TCR_Public/170312.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 12, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 70

                            Headlines

ACA ABS 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating From Ba3
ACRE COMMERCIAL 2017-FL3: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating to Cl. F Debt
AMMC CLO 20: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
AMMC CLO X: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes to BB+
ANGEL OAK 2017-1: DBRS Assigns Bsf Rating to Class B-2 Debt

ANGEL OAK 2017-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'Bsf'
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2013-WBRK: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on 2 Tranches
BEAR STERNS 1999-WF2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Class K Certs
C-BASS CBO VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to B1

CAN CAPITAL 2014-1: DBRS Cuts Class B Debt Rating to B(high)
CBA COMMERCIAL 2004-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on M-3 Certs
CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-J Debt to Ca(sf)
CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on F Debt
CITIGROUP 2014-GC21: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt

COMM 2015-CCRE22: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on 3 Tranches
CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C3: Moody's Hikes Class C Certs Rating to B1
DBUBS 2011-LC2: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on 2 Tranches
EMERSON PLACE: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes

FREDDIE MAC 2017-SC01: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. M-2 Debt
FREMF 2017-K63: Fitch to Rate Class C Debt at 'BB+sf
FREMF 2017-K63: Fitch to Rate Class C Debt at 'BB+sf'
GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: DBRS Assigns (P)B Ratings to Class B5 Debt
GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. B5 Debt

GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. K Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. K Debt
GOLDENTREE LOAN: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Class F Notes
GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to 'D'
GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ7: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt

JFIN REVOLVER: S&P Raises Ratings on Class E VFN Debt to BB+
JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC6: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class M Debt to 'Dsf'
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B+
JP MORGAN 2010-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCsf'
JP MORGAN 2017-JP5: Fitch to Rate Class E Certs 'BB-sf'

LCM XXIV: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
LENDMARK FUNDING 2016-A: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. C Notes
MADISON PARK V: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
MADISON PARK V: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. E Notes to 'Dsf'

ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-4: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to CCC
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP21: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to BB+
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C21: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Cl. G Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C28: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on 3 Tranches
MOUNTAIN VIEW 2014-1: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes

N-STAR VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to BB+
NELNET STUDENT 2008-4: Fitch Corrects January 24 Release
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on 2 Tranches
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim B Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XII: S&P Assigns (P)BB Rating on Cl. E-2-R Debt

OHA LOAN 2013-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
PARCS MASTER: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. 2007-4 Calvados Units to D
PARTS PRIVATE 2007-CT1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class C Debt
REALT 2007-1: DBRS Puts B Rating on Class K Debt Under Review
ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to B2

SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X Debt
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-3: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B-4 Debt
SOUND POINT: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
TIAA CLO II: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
TOWD POINT 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Debt

WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C23: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to 'CCC-'
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C24: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class C Certs
WELLS FARGO 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class F Debt
WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Ratings to E Debt

WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on Class E Debt
WFRBS COMM 2013-C13: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C13: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
[*] DBRS Reviews 153 Classes From 20 US RMBS Deals
[*] DBRS Reviews 234 Classes From 36 US RMBS Deals

[*] DBRS Takes Rating Actions From 6 ABS Deals
[*] Fitch Took Ratings on Distressed Classes in 5 CMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Hikes $1BB of Subprime RMBS Issued 2006-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on $633.8MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $444.2MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2005

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $3.7BB of RMBS Issued From 2016
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 28 Classes From 23 RMBS Deals

                            *********

ACA ABS 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating From Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by ACA ABS 2004-1, LIMITED:

US$47,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due July
16, 2039 (current outstanding balance of $13,309,233.91), Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 13, 2016 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf).

ACA ABS 2004-1, LIMITED, issued in May 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and CRE
CDOs originated in 2003 and 2004.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is primarily due to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since September 2016. The Class
B notes have paid down by approximately 29%, or $5.4 million since
that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the Class B OC has
improved to 181.6% from 153.0% in September 2016. The paydown of
the Class B notes is partially the result of cash collections from
certain assets treated as defaulted by the trustee in amounts
materially exceeding expectations.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since September 2016. Based on
Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is
currently 1896, compared to 2143 on September 2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any deterioration in either consumer
or commercial credit conditions and in the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. The residential real
estate property market's uncertainties include housing prices; the
pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries from
defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will continue and at
what pace. Faster than expected deleveraging could have a
significantly positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Amortization profile assumptions: Moody's modeled the
amortization of the underlying collateral portfolio based on its
assumed weighted average life (WAL). Regardless of the WAL
assumption, due to the sensitivity of amortization assumption and
its impact on the amount of principal available to pay down the
notes, Moody's supplemented its analysis with various sensitivity
analysis around the amortization profile of the underlying
collateral assets.

4) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming limited recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries exceeding Moody's expectation in the
future would positively impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM™ to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge™ cash flow
model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa1 and below ratings notched up by two rating notches (1452):

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Combination Securities: 0

Caa1 and below ratings notched down by two notches (1930):

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Combination Securities: 0


ACRE COMMERCIAL 2017-FL3: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating to Cl. F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned final ratings to the following classes of
secured Floating Rate Notes (the Notes) issued by ACRE Commercial
Mortgage 2017-FL3 Ltd.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes A, A-S, B, C and D have been privately placed.

Classes E and F are non-offered classes.

With respect to the deferrable notes (Class E and Class F), to the
extent that interest proceeds are not sufficient on a given payment
date to pay accrued interest, interest will not be due and payable
on the payment date and will instead be deferred and capitalized.
The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate the timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of deferred interest notes,
the ultimate recovery of deferred interest (inclusive of interest
payable thereon at the applicable rate, to the extent permitted by
law).

The collateral for the transaction consists of 12 floating-rate
mortgages secured by 16 transitional commercial real estate
properties totaling $341.2 million. The loans are secured by
current cash flowing assets, most of which are in a period of
transition, with plans to stabilize and improve the asset value.
The transaction has a Reinvestment Period that is expected to
expire on March 15, 2019, and DBRS will have the ability to provide
a Rating Agency Confirmation on loans that are being added to the
pool during the Reinvestment Period in order to evaluate any credit
drift caused by potential loan concentrations. The initial pool
consists of 12 loans, 11 of which, or 90.0% of the loan pool, have
a pari passu companion participation held by a subsidiary of the
trust asset seller and sponsor, ACRC Lender LLC.

The ratings assigned to the Notes by DBRS are based exclusively on
the credit provided by the transaction structure and underlying
trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing surveillance,
which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS after the date
of issuance.



AMMC CLO 20: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to AMMC CLO 20,
Limited/AMMC CLO 20 LLC's $368 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 6,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

AMMC CLO 20 Ltd./AMMC CLO 20 LLC

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)        260.00
B                     AA (sf)          44.00
C (deferrable)        A (sf)           26.00
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)         20.00
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)          18.00
Subordinated notes    NR               39.90

NR--Not rated.


AMMC CLO X: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, D, E, and
F notes from AMMC CLO X Ltd.  S&P also removed these ratings from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 6, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating
on the class A notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the February 2017 trustee report. The
rating actions also considers the updated recovery rate table in
our Corporate Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria that took into
account an update to S&P's jurisdiction ranking assessments.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $171.15 million in paydowns
to the class A notes since S&P's April 2015 rating actions that
improved the reported overcollateralization (O/C) ratios per the
February 2017 trustee report compared with the April 2015 trustee
report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 162.80% from 130.06%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 140.48% from 121.43%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 127.81% from 115.87%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio improved to 116.21% from 110.29%.

The portfolio's credit quality has slightly deteriorated since
S&P's last rating actions.  Collateral obligations rated in the
'CCC' category have increased to $14.26 million reported as of the
February 2017 trustee report from $1.79 million reported as of the
April 2015 trustee report. This contributed to the portfolio's
weighted average rating declining to ''B' from 'B+' during this
period.

Despite the larger concentration in the 'CCC' category, the
transaction has benefited from a drop in the weighted average life
because of underlying collateral seasoning to 2.35 years reported
as of the February 2017 trustee report from 3.93 years reported at
the time of S&P's last rating actions.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmation reflects S&P's view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating level.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class D, E, and F notes, its rating actions considered the decline
in the portfolio's credit quality and other scenario analysis to
account for further volatility in the underlying portfolio.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

AMMC CLO X Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             AA+ (sf)    A- (sf)/ Watch Pos
E             BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
F             BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

AMMC CLO X Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)



ANGEL OAK 2017-1: DBRS Assigns Bsf Rating to Class B-2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2017-1 (the Certificates)
issued by Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-1 (the Trust):

-- $78.1 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.3 million Class A-2 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class A-3 at A (low) (sf)
-- $9.4 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-1 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 46.65% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (low) (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (low)
(sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 33.50%, 19.85%, 13.45%, 8.35% and
4.55% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, non-prime, primarily first-lien residential
mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 529 loans with a total
principal balance of $146,469,496 as of the Cut-Off Date (February
1, 2017).

Angel Oak Mortgage Solutions LLC (AOMS), Angel Oak Home Loans LLC
(AOHL) and Angel Oak Prime Bridge LLC are the originators for
70.9%, 26.9% and 2.2% of the portfolio, respectively. The mortgages
were originated under the following six programs:

(1) Portfolio Select (74.2%) – Made to borrowers with near-prime
credit scores who are unable to obtain financing through
conventional or governmental channels because (1) they fail to
satisfy credit requirements; (2) they are self-employed and need an
alternate income calculation using 24 months of bank statements to
qualify; (3) they may have a credit score that is lower than that
required by government-sponsored entity underwriting guidelines; or
(4) they may have been subject to a bankruptcy or foreclosure 24 or
more months prior to origination.

(2) Non-Prime General (6.4%) – Made to borrowers who have not
sustained a housing event in the past 24 months, but whose credit
reports show multiple 30+ and/or 60+ day delinquencies on any
reported debt in the past 12 months.

(3) Non-Prime Recent Housing (6.5%) – Made to borrowers who have
completed or have had their properties subject to a short sale,
deed-in-lieu, notice of default or foreclosure. Borrowers who have
filed bankruptcy 12 or more months prior to origination or have
experienced severe delinquencies may also be considered for this
program.

(4) Non-Prime Foreign National (6.3%) – Made to investment
property borrowers who are citizens of foreign countries that do
not reside or work in the United States. Borrowers may use
alternative income and credit documentation. Income is typically
documented by the employer or accountant, and credit is verified by
letters from overseas credit holders.

(5) Non-Prime Investment Property (0.7%) – Made to real estate
investors who may have financed up to five mortgaged properties
with the originators (or 20 mortgaged properties overall).

(6) Investor Cash Flow (5.9%) – Made to real estate investors who
are experienced in purchasing, renting and managing investment
properties with an established five-year credit history and at
least 24 months of clean housing payment history, but who are
unable to obtain financing through conventional or governmental
channels because (1) they fail to satisfy the requirements of such
programs or (2) may be over the maximum number of properties
allowed. Loans originated under the Investor Cash Flow program are
considered business purpose and are not covered by the
ability-to-repay (ATR) rules or TRID rule.

Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. (SPS) is the servicer for the
loans. Angel Oak Home Loans LLC will act as Servicing
Administrator, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will act as
the Master Servicer. U.S. Bank National Association will serve as
Trustee and Custodian.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ATR rules, they were made to
borrowers who generally do not qualify for agency, government or
private label non-agency prime jumbo products for various reasons
described above. In accordance with the CFPB Qualified Mortgage
(QM) rules, none of the loans are designated as QM Safe Harbor,
5.0% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and 79.1% as non-QM.
Approximately 16.0% of the loans are for investment properties and
thus not subject to the QM rules.

The servicing administrator or servicer will generally fund
advances of delinquent principal and interest on any mortgage until
such loan becomes 180 days delinquent, and they are obligated to
make advances in respect of taxes, insurance premiums and
reasonable costs incurred in the course of servicing and disposing
of properties.

On or after the distribution date in March 2019, the Depositor has
the option to purchase all of the outstanding certificates at a
price equal to the outstanding class balance plus accrued and
unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full. Further, excess spread can be used to cover realized losses
first before being allocated to unpaid cap carryover amounts up to
the Class M-1 Certificates.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:
(1) Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-prime
mortgages, underwriting standards have improved significantly from
the pre-crisis era. All of the mortgage loans were underwritten in
accordance with the eight underwriting factors of the ATR rules,
although they may not necessarily comply with Appendix Q of
Regulation Z.

(2) Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:
-- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have robust
    loan attributes as reflected in combined loan-to-value (LTV)
    ratios, borrower household income and liquid reserves,
    including the loans in the Non-Prime programs that have weaker

    borrower credit.
-- LTVs gradually reduce as the programs move down the credit
    spectrum, suggesting the consideration of compensating factors

    for riskier pools.
-- The pool comprises 15.3% fixed-rate mortgages, which have the
    lowest default risk because of the stability of monthly
    payments. The pool comprises 84.7% hybrid adjustable-rate
    mortgages (ARMs) with an initial fixed period of five to ten
    years, allowing borrowers sufficient time to credit cure
    before rates reset. None of the loans are riskier hybrid ARMs
    with shorter teaser periods (two to three years).

(3) Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party
due diligence firm conducted property valuation and credit reviews
on 100% of the loans in the pool. For 94.2% of the loans (i.e., the
entire pool excluding the 77 Investor Cash Flow loans), a
third-party due diligence firm performed a regulatory compliance
review. Data integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

(4) Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Angel Oak
began originating non-agency loans in the fourth quarter of 2013.
Of the approximately 1,644 mortgages originated, 12 were ever 30
days delinquent, one loan has been 60 days delinquent, four loans
90 days delinquent and six loans 120+ days delinquent. In addition,
voluntary prepayment rates have been relatively high in previous
Angel Oak securitizations, as these borrowers tend to credit cure
and refinance into lower-cost mortgages.

(5) Strong Servicer: SPS, a strong residential mortgage servicer
and a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse, services the pool.
In this transaction, AOHL, as the servicing administrator, or SPS,
as the servicer, is responsible for funding advances to the extent
required. In addition, the transaction employs Wells Fargo as the
Master Servicer, which is rated AA (high) by DBRS. If the servicing
administrator or the servicer fails in its obligation to make
advances, Wells Fargo will be obligated to fund such servicing
advances.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

(1) Geographic Concentration: Compared with other recent
securitizations, the AOMT 2017-1 pool has a high concentration of
loans located in Florida (37.3% of the pool). Mitigating factors
include the following:

-- Although the pool is concentrated in Florida, the loans are
    well dispersed among the metropolitan statistical areas
    (MSAs). The largest Florida MSA, Fort-Lauderdale-Pompano
    Beach-Deerfield, represents only 7.2% of the entire
    transaction. DBRS does not believe the AOMT 2017-1 pool is
    particularly sensitive to any deterioration in economic
    conditions or the occurrence of a natural disaster in any
    specific region.

-- DBRS's RMBS Insight model generates an elevated asset
    correlation, as determined by the loan size and geographic
    concentration, for this portfolio compared with pools with
    similar collateral, resulting in higher expected losses across

    all rating categories.

(2) Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:
Although slightly stronger than other comparable non-QM
transactions rated by DBRS, the R&W framework for AOMT 2017-1 is
weaker compared with post-crisis prime jumbo securitization
frameworks. Instead of an automatic review when a loan becomes
seriously delinquent, this transaction employs a mandatory review
upon less immediate triggers. In addition, the R&W provider,
guarantor or backstop provider are either unrated or have limited
performance history in non-QM securitizations and may potentially
experience financial stress that could result in the inability to
fulfill repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following mitigating
factors:

-- Satisfactory third-party due diligence was conducted on 100%
    of the loans included in the pool with respect to credit,
    property valuation and data integrity. A regulatory compliance

    review was performed on all but 77 Investor Cash Flow loans. A

    comprehensive due diligence review mitigates the risk of
    future R&W violations.

-- An independent third-party R&W reviewer, Clayton Services LLC,

    is named in the transaction to review loans for alleged
    breaches of representations and warranties.

-- DBRS conducted an on-site originator review of AOHL and AOMS
    and deems the mortgage companies to be operationally sound.

-- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator scores

    downward to account for the potential inability to fulfill
    repurchase obligations, the lack of performance history as
    well as the weaker R&W framework. A lower originator score
    results in increased default and loss assumptions and provides

    additional cushions for the rated securities.

(3) Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans: As
compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this portfolio
contains mortgages originated to borrowers with weaker credits or
who have prior derogatory credit events, as well as QM-rebuttable
presumption or non-QM loans. In addition, certain loans were
underwritten to 24-month bank statements for income (21.8%) or as
business purpose loans (5.9%). DBRS notes the following mitigating
factors:

-- All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
    factors as required by the ATR rules.
-- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the
    pre-crisis era.
-- Bank statement as income and business purpose loans are
    treated as less-than-full documentation in the RMBS Insight
    model, which increases expected losses on those loans.
-- The RMBS Insight model incorporates loss severity penalties
    for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans, as explained
    further in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the
    report.
-- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the  
    Non-Prime General and Non-Prime Recent Housing Event programs,

    borrower credit events had generally happened, on average, 46
    months and 23 months, respectively, prior to origination. In
    its analysis, DBRS applies additional penalties for borrowers
    with recent credit events within the past two years.

(4) Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest: The
servicing administrator or servicer will advance scheduled
principal and interest on delinquent mortgages until such loans
become 180 days delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss
severities to the transaction because advanced principal and
interest will not have to be reimbursed from the trust upon the
liquidation of the mortgages but will increase the possibility of
periodic interest shortfalls to the certificateholders. Mitigating
factors include that principal proceeds can be used to pay interest
shortfalls to the Certificates as the outstanding senior
Certificates are paid in full, as well as the fact that
subordination levels are greater than expected losses, which may
provide for payment of interest to the Certificates. DBRS ran cash
flow scenarios that incorporated principal and interest advancing
up to 180 days for delinquent loans; the cash flow scenarios are
discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow Analysis section of the
report.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (low) (sf) address the timely
payment of interest and full payment of principal (excluding
interest-only classes) by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB
(low) (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and
full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates.


ANGEL OAK 2017-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-2 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC
2017-1:

-- $78,141,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,261,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,993,000 class A-3 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,374,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,470,000 class B-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,566,000 class B-2 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:

-- $6,664,496 class B-3 certificates.

This is the fourth Fitch-rated RMBS transaction issued post-crisis
that consists primarily of newly originated, non-prime mortgage
loans. Fitch is taking a cautious approach towards this developing
sector as many of the entrants have limited operating histories and
performance track records. As a result, some transactions are
currently unable to achieve 'AAAsf' ratings from Fitch. This is
most applicable to aggregators with less than three years
experience acquiring loans from originators that Fitch is not
familiar with.

The 'AAAsf' for AOMT 2017-1 reflects the satisfactory operational
review conducted by Fitch of the originators, 100% loan-level due
diligence review with no material findings, a Tier 2 representation
and warranty framework, and the transaction's structure.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is collateralized with 79% non-qualified (Non-QM)
mortgages as defined by the Ability-to-Repay rule (ATR) while 5% is
designated as higher-priced QMs (HPQMs) and the remainder comprises
business purpose loans not subject to ATR.

The certificates are supported by a pool of 529 mortgage loans with
a weighted average original credit score of 698 and a weighted
average original combined loan to value ratio (CLTV) of 76.9%.
Roughly 29% consists of borrowers with prior credit events, 6% are
foreign nationals and 4% are second lien loans. In addition,
approximately 22% comprise loans to self-employed borrowers
underwritten to a 24-month bank statement program. 100% loan level
due diligence was performed to confirm adherence to guidelines and
controls and the transaction also benefits from an alignment of
interest as Angel Oak Real Estate Investment Trust I (Angel Oak
REIT I) or a majority owned affiliate, will be retaining a vertical
and horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not less than
5% of the aggregate fair market value of all the certificates in
the transaction.

The loan-level reps for this transaction are substantially
consistent with Fitch criteria; however, the framework lacks a
delinquency trigger for an automatic review and includes a testing
construct for identifying breaches that, in Fitch's view, limit the
breach reviewers ability to identify or respond to issues not fully
anticipated at closing. Fitch added credit enhancement at each
rating category (222 basis points at the 'AAAsf' rating category)
to mitigate the limitations of the framework and the
non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the providers. .

Initial credit enhancement for the class A-1 certificates of 46.65%
is substantially above Fitch's 'AAAsf' rating stress loss of
35.75%. The additional initial credit enhancement is primarily
driven by the pro rata principal distribution between the A-1, A-2
and A-3 certificates, which will result in a significant reduction
of the class A-1 subordination over time through principal payments
to the A-2 and A-3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Nonprime Credit Quality (Concern): The pool has a weighted average
(WA) original credit score of 698 and WA original combined
loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 76.9%. Roughly 29% consists of
borrowers with prior credit events, 6% are foreign nationals and 4%
are second lien loans. Twenty two loans experienced a delinquency
since origination, 17 of which were due to servicer transfer
issues. Approximately 22% was made to self-employed borrowers
underwritten to a 24-month bank statement program. An additional
13% allow for 30-day seasoning of assets to close compared to 60
days for full programs. Fitch applied default penalties to account
for these attributes and loss severity was adjusted to reflect the
increased risk of ATR challenges and loans with TILA RESPA
Integrated Disclosure (TRID) exceptions.

Satisfactory Originator Review and Track Record (Positive): Fitch
conducted an operational review of AOMS and AOHL and assessed them
as Average based on the companies' seasoned management team and
extensive nonprime mortgage experience, a comprehensive sourcing
strategy and sound underwriting and risk management practices. AOHL
(retail platform) commenced agency loan originations in 2011 and
ramped up its nonprime business in 2012. Correspondent and broker
originations are conducted by AOMS, which began operations in
2014.

Solid Due Diligence Results (Positive): Third-party loan-level due
diligence was performed on 100% of the pool, the results of which
generally reflect sound underwriting and operational controls. Of
the 452 loans subject to consumer compliance testing (443 of which
were subject to TRID), 60 were assigned 'C' grades due to material
noncompliance with TRID, with the majority of findings concentrated
in the fourth- and first-quarters of 2015 and 2016, respectively,
around the time TRID was implemented.

High Investor Property Concentration (Concern): Approximately 16%
of the pool comprises investment properties, 6% of which were
originated through the originators' investor cash flow program that
targets real estate investors qualified on a cash flow ratio basis.
While the borrower's credit score and LTV are used in the
underwriting of the cash flow loans, the ratio of mortgage
principal, interest, taxes, insurance and homeowner association
dues as a percentage of market rent, which averages 74.9%,
determines the cash flow ratio. In its analysis, Fitch assumed a
55% debt-to-income ratio (DTI) for these loans. The remaining
investor properties were underwritten to borrower DTIs.

Bank Statement Loans Included (Concern): Approximately 22% of the
pool (67 loans) was made to self-employed borrowers underwritten to
a 24-month bank statement program for verifying income in
accordance with either AOHL or AOMS' guidelines, which is not
consistent with Appendix Q standards and Fitch's view of a full
documentation program. While employment is fully verified and
assets partially confirmed, the limited income verification
resulted in application of a probability of default (PD) penalty of
approximately 1.5 times (x) for the bank statement loans at the
'AAAsf' rating category. Additionally, Fitch's assumed probability
of ATR claims was doubled, which increased the loss severity.

Southeast Geographic Concentration (Concern): Over one-half of the
pool is located in the southeastern United States in areas prone to
hurricane risk. Approximately 18% is located in the Miami
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), with concentrations on the
Georgia and North Carolina coasts. To account for loan and
geographic risk, Fitch increased the pool's loss expectations at
every rating category (roughly 80 basis points [bps] in the 'AAAsf'
scenario).

R&W Framework (Mixed): As sponsor, the REIT, Angel Oak Real Estate
Investment Trust I, (Angel Oak REIT I) will be providing loan-level
representations (reps) and warranties (R&W) to the trust. If the
REIT is no longer an ongoing business concern, it will assign to
the trust its rights under the mortgage loan purchase agreements
with the originators, which include repurchase remedies for rep and
warranty breaches. While the loan-level reps for this transaction
are substantially consistent with a Tier I framework, the lack of
the delinquency trigger for an automatic review and the nature of
the prescriptive breach tests limit the breach reviewers ability to
identify or respond to issues not fully anticipated at closing.
Fitch added credit enhancement at each rating category (222 bps at
the 'AAAsf' rating category) to mitigate the limitations of the
framework and the non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the
providers.

Alignment of Interests (Positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors. Angel Oak
REIT I as sponsor and securitizer, or an affiliate will retain a
vertical and horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not
less than 5% of the aggregate fair market value of all certificates
in the transaction. As part of its focus on investing in
residential mortgage credit, as of the closing date, Angel Oak REIT
I and Angel Oak Strategic Mortgage Income Master Fund, Ltd, as
co-sponsor, will retain the class B-2, B-3 and XS certificates.
Lastly, the reps and warranties are provided by Angel Oak REIT I,
or the originators in the event the REIT ceases operations, which
aligns their interests with those of investors to maintain high
quality origination standards and sound performance.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until all
three classes have been reduced to zero. To the extent that either
the cumulative loss trigger event or the delinquency trigger event
occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 bonds until they are
reduced to zero.

Performance Triggers (Mixed): Delinquency and loan loss triggers
convert principal distribution to a straight sequential payment
priority in the event of poor asset performance. Under Fitch's
front- and back-loaded default cash flow timing scenarios, the
transaction reverts to a straight sequential pay relatively
quickly, benefiting the senior classes. Additional scenarios were
analyzed to stress the sensitivity of the delinquency trigger,
which resulted in roughly 400-bp and 300-bp-increase to the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' credit enhancement (CE) levels, respectively, compared
to levels using Fitch's standard default timing scenarios.

Servicing and Master Servicer (Positive): Select Portfolio
Servicing (SPS), rated 'RPS1-'/Outlook Stable by Fitch, will be the
primary servicer. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), rated
'RMS1'/Outlook Negative, will act as master. Advances required but
not paid by SPS will be paid by Wells Fargo. Fitch does not rate
any primary servicer higher than SPS and does not rate any Master
Servicer higher than Wells Fargo.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated four criteria variations from the
'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria' which are described below. A
variation was made to Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria'
in regards to treatment of loans with prior credit events.
Historical data suggests that borrowers with similar credit scores
as those in the pool are nearly 20% more likely to default on a
future mortgage, as compared to all outstanding borrowers, if they
had a prior mortgage related credit event. This adjustment was
applied to the roughly 29% of the pool that had a prior mortgage
related credit event, resulting in approximately an 6% increase to
the pool's probability of default at each rating category.

Due to the structural features of the transaction, Fitch analyzed
the collateral with a customized version of one of its loss models.
Fitch's Alt-A Loan Loss Model was altered to include two additional
inputs; operational quality and liquid reserves. These variables
were not common in legacy Alt-A loans and were excluded in the
derivation of Fitch's Alt-A model. Given the improvement in today's
underwriting over legacy standards, these aspects were taken into
consideration and a net credit was applied to the pool.

A third variation was made as an outside of the model adjustment to
account for the higher than average property values of the mortgage
loans and its impact on the probability of default. Fitch's
analysis showed that loans associated with property values
significantly below the median exhibited higher default rates
relative to those at or above the median value and larger
properties are generally associated with higher income borrowers
who may be less sensitive to income shocks than lower income
borrowers. Less desirable, low-value properties may also increase
the default risk if the borrower has more difficulty selling the
home. The average property value for this pool was over $400k and
there is a large distribution of loans with very high property
values relative to those in the Alt-A model's data set. Because
this variable is not considered in the Alt-A model, PDs are higher
for these loans than what the data suggests.

Fitch views the loans with a 30 day seasoning requirement for
assets to close as having less than full documentation for
verification of assets (VOA) as Fitch views 60 day seasoning for
the assets as consistent with a full documentation VOA program.
However, the customized Alt-A model only has two treatments for
documentation, full or non-full. The non-full documentation
treatment for partially verified assets is too punitive since both
income and employment are fully verified and generally consistent
with the ATR Appendix Q documentation. Fitch analyzed those loans
(except for the foreign nationals, which requires 60 days) as a
less than full VOA documentation category using its prime model to
derive the PD penalty these loans.

The aggregate impact of these adjustments resulted in losses
approximately two notches lower than unadjusted legacy Alt-A model
output.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 5.7%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2013-WBRK: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-WBRK issued by BAMLL
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-WBRK as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. The transaction consists of a $360 million
interest-only loan secured by the fee and leasehold interest in
Willowbrook Mall, an enclosed, partial two-story super-regional
mall located in Wayne, New Jersey. The fee interest consists of
approximately 495,000 square feet (sf) of major tenant and in-line
space, while the leasehold interest consists of approximately
28,000 sf of in-line space subject to a long-term ground lease with
Lord & Taylor. The mall is anchored by Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Lord
& Taylor and Sears, which do not serve as collateral for the loan.
The property is well located with a population of 1.4 million
within a ten-mile radius as at 2016, coupled with strong income
demographics as the median household income was $70,450 within a
ten-mile radius and $89,569 within a five-mile radius of the
property. The loan is sponsored by General Growth Properties and
the property is managed by an affiliate of the sponsor.

According to a June 2015 news article published by NorthJersey.com,
the property underwent a renovation project to revitalize the look
of the mall and per the property's website, all renovation work has
been completed. The improvements included new flooring, new vaulted
ceilings, a redesigned food court, new charging stations for
electronics, new glass railings, interior landscaping, new paint
finishes and new upgraded restrooms and seating areas. DBRS has
requested the cost of the upgrades and a response is currently
outstanding as of the date of this press release; however,
according to a July 2015 news article by Chron.com, the cost was
estimated to exceed $10 million.

The property continues to exhibit strong occupancy rates with a
collateral occupancy rate of 97.9% and total mall occupancy of
99.3%, as reported by the September 2016 rent roll. The major
tenants include The Gap, Inc./GapKids/babyGap (3.8% of net rentable
area (NRA), with the lease expiring in September 2024), Forever XX1
(3.1% of NRA, with the lease expiring in January 2019) and Express
(2.8% of NRA, with the lease expiring in January 2024). Old Navy
originally had a lease expiration of January 2017, but renewed its
lease through July 2027, as part of a relocation into the former
Zara space, reducing Old Navy's footprint to 1.5%, from 5.0% of the
NRA. Old Navy's former space is currently vacant as illustrated in
the mall's online directory. DBRS has requested a leasing update
from the servicer and a response is currently pending as of the
date of this press release.

Tenants representing 18.1% of the NRA have leases that have
recently expired or will be expiring within the next six months. Of
those tenants, DBRS notes that shops representing 8.3% of NRA with
2016 or January 2017 lease expirations were either still listed in
the directory or will be replaced by a new tenant paying a higher
rental rate (as confirmed by information forwarded by the
servicer). According to CoStar, retail properties located within
the Passaic Route 46/23 submarket of Northern New Jersey reported a
vacancy rate of 6.8% as of February 2017, which increased from the
Q1 2016 vacancy rate of 5.7%.

The tenant sales report for the trailing 12-month (T-12) period
ending September 2016 showed consistency in overall in-line sales
performance for the property as compared with the YE2015 figures.
According to that report, tenants occupying less than 10,000 sf
reported T-12 sales of $762 per square foot (psf), flat from
YE2015, and tenants occupying more than 10,000 sf reported T-12
sales of $492 psf, a 1.4% decrease from $499 psf at YE2015. Apple
reported a T-12 sales figure of $5,958 psf, a 1.0% increase from
$5,900 psf at YE2015. The loan continues to exhibit strong
performance with a Q3 2016 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
2.95 times (x), an increase from the YE2015 DSCR of 2.92x, but
slightly below the YE2014 DSCR of 2.98x.

The ratings assigned to Class C and D materially deviate from the
higher rating implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology, in this case, the assigned ratings are a result of the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on five other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans in the pool,
the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-4, A-1A, A-M, and A-MA to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also reflect S&P's views regarding the
current and future performance of the transaction's collateral,
available liquidity support, and the significant reduction in trust
balance.

The affirmations on classes A-J, A-JA, B, and C reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings.  The affirmations also reflect
S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral, the transaction structure, and liquidity
support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.29 billion, which is 51.6% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 124 loans (reflecting
crossed loans), down from 185 loans at issuance.  One of these
loans ($7.5 million, 0.6%) is with the special servicer, 15 ($159.9
million, 12.4%) are defeased, and 42 ($390.3 million, 30.3%) are on
the master servicers' combined watchlist.  The master servicers,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and Prudential Asset Resources, reported
financial information for 97.6% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, of which 52.8% was partial-year or year-end 2016 data, and
the remainder was year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.14x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 92.1% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.98% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the specially serviced
loan and 15 defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $532.6 million (41.4%).
Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers, S&P's calculated an S&P
Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.05x and 98.6%,
respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $202.8 million in
principal losses, or 8.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 8.2% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the specially serviced loan.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, one loan in the
pool was with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III):

   -- The High Grove Plaza loan ($7.5 million, 0.6%) has a total
      reported exposure of $7.7 million.  The loan is secured by a

      retail property totaling 70,830 sq. ft. in Naperville, Ill.
      The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 23,

      2016, because of imminent monetary default.  C-III stated
      that it is evaluating options.  The reported DSC as of
      June 30, 2016, was 0.84x.  S&P expects a minimal loss (less
      than 25%) upon this loan's eventual resolution.

RATINGS RAISED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating
Class     To          From         Credit enhancement (%)
A-4       AAA (sf)    AA (sf)                      42.49
A-1A      AAA (sf)    AA (sf)                      42.49
A-M       A (sf)      BBB (sf)                     23.09
A-MA      A (sf)      BBB (sf)                     23.09

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-J       B- (sf)                    6.36
A-JA      B- (sf)                    6.36
B         CCC (sf)                   4.42
C         CCC (sf)                   2.48
X-1       AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A--Not applicable.


BEAR STERNS 1999-WF2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Class K Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of Bear Sterns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 1999-WF2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation to class J reflects the high credit enhancement
(CE), as a result of continued paydown, including defeasance
sufficient to pay down the class. Class K and class L were affirmed
at 'Dsf' due to losses already incurred.

Defeasance Collateral: As of the February 2017 remittance, 13 loans
(73.74% of the pool balance) are fully defeased. The outstanding
bond balance for class J is fully covered by the defeased
collateral. Scheduled maturity's for the defeased loans range
between July 2018 and January 2019.

Increased CE / Paydown: CE has increased from scheduled
amortization and loan payoffs since Fitch's prior rating action in
March 2016. The pool has paid down approximately $6.9 million in
the last 12 months (or 30% of the March 2016 pool balance), and
96.75% of the pool has paid down since issuance. Continued increase
in credit enhancement is expected from maturing loans and monthly
scheduled amortization, which is approximately $650,000 per month
per the February 2017 remittance report.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated, with
only 25 of the original 294 loans remaining in the pool. None of
the remaining loans are delinquent or in special servicing. One
loan (0.89% of the pool balance) is on the servicer's watchlist. Of
the remaining 12 non-defeased loans, five are multifamily
properties (11.9% of the pool balance), three industrial warehouses
(7.73% of the pool balance), one office property (2.07% of the pool
balance), and three have retail exposure (4.56% of the pool
balance). Scheduled maturities for the non-defeased loans range
between October 2018 and May 2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
The Rating Outlook on class L remains Stable. Fitch expects the
class to pay in full through defeased loans and ongoing
amortization. Classes K and L have realized losses and will remain
at 'Dsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $9.4 million class J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 95%;
-- $0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class M certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


C-BASS CBO VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to B1
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd:

US$12,000,000 Class D-1 Fifth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance of
$5,597,219.53), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

US$4,950,000 Class D-2 Fifth Priority Secured Fixed Rate Deferrable
Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance of
$2,308,853.03), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd, issued in November 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and ABS
originated in 2002 and 2003.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since July 2016. The Class C
notes have paid down completely and the Class D-1 and D-2 notes
have collectively paid down by approximately 19%, or $1.8 million
which included paydown of approximately $1.5 million of deferred
interest, since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the
current OC ratio of the Class D notes is 271.46%, versus 194.79% in
July 2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Primary causes of uncertainty about assumptions are the extent
of any deterioration in either consumer or commercial credit
conditions and in the residential real estate property markets. The
residential real estate property market's uncertainties include
housing prices; the pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modifications and refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest
rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries from
defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will continue and at
what pace. Faster than expected deleveraging could have a
significantly positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Amortization profile assumptions: Moody's modeled the
amortization of the underlying collateral portfolio based on its
assumed weighted average life (WAL). Regardless of the WAL
assumption, due to the sensitivity of amortization assumption and
its impact on the amount of principal available to pay down the
notes, Moody's supplemented its analysis with various sensitivity
analysis around the amortization profile of the underlying
collateral assets.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially if they jump to default.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (2803):

Class D-1: +1

Class D-2: +1

Caa ratings notched down by two notches (4470):

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: 0



CAN CAPITAL 2014-1: DBRS Cuts Class B Debt Rating to B(high)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has conducted a review of the two outstanding ratings on
the CAN Capital Funding LLC Series 2014-1 (CAN Capital or the
Company), Series 2014 Notes, Class A and Series 2014 Notes, Class B
(the Notes) structured finance asset-backed securities transaction.
Of the ratings reviewed, both Class A and Class B were downgraded
and removed from Under Review with Negative Implications. Class A
was downgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from its current rating of A (sf)
and removed from Under Review with Negative Implications. Class B
was downgraded to B (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf) and removed
from Under Review with Negative Implications. The downgrades are
based on credit enhancement levels that are not sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at the securities' previous respective
rating levels and now reflect credit enhancement, which DBRS
believes is more consistent with the new respective rating levels.

CAN Capital was placed Under Review with Negative Implications on
December 2, 2016, after the announcement that the Chief Executive
Officer and two other executives of the Company had been put on
leave of absence. At the November 2016 payment date, a Rapid
Amortization Event had also occurred, as actual
overcollateralization levels fell below the required levels for the
Notes. A subsequent review of the transaction's expected
performance resulted in the rating actions described above.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and projected
    performance.

As of the February 15, 2017 Distribution Date, the outstanding
principal balance of the Class A Notes was $69,873,193.93, as
reported in the Monthly Servicing Statement for the above
referenced transaction. The outstanding principal balance of the
Class B Notes was $20,000,000.00, as reported in the Monthly
Servicing Statement. As of the February 15, 2017 Distribution Date,
the Ending Eligible Aggregate Unamortized Funded Amount of the
transaction was $89,201,170.22, as reported in the Monthly
Servicing Statement for the above referenced transaction. As such,
the Notes currently do not benefit from credit enhancement in the
form of overcollateralization.

DBRS conducted the on-site operational update meeting with CAN
Capital on February 15, 2017, at the Company's locations in New
York City, New York and Kennesaw, Georgia. In addition, DBRS
reviewed the schedule of the expected amortization for the Notes
provided by CAN Capital, which included projected collections and
write-offs over the remaining life of the collateral pool. DBRS
also reviewed pertinent additional information provided by CAN
Capital and adjusted its baseline loss expectation for the
remaining collateral pool to approximately 14%. DBRS used its DBRS
collateralized loan obligation Asset Model to assess the stressed
net loss at various rating levels based on this updated baseline
loss expectation. In addition, DBRS estimated the breakeven net
losses for the pool based on the Company's projections and
additional assumptions with respect to prepayments, loss timing and
senior expenses in the transaction. The new ratings for the Notes
reflect the updated view of DBRS with respect to the expected
performance of the remaining collateral and sufficiency of the
credit enhancement available to each class of the Notes.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2004-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on M-3 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in CBA Commercial Assets,
Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2004-1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on P&I classes M-1, M-2 and M-3 were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus
realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class, Class IO, was downgraded due to
principal paydowns of higher quality referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 20.4% of the
current balance, unchanged from Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 13.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. IO was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CBAC 2004-1.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 4.4% of the pool is in
special servicing and an additional 55% of the pool was identified
by Moody's as troubled loans. In this approach, Moody's determines
a probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced and troubled loans to the most junior
classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior classes.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 30, compared to 37 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 30, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87.5% to $12.74
million from $102.0 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 44 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 44% of the pool.

Fifty loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $10.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 62%). Two loans, constituting 4.4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's has also assumed a high
default probability for 20 poorly performing loans, constituting
55% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss of $2.4
million (a 32% expected loss on average) from these specially
serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96%. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
10% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.13X and 1.21X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.



CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-J Debt to Ca(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the rating on one class in CD 2006-CD2 Commercial
Mortgage Trust as follows:

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the Class A-J was downgraded due to Moody's expected
plus realized losses. Class A-J has already experienced a 30%
realized loss from previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.2% of the
current balance, compared to 41.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 15.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CD 2006-CD2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, compared to 12 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $106 million
from $3.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 25%
of the pool.

Two loans, constituting 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $460 million (for an average loss
severity of 58%). Five loans, constituting 51% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Alpine Commons Shopping Center ($21.8 million -- 20.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a 209,000 SF retail center located
in Wappingers Falls, NY. The loan transferred to special servicing
in January 2016 due to maturity default and was extended by one
year. The property was 93% leased as of September 2016.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Galleria Pavilion
($14.2 million -- 13.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 64,000
SF retail center surrounding the Galleria at Sunset Mall located in
Henderson, NV. The loan transferred to special servicing in January
2016 due to imminent maturity default. The special servicer
indicated that they will be proceeding with foreclosure in 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Wabash Valley
Plaza ($7.1 million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
retail center located in Terre Haute, IN. The loan transferred to
special servicing in September 2015 due to imminent maturity
default and became REO in September 2016. The property was 84%
leased as of November 2016.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by retail
properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $16.1 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (30% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 89% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 7% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 44% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 9808 and 9868 Scranton Road Loan, formerly
known as the Conexant Building Loan ($26.8 million -- 25.3% of the
pool), which is secured by two four-story buildings located about
15 miles north of San Diego, CA. The property was originally fully
leased to Conexant Systems through 2017, but the tenant defaulted
on their lease and sub-leased to two tenants. In May 2015, a new
lease was executed with MCI, an affiliate of Verizon Wireless. The
property was 52% leased as of December 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 91% and
1.13X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Shelton Pointe Loan ($12.3 million
-- 11.6% of the pool), which is secured by an office property
located in Shelton, Connecticut, roughly 15 miles west of New
Haven, Connecticut. The property was 97% leased as of April 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.49X, respectively,
compared to 71% and 1.45X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Eastgate Business Center Loan ($7.1
million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is secured by an industrial
property located approximately 10 miles north of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. The property was 91% leased as of December 2016. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to
94% and 1.09X at the last review.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC19 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC19 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited by the transaction since issuance in 2014. The collateral
consists of 76 fixed-rate loans secured by 125 commercial
properties. As of the February 2017 remittance, the pool had an
aggregate balance of approximately $978.0 million, representing a
collateral reduction of 3.7%, following the full repayment of two
loans, LV III Portfolio (Prospectus ID#34) and Gateway Apartments
(Prospectus ID#67), in addition to scheduled loan amortization.
Three loans (1.9% of the pool) are secured by collateral that has
been fully defeased.

The pool is primarily concentrated by three property types, as 12
loans (31.7% of the pool) are secured by office properties, 30
loans (21.5% of the pool) are secured by retail properties and 22
loans (21% of the pool) are secured by multifamily properties. By
geographical location, the pool is relatively diverse, as the
largest concentration by state is in Arizona, which harbors five
loans (13.0% of the pool), followed by New York with five loans
(11.2% of the pool), Texas with 13 loans (11.0% of the pool) and
California with nine loans (8.5% of the pool). Four loans (12.7% of
the pool) are structured with full interest-only (IO) terms, while
an additional five loans (9.5% of the pool) have partial IO periods
remaining, ranging from two months to 25 months.

Excluding defeasance, 52 loans (77.5% of the pool) reported
partial-year 2016 (most being Q3 2016) net cash flow (NCF) figures,
while 70 loans (94.9% of the pool) reported YE2015 NCF figures.
According to the YE2015 NCF figures, the transaction had a
weighted-average (WA) amortizing debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and WA debt yield of 1.64 times (x) and 10.5%, respectively,
compared with the DBRS issuance figures of 1.43x and 8.9%,
respectively.

Based on the partial year 2016 cash flows, the Top 15 loans (57.0%
of the pool) reported a WA amortizing DSCR of 1.68x, compared with
the DBRS issuance figure of 1.47x, reflective of a WA NCF growth of
16.6%. There are three loans (11.6% of the pool) in the Top 15
exhibiting NCF declines compared with the DBRS UW figures, with
declines ranging from -8.4% to -17.5%. These three loans include
1500 Spring Garden (Prospectus ID#3, 7.1% of the pool), 350 North
Clark (Prospectus ID#10, 2.6% of the pool) and Mid-City Plaza
(Prospectus ID#13, 1.9% of the pool). In general, these trends are
not indicative of sustainable performance declines for those loans
and DBRS will monitor all three for developments through the full
year-end reporting.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and 12 loans (11.5% of the pool) on the servicer's
watchlist. Six of the watchlisted loans (8.0% of the pool) were
flagged for deferred maintenance, while the other six loans (3.5%
of the pool) were flagged as a result of either increased vacancy
and/or near-term tenant rollover. Based on the most recent cash
flow reporting (ranging from YE2015 through partial-year 2016
financials), these 12 loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.56x, compared
to the DBRS UW figure of 1.42x, reflective of a WA amortizing NCF
growth of 7.9%.

The ratings assigned to Classes D, E and F materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the Large Pool Multi-borrower
Parameters. DBRS considers this to be a methodology deviation when
there is a rating differential of three or more notches between the
assigned rating and the rating implied by the Large Pool
Multi-borrower Parameters; in this case, the sustainability of loan
performance trends were not demonstrated and, as such, was
reflected in the ratings.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC21: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC21 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC21 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates are
exchangeable for the Class C certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the pool consisted of 70 fixed-rate
loans secured by 111 commercial properties. As of the February 2017
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 2.4% since
issuance with all 70 of the original loans outstanding, with an
outstanding trust balance of $1.015 billion. Since issuance, three
loans, representing 2.2% of the pool balance, have fully defeased.
Based on the most recent year-end (YE) reporting for the underlying
loans, the pool reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.65 times (x) and a WA debt yield of
10.0%, both an improvement over the DBRS issuance figures of 1.39x
and 8.5%, respectively. It is noteworthy that the servicer's
reported figures for the fifth-largest loan, U-Haul Storage
Portfolio (Prospectus ID#5, 3.8% of the pool) are likely
artificially inflated due to the inclusion of non-collateral
income, with the YE2015 DSCR reported at 2.47x, as compared with
the DBRS DSCR at issuance of 1.34x. Excluding this loan, the WA
DSCR and WA debt yield for the pool (as based on the most recent YE
reporting) would be 1.61x and 9.7%, respectively. Approximately
82.8% of the pool is reporting year-to-date 2016 figures, with a WA
DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.76x and 10.6%, respectively, for those
loans as based on those figures.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are six loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 6.7% of the pool balance. Three
loans (representing 2.8% of the pool) are watchlisted for upcoming
tenant rollover. The other three loans are being monitored for
declining cash flows and a low DSCR. There are no loans in special
servicing.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the 375 Park Avenue loan (Prospectus
ID#1, 15.7% of the pool balance) and The Paramount Building loan
(Prospectus ID#6, 4.1% of the pool balance) investment grade. DBRS
has today confirmed that the performance of these loans remain
consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics.



COMM 2015-CCRE22: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 rated classes of Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2015-CCRE22 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Based on full-year 2015 financial statements
for reporting loans, the pool's overall net operating income has
increased 1.8% since last year's rating action. The pool has five
Fitch Loans of Concern (7.2%), which includes four loans on the
watchlist (6.8%) and one specially serviced loan (0.4%).

As of the February 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1% to $1.283 billion from
$1.296 billion at issuance. Per servicer reporting there are eight
loans (8.9%) on the watchlist. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting the non-rated class G.

High Fitch Leverage: Based on the loans that reported YE 2015
financials, the pool's DSCR and LTV were 98x and 97.52%,
respectively. At issuance, comparable deals had average DSCRs and
LTVs of 1.19x and 106.2%, respectively.

High New York Concentration: The largest state concentration is New
York (28.3%), with four of the 10 largest loans (22.4%) secured by
properties located in New York City. The next largest state
concentrations are: Texas (11.5%), California (8.0%), New Jersey
(7.4%) and Minnesota (7.4%). The largest loan in the pool (7.7%) is
secured by a property located in downtown Manhattan.

Limited Amortization: Eight loans, representing 30.1% of the pool,
are full term interest-only, and 26 loans, representing 41.2% of
the pool, are partial interest-only. The remainder of the pool
consists of 31 balloon loans representing 28.7% by balance, with
loan terms of five to 10 years. Based on the scheduled balance at
initial loan maturity, the pool will pay down 10.7%.

Pari-Passu Debt and Additional Debt: Four loans in the pool are
pari passu: 26 Broadway (7.7% of pool), 3 Columbus Circle (6.6% of
pool), 100 West 57th Street (4.6% of pool) and Patriots Park (2.0%
of pool). Four loans in the pool (19.9%) have existing subordinate
debt hold outside the trust.

Fitch will publish a focus report on the transaction within the
next several days.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable. Due to the
recent issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset level event changes the portfolio-level
metrics. Future upgrades may be limited due to the transaction's
high leverage.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $40.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $178.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $109 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $293.5 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $79.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $982.4 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $132.9 million class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68.1 million class X-C at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $213.9 million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56.7 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.6 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class F, G, H, and X-D certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on 3 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-M, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016
Affirmed B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-M, A-MFL, A-MFX, and B were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the P&I class A-J was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO Class (Class A-X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42.6% of the
current balance, compared to 9.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 16.2% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating IO securities called "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities,"
dated October 20, 2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as
proposed, the changes could affect the ratings of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C1.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 92.5% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 3.4% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17th, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to $549 million
from $3.37 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by twenty mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 91%
of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 3.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventy-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $375 million (for an average loss
severity of 24%). Sixteen loans, constituting 92.5% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Koger Center Loan ($115.5 million -- 21.5% of the
pool), which is secured by an office complex located in
Tallahassee, Florida consisting of 18 buildings. The loan was
transferred to Special Servicing on January 7th 2017. The Loan
matured on February 1st 2017 without being paid off. The largest
tenant is the State of Florida Department of Management Services,
which occupies 68% of the net rentable area (NRA) with a scheduled
lease expiration in October 2019. The properties were 88% leased as
of October 2016, compared to 92% leased as of March 2016.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the City Place-A note
($100.0 million -- 18.6% of the pool) , which is secured by a
756,000 square feet (SF) portion of a 1.3 million SF mixed-use
complex located in West Palm Beach, Florida. City Place is a three
level, open-air entertainment-enhanced retail center, with 54 flats
and 56 lofts style office spaces above the ground-level retail. The
loan was modified in April 2011, which extended the lease term and
created a $50 million hope note. The loan has subsequently
transferred back to special servicing in February 2016. In January
2017, Macy's, one of the property's anchor tenants, announced that
they will close the store at City Place by the end of 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Wells Fargo Place
Loan ($90.0 million -- 16.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
37-story office building in downtown St. Paul, Minnesota. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in May 2016 due to imminent
default. The Loan matured on November 2016 without being paid off.
Month-to-month tenants and impending lease expirations are the main
issues surrounding the inability of the borrower to obtain
refinancing.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $226.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (46% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.8 million (a 15% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the February 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $67.5 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and poorly performing loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

The sole performing loan is the Atlas Cold Storage Loan ($22
million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant
industrial property that was built in 2000 and is located in Mc
Donough, Georgia. The tenant Versacold Usa Inc that occupied 100%
of the NRA had a lease which expired in April 2016. Per the
borrower, a new tenant occupies 100% of the NRA starting from
August 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.97X.



CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C3: Moody's Hikes Class C Certs Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on four classes in CSFB Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C3:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes B and C were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 30% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on Classes D and E were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on IO class A-X was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes. The rating on IO class A-Y was affirmed based
on the credit performance of its referenced loans (residential
cooperatives).

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 26.5% of the
current balance, compared to 31.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.8% of the original
pooled balance, unchanged from the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X and Cl. A-Y
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CSFB 2005-C3.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of eight, compared to thirteen at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $64.5 million
from $1.64 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 94% of the pool. Eleven loans ($31.4
million -- 50% of the pool) are secured by residential co-ops
located primarily in New York City. These co-op loans have
structured credit assessments of aaa (sca.pd).

Eight loans, constituting 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $111.4 million (for an average
loss severity of 41%). Two loans, constituting 36% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Tri-Pointe Plaza ($12.8 million -- 20% of the pool), which
is secured by six office buildings totaling 152,500 square feet
(SF) and located in Tucson, Arizona. The loan transferred to
special servicing in July 2012 and became real estate owned (REO)
in July 2013. As of September 2016, the property was 56% leased,
compared to 51% at Moody's prior review.

The other specially serviced loan is the University Park Loan
($10.1 million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by a 109,000
SF retail center located in Clive, Iowa. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2014 for imminent payment default and
became REO in October 2015. The property was 73% leased as of
year-end 2016, compared to 85% at Moody's prior review.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 6.9% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $16.6 million (a 61% expected loss on average)
from these specially serviced and troubled loans.

As of the February 17, 2017 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $8.5 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 93% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 67%, compared to 90% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.55X,
respectively, compared to 0.99X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans without a structured credit
assessment represent 12.6% of the pool balance. The largest loan is
the Foxcroft Mobile Home Community Loan ($4.42 million -- 7.0% of
the pool), which is secured by a 321-unit mobile home community
located in Loch Sheldrake, New York. The loan is on the watchlist
for low DSCR as a result of increased expenses and low occupancy.
In addition, the borrower has not submitted recent financials and
remains unresponsive regarding requests for updated information.
The loan is fully amortizing and matures in February 2025. The loan
remains current on its debt service payments, however, due to the
low DSCR Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the Fishers Gateway Shops Loan ($3.1
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by an unanchored
retail center in Fishers, Indiana. As of March 2016, the property
was 75% leased to eight tenants, compared to 90% at year-end 2015.
The loan has amortized approximately 17% since securitization and
has maturity date in April 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
69% and 1.51X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.39X at the last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The third largest loan is the Wrens Trail Apartments Loan ($448,089
-- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 48-unit garden style
multi-family property located in Stow, Ohio. As of September 2016,
the property was 100% leased. The loan is on the watchlist for low
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) due to increased operating
expenses. The loan is fully-amortizing, has amortized 67% since
securitization and matures in July 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 46% and 1.93X, respectively, compared to 40% and 2.22X at
the last review.


DBUBS 2011-LC2: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three classes
and affirmed the ratings on eleven classes in DBUBS 2011-LC2
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-1C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. FX, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The pool has paid down by 21% since Moody's last
review and 34% since securitization.

The ratings on eight P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on three IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of
their respective referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. FX, X-A and X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of DBUBS 2011-LC2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34.2% to $1.4
billion from $2.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 43 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 69.6% of the pool. One loan, constituting
1.6% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. One loan, constituting 0.8% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

Five loans, constituting 6.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans that have been liquidated from the pool. One
loan, constituting 0.6% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Montgomery Village
Professional Center Loan ($8.8 million), which is secured by an
office complex containing eight contiguous two-story, walk-up
buildings totaling 72,000 square feet (SF). The property is located
in Gaithersburg, Maryland approximately 30 miles northwest of
Washington, D.C. The loan transferred to special servicing in May
2014 due to payment default and became REO in April 2015. The
special servicer indicated that the resolution strategy is to
reposition the property for sale as a prospective redevelopment.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 98% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 85.4%, compared to 87.2% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Angelica
Portfolio Loan ($21.9 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is
secured by 12 industrial facilities located in eight states and
100% occupied by Angelica Corporation under a 20-year lease which
expires in January 2030. The average age of the collateral is 25
years. Performance has improved since securitization. Due to the
single tenant exposure, Moody's value incorporate a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.55X, respectively, compared to a2 (sca.pd)
and 1.58X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 41.8% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the US Steel Tower Loan ($202.1 million --
14.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 64-story, Class A office
building located in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The property
serves as the headquarters for US Steel and the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC). As per the December 2016 rent
roll the property was 91.7% leased, compared to 91.5% leased as of
October 2015. Financial performance has improved since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78.8% and 1.27X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.25X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Willowbrook Mall Loan ($195.6
million -- 13.9% of the pool), which is secured by the 400,466
square foot (SF) in-line component of a 1.4 million square foot
(SF) regional mall located in Houston, Texas. Anchors include
Dillard's, Macy's, Macy's Men and Furniture, Sears, and J.C.
Penney. All anchors own their own improvements and are not part of
the loan collateral. Total property occupancy was 93% as of
September 2016, compared to 94% as of December 2015. As of
September 2016, the running twelve month sales for total in-line
tenants less than 10,000 SF were $577 per square foot. Performance
has been steadily improving since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 83.8% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 86.9%
and 1.09X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 498 7th Avenue Loan ($192.1 million
-- 13.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 25-story office
building located between 36th and 37th Street in the Garment
District of New York City. As per the December 2016 rent roll, the
property was 100% leased, compared to 98% leased in September 2015.
The largest tenants are Group M Worldwide (41% of NRA, lease
expiration November 2018) and LN Holdings (22% of NRA, lease
expiration January 2019). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89.6%
and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.05X at last review.


EMERSON PLACE: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C notes
from Emerson Place CLO Ltd., a U.S. broadly syndicated
collateralized loan obligation (CLO), and removed them from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 6, 2016.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on the class A, D, and
E notes from the same transaction.  Emerson Place CLO Ltd. closed
in November 2006 and is managed by NewStar Capital LLC, which
acquired the former manager, Feingold O'Keeffe Capital LLC, in
October 2015.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the February 2017 trustee report.

Since S&P's March 2015 rating actions, this transaction has paid
down the class A notes by $108.5 million to 0.25% of its initial
issuance amount, resulting in a significant increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

   -- The senior class A/B O/C ratio increased to 229.75% from the

      131.35% reported in Feb. 2015.

   -- The mezzanine class C O/C ratio increased to 118.03% from
      108.69%.  The class E O/C ratio increased to 106.63% from
      102.73%.

In addition, the portfolio's credit quality has remained stable
during the same time period as the balance of 'CCC' rated assets
has remained around $10 million and the balance of defaulted assets
decreased to zero from $3.8 million.  S&P's upgrades on the class B
and C notes reflect the increase in credit support available due to
the paydowns to the class A notes and the stable credit quality of
the portfolio.

However, the percentage of long-dated assets (assets that mature
after the legal final maturity date) has increased to 71% from 47%
as of S&P's March 2015 review.  For S&P's analysis, it considered
various liquidation values for the long-dated bucket, consistent
with S&P's methodology and assumptions for both market value
securities and corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.
Although cash flows results indicated higher ratings, S&P's rating
actions on the class B and D notes reflect its application of its
market value assumptions for the long-dated assets.

S&P's cash flow results indicated a downgrade on the class E notes.
Given the portfolio's stable credit quality, the O/C increases
since S&P's prior review, and the CLO's legal final maturity in
2019, S&P believes this class is not at risk for imminent default.
S&P's affirmation on the class E notes also reflects its
application of its criteria for assigning 'CCC' ratings.

The affirmations on the class A, D, and E notes reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Emerson Place CLO Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             A+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Emerson Place CLO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
D             B- (sf)
E             CCC+ (sf)



FREDDIE MAC 2017-SC01: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. M-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to two
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2017-SC01 (FWLS
2017-SC01). The ratings range from (P)Baa1 (sf) to (P)Ba3 (sf). The
certificates are backed by two pools of fixed-rate super conforming
prime residential mortgage loans. The collateral pools consist of
loans acquired by Freddie Mac from four sellers (Caliber Home
Loans, Inc. (65.9%), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (19.1%), Quicken Loans,
Inc. (10.0%), and Fremont Bank (4.9%)), pursuant to the terms of
the Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide. Freddie Mac
will serve in a number of capacities with respect to the Trust.
Freddie Mac will be the Guarantor of the Senior Certificates,
Seller, Master Servicer, Master Document Custodian and Trustee.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2017-SC01

Cl. M-1, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected losses on pool 1 average 0.45% in a base-case
scenario and reach 6.00% at a stress level consistent with Aaa
rating on the senior classes. Moody's expected losses on pool 2
average 0.90% in a base-case scenario and reach 10.80% at a stress
level consistent with Aaa rating on the senior classes. Moody's
arrived at these expected losses using Moody's MILAN model. Moody's
Aaa stress loss for pool 1 is consistent with prime jumbo
transactions Moody's has recently rated. The lower FICO scores and
slightly higher CLTV on pool 2 contributed to the higher loss
expectations on the pool. In Moody's analysis, Moody's considered
the observed loss severity trends on Freddie Mac loans. Moody's did
not make any adjustments related to servicers and originators'
assessments. However, Moody's decreased Moody's base case and Aaa
loss expectation 5% due to the strong representation and warranties
provider (Freddie Mac).

Collateral Description

The FWLS 2017-SC01 transaction is backed by a total of 1,227
fixed-rate super conforming prime residential mortgage loans with a
balance of $639,914,335. Pool 1 is backed by 656 loans with a
balance of $341,119,843 and pool 2 is backed by 571 loans with a
balance of $298,794,492. The collateral pools consist of loans
acquired by Freddie Mac from multiple sellers pursuant to the terms
of the Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide. The
weighted average CLTV is 74.9% for the aggregate pool, and 72.3%
and 77.9% for pool 1 and pool 2 loans respectively. The weighted
average FICO for the aggregate pool is 750, and 760 and 738 for
pool 1 and pool 2 loans respectively.

Third-Party Review(TPR)

Clayton conducted a review of credit, property valuations,
regulatory compliance (regulatory compliance was conducted only for
loans in the sample which were in states with assignee liability
laws and or regulations) and data accuracy checks for 314 mortgage
loans (from an initial pool of 1,254 loans). Moody's reviewed the
TPR reports and there were no exceptions for credit, property
valuations, and regulatory compliance. The data accuracy exceptions
were minor and did not pose a material risk.

Representations & Warranties (R&Ws)

Freddie Mac will make certain representations and warranties with
respect to the mortgage loans and will be the only party from which
the trust may seek repurchase of a mortgage loan as a result of any
material breach that provides for repurchase as a remedy. Freddie
Mac's Aaa senior ratings are underpinned by strong government
support. Moody's believes that the US Government will stand behind
obligations of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, meet the baseline set
of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's has identified for US RMBS.

Structural considerations

The securitization has a two-pool 'Y' structure that distributes
principal on a pro rata basis between the senior and subordinate
classes subject to performance triggers, and sequentially amongst
the subordinate certificates. The transaction has two distinct
features: recoupment of unpaid interest on stop advance loans and
shifting certain principal payments, subject to limits, to cover
interest shortfalls to the rated subordinate bonds due to interest
rate modifications and extra-ordinary expenses.

In this transaction, Freddie Mac will stop advancing principal and
interest on any real-estate owned (REO) property or loans that are
180 days or more delinquent. This will decrease the amount of
interest remitted to the trust and could result in interest
shortfalls to the bonds. However, interest accrued but not paid on
the stop advance loans will be recovered from the liquidation
proceeds (for liquidated loans), borrower payments, modification or
repurchases and added to the interest remittance amount. This will
result in subsequent recoveries of any interest shortfalls on
subordinates bonds in the order of their payment priority.

Also, in this transaction, the certificates are exposed to interest
shortfalls due to interest rate modifications and extra-ordinary
expenses. If the interest accrued on the Class B certificate is
insufficient to absorb the reduction in interest amount caused by
modification and extra-ordinary expenses, and to the extent that
the Class B certificate is outstanding, the transaction allows for
certain principal payments (up to subordinate percentage of
scheduled principal) to be re-directed to cover interest shortfall
to the rated bonds, with a corresponding write-down of Class B
principal balance. As a result, before Classes M-1 or M-2 suffer
any unrecoverable interest shortfall, the Class B certificate
balance has to be reduced to zero. The Class B certificate
represents 1% of the collateral.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Downgrade

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Upgrade

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.
In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies, available to all
registered users of Moody's website, www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck.



FREMF 2017-K63: Fitch to Rate Class C Debt at 'BB+sf
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on FREMF 2017-K63
Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates and Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

FREMF 2017-K63 Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
-- $160,330,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,063,400,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000a class X2-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,807,000 class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,004,000 class C 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063
-- $160,330,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,063,400,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only
(b) Guaranteed by Freddie Mac. Ratings are based solely on the
underlying collateral and without respect to the Freddie Mac
guarantee.
(c) Classes A-M and XAM could be rated 'AAAsf' if the Freddie Mac
guarantee would be accounted for.

These expected ratings are based on the information provided by the
issuer as of March 6, 2017. Fitch does not expect to rate the
following classes of FREMF 2017-K63: the $212,823,435 interest-only
class X3, the $296,433,435 interest-only class X2-B, and the
$114,012,435 class D.

Additionally, Fitch does not expect to rate the following class of
Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063: the
$212,823,435 interest-only class X3.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust. The trust's primary assets are 46 loans secured by 46
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.52 billion as of the cut-off date. The Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063 (Freddie Mac SPC
K-063) represents a pass-through interest in the corresponding
class of securities issued by FREMF 2017-K63. Each Freddie Mac SPC
K-063 security has the same designation as its underlying FREMF
2017-K63 class. All loans were originated specifically for Freddie
Mac by approved Seller Servicers. The certificates follow a
sequential-pay structure.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.5% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 85.2% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.96x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 121.7% and
a Fitch debt yield of 6.8%. Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 8.8% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Leverage Than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The pool's
Fitch stressed DSCR and LTV are 0.96x and 121.7%, respectively.
These metrics identify the pool as having higher leverage than
recent comparable transactions. Fitch-rated 10-year K series
Freddie Mac deals had a 2016 average DSCR and LTV of 1.04x and
117.3%, respectively.

More Concentrated than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The average
loan size for the transaction is $33.0 million, which is much
higher than the Fitch-rated Freddie Mac 10-year 2016 average of
$17.3 million. Additionally, the pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) score of 302 is worse than the 2016 Freddie Mac 10-year
average of 253.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.6% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to FREMF
2017-K63 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario which
NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the
'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.


FREMF 2017-K63: Fitch to Rate Class C Debt at 'BB+sf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on FREMF 2017-K63
Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates and Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

FREMF 2017-K63 Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
-- $160,330,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,063,400,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000a class X2-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,807,000 class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,004,000 class C 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063
-- $160,330,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,063,400,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only
(b) Guaranteed by Freddie Mac. Ratings are based solely on the
underlying collateral and without respect to the Freddie Mac
guarantee.
(c) Classes A-M and XAM could be rated 'AAAsf' if the Freddie Mac
guarantee would be accounted for.

These expected ratings are based on the information provided by the
issuer as of March 6, 2017. Fitch does not expect to rate the
following classes of FREMF 2017-K63: the $212,823,435 interest-only
class X3, the $296,433,435 interest-only class X2-B, and the
$114,012,435 class D.

Additionally, Fitch does not expect to rate the following class of
Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063: the
$212,823,435 interest-only class X3.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust. The trust's primary assets are 46 loans secured by 46
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.52 billion as of the cut-off date. The Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063 (Freddie Mac SPC
K-063) represents a pass-through interest in the corresponding
class of securities issued by FREMF 2017-K63. Each Freddie Mac SPC
K-063 security has the same designation as its underlying FREMF
2017-K63 class. All loans were originated specifically for Freddie
Mac by approved Seller Servicers. The certificates follow a
sequential-pay structure.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.5% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 85.2% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.96x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 121.7% and
a Fitch debt yield of 6.8%. Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 8.8% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Higher Leverage Than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The pool's
Fitch stressed DSCR and LTV are 0.96x and 121.7%, respectively.
These metrics identify the pool as having higher leverage than
recent comparable transactions. Fitch-rated 10-year K series
Freddie Mac deals had a 2016 average DSCR and LTV of 1.04x and
117.3%, respectively.

More Concentrated than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The average
loan size for the transaction is $33.0 million, which is much
higher than the Fitch-rated Freddie Mac 10-year 2016 average of
$17.3 million. Additionally, the pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) score of 302 is worse than the 2016 Freddie Mac 10-year
average of 253.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.6% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to FREMF
2017-K63 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario which
NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the
'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more severe
scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could result.



GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: DBRS Assigns (P)B Ratings to Class B5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-1 (the
Certificates) issued by Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1 (GFMT
2017-1 or the Trust):

-- $220.2 million Class A11 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class AX11 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class A12 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class AX12 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class A13 at AAA (sf)
-- $220.2 million Class AX13 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class A21 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class AX21 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class A22 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class AX22 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class A23 at AAA (sf)
-- $203.6 million Class AX23 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A31 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class AX31 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A32 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class AX32 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class A33 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class AX33 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class A41 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class AX41 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class A42 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class AX42 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class A43 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class AX43 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A51 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class AX51 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A52 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class AX52 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class A53 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class AX53 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class X3 at AAA (sf)
-- $152.7 million Class X4 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.9 million Class X5 at AAA (sf)
-- $8.5 million Class B1 at AA (sf)
-- $8.5 million Class BX1 at AA (sf)
-- $10.8 million Class B2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $10.8 million Class BX2 at A (low) (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class B3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class BX3 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $2.5 million Class B4 at BB (sf)
-- $3.3 million Class B5 at B (sf)

Classes AX11, AX12, AX13, AX21, AX22, AX23, AX31, AX32, AX33, AX41,
AX42, AX43, AX51, AX52, AX53, X3, X4, X5, BX1, BX2 and BX3 are
interest-only (IO) certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A11, AX11, A12, AX12, A13, AX13, A21, AX21, A22, AX22, A23,
AX23, A31, AX32, A33, A41, AX42, A43, A51, AX52, A53 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 13.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (low) (sf), BBB (low) (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf)
ratings reflect 10.15%, 5.90%, 3.50%, 2.50% and 1.20% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the classes specified above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of mostly
expanded prime qualified mortgage (QM) and non-QM first-lien
residential mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 363 loans
with a total principal balance of $254,554,479 as of the Cut-Off
Date (February 1, 2017).

The mortgage loans were originally acquired by GMRF Mortgage
Acquisition Company LLC (the Sponsor) directly from either
originators or a third-party aggregator. The Sponsor is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Galton Mortgage Recovery Master Fund III, L.P.

The majority of the loans in this securitization (92.3%) are Credit
Grade A+ (Galton Program) borrowers with unblemished credit who may
not meet prime jumbo or agency/government guidelines. While certain
attributes are comparable with post-crisis prime transactions, the
loans in the GFMT 2017-1 portfolio may have IO features, higher
debt-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, lower credit
scores and barbelled distribution of certain characteristics as
compared with recent prime securitizations. However, the overall
credit profile of the Galton pool is much stronger than those of
other non-QM programs rated by DBRS.

The originators for the mortgage pool are Priority Financial
Network (17.6%); Parkside Lending, LLC (16.2%); RPM Mortgage, Inc.
(15.3%); Oaktree Funding Corp. (14.9%); PHH Mortgage Corp. (5.6%);
and various other originators, each comprising less than 5.0% of
the mortgage loans. The loans will be serviced by New Penn
Financial, LLC doing business as (dba) Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing. Galton Mortgage Loan Seller LLC (GMLS) will act as the
Servicing Administrator.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA (high) with a
Negative trend by DBRS) will act as the Master Servicer, Securities
Administrator and Custodian. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB,
dba Christiana Trust, will serve as Trustee.

In accordance with the CFPB QM rules, 22.3% of the loans are
designated as QM Safe Harbor, 9.1% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and
35.1% as non-QM. Approximately 33.6% of the loans are not subject
to the QM rules.

The Servicing Administrator will generally fund advances of
delinquent principal and interest (P&I) on any mortgage until such
loan becomes 120 days delinquent and is obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes, insurance premiums and reasonable costs
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that has been modified to allow available funds to
pay interest to the Class B1 and BX1 Certificates before paying
principal to the Senior Certificates.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths, including the
following:

(1) Satisfactory Underwriting Standards: Underwriting standards
have improved significantly from the pre-crisis era. The majority
of loans in this transaction (78.5%) were underwritten to a full
documentation standard with respect to verification of income
(generally through two years of W-2 forms or personal tax
statements), employment and assets. Some self-employed borrowers in
this pool were underwritten for income verification using 24 months
of bank statements (22.6% of the pool) and 12 months of bank
statements (24.1% of the pool). These borrowers have also provided
evidence of self-employment in the same business for the past two
years with a business narrative, as needed. For loans that were
underwritten to a less-than-full documentation standard, borrowers
were required to have stronger credit profiles or more equity in
their properties compared with a full-documentation loan.
Nonetheless, DBRS penalized such less-than-full documentation loans
by assigning lower documentation grades, which resulted in higher
expected losses for such loans.

(2) Robust Pool Composition: The loans in the pool, for the most
part, have relatively low LTV and DTI ratios and are made to
borrowers with robust FICO scores, incomes and reserves. The pool
is composed of loans with a weighted-average (WA) FICO score (based
on the lower of primary borrower and co-borrower's refreshed FICO
scores) of 744 and WA original combined LTV (CLTV) of 67.6%. The
borrowers have a WA DTI of 31.9% with WA reserves of approximately
$563,010 and WA annual income (primary borrower) of approximately
$444,318. Additionally, 93.4% of the pool consists of fixed-rate
loans, with only 6.1% having IO features. Although, when compared
with prime jumbo transactions, certain loan attributes, such as LTV
ratios and FICO scores, have a more barbelled distribution, the
Galton guidelines have compensating factors, such as capping the
DTI ratio or requiring additional reserves for the riskier loans.

(3) Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party
due diligence firm conducted property valuation, credit and
compliance reviews on 100.0% of the loans in the pool. Data
integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

(4) Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Galton
established the conduit and commenced activity in September 2014.
The first loan was acquired by the conduit in January 2015. Of
approximately 575 first-lien mortgages that were aggregated as of
December 2016, only four loans were ever 30 days delinquent
(excluding any servicing transfer issues), and these loans
self-cured shortly after.

(5) 100% Current Loans: All loans are current as of the Cut-Off
Date. Additionally, no loan in the securitization has had prior
delinquencies since origination.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

(1) Geographic Concentration: This transaction has a high
concentration of loans in California (CA), which represents 76.5%
of the loans in the transaction. Performance of loans that are
highly concentrated in a particular region may be more sensitive to
any deterioration in economic conditions or the occurrence of a
natural disaster in that region. Some mitigating factors include
the following:
(a) DBRS's RMBS Insight model generates an elevated asset
correlation, as determined by loan size and geographic
concentration, for this portfolio compared with pools with similar
collateral, resulting in higher expected losses across rating
categories.
(b) There is metropolitan statistical area (MSA) diversity in the
pool for the loans from California.
(c) Nonetheless, DBRS believes that the elevated concentration of
Los Angeles loans demands additional penalties and credit
protection. DBRS applied the following stresses in its RMBS Insight
model, which increases the expected losses for the loans located in
the Los Angeles area:
(i) Increased the market value decline assumption for all
properties in the Los Angeles area by an additional 50% at each
rating category.
(ii) Increased the unemployment rate stress for borrowers in the
Los Angeles area.

(2) QM Rebuttable Presumption, Non-QM and Investor Loans: This
portfolio contains QM Rebuttable Presumption or non-QM loans, as
well as a significant concentration of investor loans. Some
mitigating factors include the following:
(a) All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
factors as required by the ATR rules. The loans were also
underwritten to comply with the standards set forth in Appendix Q.

(b) Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the
pre-crisis era.
(c) The DBRS RMBS Insight model incorporates loss severity
penalties for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans, as
explained further in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the
report for this transaction.
(d) Investor loans represent higher default risk (1.2 times (x) to
1.8x penalty) relative to owner-occupied loans holding other
attributes constant. In addition, investor loans in this pool have
a better credit profile than the overall pool, with a WA FICO of
758, WA original CLTV of 56.0%, WA DTI of 31.1% and substantial
liquid reserves at approximately $403,222. Finally, the Galton
guidelines have certain LTV caps and FICO floors for investor
properties.

(3) Representations and Warranties Framework: This transaction
employs a standard that includes materiality factors. Some of the
originators in the transaction may have limited history in
securitizations and/or may potentially experience financial stress
that could result in their inability to fulfill repurchase
obligations as a result of breaches of representations and
warranties. This transaction provides the following mitigating
factors:
(a) Third-party due diligence was conducted on 100% of the pool
with satisfactory results, which mitigates the risk of future
representations and warranties violations.
(b) The mortgage loans benefit from representations and warranties
backstopped by GMLS in the event of an originator's bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding and if the originator fails to cure,
repurchase or substitute loans for such a breach.
(c) The performance of the aggregated collateral, although limited
in history, has been satisfactory to date.
(d) Automatic reviews on certain representations are triggered on
any loan that becomes 120 days delinquent or any loan that has
incurred a cumulative loss.
(e) The reviewer is required to review any triggered loans for
breaches of representations and warranties in accordance with
predetermined procedures and processes.
(f) Certain disputes are ultimately subject to the determination
made in a related arbitration proceeding.
(g) Notwithstanding the above, DBRS reduced the originator scores,
which resulted in higher expected losses.

(4) Advances of Delinquent P&I: The Servicing Administrator will
advance scheduled P&I on delinquent mortgages until such loans
become 120 days delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss
severities to the transaction because advanced P&I will not have to
be reimbursed from the Trust upon the liquidation of the mortgages
but will increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls
to the Certificateholders. Mitigating factors include available
funds are used to pay interest to the Senior Certificates and Class
B1 and Class B1X Certificates before paying principal to the Senior
Certificates and subordination levels are greater than expected
losses, which may provide for payment of interest to the
Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that incorporated P&I
advancing up to 120 days for delinquent loans; the cash flow
scenarios are discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow Analysis
section of the report for this transaction.

(5) Servicing Administrator's Financial Capability: In this
transaction, the Servicing Administrator is responsible for funding
advances to the extent required. The Servicing Administrator is an
unrated entity and may face financial difficulties in fulfilling
its servicing advance obligation in the future. Consequently, the
transaction employs Wells Fargo as the Master Servicer. If the
Servicing Administrator fails in its obligation to make advances,
Wells Fargo will be obligated to fund such servicing advances.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (low) (sf ), BBB (low)
(sf ), BB (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors are detailed in the report for this transaction. Please see
the related appendix for additional information regarding the
sensitivity of assumptions used in the rating process.


GALTON FUNDING 2017-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. B5 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 41
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1 (GFMT 2017-1). The ratings
range from Aaa (sf)- B2 (sf).

GFMT 2017-1 is the first residential mortgage backed securities
(RMBS) issuance from the sponsor, GMRF Mortgage Acquisition Company
LLC (Galton). The certificates are backed by 363 prime-quality,
primarily 30-year, fixed-rate residential mortgages with total
unpaid balance of $254,554,479 and a weighted average (WA) mortgage
rate of 4.94%. The loans were originated by multiple originators
and purchased by Galton. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will be the
servicer of the loans in the pool. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act
as the Master Servicer. The transaction benefits from the Dodd
Frank Act's risk retention requirements, which requires the sponsor
or its affiliate to hold 5% of the transaction's credit risk, and
improves alignment of interests between the sponsor and investors.

The credit quality of the collateral backing GFMT 2017-1 is strong
with a high overall WA borrower FICO score of 753 and a WA Combined
Loan-To-Value Ratio (CLTV) of 67.6%. Moreover the majority of the
loans are fixed rate (93.4%) and owner-occupied (64.8%). The WA
seasoning is 11 months, with no mortgage delinquency since
origination. 35.1% of the loans are non-Qualified Mortgage (non-QM)
loans. The non-QM designations are attributable to either
debt-to-income ratios above 43%, alternative income documentation
or interest-only periods. 44.6% of the loans were made to
self-employed borrowers. The transaction provides 100% due
diligence of data integrity, credit, property valuation, and
compliance conducted by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), an independent
third-party firm.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations to the
bonds will be based on a typical shifting-interest structure that
benefits from a 2.5% subordination floor. The subordination floor
protects against losses that occur late in the life of the pool
when relatively few loans remain (tail risk), by diverting all
principal to the senior bonds when total senior subordination is
less than 2.5% of the original pool balance. The transaction also
has a stop advance feature that benefits the senior classes. There
is no principal or interest advancing for loans that are 120 days
or more delinquent. Any interest shortfall resulting from this
provision will reduce the available distribution amount. Any
interest shortfalls resulting from this feature will be fully
subordinated and result in a principal loss to the most subordinate
classes.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. A11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A31, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX31, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A32, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX32, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A33, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AX33, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A41, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX41, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A42, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX42, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A43, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX43, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A51, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX51, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A52, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX52, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A53, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX53, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. X4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. BX1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. BX2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. BX3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the pool averages 1.00% in
a base scenario and reaches 13.50% at a stress level consistent
with Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using US Moody's Individual
Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level collateral
information as of the Cut-off Date. Loan-level adjustments to the
model results included adjustments to probability of default for
higher and lower borrower DTIs, for borrowers with multiple
mortgaged properties, self-employed borrowers, potential fees and
penalties resulting from legal challenges on non-QM loans and
higher-priced QM loans, and for the risk owing to super-priority
homeownership association (HOA) liens in certain states. Moody's
final loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
quality and the representation & warranty (R&W) framework.

Moody's bases its ratings on the certificates on the credit quality
of the mortgage loans, the structural features of the transaction,
Moody's assessments of the aggregator, originators and servicers,
the strength of the third party due diligence and the
representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

The loan pool contains 363 prime-quality 30-year (96.88%), 15-year
(1.85%) and 40-year (1.27%) primarily fixed-rate residential
mortgages with total unpaid balance of $254,554,479 and a weighted
average (WA) mortgage rate of 4.94%.

The credit quality of the collateral backing GFMT 2017-1 is strong
with a high WA borrower FICO score of 753 and a WA Combined
Loan-To-Value Ratio (CLTV) of 67.6%. However, compared to recent
prime jumbo transactions Moody's has rated, the pool has a higher
percentage of non-Qualified Mortgage (non-QM) loans (35.1% of the
pool), loans whose borrowers were qualified using alternative
documentation (21.5% of the pool), loans who had prior credit
derogatory events (9.1% of the pool), such as bankruptcies, short
sales and foreclosures and a higher percentage of borrowers with
low FICO scores (11.6% with FICO scores less than 700) or high
CLTVs ( 25.1% of the loans have a CLTV greater than 80%). The
non-QM loans are largely a result of debt-to-income (DTI) ratios
above 43%, alternative borrower income documentation, or
interest-only provisions. The borrowers who were qualified using
alternative documentation mainly provided 12 or 24 months' bank
statements for income verification.

The loans were aggregated by Galton from 27 different originators,
and all of the loans were underwritten to Galton's acquisition
guidelines. Galton's acquisition guidelines differ from those of
other aggregators of prime RMBS that Moody's rates in that they
allow for higher DTIs, prior seasoned credit derogatory events,
alternative income qualification, such as bank statements, and
higher LTVs and CLTVs. The largest four originators, who each
contributed more than 10% of the pool, are BM Real Estate Services
(17.6%), Parkside Lending, LLC (16.2%), RPM Mortgage Inc. (15.3%)
and Oaktree Funding Corp. (14.9%).

The borrowers in this transaction generally have significant liquid
cash reserves, high residual income and, in most cases, sizeable
equity in their properties. Moreover, no loan has had a delinquency
since loan origination and 100% of borrowers with prior mortgages
had a clean 24-month pay history on their prior loans.

A large percentage of the loans in the pool (44.6%) were made to
self-employed borrowers. Self-employed borrowers typically have
less stable incomes than wage earners, although a self-employed
borrower is not always riskier than a wage earner. Furthermore,
approximately 21.5% of the loans, all to self-employed borrowers,
were qualified using alternative income documentation, such as 24
or 12 months of bank statements, rather than tax returns.
Verification of income using banks statements, particularly
short-term bank statements can introduce some risks due to the
subjective underwriting of such loans. Moody's believes that income
verification using 24 months of bank statements is stronger than
partial documentation loans originated prior to 2008, and Moody's
enhancement levels considered model runs assuming these loans were
fully documented. Moody's made model adjustments for self-employed
borrowers that increased credit enhancement levels.

Third-party Review

AMC, an independent third party firm, reviewed 100% of the loans in
this transaction for credit, regulatory compliance, property
valuation, and data accuracy. The due diligence results confirm
compliance with Galton's acquisition guidelines for the vast
majority of loans, with a handful of findings related to minor
variances from the guidelines, with compensating factors. AMC
identified six loans having material compliance violations, mainly
related to technical TRID errors which the lender took efforts to
cure or the reviewer believed error was not curable. Moody's
believes that these errors represent low risk to the trust. The
review did not identify any material valuation issues. AMC
identified a number of discrepancies between the data tape and the
files utilized during the due diligence reviews, mainly related to
DTI. The data discrepancies were corrected on the final loan tape.
The significant amount of DTI discrepancies partially informed
Moody's increase to expected losses owing to originator quality.

Representations & Warranties (R&W) Framework

The originators make comprehensive loan-level R&Ws and an
independent reviewer will perform detailed reviews to determine
whether any R&Ws are breached when loans become 120 days delinquent
or the property is liquidated at a loss above a certain threshold.
These reviews are prescriptive in that the transaction documents
set forth detailed tests for each R&W that the independent reviewer
will perform. The independent reviewer, however, will not be hired
until the first loan becomes 60 days delinquent. Furthermore, an
affiliate of the sponsor will have significant discretion whether
or not to pursue enforcement against an originator, and will have
considerable flexibility to negotiate make-whole amounts instead of
requiring repurchases. The R&W providers' financial strength is
weak, as they are generally unrated and small entities. Finally,
although the sponsor's affiliate will backstop the R&Ws from the
originators, its financial condition is uncertain, as its parent is
an investment fund with a limited life. Moody's increased Moody's
expected losses to account for the weaknesses in the R&W
framework.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 2.50% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 13.50% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 2.50% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata. There is no
principal or interest advancing for loans that are 120 days or more
delinquent. Any interest shortfall resulting from this provision
will reduce the available distribution amount. Any interest
shortfalls resulting from this feature will be fully subordinated
and result in a principal loss to the most subordinate classes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. K Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation (GECMC) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2005-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect pool concentration, as well as losses
already incurred to the pool.

Pool Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only three
of the original 142 loans remaining, with the top two loans in
special servicing (89% of the pool balance). As of the February
2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 98% to $32.2 million from $1.7 billion at
issuance.

Specially Serviced Loans: The top two loans are currently in
special servicing (89%), both of which are real estate owned
(REO).

The largest loan in the pool is the Chatsworth Business Park loan
(66.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 231,770 square foot (sf)
office property in Chatsworth, CA. The loan had transferred to
special servicing in March 2010 for imminent maturity default,
followed shortly thereafter by the maturity of the loan in April
2010. The lender foreclosed on the property and the asset has been
REO since August 2012. The asset was offered for sale in an October
2013 auction, but did not sell. The property further experienced
cash flow issues in 2014 when the second largest tenant, Sanyo
North America Corp. (previously 29% of the net rentable area [NRA])
vacated in 2014 prior to its February 2017 lease expiration. The
property is currently 71% leased by a single tenant, County of LA,
whose lease was recently extended to October 2023 from March 2016.
According to the servicer, a replacement tenant has not yet been
identified for the vacant space.

The second largest loan in the pool is a specially serviced 44,264
sf retail center located in Salisbury, MD (22%). The loan had
transferred to special servicing in May 2015 for maturity default
after the borrower was unable to refinance the loan due to
occupancy declines. The foreclosure sale took place in January 2016
and the asset has been REO since April 2016. Occupancy has remained
relatively flat since transferring to special servicing, reporting
at 79% per the December 2016 rent roll. The servicer was successful
in negotiating an early lease renewal for the property's major
tenant, Barnes & Noble (50% NRA), extending its lease to January
2023 from April 2018. The servicer's REO strategy is to lease up
vacant space before marketing the asset for sale.

The remaining loan in the pool is secured by 93,522 sf grocery
anchored retail property in Phoenix, AZ (11.3%). The original
grocery anchor had occupied approximately 66,000 sf (71% NRA) prior
to its parent company filing for bankruptcy in May 2013. The lease
was subsequently acquired by a new grocer entity, which reduced the
footprint at the property to 47,585 sf (50%). The borrower has
since been able re-tenant the vacated space, with current occupancy
improving to 100% per the June 2016 rent roll compared to 79% in
June 2015. The loan has remained current since issuance, and is
fully amortizing with a May 1, 2025 maturity date.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class H is considered Stable due to high
credit enhancement and downgrades are not expected. The rating has
been capped at 'Bsf' based on the pool's significant concentration,
with two of the three loans in special servicing and REO (89%).
While a future upgrade is possible, it is unlikely given the
concentrations. Further downgrade to the distressed classes J is
possible should additional losses be realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $1.7 million class H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 70%;
-- $9.3 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $200,564 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-J, B, C, D, E, F, and G
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class N, O,
P and Q certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-C and X-P certificates.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. K Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed four classes of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.'s mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-C2 (GMAC 1998-C2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and High Credit Enhancement: The upgrade is
based on the increase to credit enhancement from defeasance and
additional paydown since Fitch's last rating action. As of the
January 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 98% to $51.8 million from $2.53 billion
at issuance, and an additional $8.1 million or 0.3% since the last
rating action. The affirmations are due to the stable to improved
performance of the underlying collateral pool. Per servicer
reporting, classes K and L are currently incurring interest
shortfalls.

Pool Concentration: Of the original 405 loans, 35 remain. The
largest loan represents 30.6% of the pool. Due to the concentrated
nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis that
grouped the remaining loans based on loan structural features,
collateral quality and performance, which ranked them by their
perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes defeased loans,
fully amortizing loans, balloon loans, and Fitch Loans of Concern.
The ratings reflect this sensitivity analysis.

Defeasance and Fully Amortizing Loans: Nine loans, representing
31.5% of the pool are fully defeased and 12 loans, composing 9.9%
of the pool, are fully amortizing loans with low leverage and high
debt service coverage ratios.

Maturity Schedule: The remaining non-specially serviced loans
mature in 2017 (16.4%), 2018 (20.2%), 2021 (1.6%), and 2023
(60.4%).

Fitch Loans of Concern: Six Loans (46.2%), including one specially
serviced loan (1.5%).

The largest loan in the pool, D'Amato Portfolio (30.6%), is a Fitch
Loan of Concern because it was previously with the special servicer
and modified. The loan is collateralized by a portfolio of 37
buildings consisting of 719,972 sf of retail and industrial space
located mostly in Milford, CT. The loan had transferred to the
special servicer in 2014 due to imminent default as a result of
cash flow issues. The borrower received a modification that
included a temporary conversion of the loan payments to
interest-only, which expired in October 2016. The loan is currently
on the watchlist due to deferred maintenance. As of October 2016,
the occupancy of the portfolio was reported at 94%, which compares
to historical occupancy rates that have fluctuated between a low of
82% and high of 95%. The loan is scheduled to mature in July 2023.

The second largest Fitch Loan of Concern, Georgetown Plaza Shopping
Center (6.9%), was also previously in special servicing and
modified. The loan is secured by a 109,800 square foot (sf) retail
center in Indianapolis, IN. The borrower was unable to refinance at
the loan's original maturity of May 2008 partly due to
environmental issues relating to a former tenant at the site. The
special servicer worked with the borrower and insurance company to
complete a remediation and disposition plan for environmental
issues. The loan was modified and split into an A/B note structure
($3.6 million A note/$1.7 million B note) with the loan term
extended to July 2017. The center's occupancy was 76%, as of June
2016, after several tenants backfilled vacant space during the
first half of 2016. The servicer contacted the sponsor for a
leasing update as the largest tenant's, (Value World) lease expires
in April 2017. The loan is current based on the modified terms;
however, Fitch assumed a full loss of the B note.

The specially serviced loan, Stratford House (1.4%), is a 197 bed
healthcare facility located in Chattanooga, TN. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in November 2013 for payment
default. The payments continue to be made but are late and the loan
is categorized as 30 days delinquent. The sponsor indicates that
the building could be sold in early 2017. The loan is scheduled to
mature in June 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class H is Stable as it is fully covered by
defeased collateral. A full payoff is expected. Despite the high
credit enhancement, the upgrade to class J is limited by increased
concentration risk, low collateral quality and adverse selection of
the remaining pool. Further upgrades are possible with increased
credit enhancement and stable pool performance. Downgrades are
possible with significant performance decline. Class K previously
incurred realized losses; however, the full balance was reinstated
due to additional recoveries on a disposed loan. The rating remains
at 'Dsf' as ultimate recovery is unlikely given the expected losses
and interest shortfalls. A portion of class L was also reinstated;
however, it has been reduced due to realized losses.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following class:

-- $19 million class J to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $11.8 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 75%;
-- $2 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0.0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate classes N. Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, and
G have paid in full. Class X was previously withdrawn. Class M and
N have been reduced to $0 due to realized losses.


GOLDENTREE LOAN: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Goldentree
Loan Management US CLO 1 Ltd./Goldentree Loan Management US CLO 1
Inc.'s $569.60 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 7,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Goldentree Loan Management US CLO 1 Ltd./Goldentree Loan Management
US CLO 1 Inc.

Class                   Rating                Amount
                                            (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                5.60
A                       AAA (sf)              367.50
B-1                     AA (sf)                60.00
B-2                     AA (sf)                12.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                 49.50
D (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)              39.00
E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)               22.50
F (deferrable)          B- (sf)                13.50
Subordinated notes      NR                     40.00

NR--Not rated.



GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B-FL,
and B-FX notes from Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd. to
'D (sf)'.  Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd. is a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities that closed in August 2007 and is managed by CW Capital
Investments LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the February 2017 trustee report.

All assets in the portfolio except two were liquidated prior to the
Dec. 29, 2016, distribution date, and the proceeds, after paying
expenses, were used to pay down the notes.  On the December 2016
payment date, the class A-1 notes were paid in full (and S&P
subsequently discontinued the rating on the notes), and the class
A-2 notes received partial paydowns.

The remaining two assets were repaid in full, and on Feb. 22, 2017,
their proceeds were used to pay down the class A-2 notes. However,
those proceeds were not adequate to pay down the A-2 notes in full.
Because there are no assets or cash remaining in the portfolio to
cover the outstanding balance of the remaining classes, S&P has
lowered the ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B-FL, and B-FX notes to
'D (sf)'.

RATINGS LOWERED

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           D (sf)      CCC- (sf)
A-3           D (sf)      CC (sf)  
B-FL          D (sf)      CC (sf)
B-FX          D (sf)      CC (sf)



GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ7: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-GCJ7
(the Certificates) issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust, Series
2012-GCJ7:

-- Class B to AA (high) (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class C to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed the remaining Certificates:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

DBRS does not rate the first loss piece, Class G. All trends are
Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the healthy performance of the pool
overall since issuance, with 69 loans remaining of the original 79
loans and a collateral reduction of 17.1% of the pool since
issuance. Additionally, six loans, representing 7.2% of the pool,
have fully defeased. Performance metrics are healthy, with a
weighted-average (WA) in-place debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.69 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 12.6%, as based on the
most recent year-end figures reported for the remaining loans in
the pool. Those figures compare with the DBRS WA Term DSCR and DBRS
WA Debt Yield for the remaining loans at issuance of 1.39x and
9.9%, respectively, indicating healthy cash flow growth overall
since issuance.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are 15 loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 20.7% of the pool balance, and
one loan in special servicing, representing 1.7% of the pool. The
majority of the loans on the watchlist are being monitored for
relatively minor deferred maintenance items, with some monitored
for cash flow declines. The loan in special servicing was
transferred in October 2014 and is now real estate owned. Given the
sharp performance and value declines for the collateral property
since issuance, DBRS anticipates a loss will be incurred at
resolution, currently projected to be contained to the unrated
Class G Certificates.

There are four loans scheduled to mature in the next 12 months,
representing 4.0% of the pool. One of those loans is defeased,
representing 0.9% of the pool. For the three non-defeased loans,
the weighted-average DBRS refinance (Refi) DSCR is healthy at
1.53x; however, the largest maturing loan, Fifth Third Center
(Prospectus ID#24, 1.2% of the pool), has a low DBRS Refi DSCR of
1.05x and a low occupancy rate for the collateral property,
indicating a near-term refinance could be difficult. DBRS has
applied that loan with an increased probability of default and will
monitor for developments through the scheduled April 2017 maturity.


JFIN REVOLVER: S&P Raises Ratings on Class E VFN Debt to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on 15 classes from three JFIN
Revolver CLO transactions.  S&P also removed these ratings from
CreditWatch, where it had placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 6, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed four ratings from the
same transactions.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of each transaction's
performance using data from the January 2017 trustee reports.

The upgrades reflect each transaction's improved
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios because of senior note paydowns
since our effective date rating actions.  The affirmed ratings
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

The transactions are collateralized loan obligations (CLOs),
investing in revolvers or delayed-drawdown collateral obligations.
The issuers for each of these transactions have hedged the large
difference between the amount of interest generated off of the
underlying collateral and the amount of interest due to the notes
by entering into multiple interest rate caps, creating
transaction-specific interest reserve accounts to pay any interest
shortfalls on each transaction's respective class A and B notes,
and issuing the class E in each transaction as a variable funding
note (VFN), which will fund to cover any interest shortfall on the
respective class C and D notes for that transaction.

Currently, the respective interest rate caps are not generating
proceeds for the transactions, as three-month LIBOR is not above
the respective strike rates in the interest rate cap agreements.

In the past, JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd. has used proceeds from the
interest reserve account to cover payments to the class A and B
notes; however, as of January 2017, both JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II
Ltd. and JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd. still had the original deposited
balances remaining in their interest reserve accounts.  A large
benefit of the interest reserve accounts for each of these
transactions is that on any determination date, after the
transactions either de-lever to 20% of their effective date target
par or the balances in the interest reserve accounts exceed the
required interest reserve account amounts, pursuant to the
transaction documents, the trustee may deposit all or a portion of
the proceeds remaining in the interest reserve accounts into the
principal collection accounts for each transaction.  These
proceeds, in turn, may be available to pay down the rated notes. On
the January 2017 payment date, JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd. reclassified
approximately $5.06 million of the $18.00 million in the interest
reserve account as principal proceeds, in line with this feature.

Due to the largely unfunded nature of the underlying collateral in
each respective transaction, the interest proceeds generated by the
underlying collateral have been insufficient to cover the interest
payments due to the rated notes.  Therefore, each transaction
continues to fund its class E VFN notes to cover the interest
payments on the class C and D notes, while the class E VFN notes
continue to defer their interest payments.

The upgrades reflect paydowns to each transaction's senior classes
of notes since S&P's last rating actions at the respective
transaction's effective date.  These paydowns resulted in improved
reported O/C ratios as compared with the ratios reported at the
effective date:

   -- For JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd., the class A/B O/C ratio improved

      to 184.27% from 143.51% as of the May 2014 trustee report,
      while the class C O/C ratio improved to 147.06% from 127.59%

      and the class D O/C ratio improved to 129.39% from 118.69%
      over the same time period.

   -- For JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd., the class A/B O/C ratio
      improved to 160.53% from 139.86% as of the September 2015
      trustee report, while the class C O/C ratio improved to
      135.41% from 124.66% and the class D O/C ratio improved to
      123.78% from 117.02% over the same time period.

   -- For JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II Ltd., the class A/B O/C ratio
      improved to 154.55% from 141.13% as of the September 2015
      trustee report, while the class C O/C ratio improved to
      132.43% from 125.77% and the class D O/C ratio improved to
      121.72% from 117.88% over the same time period.

In addition, both the JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd. and JFIN Revolver
CLO 2015-II Ltd. portfolios' credit quality have slightly improved
since S&P's last rating actions, while the JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd.
portfolio's credit quality has slightly deteriorated. This is
evidenced by movement since the effective date in both the par
balance of collateral obligations with ratings in the 'CCC'
category and, if applicable, the par balance of defaulted
obligations:

   -- JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd. reports $24.21 million in 'CCC'
      category collateral as of the January 2017 trustee report,
      compared with $3.25 million reported as of the May 2014
      effective date trustee report.  Over the same period, the
      par amount of defaulted collateral has increased to
      $7.20 million from zero.  JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd.
      reports $8.42 million in 'CCC' category collateral as of the

      January 2017 trustee report, compared with $17.50 million
      reported as of the September 2015 effective date trustee
      report.  The par balance of defaulted collateral reported in

      each trustee report was zero.  JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II
      Ltd. reports $7.00 million in 'CCC' category collateral as
      of the January 2017 trustee report, compared with
      $9.50 million reported as of the September 2015 effective
      date trustee report.  The par balance of defaulted
      collateral reported in each trustee report was zero.

Each transaction has benefited from a drop in their weighted
average life due to the underlying collateral's seasoning.

S&P's rating actions are largely driven by applying the largest
obligor default test from its corporate collateralized debt
obligation criteria.  The test is intended to address event and
model risks that might be present in rated transactions.  Despite
cash flow runs that suggested higher ratings, the largest obligor
default test constrained S&P's ratings on these transactions:

   -- JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd., for the class C and D notes at
      'AA+ (sf)' and 'A+ (sf)', respectively.  The top five
      largest obligors in the JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd. transaction
      currently represent approximately 32.47% of the portfolio's
      performing collateral balance.

   -- JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd., for the class C and D notes at
      'A+ (sf)' and 'BBB+ (sf)', respectively.  The top five
      largest obligors in the JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd.
      transaction currently represent approximately 31.34% of the
      portfolio's performing collateral balance.

   -- JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II Ltd., for the class C and D notes
      at 'A+ (sf)' and 'BBB+ (sf)', respectively.  The top five
      largest obligors in the JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II Ltd.
      transaction currently represent approximately 24.52% of the
      portfolio's performing collateral balance.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for each
of these transaction's class E VFN notes, its rating actions
considered that these notes continue to fund interest shortfalls on
the respective class C and D notes from each transaction, and that
the notes are not likely to receive any interest or principal
payments until each of the senior notes is paid down in full.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
D             A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E VFN         BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos

JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B-1           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B-F           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             A+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E VFN         BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos
Combo         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos

JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B-1           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B-F           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             A+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E VFN         BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)

JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-F           AAA (sf)

JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)

VFN--Variable funding note.


JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC6: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class M Debt to 'Dsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed five classes of JPM
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pool Concentration: There are only 16 loans outstanding as of the
February 2017 remittance. Three of the remaining loans are
cross-collateralized and represent 8.4% of the pool combined,
providing further concentration among the outstanding assets.

Defeasance: The two most senior classes are fully covered by
defeased collateral, which represents 42.1% of the current pool
balance. Class H is partially covered by defeased collateral.

Maturity Outlook: Two loans representing 23.4% of the pool are
scheduled to mature in 2017 and seven loans representing 21.9% of
the pool are scheduled to mature in 2018. While there are some
concerns regarding upcoming tenant rollover and cash flow
volatility, all of these loans are considered to be low leveraged.

Tenant Rollovers: Six loans representing 27.2% of the pool are
secured by properties with tenant rollover ahead of loan maturity.
While the potential vacancy is negligible for some of these
properties, the pool's concentration magnifies event risk for
individual loans. Two of these six loans were previously in special
servicing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook for class G was revised to Stable from Positive
following the upgrade, and the Outlook for classes F and H remains
Stable. Classes F and G are fully covered by defeased collateral
and class H is 42.9% covered by defeased collateral. The Outlooks
for classes J and K have been revised to Positive from Stable to
reflect the expectation that loans will continue to repay and the
pool to amortize, which could justify a future upgrade. Downgrades
are possible should pool performance decline or further losses be
realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:

-- $13 million class G to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook revised
    to Stable from Positive;

-- $15.6 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;

-- $5.2 million class J to 'Asf' from 'BBsf', Outlook revised to
    Positive from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $1.5 million class F at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

-- $7.8 million class K at 'Bsf', Outlook revised to Positive
    from Stable;

-- $5.2 million class L at 'CCCsf', RE 95%;

-- $1.8 million class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;

-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and X-2 certificates have been paid
in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR certificate. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificate.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B+
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-CIBC10, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.


S&P raised its ratings on classes B, C, D, and E to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the available
liquidity support, and the trust balance's significant reduction.


Classes D and E were previously lowered to 'D (sf)' because of
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P expected to remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time.  S&P raised its ratings
on these classes from 'D (sf)' because the accumulated interest
shortfalls have been repaid in full, and the classes have been
paying their full accrued interest for seven and six months,
respectively.  Additionally, at this time, S&P do not believe that
a further default of these certificate classes is virtually
certain.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes C, D, and E, S&P's analysis also
considered the significant single tenant exposure at properties
securing several large loans remaining in the transaction,
including 65-75 Lower Welden Street ($16.1 million, 14.6%),
Universal Technical Institute ($10.2 million, 9.2%), Foss
Manufacturing ($9.2 million, 8.4%), Dick's Sporting Goods-Greenwood
($2.9 million, 2.7%), and Federal Express-Buffalo
($2.9 million, 2.6%).
  
                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $110.2 million, which is 5.6% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 23 loans, down from 199
loans at issuance.  One loan ($2.3 million, 2.1%) is with the
special servicer, two ($2.6 million, 2.3%) are defeased, and five
($10.2 million, 9.3%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported
financial information for 100.0% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, of which 35.8% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was
partial- or year-end 2016 data.

S&P calculated a 1.34x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 51.2% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.89% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the defeased loans.  The
top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $89.0 million (80.7%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.36x and 53.5%, respectively, for the top 10
nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $149.2 million in
principal losses, or 7.6% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 7.7% of the original balance
based on losses incurred to date and additional losses S&P expects
upon the resolution of the specially serviced loan.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, one loan in the
pool was with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).

The 100 South Shore Drive loan has a reported exposure of
$2.6 million.  The loan is secured by a 42,758-sq.-ft. office
property in East Haven, Conn.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in October 2014 because of maturity default.  LNR
has filed for foreclosure on the property.  The reported DSC as of
year-end 2015 was 1.05x, and the reported occupancy as of
Sept. 30, 2016, was about 33%.  An appraisal reduction amount of
$1.8 million is in effect against the loan.  S&P expects a
significant loss (60% or greater) upon this loan's eventual
resolution.

RATINGS RAISED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC10

              Rating
Class     To          From
B         AA+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
C         A+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
D         BB+ (sf)    D (sf)
E         B+ (sf)     D (sf)


JP MORGAN 2010-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed two classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial mortgage pass through
certificates, series 2010-C1 on Rating Watch Negative. Fitch has
also affirmed seven classes and downgraded one distressed class
based on probable default.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Rating Watch Negative (RWN) placement of classes B and C is due
to continued performance uncertainty, high volatility and
increasing concentration risk surrounding the largest loan in the
pool, Gateway Salt Lake, which now represents approximately 24% of
the total collateral pool.

Gateway Salt Lake is a 623,972 square foot (sf) open-air lifestyle
center located in Salt Lake City, UT. Presently, major tenants
include Gateway Theatres (11.9% of net rentable area [NRA]), Barnes
& Noble (4.1%) and The Depot (4.0%). Dick's Sporting Goods, a
former anchor tenant that occupied 14.5% of the NRA, vacated in
January 2017 upon lease expiration.

The Gateway Salt Lake loan transferred to the special servicer in
August 2015 for imminent default following several years of
declining performance as a result of newer competition in the
market. In mid-2016, the servicer negotiated a loan assumption and
write-down of debt. The corrected loan returned to the master
servicer in May 2016 and has remained current under its new owner,
Vestar, an operator of retail and entertainment destinations in the
Western U.S.

Vestar is in the process of repositioning the property with a focus
on entertainment tenants. Although a near-term decline in
performance was expected (per the servicer) as the new sponsor
introduced their business plan to the center, stabilizing the
property may become increasingly challenging as the retail sector
weakens. Store closures, declining sales and review of brick and
mortar exposure are items of great focus for retailers as they
navigate through a softening market and adapt to changing consumer
habits.

Since loan modification in April 2016, property performance has
continued to decline with decreasing occupancy and rental revenue.
As of January 2017, the property was 68% occupied (54.2% excluding
Dick's lease), compared to 75% a year ago. The servicer reported
year-to-date third quarter 2016 debt service coverage ratio, on a
net operating income basis, was 0.52x, down from 0.70x at year-end
2015. The loan is currently on the servicer watchlist due to poor
financial performance.

In addition to lower occupancy and cash flow, many tenants at the
center have co-tenancy clauses in their leases; these tenants are
negotiating with the sponsor. Fitch will work to resolve the Rating
Watch assignments after receiving full-year 2016 financials and a
clearer picture of tenancy at the center going forward.

The downgrade of class D reflects a greater certainty of losses due
to the exposure of the Aquia Office Building asset (5.3% of pool),
which became real-estate owned in August 2016, exceeding the credit
enhancement to this class.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes A-2, A-3 and X-A express Fitch's
ongoing concerns with current transaction performance; however, the
Gateway remains a performing loan and liquidation is not expected
in the near term; the property has the potential to improve should
the sponsor successfully increase occupancy per their repositioning
plan. While recovery of 'AAAsf' proceeds is expected at this time,
should the borrower's business plan fail to materialize and the
loan re-transfer to special servicing, the 'AAAsf' rated classes
may be susceptible to future interest shortfalls. The placement of
classes B and C on RWN could result in downgrades of multiple
notches or categories should property performance fail to
stabilize. The distressed classes reflect either low recovery
prospects or already realized losses (in the cases of the 'Dsf'
rated classes). Upgrades are unlikely given pool concerns and
concentration.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has placed the following classes on Rating Watch Negative:

-- $16.1 million class B 'Asf';
-- $26.9 million class C 'BBB-sf'.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded the following class:

-- $14.3 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 50%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $97 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $61.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $8.9 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.



JP MORGAN 2017-JP5: Fitch to Rate Class E Certs 'BB-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Securities Trust 2017-JP5 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $43,930,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82,828,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $396,306,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69,023,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $836,131,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,917,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,015,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71,044,000class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,917,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,015,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,888,000a class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,325,000ac class D-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,691,000ac class E-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:
-- $17,761,000ac class F-RR;
-- $38,254,046ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 43 loans secured by 59
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,092,982,047 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association and
Starwood Mortgage Funding VI LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 87.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 92.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are slightly
better than those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.20x is
slightly more favorable than the YTD 2017 average of 1.17x and
similar to the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of
102.1% is better than average when compared with the YTD 2017 and
2016 averages of 106.1% and 105.2%, respectively.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans
representing 14.6% of the pool have investment-grade credit
opinions. The proportion of investment-grade credit opinion loans
in this securitization exceeds the YTD 2017 and 2016 average
concentrations of 5.8% and 8.4%, respectively. The two largest
loans in the pool, Hilton Hawaiian Village (7.3% of the pool) and
Moffett Gateway (7.3% of the pool), both have investment-grade
credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. The two loans
have a weighted average Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.50x and
64.0%, respectively.

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The largest 10 loans account for
56.6% of the pool, which is above the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of
50.4% and 54.8%, respectively. The pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) is 427, which is above the YTD 2017 average of 348 and the
2016 average of 422.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 13.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
JPMCC 2017-JP5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


LCM XXIV: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by LCM XXIV Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$387,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$63,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

LCM XXIV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans that are secured by a valid first priority
perfected security interest and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 75% ramped
as of the closing date.

LCM Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 5.25 year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2785

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2785 to 3203)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2785 to 3621)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


LENDMARK FUNDING 2016-A: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the notes issued from Lendmark Funding
Trust 2016-A as follows:

-- Class A notes at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The transaction is in the middle of its two-year revolving period,
and the key performance drivers such as defaults, prepayments and
credit enhancement levels have been in line with Fitch's initial
expectations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adequate Collateral Quality: The LFT 2016-A collateral pool
comprises secured and unsecured fixed rate personal loans and sales
finance contracts originated by the company based on its
underwriting guidelines. The portfolio will also include renewed
loans that will replace or refinance the existing loans. Additional
eligible loans will be added to the portfolio during the revolving
period ending on Jan. 31, 2018. Fitch's base case cumulative
default rate remains unchanged from closing at 18.4%, and the
stress level default rates are 50% for 'BBB+sf', 32.9% for 'BBsf',
and 23.9% for 'Bsf'.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided
by overcollateralization (OC) and excess spread. An OC of
approximately $22.6 million, or 11.3% of the pool balance, will be
maintained for the life of the transaction. The CE remains
unchanged at 34.9% for the class A, 18.8% for the class B, and
11.3% for the class C notes. Trust performance and other triggers
based on pool composition and servicing risks are used to provide
additional protection for investors should portfolio composition,
loan performance or servicer's financial conditions deteriorate
(each an early amortization event) during the two-year revolving
period. When an early amortization event occurs, the revolving
period will end and note amortization will begin.

Adequate Liquidity Support: Liquidity is provided by a
non-declining reserve account of $2,003,274.03, providing coverage
for trust expenses and note interest of over one month during the
revolving period, and longer during the amortization period. The
loan products in the trust collateral pool have exhibited high
levels of prepayments historically. Since closing, the average
annualized prepayment rate of the LFT 2016-A pool is approximately
53% including renewals, or 17% excluding renewals

Acceptable Servicing Capabilities: Lendmark Financial Services LLC.
(Lendmark) will service 100% of the portfolio. Lendmark has
approximately 20 years of history in servicing the loan products
included in the trust collateral pool. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo) is the back-up servicer. The backup servicer is required to
exercise commercially reasonable efforts within 30 days but in no
event more than 60 days to assume all servicing responsibilities
upon receipt of a servicing transfer notice from the trustee. Fitch
considers both parties acceptable servicers.

Rating Cap: A rating cap of 'BBBsf' category is applied to this
transaction. The primary reasons for the cap included Lendmark's
subprime borrower base, its decentralized origination and servicing
business model, and the transaction's two-year revolving
structure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case and lower loss coverage levels. Depending on the
extent of the decline in the coverage, certain note ratings may be
susceptible to potential negative rating actions. Rating
sensitivity results should only be considered as one potential
outcome, given that the transaction is exposed to multiple dynamic
risk factors. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.

Holding all other inputs constant, a 50% increase in base case
defaults resulted in a downgrade of at least two rating
categories.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.



MADISON PARK V: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Madison Park Funding V, Ltd.:

US$43,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015, Upgraded to A1
(sf)

US$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015, Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$447,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $165,830,506), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on May 28, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$49,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$28,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$23,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Madison Park Funding V, Ltd, issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in May 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since October 2016. The Class A-1a
notes have been paid down by approximately 41% or $114 million
since that time. Based on the trustee's February 2017 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class
C and Class D notes are reported at 148.6%, 130.6%, 123.0%, and
115.8% respectively, versus October 2016 levels of 142.8%, 127.5%,
120.9%, and 114.5%, respectively. The trustee's current OC ratios
do not reflect $68.2 million paid to the Class A-1a Notes on the
February 27, 2017 payment date. In addition, the credit quality of
the portfolio has remained stable since October 2016.

Nevertheless, the deal has increased exposure to securities that
mature after the maturity of the notes (long-dated assets), through
amend-to-extend activities. Based on Moody's calculation,
long-dated assets currently make up approximately $101.7 million or
27.7% of the portfolio. These investments could expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes mature.
Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the Class D notes, Moody's
affirmed the notes' rating owing to market risk stemming from the
exposure to these long-dated assets.

In its base case, Moody's assumed the long-dated assets are
liquidated at an average price of 70.5% at the maturity of the
notes. The liquidation price is low because about $69 million, or
68.3% of the long-dated assets mature beyond one year after the
maturity of the notes and are modeled at a liquidation value of 70%
or below based on Moody's CLO methodology. Although the market
values of these long-dated assets are currently reasonably high,
they could change quickly under distressed market conditions. In
consideration of the current market values, however, Moody's also
evaluated in its analysis scenarios when the long-dated assets are
liquidated at higher average prices.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements extending
maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable exposure to
long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2190)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3284)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $390.9 million, defaulted par of $6.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 14.74% (implying
a WARF of 2737), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.19%, a diversity score of 40 and a weighted average spread of
3.37% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


MADISON PARK V: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Madison Park Funding V, Ltd.:

US$43,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015, Upgraded to A1
(sf)

US$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015, Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$447,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $165,830,506), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on May 28, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$49,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

U.S. $28,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$23,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Madison Park Funding V, Ltd, issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in May 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since October 2016. The Class A-1a
notes have been paid down by approximately 41% or $114 million
since that time. Based on the trustee's February 2017 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class
C and Class D notes are reported at 148.6%, 130.6%, 123.0%, and
115.8% respectively, versus October 2016 levels of 142.8%, 127.5%,
120.9%, and 114.5%, respectively. The trustee's current OC ratios
do not reflect $68.2 million paid to the Class A-1a Notes on the
February 27, 2017 payment date. In addition, the credit quality of
the portfolio has remained stable since October 2016.

Nevertheless, the deal has increased exposure to securities that
mature after the maturity of the notes (long-dated assets), through
amend-to-extend activities. Based on Moody's calculation,
long-dated assets currently make up approximately $101.7 million or
27.7% of the portfolio. These investments could expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes mature.
Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the Class D notes, Moody's
affirmed the notes' rating owing to market risk stemming from the
exposure to these long-dated assets.

In its base case, Moody's assumed the long-dated assets are
liquidated at an average price of 70.5% at the maturity of the
notes. The liquidation price is low because about $69 million, or
68.3% of the long-dated assets mature beyond one year after the
maturity of the notes and are modeled at a liquidation value of 70%
or below based on Moody's CLO methodology. Although the market
values of these long-dated assets are currently reasonably high,
they could change quickly under distressed market conditions. In
consideration of the current market values, however, Moody's also
evaluated in its analysis scenarios when the long-dated assets are
liquidated at higher average prices.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements extending
maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable exposure to
long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2190)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3284)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $390.9 million, defaulted par of $6.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 14.74% (implying
a WARF of 2737), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.19%, a diversity score of 40 and a weighted average spread of
3.37% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. E Notes to 'Dsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two distressed classes and affirmed
nine classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust (MLMT) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2005-CIP1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of class D is based off increased loss expectations
from the pool's specially serviced loan. Class E has been
downgraded as that class has experienced a partial loss of
principal. The affirmations for distressed classes F through P are
based on those classes having realized a full loss of principal. As
of the February 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.3% to $34.5 million from
$2.06 billion at issuance. The pool is highly concentrated with
only five loans remaining.

Fitch modeled losses of 12.13% on the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 8.53%, including $171.2
million (8.32% of the original pool balance) in realized losses
incurred to date. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes E through Q.

Increased Loss Expectations from Specially Serviced Loan: The
remaining pool contains one specially serviced loan, which
represents 14.9% of the pool's current balance. The Center of
Excellence loan is secured by a 49,202 square foot medical office
building located in Wauwatosa, WI. The loan transferred to the
special servicer back in February 2015 due to imminent default
after the property's largest tenant, Wheaton Wisconsin Heart,
vacated upon their lease expiration in September 2014. Per servicer
reporting, the property was only 41% occupied as of December 2015
and operating at a loss, with a net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of -0.06x. A receiver has been
appointed and is currently operating the property. Per servicer
commentary, the loan is being considered for sale. Fitch's modeled
losses on the loan are expected to impact class D.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

All remaining classes are distressed. Upgrades are unlikely given
the concentrated nature of the pool and the expectation that class
D, the only remaining class without a principal loss to date,
experiences a partial loss when the specially serviced loan is
disposed.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:
-- $33.5 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 95%;
-- $1.1 million class E to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $0 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

The class A-1, A-2, A-3A, A-3B, A-SB, A-4, A-M, A-J, B, and C
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class Q
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X-C and X-P certificates.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-4: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to CCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2006-4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on four
other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrade on class C reflects the anticipated reduction in
liquidity support due to ongoing interest shortfalls from the 16
specially serviced assets ($168.9 million, 93.6%), as well as
credit support erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon these
assets' eventual resolution.  S&P lowered its rating on class D to
'D (sf)' because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

According to the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
current net monthly interest shortfalls totaled $213,693 and
resulted primarily from:

   -- Net appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts
      totaling $180,082; and

   -- Net special servicing fees totaling $33,465.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class D.

The affirmations on classes AJ, AJ-FL, AJ-FX, and B reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings.

The affirmations also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral, the
transaction's structure, and liquidity support available to the
classes.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest positive rating
movements on classes AJ, AJ-FL, AJ-FX, and B, S&P's analysis also
considered the susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
16 specially serviced assets.

                      TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $180.6 million, which is 4.0% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 19 loans and one real
estate-owned (REO) asset, down from 277 loans at issuance.  Sixteen
of these assets are with the special servicer, and no loans are
defeased or on the master servicers' combined watchlist. The master
servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and Midland Loan Services,
reported financial information for 94.7% of the loans in the pool,
of which 62.1% was partial- or year-end 2015 data, and the
remainder was partial- or year-end 2016 data.

Excluding 15 ($162.3 million, 89.9%) of the 16 specially serviced
assets, S&P calculated a 1.15x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average
debt service coverage (DSC) and 77.9% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.87% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $364.8 million in
principal losses, or 8.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 9.5% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
15 of the 16 specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, 16 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details of the three largest specially serviced assets,
all of which are part of the top 10 assets, are:

   -- The Atrium - Marriott University Park loan ($38.3 million,
      21.2%) is the largest loan in the trust and has a total
      reported exposure of $39.6 million.  The loan is secured by
      a 250-room full service hotel in Tucson, Ariz.  The loan was

      transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 7, 2016,
      because of maturity default.  The loan matured on Sept. 1,
      2016.  The special servicer indicated that a resolution
      strategy is being worked out, which includes foreclosure.  
      In addition, the franchise agreement with Marriott at the
      property expired on March 1, 2017.  The reported DSC and
      occupancy for the trailing 12 months ended June 30, 2016,
      were 1.01x and 78.5%, respectively.  A $9.6 million
      appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against this
      loan.  S&P expects a significant loss upon its eventual
      resolution.

   -- The Elm Ridge Center loan ($29.3 million, 16.2%) is the
      second-largest loan in the trust and has $29.9 million in
      total reported exposure.  The loan is secured by a 481,010-
      sq.-ft. retail property in Greece, N.Y.  The loan, which has

      a nonperforming matured balloon payment status, was
      transferred to the special servicer on June 25, 2015, due to

      imminent default, because the borrower stated that it could
      no longer fund property shortfalls.  C-III stated that it
      has begun the foreclosure process, including a receivership
      request.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015

      were 0.59x and 70.5%, respectively.  A $12.2 million ARA is
      in effect against this loan, and S&P expects a moderate loss

      upon its eventual resolution.

   -- The Caughlin Ranch Shopping Center loan ($16.8 million,
      9.3%) is the third-largest loan in the trust and has $17.0
      million in total reported exposure.  The loan is secured by
      an 113,488-sq.-ft. retail property in Reno, Nev.  The loan
      was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 15, 2016,
      because of imminent maturity default.  The special servicer
      indicated that it is seeking a receiver appointment.  The
      reported DSC and occupancy for the nine months ended
      Sept. 30, 2016, were 1.14x and 87.6%, respectively.  S&P
      expects a minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

The remaining assets with the special servicer each have individual
balances that represent less than 8.5% of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for 15 of the 16 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 38.8%.  It
is S&P's understanding that the remaining specially serviced loan,
the College Park Plaza loan ($6.6 million, 3.7%), was recently
modified in December 2016, in which the maturity date was extended
for 18 months and is expected to return back to the master
servicer.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-4
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To           From
AJ-FX             55312VBJ6              B (sf)       B (sf)
AJ                55312VAK4              B (sf)       B (sf)
AJ-FL             55312VAL2              B (sf)       B (sf)
B                 55312VAM0              B- (sf)      B- (sf)
C                 55312VAN8              CCC (sf)     B- (sf)
D                 55312VAP3              D (sf)       CCC (sf)



MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP21: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on five classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2006-TOP21, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on two other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.


The affirmations on classes A-J and B reflect S&P's expectation
that the available credit enhancement for these classes will be
within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required
for the current ratings as well as S&P's views regarding the
current and future performance of the transaction's collateral.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest positive rating
movement on classes A-J and B, S&P's analysis considered the
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the four specially
serviced loans ($80.7 million, 55.6%) and the largest performing
loan, the Anthem Health loan ($24.9 million, 17.2%), which is on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a
234,287-sq.-ft. office property, 100% leased to a single tenant
until 2020, in Louisville, Ky.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist because the loan did not pay off upon its
anticipated repayment date in December 2015.  The loan has a final
maturity in December 2035 and reported debt service coverage (DSC)
of 1.75x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2016.

The downgrades on classes C through G reflect the reduced liquidity
support available to these classes due to ongoing interest
shortfalls.  Specifically, S&P lowered its ratings on classes D, E,
F, and G to 'CCC- (sf)' because of accumulated interest shortfalls
that S&P expects will remain outstanding in the near term.  If the
accumulated interest shortfalls remain outstanding for more than 12
months, S&P may lower the ratings to 'D (sf)'.

According to the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $277,172 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Interest reductions due to nonrecoverability determinations
      totaling $241,419;
   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $19,690; and
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $16,971.

The current interest shortfalls affected class D and classes
subordinate to class D.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $145.1 million, which is 10.5% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 13 loans, down from 121
loans at issuance.  Four of these loans are with the special
servicer, three ($26.1 million, 18.0%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, and none are defeased.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., reported financial information for 98.6% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 58.7% was year-end 2015
data, and the remainder was partial-year 2016 data.

S&P calculated a 2.09x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and
100.3% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio using a 7.68% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average
capitalization rate.  The high DSC is primarily driven by the
fifth-largest loan in the pool, 45 East 89th Street Condop ($14.0
million, 9.6%), which has a servicer reported DSC of 8.71x as of
the six months ended June 30, 2016.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude two ($2.7 million, 1.9%)
of the four specially serviced loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $25.3 million in principal
losses, or 1.8% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 1.9% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of two of
the four specially serviced loans.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 13, 2017, trustee remittance report, four loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details of the two largest specially serviced loans are:

   -- The SBC-Hoffman Estates loan ($58.0 million, 40.0%) is the
      largest loan in the pool and has $59.5 million total
      reported exposure.  The loan is secured by a 1,690,214-sq.-
      ft. office property in Hoffman Estates, Ill.  In addition, a

      pari passu component totaling $55.7 million, or 49.0% of the

      whole loan, is held in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
      Securities Trust 2006-PWR11, also a CMBS transaction.  The
      whole loan was transferred on June 24, 2016, to the special
      servicer due to imminent default because the sole tenant
      occupying the property will vacate at the end of its August
      2016 lease expiration.  The property is currently 100%
      vacant.  The special servicer stated that it has ordered an
      updated appraisal report, and it will schedule a foreclosure

      sale upon confirmation by the court.  C-III also indicated
      that it expects to focus on leasing up the vacant space
      before disposition.  The master servicer deemed the loan
      nonrecoverable.  The 1757 Tapo Canyon Road loan ($20.0
      million, 13.8%) is the second-largest loan with the special
      servicer and has $22.4 million total reported exposure.  The

      loan is secured by a 179,357-sq.-ft. office property in Simi

      Valley, Calif.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on July 16, 2015, due to imminent default because
      the sole tenant vacated the property upon its 2015 lease
      expiration.  The special servicer stated that the property
      is currently 100% vacant and that it anticipates the
      foreclosure proceeding to close in the second quarter of
      2017.  A $3.9 million appraisal reduction amount is in
      effect against this loan.  C-III informed us that it plans
      to focus on leasing up the vacant space before disposition.

The two remaining loans with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 1.0% of the total pool
trust balance.  Based on S&P's analysis, it estimates minimal loss
(less than 25%) upon the eventual resolution of these two loans.

RATINGS LOWERED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-TOP21
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating
Class     To          From        Credit enhancement (%)
C         BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)                   51.33
D         CCC- (sf)   BB+ (sf)                    37.11
E         CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)                     30.00
F         CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)                     20.52
G         CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)                     13.40

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-TOP21
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-J       A (sf)                    79.77
B         BBB+ (sf)                 61.99



MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C21: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Cl. G Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C21 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2015-C21 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-FG at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's expectations
since issuance. The collateral consists of 64 fixed-rate loans
secured by 99 commercial properties, and as of the January 2017
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 1.2% since
issuance. Loans representing 92.3% of the current pool balance are
reporting YE2015 figures with a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.57 times (x) and 8.7%,
respectively. The DBRS WA DSCR and WA debt yield at issuance were
1.80x and 9.4%, respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool
represent 61.5% of the transaction balance and all loans but one
reported YE2015 financials, which showed a slight WA net cash flow
decline of 6.2% over the DBRS figures, with a WA DSCR and WA debt
yield of 1.68x and 8.7%, respectively.

As of the January 2017 remittance, there are 11 loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 17.8% of the current pool
balance, including three loans in the top 15.



MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C28: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on 3 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C28 (the
Certificates) issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Trust 2016-C28.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class F-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class F-2 at BB (sf)
-- Class EF at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G-1 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's expectations
since issuance. As of the February 2017 remittance, all 42 loans
remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal balance
of approximately $952.7 million, which represents a collateral
reduction of 0.3% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization. Pool-wide, six loans (27.1% of the pool) are
structured with full interest-only (IO) terms, while an additional
20 loans (49.2% of the pool) have partial IO periods remaining,
ranging from seven months to 46 months. According to the DBRS
underwritten (UW) figures, the transaction had a weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.77
times (x) and 9.4%, respectively, or 1.41x and 8.4%, respectively,
excluding shadow-rated loans. To date, five loans (12.6% of the
pool) have reported year-end 2016 net cash flow (NCF) figures. The
largest 15 loans in the pool collectively represent 72.3% of the
transaction balance and 13 of those loans are reporting
partial-year 2016 financials, showing a WA annualized DSCR and debt
yield of 1.74x and 14.3%, respectively.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and three loans (7.2% of the pool) on the servicer's
watchlist. The largest loan on the watchlist, Navy League Building
(Prospectus ID#4, 6.3% of the pool) is secured by a 190,926 sq. ft.
office building in Arlington, Virginia. The loan was placed on the
watchlist as a result of low income due to rent abatements in place
during the reporting period for three tenants, including the
largest tenant, which represents 25.7% of the NRA on a lease
expiring in April 2027. At closing, the borrower deposited $3.3
million in escrow to fund the rent abatements, with funds to be
released monthly through December 2017. The Q3 2016 DSCR was
reported at 1.05x and property occupancy remains strong at 98.2%,
as of the September 2016 rent roll. The remaining two loans on the
watchlist were flagged for non-performance-related reasons
pertaining to outstanding servicing advances and deferred
maintenance.

At issuance, DBRS assigned an investment-grade shadow rating to two
loans, Penn Square Mall (Prospectus ID#1, 9.5% of the pool) and GLP
Industrial Portfolio A (Prospectus ID#3, 7.4% of the pool). DBRS
has today confirmed that the performance of these loans remain
consistent with the investment-grade loan characteristics.


MOUNTAIN VIEW 2014-1: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-R, and
C-R replacement notes from Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014 that
is managed by Seix Investment Advisors LLC.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original class A, B, and C notes following payment
in full on the March 2, 2017, refinancing date.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class D, E, and F notes, which were
not part of the refinancing.

On the March 2, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-R, B-R, and C-R replacement note issuances were used to redeem
the original class A, B, and C notes as outlined in the transaction
document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on the
original notes in line with their full redemption, and S&P assigned
ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which included no other substantive changes to the
transaction.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
Replacement class          Rating        Amount (mil $)
A-R                        AAA (sf)              316.75
B-R                        AA (sf)                47.25
C-R                        A (sf)                 48.00

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
Class                      Rating
D                          BBB (sf)
E                          BB- (sf)
F                          B- (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Mountain View CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
                           Rating
Original class       To              From
A                    NR              AAA (sf)
B                    NR              AA (sf)
C                    NR              A (sf)

NR--Not rated.


N-STAR VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C
floating-rate notes from N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd., a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven classes from the
same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 31, 2017, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect increased credit support following the
transaction's $199.46 million in collective paydowns to the class
A-1, A-2, A-R, and B notes since S&P's November 2014 rating
actions.

Since then, class A-1, A-2, and A-R have been completely paid down,
and the class B notes have started to receive paydowns.  The class
B notes' balance is currently at 51.07% of the balance at issuance,
down from 100% during S&P's last review.

However, the amount of defaults has also increased during this
period and now represent nearly a third of the portfolio. According
to the January 2017 monthly trustee report, defaults are at $52.52
million, up from $30.23 million during S&P's last rating actions.
As the portfolio has amortized, the number of assets remaining in
the transaction has decreased, and the low number of assets has
increased the concentration risk.  S&P also note that the class C/D
interest coverage test has been failing the last few months and
that class H, J, and K continue to have interest shortfalls.

As a result, although S&P's model implied further upgrades on the
senior tranches, the rating actions reflect the credit quality of
the assets backing the tranches and the concentration risk.  In
addition, the class F, G, H, J, and K notes failed S&P's largest
obligor default test at the 'CCC' category.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows
S&P to use a limited number of public ratings from other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take further rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd.
Class                 Rating
             To                From
B            BB+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)
C            B- (sf)           CCC+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd.
Class        Rating
D            CCC (sf)
E            CCC (sf)
F            CCC- (sf)
G            CCC- (sf)
H            CCC- (sf)
J            CCC- (sf)
K            CCC- (sf)



NELNET STUDENT 2008-4: Fitch Corrects January 24 Release
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrected a press release on Nelnet Student Loan
Trust 2008-4 published on Jan. 24, 2017. It clarifies that the
criteria variation included in Fitch's analysis only applied to
class A-4.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Nelnet
Student Loan Trust 2008-4:

-- Class A-4 downgraded from 'AAAsf' to 'Bsf'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative and assigned Stable Outlook;

-- Class B downgraded from 'AAsf' to 'Bsf'; removed from Rating
    Watch Negative and assigned Stable Outlook.

The class A-4 notes fail the credit and maturity base case stress
scenario due to missing the legal final maturity date by 1.0 - 1.25
years. In downgrading to 'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch
considered qualitative factors such as Nelnet's ability to call the
notes ahead of the final maturity as of the optional purchase date,
and the eventual full repayment of principal in Fitch's cash flow
modelling. The optional purchase date is defined as the earlier of
the distribution date on which the pool factor falls below 10% or
October 2018.

As a result of the projected event of default (EOD) for the class
A-4 notes under the base cases, class B suffers an interest
shortfall, as all class B interest post-EOD is diverted to pay
class A principal. As a result, the class B notes fail the base
cases as well.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties provided by
eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued
interest. Fitch's U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Stable
Outlook.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
17% and a 51% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress scenario,
which is based on recent actual trust performance. The claim reject
rate is assumed to be 0.25% for the base case and 2.0% for the
'AAAsf' case. Fitch applies the standard default timing curve in
its credit stress cash flow analysis. The trailing 12-month (TTM)
average constant default rate, used in the maturity stresses, is
5.2%. TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, income-based repayment
(before adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 13.5%, 12.4%, 21.1% and 13.8%, respectively, and
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.08% based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization, excess spread and, for the class A notes,
subordination. As of October 2016, total and senior effective
parity ratios (which include the reserve account) are,
respectively, 101.07% (1.06% CE) and 112.43% (11.05% CE). Liquidity
support for the 2008-4 notes is provided by a reserve account
currently sized to the floor of $1,326,612. Excess cash will be
released from the trust as long as the target reported parity ratio
(which currently does not include the reserve account, as the pool
factor is below 40%) of 101% is maintained. However, given the
current total reported parity ratio of 100.74%, cash is not being
released.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's Student Loan ABS (SLABS) cash flow model
indicates that the class A-4 notes do not pay off before their
maturity date under Fitch's modeling scenarios, including the base
cases. If the breach of the class A-4 maturity date triggers an
EOD, interest payments will be diverted away from the class B
notes, causing the subordinate notes to fail the base cases as
well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Nelnet, Inc and Xerox Education Services. Fitch believes both are
acceptable servicers based on their long history servicing FFELP
student loans.

CRITERIA VARIATION

The decision to downgrade the A-4 notes to 'Bsf' rather than
'CCCsf' or below is a criteria variation. Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Nelnet's ability to call the notes
prior to their maturity dates and the projected eventual full
payment of principal in its analysis to support this decision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'AAsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to New Residential Mortgage
Loan Trust 2017-1's $733.994 million residential mortgage-backed
notes.

The note issuance is residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transaction backed by residential mortgage loans.

Subsequent to S&P's presale being published, four exchangeable
classes were added: B-4A, B4-IOA, B-5A, and B5-IOA.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided, as well as the associated
      structural transaction mechanics;

   -- The pool's collateral composition, which consists of highly
      seasoned, prime and nonprime, fixed- and adjustable-rate
      mortgages;

   -- The representation and warranty framework; and

   -- The ability and willingness of key transaction parties to
      perform their contractual obligations and the likelihood
      that the parties could be replaced if needed.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-1

Class              Rating                  Amount ($)
A-1                AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A-IO               AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
X                  NR                       1,052,316(i)
B-1                AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IO              AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-2                A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IO              A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-3                BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B-4                BB (sf)                 15,891,000
B-5                B (sf)                  14,756,000
B-6                NR                      22,700,457
FB                 NR                      17,065,773
A                  AAA (sf)               635,244,000
B                  NR                     121,450,457
A-1A               AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A1-IOA             AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
A-1B               AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A1-IOB             AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
A-1C               AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A1-IOC             AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
A-2                AA (sf)                661,351,000
B-1A               AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IOA             AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-1B               AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IOB             AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-1C               AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IOC             AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-2A               A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IOA             A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-2B               A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IOB             A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-2C               A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IOC             A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-3A               BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B3-IOA             BBB (sf)                18,917,000(i)
B-3B               BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B3-IOB             BBB (sf)                18,917,000(i)
B-3C               BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B3-IOC             BBB (sf)                18,917,000(i)
B-4A               BB (sf)                 15,891,000
B4-IOA             BB (sf)                 15,891,000(i)
B-5A               B (sf)                  14,756,000
B5-IOA             B (sf)                  14,756,000(i)

(i)Notional amount.
NR--Not rated.



NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim B Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-1's $733.994 residential
million mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by residential mortgage loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 1,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided, as well as the associated
      structural transaction mechanics;
   -- The pool's collateral composition, which consists of highly
      seasoned, prime and nonprime, fixed- and adjustable-rate
      mortgages, as described in the Collateral Summary section
      below;
   -- The representation and warranty framework; and
   -- The ability and willingness of key transaction parties to
      perform their contractual obligations and the likelihood
      that the parties could be replaced if needed.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-1

Class              Rating                    Amount ($)
A-1                AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A-IO               AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
X                  NR                       1,052,316(i)
B-1                AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IO              AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-2                A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IO              A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-3                BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B-4                BB (sf)                 15,891,000
B-5                B (sf)                  14,756,000
B-6                NR                      22,700,457
FB                 NR                      17,065,773
A                  AAA (sf)               635,244,000
B                  NR                     121,450,457
A-1A               AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A1-IOA             AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
A-1B               AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A1-IOB             AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
A-1C               AAA (sf)               635,244,000
A1-IOC             AAA (sf)               635,244,000(i)
A-2                AA (sf)                661,351,000
B-1A               AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IOA             AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-1B               AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IOB             AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-1C               AA (sf)                 26,107,000
B1-IOC             AA (sf)                 26,107,000(i)
B-2A               A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IOA             A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-2B               A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IOB             A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-2C               A (sf)                  23,079,000
B2-IOC             A (sf)                  23,079,000(i)
B-3A               BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B3-IOA             BBB (sf)                18,917,000(i)
B-3B               BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B3-IOB             BBB (sf)                18,917,000(i)
B-3C               BBB (sf)                18,917,000
B3-IOC             BBB (sf)                18,917,000(i)

(i)Notional amount.
NR--Not rated.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XII: S&P Assigns (P)BB Rating on Cl. E-2-R Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-2-R replacement notes from Northwoods
Capital XII Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2014 that is managed by Angelo, Gordon & Company LP.  The
class E-1 notes are not part of this refinancing, and S&P expects
to affirm the current rating on the refinancing date.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 6,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 15, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the class
A, B, C, D, and E-2 notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates
withdrawing the ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E-2 original
notes and assigning ratings to the class A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and
E-2-R replacement notes.  The class E-1 notes are not part of this
refinancing.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may
affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.  Based on the proposed supplemental indenture and the
information provided to S&P Global Ratings in connection with this
review, the replacement notes are expected to be issued at a lower
spread over LIBOR than the corresponding original notes.  There is
no proposed change to the reinvestment period duration, which ends
in September 2018, or the transaction's legal final maturity,
scheduled for September 2025.

The supplemental indenture is not expected to make other
substantive changes to the transaction.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

Replacement notes
Class              Amount    Interest
                 (mil. $)    rate (%)
A-R                376.20    LIBOR + 1.23
B-R                 69.60    LIBOR + 1.70
C-R                 52.20    LIBOR + 2.45
D-R                 30.00    LIBOR + 3.60
E-2-R               13.80    LIBOR + 6.99

Original notes
Class              Amount    Interest
                 (mil. $)    rate (%)
A                  376.20    LIBOR + 1.50
B                   69.60    LIBOR + 2.20
C                   52.20    LIBOR + 3.15
D                   30.00    LIBOR + 3.70
E-2                 13.80    LIBOR + 7.00

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Northwoods Capital XII Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             376.20
B-R                       AA (sf)               69.60
C-R                       A (sf)                52.20
D-R                       BBB (sf)              30.00
E-2-R                     BB (sf)               13.80



OHA LOAN 2013-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-1-R,
B-2-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from OHA Loan Funding 2013-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2013 that is managed by Oak Hill Advisors L.P.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original class A, B-1, B-2, C, and D notes following
payment in full on the Mach 8, 2017, refinancing date. At the same
time, S&P raised its rating on the original class E notes and
affirmed S&P's rating on the original class F notes.

On the March 8, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A, B-1, B-2, C, and D notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.


The class E notes were upgraded to 'BB+ (sf)' after considering the
benefit to the notes from the reduced senior note coupons in
connection with the refinancing.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
Replacement class          Rating        Amount (mil $)
A-R                        AAA (sf)              304.60
B-1-R                      AA+ (sf)               41.70
B-2-R                      AA+ (sf)               30.00
C-R                        AA- (sf)               30.20
D-R                        A- (sf)                26.70

RATING RAISED

OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
Class           To              From        
E               BB+ (sf)        BB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
Class                      Rating
F                           B (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
                           Rating
Original class       To           From
A                    NR           AAA (sf)
B-1                  NR           AA+ (sf)  
B-2                  NR           AA+ (sf)
C                    NR           A+ (sf)
D                    NR           BBB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PARCS MASTER: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. 2007-4 Calvados Units to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on PARCS Master Trust's class
2007-4 Calvados units to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.  The
transaction is a synthetic corporate collateralized debt
obligation.

The downgrade reflects the principal loss on the class following a
December 2016 credit event.



PARTS PRIVATE 2007-CT1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following notes issued by PARTS
Private Student Loan Trust Series 2007-CT1:

-- Class A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'CCsf'; RE 50%;
-- Class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$37 million of private student loans as of February 2017 that were
originated according to either TERI or LEARN underwriting
guidelines. The projected remaining defaults are expected to be at
about 13% of the outstanding portfolio. A recovery rate of 0% was
applied as the data provided indicates a minimal recovery rate.

Credit Enhancement (CE): This deal is under-collateralized with
negative excess spread. Senior notes, benefiting from subordination
provided by junior bonds, are receiving all the principal payments
and seeing increasing parity, while subordinate notes and junior
subordinates continue to be under-collateralized with decreasing
parity. As of February 2017, senior, subordinate and junior
subordinate parity ratios were 186.91% (CE 46.50%), 98.58% and
81.97% respectively. The Stable Outlook for the senior notes
reflects improving parity and sufficient credit enhancement to
absorb expected losses.

For the class B notes, the 'CCsf' rating reflects a very high level
of credit risk with a probable default. The class C notes are not
receiving interest payment as the class C junior subordinate note
interest trigger is in effect, although there is no payment default
in accordance with the terms of the documentation. Fitch does not
expect the notes to pay interest and principal in full.

The Recovery Estimate (RE) for the class B notes is approximately
RE 50% and for the class C notes is RE 0%.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve fund
sized at $1,000,000.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
American Education Services (AES), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA). Fitch
believes the servicing operations of AES are acceptable at this
time.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the bonds and may make certain
bond ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.



REALT 2007-1: DBRS Puts B Rating on Class K Debt Under Review
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited placed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1 issued by Real Estate
Asset Liquidity Trust (REALT), Series 2007-1 Under Review as
follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class XC-1 at AAA (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class XC-2 at AAA (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class B at AA (sf), Under Review with Developing Implications

-- Class C at A (sf), Under Review with Developing Implications

-- Classes D-1 at BBB (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Classes D-2 at BBB (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Classes E-1 at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Classes E-2 at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class F at BB (high) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class G at BB (sf), Under Review with Developing Implications

-- Class H at BB (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class J at B (high) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class K at B (sf), Under Review with Developing Implications

-- Class L at B (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

DBRS has placed all classes Under Review with Developing
Implications because of the large concentration of loans scheduled
to pay out of the trust in the near term. As of the February 2017
remittance, 26 loans remain in the pool with an outstanding trust
balance of $192 million. Of these loans, 25 have a scheduled
maturity date of either March 2017 or April 2017, representing
scheduled principal paydown of approximately $189 million. The
servicer has advised that the bulk of these loans are expected to
repay at the respective maturity dates with the exception of the
Sundance Pooled Interest loan (Prospectus ID#5; 11.9% of the
current pool balance), which is not expected to repay at the March
1, 2017, maturity date. According to the servicer, the borrower has
requested approval for a one-year extension in order to lease up
the property, which was only 6.9% occupied as of the January 2017
rent roll. The servicer advises it is currently collecting all the
necessary documents to review the request for loan modification and
will provide an update on its recommendations as soon as possible.
If the loan does not repay at maturity, that would constitute an
event of default per the loan documents; as such, DBRS believes the
loan will transfer to the special servicer in the near term. DBRS
will closely monitor the loan repayments scheduled for the coming
month and will gather information with regard to the workout status
for the Sundance Pooled Interest loan, with further rating actions
to be taken on the outstanding bonds in the near term.


ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to B2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Rosedale CLO Ltd.:

US$6,500,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
October 14, 2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Step-Up Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on October
14, 2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service also downgraded the rating on the
following note:

US$9,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on October
14, 2016 Affirmed B1 (sf)

In addition, Moody's affirmed the rating on the following note:

US$15,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$11,529,522.47) , Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 14, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Rosedale CLO Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating actions and affirmations are primarily a result
of deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October
2016. The Class B notes have been paid down fully and Class C notes
have been paid down by approximately 25.6% or $3.9 million since
that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for the
Class C and Class D notes are currently 328.80% and 135.25%
respectively, versus October 2016 levels of 210.73% and 126.07%,
respectively.

The rating downgrade on the Class E Notes is primarily a result of
decrease in the Moody's calculated Class E OC ratio since October
2016. Based on Moody's calculation, the Class E OC is currently
102.38% versus 103.41% at that time. The decrease in the Class E OC
is owed to increase in assets rated Ca/C by Moody's.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. For upgrade cases, Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the
recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would
positively impact the CLO.

6) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors Moody's rates Caa1 or lower/non-investment-grade,
especially if they jump to default. Because of the deal's lack of
granularity, Moody's also ran scenarios defaulting some of the
assets rated Caa1 or lower.

7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $1.2 million or 3.24% of par,
Moody's ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2282)

Class C: 0

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3422)

Class C: 0

Class D-1: -2

Class D-2: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $36.5 million, defaulted par of $6.1
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.64% (implying
a WARF of 2852), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.86%, a diversity score of 15 and a weighted average spread of
3.75% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.



SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one
interest-only class in Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII,
Inc. 2000-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-C2 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the interest-only (IO) class was affirmed based on
the credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16.4% of the
current balance, compared to 53.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Salomon Brothers Mortgage
Securities VII, Inc. 2000-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-C2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity,
other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 21, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $6.2 million
from $781.5 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from 4.1% to
32.7% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 54% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $58.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 65%). One loan, constituting 32.7% of the pool is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
former Diamond Point Plaza Loan ($2.03 million). The loan has been
in special servicing since 2002.The loan was originally secured by
a 251,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in suburban
Baltimore, Maryland; however, the collateral was sold for $5
million in December 2012. Sale proceeds were used to partially
recover outstanding expenses. A settlement has been reached on all
disputes, resulting in a repayment of ASERs and a $12 million
paydown of the loan.

The largest non-defeased and non-specially serviced loan represents
9.5% of the pool balance. The loan is the Eckerd's- Gloversville
Loan ($587,018), which is secured by a 10,910 SF retail property
located in Gloversville, New York approximately 50 miles northwest
of Albany. The property was originally leased to Eckerd's, however,
it is now fully occupied by Rite-Aid. Rite-Aid's lease is
co-terminus with the maturity date of the loan. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 76% since securitization. Due to the
single tenant exposure, Moody's value incorporated a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 29% and 3.77X,
respectively, compared to 33% and 3.27X, at the last review.

The other non-defeased and non-specially serviced loan in the pool
is the Southcenter Strip Retail Center Loan ($254,741 -- 4.1% of
the pool). The loan is secured by an unanchored retail center
located in Tukwila, Washington. As of September 2016, the property
was 100% leased to six tenants. The largest tenants include Car
Toys, Men's Wearhouse and Mattress Depot. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 84% since securitization



SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-3: Moody's Gives (P)B2 Rating to B-4 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-3. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans. The assets
of the trust consist of 485 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans, substantially all of which have an original term to maturity
of 30 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.40%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.50% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-3 transaction is a securitization of 485 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $345,240,401. There are 107 originators in this pool,
including Quicken Loans Inc. (10.56%) and First Republic Bank
(1.87%). In addition, Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation
(Redwood) acquired approximately 10.86% of the mortgage loans by
stated principal balance from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago
(FHLB Chicago). The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from FHLB
Chicago were originated by various participating financial
institution originators. The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood
from FHLB Chicago were originated by various participating
financial institution originators and purchased by Redwood
according to its acquisition guidelines. None of the originators
other than Quicken Loans Inc. contributed 5.00% or more of the
principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level third
party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting,
property value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has
agreed to backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of
all originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood, which Moody's has
assessed as an aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages that
is stronger than its peers. As of the January 2017 remittance
report, there have been no losses on Redwood-aggregated
transactions that closed in 2010 and later, and delinquencies to
date have also been very low.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 481 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review"). For the remaining four loans, Redwood
Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a
TPR firm check for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
four limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that
some of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from the same
originator where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. Redwood acquired 10.86% of the mortgage loans by
outstanding principal balance from the FHLB Chicago. The mortgage
loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB Chicago were originated by
various participating financial institution originators. For these
mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago will provide the loan-level R&Ws that
are assigned to the trust.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee, Master Servicer and Servicers

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee.

Moody's assesses the overall servicing arrangement of this pool as
adequate. CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for
servicer oversight, and termination of servicers and for the
appointment of successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is
committed to act as successor if no other successor servicer can be
found. There are three servicers in this pool, including Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (95.05%), Cenlar FSB (3.07%), and First Republic
Bank (1.87%).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-IO1, Cl. A-IO2,
Cl. A-IO3, Cl. A-IO4, Cl. A-IO5, Cl. A-IO6, Cl. A-IO7, Cl. A-IO8,
Cl. A-IO9, Cl. A-IO10, Cl. A-IO11, Cl. A-IO12, Cl. A-IO13, Cl.
A-IO14, Cl. A-IO15, Cl. A-IO16, Cl. A-IO17, Cl. A-IO18, Cl. A-IO19,
Cl. A-IO20, Cl. A-IO21, Cl. A-IO22, Cl. A-IO23, Cl. A-IO24, and Cl.
A-IO25 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies, available to all
registered users of Moody's website, www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.



SOUND POINT: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes from Sound Point CLO I Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by Sound Point Capital Management L.P.
S&P also removed the class B, C, D, and E note ratings from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 6, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A and E notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 10, 2017, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $161.78 million in paydowns
to the class A notes since our March 2016 rating actions.  These
paydowns resulted in improved reported overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios since the Feb. 10, 2016, trustee report, which S&P used for
its previous rating actions:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 159.2% from 136.0%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 130.99% from 120.9%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 119.8% from 113.9%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio improved to 111.6% from 108.4%.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes to reflect the
availability of sufficient credit support at their current rating
levels.  Due to the subordinate nature of the class E notes, they
did not experience a similar increase in their O/C ratio, as
compared to the more senior notes, since S&P's last rating action.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned January 2017 trustee report, to estimate future
performance.  In line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios
applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and
pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest and/or ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.
The results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view,
that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the rating levels associated with these
rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Sound Point CLO I Ltd.
                   Rating
Class        To            From
B            AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch POS
C            AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch POS
D            A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch POS

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Sound Point CLO I Ltd.
                   Rating
Class        To            From
E            BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch POS

RATING AFFIRMED

Sound Point CLO I Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)



TIAA CLO II: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to TIAA CLO II
Ltd./TIAA CLO II LLC's $368.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 7,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

TIAA CLO II Ltd./TIAA CLO II LLC  

Class                        Rating         Amount (mil. $)
A                            AAA (sf)               254.000
B                            AA (sf)                 42.000
C (deferrable)               A (sf)                  35.000
D (deferrable)               BBB (sf)                20.000
E (deferrable)               BB- (sf)                17.000
Subordinated notes           NR                      36.625

NR--Not rated.



TOWD POINT 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes Prov. B Rating on Class B2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following Asset
Backed Securities, Series 2017-1 (the Notes) issued by Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2017-1 (the Trust):

-- $1,358.1 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $115.5 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $120.6 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $101.1 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $94.9 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $74.2 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $115.5 million Class A2A at AA (sf)
-- $115.5 million Class A2B at AA (sf)
-- $115.5 million Class X1 at AA (sf)
-- $115.5 million Class X2 at AA (sf)
-- $120.6 million Class M1A at A (sf)
-- $120.6 million Class M1B at A (sf)
-- $120.6 million Class X3 at A (sf)
-- $120.6 million Class X4 at A (sf)
-- $101.1 million Class M2A at BBB (sf)
-- $101.1 million Class M2B at BBB (sf)
-- $101.1 million Class X5 at BBB (sf)
-- $101.1 million Class X6 at BBB (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 34.15% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect credit
enhancement of 28.55%, 22.70%, 17.80%, 13.20% and 9.60%,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 11,398 loans with a total principal balance of
$2,062,359,364 as of the Cut-Off Date (January 31, 2017).

As of the Statistical Calculation Date (December 31, 2016), the
portfolio contains 11,459 loans with a total principal balance of
approximately $2,076,424,870. All the below statistics regarding
the mortgage loans are based on the Statistical Calculation Date.
The portfolio contains 84.3% modified loans. Within the pool, 4,355
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates
to 8.5% of the total principal balance. The modifications happened
more than two years ago for 91.6% of the modified loans. The loans
are approximately 126 months seasoned. All loans (100.0%) were
current as of the Statistical Calculation Date, including 0.8%
bankruptcy-performing loans. Approximately 78.8% of the mortgage
loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least
the past 24 months under both the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) and Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency methods.
In accordance with the CFPB Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 0.9% of
the loans are designated as QM Safe Harbor, 0.1% as QM Rebuttable
Presumption and 0.2% as non-QM. Approximately 98.8% of the loans
are not subject to the QM rules.

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from
various transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and
2016 and are beneficially owned by both the Responsible Party and
other funds managed by affiliates of Cerberus Capital Management,
L.P. Upon acquiring the loans from the transferring trusts,
FirstKey, through a wholly owned subsidiary, Towd Point Asset
Funding, LLC, will contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor,
FirstKey, through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and
retain a 5% eligible vertical interest in each class of securities
to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to satisfy the
credit risk retention requirements. These loans were originated and
previously serviced by various entities through purchases in the
secondary market. As of the Statistical Calculation Date, all loans
are serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
non-performing loans or real estate owned properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. The asset
sale price has to equal a minimum reserve amount to maximize
liquidation proceeds of such loans or properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that generally performed well through the crisis, strong
servicers and Asset Manager oversight. Additionally, a satisfactory
third-party due diligence review was performed on the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history and data
capture as well as title and tax review. Servicing comments were
reviewed for a sample of loans. Updated broker price opinions or
exterior appraisals were provided for 100.0% of the pool; however,
a reconciliation was not performed on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider (FirstKey) with a backstop by an unrated
entity (Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund,
L.P.), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan
representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.
Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and
relative clean performance history in recent years, (2) a
comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a strong representations
and warranties enforcement mechanism, including delinquency review
trigger and breach reserve accounts.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially, and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C23: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class F commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C23, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its rating
on class H and affirmed its rating on class G from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its rating on class F to reflect its expectation of the
available credit enhancement for the class, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating level.  The upgrade also reflects S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral, the available liquidity support, and the
significant reduction in the trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on class F, S&P's analysis also considered the
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the 12 specially
serviced assets ($216.9 million, 84.6%).

The downgrade on class H reflects accumulated interest shortfalls
that S&P expects will remain outstanding in the near term as well
as credit support erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the
eventual resolution of the 12 assets with the special servicer
(discussed below).  Class H has accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for six consecutive months.

According to the Feb. 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $1,120,584 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Other expenses (primarily from recoveries of property
      protection advances and legal expenses) totaling $546,400;

   -- Interest reductions due to nonrecoverability determination
      totaling $391,062;

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $196,647; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $45,238.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class G.

The affirmation on class G reflects S&P's expectation that the
available credit enhancement for the class will be within its
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating and S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral.  S&P's analysis also
considered that while the class has experienced interest shortfalls
as of the February 2017 trustee remittance report, S&P expects the
accumulated interest shortfalls to be repaid in the near term,
though S&P believes this class is susceptible to periodic interest
shortfalls.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $256.3 million, which is 6.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  However, the trust balance was $280.2 million.  The
pool currently includes nine loans (reflecting crossed loans) and
nine real estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 270 loans at
issuance.  None are defeased, 12 assets are with the special
servicer, and two crossed loans ($19.5 million, 7.6%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., reported financial information for 91.0% of the loans in the
pool, of which 47.0% was partial- or year-end 2016 data, and the
remainder was year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.43x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 64.9% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.69% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 12 specially serviced
assets, nine of which comprised the top 10 assets.

To date, the transaction has experienced $129.2 million in
principal losses, or 3.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 6.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date,
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
12 specially serviced assets, and the write-off of approximately
$24.0 million of the under-collateralization amount.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb.17, 2017, trustee remittance report, 12 assets in the
pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC
(CWCapital).  Details of the three largest specially serviced
assets, which are the three largest assets in the pool, are:

   -- The TownMall of Westminster loan ($39.3 million, 15.4%) is
      the largest asset in the pool.  The loan has a total
      reported exposure of $43.1 million.  The loan is secured by
      444,110 sq. ft. of a 628,519-sq.-ft. enclosed regional mall
      in Westminster, Md.  The loan, which has a reported
      nonperforming matured balloon payment status, was
      transferred to the special servicer on June 18, 2015, due to

      imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on Dec. 11,
      2015.  Based on recent comments from the special servicer,
      it is S&P's understanding that the note is being marketed
      for sale in April 2017.  As of the nine months ended
      Sept. 30, 2016, the reported DSC was 0.98x, and the
      collateral's reported occupancy was 74.0% as of December
      2016.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $21.0 million
      is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a significant
      loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.  The Marriott
      Renaissance - Philadelphia, PA loan ($32.7 million, 12.8%)
      is the second-largest asset in the pool and has a total
      reported exposure of $32.9 million.  The loan is secured by
      a 349-room full-service hotel in Philadelphia, Pa.  The loan

      was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 23, 2015,
      due to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on
      Jan. 11, 2016.  According to CWCapital, the strategy is to
      foreclose and stabilize the property.  As of the six months
      ended June 30, 2016, the reported DSC was 1.20x, and
      reported occupancy was 71.1% for the trailing 12 months
      ended Nov. 30, 2016.  An ARA of $9.7 million is in effect
      against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
      loan's eventual resolution.  The 100 Motor Parkway loan
      ($28.5 million, 11.1%) is the third-largest asset in the
      pool and has a total reported exposure of $30.6 million.  
      The loan is secured by a 191,818-sq.-ft. suburban office
      property in Hauppauge, N.Y.  The loan was transferred to the

      special servicer on Dec. 21, 2015, due to maturity default.
      The loan matured on Jan. 11, 2016.  CWCapital indicated that

      the workout strategy is to market the note for sale as part
      of the May 2017 auction.  As of the nine months ended
      Sept. 30, 2016, the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.83x
      and 55.3%, respectively.  An ARA of $7.9 million is in
      effect against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
      this loan's eventual resolution.

The nine remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 10.0% of the total
pool trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 12 specially
serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of
52.9%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATING RAISED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C23

                Rating
Class     To           From       Credit enhancement (%)
F         BBB (sf)     BB (sf)                 85.95

RATING LOWERED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C23

                Rating
Class     To           From       Credit enhancement (%)
H         CCC- (sf)    B (sf)                  48.22

RATING AFFIRMED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C23

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
G         B+ (sf)                67.08



WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C24: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class C Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C24 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-C, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 34.6% of the
current balance, compared to 26.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 10.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-C was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of WBCMT 2006-C24.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 19% of the pool is in
special servicing and an additional 77% of the pool was identified
as troubled loans by Moody's. In this approach, Moody's determines
a probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced and troubled loans to the most junior
class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 97% to
$67.2 million from $2.00 billion at securitization. The
certificates are collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 5% to 72% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 81% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $187.6 million (for an average
loss severity of 49%). Two loans, constituting 18.6% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Union Square Loan ($6.3 million -- 9.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a 75,000 square foot (SF) retail property
located in Monroe, North Carolina. The property lost two anchor
tenants, representing a combined 55% of the net rentable area
(NRA), in 2015 and transferred to special servicing in January 2016
for imminent default. As of June 2016, the property was 39% leased
to eleven tenants, up from 27% at Moody's prior review.

The other specially serviced loan is the 131 Danbury Loan ($6.2
million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 53,000 SF Class
B suburban office building located in Wilton, Connecticut. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2016 after the
borrower was unable to payoff the loan at its original maturity
date. The building was originally built as flex space and
subsequently renovated and converted to office units in 1998. The
property is 96% leased to two tenants, representing 81% of the NRA
and 16% of the NRA, with lease expirations in 2018. The special
servicer is dual tracking foreclosure and an extension
modification.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for two performing loans, constituting 77%
of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss of $23.3 million
(a 36% expected loss on average) from these specially serviced and
troubled loans.

As of the February 17, 2017 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $11.3 million. Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan
modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The three performing loans not in specially servicing represent 81%
of the pool balance. The largest loan is the Bank of America --
Pasadena, CA Loan ($48.8 million -- 72.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 346,000 SF office building in Pasadena, California.
The property operates on a triple net basis and is 100% occupied by
Bank of America through October 2019. The Borrower was unable to
pay off the loan by the September 2015 anticipated repayment date
(ARD). Starting in October 2015, the loan entered into a
hyper-amortization period through the final maturity date in
December 2019. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's value
incorporates a "lit/dark" analysis. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR and Moody's has identified
this as a troubled loan.

The second largest performing loan is the St. Laurent Warehouses
Pool Loan ($3.2 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five flex industrial buildings constructed in various
years between 1973 and 2003. As of September 2016, the overall
portfolio was 96% leased, unchanged from 2015. The fully-amortizing
loan has amortized 39% since securitization and matures in March
2026. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.38X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.60X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens -- East Ridge, TN Loan
($2.9 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000 SF
single tenant retail property constructed in 2001 and located in
East Ridge, Tennessee. The property is leased and occupied by
Walgreens through 2060. The loan, which did not pay off by its ARD
in December 2015, has a final maturity in December 2035. Within two
miles of the subject, there is a CVS and Rite Aid. Moody's value
incorporated a "lit/dark" analysis due to the single tenant
exposure. The loan remains on the master servicer's watchlist for
passing its ARD and Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.


WELLS FARGO 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class F Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C20 (the Certificates),
issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C20 as
follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SFL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SFX at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited by the transaction since issuance in 2014. The collateral
consists of 98 fixed-rate loans secured by 142 commercial
properties. As of the February 2017 remittance, the pool had an
aggregate balance of approximately $1.21 billion, representing a
collateral reduction of 2.8%, due to scheduled loan amortization.
One loan (0.8% of the pool) is secured by collateral that has been
fully defeased.

The pool is primarily concentrated by three property types, as 24
loans representing 34.1% of the pool are secured by retail
properties (two of which are regional malls representing 14.4% of
the pool), 11 loans (23.0% of the pool) are secured by office
properties and 19 loans (18.5% of the pool) are secured by hotel
properties. By geographical location, the pool is relatively
diverse, as the largest concentration by state is in New Jersey,
with three loans (15.2% of the pool), followed by Texas with 14
loans (14.5% of the pool), New York with 15 loans (13.9% of the
pool) and California with 16 loans (9.8% of the pool). Two loans
(2.7% of the pool) are structured with full interest-only (IO)
terms, while an additional 11 loans (30.5% of the pool) have
partial IO periods remaining, ranging from two months to 27 months.


Excluding defeasance, 22 loans (17.9% of the pool) have reported
YE2016 net cash flow (NCF) figures, while 86 loans (95.6% of the
pool) reported partial-year 2016 (most being Q3 2016) NCF figures
and 95 loans (99.3% of the pool) reported YE2015 NCF figures.
According to the YE2015 NCF figures, the transaction had a
weighted-average (WA) amortizing debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and WA debt yield of 1.62 times (x) and 10.6%, respectively,
compared with the DBRS issuance figures of 1.48x and 9.4%,
respectively.

Based on the partial year 2016 cash flows, the Top 14 loans (54.8%
of the pool) reported a WA amortizing DSCR of 1.51x, compared with
the DBRS issuance figure of 1.38x, reflective of a WA NCF growth of
12.3%. There are four loans (13.6% of the pool) in the Top 14
exhibiting NCF declines compared with the DBRS UW figures, with
declines ranging from -6.6% to -45.9%. These four loans include
Rockwell – ARINC HQ (Prospectus ID#5, 4.0% of the pool),
Brunswick Square (Prospectus ID#6, 3.7% of the pool), Residence Inn
Adventura (Prospectus ID#8, 3.0% of the pool) and Savoy Retail &
60th Street Residential (Prospectus ID#9, 2.9% of the pool).
Excluding Savoy Retail & 60th Street Residential, which recently
experienced increased vacancy, trends for the remaining three loans
do not appear indicative of performance declines to be sustained
long-term. DBRS will monitor these loans for developments through
the full year-end reporting.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there is one loan (2.2% of the
pool) in special servicing and seven loans (6.2% of the pool) on
the servicer's watchlist. The loan in special servicing,
Minneapolis Apartment Portfolio (Prospectus ID#10), is secured by
17 Class B multifamily properties, comprising 437 units, all
located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The loan transferred to special
servicing in January 2017 because of an ongoing inquiry from the
city into the rental license of the sponsor, as the city's inquiry
reportedly alleges fraudulent and deceptive business practices. The
loan is currently 30 to 59 days delinquent. Of the seven loans
currently on the servicer's watchlist, five loans (5.3% of the
pool) were flagged due to recent declines in occupancy and/or
near-term tenant rollover, whereas the sixth loan (0.6% of the
pool) was flagged due to deferred maintenance and the remaining
loan (0.3% of the pool) was flagged due to outstanding financials.
Based on the most recent cash flow reporting (partial-year 2016
financials), these seven loans reported a WA amortizing DSCR of
1.32x, compared to the DBRS issuance figure of 2.09x, reflective of
a WA amortizing NCF decline of -14.8%.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Rockwell – ARINC HQ loan
(Prospectus ID#5, 3.9% of the pool) as investment grade. DBRS has
today confirmed that the performance of this loan is consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics. Additionally, the
shadow rating applied at issuance for the Savoy Retail & 60th
Street Residential loan (Prospectus ID #9, 2.9% of the pool) has
been removed as the credit metrics for the loan have deteriorated
since issuance following the loss of the property's anchor
restaurant tenant in early 2016.

The ratings assigned to Classes C, E and F materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the Large Pool Multi-Borrower
Parameters. DBRS considers this to be a methodology deviation when
there is a rating differential of three or more notches between the
assigned rating and the rating implied by the Large Pool
Multi-Borrower Parameters; in this case, the sustainability of loan
performance trends was not demonstrated and, as such, was reflected
in the ratings.


WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-NXS1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations follow the overall stable performance of the
underlying loans. There have been no material changes to the pool
since issuance; therefore, the original rating analysis was
considered in affirming the transaction. As of the January 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 1.1% to $944.7 million from $955.2 million at issuance.
There are three loans (3.8%) on the servicer's watchlist. The
largest watchlist loan (2.1%) is secured by a 126,962 square foot
(sf) office building located in Raleigh, NC. The property's sole
tenant is dark after being acquired by a Canadian pharmaceutical
company in April 2015. However, the tenant continues to pay rent
under the lease obligations and the loan has remained current.

Stable Performance: There have been no material changes to the
pool's overall performance since issuance. All loans are performing
in-line with Fitch's expectations.

Single Tenant Properties: The pool consists of 47 (36.3%)
single-tenanted properties, including collateral for three of the
top 10 loans.

Above-Average Collateral Quality: The pool's collateral exhibits
above-average quality. At issuance, 13 properties (50.8%) received
property quality grades of 'B+' or better.

Interest-Only Loans: Seven loans (24.9%) are full-term
interest-only and 24 loans (45.9%) are partial-interest only.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $21.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $164.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $155 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $237 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $713 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $152.8 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.9 million* class X-E at' BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.7 million* class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.7 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.7 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Indicates notional amount and interest-only.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEX
certificates, and class PEX certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G, X-B or X-G certificates.


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Ratings to E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. on March 6, 2017, assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes issued by Westlake Automobile
Receivables Trust 2017-1:

-- $167,000,000 Class A-1 at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Class A-2-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2-B at AAA (sf)
-- $57,730,000 Class B at AA (sf)
-- $77,000,000 Class C at A (sf)
-- $59,400,000 Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $27,230,000 Class E at BB (sf)

The combination of Classes A-2-A and A-2-B is expected to equal
$211.6 million.

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS’s review of the
following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date for each class.


-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of the
    auto loan portfolio by origination channels.

-- The capabilities of Westlake with regards to originations,
    underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for Westlake Services, LLC (Westlake) originations and
    performance of the Westlake auto loan portfolio.

-- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA (high) with a Negative trend
    and R-1 (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS) has served as a
    backup servicer for Westlake since 2003, when a conduit
    facility was put in place.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Westlake,
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
    for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The collateral securing the notes consists entirely of a pool of
retail automobile contracts secured by predominantly used vehicles
that typically have high mileage. The loans are primarily made to
obligors that are categorized as subprime, largely because of their
credit history and credit scores.

The ratings on the Class A Notes reflect the 42.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization (6.50%). The
ratings on the Class B, C, D and E Notes reflect 33.00%, 21.00%,
11.75% and 7.50% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Westlake
Automobile Receivables Trust 2017-1's $600.00 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2017-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 6,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 47.76%, 41.00%, 31.22%,
      24.20%, and 21.38% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These provide
      approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x,
      respectively, of S&P's 13.00%-13.50% expected cumulative net

      loss range.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      principal payments under stress cash flow modeling scenarios

      appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes would not be lowered from the assigned
      preliminary ratings for the life of the deal, S&P's rating
      on the class C notes would remain within one rating category

      of the assigned preliminary rating; S&P's rating on the
      class D notes would remain within two rating categories of
      the assigned preliminary rating for the life of the deal;
      and S&P's rating on the class E notes would remain within
      two rating categories of the assigned preliminary rating
      over one year, but would ultimately default at month 60,
      which is within the bounds of S&P's credit stability
      criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime automobile loans.

   -- The originator/servicer's long history in the
      subprime/specialty auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of approximately 10 years (2006-2016) of
      static pool data on the company's lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-3
Class    Rating      Type           Interest            Amount
                                    rate(i)           (mil. $)
A-1      A-1+ (sf)   Senior         Fixed               167.00
A-2      AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed/floating(ii)  211.64
B        AA (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed                57.73
C        A (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed                77.00
D        BBB (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed                59.40
E        BB (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed                27.23

(i)The interest rate for each class will be determined on the
pricing date.  
(ii)The class A-2 notes will be split into fixed-rate class A-2-A
and floating-rate class A-2-B.  The sizes of class A-2-A and A-2-B
will be determined at pricing, and class A-2-B will be a max of 50%
of the overall class.  The class A-2-B coupon will be expressed as
a spread tied to one-month LIBOR.


WFRBS COMM 2013-C13: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-C13.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Overall Performance: Overall pool performance has been as
expected with limited changes since issuance. No loans have
transferred to special servicing since issuance. There are five
loans (6.7%) on the master servicer's watchlist, but the issues
noted were considered relatively minor and none are considered
Fitch Loans of Concern.

Lower Loan Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 45.5% of
the pool balance, which is lower than the average 2011 and 2012 top
10 loan concentrations of 59.9% and 54.2%, respectively. In
addition, no loan accounts for more than 10.5% of the pool's
balance.

Property Type Diversity: The pool has a retail concentration of
20.2%, which is lower than the average of 2012 Fitch-rated deals of
35.9%. Hotel and multifamily properties comprise 17.7% and 8.6% of
the pool, respectively, representing greater percentages than the
2012 conduit averages of 13.5% and 6.3%. The pool's office
concentration of 29.6% is in line with the 2012 average.
Co-operative properties represented 6.9% of the pool.

Loan Maturity Schedule: Seven loans mature in 2018 (9.5%) and the
remaining 90.5% matures in 2023.

As of the February 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 4.8% to $834.6 million from
$876.7 million at issuance. Two loans (2.4% of the pool) are
defeased.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the overall
stable performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $14.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $79.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $206.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $662.5 million interest only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $81.1 million interest only class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $71.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $91 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $51.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $29.6 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $32.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $15.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $16.4 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates or the interest only
class X-C certificates.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C13: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 13 classes in
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-C13 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Class X-A and Class X-B, were
affirmed based on the credit performance of the referenced
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance, compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-C13.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25, compared to 26 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4.8% to $834.6
million from $876.7 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 49.4% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
2.4% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities. Twenty-one loans, constituting 7% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments

Ten loans, constituting 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 2% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $3.5 million (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 93% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 88%, compared to
90% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.91X and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 1.87X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

There are 21 loans with structured credit assessments ($57.7
million -- 7% of the pool) that are secured by multifamily co-op
properties located in New Jersey and New York.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 301 South College Street Loan ($85 million --
10.2% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a
$175 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 988,646 square
foot Class A office tower located in the central business district
of Charlotte, North Carolina. The property's major tenants include
Wells Fargo, Womble Carlyle and YMCA. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 103% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 102% and 1.00X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the 188 Spear Street and 208 Utah Street
Loan ($84 million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by two
office buildings located approximately two miles away from each
other in San Francisco, California. Major tenants include Amazon,
New Relic, Metaswitch Networks Corp, and Warner Brothers
Entertainment. As of September 2016, both 188 Spear Street and 208
Utah Street were 100% leased, the same as at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to
94% and 1.01X at last review.

The third largest loan is the General Services Administration (GSA)
Portfolio Loan ($50 million -- 6.0% of the pool). The loan is
secured by 14 cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted office and
flex warehouse buildings totaling 341,000 SF and located throughout
11 states. The loan sponsor is GSA Realty Holdings, Inc. The
properties are collectively 98% leased to GSA tenants under 14
long-term leases. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.10X,
respectively, the same as at last review.


[*] DBRS Reviews 153 Classes From 20 US RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 153 classes from 20 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 153 classes
reviewed, four ratings were upgraded, 142 ratings were confirmed,
six ratings were downgraded and one rating was discontinued.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating levels. The
rating confirmations reflect current asset performance and that
credit support levels have been consistent with the current rating.
The downgrades reflect a combination of the continued erosion of
credit support in these transactions and negative trends in
delinquency and projected loss activity. The discontinued rating is
a result of full principal payment to the bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS applying its updated
"RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" (see the press release "DBRS
Publishes RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities Model and Rating Methodology," dated November 28, 2016).


The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of subprime and prime
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect the structural features and
historical performance that constrain the quantitative model's
output.

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2004-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2004-A, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2004-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2004-A, Class B1 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2004-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2004-B, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2004-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2004-B, Class B1 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2004-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2004-C, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2004-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2004-C, Class B1 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-A & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2005-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2005-A, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-B & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2005-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2005-B, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-C & RESI Finance DE  
    Corporation 2005-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2005-C, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2003-A, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-A, Class B1 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-A, Class B2 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2003-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2003-B, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-B, Class B1 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-B, Class B2 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2003-C, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-C, Class B1 Risk Band
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR1,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-FR1, Class A-
    2C
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-2
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-3
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-4
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-5
-- Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
    2007-BC3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-BC3,

    Class 1-A2
-- Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
    2007-BC3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-BC3,

    Class 2-A2
-- Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2005-3, Class M-3
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
    AI-8
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
    AI-9
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
    AIII-3
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-
    1
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-
    2
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-
    4
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-
    5
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-
    6
-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-
    7
-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR3, Class I-
    A-1
-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR3, Class I-
    A-2
-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR3, Class II-
    A-1

A full text copy of the table is available free at:

                    https://is.gd/LtUtyT


[*] DBRS Reviews 234 Classes From 36 US RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 234 classes from 36 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 234 classes
reviewed, 99 ratings were confirmed and 135 ratings were upgraded.


The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating level. Rating
confirmations reflect current asset performance and credit support
levels that have been consistent with the current rating.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS applying its updated
"RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" (see "DBRS Publishes RMBS Insight
1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model And Rating
Methodology," published on November 28, 2016).

The transactions consist of U.S. Re-REMIC transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of Alt-A and Prime Jumbo
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
rating(s) implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation but, in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect the structural features and
historical performance that constrain the quantitative model
output.

-- BCAP LLC 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization Trust Securities,
    Class II-A9
-- BCAP LLC 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization Trust Securities,
    Class VII-A7
-- BCAP LLC 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization Trust Securities,
    Class VII-A9
-- BCAP LLC 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization Trust Securities,
    Class VII-A12
-- CSMC Series 2014-6R, CSMC Series 2014-6R, 5-A-1
-- Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation Re-REMIC Trust

    2014-RS1, Re-REMIC Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-RS1,

    Class 1A1
-- Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation Re-REMIC Trust

    2014-RS1, Re-REMIC Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-RS1,

    Class 3A1
-- Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2013-R8, Re-REMIC Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2013-R1, Class 2-A3
-- Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2013-R8, Re-REMIC Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2013-R1, Class 2-A
-- Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2013-R8, Re-REMIC Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2013-R1, Class 12-A3
-- Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2013-R8, Re-REMIC Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2013-R1, Class 12-A
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R4,
    Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R4,
    Class 2-A4
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R4,
    Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R4,
    Class 3-A4
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R4,
    Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R4,
    Class 4-A4
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R4,
    Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R4,
    Class 2-A
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R4,
    Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R4,
    Class 3-A
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R4,
    Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R4,
    Class 4-A
-- Nomura Resecuritization Trust 2014-3R, Resecuritization Trust
    Securities, Class 3A2

A full text copy of that ratings is available free at:

                    https://is.gd/2nefAi



[*] DBRS Takes Rating Actions From 6 ABS Deals
----------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on Feb. 29, 2017, upgraded six ratings and confirmed
seven ratings from six U.S. structured finance asset-backed
securities transactions. The upgrades are based on performance
trends and credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's
expected losses at their new respective rating levels. The
confirmations are based on performance trends and credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses
at their current respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A full text copy of the complete ratings is available free at:

                     https://is.gd/Et1nm4


[*] Fitch Took Ratings on Distressed Classes in 5 CMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on March 3, 2017, took various rating actions on
already distressed U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) bonds. Fitch downgraded nine bonds in four transactions to
'D', as the bonds have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds
were all previously rated 'CC' or below, which indicates that
losses were probable. Of these nine bonds downgraded to 'D', the
ratings on one of the classes were simultaneously withdrawn, as the
only remaining ratings in the transaction are now 'D' after this
committee's actions; as a result, the ratings are considered
immaterial.

Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on 12 additional classes
within two transactions (one transaction of which is in connection
with the simultaneous downgrade and withdrawals referenced above)
as a result of realized losses. The trust balances have been
reduced to $0 or have experienced non-recoverable realized losses
and are no longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to the
agency's coverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are limited to just the bonds with write-downs. Any
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch would
further review the affected classes.


[*] Moody's Hikes $1BB of Subprime RMBS Issued 2006-2007
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 2, 2017, upgraded the ratings
of 16 tranches, from 5 transactions issued by various issuers
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH3

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH5

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. A5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. Additionally, the upgrade
actions on bonds from J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust
2007-CH3, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH3
reflect lower expected pool losses as a result of an improvement in
pool performance. The upgraded bonds from BNC Mortgage Loan Trust
2007-2 and Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-3 also
benefit from sequential principal distributions and no loss
allocation to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

In prior rating actions, the waterfalls for J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Trust 2007-CH5 and Structured Asset Investment Loan
Trust 2006-3 were modeled incorrectly. The errors have now been
corrected. The rating actions for J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition
Trust 2007-CH5 and Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-3
are driven by performance, not the model changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on $633.8MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 20 tranches
issued from 9 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-AG1

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE7

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-WF1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-8, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-OP1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-OP2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $444.2MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 27 tranches
from four transactions, backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-11

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3A5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-9

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2A3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR5

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools. The rating
upgrades are due to the stable or improved collateral performance
of the related underlying pools and the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating upgrades on classes
I-A-1, I-A-2, I-A-3, II-A-1, II-A-2, V-A-1, and V-A-2 from American
Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1 are solely due to the
increase of credit enhancement available to the bonds. The rating
upgrade on class II-A-1 from Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation,
Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2005-AR5 is solely due to the
improved collateral performance of the related underlying pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $3.7BB of RMBS Issued From 2016
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 2, 2017, upgraded the ratings
of thirty-three tranches from four transactions backed by
conforming balance RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C01

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2I, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2F, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2I, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C02

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2I, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C04

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2I, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: STACR 2016-HQA2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3AF, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3AI, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a reduction in Moody's
expected pool losses. The actions are also a result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools which have displayed very low
levels of serious delinquencies.

The rating actions also reflect a correction to the modeling used
by Moody's in rating these transactions. Due to an input error, the
cash flow models used in prior rating actions assumed a longer
average life for the bonds than what Moody's has used in similar
transactions. The correction of the input error had an adverse
impact of about one notch on ratings of the most junior
subordinated tranches. However, as noted above, the rated bonds
continue to benefit both from a steady increase in the credit
enhancement as a result of sequential principal distributions among
subordinated bonds, and from a reduction in the expected losses on
the underlying pools owing to strong collateral performance. These
benefits more than offset the negative effect of the error
correction and result in upgrade actions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Connecticut Avenue
Securities, Series 2016-C01 Cl. 1M-2I and Cl. 2M-2I, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C02 Cl. 1M-2I , Connecticut Avenue
Securities, Series 2016-C04 Cl. 1M-2I, and STACR 2016-HQA2 Cl. M-2I
and Cl. M-3AI was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 28 Classes From 23 RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 28 classes from 23 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2006.  The review yielded 27 downgrades and one
affirmation.  S&P removed the one affirmed rating as well as five
of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where they were placed on Jan. 25, 2017.  The downgrades stem from
applying S&P's interest shortfall criteria.

All of the transactions in this review are backed by a mix of
fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage loans secured primarily by one-
to four-family residential properties.

A combination of subordination, overcollateralization (when
available), excess interest, and bond insurance (as applicable)
provide credit enhancement for all of the tranches in this review.

             APPLICATION OF INTEREST SHORTFALL CRITERIA

In reviewing these ratings, S&P applied its interest shortfall
criteria as stated in "Structured Finance Temporary Interest
Shortfall Methodology," published Dec. 15, 2015, which impose a
maximum rating threshold on classes that have incurred interest
shortfalls resulting from credit or liquidity erosion.  In applying
the criteria, S&P looked to see if the applicable class received
additional compensation beyond the imputed interest due as direct
economic compensation for the delay in interest payment. In
instances where the class did not receive additional compensation
for outstanding interest shortfalls, S&P used the maximum length of
time until full interest is reimbursed as part of its analysis to
assign the rating on the class.

In instances where the class received additional compensation for
outstanding interest shortfalls, S&P used its cash flow projections
in determining the likelihood that the shortfall would be
reimbursed under various scenarios.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include three ratings that were lowered three or
more notches.  One of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level; three of the lowered ratings went from
investment grade to speculative grade while the remaining 23
downgraded classes already had speculative-grade ratings.

S&P lowered its rating on class M-4 from Morgan Stanley ABS Capital
I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5 to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and removed
it from CreditWatch negative, and S&P lowered its ratings on class
M-1 from Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2 to
'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and on class M3 from Fremont Home Loan
Trust 2005-1 to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)'. These downgrades were
based on S&P's cash flow projections used in determining the
likelihood that the interest shortfall would be reimbursed under
various scenarios, as these classes received additional
compensation for outstanding interest shortfalls.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on class AF-3 from GSAA Home
Equity Trust 2005-7 and removed it from CreditWatch negative after
S&P received information to assess the impact of interest
shortfalls on this class.  Based on S&P's assessment the rating on
this class reflects the impact of the interest shortfalls it has
incurred.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that S&P believes could affect
residential mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Rating is available at:

                  http://bit.ly/2med9I1


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
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equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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                   *** End of Transmission ***