TCR_Public/170115.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, January 15, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 14

                            Headlines

AIRCRAFT LEASE: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class C Notes
ARES IIIR: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
ASHFORD CDO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'D'
AVIATION CAPITAL 2000-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to D
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 10 Cert. Classes

BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2016-SPL2: Fitch Rates Cl. B5 Notes 'Bsf'
BEAR STEARNS 2002-TOP8: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class N Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2003-PWR2: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. M Certs to 'BB'
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. D Certs to D
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2015-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. D Notes

CARLYLE MCLAREN: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Debt
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.16-Bil. of RMBS
COUNTRYWIDE: Moody's Hikes $49.8MM 2nd Lien RMBS Issued in 2004
CPS AUTO 2017-A: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes

CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Ratings on 3 Tranches
CW CAPITAL II: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 8 Tranches
FLAGSHIP CLO IV: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
FOUR CORNERS II: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR3: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Tranches

IMSCI 2015-6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. G Certificates
JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class G Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. B Debt
LB-UBS  COMMERCIAL 2001-C3: Fitch Corrects Jan. 5 Release
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C3: Moody's Cuts Cl. G Debt Rating to Caa2

LEHMAN BROTHERS-UBS 2001-C3: Fitch Lowers Cl. F Debt Rating to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-IQ7: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 2 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. H Certs to BB+
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE 2013-A: S&P Affirms B Rating on Cl. B-4 Loan
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Cuts Cl. F-8 Debt Rating to B1

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-1: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Certs '(P)B1'
SLM PRIVATE 2006-B: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Notes to 'BB+'
STARTS (CAYMAN) 2007-14: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on 3 Tranches
STUDENT LOAN 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
TABERNA PREFERRED VIII: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-2 Notes Rating to Caa1

VITALITY RE VIII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB+ Rating on Class B Notes
VNDO TRUST 2016-350P: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. F Debt to D
WELLS FARGO 2015-C26: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
[*] Fitch: More Sub Debt in CMBS Results in Higher Defaults

[*] S&P Completes Review on 36 Classes From 7 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 61 Classes From 8 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Cuts Ratings to 'D' on 57 Classes From 36 RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 23 Classes From 7 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 34 Classes From 11 CDO Transactions

[*] S&P Takes Actions on 38 Classes From 7 RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 81 Classes From 13 US RMBS Deals
[] Moody's Hikes $124.8MM Scratch-and-Dent RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[] Moody's Hikes $174.6MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[] Moody's Takes Action on $154.9MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2007


                            *********

AIRCRAFT LEASE: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings to the refinanced
asset-backed securities (ABS) issued by Aircraft Lease
Securitisation Limited (ALS):

   -- $380,000,000 class A notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75,000,000 class B notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,000,000 class C notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.
   -- $59,990,000 class D-1 notes 'NRsf;
   -- $10,000 class D-2 notes 'NRsf'.

ALS is a special purpose public company incorporated with limited
liability in Jersey, Channel Islands, and was established in 2005
to acquire and own aircraft assets and related leases in a
portfolio of commercial aircraft.  ALS is a resident in Ireland for
tax purposes.  As of the date of closing, ALS indirectly owns 36
aircraft and related leases through ownership interests it holds in
entities owning the aircraft and leases.

ALS is serviced by AerCap Holdings N.V. (AerCap) (Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating [IDR] of 'BBB-'/Outlook Stable), via its Irish
servicing subsidiary AerCap Ireland Limited (AerCap Ireland).

Since 2005, the trust has gone through a number of refinancing
events to redeem certain outstanding notes and/or acquire
additional aircraft for the trust.  The 2016 refinancing will
redeem any outstanding notes from the trust, including the class E
notes.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Quality: Despite the weighted average (WA) age of 14.5 years,
the pool is comprised of high quality aircraft from the A320ceo and
B737 NG families.  The WA remaining lease term is
3.3 years with over 25% of the pool scheduled to come off lease in
2018.

Weak Lessee Credits: There are 20 airline lessees in the pool.  As
is typical of aircraft ABS transactions, ALS has significant
concentration of unrated or speculative grade airline lessees.
Fitch assumed unrated lessees would perform consistent with a 'B'
IDR to accurately reflect the default risk in the pool.

Technological Risk: The A320ceo and B737 NG family of aircraft both
face replacement programs over the next decade, with the recent
introduction of the A320neo in 2016 and the B737 MAX later in 2017.
Fitch anticipates these new variants will create pressure for
values and lease rates of current generation aircraft, but expects
the current large operator bases, long lead time for full
replacement and the ongoing low fuel price environment to partially
mitigate this risk.

Sufficient Loss Coverage for Stress Scenarios: Credit enhancement
(CE) is primarily comprised of overcollateralization (OC), a
liquidity facility and a maintenance reserve.  Fitch created
multiple cash flow scenarios to evaluate the strength of the
structure's CE.  The notes pay in full prior to the legal final
maturity under Fitch's primary scenarios.

Strong Servicing Capability: ALS depends on the ability of AerCap
Ireland to collect lease and maintenance payments, remarket and
repossess aircraft in an event of lessee default, and procure
maintenance to retain asset value and ensure stable transaction
performance.  Fitch believes AerCap Ireland to be a capable
servicer, as evidenced by their servicing of prior securitizations
and total managed aircraft fleet.

Commercial Aviation Cyclicality: The industry has historically been
subject to significant cyclicality stemming from macroeconomic and
geopolitical events.  Downturns are typically marked by reduced
asset utilization rates, values and lease rates as well as
deteriorating credit quality amongst lessees.  Fitch's analysis
assumes multiple periods of significant volatility over the life of
the transaction.

Fitch's assumptions and stresses were derived and applied
consistent with criteria.  Under Fitch's primary scenarios,
assumptions including those relating to aircraft tiers,
depreciation, recessionary value declines, and lease rate factors
are unchanged from the values stated in criteria.  Fitch utilized
the low end of the recessionary value decline stress ranges.
Maintenance-adjusted base values were utilized for the values of
aircraft in the pool.  Aircraft useful life was assumed to be 20
years for Fitch's primary rating scenario, but adjusted in certain
cases according to current lease remaining terms or anticipated
sales.  Assumptions detailed below are also for Fitch's primary
scenario and were all based off AerCap's historical fleet
experience and data.

For remarketing downtime, Fitch utilized a cumulative probability
curve whereby Tier 1 Aircraft were assumed be remarketed 46% and
56% of the time within one month under an 'Asf' scenario in
recessionary and non-recessionary periods, respectively, both well
below AerCap's historical experience.  These probabilities then
increase month-over-month until tapering off and reaching 100%
probability by month nine.  Probability assumptions were stressed
further by 5% across tiers, and were increased by 5% to assume
higher probability of shorter remarketing times across lower rating
category stresses.

For repossession downtime, under 'Asf', 'BBBsf' and 'BBsf'
scenarios, Fitch assumed four, three, and two months during assumed
recessionary periods, and three, two, and two months during
non-recessionary periods, respectively.  Recessions were assumed to
last for four years with value declines occurring over three- and
four-year periods for investment grade and non-investment grade
scenarios, respectively.  The first recession was assumed to begin
six months after transaction close, while each subsequent recession
was assumed to begin five years after the end of the prior
recession.

Under 'Asf' scenarios, narrowbody aircraft were assumed to
experience remarketing and repossession costs of $400,000 and
$450,000, respectively.  These were each decreased by $50,000 when
moving down to lower rating category stresses.

For new lease term assumptions, Fitch assumed lease terms of 48 and
54 months for 'Asf' scenarios for recessionary and non-recessionary
periods, respectively.  These assumptions were increased by six
months each when moving down to lower rating category stresses.
Fitch assumed a lease extension probability of 35% and extension
term of 24 months in all scenarios, both well below AerCap's
historical experience.

For residual proceeds, Fitch assumed the majority of the aircraft
were sold for 50% of their future stressed values.  For Tier 1
narrowbody aircraft sold within the first five years of the
transaction life, Fitch assumed 100% due to high residual proceeds
observed in both AerCap and industry sales data.  All assumed
proceeds were based off the aircraft market value in Fitch's
modeling scenarios, which considers standard depreciation and any
recessionary value declines to which aircraft are exposed.  In
addition, Fitch adjusted certain residual proceeds for certain
aircraft in the pool based on expected sales occurring within the
first four months following closing.

Maintenance assumptions and stresses were also applied consistent
with criteria and the assumptions detailed above.

Fitch's ratings do not consider the application of step-up interest
to the notes following the expected maturity date on the seventh
anniversary of the refinancing.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Due to the correlation between global economic conditions and the
airline industry, the ratings may be impacted by global
macro-economic or geopolitical factors over the remaining term of
the transaction.  Therefore, Fitch evaluated various sensitivity
scenarios which could affect future cash flows from the pool and
recommended ratings for the notes.

First, Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis assuming a 10%
decrease to Fitch's lease rate factor (LRF) curve to observe the
impact of depressed lease rates on the pool.  This scenario
highlights the effect of increased competition in the aircraft
leasing market, particularly for mid-life aircraft over the past
few years, and stresses the pool to a higher degree by assuming
lease rates well below observed market rates.  Under this scenario,
the notes show little sensitivity and continue to pass their
respective rating scenarios.

Fitch next evaluated a scenario in which aircraft were assumed to
have useful lives of 25 years, versus 20 years used in the primary
rating scenario.  This scenario considers the inability of AerCap
to sell aircraft in the pool and ages aircraft further, essentially
running aircraft to part-out scenarios.  All the aircraft in the
pool migrate to Tier 3 asset types under this scenario, and
therefore are assumed to have migrated to 'CCC' airline credits, in
addition to exposure to higher levels of depreciation rates and
recessionary value declines.  Depending on their age, certain
aircraft are further exposed to more recessionary value declines
under this scenario.  Though there is more impact on cash flows,
the notes show little sensitivity to this scenario, and pass their
respective rating scenarios.

Lastly, Fitch analyzed a scenario in which residual proceeds were
assumed to be 50% of the market value for all aircraft in the pool.
This scenario assumes that AerCap must sell the aircraft for
values far below current and projected market values, indicating a
severe downturn in the aviation industry and/or high oversupply of
next generation aircraft in the pool.  This scenario displays a
quick, impactful effect of the 'neo' and 'MAX' introductions on the
next generation aircraft in the pool and their respective values.
Fitch found this scenario to have the most impact on cash flows,
but the class A and B notes continue to pass their respective
rating scenarios.  The class C notes would suffer the most under
this scenario, and would be exposed to a potential downgrade of one
to two rating categories.


ARES IIIR: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd.:

US$35,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on November 3, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

US$31,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on November 3, 2015 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$50,000,000 Class A-1 Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $10,282,782), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on November 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$446,300,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $91,784,113), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on November 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$42,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on November 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

US$42,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on November 3, 2015
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April
2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since July 2016. The Class A-1
and A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 57% or $136.5
million since that time. Based on the trustee's December 2016
report, the OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class
E notes are reported at 192.65%, 149.16%, 125.55% and 109.89%,
respectively, versus July 2016 levels of 146.16%, 127.13%, 114.68%
and 105.40%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since July 2016. Based on the trustee's December 2016 report, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2785 compared to
2622 in July 2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2293)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3439)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $267.9 million, defaulted par of
$13.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.32%
(implying a WARF of 2866), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.59%, a diversity score of 30 and a weighted average
spread of 2.96% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


ASHFORD CDO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class B-2L notes from
Ashford CDO II Ltd., formerly known as Tricadia CDO 2006-6, to 'D
(sf)' from 'CC (sf)'.  Ashford CDO II Ltd. is a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by structured finance
obligations.

The rating action is based on S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the November 2016 trustee report.

Upon liquidation, the amount of proceeds left in the transaction on
the Nov. 7, 2016, payment date was inadequate to pay the class B-2L
notes' principal balance and deferred interest in full.  The
trustee confirmed that no other assets or funds remain in the
transaction and that no future payments are expected to be made to
the class B-2L noteholders.  As a result, S&P lowered its rating on
the class B-2L notes to 'D (sf)'.


AVIATION CAPITAL 2000-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to D
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class A-1 notes from
Aviation Capital Group Trust's series 2000-1 to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)'.

The rating action reflects S&P's view that the class A-1 notes will
not be paid in full by the legal final maturity.  The transaction
sold all the remaining aircraft and engine in the portfolio in
September 2016, and the proceeds had been distributed.  With no
rental collections, the transaction is currently relying on the
available reserves to pay the interest. Although the class A-1
notes are still current on interest, S&P don't believe the
available reserve will be sufficient to pay the note principal
after paying interest.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 10 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 20 classes of Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2007-2 (BACM 2007-2).

Fitch has issued a focus report on this transaction.  The report
provides a detailed and up-to-date perspective on key credit
characteristics of the BACM 2007-2 transaction and property-level
performance of the top three loans.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relatively Stable Performance: The affirmations reflect the
relatively stable performance of the pool since Fitch's last rating
action and modeled losses remain in line with previous
expectations.  Fitch modeled losses of 23.1% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 14.4%, including
$235 million (7.4% of original pool balance) in realized losses
incurred to date.  Modeled losses at the previous rating action
were 14.5% of the original pool balance.

As of the December 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 69.5% to $967 million from
$3.17 billion at issuance.  Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$30.7 million are affecting classes C through S.

Defeasance: According to servicer reporting and as of December
2016, seven loans (7.1% of pool) have been defeased, including the
fourth largest loan (4%).

Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated 26 loans (40.5%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes nine loans (17.8%) in special
servicing.  Real estate owned (REO) assets comprise 3.3% of the
pool.  The largest contributors to Fitch modeled loss expectations
are the two largest loans in the pool, Connecticut Financial Center
- A/B Notes (13.5% of pool), which recently transferred back to
special servicing, and Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio (13.3%), which
was previously modified.

Undercollateralization: The pool is undercollateralized as the
aggregate balance of the certificates is $1.39 million greater than
the aggregate collateral balance.  This disparity of principal
balances is due to the servicer recovering workout-delayed
reimbursement amounts from the transaction's principal
collections.

Maturity Concentration: Significant deleveraging is expected as the
entire remaining pool matures in the first half of 2017. Excluding
the REO assets (3.3% of pool), the entire remaining collateral pool
matures in 2017 with 35.1% in the first quarter and 61.6% in the
second quarter.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-4, A-1A and A-M reflect increasing
credit enhancement and expected continued paydowns. With the
growing potential for adverse selection as performing loans repay
in 2017, upgrades are unlikely in the near term. Downgrades are
possible if underperforming loans further decline or if highly
leveraged loans fail to refinance.  The distressed classes may be
subject to further downgrades as additional losses are realized.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $96.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $154.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $317.3 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $153.8 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 70%;
   -- $100 million class A-JFL at 'CCCsf'; RE 70%;
   -- $15.9 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $47.6 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $31.7 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $15.9 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $27.8 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $7.4 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-2FL, A-3 and A-AB certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class S certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class XW
certificates.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2016-SPL2: Fitch Rates Cl. B5 Notes 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Bayview Opportunity Master
Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2 (BOMFT 2016-SPL2) as:

   -- $142,320,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $142,320,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $142,320,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $18,455,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18,455,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $18,455,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $5,661,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $5,661,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $14,719,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $14,719,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $14,719,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $11,662,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,662,000 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $11,662,000 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $9,285,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $24,342,818.84 class B6 notes;
   -- $24,342,818.84 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 4,274 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans of which 98% are daily simple interest
mortgage loans totaling $226.44 million, which excludes
$7.3 million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as
of the cutoff date.  Distributions of principal and interest and
loss allocations are based on a sequential pay, senior subordinate
structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 37.15% subordination provided by the 8.15% class B1, 2.50%
class B2, 6.50% class B3, 5.15% class B4, 4.10% class B5, and
10.75% class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 10 years with roughly 96.4% of the pool paying on
time for the past 24 months and 90.2% current for the past three
years.  In addition, 36.7% of the pool has been modified due to
performance issues, while the remaining loans were either not
modified (35.7%) or had their interest rates reduced due to an
interest rate reduction rider incorporated at origination (27.7%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$93,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000.  Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than those
implied by Fitch's loan loss model.  For this reason, LS floors
were applied to loans with property values below $100,000, which
ranged from 49%-100%, and increased our 'AAAsf' loss expectation by
250 basis points (bps).

Daily Simple Interest Loans (Concern): Approximately 98% of the
pool consists of daily simple interest loans that accrue interest
on a daily basis from the date of the borrower's last payment.
While the monthly payment is fixed, if a borrower pays earlier than
the due date, less of the payment is applied to interest and more
is applied to principal.  If the borrower pays late, more of the
payment is applied to interest and less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds.  Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date.  In
addition, close to 60% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk.  Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later-pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial).  Given that over 95% of
the loans were originated and serviced by a single originator prior
to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that a 24% compliance, data
integrity and pay history sample is sufficient to capture the
potential risk of incomplete files that could accompany portfolios
traded in the secondary market.  A full custodial file and tax
review was conducted on 100% of the pool (tax review result is
still outstanding on approximately 4.5% of the pool), and title
search was conducted on over 96% of the pool.  In addition, BAM,
with the guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (BLS) as servicer
(rated 'RSS2+'), reconstructed the past four years of pay histories
for 100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust.  However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I.  Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full.  Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps) from the interest remittance amount will be
used to pay down principal as well as any excess interest
allocation from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation.
The provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions, as well as the application of excess interest to the
notes, is highly supportive of timely interest payments to those
classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest.  While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower-rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral, and will generally not be repaid
until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Under Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global
Structured Finance Transactions,' dated June 2016, it may assign
ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes that incur deferrals if such
deferrals are permitted under terms of the transaction documents,
provided such amounts are fully recovered well in advance of the
legal final maturity under the relevant rating stress.

Tier 1 Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality.  The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued.  In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
July 2021.  If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches of R&Ws.

                       CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated four criteria variations from the
'U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria' and the 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned,
Re-performing and Non-Performing Loan Criteria' which are described
below.

The first variation is the less than 100% third-party review (TPR)
due diligence review for regulatory compliance, data integrity and
pay history.  Title review was conducted on over 96% of the pool
and a tax and custodial file review was conducted on 100% of the
pool.  The tax review results are still to be received on
approximately 4.5% of the pool.  The less than 100% TPR review is
consistent with Fitch's criteria for seasoned performing pools.
However, because Fitch's criteria states it views pools as seasoned
performing if it consists of loans that have never been modified, a
criteria variation was made.  Without this variation, the pool
would have had 100% compliance, data integrity, and pay history TPR
review to achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.  Fitch is comfortable with the
reduced due diligence sample, since over 95% of the loans were
originated by a single lender and the sample provided is sufficient
to provide a reliable indication of the operational quality of the
lender.

The second variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM).  Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an
AVM product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors.  Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but rather an
indexation product.  Clear Capital is a reputable third party
vendor that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set which goes down to the neighborhood
level and incorporates REO sales.  Fitch believes the HDI product
to be an adequate alternative to an AVM.  The HDI product was only
used for loans that were clean current for the prior 24 months and
had a LTV


BEAR STEARNS 2002-TOP8: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class N Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2002-TOP8.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the pool
since Fitch's prior review.  As of the December 2016 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
97.8% to $17.9 million from $842 million at issuance.  Per servicer
reporting, four loans (54.7% of the current balance) are fully
defeased.  There are no specially serviced loans remaining in the
pool and no classes are currently incurring an interest shortfall.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only eight
loans remaining.  While the quality of the remaining pool
collateral appears to be high based on historic performance, 73.4%
of the current balance is composed of loans secured by assets in
secondary and tertiary markets.  Additionally, the pool has a high
percentage of both retail (53.7% of the current balance) and office
(43%) loans.

Low Leverage: All non-defeased loans are fully amortizing with a
weighted average Fitch LTV of 16.12%.

Maturity Concentration: Seven out of eight loans mature in 2017,
with one maturing in September 2022.  The loan, the second largest
in the pool (34.7% of the current balance), is fully amortizing and
is secured by a 220,330 square foot (sf) retail center located in
Citrus Heights, CA.  Performance at the property has been strong
historically with an average occupancy of 93% over the last 10
years.  Per servicer reporting, the property was 98% occupied as of
year-end (YE) 2015 with a net operating income (NOI) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.71x.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes H through M remain Stable.
Downgrades are possible should any of the remaining loans suffer
from a material decline in performance or if modeled losses are
realized.  Upgrades are unlikely given the concentrated nature of
the pool.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $3.1 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.2 million class J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4.2 million class K at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.2 million class L at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.2 million class M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.2 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 100%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, and X-2 certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class O certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2003-PWR2: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. M Certs to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed six classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PWR2 (BS
2003-PWR2).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the collateral quality of the largest loan (3
Times Square) and the stable performance of the pool.  The pool has
sustained $12 million (1.1% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date.  As of the December 2016 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
95.3% to $50 million from $1.07 billion at issuance.  Per the
servicer reporting, one loan (0.7% of the pool) is defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes N through P.

3 Times Square: The largest loan in the pool is the $40.8 million
(81.6% of pool) pari-passu portion of 3 Times Square (totaling
$55.1 million).  The loan is fully amortizing through its October
2021 maturity date and is secured by an 883,405 square foot
30-story class-A office building located in Manhattan.  Built in
2001, the property's major tenants include Thomson Reuters, BMO
Harris Bank and JP Morgan Chase.  As of June 2016, the year to date
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was reported to be 1.71x.
Occupancy was reported to be 99%, but has been 100% for the past
several years.

Servicer Watchlist: One loan (2.1%), which is secured by a
Winn-Dixie -anchored shopping center in Melbourne, FL, is on the
servicer's watchlist.  The property has reported a DSCR below 1.0x
for the past two years due to low average rental rates.  As of
year-end 2015, the property was reported to be 92% occupied.  The
fully amortizing loan has remained current and matures in September
2018.

Pool Concentration: There are only seven loans remaining in the
pool, of which four are fully amortizing.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks remain Stable given the overall stable
performance of the pool, low leverage and continued amortization.
The class K balance is fully covered by the 3 Times Square loan and
the upgrade reflects the location, low leverage and strong
historical performance of the collateral.  The class M upgrade
reflects sufficient credit enhancement and the protection against
losses from the subordinate class N.  Fitch does not foresee
further positive or negative ratings migration unless a material
economic or asset level event changes the underlying transaction's
portfolio-level metrics or unless there is significant additional
paydown or defeasance.

Fitch upgrades these classes:

   -- $5.3 million class K to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $5.3 million class M to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $4.7 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.3 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $13.3 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $5.3 million class J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4 million class L at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.7 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D and E certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and
X-2 certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. D Certs to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on one class of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
lowered its rating on one class and affirmed its ratings on six
other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its rating on class A-M to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
this class, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the rating level.  The
upgrade also follows S&P's views regarding the collateral's current
and future performance, forecasted liquidity support, and the trust
balance's reduction.

The downgrade on class D to 'D (sf)' reflects the accumulated
interest shortfalls S&P expects to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.

According to the Dec. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $659,413 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $570,758, of which $562,852
      reflected a workout fee for a corrected loan that paid off;
      and

   -- Non-recoverable scheduled interest totaling $88,004.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class A-J.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes A-J and B, S&P's analysis also
considered the susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
four specially serviced assets ($18.3 million, 1.8%), one
credit-impaired loan ($5.0 million, 0.5%), and the magnitude of
nondefeased, performing loans (78 crossed set loans;
$647.0 million, 65.1%) maturing in the first half of 2017.  Of
specific concern is the second-largest loan (reflecting crossed
loans) in the transaction, One AT&T Center ($112.7 million, 11.3%),
which is secured by a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. office property located
in downtown St. Louis.  The loan has an anticipated repayment date
(ARD) of Jan. 1, 2017, and a final maturity date in January 2037.
The property is 100% leased to AT&T under a lease that expires in
September 2017.  Based on the rent roll provided by the master
servicer, it appears AT&T has four extension options available.
However, according to various local newspaper and real estate
industry articles, AT&T appears to have moved its employees to
various other properties across the St. Louis region, vacating
about 58% of its existing square footage in the downtown area.  The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), has contacted
the borrower for a leasing update.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)'rating on the class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Dec. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $993.8 million, which is 47.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 101 loans (reflecting
crossed loans) and one real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 234
loans (reflecting crossed loans) at issuance.  Four of these assets
($18.3 million, 1.8%) are with the special servicer, seven loans
($107.6 million, 10.8%) are defeased, and 77 loans (reflecting
crossed sets) ($655.4 million, 65.9%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered one loan as
credit-impaired ($5.0 million, 0.5%) and one loan ($1.3 million,
0.1%) as paid-off following the December 2016 pay date.  Wells
Fargo reported financial information for 95.5% of the nondefeased
loans in the pool, of which 37.8% was partial-year 2016 data and
the remainder was partial or year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.63x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 76.3% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.54% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the four specially
serviced assets, seven defeased loans, one credit-impaired loan,
theone paid-off loan, and one non-reporting loan.  The top 10
nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance
of $549.1 million (55.3%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.75x and 77.0%, respectively, for all the top 10
nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $81.8 million in principal
losses, or 3.9% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 4.4% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
four specially serviced assets and one credit impaired loan.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Dec. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, four assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  The largest specially serviced asset is:

The Inn at Chester Springs REO asset is the largest nondefeased REO
asset in the pool, with a $10.9 million (1.1%) pool trust balance
and a $13.4 million reported total exposure.  The asset is a
216-room full-service lodging property in Uwchlan Township, Pa. It
was built in 2002 and renovated in 2005.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing effective Feb. 3, 2014, due to imminent
default.  The asset became REO on Feb. 3, 2015.  As of Dec. 31,
2015, property revenues weren't sufficient to cover operating
expenses, and reported occupancy was 44.0%.  An appraisal reduction
amount (ARA) of $10.4 million is in effect against this asset.
This asset has been deemed non-recoverable by the master servicer.
S&P expects a significant loss (60% or greater) upon its eventual
resolution.

The three remaining assets with C-III each have individual balances
representing less than 0.5% of the total pool trust balance.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined the
1577 Northern Blvd loan to be credit-impaired. Per Wells Fargo,
this loan transferred to the special servicer effective Dec. 14,
2016 (after the Dec. 12, 2016, remittance report).  The loan's ARD
is Jan. 1, 2017, and is secured by a one-story, 15,400-sq.-ft.
retail property, in Manhasset, N.Y., which was built in 1948 and
renovated in 1983.  S&P expects a minimal loss (less than 25%) upon
the loan's eventual resolution.

In summary, S&P estimated a 45.0% weighted average loss severity
for the four specially serviced assets and one credit-impaired
loan.

RATINGS LIST

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-TOP26

                                  Rating
Class             Identifier      To                  From
A-4               07388VAE8       AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
A-1A              07388VAF5       AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
A-M               07388VAG3       AAA (sf)            AA (sf)
A-J               07388VAH1       BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
B                 07388VAJ7       B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)
C                 07388VAK4       B- (sf)             B- (sf)
D                 07388VAL2       D (sf)              CCC (sf)
X-1               07388VAY4       AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2015-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
and B-R replacement notes from BlueMountain CLO 2015-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2015,
that is managed by BlueMountain Capital Management LLC.  S&P
withdrew its ratings on the transaction's original class A-1, A-2,
and B notes following payment in full on the Dec. 23, 2016,
refinancing date.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class C, D, and E notes, which were not part of the
refinancing.

On the Dec. 23, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, and B-R replacement note issuances were used to
redeem the original class A-1, A-2, and B notes as outlined in the
transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew the
ratings on the transaction's original notes in line with their full
redemption, and we are assigning ratings to the transaction's
replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available
is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the transaction remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2015-1 Ltd.

Replacement class      Rating                Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                  AAA (sf)                     310.00
A-2-R                  AA (sf)                       69.50
B-R                    A (sf)                        29.70

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

BlueMountain CLO 2015-1 Ltd.

                        Rating
Original class      To          From
A-1                 NR          AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR          AA (sf)
B                   NR          A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

BlueMountain CLO 2015-1 Ltd.

Class                Rating
C                    BBB (sf)
D                    BB (sf)
E                    B (sf)

UNAFFECTED CLASS

BlueMountain CLO 2015-1 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
Subordinated notes      NR

NR--Not rated.


CARLYLE MCLAREN: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Carlyle McLaren CLO, Ltd.:

US$28,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2015 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

US$22,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2021,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2015 Upgraded to Baa2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$333,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2021
(current outstanding balance of $31,057,117), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 10, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Up To US$60,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
February 2021 (current outstanding balance of $5,595,877), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

US$20,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2021
(current outstanding balance of $19,025,772), Affirmed Ba3 (sf);
previously on August 10, 2015 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Carlyle McLaren CLO, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
August 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2016. The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 77.7% or $127.4
million since then. Based on the trustee's December 2016 report,
the OC ratios for the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L and Class
B-2L notes are reported at 205.5%, 150.5%, 124.4% and 107.0%,
respectively, versus February 2016 levels of 138.1%, 121.4%, 110.9%
and 103.2%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since February 2016. Based on the trustee's December 2016 report,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 3190
compared to 2608 in February 2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Sensitivity to default timing scenarios: The junior and
mezzanine notes in this CLO rely significantly on excess interest
for additional credit enhancement. However, the availability of
such credit enhancement from excess interest is subject to
uncertainty relating to the timing and the amount of defaults, and
the transaction could be negatively affected if the timing of
defaults differs from Moody's assumptions. Moody's modeled
additional scenarios using concentrated default timing profiles to
assess the sensitivity of the notes' ratings to volatility in the
amount of excess interest available after defaults.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2501)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3751)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $153.5 million, defaulted par of $4.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 18.6% (implying
a WARF of 3126), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.8%, a diversity score of 27 and a weighted average spread of
3.3% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust
2014-GC19 pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations follow the overall stable performance of the
underlying loans.  There have been no material changes to the pool
since issuance, therefore the original rating analysis was
considered in affirming the transaction.  The pool has experienced
3.5% collateral reduction as a result of amortization and payoffs.
Two loans with a combined securitized balance of $12.6 million
prepaid from the trust in July and October 2016.  The prepayment
penalties applied to these loans aggregated to $1.8 million.  There
are 12 loans on the servicer's watchlist, most of which have been
flagged for deferred maintenance.  There are no delinquent or
specially serviced loans in the pool.

Stable Performance: There have been no material changes to the
pool's overall performance since issuance.  All loans are
performing in-line with Fitch's expectations.

High Fitch Leverage: At issuance, the pool's Fitch debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) were 1.13x and
106.4%, respectively, worse than the 2013 and 2012 averages of
1.29x and 101.6%, and 1.24x and 97.2%.

Property Type Diversity: The pool is diverse by property type, with
the largest property type in the pool being retail properties at
26.8%, followed by multifamily at 20.9%, office at 18.1%, mixed use
at 17.7% and independent living at 10.0% of the pool.  The
independent living concentration, which is a less traditional
property type, is represented by the largest loan in the pool.  No
other property type comprises more than 4.9% of the pool.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 13.1% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity.  There are 23 loans
(39.4% of the pool balance) with partial interest-only periods, and
an additional five loans (12.7% of the pool balance) which are
interest-only for the full term.  Of the 23 partial interest-only
loans, 11 still have not yet begun amortizing.

Above-Average Property Quality: At issuance Fitch assigned property
quality grades of 'A-' or better to two of the 10 largest loans in
the pool, which represent 15% of the balance of properties
inspected by Fitch.  Furthermore, property quality grades of 'B+'
or better were assigned to 50% of the balance of properties
inspected by Fitch.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $13.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $125.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $215 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $246.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $74.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $66.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $741.6 million class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.8 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.8 million class X-B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.8 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $0 class PEZ at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $54.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.6 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.6 million class X-C at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.4 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G or class X-D certificates.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.16-Bil. of RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 42 tranches
from 12 transactions and downgraded 9 tranches from one
transaction, backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, issued by Multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR3

Cl. 1-A1A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-1AX, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-2AX, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A2A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A3A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A4A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR6

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR9

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-OPX1

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-10

Cl. I-A3A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-8

Cl. II-A1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-PO, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-XS, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2014
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A4A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. I-A1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A2A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A2B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A3A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A3B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. I-A5A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-A5B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2016
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-3

Cl. II-A2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A2A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-4

Cl. A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF2

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-6A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-6B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19,
2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. AF-7, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS8

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the large increase in
credit enhancement available to bonds due to the distribution of
funds related to the $1.125 billion Citigroup settlement. The
upgrade of CL.1-A-1 in Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC
Trust Certificates, Series 2007-RS8 is due to the upgrade of its
underlying bond CL. 2-A3A from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-AR3.

The rating downgrades are primarily due to significant
undercollateralization to the bonds.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013. The
methodology used for rating Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc.
Re-REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2007-RS8 was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Resecuritizations" published in Feburary 2014

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


COUNTRYWIDE: Moody's Hikes $49.8MM 2nd Lien RMBS Issued in 2004
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
from five transactions backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-D

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-E

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-F

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-K

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-L

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the build-up in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CPS AUTO 2017-A: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CPS Auto
Receivables Trust 2017-A's $206.32 million asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 9,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 55.9%, 48.6%, 39.3%,
      30.3%, and 24.7%, of credit support for the class A, B, C,
      D, and E notes, respectively, based on break-even cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of approximately 3.20x, 2.70x,
      2.10x, 1.60x, and 1.27x S&P's 17.00-18.00% expected
      cumulative net loss range for the class A, B, C, D, and E
      notes, respectively.

   -- S&P's expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
      1.60x its expected net loss level, the preliminary ratings
      on the class A and B notes will not decline by more than one

      rating category during the first year, and the preliminary
      ratings on the class C, D, and E notes will not decline by
      more than two rating categories during the first year, all
      else being equal.  The class E notes do not get paid in full

      under this stress scenario.  This is consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria.

   -- The preliminary rated notes' underlying credit enhancement
      in the form of subordination, overcollateralization, a
      reserve account, and excess spread for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes under our stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios, which S&P believes is appropriate for
      the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structure,
      which includes a noncurable performance trigger.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2017-A

Class   Rating     Type          Interest         Amount
                                 rate(i)        (mil. $)
A       AAA (sf)   Senior        Fixed             99.12
B       AA (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed             29.92
C       A (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             32.66
D       BBB (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed             24.57
E       BB- (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed             20.05

(i)The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Ratings on 3 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 21 rated classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust (CSMC) series 2007-C1 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect high losses relative to the transaction's
current credit enhancement.  Fitch modeled losses of 32.2% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
18.6%, including $373.9 million (11.1% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  As of the December 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 76.6% to $789.7 million from $3.4 billion at issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-J through T.


Pool Concentration: The transaction is concentrated with 52 of the
original 265 loans remaining.  The largest five loans in the
transaction represent 61.8% of the pool balance.  A large portion
of the remaining non-specially serviced loans in the pool are
facing refinance challenges approaching maturity due to the high
percentage (73.4%) of interest-only loans.  The vast majority of
these loans mature by February, 2017 (49.6%).  Fitch's analysis
included additional potential paydown and loss scenarios based on
the likelihood of the non-specially serviced loans to refinance at
maturity.  The additional analysis was performed to ensure that the
current ratings are sufficient given the potential for near-term
defaults.

High Concentration of Specially Serviced Loans: Eighteen loans
representing 50% of the pool are in special servicing, 10 of which
(23.4%) are REO or in foreclosure.  The largest loan in the pool is
the specially serviced, City Place (19.2%), which was previously
modified into an A/B note structure and given a 26-month maturity
extension.  The asset's performance continues to deteriorate and
transferred back to the special servicer after the sponsor
requested further relief in order to stabilize the asset.

Specially Serviced Disposition Timing: The ultimate resolution of
loan workouts and timing of disposition remains uncertain.  This
directly affects the repayment of the A-M classes which partially
rely upon the proceeds from the disposition of assets in special
servicing.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class A-1A reflects sufficient credit
enhancement and continued delevering of the transaction through
amortization and expected repayment of certain maturing loans.  The
Negative Outlooks on the A-M classes reflect the transaction's
concentration and significant upcoming maturities.  Fitch will
revisit the transaction over the next several months.  Downgrades
are possible if a higher amount of loans default at maturity than
are currently expected.  Distressed classes may be subject to
downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $152.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $212.1 million class A-M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $90 million class A-MFL at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $25 million class A-MFX at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $286.6 million class A-J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $13.8 million class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, and S have been
reduced to zero due to realized losses.  Class T is not rated.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-AB are paid in full.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only classes X and A-SP.


CW CAPITAL II: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 8 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by CW Capital COBALT II, Ltd.:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1AR, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

CW Capital Cobalt II, Ltd. is a static cash transaction
(re-investment period ended April 2011), backed by a portfolio of:
i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (95.7% of the
current pool balance); issued between 2004 and 2007; and ii) CRE
CDOs (4.3%). As of the October 26, 2016 note valuation report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $287.5 million from $600.0 million at
issuance as a result of regular amortization of the underlying
collateral, recoveries from defaulted collateral, and principal
proceeds from the failure of certain coverage tests.

The pool contains ten assets totaling $57.4 million (36.2% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's December 8, 2016 report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3944,
compared to 3862 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (10.1% compared to 9.2% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (44.1% compared to 40% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(0.0% compared to 5.7% at last review), B1-B3 (6.3% compared to
8.9% at last review), and Caa1-C (39.5% compared to 36.2% at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.3 years, compared to 1.8 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 5.4%, compared to 4.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 8.7%, compared to 6.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016. Please see
the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Holding all other parameters constant,
increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral pool by 10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero to one notch upward (e.g., one notch up implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2). Reducing the recovery rate of
100% of the collateral pool to 0.0% would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch
downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3
to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


FLAGSHIP CLO IV: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Flagship CLO VI:

US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 30, 2016 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021
(current outstanding balance of $19,195,475), Upgraded to Ba1
(sf); previously on August 30, 2016 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$35,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $9,374,321), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously

on August 30, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $264,065), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on August 30, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$33,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa

(sf); previously on August 30, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 30, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Flagship CLO VI, issued in June 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in June 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2016. The Class
A-1a notes have been paid in full, the Class A-1b notes have been
paid down by approximately 73.6% or $26.1 million and the Class A-2
notes have been paid down by approximately 91.2% or $2.7 million
since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are currently
269.46%, 177.44%, 136.12% and 111.26%, respectively, versus August
2016 levels of 151.12%, 130.63%, 116.58% and 105.67%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since August 2016. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2753 compared to 2528 at that
time.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2203)

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +1

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3304)

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $116.9 million, defaulted par of
$936,205, a weighted average default probability of 14.20%
(implying a WARF of 2753), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 52.87%, a diversity score of 26 and a weighted average
spread of 2.92% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


FOUR CORNERS II: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Four Corners CLO II, Ltd.:

US$9,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 21, 2016 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$10,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current balance
of $6,470,943.54), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 21,
2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$21,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

US$11,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on September 21, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Four Corners CLO II, Ltd. issued in January 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since September 2016. The Class
A notes have been completely paid off and the Class B notes have
been paid down by approximately 38% or $4.0 million that time.
Based on the trustee's December 2016 report, the OC ratios for the
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
790.86%, 182.96%, 136.58% and 105.58%, respectively, versus
September 2016 levels of 333.75%, 156.67%, 126.92% and 104.04%,
respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do (long-dated securities). Based on the
trustee's December 2016 report, the long-dated securities currently
make up approximately 30.89% of the portfolio. These investments
could expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation
when the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the
Class E notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the Class E notes
owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to these long-dated
securities.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light of the
deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its
sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis,
Moody's ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1908)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2862)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Class E: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $51.2 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 11.26% (implying a WARF of
2385), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.70%, a
diversity score of 16 and a weighted average spread of 2.87%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR3: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR3
("GSMS 2006-RR3"):

Cl. A1-P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. A1-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

GSMS 2006-RR3 is a static Re-Remic transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the current pool balance), issued in 2005 and 2006. As of the
December 20, 2016 trustee report, the aggregate certificate balance
of the transaction has decreased to $77.5 million compared to
$727.8 million at issuance as a result of the sales and recoveries
of certain assets and realized losses to the remaining underlying
CMBS collateral pool.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6209,
compared to 6806 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: B1-B3 (52.2% compared to 44.0% at last
review) and Caa1-Ca/C (47.8% compared to 56.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.2 years, compared to 1.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 32.5%, compared to 30.8% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016. Please see
the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. However, in light of the
performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes that it is
unlikely that the ratings announced today are sensitive to further
change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


IMSCI 2015-6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Institutional Mortgage
Securities Canada Inc.'s (IMSCI) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2015-6.  All currencies are denominated in
Canadian dollars (CAD).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance with No Material Changes: All of the loans are
current, as of the December 2016 distribution date, with no
material changes to pool metrics.  As property level performance is
generally in line with issuance expectations, the original rating
analysis was considered in affirming the transaction.  As of the
December 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 4.6% to $310.4 million from $325.4
million at issuance.  No loans have transferred to special
servicing since issuance.

Fitch has designated two loans (combined, 5.1% of pool) as Fitch
Loans of Concern (LOC).  The largest LOC, Hilton Garden Inn Dorval
(3.4%), is secured by a 159-room full-service hotel located in
Montreal, QC, adjacent to the Pierre-Elliot-Trudeau International
Airport.  Year-end (YE) 2015 net operating income (NOI) declined
55.2% from underwritten figures and NOI DSCR dropped to 1.09x,
likely the result of a recently completed $3 million property
improvement plan scheduled at issuance.  Based on STR reporting for
the trailing 12-month period ended December 2015, the occupancy,
average daily rate, and revenue per available room were 79.9%,
$133, and $107, respectively, compared to 82.3%, $128, and $105 at
issuance.  The other LOC (1.7%), a 322,360 square foot industrial
property located in Montreal, QC, experienced occupancy declining
to 56% at YE 2015 from 65% at issuance.  Occupancy has since
improved to 61.2% in November 2016.

Canadian Loan Attributes: The ratings reflect strong Canadian
commercial real estate loan performance, including a low
delinquency rate and low historical losses of less than 0.1%, as
well as positive loan attributes such as short amortization
schedules, recourse to the borrower, and additional guarantors.

Significant Amortization: The pool has a weighted average
amortization term of 25.5 years, which represents faster
amortization than U.S. conduit loans.  There are no partial or full
interest-only loans.  The pool's scheduled maturity balance
represents a paydown of 25.1% of the December 2016 balance and
28.6% of the balance at issuance.

Loans with Recourse: Of the pool, 63.3% of the loans feature full
or partial recourse to the borrowers and/or sponsors.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
performance of the pool.  Fitch does not foresee positive or
negative ratings migration until a material economic or asset-level
event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $193.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $73.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7.3 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.4 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.7 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.3 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X or the $6.1 million
non-offered class H.


JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. (JPMCC), commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2001-CIBC2.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of classes E and F at 'Csf' are primarily due to
the expected losses on Collin Creek Mall (98.6% of the pool).
Losses associated with the loan workout will likely impact both
classes.  As of the December 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced approximately 94.2% to
$55.7 million from $961.7 million at issuance.  Currently, there
are only two assets remaining in the pool, one of which (1.4%) is
defeased.  Interest shortfalls are affecting classes E through NR,
with the exception of class J, with cumulative unpaid interest
totaling $7.3 million.

Remaining Collateral/Pool Concentration: The top loan (98.6%) is a
real estate owned (REO) asset and is a retail property located in
Plano, TX.  The second loan (1.4%) is defeased.

Maturities: The defeased loan (1.4%) matures in July 2021.

At issuance, the collateral for the Collin Creek Mall loan included
the non-anchor spaces (332,055 square feet) of a 1.12 million sf
regional mall in Plano, TX.  The shadow anchors include Amazing
Jake, Macy's, JC Penney, and Sears, all of which are under
long-term leases.  Dillards, a former shadow anchor, vacated in
January 2014 after its lease expiration.  Macy's has announced that
this store will close in 2017 due to poor performance.

The loan transferred to the Special Servicer in November 2014 due
to imminent default.  It became an REO asset through a deed in lieu
of foreclosure (DIL) which closed in April 2015.  The borrower
surrendered ownership to the Dillard's box and three undeveloped
out-parcels as additional collateral.  The performance of the
Collin Creek Mall has deteriorated significantly in recent years
with declining occupancy and cash flow due to fierce market
competition from several newer shopping malls nearby.  As of July
2016 rent roll, the property was 74.8% occupied, compared to 84% in
2015 and 2014, and 94% at year-end (YE) 2013. The occupancy at
issuance was 98%.  The servicer reported second-quarter 2016 DSCR
was 0.29x, compared to 0.21x at YE2015. 0.67x at YE2014 and 1.75x
at underwriting.  The special servicer is evaluating various
options for an optional resolution strategy.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The distressed classes (rated below 'B') may be subject to further
rating actions as losses are realized.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $27.6 million class E at 'Csf/RE5%';
   -- $12 million class F at'Csf/RE0%';
   -- $16.1 million class G at 'Dsf/RE0%'.

Classes A-1 through D, as well as the interest only class X-2, have
paid in full.  Classes H, J, K, L and M have been depleted due to
losses and are affirmed at 'Dsf/RE0%'.  Fitch does not rate NR
class certificates.  Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on
the Interest-only class X-1.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. B Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2006-CIBC14 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, A-J and B were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, X-1 was affirmed based on the credit of
the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 21.5% of the
current balance, compared to 43.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 12.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 54% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 14% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7, compared to 11 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $92 million
from $2.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 99% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $315 million (for an average loss
severity of 41%). Four loans, constituting 54% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Canyon Portal 2 Loan ($20.6 million -- 22.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a 47,500 SF mixed use property located in
Sedona, AZ. The retail component comprises of 25,600 SF and there
is also a 39-key hotel portion which makes up 21,300 SF. The loan
transferred to special servicing on 11/25/15 due to imminent
maturity default and the borrower filed for bankruptcy on 4/19/16.
The loan was previously modified in 2010 and has an extended
maturity of August, 2019.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Green Bay Plaza
Loan ($16.7 million -- 18.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
235,000 SF shopping center located in Green Bay, WI. The loan
transferred to special servicing on 2/21/14 due to imminent
default. As of October 2016, the property was 81% leased. The
special servicer is working to lease up additional space and
stabilize the property before marketing it for sale in the first
half of 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Wyckford Commons
Apartments Loan ($7.1 million -- 7.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 248 unit apartment complex located in Indianapolis,
IN, roughly 8 miles west of the Central Business District. The loan
transferred to special servicing on 12/5/13 due to payment default
and became REO in August of 2016. As of September 2016, the
property was 77% leased.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by an industrial
property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $17.5 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (35% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans, constituting 14% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.2 million (a 17% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 69% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 76% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 53%, compared to 76% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 2.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 1.62X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 25% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the MetoKote -- US Portfolio Loan ($11.8
million -- 12.8% of the pool), which is secured by five industrial
properties totaling 624,010 SF in Ohio, Illinois and Tennessee. The
properties are 100% leased to MetoKote through May 2025. The loan
is fully amortizing and due to the single tenant concentration,
Moody's value is based on a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 48% and 2.1X, respectively, compared to 42% and
2.37X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Stayton Business Center II Loan ($7
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 112,000 SF
industrial building located in Jessup, MD approximately 15 miles
southwest of the Baltimore Central Business District. As of October
2016, the property was 100% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 79% and 1.22X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.24X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the City Line Apartments Loan ($4.2
million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 200 unit
multifamily complex located in Newport News, VA. As of September
2016, the property was 99% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 50% and 1.78X, respectively, compared to 63% and 1.43X at the
last review.


LB-UBS  COMMERCIAL 2001-C3: Fitch Corrects Jan. 5 Release
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrects a release it published on Jan. 5, 2017 on
Lehman Brothers-UBS (LB-UBS) Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C3.  Fitch corrects
the rating for the $16 million class D to 'Bsf' from 'BBBsf'.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed one class
of Lehman Brothers-UBS (LB-UBS) Commercial Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C3.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are primarily based on the continued decline in
performance and higher certainty of losses related to the largest
asset in the pool (65.6%), which is in special servicing.  As of
the December 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 93% to $97.1 million from $1.4 billion
at issuance.  Three loans totaling 95.4% of the remaining pool
balance are delinquent and in special servicing. One loan (2.1%) is
defeased.

Highly Concentrated Pool: Only five of the original 169 assets
remain in the pool.  The largest two assets account for 65.6% and
26.7% of the pool, respectively and both are real estate owned
(REO).

High Percentage of Specially Serviced Assets: Three assets
totalling 95.4% of the pool are in special servicing.  Two assets
(92.3%) are REO and one (3.1%) is in foreclosure.

Vista Ridge Mall Decline: The performance of the largest asset,
Vista Ridge Mall (65.6%), has continued to decline.  Collateral
occupancy has decreased to 73.3% as of November 2016 from 81% as of
January 2016.  The property also reflects a number of
non-collateral anchors that have been closing stores including most
prominently, Sears and Macy's.  Cash flow at the property has also
continued to decline with the property reflecting a 0.71x debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of year-end 2015 with net
operating income less than half of its peak levels in 2007.  This
decline is anticipated to be exacerbated by the continued decline
in occupancy and given that the special servicer took title to the
asset in May of 2016.  Fitch's analysis includes a significant loss
assumption related to this asset.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class D reflects the potential for
downgrades if loss expectations on the specially serviced loans
increase.  Upgrades are not likely due to the concentrated nature
and poor performance of the remaining pool.

Classes may be subject to further downgrades as additional losses
are realized, if losses exceed Fitch's expectations, or property
performance continues to decline.

Fitch downgrades these classes as indicated:

   -- $16 million class D to 'Bsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative.
   -- $18 million class E to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $18 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 10%.

Fitch affirms this class as indicated:

   -- $12.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, and C certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class H, J, K, L, M, N, P and Q certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C3: Moody's Cuts Cl. G Debt Rating to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classses
and downgraded the rating on one class in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C3 as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes D and E were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes F and G were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the P&I class H was downgraded due to the anticipated
timing of losses of poorly performing loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.0% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.6% of the original
pooled balance, the same at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 15th, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $67 million
from $1.97 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 44% of the pool.

Two loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $85 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 22% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $4 million (a 27% expected loss based on a 61%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 and partial year 2016 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV of the
performing loans is 111%, compared to 108% at Moody's last review.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
7.6% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs of the performing loans are 1.12X
and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 1.15X and 0.98X at the last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 76% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Medlock Crossing Loan ($29 million -- 44% of the pool),
which is secured by a 159,060 square feet(SF) retail property
located in Duluth, Georgia. The anchor tenant is Regal Cinemas,
which occupies its space under a lease set to expire in February
2019. The property was 95% leased as of June 2016, compared to 98%
leased as of year-end 2015. The loan benefits from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.9X, respectively,
compared to 116% and 0.89X at prior review.

The second largest loan is the University Square Loan ($12.9
million -- 19% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 76,360 SF
retail center in San Antonio, Texas. The largest tenants (Bassett
Home Furnishings -- 34% of the NRA) vacated their spaces at their
lease expiration dates in November 2014. A replacement lease has
been executed for the vacant space with the lease commencement date
of October 23rd, 2015. The property was 100% leased as of June
2016, compared to 66% leased as of September 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 135%
and 0.84X at prior review.

The third largest loan is The Crossing Loan ($8.5 million -- 13% of
the pool) which is secured by a 95,378 SF shopping center in
Matthews, North Carolina, approximately 10 miles southeast of
Charlotte CBD. Moody's identified this as a troubled loan and has
estimated a moderate loss on this loan.


LEHMAN BROTHERS-UBS 2001-C3: Fitch Lowers Cl. F Debt Rating to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed one class
of Lehman Brothers-UBS (LB-UBS) Commercial Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C3.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are primarily based on the continued decline in
performance and higher certainty of losses related to the largest
asset in the pool (65.6%), which is in special servicing.  As of
the December 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 93% to $97.1 million from $1.4 billion
at issuance.  Three loans totalling 95.4% of the remaining pool
balance are delinquent and in special servicing. One loan (2.1%) is
defeased.

Highly Concentrated Pool: Only five of the original 169 assets
remain in the pool.  The largest two assets account for 65.6% and
26.7% of the pool, respectively and both are real estate owned
(REO).

High Percentage of Specially Serviced Assets: Three assets
totalling 95.4% of the pool are in special servicing.  Two assets
(92.3%) are REO and one (3.1%) is in foreclosure.

Vista Ridge Mall Decline: The performance of the largest asset,
Vista Ridge Mall (65.6%), has continued to decline.  Collateral
occupancy has decreased to 73.3% as of November 2016 from 81% as of
January 2016.  The property also reflects a number of
non-collateral anchors that have been closing stores including most
prominently, Sears and Macy's.  Cash flow at the property has also
continued to decline with the property reflecting a 0.71x debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of year-end 2015 with net
operating income less than half of its peak levels in 2007.  This
decline is anticipated to be exacerbated by the continued decline
in occupancy and given that the special servicer took title to the
asset in May of 2016.  Fitch's analysis includes a significant loss
assumption related to this asset.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class D reflects the potential for
downgrades if loss expectations on the specially serviced loans
increase.  Upgrades are not likely due to the concentrated nature
and poor performance of the remaining pool.

Classes may be subject to further downgrades as additional losses
are realized, if losses exceed Fitch's expectations, or property
performance continues to decline.

Fitch downgrades these classes as indicated:

   -- $16 million class D to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.
   -- $18 million class E to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $18 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 10%.

Fitch affirms this class as indicated:

   -- $12.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, and C certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class H, J, K, L, M, N, P and Q certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-IQ7: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Morgan Stanley Capital
I Trust (MSC 2004-IQ7) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2004-IQ7.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral.  As of the December 2016 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 96.5% to
$30.5 million from $863 million at issuance.  No loans are
delinquent or in special servicing.  Two loans totaling 29.2% of
pool balance are defeased.

Stable Performance: All loans are current with no loans in special
servicing or material changes in loan-level performance since last
rating action.

Pool Concentration: The pool has become very concentrated with 15
loans remaining.  The largest of these loans, Linden Place Office
Building, accounts for 44.2% of total pool balance, resulting in
binary risk factors.

Quality Collateral: Of the loans remaining in the pool, 29.2% are
secured by defeasance collateral and 11.9% of non-defeased loans
are secured by cooperative properties predominantly located in New
York City.  The remaining collateral consists of a performing
office building in Omaha, Nebraska and four fully amortizing loans
(14.7%) against retail properties with between 47.2% and 15.9% of
their original balance outstanding.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks reflect the stable performance of the pool,
continued amortization, defeasance and strong credit profile of the
underlying collateral.  Downgrades are not likely as the pool
continues to amortize and credit enhancement is expected to
increase.  Upgrades are not likely to lower classes due to the
thinner tranche sizes and increased concentration with the
potential for binary losses scenarios related to the Linden Place
Office Building loan.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $2.6 million class F at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $4.3 million class G at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $5.4 million class H at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $4.3 million class J at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.2 million class K at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.2 million class L at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.2 million class M at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.2 million class N at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D, and E certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class O certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and
X-Y certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. H Certs to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2004-TOP15, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes E, F, G, and H to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the collateral's current
and future performance, the available liquidity support, and the
significant reduction in trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movement on classes G and H, S&P's analysis also
considered the liquidity available to these bonds and their
exposure to potential future loan defaults given the pool's
maturity profile.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Dec. 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $28.6 million, which is 3.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 20 loans, down from 119
loans at issuance.  None of the loans are with the special
servicer, four ($3.1 million, 10.7%) are defeased, and six ($9.3
million, 32.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), reported financial
information for 98.3% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, all of
which was year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.73x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 28.2% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.70% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the defeased loans.  The
top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $21.8 million (76.2%). Using adjusted servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.72x and 30.6%, respectively, for the top 10
nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $14.4 million in principal
losses, or 1.6% of the original pool trust balance.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Dec. 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, no loans in the
pool were with the special servicer.  Details of the two largest
watchlist loans, both of which are top 10 nondefeased loans, are:

   -- The Elkhorn Plaza Shopping Center loan ($3.2 million, 11.2%)

      is the largest nondefeased loan in the pool.  The loan is
      secured by a 50,901-sq.-ft. retail property in Sacramento,
      Calif.  The loan was placed on the master servicer's
      watchlist due to a low reported DSC ratio.  The reported DSC

      and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 0.94x and 74.0%,
      respectively.  Wells Fargo reported that the borrower is
      actively marketing the vacant spaces and has signed some new

      leases.

   -- The Crossroads Shopping Center loan ($2.3 million, 8.1%) is
      the fourth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool.  The loan
      is secured by a 60,167-sq.-ft. retail property in Truckee,
      Calif.  The loan was placed on the master servicer's
      watchlist due to a low reported DSC ratio.  The reported DSC

      and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 0.67x and 93.0%,
      respectively.  Wells Fargo reported that a new tenant was
      under a free rent period for part of 2015, contributing to
      the decline in DSC.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-TOP15
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004 TOP15

                                  Rating
Class             Identifier      To                  From
E                 61745MM26       AAA (sf)            A- (sf)
F                 61745MM34       AA (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
G                 61745MM42       A (sf)              BBB- (sf)
H                 61745MM59       BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE 2013-A: S&P Affirms B Rating on Cl. B-4 Loan
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on nine classes from
Nationstar Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-A, a U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction.

The transaction is backed by seasoned first-lien, fixed- and
adjustable-rate residential mortgage loans originated primarily
between 1998 and 2003 that are secured by residential properties.
Although the majority of borrowers in the pool had low or no
documentation at origination, the majority of the collateral had
FICOs as of securitization and overall credit characteristics
consistent with prime collateral.  Each class of rated certificates
in this transaction receives credit support from subordination of
the certificates that are lower in the payment priority.

The affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that the projected credit
support for these classes will remain sufficient to cover its
projected losses at the current rating levels.

S&P analyzed the current structural and performance characteristics
and performed a collateral analysis to project the losses and a
cash flow analysis to apply these losses under different rating
scenarios.  S&P's collateral analysis entailed an assessment of the
transaction's collateral performance by reviewing historical
delinquency behavior and projecting losses for the remaining loans
in the pool by applying S&P's criteria, "Methodology And
Assumptions For Rating U.S. RMBS Prime, Alternative-A, And Subprime
Loans," published Sept. 10, 2009, and using our Loan Evaluation and
Estimate of Loss System (LEVELS) model.

S&P analyzed the surviving loans using original loan
characteristics with updated loan balances and Federal Housing
Finance Agency Index-adjusted property values.  S&P also used the
FICO scores provided at the transaction's closing and applied
additional adjustments to S&P's projected defaults for loans that
have exhibited what it considers to be adverse payment performance
(i.e., currently delinquent or delinquent more than once since the
transaction's closing) according to S&P's published criteria.

The table below lists the number of loans remaining that have been
delinquent during the transaction's life.  It excludes instances
where loans may have been delinquent, but did not demonstrate
adverse performance behavior according to S&P's criteria (i.e.,
they were 30 days delinquent no more than once since the
transaction's closing and are current).

DELINQUENCIES

Delinquency      No. of                 % of
status          loans(i)    outstanding pool
30 days              36                 7.41
60 days              10                 1.64
90 days              26                 7.60
Foreclosure          6                  0.91

(i)Including prior and current delinquencies.

Although the current pool has experienced some delinquencies, the
pool is performing according to S&P's initial base-case loss
projections.

For this pool, the overall characteristics have not varied
significantly since the transaction's closing; however, the
pool-level loan-to-value ratios have decreased because of
amortization and national property price appreciation since
closing, which is driving a reduction in our projected losses on
these pools.

S&P applied a cash flow analysis based on its loss projections (as
described in S&P's above mentioned RMBS criteria).  Although the
projected ratings under S&P's cash flow analysis showed several
upward rating movements, it affirmed all ratings because of a
combination of these factors:

   -- The transaction is still relatively young and is still
      within its unscheduled subordinate principal lockout period,

      which phases out beginning in December 2018;

   -- The transaction utilizes an amortizing subordination feature

      in which it can begin allocating greater principal amounts
      to more subordinate classes over time, thus reducing credit
      support; and

   -- S&P expects prepayment rates for this pool to decline, which

      could leave the transaction more prone to back-ended losses.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Nationstar Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-A
Class      CUSIP          Rating
A          63861HAA6      AAA (sf)
A-1        63861HAL2      AAA (sf)
A-IO       63861HAB4      AAA (sf)
B-1        63861HAC2      AA (sf)
B1-IO      63861HAD0      AA (sf)
B-2        63861HAE8      A (sf)
B2-IO      63861HAF5      A (sf)
B-3        63861HAG3      BBB (sf)
B-4        63861HAH1      B (sf)


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Cuts Cl. F-8 Debt Rating to B1
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the ratings on three classes in Salomon Brothers
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-MM, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-MM as follows:

Cl. E-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. E-8, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. F-4, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. F-8, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. G-8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016
Affirmed B3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the three rake bonds E-4, F-4, and G-4 were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the three rake bonds E-8, F-8, and G-8 were
downgraded due to higher Moody's LTV for the Stamford Square Loan
which supports these bonds.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 18th, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $23.3 million
from $674 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans. No loans have been liquidated
from the pool since securitization and there are no loans currently
in special servicing.

One loan, constituting 85% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 50% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 114%, compared to 82% at Moody's
last review. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.4%.

This transaction has several unique features in terms of
certificate structure, loan grouping, payment priority and loss
allocation. The interest-only class (Class X) is the only remaining
senior certificate in the trust. Additionally, there are six
remaining junior certificates that are divided into two series
corresponding to specific loan groups. At securitization, the
aggregate principal balance of each loan group was divided into a
senior portion and a junior portion and the senior portion of each
series supported the pooled classes. As of the December 2016
remittance date, the certificate principal balance of the related
senior portions have been reduced to zero and principal payments
are now applied to the junior certificates on a senior/sequential
basis within each respective loan group. Based on the payment
priority and the certificate structure of this transaction, it is
possible that a junior certificate holder may receive principal
payments before the principal balance of a higher-rated certificate
from a different loan group is reduced to zero. At securitization
there were eight loan groups, however, six groups, corresponding to
Classes E-1, F-1, G-1; E-2, F-2, G-2; E-3, F-3, G-3; E-5, F-5, G-5;
E-6, F-6, G-6; and E-7, F-7 and G-7, have been repaid in full.

Loan Group 4 originally consisted of four loans but due to pay offs
only one loan remains as the collateral for classes E-4, F-4 and
G-4. The remaining loan in Loan Group 4 is the Peace Corps Building
Loan ($3.5 million -- 15.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
159,000 square foot (SF) office building located in Washington,
D.C. The property was 100% leased as of September 2016, the same as
at last review. The GSA leases over 90% of the net rentable
area(NRA) through May 2018 which is six months prior to the loan
maturity date of November 2018. The loan is fully amortizing and
has amortized approximately 81% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 18% and 5.95X, respectively, compared to 21%
and 5.05X at Moody's last review. Moody's affirmed the ratings of
classes E-4, F-4 and G-4 due to overall stable loan performance.

Loan Group 8 originally held four loans but due to pay offs only
one loan remains as the collateral for classes E-8, F-8 and G-8.
The remaining loan in Loan Group 8 is the Stamford Square Loan
($19.8 million -- 84.8% of the pool), which is secured by a Class A
office building located in Stamford, Connecticut. The property was
69% leased as of September 2016, compared to 71% leased as of
December 2014. The largest tenant (General Electric -- 57% of NRA)
vacated at its lease expiration in June 2012. This loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSCR. The loan amortizes
on a 25-year schedule and has amortized approximately 43% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 96% and 1.18X at Moody's last review.
Moody's downgraded the ratings of classes E-8, F-8 and G-8 due to
higher Moody's LTV for the Stamford Square Loan which supports
these bonds.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-1: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Certs '(P)B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-1. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans. The assets
of the trust consist of 460 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans. All loans, except one, have an original term to maturity of
30 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.30% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Our loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to our Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-1 transaction is a securitization of 460 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $342,929,214. There are 132 originators in the
transaction. 7.79% of the mortgage loans by outstanding principal
balance were originated by Quicken Loans, 5.57% of the mortgage
loans by outstanding principal balance were originated by First
Republic Bank and 12.12% of the mortgage loans by outstanding
principal balance were purchased by Redwood from FHLB Chicago. The
mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from FHLB Chicago were
originated by various participating financial institution investors
who provide R&W to FHLB, who then provides R&W to Redwood. None of
the originators other than Quicken Loans and First Republic Bank
represents more than 5.0% of the principal balance of the loans in
the pool. The loan-level third party due diligence (TPR) review
encompassed credit underwriting, property value and regulatory
compliance. In addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and
warranty repurchase obligation of all originators other than First
Republic Bank (5.57% of the outstanding principal balance of the
loans).

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood), which Moody's has assessed as an Above
Average aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages. There have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that closed in
2010 and later, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. We view
the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity of
senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration our expected losses
on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.50% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 453 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review"). For the remaining seven loans, Redwood
Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include
checks for TRID compliance. The custodian reviewed the mortgage
files and did not find any exceptions.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. We reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans (i.e. before the originator cured any
of the errors) from the same originator where a full review was
conducted and extrapolated the results on the limited review loans.
As a result, we increased our Aaa loss to account for this
adjustment.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.


SLM PRIVATE 2006-B: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on the outstanding
student loan notes issued by SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust
2006-A (SLM 2006-A), SLM 2006-B, and SLM 2006-C.

The rating downgrades are mostly driven by the transactions' lower
than expected excess spreads and reduced loss coverage commensurate
with the bonds' ratings.

The upgrades are mostly driven by the improved credit enhancement
as a result of target overcollateralization (OC) being maintained
which more than offset the impact of lower expected excess spreads
for the affected bonds.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The SLM 2006-A, SLM 2006-B and SLM 2006-C
trusts are collateralized by $0.98, $0.89 and $0.49 billion,
respectively, of private student loans originated by Navient
Corporation (Navient) under the Signature Education Loan Program,
LAWLOANS program, MBALoans program, and MEDLOANS program.  The
projected remaining default rates are 7.5%, 10.5% and 12%,
respectively.  A recovery rate of 13% was applied based on
Navient's historical recoveries on its legacy private student
loans.

Credit Enhancement (CE): For all three trusts, CE is sufficient to
provide loss coverage for the class A, B, and C notes at each
respective rating category.  CE is provided by a combination of
overcollateralization (the excess of the trust's asset balance over
the bond balance), excess spread, and subordination of the class B
and C notes to the class A notes, and the class C notes to the
class B notes.

As of the most recent distribution date (Dec. 15, 2016), the class
A, B and C parity ratios (including the reserve account) for SLM
2006-A were 118.25%, 111.84% and 105.38%, respectively; for SLM
2006-B they were 118.31%, 111.89% and 105.93%, respectively; for
SLM 2006-C they were 124.24%, 115.49% and 105.69%, respectively.
All three transactions have reached their target OC amounts of
$45.1 million for SLM 2006-A, $45.0 million for SLM 2006-B and
$24.1 million for SLM 2006-C.

The class A, B and C notes in each of the SLM 2006-A and SLM 2006-B
trusts are currently being redeemed on pro rata basis.  However,
the priority of redemption will be reversed to sequential if
cumulative realized losses, at 16.24% for SLM 2006-A and 19.04% for
SLM 2006-B as of Dec. 15, 2016, exceed 20% of the original pool
balance.  The class A, B and C notes in SLM 2006-C are being
redeemed sequentially as SLM 2006-C's cumulative realized losses,
at 21.25% as of Dec. 15, 2016, exceeded 20% of the original pool
balance in June 2015.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a non-declining
reserve account sized at approximately $5.0 million each for SLM
2006-A and SLM 2006-B, and $2.7 million for SLM 2006-C.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated satisfactory servicing
capabilities

                      CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and
Covered Bonds', Fitch looks to its own ratings in analysing
counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's creditworthiness.
The definition of eligible investments for this deal allows for the
possibility of using investments not rated by Fitch, which
represents a criteria variation.  Fitch doesn't believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case.  This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust

Fitch takes these rating actions as indicated:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-A:

   -- Class A-4 downgraded to 'A+sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained;
   -- Class A-5 downgraded to 'A+sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained;
   -- Class B affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable maintained;
   -- Class C upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-B:

   -- Class A-4 downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class A-5 downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class A-5W downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised

      to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained;
   -- Class C downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBBBsf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-C:

   -- Class A-4 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class A-5 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class B upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained;
   -- Class C upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
      maintained.


STARTS (CAYMAN) 2007-14: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on 3 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A1-D, A2-D,
and A2-A notes from STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.'s series 2007-14, a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (SCDO) transaction.

The rating actions followed S&P's surveillance schedule review of
the SCDO.  The affirmations reflect the availability of adequate
credit support at the current rating level; a synthetic-rated
overcollateralization ratio is above 100% as of the December 2016
run, passing with sufficient cushion per S&P's criteria.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2007-14
Class            Rating
A1-D             CCC- (sf)
A2-D             CCC- (sf)
A2-A             CCC- (sf)


STUDENT LOAN 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on four classes of Student
Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1 certificates.  At the same
time, S&P placed the ratings on two classes of certificates from
the same transaction on CreditWatch with positive implications.

Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1 is a repackaging
of various notes issued from NCF Grantor Trust 2005-1, NCF Grantor
Trust 2005-3, and North Star Education Finance Series 2006-A.

The 'B+ (sf)' ratings on the class 5-A-1 and 5-A-IO certificates
are dependent on the lower of S&P's ratings on (1) Deutsche Bank
AG, New York Branch (the interest rate swap counterparty) and (2)
the higher of S&P's ratings on the underlying securities--NCF
Grantor Trust 2005-1's class A-5-1 and A-5-2 certificates due March
26, 2035, ('B+ (sf)') and the rating on Ambac Assurance Corp. (not
rated), the financial guarantee insurer.

The 'B (sf)' ratings on the class 6-A-l and 6-A-IO certificates are
dependent on the lower of (1) the rating on transferable custody
receipts relating to NCF Grantor Trust 2005-3 Series 2005-GT3 due
2033 class A-5-1 ('B (sf)') and (2) the rating of Deutsche Bank AG,
New York Branch.

The 'A- (sf)' ratings on the class 7-A-1 and 7-A-IO certificates
are dependent on the lower of the ratings on (1) Deutsche Bank AG,
New York Branch, which provides an interest rate swap on the
certificates, and (2) the higher of the ratings on North Star
Education Finance Series 2006-A's class A-4 notes ('AAA (sf)') and
Ambac Assurance Corp. (not rated), which provides a financial
guarantee insurance policy on the underlying securities.

In addition, the ratings on the class 7-A-1 and 7-A-IO certificates
benefit from a one-notch elevation above the support provider's
rating to reflect S&P's criteria for transactions that requires
replacement of a support provider if a rating trigger is breached.

The rating actions follow the Dec. 15, 2016, placement of S&P's
'BBB+/A-2' rating on the swap counterparty bank branch parent,
Deutsche Bank AG, on CreditWatch with positive implications.
Because the ratings backed by agreements from Deutsche Bank AG, New
York Branch are supported by a bank branch, S&P applied the
methodology outlined in "Assessing Bank Branch Creditworthiness,"
published Oct. 14, 2013, to analyze this transaction.  S&P's
ratings on the issues are based on the lower of its long- and
short-term issuer credit ratings on Deutsche Bank AG, the parent of
the of the LOC provider, and the long- and short-term foreign
currency ratings on the U.S. ('AA+/A-1+'), the jurisdiction where
Deutsche Bank AG's New York branch is located.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1

Class       Ratings
5-A-1       B+ (sf)
5-A-IO      B+ (sf)
6-A-1       B (sf)
6-A-IO      B (sf)

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1

                            Rating
Class               To                  From

7-A-1       A- (sf)/Watch Pos           A- (sf)
7-A-IO      A- (sf)/Watch Pos           A- (sf)


TABERNA PREFERRED VIII: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-2 Notes Rating to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Taberna Preferred Funding VIII, Ltd.:

US$160,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of
$29,233,983), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on January 15, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$215,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of $39,283,165), Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf); previously on January 15, 2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$120,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on January
15, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Taberna Preferred Funding VIII, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed mainly by a portfolio of REIT
trust preferred securities (TruPS) and one corporate bond.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since April 2016.

The Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes have paid down by approximately
39.5% or $44.7 million since April 2016, using principal proceeds
from the redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC
ratios for Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes have improved to 488.2%
and 177.5%, respectively, from April 2016 levels of 332.9% and
161.6%, respectively. The Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the
use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral
pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 5128 from 5657 in
April 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $334.5 million, defaulted/deferring par of $24.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 58.68% (implying
a WARF of 5128), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 11.50%. In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's
explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in the
transaction, the risk of an event of default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016. Please
see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of
this methodology.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US
REIT sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalcā„¢ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then used
the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.
CDOROM is available on www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions
-- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free license
agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized REIT companies that Moody's does not rate publicly.
For REIT TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group
assesses their credit quality using the REIT firms' annual
financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 3093 )

Class A-1A: +2

Class A-1B: +2

Class A-2: +4

Class B: +4

Class C: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 6060)

Class A-1A: -1

Class A-1B: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B: 0

Class C: 0


VITALITY RE VIII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB+ Rating on Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has assigned preliminary ratings of
BBB+(sf)' and 'BB+(sf)' to the Class A and B notes, respectively,
to be issued by Vitality Re VIII Ltd.

The notes will cover claims payments of Health Re Inc. -- and
ultimately, Aetna Life Insurance Co. (ALIC) -- related to the
covered insurance business to the extent the medical benefits ratio
(MBR) exceeds 102% for the class A notes and 96% for the class B
notes.  The MBR will be calculated on an annual aggregate
basis.

The preliminary ratings are based on the lowest of:
the MBR risk factor on the ceded risk ('bbb+' for the class A notes
and 'bb+' for the class B notes), the rating on ALIC (the
underlying ceding insurer), and the rating on the permitted
investments ('AAAm') that will be held in the collateral account
(there is a separate collateral account for each class of notes) at
closing.

According to the risk analysis provided by Milliman, the primary
driver of historical financial fluctuations has been the volatility
in per-capita claim cost trends and lags in insurers' reactions to
these trend changes in their premium rating increase actions.
Other volatility factors include changes in expenses and target
profit margins.  Although these factors cause the majority of
claims volatility, the extreme tail risk is affected by severe
pandemic.

This is the second Vitality Re issuance that permits the
probability of attachment, for the class A notes only, to be reset
higher or lower than at issuance.  For each reset of the class A
notes, if any class B notes are outstanding on the applicable reset
calculation date, the updated MBR attachment of the class A notes
will be set so it is equal to the updated MBR exhaustion for the
class B notes.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
Vitality Re VIII Ltd.
  Sr. Secured Class A notes due Jan. 8, 2021   BBB+(sf) (prelim)
  Sr. Secured Class B notes due Jan. 8, 2021   BB+(sf) (prelim)


VNDO TRUST 2016-350P: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to VNDO Trust 2016-350P's
$233.33 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2016-350P.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a portion of a whole loan with an aggregate
cut-off date principal balance of $233.33 million.  The trust loan
is part of a pari passu, split loan structure in the aggregate
principal amount of $400.0 million.  The whole loan is secured by,
among other things, the borrower's fee simple interest in 350 Park
Ave., a 570,784-sq.-ft. 30-story class A office building in
Manhattan's Park Avenue submarket.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED(i)

VNDO Trust 2016-350P

Class       Rating(ii)      Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)        94,018,000
X-A(iii)    AAA (sf)        94,018,000
B           AA- (sf)        20,893,000
C           A- (sf)         14,409,000
D           BBB- (sf)       46,879,000
E           BB- (sf)        57,133,000

  (i) S&P had previously issued preliminary ratings on the class
      X-B certificates, but the issuer is no longer issuing that
      class.  Therefore, S&P is withdrawing the preliminary rating

      on that class, and S&P is not assigning a final rating.

(ii) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
      buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.


(iii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-A
      certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
      realized losses allocated to the class A certificates.


WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. F Debt to D
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' on two classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from two U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transactions.  The downgrades reflect principal losses as
detailed in the December 2016 trustee remittance report.

Discussions of the individual transactions:

      WACHOVIA BANK COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST'S SERIES 2003-C9

S&P lowered its rating on class F to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' in
order to reflect principal losses as detailed in the December 2016
trustee remittance report.  The reported net principal losses on
class F totalled $3.2 million and resulted primarily from the
liquidation of two assets.  The largest asset to liquidate was the
Southwest Commons Shopping Centre Loan, which liquidated at a loss
severity of 83.0% of its original trust balance.  Consequently,
class F experienced a 20.1% loss of its $15.8 million original
principal balance, and class G (not rated by S&P Global Ratings)
lost 100% of its beginning balance.

                    CD 2006-CD3 MORTGAGE TRUST

S&P lowered its rating on class B to 'D (sf)' 'CCC- (sf)' in order
to reflect principal losses as detailed in the December 2016
trustee remittance report.  The reported net principal losses to
class B totaled $2.1 million and resulted primarily from the
liquidation of the Namco Plaza asset, which liquidated at a loss
severity of 46.3% of its original trust balance.  Consequently,
class B experienced a 9.2% loss of its $22.3 million original
principal balance.  In addition, class C, (not rated by S&P Global
Ratings) lost 100% of its beginning balance.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust

Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C9

                             Rating
Class                 To              From
F                     D (sf)          CCC- (sf)

CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust

Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                             Rating
Class                 To              From
B                     D (sf)          CCC- (sf)


WELLS FARGO 2015-C26: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-C26 (WFCM 2015-C26), commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance with no Material Changes: All of the loans are
current, as of the November 2016 distribution date, with no
material changes to pool metrics.  As property level performance is
generally in line with issuance expectations, the original rating
analysis was considered in affirming the transaction.

As of the November 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 3.3% to $930 million from
$962.1 million at issuance.  There are two Fitch Loans of Concern
(6.7% of the pool) including one specially serviced loan (4.8%) and
an additional loan (1.9%) that may lose its largest tenant (69.5%
of net rentable area [NRA]).  The portfolio includes a high
concentration of loans secured by hotel properties at 21.8%, and
multifamily properties at 33% (including loans secured by co-ops).

Specially Serviced Loan: The largest loan in the pool, Chateau on
the Lake, transferred to special servicing in July 2016 due to the
borrower and parent company filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The
filing was made in connection with litigation related to a complex
deal made in 2005 to reprivatize the sponsor's Hammons Hotels.  The
loan remains current.  The servicer reported YE 2015 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 2.43x.  Per the August 2016 STR report,
trailing 12-month (TTM) occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 55.8%, $162
and $91, respectively.  While there has been a slight decline in
occupancy since issuance (58.3%, as of TTM October 2014), both ADR
and RevPAR have increased (from $155 and $90, respectively, for TTM
October 2014).

Diverse Pool: The 10 largest loans represent 35% of the total pool
balance, which is a lower concentration than other Fitch-rated CMBS
fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.

Above-Average Amortization: Based on the issuance scheduled balance
at maturity, the pool will pay down 15.9%.  Only 1% of the pool is
full-term interest-only; however, 56.5% is partial-term
interest-only.  The remainder of the pool consists of amortizing
balloon loans.

High Fitch Leverage at Issuance: Issuance DSCR and loan-to-value
(LTV) were 1.35x and 105.9%, respectively.  However, without loans
collateralized by co-op loans factored in, the numbers were 1.16x
and 109.5%, respectively, which represented higher leverage than
similar Fitch rated CMBS fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable as a result of
overall stable performance of the pool and continued amortization.
Upgrades may occur with improved pool performance and additional
paydown or defeasance.  Downgrades to the classes are possible
should an asset level or economic event cause a decline in pool
performance.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $37.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $198 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $279.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $88.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $77 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $718.4 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $168.4 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class X-C* at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.6 million class X-D* at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEX
certificates, and class PEX certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class X-B, X-E, and G certificates.


[*] Fitch: More Sub Debt in CMBS Results in Higher Defaults
-----------------------------------------------------------
The more subordinate debt U.S. CMBS senior loans carry, the more
likely they are to default, especially for multifamily and retail
properties according to Fitch Ratings in a new report.

A recent analysis by Fitch of over 24,000 CMBS 1.0 conduit loans
issued between 2003 and 2008 shows that approximately 1,000 (4%)
had subordinate debt in place at the time of issuance.  The senior
loans with subordinate debt show a default rate nearly 60% higher
compared to the loans without any subordinate debt.  Approximately
5% of CMBS 2.0 senior loans have subordinate debt in place,
according to Managing Director Robert Vrchota.  'Defaults have been
substantially higher for senior loans with subordinate debt in
place,' said Vrchota.  'We expect this trend to continue for CMBS
2.0 and consider all subordinate debt when analyzing senior
loans.'

Specific property types also play into this trend.  The default
rate for loans with subordinate debt secured by multifamily
properties was nearly double on the 309 multifamily loans with
subordinate debt at 34.6% compared to 18.5% on the 4,891
multifamily loans without subordinate debt.  The same trend holds
true for the default rate on retail loans with subordinate debt,
which came in at nearly 37%, compared to 22.8% for those retail
loans without subordinate debt.

Surprisingly, senior CMBS loans with mezzanine debt had higher
losses than those with subordinate mortgage debt.  While the 34.5%
default rate on senior loans with subordinate non-mortgage debt was
slightly better than the 36.7% default rate for senior loans with
subordinate mortgage debt, losses painted a different picture.
Realized losses on the 443 loans with subordinate non-mortgage debt
totaled 6.5% compared to 5.2% for the 558 loans with subordinate
mortgage debt.  'Despite the reduced rights of non-mortgage
subordinate debt, this so called 'rescue equity' does not appear to
be helping senior loan performance in practice,' said Senior
Director Ryan Frank.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 36 Classes From 7 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 36 classes from seven
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 1999 and 2005.  The review yielded six upgrades, one
downgrade, and 29 affirmations.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into decisions to raise,
lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative ratings
suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These considerations are
based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

                             UPGRADES

The upgrades reflect improved collateral performance/delinquency
trends and/or increased credit support relative to S&P's projected
losses.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades include one rating that was raised by three notches.

The upgrade on class A-9 from Residential Asset Securitization
Trust 2004-A4 reflects a decrease in our projected loss due to
fewer reported delinquencies during the most recent performance
periods compared to those reported during the previous review
dates.  Total delinquencies decreased to 9.09% in November 2016
from 12.63% in March 2015.

S&P raised its ratings on five classes from RALI Series 2004-QA1
Trust (including the ratings on classes A-I and A-II to 'AAA (sf)')
to reflect the impact of the transaction's cumulative loss trigger
failure, resulting in permanent sequential principal payments to
all classes.  Classes A-I and A-II receive all principal payments
from their respective groups until they have been paid down to
zero, during which time principal payments will not be made to more
subordinate classes.  This sequential principal payment mechanism
prevents erosion of credit support and results in an earlier
paydown to the more senior classes before back-end losses can
occur.

S&P also raised its rating on class M-3 from this transaction to
'B- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because S&P believes this class is no
longer vulnerable to default.

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P downgraded the rating on class B-1 from Residential Asset
Securitization Trust 2003-A6 to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because
S&P believes that this class is virtually certain to default.

                             AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover our projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Tail risk or low loan count;
   -- Insufficient subordination or overcollateralization;
   -- Delinquency trends; and/or
   -- Historical interest shortfalls.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect its view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that we believe could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9% in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6% for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6% in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, S&P believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                    http://bit.ly/2jj8BvD


[*] S&P Completes Review on 61 Classes From 8 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 61 classes from eight
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 2001 and 2005.  The review yielded one upgrade, four
downgrades, and 56 affirmations.  The transactions in this review
are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo
loans, which are secured primarily by first liens on one- to
four-family residential properties.

S&P affirmed the ratings of the two interest-only (IO) classes that
were included in this review.  The rating actions reflect the
application of S&P's IO criteria, which provide that S&P will
maintain the current ratings on an IO class until all of the
classes that the IO security references are either lowered to below
'AA- (sf)' or have been retired--at which time S&P will withdraw
these IO ratings.  The ratings on each of these classes have been
affected by recent rating actions on the reference classes upon
which their notional balances are based.

A criteria interpretation for the above mentioned criteria was
issued to clarify that when the criteria state "we will maintain
the current ratings," it means that we will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
prior to the release of these criteria.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its rating on the class A notes from Sequoia Mortgage
Trust 5 to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'.  S&P's projected credit
support for the affected class is sufficient to cover its projected
loss for this rating level.  Total hard credit support for class A
increased to 17.00% at November 2016 from 13.74% at November 2015.


                             DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on four classes, including one rating that
was lowered three or more notches.  Of the four downgrades, S&P
lowered its rating on one class to speculative-grade ('BB+' or
lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or higher).  The remaining
three downgraded classes already had speculative-grade ratings. The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover its
projected losses for the related transactions at a higher rating.
The downgrades reflect tail risk and/or our principal-only (PO)
criteria.

Tail Risk

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2003-MS5 Trust and Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-29 are
backed by a small remaining pool of mortgage loans.  S&P believes
that pools with less than 100 loans remaining create an increased
risk of credit instability, because a liquidation and subsequent
loss on one loan, or a small number of loans, at the tail end of a
transaction's life may have a disproportionate impact on a given
RMBS tranche's remaining credit support.  S&P refers to this as
"tail risk."

S&P addressed the tail risk on the classes from these two
transactions by conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this
risk, as set forth in S&P's tail risk criteria.  S&P lowered its
ratings on Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-MS5 Trust class C-B-1 to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and
class C-B-2 to 'B- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)', and Structured Asset
Securities Corp 2003-29 class 1-A-1 to 'B- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)', to
reflect the application of S&P's tail risk criteria.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 40 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remained relatively
consistent with its prior projections and is sufficient to cover
its projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination,
   -- Tail risk, and/or
   -- They are subject to our IO criteria/PO criteria.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected-case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's
view that these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting, and the
'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions. S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that S&P believes could affect
residential mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9% in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6% in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5% in 2016
      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                   http://bit.ly/2iTjQy4


[*] S&P Cuts Ratings to 'D' on 57 Classes From 36 RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on 57 classes of mortgage
pass-through certificates from 36 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions issued between 2003 and 2008 to 'D
(sf)'.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate mixed collateral mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.  The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the
principal writedowns' impact on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.

All but one of the classes were rated either 'CCC (sf)' or
'CC (sf)' before the rating actions.  Class II-A-1 from First
Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-FA5 (First
Horizon 2005-FA5) was rated 'A+ (sf)'.  This deal was structured
with three cross-collateralized groups, and this group II senior
class benefitted from overcollateralization among the groups.
However, in October 2016, a $205,800 loan was liquidated resulting
in a $223,700 loss.  This wiped out any remaining
overcollateralization, resulting in a loss to this class.

Classes 30-PO from Banc of America Funding 2005-8 Trust and II-A-P
from RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust are principal-only (PO) strip
classes, which receive principal primarily from discount loans
within the related transaction.  When a discount loan takes a loss,
the PO strip class is allocated a loan-specific percentage of that
loss.  However, because these PO classes are senior classes in the
waterfall, they are reimbursed from cash flows that would otherwise
be paid to the most junior classes.  These PO classes have incurred
a loss on their principal obligation.  But because the balances of
all of the subordinate classes in each respective structure have
been reduced to zero, S&P expects no future reimbursement from the
cash flows from each of the respective transactions.

The 57 defaulted classes consist of these:

   -- Thirty from prime jumbo transactions (52.63 %);
   -- Nine from alternative-A transactions (15.79%);
   -- Eight from subprime transactions (14.04 %);
   -- Five from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit transactions (8.77%);
   -- Two from negative amortization transactions (3.51%);
   -- One from a Federal Housing Administration/Veteran Affairs
      transaction (1.75%);
   -- One from a reperforming transaction (1.75%); and
   -- One from a Risk Transfers transaction (1.75%).

All of the transactions in this review receive credit enhancement
from a combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable).

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal writedowns, and S&P will take rating actions
as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                  http://bit.ly/2jjaOaB



[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 23 Classes From 7 CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 20 classes from five
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions,
one class from one CF mezzanine structured finance (SF) collateral
debt obligation (CDO) transaction, and two classes from one CF CDO
backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Cannington Funding Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      November 2016.

   -- Covenant Credit Partners CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in October 2016.

   -- Carlyle High Yield Partners IX Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in December 2016.

   -- Flagship CLO VI (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down.

   -- Helios Series I Multi Asset CBO Ltd. (CF, Mezzanine SF CDO):

      senior-most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1 (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in November 2016.

   -- RAIT Preferred Funding II Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most

      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Cannington Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Carlyle High Yield Partners IX Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Covenant Credit Partners CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA (sf)
C                   NR                  A (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
E                   NR                  BB- (sf)

Flagship CLO VI
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)

Helios Series I Multi Asset CBO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From

B                   NR                  CCC (sf)

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  B+ (sf)

RAIT Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1R                NR                  A- (sf)
A-1T                NR                  A- (sf)


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 34 Classes From 11 CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 27 classes from six
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions,
three class from one CF mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDO
transaction, and four classes from four CF collateral debt
obligations (CDO) backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Benefit Street Partners CLO IX Ltd. (CF CLO): class X
      notes(i) paid down;

   -- other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Clear Lake CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC (CF mezzanine SF CDO): senior-most
      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Magnetite VI Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in December
      2016.

   -- Marathon Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd. (CF mezzanine SF CDO):
      last remaining rated tranches paid down.

   -- Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd. (CF mezzanine SF CDO): senior-
      most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd. (CF mezzanine SF CDO): senior-most
      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- OHA Park Avenue CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- Putnam Structured Product Funding 2003-1 Ltd. (CF mezzanine
      SF CDO): rated tranches paid down.

   -- Stone Tower CLO VII Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- Voya CLO 2012-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

(i)An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Benefit Street Partners CLO IX Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
X                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Clear Lake CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Voya CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
B-R                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
C-R                 NR                  AA- (sf)
D-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)
E-R                 NR                  BB (sf)

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
M                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Magnetite VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-R                 NR                  AA (sf)
C-R                 NR                  A (sf)
D-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)
E-R                 NR                  BB (sf)

Marathon Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
K                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd. 2007-2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  CCC+ (sf)

N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd. 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  CCC+ (sf)

OHA Park Avenue CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Putnam Structured Product Funding 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LT-a             NR                  CCC (sf)
A-1LT-b             NR                  CCC (sf)
A-1LT-c             NR                  CCC (sf)

Stone Tower CLO VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Actions on 38 Classes From 7 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 38 classes from seven
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transactions.
The review yielded 12 upgrades (of which S&P removed nine of them
from CreditWatch with developing implications and two from
CreditWatch with positive implications), two downgrades (of which
S&P removed both from CreditWatch with negative implications), and
nine affirmations (of which S&P removed six from CreditWatch
positive and two from CreditWatch developing).  In addition, S&P
revised the CreditWatch statuses on eight classes to CreditWatch
negative from CreditWatch positive and on six classes to
CreditWatch negative from CreditWatch developing, and placed one
additional rating on CreditWatch negative.  These CreditWatch
negative placements reflect S&P's view of potential interest
shortfalls on these classes reported by the Trustee.

S&P previously placed 35 of these ratings on CreditWatch earlier
this year, pending completion of S&P's loan modification analysis
on the rated classes as prescribed by our loan modification
criteria, "Methodology For Incorporating Loan Modifications And
Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings," published
April 17, 2015, (loan modification criteria).  S&P has now
completed its loan modification analysis, and the rating actions
resolve S&P's initial CreditWatch placements on these ratings--S&P
has placed 14 of these ratings (and one additional rating) on
CreditWatch negative, as described below.

                    LOAN MODIFICATION CRITERIA

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications or other credit-related events, S&P imputes the
actual interest owed to that class of securities pursuant to its
loan modification criteria.

Based on S&P's loan modification criteria, it applies a maximum
potential rating (MPR) cap to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications or other credit-related events.  If S&P applies an
MPR cap to a particular class, the resulting rating may be lower
than if S&P had solely considered that class' paid interest based
on the applicable WAC.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 12 classes and removed nine of them from
CreditWatch developing and two from CreditWatch positive, as the
projected credit support for these classes is sufficient to cover
our projected losses at these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect
increased credit support to each of these classes.  The results of
S&P's loan modification analysis on these classes yielded an MPR
cap that was equal to or higher than the revised ratings.

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its rating on class 10-A-2 from CSMC Series 2009-16R to
'BBB- (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' and on class 6-A-1 from CSMC Series
2010-1R to 'CCC (sf)' from 'AAA (sf)', and removed them from
CreditWatch negative, where they were placed during various reviews
earlier this year.  The downgrades reflect the application of S&P's
loan modification criteria.  Loan modifications or other
credit-related events have reduced the interest payments to these
bondholders, resulting in a lower MPR cap on these classes.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on nine classes and removed six of them
from CreditWatch positive and two of them from CreditWatch
developing.

S&P had placed its 'AA+ (sf)' ratings on six classes from group 2
from CSMC Series 2009-14R on CreditWatch positive on April 29,
2016.  At that time, the underlying transaction had experienced
enough improved collateral performance to merit a possible upgrade;
however, it was possible that the completion of S&P's loan
modification analysis could limit any potential upgrades on these
classes.  S&P has now completed its loan modification analysis, and
the MPR on each class is higher than the current rating.  S&P
affirmed the ratings on these classes and removed them from
CreditWatch positive to reflect the stabilization of the
performance of the underlying transaction supporting these
classes.

S&P had placed its 'AA (sf)' rating on class 6-A-2 from CSMC Series
2010-8R on CreditWatch developing on April 29, 2016.  At that time,
the underlying transaction had experienced enough improved
collateral performance to merit a possible upgrade; however, it was
possible that the completion of S&P's loan modification analysis
could result in an affirmation or downgrade. S&P has now completed
its loan modification analysis, and the MPR on this class is higher
than the current rating.  However, S&P affirmed this rating and
removed it from CreditWatch developing to reflect the stabilization
of the performance of the underlying transaction supporting this
class.

S&P had placed its 'CCC (sf)' rating on class 4-A2 from Jefferies
Resecuritization Trust 2009-R5 on CreditWatch developing on
March 29, 2016.  At that time, the underlying transaction had
experienced enough improved collateral performance to merit a
possible upgrade; however, it was possible that the completion of
our loan modification analysis could result in an affirmation or
downgrade.  S&P has now completed its loan modification analysis,
and the MPR on this class is 'CCC (sf)', resulting in S&P's
affirming this rating and removing it from CreditWatch developing.

               RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

S&P is placing its ratings on 15 classes on CreditWatch negative.
Of the 15 ratings, eight were previously on CreditWatch positive
and six were previously on CreditWatch developing pending
completion of S&P's loan modification analysis.  S&P has now
completed its loan modification analysis, and the resulting MPR on
each class is equal to or higher than the current rating.  However,
the trustee for each related transaction has reported interest
shortfalls to these classes in recent months.  In some cases,
shortfalls are being reported at the re-REMIC level, but not on the
related underlying class.  Once S&P is able to verify the validity
of these possible interest shortfalls, it will adjust the ratings
as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2j7St11


[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 81 Classes From 13 US RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 81 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2001 and 2005.  The review yielded 12 upgrades, nine
downgrades, 52 affirmations, and eight withdrawals.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate mixed collateral mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what it would rate the class
without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P
relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.  The
rating on a bond-insured obligation will be the higher of the
rating on the bond insurer and the rating of the underlying
obligation, without considering the potential credit enhancement
from the bond insurance.

Of the classes reviewed, these are insured by an insurance provider
that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.series 2004-R10's class
      A-1 ('AA (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.

      ('AA').

   -- Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corp.series 2005-5's class II-
      A1D2 ('CCC (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal
      Corp. ('AA').

The reviewed transactions also have two other classes that were
insured by a rated insurance provider when the deal was originated,
but S&P Global Ratings has since withdrawn the rating on the
insurance provider of those classes.

The rating actions reflect the application of S&P's interest-only
(IO) criteria, which provide that S&P will maintain the current
ratings on an IO class until all of the classes that the IO
security references are either lowered to below 'AA- (sf)' or have
been retired, at which time S&P will withdraw our ratings on these
IO classes.  The ratings on each of these classes have been
affected by recent rating actions on the reference classes, upon
which their notional balances are based.

A criteria interpretation for the above mentioned criteria was
issued to clarify that when the criteria state "we will maintain
the current ratings," it means that we will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
before the release of this criteria.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

The upgrades include seven ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/severe delinquency trends
      (greater than 90 days delinquent, including foreclosures and

      real estate-owned assets);
   -- Increased credit support (subordination, excess spread, or
      overcollateralization, where applicable) relative to S&P's
      projected losses; and/or
   -- S&P's principal-only (PO) criteria.

The upgrades on classes A-1, A-3, and A-5 from Residential Asset
Securitization Trust 2003-A13 reflect a decrease in S&P's projected
losses and its belief that its projected credit support for the
affected classes will be sufficient to cover its revised projected
losses at these rating levels.  S&P has decreased its projected
losses because there have been fewer reported severe delinquencies
during the most recent performance periods compared with those
reported during the previous review dates.  Severe delinquencies
decreased to 4.8% as of November 2016 from 8.8% as of February
2014.  The PO strip rating was raised commensurate with the
lowest-rated senior class within the structure.

S&P raised its rating on class B from Asset Backed Securities Corp.
Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2001-HE3 to 'B- (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' because the class experienced increased credit support to
25.9% as of November 2016 from 22.6% as of February 2016, and S&P
believes this class is no longer vulnerable to default.  In
addition, S&P raised its ratings from 'CCC (sf)' on the following
classes from the same transaction because the classes experienced
increased credit support, and S&P believes these classes are no
longer vulnerable to default.

   -- Credit support for class M1 increased to 32.5% as of October

      2016 from 29.7% as of February 2016 ('BB+ (sf)'); and

   -- Credit support for class M2 increased to 29.6% as of October

      2016 from 26.9% as of February 2016 ('B+ (sf)').

S&P also raised the ratings of class M-6 from Accredited Mortgage
Loan Trust 2004-4 and class I-A2 from Opteum Mortgage Acceptance
Corp. series 2005-5 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because S&P
believes these classes are no longer virtually certain to default,
primarily owing to the improved performance of the collateral
backing this transaction.  However, the 'CCC (sf)' ratings indicate
that S&P believes that its projected credit support will remain
insufficient to cover its projected losses for these classes and
that the classes are still vulnerable to defaulting.  

                             DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include one rating that was lowered three notches.
S&P lowered its rating on one class to speculative-grade ('BB+
(sf)' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB- (sf)' or higher).
Another two of the lowered ratings remained at an investment-grade
level, while the remaining six downgraded classes already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect one or
more of:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Erosion of credit support; and/or
   -- S&P's PO criteria.

The downgrade on class NB-2 from RALI Series 2002-QS17 Trust
reflects the increase in S&P's projected losses and its belief that
the projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover the projected losses we applied at the
previous rating levels.  The increase in S&P's projected losses is
due to higher reported delinquencies during the most recent
performance periods compared with those reported during the
previous review dates.  Severe delinquencies increased to 10.6% as
of October 2016 from 8.5% as of May 2014, and loss severities
increased to 129% from 33% during the same time period.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                             WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on classes A-4, A-5, A-6, B-1, B-2, B-3,
A-X, and PO from Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2002-A13
because the related pool has a small number of loans remaining.
Once a pool has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there
is a high degree of credit instability that is incompatible with
any rating level.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.


[] Moody's Hikes $124.8MM Scratch-and-Dent RMBS Issued 2004-2007
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 17 tranches
issued from six transactions backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-C

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-D

Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series
2004-A

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-SC1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of increasing credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[] Moody's Hikes $174.6MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 21 tranches
from eight transactions issued by various issuers, and backed by
subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE2

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2004-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ1 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-7, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ4 Trust

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2004-NC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC8

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2014 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Developing on Dec 02, 2016)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds and/or improvements in pool
performance and pool expected losses. The actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[] Moody's Takes Action on $154.9MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2

Cl. I-A1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR8

Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR16 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades for Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2 and
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR8 are primarily due to the
distribution of funds related to the $1.125 billion Citigroup RMBS
settlement. The rating upgrades for Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed
Securities 2005-AR16 Trust reflect the bond specific credit
enhancement available to classes 1-A-1 and 1-A-2

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
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then-ending.

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                            *********

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Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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