               NR                  AAA (sf)

Cedar Funding II CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-X                 NR                  AAA (sf)

CIFC Funding 2006-II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3L                NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1L                NR                  AAA (sf)
B-2L                NR                  AA+ (sf)

Dryden XXII Senior Loan Fund
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
B-R                 NR                  AA- (sf)
C-R                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Flagship CLO VI
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB (sf)

Goldentree Loan Opportunities IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1cJ               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1cS               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)

LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 PLC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Muir Woods CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
E                   NR                  BB (sf)
F                   NR                  B (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners XI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1B                NR                  AAA (sf)

Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  B+ (sf)

NR-Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Actions on 25 Classes From Nine RMBS Issued 2003-2010
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 25 classes from nine
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 2003 and 2010.  The review yielded six upgrades, one
downgrade, nine affirmations, and nine discontinuances.

With respect to insured obligations, where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.  The rating on a bond-insured obligation will be the higher
of the rating on the bond insurer and the rating of the underlying
obligation, without considering the potential credit enhancement
from the bond insurance.

Class A-6 from RAMP Series 2003-RZ4 Trust and class A-6-B from RAMP
Series 2003-RZ5 Trust were insured by a rated insurance provider
when these deals were originated, but S&P Global Ratings has since
withdrawn the rating on the insurance provider of those classes.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

The six upgrades reflect improved collateral performance and
delinquency trends and/or increased credit support relative to
S&P's projected losses.  S&P's projected credit support for the
affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
the rating levels.  S&P raised two ratings nine or more notches.

The upgrades on classes M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4 from RAAC Series
2005-SP3 Trust reflect a decrease in S&P's projected losses and its
belief that its projected credit support for the affected classes
will be sufficient to cover its revised projected losses at these
rating levels.  S&P has decreased its projected losses because
there have been fewer reported delinquencies during the most recent
performance periods compared to those reported during the previous
review dates.  Severe delinquencies decreased to 14.86% in January
2017 from 19.42% in June 2014.

The upgrades on classes M-2 and B-1 from CWABS Inc. Series 2003-S2
reflect an increase in credit support and the classes' ability to
withstand a higher level of projected losses than previously
anticipated.  Credit support for class M-2 increased to 43.31% in
January 2017 from 15.36% in June 2014, and for class B-1 it
increased to 34.45% in January 2017 from 11.85% in June 2014.

                           DOWNGRADES

The downgrade on class A from Mid-State Capital Trust 2010-1
reflects the increase in S&P's projected losses and its belief that
the projected credit support for the affected class will be
insufficient to cover the projected losses S&P applied at the
previous rating level.  The increase in S&P's projected losses is
due to higher reported delinquencies during the most recent
performance period compared to those reported during the previous
review date.  Severe delinquencies increased to 12.35% in February
2017 from 7.85% in February 2014.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on five classes in the 'AAA (sf)' through
'B (sf)' rating categories to reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support on these classes remained relatively
consistent with our prior projections and is sufficient to cover
our projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Increased delinquencies

In addition, per our second-lien criteria, the ratings on classes
A-4 and A-5 from CWABS Inc. Series 2003-S2 are limited to a
liquidity rating cap of 'A+ (sf)' because of an estimated payoff of
greater than 24 months or insufficient hard credit enhancement for
higher rating categories.

S&P affirmed its rating on class B from WFHET NIM Co. 2005-4, a net
interest margin class, at 'CCC (sf)' to reflect S&P's belief that
this class may ultimately not be repaid its full amount of
principal as it did not pass any of S&P's 'B-' cash flow stress
scenarios.  The remaining ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' are based
on S&P's belief that its projected credit support will remain
insufficient to cover its 'B-' expected-case projected losses for
these classes and that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting.

                           DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on nine classes from two transactions,
RAMP Series 2003-RZ4 Trust and RAMP Series 2003-RZ5 Trust, which
were paid in full during recent remittance periods. The payments in
full were due to a recent RMBS settlement with Residential Capital
LLC and certain direct and indirect subsidiaries, including the
seller and master servicer to these transactions, which resulted in
large principal payments that were sufficient to pay down the
classes.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2mR7Dvs


[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 25 Tranches From 2 RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 25 classes from two U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2007 and 2008.  The review yielded eight upgrades (all of
which are error corrections), two downgrades, nine affirmations,
and six withdrawals.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime jumbo and reperforming mortgage loans, which
are secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                            CORRECTIONS

S&P corrected and raised its ratings on exchangeable classes A-1,
1-A-3, 2-A-5, 2-A-6, 2-A-7, 2-A-8, and 2-A-9 from Morgan Stanley
ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-SEA1 to either 'CC (sf)' or
'CCC (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.  S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)' on Aug. 28, 2013, due to the trustee's reports of interest
shortfalls on these classes.  The trustee has since confirmed to
S&P that it incorrectly reported these interest shortfalls and will
correct its reporting on these classes accordingly.  The revised
ratings reflect S&P's view of the credit risk for these seven
classes.

S&P also corrected and raised its rating on exchangeable class
1-A-5 from Banc of America Mortgage 2008-A Trust to 'CCC (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' to reflect the ratings on root classes 1-A-3 and 1-A-4.
On Sept. 30, 2015, S&P incorrectly lowered its rating on
exchangeable class 1-A-5 by not taking into consideration S&P's
view of exchangeable class 1-A-5's root classes.  Exchangeable
class 1-A-5 bears the same credit and liquidity risk as root
classes 1-A-3 and 1-A-4; therefore, S&P's cash flows should project
pro rata principal writedowns in the same period for classes 1-A-3
and 1-A-4, which combined equal the principal writedowns for
exchangeable class 1-A-5.  S&P has applied this analysis to
exchangeable class 1-A-5, and our revised rating reflects our view
of the credit risk of exchangeable class 1-A-5.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades on classes 1-A-2 and 2-A-4 from Morgan Stanley ABS
Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-SEA1 reflect S&P's belief that default is
virtually certain for these classes.  These classes were downgraded
to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because unrealized writedowns have
occurred since their credit support depleted, which lead S&P to
believe that these classes will likely not receive principal
payment in full.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed nine 'CCC (sf)' ratings to reflect its belief that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its 'B'
expected case projected losses for these classes.  Per "Criteria
For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published
Oct. 1, 2012, these 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting.

                             WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on six classes from Banc of America
Mortgage 2008-A Trust because the related collateral group has a de
minimus number of loans remaining.  In this transaction,
cross-subordination has been depleted because all junior classes
have been written down; therefore, credit instability is addressed
on the related collateral group level.  Because the number of loans
in the related collateral group has declined to a de minimis
amount, S&P believes there is a high degree of credit instability
that is incompatible with any rating level.

                           ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                        http://bit.ly/2ncI9tv



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

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